Pa Uas

Inspiring Innovation with Integrity
PEMASARAN AGRIBISNIS
AGB 133C sks 2(2-0)
Program Studi Agribisnis

Departemen Agribisnis FEM IPB
2022
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Pertemuan ke-8
Pasar Berjangka (Market Over Time)
&
Strategi Pengelolaan Risiko Pasar
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Harga Komoditas Pertanian

Berfluktuasi dari waktu ke waktu
Harga Cabai
80,000
Dec
70,000
Aug
60,000
IDR Nov
50,000
Jan
40,000
30,000
20,000 Jun Dec

Aug
10,000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: Ministry of Trade, Indonesia (2019)
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Harga Komoditas Pertanian

Berfluktuasi dari waktu ke waktu
Harga Telur Ayam
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Mengapa Market Over Time?

(Pasar Berjangka)
Ciri umum produk on farm:
1. Variasi bentuk, rasa, ukuran, warna,
tingkat kematangan
2. Banyak varietas Oleh karena produksi musiman
3. Perishable (cepat busuk)
4. Bulky (besar sekali)
 Sedangkan konsumsi bersifat
5. Voluminous
6. Harga murah
kontinyu; dengan demikian
 Perlu mengalokasikan,
Ciri umum produksi on farm: mengolah dan menyimpan
1. Tergantung alam (lahan, air, suhu, produk agribisnis sehingga
kelembaban, CH, SM) tersedia bagi konsumen sesuai
2. Gestation period dengan waktu yang diinginkan
3. Risiko HPT konsumen.
4. Musiman
5. Membutuhkan banyak tenaga kerja
6. Membutuhkan lahan yang luas
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Pentingnya Perdagangan Berjangka

 Perbedaan waktu atau gap antara produksi dan konsumsi
ini menimbulkan risiko kehilangan secara fisik karena
penyusutan atau penyimpanan dan risiko fluktuasi atau
perubahan harga.
 Contoh : perusahaan pengalengan mangga harus
bergantung pada musim mangga (bahan baku). Jika
membeli mangga dalam jumlah banyak saat musimnya dan
menyimpan untuk waktu lama (demi full capacity), maka
biaya penyimpanan akan tinggi karena cepat busuk
sehingga butuh cold storage yang mahal  lebih baik
melakukan strategi perdagangan berjangka misal
melakukan kontrak future trading (Kontrak Perdagangan
Berjangka)
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Strategi market over time

• Hedger and investor/speculator
1. Future trading • Grading, standardization, market information
2. Warehouse • Product  durable good (>3 months)

• Debtor, creditor, warehouse manager
receipt
• share
3. Share Leasing • Mechanism
• Product
4. Insurance • Premium, subsidy and indemnity
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Ad 1. Future Trading
Perdagangan Berjangka Komoditi
 Fluktuasi harga dapat diatasi melalui perdagangan
secara kontrak atau yang akan datang (future trading).
 Future Trading (Future Market) adalah suatu lembaga
yang diorganisir dimana pembeli dan penjual
menggunakannya untuk transaksi yang akan datang
 The Futures Contract adalah perjanjian yang dibuat
untuk mengorganisir pertukaran melalui pembelian or
penjualan dari sejumlah komoditi tertentu pada Future
Trading (FT) dengan harga tertentu untuk penyerahan
komoditi yang akan datang
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 FT Adalah segala sesuatu yang berkaitan jual beli komoditas

dengan penarikan margin dengan penyelesaian kemudian
berdasarkan kontrak berjangka, kontrak derivatif syariah
dan atau kontrak derivatif lainnya (UU No. 10/2011)
 Manfaat Perdagangan Berjangka Komoditi sebagai sarana:
 Pengelolaan Risiko (Risk Management) melalui kegiatan
Lindung Nilai (Hedging),
 Sarana pembentukan harga (Price Discovery), dan
 Sebagai alternatif investasi (Investment Enhancement).
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• Ketetapan dalam kontrak :
1. Kontrak berdasarkan kualitas dan harga tertentu
2. Melibatkan transaksi pada bulan dan tahun tertentu
3. Ada ketetapan untuk pengiriman atau pembebasan kontrak
4. Kontrak dijamin ketetapan pelaksanaannya (clearing house,
adalah agen yang ditetapkan sebagai intermediarry buyer
seller)
• Produsen (petani/prosesor) di FT yang melakukan lindung nilai
(hedging) disebut hedger, sedangkan yang memanfaatkan
pergerakan harga disebut investor or spekulator.
• Indonesia memiliki Bappebti (Badan Pengawas Perdagangan
Berjangka Komoditi) di bawah Kementerian Perdagangan RI
yang mengawasi Perdagangan Berjangka Komoditas di Bursa
Berjangka Komoditas
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Hedging (Perlindungan Nilai/Harga)

• Berbeda dengan spekulan, hedger (petani) berusaha melindungi diri
terhadap perubahan harga dimasa datang.
• Kalau spekulan berkeinginan mengambil risiko tambahan dengan
mencari keuntungan dari perubahan harga (seperti motif capital gain
dalam jual beli saham)
• Seorang petani yang menanam jagung dan menunggu panennya. Ia

telah mengetahui biaya penanaman (mengolah lahan, memupuk, biaya
tenaga kerja), tetapi dia tidak mengetahui dengan pasti berapa produksi
jagung yang akan dipanennya, tergantung cuaca. Ia juga tidak tahu
berapa harga yang pasti pada saat panen, tergantung kondisi supply dan
demand pada saat panen.
• Jadi petani menghadapi risiko produksi dan risiko harga.
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Risiko Petani
• Risiko kuantitas : gagal panen karena cuaca, iklim,
dan sebagainya  petani rugi  harga melambung
karena langka  masyarakat rugi membeli mahal
• Risiko harga : Jika tidak gagal panen tetapi harga

rendah  petani rugi karena harga rendah 
masyarakat diuntungkan
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Standardisasi, Grading dan Informasi Pasar
• Dampak dari KARAKTERISTIK PRODUK dan PRODUKSI, untuk

meningkatkan profit, perlu grading dan standarisasi.
• Grading adalah klasifikasi dari setiap atau sejumlah produk

berdasarkan kualitas tertentu, pemilahan dari produk-produk
yang kategorinya tidak seragam ke yang seragam. Produk
agribisnis yang kualitas berdasarkan grade dan standar
tertentu (ISO, ISN) meningkatkan efisiensi teknis dan harga
 profit ?
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• Standarisasi adalah sifat umum yang diterima dan membuat diferensiasi

(berbeda) dari nilai produk yang diterima pelanggan atau di mata pembeli.
• Dimensi standardisasi adalah semua atribut produk yang standardisasi
diterima dengan baik atau tidak oleh pelanggan, misal berat per unit, tingkat
kematangan, warna, kadar kotoran, tingkat kehalusan, dll.
• Standarisasi pangan dapat bersifat psikologis, misal kandungan nutrisi,
selera, rasa, dan lain-lain
• Memungkinkan menjual produk-produk agribisnis melalui contoh (sample
terstandarisasi);
• Grading dan standardisasi mengurangi biaya (transaksi dan mencari)  harga
yang kompetitif akan terwujud.
• Syarat pada pasar berjangka (future trading), basis standar dan grade
tertentu.
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Beberapa Kriteria Grade dan Standardisasi
1. Standard harus karakteristiknya mudah dikenal, grade berorentasi pada

penggunaan nilai opini
2. Standard harus berdasarkan karakteristik yang seragam, konsisten, mudah
diinterpretasikan
3. Standard harus mempergunakan faktor-faktor dan terminologi yang
membuat grade mempunyai arti dan manfaat sebanyak mungkin
4. Standard dan grades harus sama kriterianya antara konsumen dengan
produsen
5. Biaya operasional dari grading / standard harus murah dan sehingga
efisiensi
• Contoh grade
1. A,B,C, waste, dengan standarisasi A yaitu : minimal diameter, berat, warna
kulit, dsb
2. A,B, C,D
3. A,B
Baik, buruk
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Contoh Spesifikasi Biji Kakao

Standar Kualitas Nasional (SNI)
GRADE KADAR AIR KOTORAN BIJI / 100 Jamur (%)
(%) (%) gram
GRADE AA 6-7 0 Max. 85 1-2
GRADE A 7-8 2 85-100 0
GRADE B 7.5 2.5 101-110 4
GRADE C 8-9 3-4 111-120 ≥4
REJECTED ≥10 ≥5 ≥120 ≥5-6
Sumber : Manual Post Harvest Cocoa Bean Quality and Fermentation, Swiss Contact, 2013
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orange
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Informasi Pasar
• Informasi pasar atau intelijen pasar merupakan fungsi

fasilitas dalam pendekatan fungsi-fungsi tataniaga
produk agribisnis.
• Informasi pasar yang diperlukan harus akurat dan
tepat waktu, agar mempunyai manfaat maksimal
• Kasus kedelai di Lamongan : harga ditentukan
pengumpul kabupaten dan pengolah. Informasi
disebarkan terlebih dahulu diantara mereka, baru
diturunkan ke petani  berdampak petani hanyalah
price taker yang tertindas.
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• Informasi harus memiliki kriteria :
1. Informasi harus lengkap dan komprehensif
2. Informasi harus relevan dan standardisasi dipergunakan
3. Informasi harus tepat waktu dan seimbang antara tingkat pasar atau partisipan
• Informasi yang dimiliki diantara partisipan akan menyeimbangkan kekuatan (power)
• Informasi harus dicari, informasi harga antar pasar, antar waktu dapat berbeda-beda
sehingga hrs dicari, tetapi ini ada biaya. Oleh sebab itu harus diperhitungkan antara
manfaat yang diharapkan (the expected savings) dengan biaya mencari informasi (the
cost of search). Sampai batas mana ?
• Contoh, petani berencana mencari benih unggul :
 Kios A (5km)
cost = Rp 10 000 (biaya pulsa, membeli koran, dan ongkos mencari informasi)
benefit = tersedia beragam brand, type, price
 Kios B (20km)
benefit = tersedia beragam brand, type, price, varietas, ready stock
 Kios C (80 km)
benefit = tersedia beragam brand, type, price, varietas, ready stock, insurance,
jaminan uang kembali, free ongkir
Benefit and cost ? Ke Kios mana petani akan membeli benih ?
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Informasi Pasar
Contoh, petani berencana menjual mangganya :
 Tengkulak (0km, tengkulak dating sendiri)
cost = Rp 10 000 (biaya pulsa dan ongkos mencari informasi)
benefit = cepat datang, uang tunai, berani memborong, P=Rp3000
 Koperasi (1km)
benefit = SHU, uang tunai, harga lebih tinggi, berani memborong tapi minta
digrade, P=Rp2000, Rp3000, Rp4000
 Pabrik jus (2km)
benefit = harga lebih tinggi, uang tunai, tapi tidak mau memborong, grade A
P=5500
 Pasar tradisional kabupaten (3km)
benefit = harga lebih tinggi, uang tunai, berani memborong, P=Rp 4500
 Retail modern (4km)
benefit = harga lebih tinggi, uang tidak tunai, tapi minta degrade, P=Rp3000, Rp
5000, Rp 6000
Kemana petani akan menjual mangganya ?
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Informasi Pasar
• Ada tiga jenis Informasi pasar yaitu Market News, Market Outlook
and Advertising
1. Market News : berita pasar. Merupakan informasi apa adanya tentang harga,
stok, kondisi pasar dan lain-lain. Biasanya informasi ini data harian, mingguan
atau jam.
2. Market Outlook merupakan ramalan atau prediksi kondisi pasar yang akan
datang (future). Data apa adanya (market News), diolah (melalui statistika
dan lain-lain), ditafsirkan sehingga standardisasi membuat perencanaan dan
estimasi.
3. Advertising (Iklan), ada dua jenis :
 Generic Advertising, iklan yang dilakukan oleh kelompok atau grup peusahaan yang
produknya searah, misal susu dan produk olahannya. Mencoba menggeser kurva demand ke
kanan untuk memperluas permintaan atau pasar, disebut juga Nonbrand Institutional
Advertising atau national brand. GEMARIKAN. GO ORGANIC, GERNAS KAKAO, MARI
SARAPAN
 Brand Advertising, promosi iklan yang dilakukan oleh PERUSAHAAN TERTENTU secara
individu. Iklan ini tidak hanya mencoba meningkatkan permintaan tetapi juga mencoba
membuat permintaan PRODUK MEREKA lebih inelastis (pelanggan fanatik).
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Informasi Pasar
• GENERIK ADVERTISING (NATIONAL BRAND):

1. Pentingnya makan 4 sehat 5 sempurna 
mendongkrak omzet susu berbagai merk
2. pentingnya merencanakan kelahiran (KB)
P
 mendongkrak omzet berbagai alat Brand ad
kontrasepsi berbagai merk generic ad
3. Peringatan jangan membuang sampah
sembarangan  mendongkrak omzet
sabun cuci tangan cair berbagai merk
• BRAND ADVERTISING (PRIVATE BRAND):
• PT Unilever  brand : lux, lifebuoy, sunsilk
Q
• PT Toyota  innova, avanza, fortuner, rush
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P
 Generic Advertising, iklan yang dilakukan oleh kelompok
atau grup peusahaan yang produknya searah, misal susu
dan produk olahannya. Mencoba menggeser kurva demand
ke kanan untuk memperluas permintaan atau pasar, disebut
juga Nonbrand Institutional Advertising atau national
brand.
 Contoh : Gerakan 4 sehat 5 sempurna berdampak demand
susu meningkat (semua merek) dari Qdo ke Qd1.
pergeseran demand disebabkan ; selera
Qd1
Qdo Q
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P
 Brand Advertising, promosi iklan yang dilakukan oleh
PERUSAHAAN TERTENTU secara individu. Iklan ini tidak hanya
mencoba meningkatkan permintaan tetapi juga mencoba membuat
permintaan PRODUK MEREKA lebih inelastis (pelanggan fanatik).
 Dengan kurva demand yang lebih inelastic (pergeseran dari Qdo ke
Qd1) maka konsumen dianggap lebih setia (loyal/fanatic) karena
jika harga naik dua kali lipat (100%) dari Po ke P1, konsumen tetap
saja mau membeli, walaupun pembelian berkurang namun turunnya
sangat sedikit.
Qd1
P1
Qdo
Po
Q
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Ad. 2. SISTEM RESI GUDANG

(Warehouse Receipt System)
1. Definisi
• Sistem Resi Gudang adalah Kegiatan yang berkaitan
dengan Penerbitan, Pengalihan, Penjaminan dan
Penyelesaian Transaksi Resi Gudang.
• Resi Gudang adalah Dokumen Bukti Kepemilikan atas
barang yang disimpan di gudang yang diterbitkan oleh
pengelola gudang.
• Barang adalah Setiap benda bergerak yang standardisasi
disimpan dalam jangka waktu tertentu dan
diperdagangkan secara umum.
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SISTEM RESI GUDANG
2. Unsur-unsur resi gudang

a. Pemegang Resi Gudang adalah :
1) Pemilik barang (ex. petani) atau
2) pihak yang menerima pengalihan dari pemilik barang (ex. petani)
atau
3) pihak lain yang menerima pengalihan lebih lanjut.
b. Pengelola Gudang adalah Pihak yang melakukan usaha

pergudangan, baik gudang milik sendiri maupun milik orang
lain, yang melakukan penyimpanan, pemeliharaan dan
pengawasan barang yang disimpan oleh pemilik barang
(ex.petani) serta berhak menerbitkan Resi Gudang.
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SISTEM RESI GUDANG
3. Pengertian Hak Jaminan Atas Resi

Gudang
• Resi dapat menjadi jaminan hutang
petani kepada kreditur.
• Hak Jaminan atas Resi Gudang adalah
Hak Jaminan yang dibebankan pada Resi
Gudang untuk pelunasan utang (ex.
petani) yang memberikan kedudukan
untuk diutamakan bagi penerima hak
jaminan terhadap kreditur yang lain
(Pasal 1 angka (9) UU SRG)
• Hak Jaminan dalam undang-undang ini
meliputi klaim asuransi dalam hal barang
sebagaimana tersebut dalam Resi
Gudang diasuransikan
• (Penjelasan Pasal 12 ayat (1) UU SRG)
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4. Para Pihak Dalam Jaminan Resi Gudang
a. Kreditur yang menerima jaminan dan akan

menyimpan Resi Gudang sebagai jaminan dari
Debitur, ex. petani
b. Debitur yang menyerahkan Resi Gudang sebagai
dokumen bukti kepemilikan atas barang yang
disimpan di dalam gudang.
c. Pengelola Gudang yang mengelola barang-barang
debitur yang ditaruh di dalam gudang.
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SISTEM RESI GUDANG
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SISTEM RESI GUDANG
Petani
pemilik
resi
(debitur)
Pengelola
Kreditur/
resi
bank
gudang
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SISTEM RESI GUDANG
Resi Gudang: Pembiayaan & Perlindungan Harga

Percontohan: Lampung (lada, kopi); Jawa Barat (gabah); Jawa Tengah (gabah dan jagung);
Jawa timur (gabah, jagung, kedelai); dan Sulawesi Selatan (gabah, kakao, Jagung, rumput laut),
dan lain-lain
PENILAIAN
KUALITAS
ORIENTASI
EKSPOR
KOMODITAS PENGERINGAN - KOMODITAS PENGELOLA

MENTAH/ASALAN SORTASI- SIAP SIMPAN GUDANG
PRA-PANEN MASA-PANEN PASCA-PANEN KONSUMSI

dalam NEGERI /
KETAHANAN
PANGAN
DEP. PERTANIAN; BPPT,

DEPDAG
KEM. KOPERASI PEMDA,
– BAPPEBTI, BI
& UKM SWASTA
Pengurangan ketergantungan Alat panen, pengering, sortasi

SKEMA
• Mutu lebih baik;
petani/UKM kepada tengkulak SISTEM RESI
• Masa simpan lebih panjang;
(melalui skema pendanaan), GUDANG
• Harga terjamin/terlindung
penyediaan sarana dan faktor
produksi: pupuk, pestisida, dsb
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SISTEM RESI GUDANG
Contoh Dokumen Resi Gudang
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Ad.3. Sistem Bagi Hasil

(share leasing)
• Stakeholder :
1. Petani penyakap : petani tidak punya lahan, mengelola lahan tuan
tanah dengan system bagi hasil.
2. Penyewa : petani tidak punya lahan, mengelola lahan tuan tanah
dengan membayar sewa lahan.
3. Buruh tani : bukan pengusahataniTuan tanah : memiliki lahan tetapi
tidak ikut mengelola
4. Tuan tanah : memiliki lahan tetapi tidak ikut mengelola
5. Petani pemilik penggarap : memiliki lahan dan menggarap sendiri
• Sistem :
1. Maro : (1:1)
2. Mertelu : (1:3)
3. Biaya panen : (5:1)
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Sistem Bagi Hasil kasus Tesang Sawah di

Sulawesi Selatan
Sistem profit sharing dan loss sharing dengan 3 tipe :
• Tipe 1 (3:1) ; yaitu pemilik lahan memeroleh imbalan bagi hasil
yang lebih besar daripada penggarap lahan karena memiliki
kewajiban yang lebih besar (biaya input produksi dan menyiapkan
lahan), sedangkan penggarap menyiapkan tenaga kerja.
• Tipe 2 (1:1); yaitu pemilik dan penggarap lahan memeroleh
imbalan yang sama rata. Pemilik lahan sharing lahan dan bibit,
penggarap sharing factor produksi lainnya.
• Tipe 3 (1:3); yakni penggarap lahan memeroleh imbangan yang
lebih besar daripada pemilik lahan. Pemilik lahan sharing lahan,
penggarap sharing factor produksi lainnya.
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Ad. 4. Asuransi Pertanian

• UU No. 2 Tahun 1992 tentang Usaha Perasuransian
 Asuransi adalah perjanjian antara dua pihak atau lebih,
dengan mana pihak penanggung mengikatkan diri kepada
tertanggung, dengan menerima premi asuransi, untuk
memberikan penggantian kepada tertanggung karena
kerugian, kerusakan atau kehilangan keuntungan yang
diharapkan atau tanggung jawab hukum pihak ketiga yang
mungkin akan diderita tertanggung, yang timbul dari suatu
peristiwa yang tidak pasti, atau memberikan suatu
pembayaran yang didasarkan atas meninggal atau hidupnya
seseorang yang dipertanggungkan.
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Asuransi sering digunakan oleh petani untuk tujuan
menanggulangi risiko atas hasil (juga penerimaan) pertanian,
dan sudah sangat banyak digunakan di luar pertanian seperti
properti, kesehatan dan kendaraan.
• Bagi kepentingan individu asuransi bagai pertukaran sesuatu
yang pasti dari sedikit uang premi untuk sebuah perlindungan
dari yang tidak pasti namun berpotensi besar standardisasi
menimbulkan kerugian (loss).
• Pembayaran ganti rugi diberikan dengan besaran sesuai pilihan
petani atas jaminan asuransi yang diset oleh perusahaan
asuransi.
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Seseorang harus memperhitungkan berapa besar pertanggungan
asuransi standardisasi mengganti kehilangan/kerugian yang
terjadi.
• Satu kunci karakter pasar asuransi adalah konsep risk pooling
yaitu gabungan peluang risiko yang terjadi pada banyak orang
yang berkontribusi melalui pembayaran premi sebagai dana
bersama, yang mana dana tersebut digunakan untuk membayar
kerugian setiap orang yang berada pada pool (kumpulan orang)
tersebut (Ray).
• Dalam hal market failure pemerintahlah yang melakukan program
multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI = asuransi tanaman multi-
ancaman bencana).
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Idenya adalah karena produksi tanaman memiliki multi-ancaman

bencana alam, seperti kekeringan, banjir, penyakit dan sebagainya
pada cakupan wilayah yang sangat luas.
• Hal ini sangat sulit bagi perusahaan swasta, karena banyaknya
ancaman kegagalan (Miranda and Glauber; Ray).
• Alasan lain MPCI oleh swasta gagal karena petani telah merespon
sendiri risiko dengan cara diversifikasi produksi dan meredam
konsumsi melalui tabungan dan pinjaman yang mengurangi efek
asuransi dan mengakibatkan asuransi tidak menarik bagi petani.
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Faktor lain yang juga merupakan masalah yang signifikan dalam

MPCI adalah moral hazartd (buruk moral) dan adverse
selection (pilihan merugikan).
• Moral hazard misalnya upaya secara sengaja petani
membiarkan dan mempercepat tanaman kena bencana
setelah mereka membeli polis asuransi.
• Adverse selection dilakukan petani yang sengaja membeli
polis asuransi karena sudah mengetahui informasi bencana
yang akan melanda daerahnya.
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Kompensasi/ ganti rugi yang diterima petani akibat kerusakan
usahanya :
Indemnity = Max [(Guaranteed Yield – Actual Yield),0] * Price Guarantee
• Perusahaan asuransi menentukan harga pada produknya untuk

menutup biaya overhead, biaya produksi, dan penstandardisasian
yang diinginkan.
• Besar premi yang ditentukan sesuai dengan persamaan berikut :
Premium = (Actuarially Fair Premium + Administrative Cost) > Expected Indemnity
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Contoh :
 Diasumsikan seorang petani kedelai memiliki suatu APH
(Actual Production History) 12 ton per ha dan memilih
hasil produksi yang dicover asuransi adalah 75 persen.
Jadi yang dijamin adalah 8 ton per ha (75% x 12 ton).
Jika produksi aktual adalah 5 ton per ha, maka
indemnity akan dibayarkan untuk produksi 3 ton (8 – 5
ton). Jika petani memilih harga kedelai Rp 5.000,00/kg,
maka indemnity yang diterima petani adalah sebesar Rp
15.000.000,00 ( 3 ton x Rp 5.000,00/kg).  AUTP ???
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Federasi MPCI menyediakan empat jenis subsidi, yaitu :
(1) Premium subsidy
(2) Delivery expense reimbursement
(3) Reinsurance
(4) Excess losses
• Premi yang dibebankan kepada petani dengan adanya subsidi

adalah :
Premium = (Actuarially Fair Premium – Premium Subsidy) < Expected Indemnity
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Perusahaan yang telah melaksanakan program asuransi
di Indonesia, antara lain :
1. Koperasi Persusuan Bandung Selatan (KPBS)
a) Santunan kematian ternak
b) Santunan kematian anggota atau suami atau istri anggota
c) Santunan asuransi untuk karyawan dan pengurus
2. PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (PT Jasindo)
a) Subsistem pengadaan sarana produksi: pabrik pupuk, alat-alat
pertanian
b) Subsistem pengolahan: pabrik gula, pabrik tekstil
c) Subsistem budidaya pertanian: perkebunan besar pada
komoditi tertentu seperti teh, kopi, karet, kelapa sawit
Asuransi Pertanian
Tujuan program asuransi pertanian standardisasi dibagi

menjadi beberapa sasaran :
1.Bagi kelompok sasaran petani :

 Menyadarkan petani terhadap risiko gagal panen /peternakan
 Mendorong petani meningkatkan keterampilan dan
memeperbaiki manajemen usaha pertanian
 Mengurangi ketergantungan petani akan permodalam yang
berasal dari pihak lain dan membantu petani menyediakan biaya
produksi atau modal usaha peternakan
 Meningkatkan penstandardisasian petani dari keberhasilan usaha
pertanian/peternakan secara berkelanjutan
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Asuransi Pertanian
2. Bagi kelompok sasaran pemerintah daerah :
 Meningkatkan kesadaran dan tanggung jawab aparat Pemda

tentang pentingnya antisipasi risiko usaha pertanian di daerahnya
 Membantu menyediakan sarana dan akses permodalan bagi
petani jika mengalami risiko usaha pertanian atau terjadi gagal
panen/peternakan
 Membantu pembangunan ekonomi regional melalui cabang
usaha bisnis asuransi
 Meningkatkan keberhasilan usaha pertanian/peternakan, serta
ketahanan dan keamanan pangan regional
 Membuka peluang penyerapan tenaga kerja baru
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Komoditas pertanian yang standardisasi
diasuransikan
 Seperti kebanyakan aset dan produksi, tanaman dapat diasuransikan thd
bahaya apa saja, ttp semua ada harganya. Dalam situasi dimana
keuntungan usaha berbagai komoditas pertanian sangat marjinal, keadaan
menjadi berbalik. Keuntungan marjinal mendorong kebutuhan akan
manajemen risiko termasuk asuransi, tetapi juga mengurangi kemampuan
membeli perlindungan yang diperlukannya.
 Asuransi usaha tanaman pangan bersifat musiman, kerusakan atau kerugian
berhubungan dengan satu musim tanam untuk menyederhanakan
penilaian kerugian. Secara umum, semakin tinggi nilai komoditas tanaman,
semakin tinggi pula permintaan asuransi. Komoditas bernilai ekonomi tinggi
biasanya dibiayai dengan fasilitas perbankan yang mengharuskannya untuk
diasuransikan. Subsektor tanaman pangan, hortikultura, perkebuanan, dan
peternakan layak diasuransikan.
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Contoh hipotetik premi berdasarkan jenis komoditi dan bencana yang diasuransikan
Komoditi Bencana : Umur tanaman % kerusakan : Premi untuk Ganti rugi untuk
1. Banjir saat bencana : 1. <50% satu macam satu macam
2. Kekeringan 1. <30HST 2. 50-75% bencana : bencana:
3. Hama 2. 30-60HST 3. >75%
4. Penyakit 3. >60HST
Padi 1 3 3 100 000 6 000 000
2 1 3 120 000 7 000 000
2 3 2 120 000 7 000 000
3 2 3 130 000 8 000 000
Jagung 1 3 3 100 000 6 000 000
Kedelai 2 1 3 120 000 7 000 000
Bawang 2 3 2 300 000 60 000 000
merah
Bawang 3 2 3 350 000 80 000 000
putih
Cabai 1 3 3 200 000 40 000 000
besar
Cabai 4 3 3 250 000 50 000 000
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Jenis risiko usaha pertanian utama
yang dapat diasuransikan
 Kekeringan (drought) : kekeringan merupakan peristiwa cuaca yang kerap
terjadi di negara tropis. Time of impact dan wilayah yang terkena dampak
(geographical area) memerlukan batasan yang jelas. Kekeringan
standardisasi terjadi dalam waktu yang lama dan dampaknya bahkan
dialami hingga musin tanam berikutnya. Kekeringan standardisasi
diperparah oleh penyebab lain seperti penyakit tanaman yang menyerang
tanaman yang stress akibat kekurangan air. Kerusakan karena kekeringan
adalah risiko usahatani dan standardisasi diasuransikan.
 Banjir (flood) : kerusakan akibat banjir standardisasi disebabkan curah hujan
yang berlebihan, ttp bisa juga disebabkan oleh kelebihan air di daerah lain
dalam bentuk luapan air sungai atau danau yang mengalir ke lahan
pertanian. Risiko banjir pada dasarnya standardisasi diasuransikan, dengan
pengecualian lahan pertanian yang tidak cukup didukung drainase atau
saluran pembuangan air tidak terawat,atau lahan pertanian berada pada
kontur dataran rendah sehingga rawan tergenang banjir.
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Asuransi Pertanian
• Organisme pengganggu tanaman (OPT) : yang mencakup hama
tumbuhan dan penyakit tumbuhan. Risiko serangan OPT sangat
bervariasi menurut jenis hama atau penyakit serta menurut wilayah
dan intensitas serangan. Risiko yang ditanggung dalam program
asuransi pertanian harus dicantumkan dalam surat perjanjian
kerjasama antara pihak-pihak yang bekerjasama untuk dipatuhi
bersama.
• Kematian ternak (sapi, ayam, dll
• Kehilangan ternak
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STRATEGI DAN LANGKAH-LANGKAH OPERASIONAL

KELOMPOK KERJA PELAKSANA
• Skema asuransi diawali dengan prakarsa pemerintah pusat ttg perlindungan

petani dari gagal panen/puso akibat :
1. Banjir
2. Kekeringan
3. Serangan OPT
4. Kematian/kehilangan ternak
• Tiga pihak yang terlibat :

1. Pemerintah: Dg membentuk POKJA asuransi pertanian tingkat pusat dan
anggotanya wakil2 instansi/asosiasi/pihak terkait. Di level provinsi dan Kab,
belum mengambil langkah sesuai inisitaif pemr pusat. Keanggotaan perlu
dilengkapi tokoh panutan, pemerhati, praktisi, asosiasi, LSM
2. Petani : poktan/gapoktan  komunikasi internal dan eksternal
3. Perusahaan asuransi : memperluas cakupan bisnis/variasi produk dg
learning by doing dalam crops insurance
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Premi dan penutupan skema asuransi pertanian
• Premi: biaya yang harus dibayar petani untuk

menstandardisasikan perlindungan asuransi dan memperoleh
ganti rugi jika gagal panen. Sumber premi :
1. Pemerintah (APBN/APBD)
2. Kemitraan (PKBL, BUMN, swasta)
3. Perbankan
4. Swadaya petani
• Besar premi : 2.5% sd 3.5% dari harga pertanggungan (yang
ditetapkan berdasarkan biaya produksi sesuai jenis komoditi)
 keputusan premi per musim
• Polis: dokumen kesepakatan perjanjian kerjasama yang isinya
harus dipatuhi oleh kedua pihak
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Mekanisme
Pelaksanaan
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Mekanisme klaim/ganti rugi penutupan :

verifikasi, disetujui
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TERIMA KASIH
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AGB 133C sks 2(2-0)

2022
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Pertemuan ke-9
Structure Conduct
Performance
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Overview ➔ Industry Analysis
7-3
I. Market Structure : Measures of Industry Concentration

1. Number and size of firms.
2. Industry concentration.
3. Technological and cost conditions.
4. Demand conditions.
5. Ease of entry and exit.
6. Product condition : homogenus or differentiated
7. Market / Industry Information
II. Conduct : Pricing Behavior, Integration and Merger Activity
1. Pricing.
2. Advertising.
3. R&D.
4. Merger activity
III. Performance : Dansby-Willig Index, Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
1. Profitability.
2. Social welfare
IV. Preview of Coming Attractions
Pendekatan S-C-P adalah pendekatan organisasi pasar yang mencakup atau mengkombinasikan semua aspek dari sistem
tataniaga yaitu S (market structure), C (market conduct) dan P (market performance).
Approaches to Studying Industry
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm: Causal View
Market Market Market P

Structure Conduct Performance C
P
S
C
The Feedback Critique
• No one-way causal link. S
• Conduct can affect market structure.
• Market performance can affect conduct as well as market structure.
Large scale
Contoh
Market Structure ; Market Conduct Market Performance :

monopoly : price maker high profit
• Diskriminasi • Investment : scale, technology

• Inovasi /R&D ➔ ingredients,
packaging, distribution, promotion

• No one-way causal link.
Sructure (S), conduct (C), dan performance (P) dalam suatu waktu berada pada sistem
dimana S dan C adalah faktor penentu dari P, dilain waktu S dan C ditentukan oleh P. Hal ini
menunjukkan suatu sistem dinamis yang mengembangkan respon penyesuaian dari
perusahaan terhadap kondisi pasar dan keadaan yang memungkinkan.
• Hubungan antara pembeli dan penjual adalah hub

kompetitif, setelah ada kesepakatan (hub negosiasi),
terjadi transaksi.
• Hub kompetitif dan negosiasi diantara pembeli dan
penjual dicerminkan oleh Market Conduct (perilaku
pasar) yg terlihat dari strategi perusahaan
• Struktur pasar (Market Structure) didefinisikan sebagai
sifat-sifat organisasi pasar yg mempengaruhi perilaku
dan keragaan pasar (Market Conduct)
Relating the Porter Five Forces Model to the SCP Paradigm and the Feedback Critique
Free entry and exit • Entry Costs Entry • Network Effects

to industry • Speed of Adjustment • Reputation
• Sunk Costs • Switching Costs
• Economies of Scale • Government Restraints
Power of Input
Suppliers Power of Buyers Price maker
• Supplier Concentration • Buyer Concentration
Level, Growth, • Price/Value of Substitute
• Price/Productivity of Alternative
Inputs and Sustainability Products or Services
• Relationship-Specific • Relationship-Specific
Of Industry Profits Investments
Investments
• Supplier Switching Costs • Customer Switching Costs
• Government Restraints • Government Restraints
Product homogen
Industry Rivalry Substitutes & Complements
• Concentration • Price/Value of Surrogate • Network Effects
• Switching Costs
• Price, Quantity, Quality, or Products or Services • Government
• Timing of Decisions
Service Competition • Price/Value of Complementary Restraints
The number and • Information
• Degree of Differentiation Products or Services
size of the firm • Government
Restraints
1. Structure
Struktur pasar dapat diartikan sebagai karakteristik dari produk maupun institusi yang terlibat pada pasar tersebut yang
merupakan resultan atau saling mempengaruhi dari market conduct (perilaku pasar) dan market performance (keragaan
pasar). Struktur pasar dapat diartikan sebagai tipe atau jenis-jenis pasar.
1.1. Number and size of firm

Karakteristik Struktur Pasar
∑ Perusahaan Produk Penjual Pembeli
Banyak Standardisasi Pure Competition Pure Competition
Banyak Diferensiasi Monopolistic Competition Monopsonistic Competition

Sedikit Standardisasi Pure Oligopoly Pure Oligopsony
Sedikit Diferensiasi Diferensiasi Oligopoly Diferensiasi Oligopsony
Satu Unik Monopoly Monopsony
1.2. Industry Concentration
• Four-Firm Concentration Ratio
• The sum of the market shares of the top four firms in the defined industry. Letting Si denote sales for firm i and ST denote total
industry sales S
C4 = w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 , where w1 = i
ST
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
• The sum of the squared market shares of firms in a given industry, multiplied by 10,000: HHI = 10,000  S wi2, where wi = Si/ST.
• Example
There are five banks competing in a local market. Each of the five banks have a 20 percent market share.
a. What is the four-firm concentration ratio?
C4 = 0.2 + 0.2 + 0.2 + 0.2 = 0.8
b. What is the HHI?
(
HHI = 10,000 (.2) + (.2) + (.2) + (.2) + (.2)
2 2 2 2 2
) = 2,000
• Limitation of Concentration Measures
1. (Market Definition: National, regional, or local?
2. Global Market: Foreign producers excluded.
3. Industry definition and product classes.
1.3. Technology
• Industries differ regarding the technology used to produce goods and services.
• Some industries are labor intensive;
• Some industries are capital intensive;
• Other industries use a combination of labor and capital.
1.4. Measuring Demand and Market Conditions

The Rothschild Index (R) measures the elasticity of industry demand for a product relative to that of an
individual firm:
R = E T / EF .
ET = elasticity of demand for the total market.
EF = elasticity of demand for the product of an individual firm.
The Rothschild Index is a value between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly).
When an industry is composed of many firms, each producing similar products, the Rothschild index will
be close to zero.
Own-Price Elasticities of Demand and Rothschild Indices
Elasticity Elasticity
Industry of Market of Firm’s Rothschild
Demand Demand Index
Food -1.0 -3.8 0.26
Tobacco -1.3 -1.3 1.00
Textiles -1.5 -4.7 0.32
Apparel -1.1 -4.1 0.27
Paper -1.5 -1.7 0.88
Chemicals -1.5 -1.5 1.00
Rubber -1.8 -2.3 0.78
1.5.Market Entry and Exit Conditions

Barriers to entry
1. Capital requirements.
2. Patents and copyrights.
3. Economies of scale.
4. Economies of scope.
A. Perfect competition market
• What is a perfectly competitive market?
• What is marginal revenue? How is it related to total and average revenue?
• How does a competitive firm determine the quantity that maximizes profits?
• When might a competitive firm shut down in the short run? Exit the market in the long run?
• What does the market supply curve look like in the short run? In the long run?
Characteristics of Perfect Competition

1. Many buyers and many sellers.
2. The goods offered for sale are largely the same (homogneous)
3. Firms can freely enter or exit the market.
Because of 1 & 2, each buyer and seller is a “price taker” – takes the price as given.
The Revenue of a Competitive Firm

• Total revenue (TR) = P * Q
• Average revenue (AR) = TR/Q = P
• Marginal revenue (MR): The change in TR from selling one more unit. MR = ΔTR/ ΔQ
12
Calculating TR, AR, MR MR = P for a Competitive Firm
A competitive firm can keep
increasing its output without affecting
TR ∆TR the market price.
Q P TR = P x Q AR = MR =
Q ∆Q So, each one-unit increase in Q causes
revenue to rise by P, i.e., MR = P
0 $10 $0 n/a
$10
1 $10 $10 $10
$10 MR = P is only true for
2 $10 $20 $10
3 $10 $30 $10

$10 firms in competitive markets.
$10
4 $10 $40 $10 Profit Maximization
$10
5 $10 $50 $10 What Q maximizes the firm’s profit?
To find the answer, “think at the margin.”
Notice that
MR = P
If increase Q by one unit,
revenue rises by MR,
cost rises by MC.
If MR > MC, then increase Q to raise profit.
If MR < MC, then reduce Q to raise profit.
Profit Maximization
(continued from earlier exercise)
Profit = MR –
At any Q with MR > MC, Q TR TC Profit MR MC
MC
increasing Q raises 0 $0 $5 –$5
$10 $4 $6
profit. 1 10 9 1
10 6 4
2 20 15 5
At any Q with MR < MC, 10 8 2
3 30 23 7
reducing Q raises profit. 10 10 0
4 40 33 7
10 12 –2
5 50 45 5
At Qa, MC < MR. Costs

So, increase Q MC
to raise profit.
MC and the Firm’s Supply Decision At Qb, MC > MR.

So, reduce Q
Rule: MR = MC at the profit-maximizing Q. to raise profit. P1 MR
At Q1, MC = MR.
Changing Q
would lower profit.
Q
Qa Q1 Qb
FIRMS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 14

If price rises to P2, Costs
then the profit-
MC
maximizing quantity
rises to Q2. P2 MR2
The MC curve
determines the
firm’s Q at any price. P1 MR
Hence,
the MC curve is the
firm’s supply curve. Q
Q1 Q2

Shutdown vs. Exit
• Shutdown:
A short-run decision not to produce anything because of market conditions.
• Exit:
A long-run decision to leave the market.
• A key difference:
• If shut down in SR, must still pay FC.
• If exit in LR, zero costs.
A Firm’s Short-run Decision to Shut Down

• Cost of shutting down: revenue loss = TR
• Benefit of shutting down: cost savings = VC
(firm must still pay FC)
• So, shut down if TR < VC
• Divide both sides by Q: TR/Q < VC/Q
• So, firm’s decision rule is: Shut down if P < AVC

A Competitive Firm’s SR Supply Curve
The firm’s SR supply curve is the portion of its MC curve above AVC.
Costs
Costs
MC
MC
If P > AVC, then firm

produces Q where P = ATC
LRATC
MC.
If P < AVC, then firm

shuts down (produces Q
= 0). Q
Q
The firm’s LR supply curve is the portion of its MC curve above LRATC.

The Irrelevance of Sunk Costs
• Sunk cost: a cost that has already been committed and cannot be recovered
• Sunk costs should be irrelevant to decisions;
you must pay them regardless of your choice.
• FC is a sunk cost: The firm must pay its fixed costs whether it produces or shuts down.
• So, FC should not matter in the decision to shut down.
A Firm’s Long-Run Decision to Exit

Cost of exiting the market: revenue loss = TR
Benefit of exiting the market: cost savings = TC
(zero FC in the long run)
So, firm exits if TR < TC
Divide both sides by Q to write the firm’s decision rule as: Exit if P < ATC
A New Firm’s Decision to Enter Market
In the long run, a new firm will enter the market if it is profitable to do so: if TR > TC.
Divide both sides by Q to express the firm’s entry decision as:
Enter if P > ATC
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
Identifying a firm’s profit
A competitive firm
Determine this firm’s Costs, P
total profit.
MC
Identify the area on the P = $10 MR

graph that represents ATC
the firm’s profit.
$6
Q
50
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
Answers
A competitive firm
Costs, P
Profit per unit MC
= P – ATC
P = $10 MR
= $10 – 6
profit ATC
= $4
$6
Total profit
= (P – ATC) x Q
= $4 x 50
= $200 Q
50
ACTIVE LEARNING 3
Identifying a firm’s loss
A competitive firm
Determine Costs, P
this firm’s
MC
total loss, assuming
AVC < $3.
ATC
Identify the area on
the graph that $5
represents
the firm’s loss. P = $3 MR
Q
30
21
ACTIVE LEARNING 3
Answers
A competitive firm
Costs, P
Total loss MC
= (ATC – P) x Q
= $2 x 30 ATC
= $60
$5
loss loss per unit = $2
P = $3 MR
Q
30
22
Market Supply: Assumptions
1) All existing firms and potential entrants have identical costs.
2) Each firm’s costs do not change as other firms enter or exit the market.
3) The number of firms in the market is
• fixed in the short run
(due to fixed costs)
• variable in the long run
(due to free entry and exit)
The SR Market Supply Curve

• As long as P ≥ AVC, each firm will produce its profit-maximizing quantity, where
MR = MC.
• Recall from Chapter 4:
At each price, the market quantity supplied is
the sum of quantities supplied by all firms.

Example: 1000 identical firms
At each P, market Qs = 1000 x (one firm’s Qs)
One firm Market

P MC P S
P3 P3
P2 P2
AVC
P1 P1
Q Q
10 20 30 (firm) (market)
10,000 20,000 30,000

Entry & Exit in the Long Run
• In the LR, the number of firms can change due to entry & exit.
• If existing firms earn positive economic profit,
• new firms enter, SR market supply shifts right.
• P falls, reducing profits and slowing entry.
• If existing firms incur losses,
• some firms exit, SR market supply shifts left.
• P rises, reducing remaining firms’ losses.

The Zero-Profit Condition
• Long-run equilibrium:
The process of entry or exit is complete –
remaining firms earn zero economic profit.
• Zero economic profit occurs when P = ATC.
• Since firms produce where P = MR = MC,
the zero-profit condition is P = MC = ATC.
• Recall that MC intersects ATC at minimum ATC.
• Hence, in the long run, P = minimum ATC.

Why Do Firms Stay in Business if Profit = 0?
• Recall, economic profit is revenue minus all costs – including implicit costs,
like the opportunity cost of the owner’s time and money.
• In the zero-profit equilibrium,
• firms earn enough revenue to cover these costs
• accounting profit is positive

SR & LR Effects of an Increase in Demand
A firm begins in …but then an increase
long-run to…driving
…leadingeq’m… SR profits to zero
Over time, profits
in demandinduce entry,
raises P,…
andfirm.
profits for the restoring long-run
shifting eq’m.
S to the right, reducing P…
P One firm P Market

MC S1
S2
Profit ATC B
P2 P2
A C long-run
P1 P1 supply
D2
D1
Q Q
(firm) Q1 Q2 Q3 (market)
The LR Market Supply Curve
In the long run, The LR market supply
the typical firm curve is horizontal at
earns zero profit. P = minimum ATC.
One firm Market

P MC P
LRATC
P=
long-run
min. supply
ATC
Q Q
(firm) (market)
Why the LR Supply Curve Might Slope Upward
• The LR market supply curve is horizontal if

1) all firms have identical costs, and
2) costs do not change as other firms enter or exit the market.
• If either of these assumptions is not true,
then LR supply curve slopes upward.

1) Firms Have Different Costs
• As P rises, firms with lower costs enter the market

before those with higher costs.
• Further increases in P make it worthwhile
for higher-cost firms to enter the market,
which increases market quantity supplied.
• Hence, LR market supply curve slopes upward.
• At any P,
• For the marginal firm,
P = minimum ATC and profit = 0.
• For lower-cost firms, profit > 0.

2) Costs Rise as Firms Enter the Market
• In some industries, the supply of a key input is limited (e.g., amount of land
suitable for farming is fixed).
• The entry of new firms increases demand for this input, causing its price to
rise.
• This increases all firms’ costs.
• Hence, an increase in P is required to increase the market quantity supplied,
so the supply curve is upward-sloping.

Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
● monopolistic competition Market in which firms can
enter freely, each producing its own brand or version of a
differentiated product.
● oligopoly Market in which only a few firms compete

with one another, and entry by new firms is impeded.
● cartel Market in which some or all firms explicitly

collude, coordinating prices and output levels to
maximize joint profits.
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
• The Makings of Monopolistic Competition
A monopolistically competitive market has two key characteristics:
1. Firms compete by selling differentiated products that are highly substitutable for one another but not
perfect substitutes. In other words, the cross-price elasticities of demand are large but not infinite.
2. There is free entry and exit: it is relatively easy for new firms to enter the market with their own brands
and for existing firms to leave if their products become unprofitable.
• Equilibrium in the Short Run and the Long Run
A Monopolistically
Competitive Firm in the
Short and Long Run
Because the firm is the only producer of its

brand, it faces a downward-sloping
demand curve.
Price exceeds marginal cost and the firm
has monopoly power.
In the short run, described in part (a), price
also exceeds average cost, and the firm
earns profits shown by the yellow-shaded
rectangle.
A Monopolistically
Short and Long Run
In the long run, these profits attract

new firms with competing brands.
The firm’s market share falls, and
its demand curve shifts downward.
In long-run equilibrium, described
in part (b), price equals average
cost, so the firm earns zero profit
even though it has monopoly
power.
• Monopolistic Competition and Economic Efficiency
Comparison of
Monopolistically
Competitive Equilibrium
and Perfectly Competitive
Equilibrium
Under perfect competition, price

equals marginal cost.
The demand curve facing the firm is
horizontal, so the zero-profit point
occurs at the point of minimum
average cost.
Comparison of
Monopolistically
Equilibrium
Under monopolistic
competition, price
exceeds marginal cost.
Thus there is a
deadweight loss, as
shown by the yellow-
shaded area.
The demand curve is
downward-sloping, so
the zero profit point is In both types of markets, entry occurs until profits are driven to zero.
to the left of the point of
minimum average cost. In evaluating monopolistic competition, these inefficiencies must be
balanced against the gains to consumers from product diversity.
OLIGOPOLY
In oligopolistic markets, the products may or may not be differentiated.
What matters is that only a few firms account for most or all of total production.
In some oligopolistic markets, some or all firms earn substantial profits over the long
run because barriers to entry make it difficult or impossible for new firms to enter.
Oligopoly is a prevalent form of market structure. Examples of oligopolistic industries
include automobiles, steel, aluminum, petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and
computers.
OLIGOPOLY
• Equilibrium in an Oligopolistic Market
When a market is in equilibrium, firms are doing the best they can and have no reason to change
their price or output.
Nash Equilibrium Equilibrium in oligopoly markets means that each firm will want to do the best
it can given what its competitors are doing, and these competitors will do the best they can given
what that firm is doing.
● Nash equilibrium Set of strategies or actions in which

each firm does the best it can given its competitors’ actions.
● duopoly Market in which two firms compete with each other.

OLIGOPOLY
• The Cournot Model
● Cournot model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a
homogeneous good, each firm treats the output of its competitors as
fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously how much to produce.
Firm 1’s Output Decision
Firm 1’s profit-maximizing output depends on how much it thinks

that Firm 2 will produce.
If it thinks Firm 2 will produce nothing, its demand curve, labeled
D1(0), is the market demand curve. The corresponding marginal
revenue curve, labeled MR1(0), intersects Firm 1’s marginal cost
curve MC1 at an output of 50 units.
If Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 will produce 50 units, its demand curve,
D1(50), is shifted to the left by this amount. Profit maximization now
implies an output of 25 units.
Finally, if Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 will produce 75 units, Firm 1 will
produce only 12.5 units.
OLIGOPOLY
● reaction curve Relationship between a firm’s profit-maximizing
output and the amount it thinks its competitor will produce.
Reaction Curves
and Cournot Equilibrium
Firm 1’s reaction curve shows how much it will

produce as a function of how much it thinks Firm 2
will produce.
Firm 2’s reaction curve shows its output as a
function of how much it thinks Firm 1 will produce.
In Cournot equilibrium, each firm correctly
assumes the amount that its competitor will
produce and thereby maximizes its own profits.
Therefore, neither firm will move from this
equilibrium.
● Cournot equilibrium Equilibrium in the Cournot model in which each firm correctly assumes how much its competitor
will produce and sets its own production level accordingly.
OLIGOPOLY
• The Linear Demand Curve—An Example

Two identical firms face the following market demand curve
P = 30 – Q
Also, MC1 = MC2 = 0
Total revenue for firm 1: R1 = PQ1 = (30 –Q)Q1
then MR1 = ∆R1/∆Q1 = 30 – 2Q1 –Q2
Setting MR1 = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) and solving for Q1, we find
Firm 1’s reaction curve: Q1 = 15- 1 Q2

2
By the same calculation, Firm 2’s reaction curve: Q2 = 15- 1 Q2

2
Cournot equilibrium: Q1 = Q2 =10
Total quantity produced: Q = Q1 = Q2 = 20

OLIGOPOLY
If the two firms collude, then the total profit-maximizing quantity can be obtained as follows:
Total revenue for the two firms: R = PQ = (30 –Q)Q = 30Q – Q2, then MR1 = ∆R/∆Q = 30 – 2Q
Setting MR = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) we find that total profit is maximized at Q = 15.
Then, Q1 + Q2 = 15 is the collusion curve.
If the firms agree to share profits equally, each will produce half of the total output:
Q1 = Q2 = 7.5
OLIGOPOLY
Duopoly Example
The demand curve is P = 30 − Q, and both firms

have zero marginal cost. In Cournot equilibrium,
each firm produces 10.
The collusion curve shows combinations of Q1 and
Q2 that maximize total profits.
If the firms collude and share profits equally, each
will produce 7.5.
Also shown is the competitive equilibrium, in which
price equals marginal cost and profit is zero.
OLIGOPOLY
• First Mover Advantage—The Stackelberg Model
● Stackelberg model Oligopoly model in which one firm sets its
output before other firms do.
Suppose Firm 1 sets its output first and then Firm 2, after observing Firm 1’s output, makes its
output decision. In setting output, Firm 1 must therefore consider how Firm 2 will react.
P = 30 – Q
Also, MC1 = MC2 = 0
1
Firm 2’s reaction curve: Q2 = 15- 2 Q2
Firm 1’s revenue: R1 = PQ1 = 30Q1 − Q12 − Q2Q1
And MR1 = ∆R1/∆Q1 = 15 – Q1
Setting MR1 = 0 gives Q1 = 15, and Q2 = 7.5

We conclude that Firm 1 produces twice as much as Firm 2 and makes twice as much profit.
Going first gives Firm 1 an advantage.
PRICE COMPETITION
• Price Competition with Homogeneous
• Products—The Bertrand Model
● Bertrand model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a homogeneous good, each
firm treats the price of its competitors as fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously what
price to charge.
P = 30 – Q
MC1 = MC2 = $3
Q1=Q2 = 9, and in Cournot equilibrium, the market price is $12, so that each firm makes a
profit of $81.
Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand model results in both firms setting price equal to marginal
cost: P1=P2=$3. Then industry output is 27 units, of which each firm produces 13.5 units,
and both firms earn zero profit.
In the Cournot model, because each firm produces only 9 units, the market price is $12.
Now the market price is $3. In the Cournot model, each firm made a profit; in the Bertrand
model, the firms price at marginal cost and make no profit.
PRICE COMPETITION
• Price Competition with Differentiated Products
Suppose each of two duopolists has fixed costs of $20 but zero variable costs, and that
they face the same demand curves:
Firm 1’s demand: Q1 = 12 − 2P1 + P2
Firm 2’s demand: Q = 12 − 2P + P
2 2 1
Choosing Prices
Firm 1’s profit: 1 = PQ
1 1
− 20 =12P1 − 2P12 − 20
Firm 1’s profit maximizing price: 1 / P1 =12 − 4P1 + P2 = 0
Firm 1’s reaction curve: P1 = 3 + 1 P2

4
Firm 2’s reaction curve: P2 = 3 + 1 P1

4
PRICE COMPETITION
Nash Equilibrium in Prices
Here two firms sell a differentiated product, and each firm’s

demand depends both on its own price and on its competitor’s
price. The two firms choose their prices at the same time, each
taking its competitor’s price as given.
Firm 1’s reaction curve gives its profit-maximizing price as a
function of the price that Firm 2 sets, and similarly for Firm 2.
The Nash equilibrium is at the intersection of the two reaction
curves: When each firm charges a price of $4, it is doing the best
it can given its competitor’s price and has no incentive to change
price.
Also shown is the collusive equilibrium: If the firms cooperatively
set price, they will choose $6.
• Price Rigidity
The Kinked Demand Curve
• Price Rigidity
● price rigidity Characteristic of oligopolistic markets by
which firms are reluctant to change prices even if costs or
demands change.
● kinked demand curve model Oligopoly model in which
each firm faces a demand curve kinked at the currently
prevailing price: at higher prices demand is very elastic,
whereas at lower prices it is inelastic.
Each firm believes that if it raises its price above the current
price P*, none of its competitors will follow suit, so it will lose
most of its sales.
Each firm also believes that if it lowers price, everyone will
follow suit, and its sales will increase only to the extent that
market demand increases.
As a result, the firm’s demand curve D is kinked at price P*, and
its marginal revenue curve MR is discontinuous at that point.
If marginal cost increases from MC to MC’, the firm will still
produce the same output level Q* and charge the same price
P*.
• Price Signaling and Price Leadership
● price signaling Form of implicit collusion in which a

firm announces a price increase in the hope that other
firms will follow suit.
● price leadership Pattern of pricing in which one firm

regularly announces price changes that other firms then
match.
Market Power: Monopoly and Monopsony
● monopoly Market with only one seller.
● monopsony Market with only one buyer.
● market power Ability of a seller or buyer
to affect the price of a good.
MONOPOLY
• Average Revenue and Marginal Revenue
● marginal revenue Change in revenue
resulting from a one-unit increase in output.
TABLE 10.1 Total, Marginal, and Average Revenue
Total Marginal Average
Price (P) Quantity (Q) Revenue (R) Revenue (MR) Revenue (AR)
$6 0 $0 --- ---
5 1 5 $5 $5
4 2 8 3 4
3 3 9 1 3
2 4 8 -1 2
1 5 5 -3 1
MONOPOLY
Average and Marginal
Revenue
Average and marginal

revenue are shown for
the demand curve
P = 6 − Q.
MONOPOLY
• The Monopolist’s Output Decision
Profit Is Maximized When Marginal

Revenue Equals Marginal Cost
Q* is the output level at which MR = MC.

If the firm produces a smaller output—say, Q1—it
sacrifices some profit because the extra revenue that
could be earned from producing and selling the units
between Q1 and Q* exceeds the cost of producing
them.
Similarly, expanding output from Q* to Q2 would
reduce profit because the additional cost would
exceed the additional revenue.
MONOPOLY
We can also see algebraically that Q* maximizes profit. Profit π is the

difference between revenue and cost, both of which depend on Q:
As Q is increased from zero, profit will increase until it reaches a

maximum and then begin to decrease. Thus the profit-maximizing
Q is such that the incremental profit resulting from a small increase
in Q is just zero (i.e., Δπ /ΔQ = 0). Then
But ΔR/ΔQ is marginal revenue and ΔC/ΔQ is marginal cost. Thus

the profit-maximizing condition is that
, or
MONOPOLY
• An Example
Example of Profit Maximization
Part (a) shows total revenue R, total cost C, and profit, the
difference between the two.
Part (b) shows average and marginal revenue and average and
marginal cost.
Marginal revenue is the slope of the total revenue curve, and
marginal cost is the slope of the total cost curve.
The profit-maximizing output is Q* = 10, the point where marginal
revenue equals marginal cost.
At this output level, the slope of the profit curve is zero, and the
slopes of the total revenue and total cost curves are equal.
The profit per unit is $15, the difference between average revenue
and average cost.
Because 10 units are produced, total profit is $150.
MONOPOLY
• A Rule of Thumb for Pricing
We want to translate the condition that marginal revenue should

equal marginal cost into a rule of thumb that can be more easily
applied in practice.
To do this, we first write the expression for marginal revenue:
MONOPOLY
Note that the extra revenue from an incremental unit of quantity,

Δ(PQ)/ΔQ, has two components:
1. Producing one extra unit and selling it at price P brings in
revenue (1)(P) = P.
2. But because the firm faces a downward-sloping demand
curve, producing and selling this extra unit also results in a
small drop in price ΔP/ΔQ, which reduces the revenue from
all units sold (i.e., a change in revenue Q[ΔP/ΔQ]).
Thus,
MONOPOLY

(Q/P)(ΔP/ΔQ) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand,
1/Ed, measured at the profit-maximizing output, and
Now, because the firm’s objective is to maximize profit, we can set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost:
which can be rearranged to give us
(10.1)
Equivalently, we can rearrange this equation to express

price directly as a markup over marginal cost:
(10.2)
MONOPOLY
• The Multiplant Firm
Suppose a firm has two plants. What should its total output be, and how
much of that output should each plant produce? We can find the answer
intuitively in two steps.
● Step 1. Whatever the total output, it should be divided between

the two plants so that marginal cost is the same in each plant.
Otherwise, the firm could reduce its costs and increase its profit
by reallocating production.
● Step 2. We know that total output must be such that marginal

revenue equals marginal cost. Otherwise, the firm could increase
its profit by raising or lowering total output.
MONOPOLY
We can also derive this result algebraically. Let Q1 and C1 be the output
and cost of production for Plant 1, Q2 and C2 be the output and cost of
production for Plant 2, and QT = Q1 + Q2 be total output. Then profit is
The firm should increase output from each plant until the incremental profit
from the last unit produced is zero. Start by setting incremental profit from
output at Plant 1 to zero:
Here Δ(PQT)/ΔQ1 is the revenue from producing and selling one more unit—
i.e., marginal revenue, MR, for all of the firm’s output.
MONOPOLY
The next term, ΔC1/ΔQ1, is marginal cost at Plant 1, MC1. We thus have
MR − MC1 = 0, or
Similarly, we can set incremental profit from output at Plant 2 to zero,
Putting these relations together, we see that the firm should produce so that
(10.3)
MONOPOLY
Production with Two Plants
A firm with two plants

maximizes profits by
choosing output levels Q1
and Q2 so that marginal
revenue MR (which
depends on total output)
equals marginal costs for
each plant, MC1 and MC2.
MONOPOLY POWER
The Demand for Toothbrushes
Part (a) shows the market demand for

toothbrushes.
Part (b) shows the demand for toothbrushes as
seen by Firm A.
At a market price of $1.50, elasticity of market
demand is −1.5.
Firm A, however, sees a much more elastic
demand curve DA because of competition from
other firms.
At a price of $1.50, Firm A’s demand elasticity
is −6.
Still, Firm A has some monopoly power: Its
profit-maximizing price is $1.50, which exceeds
marginal cost.
MONOPOLY POWER
• Measuring Monopoly Power
Remember the important distinction between a perfectly competitive firm

and a firm with monopoly power: For the competitive firm, price equals
marginal cost; for the firm with monopoly power, price exceeds marginal
cost.
● Lerner Index of Monopoly Power
Measure of monopoly power calculated
as excess of price over marginal cost as
a fraction of price.
Mathematically:
This index of monopoly power can also be expressed in terms of the

elasticity of demand facing the firm.
(10.4)
MONOPOLY POWER
• The Rule of Thumb for Pricing
Elasticity of Demand and Price Markup
The markup (P − MC)/P is equal to minus the inverse of the elasticity of demand facing the firm. If the firm’s demand is elastic, as in
(a), the markup is small and the firm has little monopoly power.The opposite is true if demand is relatively inelastic, as in (b).
SOURCES OF MONOPOLY POWER
• The Elasticity of Market Demand
If there is only one firm—a pure monopolist—its demand curve is the market demand curve.
Because the demand for oil is fairly inelastic (at least in the short run), OPEC could raise oil
prices far above marginal production cost during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Because the demands for such commodities as coffee, cocoa, tin, and copper are much more
elastic, attempts by producers to cartelize these markets and raise prices have largely failed.
In each case, the elasticity of market demand limits the potential monopoly power of individual
producers.
• The Number of Firms
When only a few firms account for most of the sales in a market, we say that
the market is highly concentrated.
● barrier to entry Condition that

impedes entry by new competitors.
• The Interaction Among Firms
Firms might compete aggressively, undercutting one another’s prices to

capture more market share.
This could drive prices down to nearly competitive levels.
Firms might even collude (in violation of the antitrust laws), agreeing to limit
output and raise prices.
Because raising prices in concert rather than individually is more likely to be
profitable, collusion can generate substantial monopoly power.
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY POWER
Deadweight Loss from Monopoly Power
The shaded rectangle and triangles show changes inc

consumer and producer surplus when moving from
competitive price and quantity, Pc and Qc,
to a monopolist’s price and quantity, Pm and Qm.
Because of the higher price, consumers lose A + B
and producer gains A − C. The deadweight loss is B + C.
• Rent Seeking
● rent seeking Spending money in

socially unproductive efforts to acquire,
maintain, or exercise monopoly.
In 1996, the Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) successfully lobbied the
Clinton administration for regulations requiring that the ethanol (ethyl alcohol)
used in motor vehicle fuel be produced from corn.
Why? Because ADM had a near monopoly on corn-based ethanol production,
so the regulation would increase its gains from monopoly power.
• Price Regulation
Price Regulation
If left alone, a monopolist produces Qm and

charges Pm.
When the government imposes a price ceiling of
P1 the firm’s average and marginal revenue are
constant and equal to P1 for output levels up to
Q1.
For larger output levels, the original average and
marginal revenue curves apply.
The new marginal revenue curve is, therefore,
the dark purple line, which intersects the
marginal cost curve at Q1.
Price Regulation
When price is lowered to Pc, at the point

where marginal cost intersects average
revenue, output increases to its maximum
Qc. This is the output that would be
produced by a competitive industry.
Lowering price further, to P3 reduces output
to Q3 and causes a shortage,
Q’3 − Q3.
• Natural Monopoly
● natural monopoly Firm that can produce

the entire output of the market at a cost
lower than what it would be if there were
several firms.
Regulating the Price of a Natural

Monopoly
A firm is a natural monopoly because it has economies of

scale (declining average and marginal costs) over its
entire output range.
If price were regulated to be Pc the firm would lose
money and go out of business.
Setting the price at Pr yields the largest possible output
consistent with the firm’s remaining in business; excess
profit is zero.
• Regulation in Practice
● rate-of-return regulation Maximum price

allowed by a regulatory agency is based on the
(expected) rate of return that a firm will earn.
The difficulty of agreeing on a set of numbers to be used in rate-of-return

calculations often leads to delays in the regulatory response to changes in
cost and other market conditions.
The net result is regulatory lag—the delays of a year or more usually entailed
in changing regulated prices.
MONOPSONY
● oligopsony Market with only a few buyers.
● monopsony power Buyer’s ability to affect

the price of a good.
● marginal value Additional benefit derived

from purchasing one more unit of a good.
● marginal expenditure Additional cost of

buying one more unit of a good.
● average expenditure Price paid per unit of a

good.
MONOPSONY
Competitive Buyer Compared to Competitive Seller
In (a), the competitive buyer takes market price P* as given. Therefore, marginal expenditure and average expenditure are constant and equal;
quantity purchased is found by equating price to marginal value (demand).
In (b), the competitive seller also takes price as given. Marginal revenue and average revenue are constant and equal;
quantity sold is found by equating price to marginal cost.
MONOPSONY
Competitive Buyer Compared to

Competitive Seller
The market supply curve is monopsonist’s average

expenditure curve AE.
Because average expenditure is rising, marginal
expenditure lies above it.
The monopsonist purchases quantity Q*m, where marginal
expenditure and marginal value (demand) intersect.
The price paid per unit P*m is then found from the average
expenditure (supply) curve.
In a competitive market, price and quantity, Pc and Qc, are
both higher.
They are found at the point where average expenditure
(supply) and marginal value (demand) intersect.
MONOPSONY
• Monopsony and Monopoly Compared
Monopoly and Monopsony
These diagrams show the close analogy between monopoly and monopsony. (a) The monopolist produces where marginal revenue intersects
marginal cost. Average revenue exceeds marginal revenue, so that price exceeds marginal cost. (b) The monopsonist purchases up to the
point where marginal expenditure intersects marginal value. Marginal expenditure exceeds average expenditure, so that marginal value
exceeds price.
MONOPSONY POWER
Monopsony Power: Elastic versus Inelastic Supply
Monopsony power depends on the elasticity of supply. When supply is elastic, as in (a), marginal expenditure and average expenditure do
not differ by much, so price is close to what it would be in a competitive market. The opposite is true when supply is inelastic, as in (b).
MONOPSONY POWER
• Sources of Monopsony Power

Elasticity of Market Supply
If only one buyer is in the market—a pure monopsonist—its monopsony power is completely
determined by the elasticity of market supply. If supply is highly elastic, monopsony power is
small and there is little gain in being the only buyer.
Number of Buyers
When the number of buyers is very large, no single buyer can have much influence over price.
Thus each buyer faces an extremely elastic supply curve, so that the market is almost
completely competitive.
Interaction Among Buyers
If four buyers in a market compete aggressively, they will bid up the price close to their marginal value of
the product, and will thus have little monopsony power. On the other hand, if those buyers compete less
aggressively, or even collude, prices will not be bid up very much, and the buyers’ degree of monopsony
power might be nearly as high as if there were only one buyer.
MONOPSONY POWER
• The Social Costs of Monopsony Power
Deadweight Loss from

Monopsony Power
The shaded rectangle and triangles show

changes in buyer and seller surplus when
moving from competitive price and quantity, Pc
and Qc,
to the monopsonist’s price and quantity, Pm and
Qm.
Because both price and quantity are lower, there
is an increase in buyer (consumer) surplus given
by A − B.
Producer surplus falls by
A + C, so there is a deadweight loss given by
triangles B and C.
MONOPSONY POWER
• Bilateral Monopoly
● bilateral monopoly Market with only

one seller and one buyer.
Monopsony power and monopoly power will tend to

counteract each other.
LIMITING MARKET POWER: THE ANTITRUST LAWS
● parallel conduct Form of implicit

collusion in which one firm consistently
follows actions of another.
● predatory pricing Practice of
pricing to drive current competitors out
of business and to discourage new
entrants in a market so that a firm can
enjoy higher future profits.
TERIMA KASIH
AGB 133C sks 2(2-0)

Pertemuan ke-9
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE

(SCP)
PENDEKATAN SCP
Pendekatan S-C-P adalah pendekatan organisasi

pasar yang mencakup atau mengkombinasikan
semua aspek dari sistem tataniaga yaitu S (market
structure), C (market conduct) dan P (market
performance).
Sructure (S), conduct (C), dan performance (P) dalam suatu waktu
berada pada sistem dimana S dan C adalah faktor penentu dari P, dilain
waktu S dan C ditentukan oleh P. Hal ini menunjukkan suatu sistem dinamis
yang mengembangkan respon penyesuaian dari perusahaan terhadap kondisi
pasar dan keadaan yang memungkinkan.
PENDEKATAN AN SCP
P C
“an analytical framework that explains the connection between economic or market structure,
market conduct and its performance.”
Faccarello, G. and Kurz, H.D. eds., 2016. Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume II: Schools of Thought in Economics (Vol. 2). Edward Elgar
Publishing.
 Hubungan antara pembeli dan penjual adalah hub

terjadi transaksi.
 Hub kompetitif dan negosiasi diantara pembeli dan
 Struktur pasar (Market Structure) didefinisikan
sebagai sifat-sifat organisasi pasar yg mempengaruhi
perilaku dan keragaan pasar (Market Conduct)
STRUKTUR PASAR (S)

Struktur pasar dapat diartikan sebagai karakteristik dari produk
maupun institusi yang terlibat pada pasar tersebut yang
merupakan resultan atau saling mempengaruhi dari market
conduct (perilaku pasar) dan market performance (keragaan
pasar). Struktur pasar dapat diartikan sebagai tipe atau jenis-
jenis pasar.
Empat faktor penentu struktur pasar :
1) Jumlah atau ukuran prushaan

(pmbeli/penjual)
2) Kondisi produk : homogen atau diferensiasi
3) Mudah atau sukar prshaan masuk atau keluar
dari pasar/industri
4) Informasi pasar/industri
PPS Monopolistic Oligopoly Monopoly

Pure Pure
Banyak Standardisasi
Competition Competition
Monopolistic Monopsonistic
Banyak Diferensiasi
Competition Competition
Diferensiasi Diferensiasi
Sedikit Diferensiasi
Oligopoly Oligopsony
Pasar Persaingan Sempurna

Struktur pasar ini sering disebut persaingan murni
atau atomistik
Kondisi strktr pasar yg memuaskan partisipan dlm
industri
Karakteristik (PPS):
(a) Jumlah partisipan sangat banyak;
(b) Produknya homogen, ada perbedaan kualitas tapi
produk dg kualitas yg sama tdk dpt berbeda
karena merk or iklan;
(c) Perusahaan bebas untuk masuk atau keluar

pasar tanpa halangan;
(d) semua partisipan memiliki pengetahuan
informasi harga dll tentang pasar;
(e) harga bebas dari restriksi dan perusaahan tdk
dpt mempengaruhi
Kurva Pasar Persaingan Sempurna

Just a reminder:
PPS Untung PPS Rugi

Monopolistic Competition
Bentuk ini antara monopoli dengan oligopoli
Ada beberapa perusahaan dalam pasar; dimana masing- masing
tdk dpt mempengaruhi yg lain; tetapi lebih banyak mereka dpt
membuat saling terikat.
Karakteristik :
1. Jumlah perusahaan banyak,
2. Produknya diferensiasi dan bervariasi,
3. Relatif mudah untuk perusahaan baru masuk industri,
4. Bbrp prsh dpt mempengaruhi harga, ada batasan melalui
substitusi, Contoh : toko pangan dll
Oligopoli atau Oligopsoni

 Pengawasan penjualan ada pada bbrp perusahaan besar
 Konsentrasi pasar dari perusahaan besar (the leading
firms) akan mempengaruhi harga
 Setiap perusahaan dalam mengambil keputusan produksi
dan harga, akan memperhitungkan reaksi pasar dan
rivalnya
 Industri oligopoli akan menciptakan hierarchy dari
pemimpin dan pengikut (leaders-followers).
Oligopoli & PP Monopolistic
Just a reminder
Oligopoli Untung Monopolistik Untung

Monopoli atau Monopsoni

 Adalah bentuk yg sangat bertentangan dg PPS
 Monopoli sering disebut Price Setters, karena kurva
demand pasar adalah kurva demand perusahaan
 Monopoli melakukan hambatan (protection) dari
rivalnya dan dapat bebas (?) menentukan harga
produknya  akan memilih harga dan output yg
menyebabkan maksimum profit.
 Monopoli dpt melalui mengontrol (menguasai)
bahan baku, hak paten dan skala ekonomi.
Kurva Pasar Monopoli

Just a reminder:
Monopoly Untung Monopoly Rugi

Competition In Food Markets

 Kunci kompetisi adalah jumlah partisipan yg berperan
dalam ekonomi pasar.
 Melalui kompetisi, organisasi ekonomi akan menjawab:
apa, berapa, bagaimana berproduksi dan distribusi.
 Aktivitas kompetisi adalah perilaku harga dan alokasi
sumberdaya.
 Melalui kompetisi akan menghambat profit seeking,
meningkatkan perubahan produk, teknologi dan
menurunkan biaya
Kondisi Persaingan dalam Pasar-Pasar Pangan
 Produsen pertanian dicontohkan mendekati kondisi psr

persaingan sempurna (PPS).
 Kondisi ini sudah berubah krn jumlah produsen menurun,
skala usaha meningkat, capital and management meningkat
 Petani aktif melalui koperasi dan pemasaran bersama, ada
program promosi dll
 Dlm pasar tdk bersaing (imperfectly competitive markets),prsh
akan melakukan diferensiasi produk melalui strategi-strategi
 Melalui seleksi marketing strategies, cara penjualan

yg berbeda sesuai dengan keinginan
pembeli,mengurangi substitusi produk, meningkatkan
selang harga  Untuk meningkatkn profit
perusahaan
 Tehnik diferensiasi melalui branding, packaging,
promosi penjualan dan iklan
 Diferensiasi produk, dilakukan pada setiap tingkat dari
sistem pangan. Grocers membedakan melalui harga,
lokasi, design toko dan pelayanan. Pengolah (pabrik)
mlalui produk baru, packaging and brand advertising.
Produk diferensiasi ??
 Meningkatkan ruang pilihan dan kepuasan konsumen dan juga

atribut produk yg lebih disenangi
 Konsentrasi pasar adl proporsi dari penjualan industri (pasar)
yg dikuasai oleh prsh besar  kondisi imperfect competition
 Tingkat keberhasilan perusahaan adalah bagaimana dapat
menahan perusahaan baru masuk ke industri dan
meningkatkan konsentrasi pasar melalui pengolahan,
pedagang besar dan retail
Sebagai acuan :
a) Strongly oligopolistic industries, apabila 4
perusahaan mempunyai konsentrasi ratio
paling sedikit 50 %;
b) weak oligopoly = 33 – 50 %;
c) industri tidak terkonsentrasi < 33 %
Ada kecenderungan merger perusahaan:

horizontal, vertikal and conglomerate merger.
Kompetitif yg efektif
(workable Competitive system)
 Harus cukup besar jumlah pembeli-penjual; secara
individu tidak ada yg dpt mempengaruhi pasar, tapi
cukup untuk alternatif pilihan
 Tdk ada prsh-pedagang yg dpt menekan pesaingnya
 Pedagang harus responsif (rugi atau profit)
 Tdk ada perjanjian atau kolusi
 Bebas untuk masuk atau keluar industri
PERILAKU PASAR (C)
Perilaku Pasar : merupakan perilaku partisipan (pembeli dan

penjual), strategi atau reaksi yang dilakukan partisipan pasar secara
individu atau kelompok, dalam hubungan kompetitif atau
negosiasi terhadap partisipan lainnya untuk mencapai tujuan
pemasaran tertentu.
Misal praktek-praktek bisnis yang dilakukan perusahaan dalam :

kebijakan penentuan harga, promosi penjualan dan berbagai
strategi penjualan lainnya yang dilakukan untuk mencapai hasil
pasar yang spesifik.
Hubungan antara pembeli dan penjual  hub. Persaingan.
Setelah ada kesepakatan  transaksi dan hub. negosiasi
KINERJA PASAR (P)

Kinerja Pasar merupakan keragaan pasar yang
merupakan hasil atau pengaruh dari market structure
dan market conduct yang dalam realita dapat terlihat
dari produk atau output, harga dan biaya pada pasar-
pasar tertentu. Misal efisiensi harga atau biaya
produksi, biaya promosi penjualan (termasuk nilai
informasi), volume penjualan dan efisiensi pertukaran.
Indikator dalam menentukan efisiensi pemasaran

dengan pendekatan SCP
PERBEDAAN SCP DAN SCM
Asmarantaka et al, 2017

TERIMA KASIH
AGB 133C sks 2(2-0)

2022
netti tinaprilla
Pertemuan ke-9
Structure Conduct
Performance
netti tinaprilla
Overview  Industry Analysis
7-3
I. Market Structure : Measures of Industry Concentration

1. Number and size of firms.
2. Industry concentration.
3. Technological and cost conditions.
4. Demand conditions.
5. Ease of entry and exit.
6. Product condition : homogenus or differentiated
7. Market / Industry Information
II. Conduct : Pricing Behavior, Integration and Merger Activity
1. Pricing.
2. Advertising.
3. R&D.
4. Merger activity
III. Performance : Dansby-Willig Index, Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
1. Profitability.
2. Social welfare
IV. Preview of Coming Attractions
Pendekatan S-C-P adalah pendekatan organisasi pasar yang mencakup atau mengkombinasikan semua aspek dari sistem
tataniaga yaitu S (market structure), C (market conduct) dan P (market performance).
Approaches to Studying Industry
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm: Causal View
Market Market Market P

Structure Conduct Performance C
P
S
C
• No one-way causal link. S
Contoh Large scale
Market Structure ; Market Conduct Market Performance :

monopoly : price maker high profit
• Diskriminasi • Investment : scale, technology

• Inovasi /R&D  ingredients,
packaging, distribution, promotion

• No one-way causal link.
Sructure (S), conduct (C), dan performance (P) dalam suatu waktu berada pada sistem
dimana S dan C adalah faktor penentu dari P, dilain waktu S dan C ditentukan oleh P. Hal ini
menunjukkan suatu sistem dinamis yang mengembangkan respon penyesuaian dari
perusahaan terhadap kondisi pasar dan keadaan yang memungkinkan.
• Hubungan antara pembeli dan penjual adalah hub

terjadi transaksi.
• Hub kompetitif dan negosiasi diantara pembeli dan
• Struktur pasar (Market Structure) didefinisikan sebagai
sifat-sifat organisasi pasar yg mempengaruhi perilaku
dan keragaan pasar (Market Conduct)
Relating the Porter Five Forces Model to the SCP Paradigm and the Feedback Critique
Free entry and exit  Entry Costs Entry  Network Effects

to industry  Speed of Adjustment  Reputation
 Sunk Costs  Switching Costs
 Economies of Scale  Government Restraints
Power of Input
Suppliers Power of Buyers Price maker
 Buyer Concentration
 Supplier Concentration Level, Growth,  Price/Value of Substitute
 Price/Productivity of Alternative
Inputs and Sustainability Products or Services
 Relationship-Specific
 Relationship-Specific Of Industry Profits Investments
Investments
 Supplier Switching Costs  Customer Switching Costs
 Government Restraints  Government Restraints
Product homogen
Industry Rivalry Substitutes & Complements
 Concentration Price/Value of Surrogate Network Effects
 Switching Costs
 Price, Quantity, Quality, or Products or Services Government
 Timing of Decisions
Service Competition Price/Value of Complementary Restraints
The number and  Information
 Degree of Differentiation Products or Services
size of the firm  Government
Restraints
1. Structure
Struktur pasar dapat diartikan sebagai karakteristik dari produk maupun institusi yang terlibat pada pasar tersebut yang
merupakan resultan atau saling mempengaruhi dari market conduct (perilaku pasar) dan market performance (keragaan
pasar). Struktur pasar dapat diartikan sebagai tipe atau jenis-jenis pasar.
1.1. Number and size of firm

Banyak Standardisasi Pure Competition Pure Competition
Banyak Diferensiasi Monopolistic Competition Monopsonistic Competition

Sedikit Diferensiasi Diferensiasi Oligopoly Diferensiasi Oligopsony
1.2. Industry Concentration
• Four-Firm Concentration Ratio
• The sum of the market shares of the top four firms in the defined industry. Letting Si denote sales for firm i and ST denote total
industry sales S
C 4  w 1  w 2  w 3  w 4 , where w1  i
ST
• Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
• The sum of the squared market shares of firms in a given industry, multiplied by 10,000: HHI = 10,000  S wi2, where wi = Si/ST.
• Example
There are five banks competing in a local market. Each of the five banks have a 20 percent market share.
a. What is the four-firm concentration ratio?
C 4  0 .2  0 .2  0 .2  0 .2  0 .8
b. What is the HHI?
HHI  10 , 000 . 2  2
 . 2 2  . 2 2  . 2 2  . 2 2  2 , 000
• Limitation of Concentration Measures

1. (Market Definition: National, regional, or local?
2. Global Market: Foreign producers excluded.
3. Industry definition and product classes.
1.3. Technology
• Industries differ regarding the technology used to produce goods and services.
• Some industries are labor intensive;
• Some industries are capital intensive;
• Other industries use a combination of labor and capital.
1.4. Measuring Demand and Market Conditions

The Rothschild Index (R) measures the elasticity of industry demand for a product relative to that of an
individual firm:
R = ET / EF .
ET = elasticity of demand for the total market.
EF = elasticity of demand for the product of an individual firm.
The Rothschild Index is a value between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (monopoly).
When an industry is composed of many firms, each producing similar products, the Rothschild index will
be close to zero.
Own-Price Elasticities of Demand and Rothschild Indices
E l a s t i c i t y E l a s t i c i t y
I n d u s t r y o f M a r k e t o f F i r m ’ s R o t h s c h i l d
D e m a n d D e m a n d I n d e x
F o o d - 1 . 0 - 3 .8 0 .2 6
T o b a c c o - 1 . 3 - 1 .3 1 .0 0
T e x t i l e s - 1 . 5 - 4 .7 0 .3 2
A p p a r e l - 1 . 1 - 4 .1 0 .2 7
P a p e r - 1 . 5 - 1 .7 0 .8 8
C h e m i c a l s - 1 . 5 - 1 .5 1 .0 0
R u b b e r - 1 . 8 - 2 .3 0 .7 8
1.5.Market Entry and Exit Conditions

Barriers to entry
1. Capital requirements.
2. Patents and copyrights.
3. Economies of scale.
4. Economies of scope.
A. Perfect competition market
• What is a perfectly competitive market?
• What is marginal revenue? How is it related to total and average revenue?
• How does a competitive firm determine the quantity that maximizes profits?
• When might a competitive firm shut down in the short run? Exit the market in the long run?
• What does the market supply curve look like in the short run? In the long run?
Characteristics of Perfect Competition

1. Many buyers and many sellers.
2. The goods offered for sale are largely the same (homogneous)
3. Firms can freely enter or exit the market.
Because of 1 & 2, each buyer and seller is a “price taker” – takes the price as given.
The Revenue of a Competitive Firm

• Total revenue (TR) = P * Q
• Average revenue (AR) = TR/Q = P
• Marginal revenue (MR): The change in TR from selling one more unit. MR = ΔTR/ ΔQ
12
Calculating TR, AR, MR MR = P for a Competitive Firm
A competitive firm can keep
increasing its output without affecting
Q P TR = P x Q AR =
TR
MR =
∆TR the market price.
Q ∆Q So, each one-unit increase in Q causes
revenue to rise by P, i.e., MR = P
0 $10 $0 n/a
$10
1 $10 $10 $10
$10 MR = P is only true for
2 $10 $20 $10
3 $10 $30 $10

$10 firms in competitive markets.
$10
4 $10 $40 $10 Profit Maximization
$10
5 $10 $50 $10 What Q maximizes the firm’s profit?
To find the answer, “think at the margin.”
Notice that
MR = P
If increase Q by one unit,
revenue rises by MR,
cost rises by MC.
If MR > MC, then increase Q to raise profit.
If MR < MC, then reduce Q to raise profit.
Profit Maximization
(continued from earlier exercise)
Profit = MR –
At any Q with MR > MC, Q TR TC Profit MR MC
MC
increasing Q raises 0 $0 $5 –$5
$10 $4 $6
profit. 1 10 9 1
10 6 4
2 20 15 5
At any Q with MR < MC, 10 8 2
3 30 23 7
reducing Q raises profit. 10 10 0
4 40 33 7
10 12 –2
5 50 45 5
At Qa, MC < MR. Costs

So, increase Q MC
to raise profit.
MC and the Firm’s Supply Decision At Qb, MC > MR.

So, reduce Q
Rule: MR = MC at the profit-maximizing Q. to raise profit. P1 MR
At Q1, MC = MR.
Changing Q
would lower profit.
Q
Qa Q1 Qb

If price rises to P2, Costs
then the profit-
MC
maximizing quantity
rises to Q2. P2 MR2
The MC curve
determines the
firm’s Q at any price. P1 MR
Hence,
the MC curve is the
firm’s supply curve. Q
Q1 Q2

Shutdown vs. Exit
• Shutdown:
A short-run decision not to produce anything because of market conditions.
• Exit:
A long-run decision to leave the market.
• A key difference:
• If shut down in SR, must still pay FC.
• If exit in LR, zero costs.
A Firm’s Short-run Decision to Shut Down

• Cost of shutting down: revenue loss = TR
• Benefit of shutting down: cost savings = VC
(firm must still pay FC)
• So, shut down if TR < VC
• Divide both sides by Q: TR/Q < VC/Q
• So, firm’s decision rule is: Shut down if P < AVC

A Competitive Firm’s SR Supply Curve
The firm’s SR supply curve is the portion of its MC curve above AVC.
Costs
Costs
MC
MC
If P > AVC, then firm

produces Q where P = ATC
LRATC
MC.
If P < AVC, then firm

shuts down (produces Q
= 0). Q
Q
The firm’s LR supply curve is the portion of its MC curve above LRATC.

The Irrelevance of Sunk Costs
• Sunk cost: a cost that has already been committed and cannot be recovered
• Sunk costs should be irrelevant to decisions;
you must pay them regardless of your choice.
• FC is a sunk cost: The firm must pay its fixed costs whether it produces or shuts down.
• So, FC should not matter in the decision to shut down.
A Firm’s Long-Run Decision to Exit

Cost of exiting the market: revenue loss = TR
Benefit of exiting the market: cost savings = TC
(zero FC in the long run)
So, firm exits if TR < TC
Divide both sides by Q to write the firm’s decision rule as: Exit if P < ATC
A New Firm’s Decision to Enter Market
In the long run, a new firm will enter the market if it is profitable to do so: if TR > TC.
Divide both sides by Q to express the firm’s entry decision as:
Enter if P > ATC
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
Identifying a firm’s profit
A competitive firm
Determine this firm’s Costs, P
total profit.
MC
Identify the area on the P = $10 MR

graph that represents ATC
the firm’s profit.
$6
Q
50
ACTIVE LEARNING 2
Answers
A competitive firm
Costs, P
Profit per unit MC
= P – ATC
P = $10 MR
= $10 – 6
profit ATC
= $4
$6
Total profit
= (P – ATC) x Q
= $4 x 50
= $200 Q
50
ACTIVE LEARNING 3
Identifying a firm’s loss
A competitive firm
Determine Costs, P
this firm’s
MC
total loss, assuming
AVC < $3.
ATC
Identify the area on
the graph that $5
represents
the firm’s loss. P = $3 MR
Q
30
21
ACTIVE LEARNING 3
Answers
A competitive firm
Costs, P
Total loss MC
= (ATC – P) x Q
= $2 x 30 ATC
= $60
$5
loss loss per unit = $2
P = $3 MR
Q
30
22
Market Supply: Assumptions
1) All existing firms and potential entrants have identical costs.
2) Each firm’s costs do not change as other firms enter or exit the market.
3) The number of firms in the market is
• fixed in the short run
(due to fixed costs)
• variable in the long run
(due to free entry and exit)

• As long as P ≥ AVC, each firm will produce its profit-maximizing quantity, where
MR = MC.
• Recall from Chapter 4:
At each price, the market quantity supplied is
the sum of quantities supplied by all firms.

Example: 1000 identical firms
At each P, market Qs = 1000 x (one firm’s Qs)
One firm Market

P MC P S
P3 P3
P2 P2
AVC
P1 P1
Q Q
10 20 30 (firm) (market)
10,000 20,000 30,000

Entry & Exit in the Long Run
• In the LR, the number of firms can change due to entry & exit.
• If existing firms earn positive economic profit,
• new firms enter, SR market supply shifts right.
• P falls, reducing profits and slowing entry.
• If existing firms incur losses,
• some firms exit, SR market supply shifts left.
• P rises, reducing remaining firms’ losses.

The Zero-Profit Condition
• Long-run equilibrium:
The process of entry or exit is complete –
remaining firms earn zero economic profit.
• Zero economic profit occurs when P = ATC.
• Since firms produce where P = MR = MC,
the zero-profit condition is P = MC = ATC.
• Recall that MC intersects ATC at minimum ATC.
• Hence, in the long run, P = minimum ATC.

Why Do Firms Stay in Business if Profit = 0?
• Recall, economic profit is revenue minus all costs – including implicit costs,
like the opportunity cost of the owner’s time and money.
• In the zero-profit equilibrium,
• firms earn enough revenue to cover these costs
• accounting profit is positive

SR & LR Effects of an Increase in Demand
A firm begins in …but then an increase
long-run to…driving
…leadingeq’m… SR profits to zero
Over time, profits
in demandinduce entry,
raises P,…
andfirm.
profits for the restoring long-run
shifting eq’m.
S to the right, reducing P…
P One firm P Market

MC S1
S2
Profit ATC B
P2 P2
A C long-run
P1 P1 supply
D2
D1
Q Q
(firm) Q1 Q2 Q3 (market)
Why the LR Supply Curve Might Slope Upward
• The LR market supply curve is horizontal if

1) all firms have identical costs, and
2) costs do not change as other firms enter or exit the market.
• If either of these assumptions is not true,
then LR supply curve slopes upward.

1) Firms Have Different Costs
• As P rises, firms with lower costs enter the market

before those with higher costs.
• Further increases in P make it worthwhile
for higher-cost firms to enter the market,
which increases market quantity supplied.
• Hence, LR market supply curve slopes upward.
• At any P,
• For the marginal firm,
P = minimum ATC and profit = 0.
• For lower-cost firms, profit > 0.

2) Costs Rise as Firms Enter the Market
• In some industries, the supply of a key input is limited (e.g., amount of land
suitable for farming is fixed).
• The entry of new firms increases demand for this input, causing its price to
rise.
• This increases all firms’ costs.
• Hence, an increase in P is required to increase the market quantity supplied,
so the supply curve is upward-sloping.

The LR Market Supply Curve
In the long run, The LR market supply
the typical firm curve is horizontal at
earns zero profit. P = minimum ATC.
One firm Market

P MC P
LRATC
P=
long-run
min. supply
ATC
Q Q
(firm) (market)
2. Conduct
1. Pricing.
2. Advertising.
3. R&D.
4. Merger activity
7-34
2.1. Pricing Behavior

• The Lerner Index
L = (P - MC) / P
• A measure of the difference between
price and marginal cost as a fraction
of the product’s price.
• The index ranges from 0 to 1.
• When P = MC, the Lerner Index
is zero; the firm has no market
power.
• A Lerner Index closer to 1
indicates relatively weak price
competition; the firm has
market power.
7-35
Markup Factor
• From the Lerner Index, the firm can determine the
factor by which it should over MC. Rearranging the
Lerner Index
 1 
P  MC
1 L 
• The markup factor is 1/(1-L).
• When the Lerner Index is zero (L = 0), the markup factor is 1 and P = MC.
• When the Lerner Index is 0.20 (L = 0.20), the markup factor is 1.25 and the
firm charges a price that is 1.25 times marginal cost.
7-36
Lerner Indices & Markup Factors

Industry Lerner Index Markup Factor
Food 0.26 1.35
Tobacco 0.76 4.17
Textiles 0.21 1.27
Apparel 0.24 1.32
Paper 0.58 2.38
Chemicals 0.67 3.03
Petroleum 0.59 2.44
7-37
Integration and Merger Activity

• Vertical Integration
• Where various stages in the production of a single
product are carried out by one firm.
• Horizontal Integration
• The merging of the production of similar products into
a single firm.
• Conglomerate Mergers
• The integration of different product lines into a single
firm.
7-38
DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines
• Based on HHI = 10,000 S wi2, where
wi = Si /ST.
• Merger may be challenged if
• HHI exceeds 1800, or would be after merger, and
• Merger increases the HHI by more than 100.
• But...
• Recognizes efficiencies: “The primary benefit of mergers
to the economy is their efficiency potential...which can
result in lower prices to consumers...In the majority of
cases the Guidelines will allow firms to achieve efficiencies
through mergers without interference...”
3. Performance
1. Profitability.
2. Social welfare
7-40
Performance
• Performance refers to the profits and social
welfare that result in a given industry.
• Social Welfare = CS + PS
• Dansby-Willig Performance Index measure by how
much social welfare would improve if firms in an
industry expanded output in a socially efficient manner.
7-41
Dansby-Willig
Performance Index
Industry Dansby-Willig Index
Food 0.51
Textiles 0.38
Apparel 0.47
Paper 0.63
Chemicals 0.67
Petroleum 0.63
Rubber 0.49
7-42
Preview of Coming Attractions

• Discussion of optimal managerial decisions under
various market structures, including:
• Perfect competition
• Monopoly
• Monopolistic competition
• Oligopoly
7-43
Conclusion
• Modern approach to studying industries involves
examining the interrelationship between structure,
conduct, and performance.
• Industries dramatically vary with respect to concentration
levels.
• The four-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman index
measure industry concentration.
• The Lerner index measures the degree to which firms can
markup price above marginal cost; it is a measure of a
firm’s market power.
• Industry performance is measured by industry profitability
and social welfare.
TERIMA KASIH
Pasar Persaingan Sempurna

Struktur pasar ini sering disebut persaingan murni
atau atomistik
Kondisi strktr pasar yg memuaskan partisipan dlm
industri
Karakteristik (PPS):
(a) Jumlah partisipan sangat banyak;
(b) Produknya homogen, ada perbedaan kualitas tapi
produk dg kualitas yg sama tdk dpt berbeda
karena merk or iklan;
(c) Perusahaan bebas untuk masuk atau keluar

pasar tanpa halangan;
(d) semua partisipan memiliki pengetahuan
informasi harga dll tentang pasar;
(e) harga bebas dari restriksi dan perusaahan tdk
dpt mempengaruhi
Monopoli atau Monopsoni

 Adalah bentuk yg sangat bertentangan dg PPS
 Monopoli sering disebut Price Setters, karena kurva
demand pasar adalah kurva demand perusahaan
 Monopoli melakukan hambatan (protection) dari
rivalnya dan dapat bebas (?) menentukan harga
produknya  akan memilih harga dan output yg
menyebabkan maksimum profit.
 Monopoli dpt melalui mengontrol (menguasai)
bahan baku, hak paten dan skala ekonomi.
Oligopoli atau Oligopsoni

 Pengawasan penjualan ada pada bbrp perusahaan besar
 Konsentrasi pasar dari perusahaan besar (the leading
firms) akan mempengaruhi harga
 Setiap perusahaan dalam mengambil keputusan produksi
dan harga, akan memperhitungkan reaksi pasar dan
rivalnya
 Industri oligopoli akan menciptakan hierarchy dari
pemimpin dan pengikut (leaders-followers).
Monopolistic Competition
Bentuk ini antara monopoli dengan oligopoli
Ada beberapa perusahaan dalam pasar; dimana masing- masing
tdk dpt mempengaruhi yg lain; tetapi lebih banyak mereka dpt
membuat saling terikat.
Karakteristik :
1. Jumlah perusahaan banyak,
2. Produknya diferensiasi dan bervariasi,
3. Relatif mudah untuk perusahaan baru masuk industri,
4. Bbrp prsh dpt mempengaruhi harga, ada batasan melalui
substitusi, Contoh : toko pangan dll
Competition In Food Markets

 Kunci kompetisi adalah jumlah partisipan yg berperan
dalam ekonomi pasar.
 Melalui kompetisi, organisasi ekonomi akan menjawab:
apa, berapa, bagaimana berproduksi dan distribusi.
 Aktivitas kompetisi adalah perilaku harga dan alokasi
sumberdaya.
 Melalui kompetisi akan menghambat profit seeking,
meningkatkan perubahan produk, teknologi dan
menurunkan biaya
Kondisi Persaingan dalam Pasar-Pasar Pangan
 Produsen pertanian dicontohkan mendekati kondisi psr

persaingan sempurna (PPS).
 Kondisi ini sudah berubah krn jumlah produsen menurun,
skala usaha meningkat, capital and management meningkat
 Petani aktif melalui koperasi dan pemasaran bersama, ada
program promosi dll
 Dlm pasar tdk bersaing (imperfectly competitive markets),prsh
akan melakukan diferensiasi produk melalui strategi-strategi
 Melalui seleksi marketing strategies, cara penjualan

yg berbeda sesuai dengan keinginan
pembeli,mengurangi substitusi produk, meningkatkan
selang harga  Untuk meningkatkn profit
perusahaan
 Tehnik diferensiasi melalui branding, packaging,
promosi penjualan dan iklan
 Diferensiasi produk, dilakukan pada setiap tingkat dari
sistem pangan. Grocers membedakan melalui harga,
lokasi, design toko dan pelayanan. Pengolah (pabrik)
mlalui produk baru, packaging and brand advertising.
Produk diferensiasi ??
 Meningkatkan ruang pilihan dan kepuasan konsumen dan juga

atribut produk yg lebih disenangi
 Konsentrasi pasar adl proporsi dari penjualan industri (pasar)
yg dikuasai oleh prsh besar  kondisi imperfect competition
 Tingkat keberhasilan perusahaan adalah bagaimana dapat
menahan perusahaan baru masuk ke industri dan
meningkatkan konsentrasi pasar melalui pengolahan,
pedagang besar dan retail
Sebagai acuan :
a) Strongly oligopolistic industries, apabila 4
perusahaan mempunyai konsentrasi ratio
paling sedikit 50 %;
b) weak oligopoly = 33 – 50 %;
c) industri tidak terkonsentrasi < 33 %
Ada kecenderungan merger perusahaan:

horizontal, vertikal and conglomerate merger.
Kompetitif yg efektif
(workable Competitive system)
 Harus cukup besar jumlah pembeli-penjual; secara
individu tidak ada yg dpt mempengaruhi pasar, tapi
cukup untuk alternatif pilihan
 Tdk ada prsh-pedagang yg dpt menekan pesaingnya
 Pedagang harus responsif (rugi atau profit)
 Tdk ada perjanjian atau kolusi
 Bebas untuk masuk atau keluar industri
PERILAKU PASAR (C)
Perilaku Pasar : merupakan perilaku partisipan (pembeli dan

penjual), strategi atau reaksi yang dilakukan partisipan pasar secara
individu atau kelompok, dalam hubungan kompetitif atau
negosiasi terhadap partisipan lainnya untuk mencapai tujuan
pemasaran tertentu.
Misal praktek-praktek bisnis yang dilakukan perusahaan dalam :

kebijakan penentuan harga, promosi penjualan dan berbagai
strategi penjualan lainnya yang dilakukan untuk mencapai hasil
pasar yang spesifik.
Hubungan antara pembeli dan penjual  hub. Persaingan.
Setelah ada kesepakatan  transaksi dan hub. negosiasi
KINERJA PASAR (P)

Kinerja Pasar merupakan keragaan pasar yang
merupakan hasil atau pengaruh dari market structure
dan market conduct yang dalam realita dapat terlihat
dari produk atau output, harga dan biaya pada pasar-
pasar tertentu. Misal efisiensi harga atau biaya
produksi, biaya promosi penjualan (termasuk nilai
informasi), volume penjualan dan efisiensi pertukaran.
Indikator dalam menentukan efisiensi pemasaran

dengan pendekatan SCP

TERIMA KASIH
PASAR PERSAINGAN
SEMPURNA
Pertemuan 8
Copyright © 2001 by Harcourt, Inc.
All rights reserved. Requests for permission to make copies of any part of the
work should be mailed to:
Permissions Department, Harcourt College Publishers,
6277 Sea Harbor Drive, Orlando, Florida 32887-6777.
PENENTUAN HARGA DALAM PASAR PERSAINGAN
SEMPURNA
Struktur pasar :
Sifat-sifat (characteristics) organisasi pasar
yang mempengaruhi perilaku dan keragaan
perusahaan.
Misal : Jumlah penjual & keadaan produk
(nature of the product), mudah
sulitnya memasuki industri dll.
Lanjutan…
2 Aturan Bagi Perusahaan Yg Memaksimumkan
Keuntungan:
1. Perusahaan tidak akan berproduksi apabila AR dari
penjualan produknya tidak sama/tidak melebihi
AVC.
2. Perusahaan akan terus menambah produksi
selama MR> MC, dan berhenti menambah
produksinya jika MR=MC.
Lanjutan…
 Ke-2 aturan di atas merupakan penegasan
dari 3 necessary conditions agar perusahaan
mencapai  maksimum, yaitu:
1) P  AVC
2) MR = MC
3) Kurva MC harus memotong kurva

MR dari bawah.
Asumsi-Asumsi Pasar
Persaingan Sempurna :
1. Terdapat banyak penjual dan pembeli
2. Perusahaan berperilaku sebagai price taker
3. Adanya kebebasan bagi perusahaan untuk keluar
masuk industri
4. Produk homogen
Perusahaan vs Industri
Industri :
Kumpulan perusahaan yang memproduksi
produk yang sejenis.
Misal :
Industri Sepatu berarti kumpulan perusahaan
yang memproduksi sepatu
Asumsi-asumsi Pasar (Lanjutan…)
Berdasarkan asumsi yang ke-2 maka
permintaan yang dihadapi oleh satu
perusahaan adalah :
elastis sempurna (berbentuk garis horizontal).
Gambar ii
Sedangkan kurva permintaan yang dihadapi

industri memiliki slope negatif (turun dari kiri
atas ke kanan bawah). Gambar i
Kurva Permintaan Perusahaan & Industri
Harga
4 S 4
3 3
Dperusahaan
2 2
1 Dps 1
0 Jumlah
100
20
200
40
10
30
300
400
(Ton)
(i) Kurva Permintaan Industri (ii) Kurva permintaan yang
dihadapi oleh perusahaan
Penerimaan Perusahaan
• Total Revenue (Penerimaan Total)
TR = P x Q
• Average Revenue (Penerimaan Rata-Rata)
AR = P.Q/Q = P
• Marginal Revenue (Penerimaan Marjinal)
MR = P(Q + 1) – P.Q
= P.Q + P – P.Q = P
Tabel 8.1. Konsep Penerimaan untuk Perusahaan
Penerima Harga
Q P per Unit TR= p x q AR=TR/Q MR = TR/q

10 3.00 30 3
11 3.00 33 3 3
12 3.00 36 3 3
13 3.00 39 3 3
Gambar 8.2. Kurva Penerimaan untuk
Perusahaan Penerima Harga
TR P=AR=MR
TR
36
39
Rp per Unit
D=P=AR=MR
Harga
33 3
30
Dperusahaan
Output 0 5 10 Output
10
15
11
13
0 5
Kurva permintaan yang

Kurva penerimaan total
juga merupakan kurva
AR, MR dan Harga
Lanjutan…
14 MC
12 ATC
AVC
10
Biaya Per Unit
E
p= 8
p=AR=MR
6
p1 F
4
0
q1
0 2 4 6 8 10
Jumlah Output
Gambar I.3. Keseimbangan Jangka Pendek

Perusahaan dalam Pasar Persaingan
Sempurna P = MC
Kemungkinan Keuntungan Perusahaan Persaingan
Sempurna dalam Jangka Pendek
AVC<P<ATC P=ATC P>ATC

14 14 14
MC MC MC
12 ATC 12 ATC 12 ATC
10 AVC 10 AVC 10 AVC
p3=8
8 8
p=AR=MR
6 6 6
p2
p1=4 4 4
2 2 2
0 0 0
q2 q3
0 2 4q1 6 8 10 0 5 10 0 5 10
Juml ah Output Jumlah Output Jumlah Output
Dalam jangka pendek terdapat lima kemungkinan
keuntungan/kerugian yang dialami oleh perusahaan:
1. Jika AVC < P < ATC perusahaan dapat menutupi

seluruh TVC, tetapi hanya sebagian dari
TFC. Perusahaan dapat berproduksi. Gambar
i.
2. Jika P = ATC perusahaan memperolah laba
normal. Gambar ii.
Dalam jangka pendek terdapat lima
kemungkinan keuntungan/kerugian yang dialami
oleh perusahaan:
3. Jika P > ATC perusahaan memperoleh laba
positif. Gambar iii.
4. Jika P = AVC perusahaan berada dalam
kondisi Shut Down Point (titik kritis). Pada
kasus ini semua biaya variabel dapat tertutupi
tetapi semua biaya tetap tidak tertutupi.
5. Jika P < AVC perusahaan gulung tikar.
KURVA PENAWARAN PERUSAHAAN DALAM PPS
(i) Kurva AVC, ATC dan MC (ii) Kurva Penawaran

Perusahaan
Kurva Penawaran Pasar
P P P
SA SB
P2 P2 P2
P1 P1 P1
4 8 q q q
5 10 9 18
(i) Perusahaan A (ii) Perusahaan B (iii) Pasar (ndustri)
Kurva Penawaran Perusahaan & Industri
 Kurva penawaran suatu perusahaan adalah MC yang

dimulai dari tingkat output MC memotong AVC dari bawah.
 Kurva penawaran industri adalah jumlah horizontal dari kurva

penawaran perusahaan-perusahaan.
KESEIMBANGAN JANGKA PANJANG
 Keuntungan yang diperoleh perusahaan dalam

industri bersaing merupakan sinyal masuknya (entry)
perusahaan baru ke dalam industri; penawaran
industri meningkat (dari S0 ke S1), jumlah yang
diperjual belikan di pasar naik (qE ke q1) dan harga di
pasar turun (dari PE ke P1), sehingga keuntungan
perusahaan turun. Demikian seterusnya.
 Perusahaan akan berhenti masuk ke dalam industri
jika perusahaan-perusahaan dalam industri
memperoleh laba normal.
(Lanjutan…)
 Kerugianyang diperoleh perusahaan dalam industri

bersaing merupakan sinyal keluarnya (exit)
perusahaan dari industri; penawaran industri
menurun, akibatnya harga di pasar naik, sehingga
penerimaan perusahaan meningkat. Demikian
seterusnya sampai laba yang diperoleh adalah laba
normal.
(Lanjutan…)
 Dalam jangka panjang perusahaan haruslah

berproduksi pada biaya minimum jangka
panjangnya. Tingkat output yang diproduksi paada
biaya minimum ini disebut minimum efficient scale
(MES).
(Lanjutan…)
HARGA
S0
S1
E0
PE
E1
P1
q0 qE q1 JUMLAH
Gambar XI.7. Pengaruh Masuknya Perusahaan

Baru pada Kurva Penawaran Pasar
Respon Jangka Panjang Terhadap
Perubahan Teknologi
 Apabila dalam jangka panjang terjadi perubahan
teknologi yang dapat menurunkan kurva biaya dari
perusahaan-perusahaan yang baru dibangun, maka
perusahaan-perusahaan baru tersebut akan
memperoleh laba ekonomi.
 Penemuan teknologi baru ini disamping meningkatkan
kapasitas perusahaan juga menurunkan harga, yang
akan terus berlangsung sampai P = ATC jangka pendek
perusahaan-perusahaan baru. Pada harga produk ini,
perusahaan-perusahaan lama tidak lagi mampu
menutup ATC jangka panjangnya.
Respon Jangka Panjang Terhadap
Perubahan Teknologi
 Apabilamesin-mesin dan lain-lain faktor tetap dari

perusahaan-perusahaan lama itu sudah tua, mereka
akan keluar industri. Akhirnya akan terbentuk
keseimbangan jangka panjang yang baru, dimana
perusahaan-perusahaan dalam industri sudah
mempergunakan teknologi baru.
lanjutan…
HARGA HARGA MC HARGA

MC MC
ATC ATC
ATC
AVC AVC
E E3
P0 P0 E1 P0 AVC
Output Output Output
(i) Perusahaan 1 (lama) (ii) Perusahaan 2 (baru) (iii) Perusahaan 3 (paling baru)
DAYA TARIK PERSAINGAN SEMPURNA
• Dua daya tarik PPS:

(1) Daya tarik non ekonomi ; bekerjanya
mekanisme pasar
(2) Daya tarik ekonomi; efisiensi
produktif dan efisiensi alokatif
DAYA TARIK PERSAINGAN SEMPURNA
(Lanjutan…)
 Efisiensi Produktif.
Tercapai jika produksi dihasilkan dengan biaya
seminimum mungkin. Perusahaan berproduksi
pada saat ATC minimum.
• Efisiensi Alokatif.
Efisiensi alokatif tercapai apabila sudah tidak
mungkin mengubah alokasi sumber daya untuk
membuat seseorang lebih baik keadaannya tanpa
menyebabkan orang lain lebih buruk.
Tercapai jika P = MC.
Gambar 8.9. Interpretasi Grafis dari Efisiensi
Alokatif
P S = MC
D1 P’2
P1
B
P* Harga Persaingan
E
P1’ S1 P2
D
q* q2 q
0 q1
PEMBENTUKAN HARGA PASAR
MONOPOLI &
PERBANDINGANNYA DG PPS
Pertemuan 9
Copyright © 2001 by Harcourt, Inc.
All rights reserved. Requests for permission to make copies of any part of
the
work should be mailed to:
Permissions Department, Harcourt College Publishers,
6277 Sea Harbor Drive, Orlando, Florida 32887-6777.
Pengertian Monopoli
Monopoli :
Struktur pasar dimana seluruh output industri
diproduksi & dikontrol oleh satu perusahaan.
Asumsi Monopoli
1. Banyak pembeli, satu penjual

2. Perusahaan bertidak sebagai price maker
3. Produk homogen
4. Terdapat halangan bagi perusahaan lain untuk
masuk industri
Kurva permintaan monopolis
Karena dalam industri hanya terdapat 1
produsen, maka kurva D yang dihadapi
monopolis = kurva D yang dihadapi industri
(berslope negative)
Tabel 9.1. Hubungan Antara Penerimaan Rata-rata dg

Penerimaan Marginal
Harga (p = AR) Jumlah (q) TR= p x q MR = TR/q

9.10 9 81.90
9.00 10 90.00 8.10
8.90 11 97.90 7.90
Gambar 9.1. Kurva D, AR & MR
10
5
D = AR
Rupiah Per Unit
MR
0 50 100 Jumlah
MR, TR & Elastisitas Permintaan
Hubungan antara MR dan elastisitas dapat

dirumuskan;
1
MR  p (1  )
dimana; e
p = harga
e = elastisitas permintaan, bertanda negatif
Gambar 9.2. Hubungan TR, AR, MR dg Ed
10
elastis
Harga
5 e= -1
inelastis
MR
D
0
0 25 50 75 100 125
Jumlah
300
250
Penerimaan Total
200
TR
150
100
50
0
0 25 50 75 100 125
Keuntungan Maksimum Pada Pasar
Monopoli
 Keuntungan maksimum
monopoli tercapai pada
saat MR=MC.
Posisi Keuntungan Monopoli
Tidak ada jaminan bahwa monopolis akan mendapat
keuntungan. Jika monopolis tidak dapat
menghilangkan kerugiannya, perusahaan akhirnya
akan jatuh.
Pd Gambar 9.3 (i) monopoli memperoleh laba positif.

Pd Gambar 9.3 (ii), Jika biaya rata-rata perusahaan di
ATC3 perusahaan mengalami kerugian, sedangkan jika
di ATC2 perusahaan memperoleh laba normal
Gambar 9.3. Keuntungan Monopolis
Rupiah Per Unit Rupiah Per

Unit
MC
MC
ATC3
P0 ATC2
P0 ATC1
D
D
MR MR
0 q0 Output 0 q0 Output
(i) (ii)
Kurva Penawaran Monopolist
Berbeda dengan PPS, pd monopoli tidak

terdapat hubungan yang unik antara P dg
jumlah output yang ditawarkan
Keseimbangan Jangka Panjang
 Monopolis yg memperoleh keuntungan dalam jangka
panjang harus menciptakan hambatan bagi perusahaan lain
untuk masuk ke dalam industri.
Hambatan tersebut dapat berupa:

1. Pengusaan bahan baku
2. Pengusaan teknik produksi tertentu
3. Tindakan yuridis, yaitu diberikannya hak-hak paten
4. Diperoleh secara institusional, misalnya pemberianlisensi
oleh pemerintah untuk berusaha secara tunggal.
Inefisiensi Monopoli
Efisiensi & Inefisiensi Produksi

 Pada perusahaan monopoli, efisiensi produksi
mungkin tercapai dan mungkin tidak.
• Pd Gambar 9.4 (i); Efisiensi produksi tercapai.

• Pd Gambar 9.4.(ii); Efisiensi produksi tidak tercapai.
Gambar 9.4. Efisiensi & Inefisiensi Produksi
P P MC
MC
P1 P1 ATC
ATC
P2
ATC
ATCmin ATCmin
D
D=P=AR
MR
MR
(i) (ii)
Inefisiensi Monopoli
Inefisiensi Alokati (P> MC)

Pada monopoli Efisiensi alokatif tidak
pernah tercapai, karena monopoli
berproduksi pada saat
MC = MR tetapi  P
Diskriminasi Harga
 Diskriminasi harga ;
Menjual komoditi yang sama dalam
jumlah komoditi yang berbeda pada
harga yang berbeda. Perbedaan ini
bukan disebabkan oleh perbedaan
biaya.
Diskriminasi Harga (lanjutan…)
Diskriminasi harga terjadi jika:

(1) Penjual dapat mengontrol jumlah komoditi
yang dijual kepada setiap pembeli atau
kelompok pembeli.
(2) Penjual dapat mencegah penjualan kembali
komoditi dari pembeli yang menghadapi
harga rendah kepada pembeli yang
menghadapi harga tinggi.
Diskriminasi Harga (lanjutan…)
 Akibat-akibat positif dari diskriminasi

harga ;
(1) Perusahaan akan memperoleh TR yang
lebih tinggi.
(2) Output yang dijual lebih tinggi
daripada output perusahaan
monopoli dengan satu harga.
DERAJAT-DERAJAT DISKRIMINASI
HARGA
(1) Diskriminasi harga derajat pertama

(2) Diskriminasi harga derajat kedua
(3) Diskriminasi harga derajat ketiga
Diskriminasi Harga Derajat I
- Untuk dapat melakukan kebijaksanaan DH I

monopolist harus mengetahui permintaan dari
setiap konsumen.
- Pada DH I monopolist mengambil seluruh surplus

konsumen
Gambar 9.5. Diskriminasi Harga Derajat I
P
100
75
DB
DA
0 5 Q
10
Diskriminasi Harga Derajat II
- DH II biasanya diterapkan pada komoditi

public utility.
- Pd DH II monopolist hanya mengambil
sebagian dari SK
Gambar 9.8. Diskriminasi Harga Derajat
II
P
P0
A
P1 R B
P2 S C
P3 T D
0 K L M N Q
Diskriminasi Harga Derajat III
DH III dapat diterapkan apabila:
(1) Terdapat dua atau lebih pasar yang mempunyai
elastisitas permintaan yang berbeda.
(2) Barang dari pasar yang satu tidak dapat dijual
ke pasar yang lainnya.
Pd DH III, keuntungan maksimum dicapai oleh
monopoli bila MR dari tiap pasar = MC. Monopolist
akan menetapkan P yang lebih rendah pada pasar yang
elastisitas permintaannya lebih elastis dan sebaliknya
(Gambar 9.7).
Gambar 9.7. Penentuan Harga DH III
P
P1
D1
P2
D2
MC
MR1 MR2
Q1 Q
0 Q2
Perbandingan Bentuk Pasar Monopoli dg PPS
Pengaruh Perubahan Biaya Produksi
Bila ditemukan suatu teknologi baru, MC bergeser ke kanan.
Keseimbangan yang baru tercapai pada tingkat Q yang lebih tinggi
dan P yang lebih rendah (Gambar 9.8)
Apabila faktor-faktor lain tetap, kenaikan Q & penurunan P pada PPS

akan lebih besar daripada pasar monopoli.
Gambar 9.8. Pengaruh Perubahan Biaya Produksi pd Monopoli &
PPS
P P
S=MC
MC
D
S1=MC1
MC1
Pm
Pc
Pm1
Pc1
qc qc1 Q qm qm1 Q
Perubahan dari PPS Menjadi Monopoli Tanpa
diikuti Perubahan Biaya
• Jika perusahaan dalam PPS berubah menjadi

monopoli tanpa perubahan biaya, maka Q akan
turun (dari qc ke qc) sedangkan P akan naik (dari Pc
ke Pm ). Gambar 9.9.
• Terjadi deadweight loss sebesar segitiga acd : abc

berasal dari SK dan bcd berasal dari SP
Gambar 9.10. Perubahan PPS Menjadi Monopoli Tanpa
Perubahan Biaya
MC=S
Pm a
b c
Pc
d
D
MR
Q
qm qc
0
Perubahan dari PPS menjadi monopoli yang diikuti
perubahan biaya
Perubahan dr PPS menjadi monopoli dapat

menyebabkan biaya menjadi lebih murah, sehingga
MC bergeser ke kanan. Keuntungan yang diperoleh
dengan adanya perubahan biaya tersebut disebut
economies of scope (Gambar 9.11).
Economies of scope dapat dicapai dengan

menghasilkan bermacam-macam output, distribusi
dalam skala besar, iklan secara nasional dan
pembelian input dalam jumlah besar.
Gambar 9.11. Perubahan PPS menjadi Monopoli
yang diikuti perubahan biaya
P
MCc=S
MCM
Pc
Pm
D
MR
0 qc qm Q
INSENTIF UNTUK BERINOVASI
• Inovasi Pada Struktur Pasar Monopoli
Adanya inovasi menyebabkan biaya produksi turun,
sehingga  meningkat.  pada perusahan monopoli
dapat dinikmat dalam jangka pendek maupun panjang,
kerena ada halangan bagi perusahaan lain untuk masuk
industri.
Umumnya perusahaan monopoli adalah perusahaan

besar, sehingga lebih mudah menyediakan dana
penelitian & pengembangan dibandingkan perusahaan
PPS.
INSENTIF UNTUK BERINOVASI (Lanjutan…)
• Inovasi Pada Struktur PPS

Adanya inovasi dalam PPS juga akan menyebabkan
biaya produksi turun, sehingga  meningkat. Tetapi
 yang dinikmati oleh PPS hanya berlaku hanya
dalam jangka pendek. Sebab, dalam jangka
panjang perusahaan baru bebas masuk ke dalam
industri. Dalam jangka panjang,  perusahaan
pada PPS adalah keuntungan normal.
10
CHAPTER
Market Power:
Monopoly and
Monopsony
Prepared by:
Fernando & Yvonn Quijano
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 8e.
CHAPTER 12 OUTLINE
12.1 Monopolistic Competition

12.2 Oligopoly
12.3 Price Competition
12.4 Competition versus Collusion:
The Prisoners’ Dilemma
12.5 Implications of the Prisoners’ Dilemma for
Oligopolistic Pricing
12.6 Cartels
Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
● monopolistic competition Market in which firms can

enter freely, each producing its own brand or version of a
differentiated product.
● oligopoly Market in which only a few firms compete

with one another, and entry by new firms is impeded.
● cartel Market in which some or all firms explicitly

collude, coordinating prices and output levels to
maximize joint profits.
12.1 MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
A monopolistically competitive market has two key characteristics:
1. Firms compete by selling differentiated products that are highly

substitutable for one another but not perfect substitutes. In other
words, the cross-price elasticities of demand are large but not
infinite.
2. There is free entry and exit: it is relatively easy for new firms to
enter the market with their own brands and for existing firms to
leave if their products become unprofitable.

Figure 12.1
A Monopolistically
Short and Long Run
Because the firm is the
only producer of its
brand, it faces a
downward-sloping
demand curve.
Price exceeds marginal
cost and the firm has
monopoly power.
In the short run,
described in part (a),
price also exceeds
average cost, and the
firm earns profits
shaded rectangle.

Figure 12.1 (continued)
A Monopolistically
Short and Long Run
In the long run, these
profits attract new firms
with competing brands.
The firm’s market share
falls, and its demand
curve shifts downward.
In long-run equilibrium,
described in part (b),
price equals average
cost, so the firm earns
zero profit even though
it has monopoly power.

Figure 12.2
Comparison of
Monopolistically
Equilibrium
Under perfect
competition, price
equals marginal cost.
The demand curve
facing the firm is
horizontal, so the zero-
profit point occurs at
the point of minimum
average cost.

Comparison of
Monopolistically
Equilibrium
Under monopolistic
competition, price
exceeds marginal cost.
Thus there is a
deadweight loss, as
shaded area.
The demand curve is
downward-sloping, so
the zero profit point is In both types of markets, entry occurs until profits are
to the left of the point of driven to zero.
minimum average cost.
In evaluating monopolistic competition, these
inefficiencies must be balanced against the gains to
consumers from product diversity.
TABLE 12.1 Elasticities of Demand for Brands of Colas and Coffee

Brand Elasticity of Demand
Colas Royal Crown –2.4
Coke –5.2 to –5.7
Ground coffee Folgers –6.4
Maxwell House –8.2
Chock Full o’Nuts –3.6
With the exception of Royal Crown and Chock Full o’ Nuts,

all the colas and coffees are quite price elastic. With
elasticities on the order of −4 to −8, each brand has only
limited monopoly power. This is typical of monopolistic
competition.
12.2 OLIGOPOLY
In oligopolistic markets, the products may or may not be

differentiated.
What matters is that only a few firms account for most or all of total
production.
In some oligopolistic markets, some or all firms earn substantial
profits over the long run because barriers to entry make it difficult
or impossible for new firms to enter.
Oligopoly is a prevalent form of market structure. Examples of
oligopolistic industries include automobiles, steel, aluminum,
petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and computers.
12.2 OLIGOPOLY
• Equilibrium in an Oligopolistic Market
When a market is in equilibrium, firms are doing the best they can
and have no reason to change their price or output.
Nash Equilibrium Equilibrium in oligopoly markets means that

each firm will want to do the best it can given what its competitors
are doing, and these competitors will do the best they can given
what that firm is doing.
● Nash equilibrium Set of strategies or actions in which

each firm does the best it can given its competitors’ actions.
● duopoly Market in which two firms compete with each other.

12.2 OLIGOPOLY

● Cournot model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a
homogeneous good, each firm treats the output of its competitors as
fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously how much to produce.
Figure 12.3
Firm 1’s Output Decision
Firm 1’s profit-maximizing output depends on
how much it thinks that Firm 2 will produce.
If it thinks Firm 2 will produce nothing, its
demand curve, labeled D1(0), is the market
demand curve. The corresponding marginal
revenue curve, labeled MR1(0), intersects
Firm 1’s marginal cost curve MC1 at an output
of 50 units.
If Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 will produce 50
units, its demand curve, D1(50), is shifted to
the left by this amount. Profit maximization
now implies an output of 25 units.
Finally, if Firm 1 thinks that Firm 2 will
produce 75 units, Firm 1 will produce only
12.5 units.
12.2 OLIGOPOLY
● reaction curve Relationship between a firm’s profit-maximizing
output and the amount it thinks its competitor will produce.
Figure 12.4
Reaction Curves
and Cournot Equilibrium
Firm 1’s reaction curve shows
how much it will produce as a
function of how much it thinks
Firm 2 will produce.
Firm 2’s reaction curve shows its
output as a function of how much
it thinks Firm 1 will produce.
In Cournot equilibrium, each firm
correctly assumes the amount
that its competitor will produce
and thereby maximizes its own
profits. Therefore, neither firm will
move from this equilibrium.
● Cournot equilibrium Equilibrium in the Cournot model in which
each firm correctly assumes how much its competitor will produce
and sets its own production level accordingly.
12.2 OLIGOPOLY
Two identical firms face the following market demand curve
P = 30 – Q
Also, MC1 = MC2 = 0
Total revenue for firm 1: R1 = PQ1 = (30 –Q)Q1
then MR1 = ∆R1/∆Q1 = 30 – 2Q1 –Q2
Setting MR1 = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) and solving for Q1, we find
Firm 1’s reaction curve: Q  15- 1 Q

1 2 2
By the same calculation, Firm 2’s reaction curve: Q2  15- 1 Q2

2
Cournot equilibrium: Q1  Q2 10
Total quantity produced: Q  Q1  Q2  20

12.2 OLIGOPOLY
If the two firms collude, then the total profit-maximizing quantity can
be obtained as follows:
Total revenue for the two firms: R = PQ = (30 –Q)Q = 30Q – Q2,
then MR1 = ∆R/∆Q = 30 – 2Q
Setting MR = 0 (the firm’s marginal cost) we find that total profit is
maximized at Q = 15.
Then, Q1 + Q2 = 15 is the collusion curve.
If the firms agree to share profits equally, each will produce half of
the total output:
Q1 = Q2 = 7.5
12.2 OLIGOPOLY
Figure 12.5
Duopoly Example
The demand curve is P =

30 − Q, and both firms
have zero marginal cost.
In Cournot equilibrium,
each firm produces 10.
The collusion curve shows
combinations of Q1 and Q2
that maximize total profits.
If the firms collude and
share profits equally, each
will produce 7.5.
Also shown is the
competitive equilibrium, in
which price equals
marginal cost and profit is
zero.
12.2 OLIGOPOLY
• First Mover Advantage—The Stackelberg Model
● Stackelberg model Oligopoly model in which one firm sets its
output before other firms do.
Suppose Firm 1 sets its output first and then Firm 2, after observing
Firm 1’s output, makes its output decision. In setting output, Firm 1
must therefore consider how Firm 2 will react.
P = 30 – Q
Also, MC1 = MC2 = 0
1
Firm 2’s reaction curve: Q2  15- 2 Q2
Firm 1’s revenue: R1  PQ1  30Q1  Q12  Q2Q1
And MR1 = ∆R1/∆Q1 = 15 – Q1
Setting MR1 = 0 gives Q1 = 15, and Q2 = 7.5

We conclude that Firm 1 produces twice as much as Firm 2 and
makes twice as much profit. Going first gives Firm 1 an advantage.
12.3 PRICE COMPETITION
• Price Competition with Homogeneous
• Products—The Bertrand Model
● Bertrand model Oligopoly model in which firms produce a

homogeneous good, each firm treats the price of its competitors
as fixed, and all firms decide simultaneously what price to
charge.
P = 30 – Q
MC1 = MC2 = $3
Q1=Q2 = 9, and in Cournot equilibrium, the market price is $12,
so that each firm makes a profit of $81.
Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand model results in both firms
setting price equal to marginal cost: P1=P2=$3. Then industry
output is 27 units, of which each firm produces 13.5 units, and
both firms earn zero profit.
In the Cournot model, because each firm produces only 9 units,
the market price is $12. Now the market price is $3. In the
Cournot model, each firm made a profit; in the Bertrand model,
the firms price at marginal cost and make no profit.
Suppose each of two duopolists has fixed costs of $20 but zero
variable costs, and that they face the same demand curves:
Firm 1’s demand: Q1  12  2 P1  P2
Firm 2’s demand: Q2  12  2P2  P1
Choosing Prices
Firm 1’s profit: 1  PQ
1 1
 20  12P1  2P12  20
Firm 1’s profit maximizing price: 1 / P1  12  4P1  P2  0
Firm 1’s reaction curve: P1  3  1 P2

4
Firm 2’s reaction curve: P2  3  1 P1

4

Figure 12.6
Nash Equilibrium in Prices
Here two firms sell a differentiated

product, and each firm’s demand
depends both on its own price and on its
competitor’s price. The two firms choose
their prices at the same time, each taking
its competitor’s price as given.
Firm 1’s reaction curve gives its profit-
maximizing price as a function of the
price that Firm 2 sets, and similarly for
Firm 2.
The Nash equilibrium is at the
intersection of the two reaction curves:
When each firm charges a price of $4, it
is doing the best it can given its
competitor’s price and has no incentive
to change price.
Also shown is the collusive equilibrium: If
the firms cooperatively set price, they will
choose $6.
P&G’s demand curve for monthly sales: Q  3375PU ( PU )( PK ).25
Assuming that P&G’s competitors face the same demand conditions, with what price
should you enter the market, and how much profit should you expect to earn?
TABLE 9.1 Airline Industry Data

Competitor’s (Equal) Prices ($)
P& G’s
Price ($) 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80
1.10 –226 –215 –204 –194 –183 –174 –165 –155
1.20 –106 –89 –73 –58 –43 –28 –15 –2
1.30 –56 –37 –19 2 15 31 47 62
1.40 –44 –25 –6 12 29 46 62 78
1.50 –52 –32 –15 3 20 34 52 68
1.60 –70 –51 –34 –18 –1 14 30 44
1.70 –93 –76 –59 –44 –28 –13 1 15
1.80 –118 –102 –87 –72 –57 –44 –30 –17
12.4 COMPETITION VERSUS COLLUSION:
THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
In our example, there are two firms,
each of which has fixed costs of $20
and zero variable costs. They face the
same demand curves: ● payoff matrix Table showing
profit (or payoff) to each firm given
Firm 1’s demand: Q1  12  2 P1  P2
its decision and the decision of its
Firm 2’s demand: Q2  12  2P2  P1 competitor.
We found that in Nash equilibrium each
TABLE 12.3 Payoff Matrix for Pricing Game
firm will charge a price of $4 and earn a
profit of $12, whereas if the firms Firm 2
collude, they will charge a price of $6 Charge $4 Charge $6
and earn a profit of $16.
Charge $4 $12, $12 $20, $4
But if Firm 1 charges $6 and Firm 2 Firm 1
charges only $4, Firm 2’s profit will Charge $6 $4, $20 $16, $16
increase to $20. And it will do so at the
expense of Firm 1’s profit, which will fall
to $4.
 2  P2Q2  20  (4)[(12  (2)(4)  6]  20  $20
1  PQ
1 1
 20  (6)[12  (2)(6)  4]  20  $4
● noncooperative game Game in which negotiation and

enforcement of binding contracts are not possible.
● prisoners’ dilemma Game theory example in which two

prisoners must decide separately whether to confess to a crime;
if a prisoner confesses, he will receive a lighter sentence and
his accomplice will receive a heavier one, but if neither
confesses, sentences will be lighter than if both confess.
TABLE 12.4 Payoff Matrix for Prisoners’ Dilemma

Prisoner B
Confess Don’t confess
Confess –5, –5 –1, –10

Prisoner A
Don’t confess –10, –1 –2, –2
We argued that P&G should expect its competitors to charge a price of $1.40 and
should do the same. But P&G would be better off if it and its competitors all
charged a price of $1.50.
TABLE 12.5 Payoff Matrix for Pricing Problem

Unilever and KAO
Charge $1.40 Charge $1.50
Charge $1.40 $12, $12 $29, $11

P&G
Charge $1.50 $3, $21 $20, $20
Because these firms are in a prisoners’ dilemma. No matter what Unilever and Kao
do, P&G makes more money by charging $1.40.
12.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
FOR OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING
• Price Rigidity
● price rigidity Characteristic of oligopolistic markets

by which firms are reluctant to change prices even if
costs or demands change.
● kinked demand curve model Oligopoly model in

which each firm faces a demand curve kinked at the
currently prevailing price: at higher prices demand is
very elastic, whereas at lower prices it is inelastic.
• Price Rigidity
Figure 12.7
Each firm believes that if it raises

its price above the current price
P*, none of its competitors will
follow suit, so it will lose most of its
sales.
Each firm also believes that if it
lowers price, everyone will follow
suit, and its sales will increase
only to the extent that market
demand increases.
As a result, the firm’s demand
curve D is kinked at price P*, and
its marginal revenue curve MR is
discontinuous at that point.
If marginal cost increases from MC
to MC’, the firm will still produce
the same output level Q* and
charge the same price P*.
● price signaling Form of implicit collusion in which a

firm announces a price increase in the hope that other
firms will follow suit.
● price leadership Pattern of pricing in which one firm

regularly announces price changes that other firms then
match.
The interest rate that banks charge large corporate clients is

called the prime rate.
Because it is widely known, it is a convenient focal point for
price leadership.
The prime rate changes only when money market conditions
cause other interest rates to rise or fall substantially. When that
happens, one of the major banks announces a change in its
rate and other banks quickly follow suit.
Different banks act as leader from time to time, but when one
bank announces a change, the others follow within two or three
days.
Figure 12.8
The prime rate is the rate

that major banks charge
large corporate customers
for short-term loans. It
changes only infrequently
because banks are
reluctant to undercut one
another. When a change
does occur, it begins with
one bank, and other banks
quickly follow suit. The
corporate bond rate is the
return on long-term
corporate bonds. Because
these bonds are widely
traded, this rate fluctuates
with market conditions.
• The Dominant Firm Model

Figure 12.9
Price Setting by a Dominant Firm
D is the market demand curve, and

SF is the supply curve (i.e., the
aggregate marginal cost curve) of the
smaller fringe firms.
The dominant firm must determine its
demand curve DD. As the figure
shows, this curve is just the
difference between market demand
and the supply of fringe firms.
At price P1, the supply of fringe firms
is just equal to market demand; thus
the dominant firm can sell nothing.
At a price P2 or less, fringe firms will
not supply any of the good, so the
dominant firm faces the market
demand curve.
At prices between P1 and P2, the
dominant firm faces the demand
curve DD.
• The Dominant Firm Model

The dominant firm produces a

quantity QD at the point where its
marginal revenue MRD is equal to its
marginal cost MCD.
The corresponding price is P*.
At this price, fringe firms sell QF
Total sales equal QT.
12.6 CARTELS
Producers in a cartel explicitly agree to cooperate in setting prices
and output levels.
• Analysis of Cartel Pricing
Figure 12.10
TD is the total world demand curve

for oil, and Sc is the competitive
(non-OPEC) supply curve.
OPEC’s demand DOPEC is the
difference between the two.
Because both total demand and
competitive supply are inelastic,
OPEC’s demand is inelastic.
OPEC’s profit-maximizing quantity
QOPEC is found at the intersection
of its marginal revenue and
marginal cost curves; at this
quantity, OPEC charges price P*.
If OPEC producers had not
cartelized, price would be Pc, where
OPEC’s demand and marginal cost
curves intersect.
12.6 CARTELS
Figure 12.11
The CIPEC Copper Cartel
TD is the total demand for

copper and Sc is the
competitive (non-CIPEC)
supply.
CIPEC’s demand DCIPEC is
the difference between the
two.
Both total demand and
competitive supply are
relatively elastic, so
CIPEC’s demand curve is
elastic, and CIPEC has
very little monopoly power.
Note that CIPEC’s optimal
price P* is close to the
competitive price Pc.
12.6 CARTELS
In intercollegiate athletics, there are many firms and

consumers, which suggests that the industry is competitive. But
the persistently high level of profits in this industry is
inconsistent with competition. This profitability is the result of
monopoly power, obtained via cartelization.
The cartel organization is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The
NCAA restricts competition in a number of important ways.
To reduce bargaining power by student athletes, the NCAA creates and enforces
rules regarding eligibility and terms of compensation.
To reduce competition by universities, it limits the number of games that can be
played each season and the number of teams that can participate in each division.
12.6 CARTELS
In 1996, the federal government allowed milk producers

in the six New England states to cartelize. The cartel—called
the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact—set minimum
wholesale prices for milk, and was exempt from the antitrust
laws. The result was that consumers in New England paid more
for a gallon of milk than consumers elsewhere in the nation.
Studies have suggested that the cartel covering the New England states has caused
retail prices of milk to rise by only a few cents a gallon. Why so little? The reason is
that the New England cartel is surrounded by a fringe of noncartel producers.
10
CHAPTER
Market Power:
Monopoly and
Monopsony
Prepared by:
CHAPTER 10 OUTLINE
10.1 Monopoly
10.2 Monopoly Power
10.3 Sources of Monopoly Power
10.4 The Social Costs of Monopoly Power
10.5 Monopsony
10.6 Monopsony Power
10.7 Limiting Market Power: The Antitrust Laws
Market Power: Monopoly and Monopsony
● monopoly Market with only one seller.
● monopsony Market with only one buyer.
● market power Ability of a seller or buyer

to affect the price of a good.
10.1 MONOPOLY
● marginal revenue Change in revenue

resulting from a one-unit increase in output.
TABLE 10.1 Total, Marginal, and Average Revenue

Total Marginal Average
Price (P) Quantity (Q) Revenue (R) Revenue (MR) Revenue (AR)
$6 0 $0 --- ---
5 1 5 $5 $5
4 2 8 3 4
3 3 9 1 3
2 4 8 -1 2
1 5 5 -3 1
10.1 MONOPOLY

Figure 10.1
Average and Marginal
Revenue
Average and marginal
revenue are shown for
the demand curve
P = 6 − Q.
10.1 MONOPOLY

Figure 10.2
Profit Is Maximized When Marginal

Revenue Equals Marginal Cost
Q* is the output level at which

MR = MC.
If the firm produces a smaller
output—say, Q1—it sacrifices
some profit because the extra
revenue that could be earned
from producing and selling the
units between Q1 and Q*
exceeds the cost of producing
them.
Similarly, expanding output from
Q* to Q2 would reduce profit
because the additional cost
would exceed the additional
revenue.
10.1 MONOPOLY
We can also see algebraically that Q* maximizes profit. Profit π is the

difference between revenue and cost, both of which depend on Q:
As Q is increased from zero, profit will increase until it reaches a

maximum and then begin to decrease. Thus the profit-maximizing
Q is such that the incremental profit resulting from a small increase
in Q is just zero (i.e., Δπ /ΔQ = 0). Then
But ΔR/ΔQ is marginal revenue and ΔC/ΔQ is marginal cost. Thus

the profit-maximizing condition is that
, or
10.1 MONOPOLY
• An Example
Figure 10.3
Example of Profit Maximization
Part (a) shows total revenue R, total cost C,

and profit, the difference between the two.
Part (b) shows average and marginal
revenue and average and marginal cost.
Marginal revenue is the slope of the total
revenue curve, and marginal cost is the
slope of the total cost curve.
The profit-maximizing output is Q* = 10, the
point where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost.
At this output level, the slope of the profit
curve is zero, and the slopes of the total
revenue and total cost curves are equal.
The profit per unit is $15, the difference
between average revenue and average cost.
Because 10 units are produced, total profit is
$150.
10.1 MONOPOLY
We want to translate the condition that marginal revenue should

equal marginal cost into a rule of thumb that can be more easily
applied in practice.
To do this, we first write the expression for marginal revenue:
10.1 MONOPOLY
Note that the extra revenue from an incremental unit of quantity,

Δ(PQ)/ΔQ, has two components:
1. Producing one extra unit and selling it at price P brings in
revenue (1)(P) = P.
2. But because the firm faces a downward-sloping demand
curve, producing and selling this extra unit also results in a
small drop in price ΔP/ΔQ, which reduces the revenue from
all units sold (i.e., a change in revenue Q[ΔP/ΔQ]).
Thus,
10.1 MONOPOLY

(Q/P)(ΔP/ΔQ) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand,
1/Ed, measured at the profit-maximizing output, and
Now, because the firm’s objective is to maximize profit, we

can set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost:
which can be rearranged to give us
(10.1)
Equivalently, we can rearrange this equation to express

price directly as a markup over marginal cost:
(10.2)
10.1 MONOPOLY
In 1995, Prilosec, represented a new generation of

antiulcer medication. Prilosec was based on a very
different biochemical mechanism and was much more
effective than earlier drugs.
By 1996, it had become the best-selling drug in the world and faced no
major competitor.
Astra-Merck was pricing Prilosec at about $3.50 per daily dose.
The marginal cost of producing and packaging Prilosec is only about 30 to
40 cents per daily dose.
The price elasticity of demand, ED, should be in the range of roughly −1.0 to
−1.2.
Setting the price at a markup exceeding 400 percent over marginal cost is
consistent with our rule of thumb for pricing.
10.1 MONOPOLY
• Shifts in Demand
A monopolistic market has no supply curve.
The reason is that the monopolist’s output decision depends not only
on marginal cost but also on the shape of the demand curve.
Shifts in demand can lead to changes in price with no change in
output, changes in output with no change in price, or changes in both
price and output.
10.1 MONOPOLY
• Shifts in Demand
Figure 10.4
Shifts in Demand
Shifting the demand curve shows

that a monopolistic market has no
supply curve—i.e., there is no
one-to-one relationship between
price and quantity produced.
In (a), the demand curve D1 shifts
to new demand curve D2.
But the new marginal revenue
curve MR2 intersects marginal
cost at the same point as the old
marginal revenue curve MR1.
The profit-maximizing output
therefore remains the same,
although price falls from P1 to P2.
In (b), the new marginal revenue
curve MR2 intersects marginal
cost at a higher output level Q2.
But because demand is now more
elastic, price remains the same.
10.1 MONOPOLY
• The Effect of a Tax

Suppose a specific tax of t dollars per unit is levied, so that the monopolist
must remit t dollars to the government for every unit it sells. If MC was the
firm’s original marginal cost, its optimal production decision is now given by
Figure 10.5
Effect of Excise Tax on Monopolist
With a tax t per unit, the firm’s

effective marginal cost is
increased by the amount t to
MC + t.
In this example, the increase in
price ΔP is larger than the tax t.
10.1 MONOPOLY
Suppose a firm has two plants. What should its total output be, and how
much of that output should each plant produce? We can find the answer
intuitively in two steps.
● Step 1. Whatever the total output, it should be divided between

the two plants so that marginal cost is the same in each plant.
Otherwise, the firm could reduce its costs and increase its profit
by reallocating production.
● Step 2. We know that total output must be such that marginal

revenue equals marginal cost. Otherwise, the firm could increase
its profit by raising or lowering total output.
10.1 MONOPOLY
We can also derive this result algebraically. Let Q1 and C1 be the output
and cost of production for Plant 1, Q2 and C2 be the output and cost of
production for Plant 2, and QT = Q1 + Q2 be total output. Then profit is
The firm should increase output from each plant until the incremental profit
from the last unit produced is zero. Start by setting incremental profit from
output at Plant 1 to zero:
Here Δ(PQT)/ΔQ1 is the revenue from producing and selling one more unit—
i.e., marginal revenue, MR, for all of the firm’s output.
10.1 MONOPOLY
The next term, ΔC1/ΔQ1, is marginal cost at Plant 1, MC1. We thus have
MR − MC1 = 0, or
Similarly, we can set incremental profit from output at Plant 2 to zero,
Putting these relations together, we see that the firm should produce so that
(10.3)
10.1 MONOPOLY

Figure 10.6
Production with Two Plants
A firm with two plants

maximizes profits by
choosing output levels Q1
and Q2 so that marginal
revenue MR (which
depends on total output)
equals marginal costs for
each plant, MC1 and MC2.
10.2 MONOPOLY POWER
Figure 10.7
The Demand for Toothbrushes
Part (a) shows the market

demand for toothbrushes.
Part (b) shows the demand
for toothbrushes as seen by
Firm A.
At a market price of $1.50,
elasticity of market demand
is −1.5.
Firm A, however, sees a
much more elastic demand
curve DA because of
competition from other firms.
At a price of $1.50, Firm A’s
demand elasticity is −6.
Still, Firm A has some
monopoly power: Its profit-
maximizing price is $1.50,
which exceeds marginal
cost.
10.2 MONOPOLY POWER
• Measuring Monopoly Power
Remember the important distinction between a perfectly competitive firm

and a firm with monopoly power: For the competitive firm, price equals
marginal cost; for the firm with monopoly power, price exceeds marginal
cost.
● Lerner Index of Monopoly Power
Measure of monopoly power calculated
as excess of price over marginal cost as
a fraction of price.
Mathematically:
This index of monopoly power can also be expressed in terms of the

elasticity of demand facing the firm.
(10.4)
10.2 MONOPOLY POWER
• The Rule of Thumb for Pricing
Figure 10.8
Elasticity of Demand and Price Markup
The markup (P − MC)/P is equal to minus the inverse of the elasticity of demand facing the firm.
If the firm’s demand is elastic, as in (a), the markup is small and the firm has little monopoly power.
The opposite is true if demand is relatively inelastic, as in (b).
10.2 MONOPOLY POWER
Although the elasticity of market demand for

food is small (about −1), no single supermarket
can raise its prices very much without losing
customers to other stores.
The elasticity of demand for any one
supermarket is often as large as −10. We find P
= MC/(1 − 0.1) = MC/(0.9) = (1.11)MC.
The manager of a typical supermarket should set prices about 11 percent
above marginal cost.
Small convenience stores typically charge higher prices because its customers
are generally less price sensitive.
Because the elasticity of demand for a convenience store is about −5, the
markup equation implies that its prices should be about 25 percent above
marginal cost.
With designer jeans, demand elasticities in the range of −2 to −3 are typical.
This means that price should be 50 to 100 percent higher than marginal cost.
10.2 MONOPOLY POWER
TABLE 10.2 Retail Prices of VHS and DVDs

1985 2007
Title Retail Price VHS Title Retail Price DVD
Purple Rain $29.88 Pirates of the Caribbean $19.99
Raiders of the Lost Ark $24.95 The Da Vinci Code $19.99
Jane Fonda Workout $59.95 Mission: Impossible III $17.99
The Empire Strikes Back $79.98 King Kong $19.98
An Officer and a Gentleman $24.95 Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire $17.49
Star Trek: The Motion Picture $24.95 Ice Age $19.99
Star Wars $39.98 The Devil Wears Prada $17.99
Source (2007): Based on http://www.amazon.com. Suggested retail price.
10.2 MONOPOLY POWER
Figure 10.9
Video Sales
Between 1990 and 1998, lower

prices induced consumers to buy
many more videos.
By 2001, sales of DVDs overtook
sales of VHS videocassettes.
High-definition DVDs were
introduced in 2006, and are
expected to displace sales of
conventional DVDs.
10.3 SOURCES OF MONOPOLY POWER
• The Elasticity of Market Demand
If there is only one firm—a pure monopolist—its demand curve is the market
demand curve.
Because the demand for oil is fairly inelastic (at least in the short run), OPEC
could raise oil prices far above marginal production cost during the 1970s and
early 1980s.
Because the demands for such commodities as coffee, cocoa, tin, and copper
are much more elastic, attempts by producers to cartelize these markets and
raise prices have largely failed.
In each case, the elasticity of market demand limits the potential monopoly
power of individual producers.
• The Number of Firms
When only a few firms account for most of the sales in a market, we say that
the market is highly concentrated.
● barrier to entry Condition that

impedes entry by new competitors.
• The Interaction Among Firms
Firms might compete aggressively, undercutting one another’s prices to

capture more market share.
This could drive prices down to nearly competitive levels.
Firms might even collude (in violation of the antitrust laws), agreeing to limit
output and raise prices.
Because raising prices in concert rather than individually is more likely to be
profitable, collusion can generate substantial monopoly power.
10.4 THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY POWER
Figure 10.10
Deadweight Loss from Monopoly Power
The shaded rectangle and triangles

show changes inc consumer and
producer surplus when moving from
competitive price and quantity, Pc
and Qc,
to a monopolist’s price and quantity,
Pm and Qm.
Because of the higher price,
consumers lose A + B
and producer gains A − C. The
deadweight loss is B + C.
• Rent Seeking
● rent seeking Spending money in

socially unproductive efforts to acquire,
maintain, or exercise monopoly.
In 1996, the Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) successfully lobbied the
Clinton administration for regulations requiring that the ethanol (ethyl alcohol)
used in motor vehicle fuel be produced from corn.
Why? Because ADM had a near monopoly on corn-based ethanol production,
so the regulation would increase its gains from monopoly power.
Figure 10.11
Price Regulation
If left alone, a monopolist

produces Qm and charges
Pm.
When the government
imposes a price ceiling of
P1 the firm’s average and
marginal revenue are
constant and equal to P1
for output levels up to Q1.
For larger output levels, the
original average and
marginal revenue curves
apply.
The new marginal revenue
curve is, therefore, the dark
purple line, which intersects
the marginal cost curve at
Q1.
Price Regulation
When price is lowered to

Pc, at the point where
marginal cost intersects
average revenue, output
increases to its maximum
Qc. This is the output that
would be produced by a
competitive industry.
Lowering price further, to
P3 reduces output to Q3
and causes a shortage,
Q’3 − Q3.
• Natural Monopoly
● natural monopoly Firm that can produce

the entire output of the market at a cost
lower than what it would be if there were
several firms.
Figure 10.12
Regulating the Price of a Natural
Monopoly
A firm is a natural monopoly
because it has economies of
scale (declining average and
marginal costs) over its entire
output range.
If price were regulated to be Pc
the firm would lose money and
go out of business.
Setting the price at Pr yields the
largest possible output consistent
with the firm’s remaining in
business; excess profit is zero.
• Regulation in Practice
● rate-of-return regulation Maximum price

allowed by a regulatory agency is based on the
(expected) rate of return that a firm will earn.
The difficulty of agreeing on a set of numbers to be used in rate-of-return

calculations often leads to delays in the regulatory response to changes in
cost and other market conditions.
The net result is regulatory lag—the delays of a year or more usually entailed
in changing regulated prices.
10.5 MONOPSONY
● oligopsony Market with only a few buyers.
● monopsony power Buyer’s ability to affect

the price of a good.
● marginal value Additional benefit derived

from purchasing one more unit of a good.
● marginal expenditure Additional cost of

buying one more unit of a good.
● average expenditure Price paid per unit of a

good.
10.5 MONOPSONY
Figure 10.13
Competitive Buyer Compared to Competitive Seller
In (a), the competitive buyer takes market price P* as given. Therefore, marginal expenditure and
average expenditure are constant and equal;
quantity purchased is found by equating price to marginal value (demand).
In (b), the competitive seller also takes price as given. Marginal revenue and average revenue are
constant and equal;
quantity sold is found by equating price to marginal cost.
10.5 MONOPSONY
Figure 10.14
Competitive Buyer Compared to

Competitive Seller
The market supply curve is

monopsonist’s average expenditure
curve AE.
Because average expenditure is
rising, marginal expenditure lies
above it.
The monopsonist purchases quantity
Q*m, where marginal expenditure
and marginal value (demand)
intersect.
The price paid per unit P*m is then
found from the average expenditure
(supply) curve.
In a competitive market, price and
quantity, Pc and Qc, are both higher.
They are found at the point where
average expenditure (supply) and
marginal value (demand) intersect.
10.5 MONOPSONY
• Monopsony and Monopoly Compared
Figure 10.15
Monopoly and Monopsony
These diagrams show the close analogy between monopoly and monopsony.
(a) The monopolist produces where marginal revenue intersects marginal cost.
Average revenue exceeds marginal revenue, so that price exceeds marginal cost.
(b) The monopsonist purchases up to the point where marginal expenditure intersects marginal value.
Marginal expenditure exceeds average expenditure, so that marginal value exceeds price.
10.6 MONOPSONY POWER
Figure 10.16
Monopsony Power: Elastic versus Inelastic Supply
Monopsony power depends on the elasticity of supply.

When supply is elastic, as in (a), marginal expenditure and average expenditure do not differ by
much, so price is close to what it would be in a competitive market.
The opposite is true when supply is inelastic, as in (b).
• Sources of Monopsony Power

Elasticity of Market Supply
If only one buyer is in the market—a pure monopsonist—its monopsony
power is completely determined by the elasticity of market supply. If
supply is highly elastic, monopsony power is small and there is little gain
in being the only buyer.
Number of Buyers
When the number of buyers is very large, no single buyer can have much
influence over price. Thus each buyer faces an extremely elastic supply
curve, so that the market is almost completely competitive.
Interaction Among Buyers
If four buyers in a market compete aggressively, they will bid up the price
close to their marginal value of the product, and will thus have little
monopsony power. On the other hand, if those buyers compete less
aggressively, or even collude, prices will not be bid up very much, and
the buyers’ degree of monopsony power might be nearly as high as if
there were only one buyer.
• The Social Costs of Monopsony Power

Figure 10.17
Deadweight Loss from
Monopsony Power
The shaded rectangle and

triangles show changes in
buyer and seller surplus
when moving from
competitive price and
quantity, Pc and Qc,
to the monopsonist’s price
and quantity, Pm and Qm.
Because both price and
quantity are lower, there is
an increase in buyer
(consumer) surplus given
by A − B.
Producer surplus falls by
A + C, so there is a
deadweight loss given by
triangles B and C.
• Bilateral Monopoly
● bilateral monopoly Market with only

one seller and one buyer.
Monopsony power and monopoly power will tend to

counteract each other.
The role of monopsony power was

investigated to determine the extent to which
variations in price—cost margins could be
attributed to variations in monopsony power.
The study found that buyers’ monopsony
power had an important effect on the price—
cost margins of sellers.
In industries where only four or five buyers account for all or nearly all sales,
the price-cost margins of sellers would on average be as much as 10
percentage points lower than in comparable industries with hundreds of buyers
accounting for sales.
Each major car producer in the United States typically buys an individual part
from at least three, and often as many as a dozen, suppliers.
For a specialized part, a single auto company may be the only buyer.
As a result, the automobile companies have considerable monopsony power.
10.7 LIMITING MARKET POWER: THE ANTITRUST LAWS
● antitrust laws Rules and regulations

prohibiting actions that restrain, or are
likely to restrain, competition.
There have been numerous instances of illegal combinations. For example:

● In 1996, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) and two other major
producers of lysine (an animal feed additive) pleaded guilty to criminal
charges of price fixing.
● In 1999, four of the world’s largest drug and chemical companies—Roche
A.G. of Switzerland, BASF A.G. of Germany, Rhone-Poulenc of France, and
Takeda Chemical Industries of Japan—were charged by the U.S.
Department of Justice with taking part in a global conspiracy to fix the prices
of vitamins sold in the United States.
● In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice began an investigation of price
fixing by DRAM (dynamic access random memory) producers. By 2006, five
manufacturers—Hynix, Infineon, Micron Technology, Samsung, and
Elpida—had pled guilty for participating in an international price-fixing
scheme.
● parallel conduct Form of implicit

collusion in which one firm consistently
follows actions of another.
● predatory pricing Practice of

pricing to drive current competitors out
of business and to discourage new
entrants in a market so that a firm can
enjoy higher future profits.
• Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws are enforced in three ways:
1. Through the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
2. Through the administrative procedures of the Federal Trade Commission.
3. Through private proceedings.
Antitrust in Europe
The responsibility for the enforcement of antitrust concerns that involve two or
more member states resides in a single entity, the Competition Directorate.
Separate and distinct antitrust authorities within individual member states are
responsible for those issues whose effects are felt within particular countries.
The antitrust laws of the European Union are quite similar to those of the United
States. Nevertheless, there remain a number of differences between antitrust
laws in Europe and the United States.
Merger evaluations typically are conducted more quickly in Europe.
It is easier in practice to prove that a European firm is dominant than it is to show
that a U.S. firm has monopoly power.
Robert Crandall, president and CEO of American, made a phone call to

Howard Putnam, president and chief executive of Braniff. It went like this:
Crandall: I think it’s dumb as hell for Christ’s sake, all right, to sit here and
pound the @!#$%&! out of each other and neither one of us making a
@!#$%&! dime.
Putnam: Well . . .
Crandall: I mean, you know, @!#$%&!, what the hell is the point of it?
Putnam: But if you’re going to overlay every route of American’s on top of
every route that Braniff has—I just can’t sit here and allow you to bury us
without giving our best effort.
Crandall: Oh sure, but Eastern and Delta do the same thing in Atlanta and
have for years.
Putnam: Do you have a suggestion for me?
Crandall: Yes, I have a suggestion for you. Raise your @!#$%&! fares 20
percent. I’ll raise mine the next morning.
Putnam: Robert, we. . .
Crandall: You’ll make more money and I will, too.
Putnam: We can’t talk about pricing!
Crandall: Oh @!#$%&!, Howard. We can talk about any @!#$%&! thing we
want to talk about.
Crandall was wrong. Talking about prices and agreeing to fix them is a clear
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
However, proposing to fix prices is not enough to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act: For the law to be violated, the two parties must agree to
collude.
Therefore, because Putnam had rejected Crandall’s proposal, Section 1 was
not violated.
Did Microsoft engage in illegal practices?

The U.S. Government said yes; Microsoft disagreed.
Here are some of the U.S. Department of Justice’s
major claims and Microsoft’s responses.
DOJ claim: Microsoft has a great deal of market power in the market for PC
operating systems—enough to meet the legal definition of monopoly Power.
MS response: Microsoft does not meet the legal test for monopoly power
because it faces significant threats from potential competitors that offer or will
offer platforms to compete with Windows.
DOJ claim: Microsoft viewed Netscape’s Internet browser as a threat to its
monopoly over the PC operating system market. In violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, Microsoft entered into exclusionary agreements with computer
manufacturers and Internet service providers with the objective of raising the
cost to Netscape of making its browser available to consumers.
MS response: The contracts were not unduly restrictive. In any case,
Microsoft unilaterally agreed to stop most of them.
DOJ claim: In violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Microsoft engaged in

practices designed to maintain its monopoly in the market for desktop PC
operating systems. It tied its browser to the Windows 98 operating system,
even though doing so was technically unnecessary. This action was predatory
because it made it difficult or impossible for Netscape and other firms to
successfully offer competing products.
MS response: There are benefits to incorporating the browser functionality
into the operating system. Not being allowed to integrate new functionality into
an operating system will discourage innovation. Offering consumers a choice
between separate or integrated browsers would cause confusion in the
marketplace.
DOJ claim: In violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Microsoft attempted
to divide the browser business with Netscape and engaged in similar conduct
with both Apple Computer and Intel.
MS response: Microsoft’s meetings with Netscape, Apple, and Intel were for
valid business reasons. Indeed, it is useful for consumers and firms to agree
on common standards and protocols in developing computer software.
N. GREGORY MANKIW
PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS
Eight Edition
Pertemuan
Monopoly
Premium PowerPoint Slides by:

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duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole Eastern Illinois University
or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed
207
with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-
protected website or school-approved learning management
Look for the answers to these questions:
• Why do monopolies arise?
• Why is MR < P for a monopolist?
• How do monopolies choose their P and Q?
• How do monopolies affect society’s well-being?
• What is price discrimination?
© 2018 Cengage Learning®. May not be scanned, copied or

duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole
208
Introduction
• Monopoly
• A firm that is the sole seller of a product without close substitutes
• Has market power
• The ability to influence the market price of the product it sells
• A competitive firm has no market power
• Arise due to barriers to entry
• Other firms cannot enter the market to compete with it

209
Three Barriers to Entry
1. Monopoly resources
• A single firm owns a key resource.
• E.g., DeBeers owns most of the world’s
diamond mines
2. Government regulation
• The government gives a single firm the exclusive right to produce the good.
• E.g., patents, copyright laws

210
Three Barriers to Entry
3. The production process
• Natural monopoly: a single firm can produce
the entire market Q at lower cost than could
several firms
Cost Electricity
Example: 1000 homes
ATC slopes
need electricity.
downward due
ATC is lower if one firm to huge FC and
services all 1000 homes $80 small MC
than if two firms each $50 ATC
service 500 homes.
Q
500
duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole 1000
211
A competitive firm’s A monopolist’s
Monopoly vs. Competition: Demand Curves
P
demand curve
P
demand curve
D
Q Q
•In a competitive market, the market demand curve slopes downward.
But the demand curve for any individual firm’s product is horizontal at
the market price. The firm can increase Q without lowering P, so MR =
P for the competitive firm.
•A monopolist is the only seller, so it faces the market demand curve.
To sell a larger Q, the firm must reduce P. Thus, MR ≠ P.
212
Active Learning 1 Answers
• P = AR, Q P TR AR MR
same as for a
competitive firm. 0 $4.50 $0 n.a.
$4
• MR < P, whereas MR = 1 4.00 4 $4.00
3
P for a competitive 2 3.50 7 3.50
firm. 2
3 3.00 9 3.00
1
4 2.50 10 2.50
0
5 2.00 10 2.00
–1
6 1.50
9 1.50
213
Common Grounds’P,DMRand MR Curves
Q P MR
$5
0 $4.50
$4 4
Demand curve (P)
1 4.00 3
3
2 3.50 2
2 1
3 3.00
1 0
4 2.50
0 -1 MR
5 2.00 -2
–1
6 1.50 -3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Q
214
Profit-Maximization
• Like a competitive firm, a monopolist maximizes profit by producing
the quantity where MR = MC
• Sets the highest price consumers are willing to pay for that quantity
• It finds this price from the D curve

215
Profit-Maximization
Costs and
Revenue MC
The profit-maximizing P
Q is where MR = MC.
Find P from the
demand curve at this D
Q.
MR
Q Quantity
Profit-maximizing output
216
The Monopolist’s Costs
Profitand
Revenue MC
As with a competitive
firm, P
the monopolist’s ATC
ATC
profit equals
(P – ATC) x Q D
MR
Q Quantity

217
A Monopoly Does Not Have an S Curve
• A competitive firm takes P as given

• Has a supply curve that shows how its Q depends on P
• A monopoly firm is a “price-maker”
• Q does not depend on P
• Q and P are jointly determined by MC, MR, and the demand curve
• Hence, no supply curve for monopoly.

218
CASE Patents
STUDY: onMonopoly
new drugsvs. Generic DrugsThe market for
give a temporary Price a typical drug
monopoly to the
seller.
PM
When the
patent expires, PC = MC
the market D
becomes
competitive, MR
generics appear.
QM Quantity
QC
219
The Welfare
• Recall: Cost of Monopoly
• Competitive market equilibrium: P = MC and total surplus is
maximized
• Monopoly equilibrium, P > MR = MC
• The value to buyers of an additional unit (P)
exceeds the cost of the resources needed to
produce that unit (MC)
• The monopoly Q is too low – could increase total
surplus with a larger Q.
• Monopoly results in a deadweight loss

220
TheCompetitive
Welfareequilibrium:
Cost of Monopoly
Price Deadweight
• quantity = QC loss MC
• P = MC
• total surplus is P
maximized P = MC
MC
Monopoly equilibrium:
• quantity = QM D
• P > MC MR
• deadweight loss
QM QC Quantity

221
Price Discrimination
• Price discrimination:
• Sell the same good at different prices to different buyers
• A firm can increase profit by charging a higher price to buyers with higher
willingness to pay
• Requires the ability to separate customers according to their willingness to
pay
• Can raise economic welfare

222
• Perfect price discrimination

• Charge each customer a different price
• Exactly his or her willingness to pay
• Monopoly firm gets the entire surplus (Profit)
• No deadweight loss

duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in
223 part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain
product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or
school-approved learning management system for classroom use.
Single Price Monopoly
Here, the Consumer

Price
monopolist surplus
charges the same Deadweight
price (PM) to all PM loss
buyers.
MC
Monopoly
profit D
A deadweight loss
MR
results.
QM Quantity
224
Here,
Perfect theDiscrimination
Price monopolist vs. Single Price Monopoly
produces the competitive
quantity, but charges each Price
buyer his or her WTP. Monopoly
This is called perfect price profit
discrimination.
The monopolist captures
all CS as profit. MC
But there’s no DWL. D
MR
Quantity
© 2018 Cengage Learning®. May not be scanned, copied or Q
225
Between Monopoly and Competition
Two extremes
• Perfect competition: many firms, identical products
• Monopoly: one firm
In between these extremes: imperfect competition

• Oligopoly: only a few sellers offer similar or identical
products.
• Monopolistic competition: many firms sell similar but
not identical products.
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 226

Comparing Perfect & Monop. Competition
Perfect Monopolistic
competition competition
number of sellers many many

free entry/exit yes yes
long-run econ. profits zero zero
the products firms sell identical differentiated
firm has market power? none, price-taker yes

downward-
D curve facing firm horizontal
sloping
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 227

Summary
• A monopoly is a firm that is the sole seller in its market.
• A monopoly arises when a single firm owns a key resource, when
the government gives a firm the exclusive right to produce a good,
or when a single firm can supply the entire market at a lower cost
than many firms could.
• Faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its product.

228
Summary
• Monopoly increases production by 1 unit
• Causes the price of its good to fall, which reduces the amount
of revenue earned on all units produced.
• Marginal revenue is always below the price
• A monopoly firm maximizes profit by producing the quantity at
which marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
• Sets the price at which that quantity is demanded. P > MR, so P >
MC

229
Summary
• A monopolist’s profit-maximizing level of output is below the
level that maximizes the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
• Causes deadweight losses
• A monopolist can often increase profits by charging different
prices for the same good based on a buyer’s willingness to pay.
• Price discrimination can raise economic welfare
• Perfect price discrimination, the deadweight loss of monopoly is
completely eliminated

230
10
CHAPTER
Market Power:
Monopoly and
Monopsony
Prepared by:
CHAPTER 11 OUTLINE
11.1 Capturing Consumer Surplus
11.2 Price Discrimination
11.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination and
Peak-Load Pricing
11.4 The Two-Part Tariff
11.5 Bundling
11.6 Advertising
11.1 CAPTURING CONSUMER SURPLUS
Figure 11.1
Capturing Consumer Surplus
If a firm can charge only one price for

all its customers, that price will be P*
and the quantity produced will be Q*.
Ideally, the firm would like to charge a
higher price to consumers willing to
pay more than P*, thereby capturing
some of the consumer surplus under
region A of the demand curve.
The firm would also like to sell to
consumers willing to pay prices lower
than P*, but only if doing so does not
entail lowering the price to other
consumers.
In that way, the firm could also
capture some of the surplus under
region B of the demand curve.
● price discrimination Practice of
charging different prices to different
consumers for similar goods.
11.2 PRICE DISCRIMINATION
First-Degree Price Discrimination
● first-degree price discrimination Practice of

charging each customer her reservation price.
Figure 11.2
Additional Profit from Perfect First-Degree
Because the firm charges each consumer her

reservation price, it is profitable to expand
output to Q**.
When only a single price, P*, is charged, the
firm’s variable profit is the area between the
marginal revenue and marginal cost curves.
With perfect price discrimination, this profit
expands to the area between the demand
curve and the marginal cost curve.
● variable profit Sum of profits on each incremental

unit produced by a firm; i.e., profit ignoring fixed costs.
First-Degree Price Discrimination

Perfect Price Discrimination
The additional profit from producing and selling an incremental unit
is now the difference between demand and marginal cost.
Imperfect Price Discrimination
Figure 11.3
First-Degree Price Discrimination in
Practice
Firms usually don’t know the
reservation price of every
consumer, but sometimes
reservation prices can be roughly
identified.
Here, six different prices are
charged. The firm earns higher
profits, but some consumers may
also benefit.
With a single price P*4, there are
fewer consumers.
The consumers who now pay P5 or
P6 enjoy a surplus.
Second-Degree Price Discrimination

● second-degree price discrimination Practice of charging different
prices per unit for different quantities of the same good or service.
● block pricing Practice of charging different prices for different
quantities or “blocks” of a good.
Figure 11.4
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Different prices are charged for

different quantities, or “blocks,” of
the same good. Here, there are
three blocks, with corresponding
prices P1, P2, and P3.
There are also economies of
scale, and average and marginal
costs are declining. Second-
degree price discrimination can
then make consumers better off
by expanding output and lowering
cost.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination

● third-degree price discrimination Practice of dividing consumers
into two or more groups with separate demand curves and charging
different prices to each group.
Creating Consumer Groups
If third-degree price discrimination is feasible, how should the firm decide

what price to charge each group of consumers?
• We know that however much is produced, total output should be

divided between the groups of customers so that marginal revenues
for each group are equal.
• We know that total output must be such that the marginal revenue for
each group of consumers is equal to the marginal cost of production.

● third-degree price discrimination Practice of dividing consumers
into two or more groups with separate demand curves and charging
different prices to each group.
Creating Consumer Groups
(11.1)

Determining Relative Prices
(11.2)
Figure 11.5
Consumers are divided into two groups, with

separate demand curves for each group. The
optimal prices and quantities are such that
the marginal revenue from each group is the
same and equal to marginal cost.
Here group 1, with demand curve D1, is
charged P1,
and group 2, with the more elastic demand
curve D2, is charged the lower price P2.
Marginal cost depends on the total quantity
produced QT.
Note that Q1 and Q2 are chosen so that MR1
= MR2 = MC.

Determining Relative Prices
Figure 11.6
No Sales to Smaller Market
Even if third-degree price discrimination

is feasible, it may not pay to sell to both
groups of consumers if marginal cost is
rising.
Here the first group of consumers, with

demand D1, are not willing to pay much
for the product.
It is unprofitable to sell to them because

the price would have to be too low to
compensate for the resulting increase in
marginal cost.
Coupons provide a means of price

discrimination.
Studies show that only about 20 to 30 percent of all
consumers regularly bother to clip, save, and use
coupons.
Rebate programs work the same way.
Only those consumers with relatively price-sensitive demands bother to send
in the materials and request rebates.
Again, the program is a means of price discrimination.
TABLE 11.1 Price Elasticities of Demand for Users versus Nonusers of Coupons
PRICE ELASTICITY
Product Nonusers Users
Toilet tissue −0.60 −0.66
Stuffing/dressing −0.71 −0.96
Shampoo −0.84 −1.04
Cooking/salad oil −1.22 −1.32
Dry mix dinners −0.88 −1.09
Cake mix −0.21 −0.43
Cat food −0.49 −1.13
Frozen entrees −0.60 −0.95
Gelatin −0.97 −1.25
Spaghetti sauce −1.65 −1.81
Creme rinse/conditioner −0.82 −1.12
Soups −1.05 −1.22
Hot dogs −0.59 −0.77
Travelers are often amazed at the variety of fares available for

round-trip flights from New York to Los Angeles.
Recently, for example, the first-class fare was above $2000; the regular
(unrestricted) economy fare was about $1700, and special discount fares
(often requiring the purchase of a ticket two weeks in advance and/or a
Saturday night stayover) could be bought for as little as $400.
These fares provide a profitable form of price discrimination. The gains from
discriminating are large because different types of customers, with very
different elasticities of demand, purchase these different types of tickets.
TABLE 11.2 Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel

FARE CATEGORY
Elasticity First Class Unrestricted Coach Discounted
Price −0.3 −0.4 −0.9
Income 1.2 1.2 1.8

11.3 INTERTEMPORAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION
AND PEAK-LOAD PRICING
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
● intertemporal price discrimination Practice of separating
consumers with different demand functions into different
groups by charging different prices at different points in time.
● peak-load pricing Practice of charging higher prices during
peak periods when capacity constraints cause marginal costs
to be high.
Figure 11.7
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Consumers are divided into groups

by changing the price over time.
Initially, the price is high. The firm

captures surplus from consumers
who have a high demand for the
good and who are unwilling to wait
to buy it.
Later the price is reduced to appeal

to the mass market.
Peak-Load Pricing
Figure 11.8
Peak-Load Pricing
Demands for some goods and

services increase sharply during
particular times of the day or year.
Charging a higher price P1 during

the peak periods is more profitable
for the firm than charging a single
price at all times.
It is also more efficient because

marginal cost is higher during peak
periods.
Publishing both hardbound and paperback

editions of a book allows publishers to price
discriminate.
Some consumers want to buy a new
bestseller as soon as it is released, even if
the price is $25. Other consumers,
however, will wait a year until the book is
available in paperback for $10.
The key is to divide consumers into two groups, so that those who are willing
to pay a high price do so and only those unwilling to pay a high price wait and
buy the paperback.
It is clear, however, that those consumers willing to wait for the paperback
edition have demands that are far more elastic than those of bibliophiles.
It is not surprising, then, that paperback editions sell for so much less than
hardbacks.
11.4 THE TWO-PART TARIFF
● two-part tariff Form of pricing in which

consumers are charged both an entry and a
usage fee.
Single Consumers
Figure 11.9
Two-Part Tariff with a Single Consumer
The consumer has demand curve

D.
The firm maximizes profit by setting

usage fee P equal to marginal cost
and entry fee T* equal to the entire

surplus of the consumer.
Two Consumers
Figure 11.10
Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
The profit-maximizing usage fee P*

will exceed marginal cost.
The entry fee T* is equal to the

surplus of the consumer with the
smaller demand.
The resulting profit is 2T* + (P* −

MC)(Q1 + Q2). Note that this profit is
larger than twice the area of triangle
ABC.
Many Consumers
Figure 11.11
Two-Part Tariff with Many Different Consumers
Total profit π is the sum of the profit from the entry

fee πa and the profit from sales πs. Both πa and πs
depend on T, the entry fee.
Therefore
π = πa + πs = n(T)T + (P− MC)Q(n)

where n is the number of entrants, which depends
on the entry fee T, and Q is the rate of sales, which
is greater the larger is n.
Here T* is the profit-maximizing entry fee, given P.
To calculate optimum values for P and T, we can
start with a number for P, find the optimum T, and
then estimate the resulting profit.
P is then changed and the corresponding T
recalculated, along with the new profit level.
In 1971, Polaroid introduced its SX-70 camera.

This camera was sold, not leased, to consumers.
Nevertheless, because film was sold separately,
Polaroid could apply a two-part tariff to the pricing
of the SX-70.
Why did the pricing of Polaroid’s cameras and film involve a two-part tariff?
Because Polaroid had a monopoly on both its camera and the film, only
Polaroid film could be used in the camera.
How should Polaroid have selected its prices for the camera and film? It could
have begun with some analytical spadework. Its profit is given by
π = PQ + nT− C1(Q) − C2(n)
where P is the price of the film, T the price of the camera, Q the quantity of
film sold, n the number of cameras sold, and C1(Q) and C2(n) the costs of
producing film and cameras, respectively.
Most telephone service is priced using a two-part

tariff: a monthly access fee, which may include
some free minutes, plus a per-minute charge for
additional minutes.
This is also true for cellular phone service, which has grown explosively,
both in the United States and around the world.
Because providers have market power, they must think carefully about
profit-maximizing pricing strategies.
The two-part tariff provides an ideal means by which cellular providers can
capture consumer surplus and turn it into profit.
11.5 BUNDLING
● bundling Practice of selling two or

more products as a package.
To see how a film company can use customer heterogeneity to its
advantage, suppose that there are two movie theaters and that their
reservation prices for our two films are as follows:
If the films are rented separately, the maximum price that could be charged
for Wind is $10,000 because charging more would exclude Theater B.
Similarly, the maximum price that could be charged for Gertie is $3000.
But suppose the films are bundled. Theater A values the pair of films at
$15,000 ($12,000 + $3000), and Theater B values the pair at $14,000
($10,000 + $4000). Therefore, we can charge each theater $14,000 for the
pair of films and earn a total revenue of $28,000.
11.5 BUNDLING
Relative Valuations
Why is bundling more profitable than selling the films separately? Because
the relative valuations of the two films are reversed.
The demands are negatively correlated—the customer willing to pay the
most for Wind is willing to pay the least for Gertie.
Suppose demands were positively correlated—that is, Theater A would pay
more for both films:
If we bundled the films, the maximum price that could be charged for
the package is $13,000, yielding a total revenue of $26,000, the same as
by renting the films separately.
11.5 BUNDLING
Relative Valuations
Figure 11.12
Reservation Prices
Reservation prices r1 and r2 for two

goods are shown for three
consumers, labeled A, B, and C.
Consumer A is willing to pay up to
$3.25 for good 1 and up to $6 for
good 2.
11.5 BUNDLING
Relative Valuations
Figure 11.13
Consumption Decisions When
Products Are Sold Separately
The reservation prices of consumers
in region I exceed the prices P1 and P2
for the two goods, so these
consumers buy both goods.
Consumers in regions II and IV buy
only one of the goods,
and consumers in region III buy
neither good.
11.5 BUNDLING
Relative Valuations
Figure 11.14
Consumption Decisions When
Products Are Bundled
Consumers compare the sum of their
reservation prices r1 + r2, with the
price of the bundle PB.
They buy the bundle only if r1 + r2 is at
least as large as PB.
11.5 BUNDLING
Relative Valuations
Figure 11.15
Reservation Prices
In (a), because demands are perfectly positively correlated, the firm does not gain by
bundling: It would earn the same profit by selling the goods separately.
In (b), demands are perfectly negatively correlated. Bundling is the ideal strategy—all
the consumer surplus can be extracted.
11.5 BUNDLING
Relative Valuations
Figure 11.16
Movie Example
Consumers A and B are two movie theaters.

The diagram shows their reservation prices
for the films Gone with the Wind and
Getting Gertie’s Garter.
Because the demands are negatively
correlated, bundling pays.
11.5 BUNDLING
Mixed Bundling
● mixed bundling Selling two or more goods both as a
package and individually.
● pure bundling Selling products only as a package.
Figure 11.17
Mixed versus Pure Bundling
With positive marginal costs, mixed

bundling may be more profitable than pure
bundling.
Consumer A has a reservation price for
good 1 that is below marginal cost c1,
and consumer D has a reservation price for
good 2 that is below marginal cost c2.
With mixed bundling, consumer A is
induced to buy only good 2, and consumer
D is induced to buy only good 1, thus
reducing the firm’s cost.
11.5 BUNDLING
Mixed Bundling
Let’s compare three strategies:

1. Selling the goods separately at prices P1 = $50 and P2 = $90.
2. Selling the goods only as a bundle at a price of $100.
3. Mixed bundling, whereby the goods are offered separately at
prices P1 = P2 = $89.95, or as a bundle at a price of $100.
11.5 BUNDLING
Mixed Bundling
Figure 11.18
Mixed Bundling with Zero Marginal Costs
If marginal costs are zero, and if consumers’ demands are

not perfectly negatively correlated, mixed bundling is still
more profitable than pure bundling.
In this example, consumers B and C are willing to pay $20
more for the bundle than are consumers A and D.
With pure bundling, the price of the bundle is $100. With
mixed bundling, the price of the bundle can be increased
to $120 and consumers A and D can still be charged $90
for a single good.
11.5 BUNDLING
Bundling in Practice
Figure 11.19
Mixed Bundling in Practice
The dots in this figure are estimates of

reservation prices for a representative
sample of consumers.
A company could first choose a price for
the bundle, PB, such that a diagonal line
connecting these prices passes roughly
midway through the dots.
The company could then try individual
prices P1 and P2.
Given P1, P2, and PB, profits can be
calculated for this sample of consumers.
Managers can then raise or lower P1, P2,
and PB and see whether the new pricing
leads to higher profits. This procedure is
repeated until total profit is roughly
maximized.
11.5 BUNDLING
For a restaurant, mixed bundling

means offering both complete dinners
(the appetizer, main course, and
dessert come as a package) and an à
la carte menu (the customer buys the
appetizer, main course, and dessert
separately).
This strategy allows the à la carte menu to be priced to capture
consumer surplus from customers who value some dishes much more
highly than others.
At the same time, the complete dinner retains those customers who
have lower variations in their reservation prices for different dishes
(e.g., customers who attach moderate values to both appetizers and
desserts).
11.5 BUNDLING
11.5 BUNDLING
Tying
● tying Practice of requiring a customer to

purchase one good in order to purchase another.
Why might firms use this kind of pricing practice?

One of the main benefits of tying is that it often allows a firm to
meter demand and thereby practice price discrimination more
effectively.
Tying can also be used to extend a firm’s market power.
Tying can have other uses. An important one is to protect customer
goodwill connected with a brand name.
This is why franchises are often required to purchase inputs from
the franchiser.
11.6 ADVERTISING
Figure 11.20
Effects of Advertising
AR and MR are average and marginal

revenue when the firm doesn’t advertise,
and AC and MC are average and marginal
cost.
The firm produces Q0 and receives a price P0.
Its total profit π0 is given by the gray-shaded

rectangle.
If the firm advertises, its average and
marginal revenue curves shift to the right.
Average cost rises (to AC′) but marginal cost
remains the same.
The firm now produces Q1 (where MR′ = MC),
and receives a price P1.
Its total profit, π1, is now larger.

11.6 ADVERTISING
The price P and advertising expenditure A to maximize profit, is

given by:
Advertising leads to increased output.

But increased output in turn means increased production costs,
and this must be taken into account when comparing the costs
and benefits of an extra dollar of advertising.
The firm should advertise up to the point that
(11.3)
= full marginal cost of

advertising
11.6 ADVERTISING
A Rule of Thumb for Advertising

First, rewrite equation (11.3) as follows:
Now multiply both sides of this equation by A/PQ, the advertising-

to-sales ratio.
● advertising-to-sales ratio Ratio of a firm’s
advertising expenditures to its sales.
● advertising elasticity of demand Ratio of a firm’s

advertising expenditures to its sales.
(11.4)
11.6 ADVERTISING
Convenience stores have lower price elasticities of

demand (around −5), but their advertising-to-sales
ratios are usually less than those for supermarkets
(and are often zero). Why?
Because convenience stores mostly serve customers who live nearby; they
may need a few items late at night or may simply not want to drive to the
supermarket.
Advertising is quite important for makers of designer jeans, who will have
advertising-to-sales ratios as high as 10 or 20 percent.
Laundry detergents have among the highest advertising-to-sales ratios of all
products, sometimes exceeding 30 percent, even though demand for any
one brand is at least as price elastic as it is for designer jeans. What
justifies all the advertising? A very large advertising elasticity.
11.6 ADVERTISING
AGB 133C sks 2(2-0)

Pertemuan ke-10
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE

(SCP)
PENELAAHAN
Sructure (S), conduct (C), dan performance (P) dalam suatu waktu
berada pada sistem dimana S dan C adalah faktor penentu dari P, dilain
waktu S dan C ditentukan oleh P. Hal ini menunjukkan suatu sistem dinamis
yang mengembangkan respon penyesuaian dari perusahaan terhadap kondisi
pasar dan keadaan yang memungkinkan.
Indikator dalam
menentukan
efisiensi pemasaran
dengan pendekatan
SCP
MARKET STRUCTURE
METODE YANG DIGUNAKAN DALAM MENENTUKAN STRUCTURE (1)

METODE YANG DIGUNAKAN DALAM MENENTUKAN STRUCTURE (2)

PENELAAHAN
STRUCTURE
dalam sistem
pemasaran gula
tebu di PTPN
BUMA
MARKET CONDUCT
PENELAAHAN CONDUCT
dalam sistem pemasaran gula tebu
MARKET PERFORMANCE
PENELAAHAN PERFORMANCE
dalam sistem pemasaran gula tebu (1)
c
PENELAAHAN PERFORMANCE
dalam sistem pemasaran gula tebu (2)

Jakarta, 25 November 2022
SRG & PLK

Sistem Resi Gudang
dan Pasar Lelang Komoditas
Biro Pembinaan dan Pengembangan SRG dan PLK - BAPPEBTI

www.bappebti.go.id ronabang.srgplk Ronabang.srgplk
I
Badan Pengawas
Perdagangan PBK
Berjangka Komoditi o Lindung nilai (Hedging)
o Price Discovery
o Sarana investasi
Referensi Harga
Referensi Harga
Penyerahan Fisik
Penyerahan Fisik
PLK Referensi
SRG
o Harga referensi Harga o Alternatif pembiayaan
o Efisiensi rantai perdagangan o Manajemen stok/tunda jual
o Akses Pasar Transaksi
o Efisiensi rantai pasok
o Jaminan Transaksi o Stabilisasi harga
Penyerahan Fisik
❑ UU No. 7 Tahun 2014 ❑ Perpres No. 75 Tahun 2022

Tentang Perdagangan Tentang Penataan Pembinaan dan
❑ UU No. 32 Tahun 1997 Pengembangan Pasar Lelang
Komoditas
Tentang Perdagangan Berjangka
Komoditi diubah dengan UU No 10 ❑ Kepmenperindag No. 650 Tahun 2004
Tahun 2011 Tentang Ketentuan Penyelenggaraan
Pasar Lelang Dengan Penyerahan
❑ UU No. 9 Tahun 2006
Kemudian (Forward) Komoditi Agro
Tentang Sistem Resi Gudang diubah
dengan UU No. 9 Tahun 2011
SISTEM RESI GUDANG
Sistem Resi Gudang
“Berbagai kegiatan yang berkaitan dengan
penerbitan, pengalihan, penjaminan, dan
penyelesaian transaksi Resi Gudang”
Resi Gudang
“Dokumen/surat bukti kepemilikan barang yang
disimpan di Gudang yang diterbitkan oleh
Pengelola Gudang tertentu”
UU No. 9 Tahun 2006

jo. UU No. 9 Tahun 2011
Komoditas
Sistem Resi Gudang
Kedelai
Gabah
Beras 20 KOMODITAS
Gula kristal putih Jagung
Permendag Nomor 14 Tahun 2021
Kopi Tentang Barang Dan Persyaratan Barang Yang Dapat
Ayam karkas beku Disimpan Dalam Gudang SRG
Pala Kakao
Ikan
Bawang merah
Timah
Lada
Karet
“
Penetapan Selanjutnya tentang barang dalam
SRG dilakukan dengan mempertimbangkan
Rumput laut
rekomendasi dari PEMDA, instansi terkait atau
Kopra Rotan asosiasi komoditas mengikuti ketentuan dalam
Teh Gambir Garam Permendag Nomor 14 Tahun 2021
Kelembagaan
Sistem Resi Gudang
Melakukan penatausahaan Resi Gudang dan

Derivatif Resi Gudang yang meliputi
BADAN pencatatan, penyimpanan,
Melakukan pembinaan, pengaturan dan pemindahbukuan kepemilikan,
pengawasan terhadap kegiatan yang PENGAWAS PUSAT pembebanan hak jaminan, pelaporan, serta
berkaitan dengan SRG (BAPPEBTI) REGISTRASI penyediaan sistem dan jaringan informasi
Memberikan persetujuan kepada Pengelola

Gudang, Gudang, LPK dan Pusat Registrasi
dalam Sistem Resi Gudang Melindungi hak
Pemegang Resi Gudang
SRG LEMBAGA
PENJAMIN
RESI GUDANG
dan/atau Penerima Hak
Jaminan
LEMBAGA
KEUANGAN
BANK / NONBANK Memelihara stabilitas dan
integritas SRG
PENGELOLA LPK Melakukan serangkaian kegiatan untuk

Melakukan penyimpanan, pemeliharaan, GUDANG
menilai atau membuktikan bahwa
dan pengawasan barang yang disimpan
persyaratan tertentu yang berkaitan dengan
oleh pemilik barang serta berhak
produk, proses, sistem, dan/atau personel
menerbitkan Resi Gudang
ASURANSI terpenuhi
Alur
3 Jika persyaratan telah sesuai dan telah
diverifikasi oleh Pusreg, Pengelola Gudang
dapat menerbitkan Resi Gudang lalu
Pemanfaatan SRG Resi Gudang diserahkan kepada Pemilik Barang
Uji Mutu
(LPK Uji Mutu)
Asuransi
(Lembaga
Asuransi) PASAR:
Petani & Lembaga Keuangan Pabrikan,
Pelaku Usaha Pengelola Gudang & Gudang SRG Ekspor, dll
2 4 5 Barang SRG dijual ke PASAR
1
Pengelola Gudang melakukan Pemilik (pedagang besar, pabrikan, eksportir,
penimbangan barang, lalu LPK Uji Mutu barang/pemegang dll), baik secara langsung maupun
melakukan pengujian kualitas barang Resi Gudang dapat tidak langsung (lelang), baik secara
Pemilik barang mengajukan offline maupun online
membawa komoditi ke Jika telah memenuhi persyaratan mutu, pembiayaan ke
Gudang SRG dan maka barang akan dibebani asuransi Lembaga Keuangan Apabila barang sedang dijaminkan
mengajukan dan dilanjutkan dengan serangkaian dengan agunan Resi pada Lembaga Pembiayaan, maka
permohonan proses penerbitan Resi Gudang melalui Gudang pemilik barang/pemegang Resi
penyimpanan barang Information Sistem Warehouse Receipt Gudang terlebih dahulu melakukan
kepada Pengelola - ISWARE (Pusat Registrasi) pelunasan ke Lembaga Pembiayaan
Gudang SRG
Tujuan & Manfaat
Sistem Resi Gudang
Saran Pemantauan/Pengendalian Stok Nasional

Instrumen Permodalan Transaksi Resi Gudang tercatat dalam Sistem Informasi Resi
Gudang/Information System Warehouse Resceipt (IS-WARE)
Menyediakan alternatif pembiayaan dengan agunan secara langsung dan real time dengan cakupan informasi:
inventori/barang yang disimpan di Gudang SRG jumlah, harga dan nilai barang, identitas pemilik, lokasi
penyimpanan, dll
Mewujudkan Sistem Perdagangan yang Efisien

✓ Efisiensi biaya yang mendukung kelancaran proses
produksi dan distribusi barang
Sarana Tunda Jual
✓ Memperpendek mata rantai perdagangan: tersedianya Memberikan alternatif pilihan bagi petani/penyimpan barang
offtaker (adanya kepastian buyer) dan Fasilitasi pemasaran untuk menjual komoditas pada titik harga terbaik
produk baik secara langsung maupun lelang (online) oleh
Pemerintah (Pusat & Daerah)
Pemberian Nilai Tambah Produk

Sarana Stabilisasi Harga Pasar ▪ Adanya kepastian mutu atas barang yang disimpan
Memfasilitasi cara penjualan yang dapat dilakukan ▪ Barang yang disimpan dapat diolah lebih lanjut sebelum
sepanjang tahun dijual ke pasar melalui fasilitas penunjang yang tersedia di
Gudang SRG
Transaksi Resi Gudang
1,219 Volume Komoditas SRG yang Ditransaksikan Pada Tahun 2022 (Ton; %)
Timah 1.30% Ikan 0.86% Kopi 0.26% Kedelai 0.03% Lada 0.01%
Transaksi Resi Gudang dalam 5 Tahun Terakhir Bawang Merah 0.14% Ayam Beku Karkas
(Miliar Rupiah) 0.12%
Gabah 5.00%
136%
Rumput Laut 5.64%
796
Beras 6.86%
Penerbitan
516 106%
Pembiayaan
170%
Gula 79.78%
357
72% 191 203%

11%
100 111
84% 118 32,367.00
21%
53 64 Volume Komoditas SRG
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022* yang Saat Ini Masih Aktif
dan Masih Disimpan di Gudang SRG (ton)
Gabah 30% Gabah 30,7% Timah 29% Timah 68% Gula 47,7%
Kopi 27,8% Rumput laut 14,5%
Kopi 25,7% Kopi 22,2% Timah 35,9%
Beras 5,6%
Beras 18,5% Beras 19,3% Gabah 15,2% Rumput Laut 8.1%
Kopi 5%
Rumput Laut Rumput Laut 13,3% Gabah 3,3% Beras 3,6%
Rumput Laut 18,5%
18,4% Beras 12,1% Ayam beku karkas 3,2% Gabah 1.7%
Jagung 6,8%
Lada 6,2% Ikan 1,8% Ikan 0,3% Ikan 1.2%
Lada 1,8% Lada 0,1% Kopi 1.3%
Lada 1,2% Ayam karkas beku 0,4%
Garam 0,6% Kedelai 0,1% Ayam Beku Karkas 0.2%
Jagung 0,3%
Bawang Merah 0,04% Bawang Merah 0.2%
Jagung 0,01% Lada 0.03% 2,709 1,866
Gambir 0,01% Kedelai 0.02% 1,365
326 147 20 6
Sumber: Bappebti, 23 November 2022 Gula Rumput Laut Gabah Beras Ikan Kopi Kedelai Ayam Beku
KEMUDAHAN PEMBIAYAAN SSRG
PMK 187/2021 sebagai salah terobosan untuk mendorong

POKOK-POKOK PERUBAHAN PMK
optimalsisasi implementasi SRG, menggantikan PMK 171/2009
01 PERLUASAN PENERIMA
Perluasan penerima dan sektor sesuai kebijakan
Menteri Perdagangan (UKM)
02 SKEMA SYARIAH
Penambahan ketentuan terkait Pembiayaan Syariah
Non Subsidi 03 PENINGKATAN PLAFON PENERIMA

S-SRG Peningkatan Plafon dari 75 juta menjadi 500 Juta per
o Pelaku Usaha penerima per tahun
o Petani
Besar
o Koperasi 04 PENYESUAIAN TINGKAT BUNGA
o UKM Tingkat bunga disesuaikan dengan tingkat bunga
KUR (saat ini 6 % / tahun)
05 PENJAMINAN
❑ UU No. 9 Tahun 2006 jo. UU No. 9 Tahun 2011 Penambahan klausul Bank Penyalur dapat melakukan
❑ PP No. 36 Tahun 2007 jo. PP No. 70 Tahun 2013 penjaminan atas pembiayaan S-SRG
❑ POJK No. 40 Tahun 2019 06 PEMBIAYAAN HULU-HILIR

Petani memperoleh pembiayaan KUR (Hulu), S-SRG
❑ PMK No. 171 Tahun 2009 jo PMK No. 187 Tahun 2021 (Hilir)
❑ Permendag No. 66 Tahun 2009 (dalam proses
07 PERPANJANGAN MASA PEMBIAYAAN
perubahan) Pembiayaan maksimal satu tahun atau menyesuaikan
jangka waktu RG (semula 6 Bulan)
Key Success
Implementasi SRG Berkelanjutan
Pemerintah Dukungan pemerintah (pusat dan daerah) dan keterlibatan aktif

kelembagaan terkait SRG (lembaga uji mutu, perbankan, dll)
Pengelola
Gudang
Pengelola Gudang yang mandiri dan profesional dalam

menjalankan usaha SRG (diversifikasi/integrasi usaha di bidang SRG
dan jasa lainnya, pola kemitraan dengan produsen/petani, dan
konektivitas dengan pasar/stand by buyer)
Lembaga
Pelaksana SRG Pusat
Registrasi
Penjamian Dukungan infrastruktur pendukung baik dari tahap budidaya,
panen, pasca panen sampai dengan pemasaran (sarana pengolahan,
SRG gudang, infrastruktur transportasi dll)
Lembaga
Adanya kepastian jaringan pemasaran untuk komoditas dalam SRG
Peniaian (off taker/stand by buyer)
Kesesuaian
Lembaga
Asuransi
Keuangan
Kelembagaan petani/nelayan yang sudah terbentuk cukup kuat di
sentra produksi/lokasi gudang
I
Trilogi
Implementasi SRG menjadi salah satu instrumen penataan sistem
perdagangan dan pembiayaan yang efektif dan
Sistem Resi Gudang efisien, sehingga dapat mendukung terwujudnya
kelancaran produksi dan distribusi perdagangan.
PEMILIK BARANG (PENYIMPAN)
1. Instrumen pembiayaan
Diharapkan dengan implementasi SRG yang optimal 2. Sarana tunda jual
dan berkesinambungan dapat memberikan profit dan 3. Peningkatan nilai tambah
benefit di berbagai bidang dan berbagai pihak 4. Kemudahan akses pasar
5. Penguatan kelembagaan ekonomi
khususnya bagi petani dan pelaku agrobisnis petani
PEMBELI AKHIR / OFF TAKER
SRG
Manajemen Pascapanen 1. Harga beli lebih kompetitif
2. Jaminan kuantitas dan kualitas barang
3. Efisiensi biaya penyimpanan / stocking
4. Stabilisasi dan peningkatan cashflow
PENGELOLA GUDANG SRG

1. Jasa pengelolaan gudang/barang
2. Peluang sebagai standby buyer / off taker
3. Jaminan ketersediaan barang / manajemen
stok
4. Perluasan bisnis
SRG
Instrumen Pembiayaan
LEMBAGA KEUANGAN
1. Hak Eksekutorial oleh Undang-Undang SRG
2. Jaminan bersifat liquid, yaitu berupa komoditas yang
disimpan di Gudang SRG yang tersertifikasi
3. Perlindungan yang tinggi atas jaminan
4. Aktivitas penyaluran kredit aman dan menguntungkan
SRG
Efisiensi Rantai Perdagangan PEMERINTAH
1. Sarana Pengendalian Stok Nasional
2. Mendukung pengembangan informasi harga
3. Mendukung pengendalian inflasi daerah
4. Penunjang ekspor (meningkatkan neraca
perdagangan)
PASAR LELANG KOMODITAS
PASAR LELANG KOMODITAS
APA PASAR LELANG KOMODITAS
Pasar Lelang Komoditas merupakan pasar fisik terorganisasi bagi pembeli dan penjual untuk
melakukan transaksi komoditas melalui sistem lelang dengan penyerahan komoditas
1. Penyelenggara Lelang sebagai Operator PLK;

2. Sistem keanggotaan peserta (terbuka untuk umum);
3. Adanya Publikasi secara terbuka;
4. Komoditas/Barang dengan kualifikasi mutu tertentu
Unsur Sebagai Pasar Terorganisasi
5. Penjaminan transaksi
6. Sistem penawaran yang terbuka dan kompetitif dalam
sesi waktu yang sudah diatur
TUJUAN
PASAR LELANG KOMODITAS (PLK)
❖ Mempertemukan kepentingan Produsen, Meningkatnya Daya Saing

UKM dengan pemakai langsung, pabrikan, Sektor Perdagangan
pedagang besar;
❖ Efisiensi mata rantai perdagangan
❖ Pembentukan harga yang transparan
❖ Referensi harga
❖ Meningkatkan perekonomian daerah
1. Kepastian Pasar 1. Kepastian barang

PENJUAL 2. Harga jual kompetitif PEMBELI 2. Harga beli yang kompetitif
3. Transaksi terlindungi 3. Transaksi terlindungi
EKOSISTEM DALAM PASAR LELANG
PEMERINTAH PUSAT & PEMERINTAH DAERAH
• Efisiensi mata
rantai
perdagangan
Penyelenggara Lembaga Kliring • Pembentukan

PLK dan Penjaminan harga yang
PESERTA BELI
PESERTA JUAL (Industri besar, transparan
(Produsen, IKM, Ritel,
Petani UMKM) pabrikan,eksportir, • Referensi Harga
perantara
Gudang/Lokasi perdagangan)
Serah Komoditi
INTEGRASI SRG - PLK
INTEGRASI SRG - PLK
SISTEM INFORMASI SRG

Petani/Pedagang
(Pelaku Usaha) Uji Mutu dan
PASAR/INDUSTRI
Asuransi
RESI GUDANG
GUDANG SRG
PEMBIAYAAN
Pengelola Gudang SRG BANK/NON-BANK
RESI GUDANG
Lembaga Kliring
dan Penjaminan
Penyelenggara Lelang
Pengelola Gudang SRG
dapat berperan sebagai
Penyelenggara Lelang
PESERTA JUAL
Gudang Serah
Pelaksanaan lelang dapat PESERTA BELI
dilakukan di gedung lelang atau
langsung dari Gudang SRG
Biro Pembinaan dan Pengembangan SRG dan PLK - BAPPEBTI
www.bappebti.go.id ronabang.srgplk Ronabang.srgplk

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Inspiring Innovation with Integrity

Program Studi Agribisnis

Harga Komoditas Pertanian

20,000 Jun Dec

Source: Ministry of Trade, Indonesia (2019)

Harga Komoditas Pertanian

Mengapa Market Over Time?

Pentingnya Perdagangan Berjangka

Strategi market over time

2. Warehouse • Product  durable good (>3 months)

Perdagangan Berjangka Komoditi

 FT Adalah segala sesuatu yang berkaitan jual beli komoditas

Perdagangan Berjangka Komoditi

Hedging (Perlindungan Nilai/Harga)

• Seorang petani yang menanam jagung dan menunggu panennya. Ia

• Jadi petani menghadapi risiko produksi dan risiko harga.

• Risiko harga : Jika tidak gagal panen tetapi harga

Standardisasi, Grading dan Informasi Pasar

• Dampak dari KARAKTERISTIK PRODUK dan PRODUKSI, untuk

• Grading adalah klasifikasi dari setiap atau sejumlah produk

• Standarisasi adalah sifat umum yang diterima dan membuat diferensiasi

Beberapa Kriteria Grade dan Standardisasi

1. Standard harus karakteristiknya mudah dikenal, grade berorentasi pada

Contoh Spesifikasi Biji Kakao

• Informasi pasar atau intelijen pasar merupakan fungsi

• GENERIK ADVERTISING (NATIONAL BRAND):

Ad. 2. SISTEM RESI GUDANG

SISTEM RESI GUDANG

2. Unsur-unsur resi gudang

b. Pengelola Gudang adalah Pihak yang melakukan usaha

SISTEM RESI GUDANG

3. Pengertian Hak Jaminan Atas Resi

4. Para Pihak Dalam Jaminan Resi Gudang

a. Kreditur yang menerima jaminan dan akan

SISTEM RESI GUDANG

Resi Gudang: Pembiayaan & Perlindungan Harga

KOMODITAS PENGERINGAN - KOMODITAS PENGELOLA

PRA-PANEN MASA-PANEN PASCA-PANEN KONSUMSI

DEP. PERTANIAN; BPPT,

Pengurangan ketergantungan Alat panen, pengering, sortasi

Contoh Dokumen Resi Gudang

Ad.3. Sistem Bagi Hasil

Sistem Bagi Hasil kasus Tesang Sawah di

Ad. 4. Asuransi Pertanian

• Idenya adalah karena produksi tanaman memiliki multi-ancaman

• Faktor lain yang juga merupakan masalah yang signifikan dalam

Indemnity = Max [(Guaranteed Yield – Actual Yield),0] * Price Guarantee

• Perusahaan asuransi menentukan harga pada produknya untuk

• Besar premi yang ditentukan sesuai dengan persamaan berikut :

Premium = (Actuarially Fair Premium + Administrative Cost) > Expected Indemnity

• Premi yang dibebankan kepada petani dengan adanya subsidi

Premium = (Actuarially Fair Premium – Premium Subsidy) < Expected Indemnity

Tujuan program asuransi pertanian standardisasi dibagi

1.Bagi kelompok sasaran petani :

 Meningkatkan kesadaran dan tanggung jawab aparat Pemda

STRATEGI DAN LANGKAH-LANGKAH OPERASIONAL

• Skema asuransi diawali dengan prakarsa pemerintah pusat ttg perlindungan

• Tiga pihak yang terlibat :

Premi dan penutupan skema asuransi pertanian

• Premi: biaya yang harus dibayar petani untuk

Mekanisme klaim/ganti rugi penutupan :

Program Studi Agribisnis

I. Market Structure : Measures of Industry Concentration