CASE DIGESTS Consti

20. TANADA v. ANGARA Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/may1997/118295.htm Facts: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement. Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Doctrine: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies (Sec 2, Art II) , the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. 21. HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL Full text: http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisions%20/%20Signed %20Resolutions&docid=13137181561954683308 Facts: The Hacienda comprised 6,443 Has. In 1957 Tabacalera sold the land to Tadeco owned by the Cojuancos. GSIS financed the purchase on condition that the land will ultimately be subdivided and sold to the tenants. In 1980 the government filed at RTC Manila a case against Tadeco for it to surrender the Hacienda to MAR (now the DAR) so the land will be distributed to the farmers. Manila RTC ruled against Tadeco. Tadeco appealed to the CA. In 1988, CA dismissed the appeal subject to revival if Tadeco fails to get approval of farmers of Stock Distribution Option (SDO) and if opted by farmers Tadeco fails to implement SDO. In 1988 Tadeco created Hacienda Luisita Inc and Tadeco bought shares of HLI in exhange of the Hacienda Land. The total shares were 400,000,000 with par value of P400,000,000.00. 150,000,000 shares were for

farmers and 250,000,000 shares for other stockholders. Farmers and HLI entered into Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) which provides that farmers agree because such SDO will improve their lives and they will get greater benefits. DAR approved SDOA. In 1995 the HLI applied to convert 500 has to industrial use. Conversion was approved. Then it transferred the 500 has to Centennary Holdings Inc. which transferred it to Luisita Industrial Park Corp (LIPCO). LIPCO conveyed some lands to RCBC as payment for loans. In addition to the 500 has sold to LIPCO, 80.51 has was expropriated for use of SCTEX. In 2003 farmer groups filed case at DAR for either renegotiation of SDOA or its recovation on ground that their lives did not improve and they did not get fair shares in the sale of lands to LIPCO and for SCTEX use. DAR created a task force that recommended to PARC (Presidential Agrarian Reform Council) that the previous order approving the SDO would be revoked. In 2005 PARC revoked the SDO and ordered the compulsory acquisition of the Hacienda for distribution to farmers. HLI went to the SC and asked for a TRO to stop implementation of Park Order. In 2006 SC issues a TRO, hence this case. Issue: Whether the PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke the HLIs SDP that it earlier approved Held: The instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names. Doctrine: The HLI foists on the Court the argument that subjecting its landholdings to compulsory distribution after its approved SDP has been implemented would impair the contractual obligations created under the SDOA. The broad sweep of HLIs argument ignores certain established legal precepts and must, therefore, be rejected. A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations between or among parties is deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of the nonimpairment guarantee. There is, in that instance, no impingement of the impairment clause, the non-impairment protection being applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. Impairment, in fine, obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existing remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in effect at the time of contract execution, as in the case of RA 6657, in relation to DAO 10, vis--vis HLIs SDOA. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II [of the Constitution] is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto. 22. LIM v. PANO Full text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/129093.htm Facts: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on the ground that an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING

LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGANNG LAGUNA As a Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation oflotto and all forms of gambling; (2) It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial governments police power under the General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991; (3) they also maintain that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal. As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguninang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of LGC of 1991.The respondent judge Francisco Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari. Issues: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based thereon are valid Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit Held: The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the objection of the council to said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the par tof the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. As for the second issue, Court ruled that petitioners erred in declaring that sections 2 (C) and 27 of RA 7160 apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. From careful reading of said provisions, the Court find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Section 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code. Doctrine: In Lina vs. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001, the SC held that the basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy (Sec 25, Art II). Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains control of the LGUs although in a significantly reduced degree now under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. There are notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the LGUs of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of LGUs, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.

23. JUDGE DADOLE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/dec2002/gr_125350_2002.html Facts: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that the local government units under the Local Government Code shall provide additional allowances to national government officials and employees in the "form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities". In addition, the said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need of publication. Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994. The petitioner judges, through Executive Judge Dadole, filed a motion of reconsideration of the decision of the COA, but was denied. Issues: Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published Whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress Held: The Court ruled in favor of the judges, granting their petition. On the first issue, the SC declared LBC 55 to be null and void. They recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. By constitutional fiat, the members of the Cabinet and other executive officials, as mere alter egos, are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. In addition, the DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement, which is Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code). In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication. The Court also disagreed on the second issue. Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. Just because Mandaue City's locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city's own revenues. Doctrine: The President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations (Sec 25, Art II of the Constitution). 24. PAMATONG v. COMELEC

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/gr_161872_2004.html Facts: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Issue: Whether there exists a constitutional right to run for or hold public office Held: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Doctrine: The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office (Sec 26, Art II of the Constitution) may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens, which they create. 25. La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Victor Ramos Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_127882_2004.html Facts: This case is in continuation of the petition already decided by the Court last January 27,2004. The established facts are already mentioned in the first case. But since the Court found new issues, there is a need to reiterate the said facts. The Court decided Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Law), (2), its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9640, and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP) as unconstitutional on the ground that service contracts are prohibited in the 1987 Constitution (Section 2, Article XII) in favor of the rights of the Filipinos to enjoy the national

patrimony. Subsequently, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. After which petitioners were required to comment on the matter and then the oral argument was set. Hence, the Court found out new issues after hearing the arguments of the parties involved. Issues: Whether RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the WMCP FTAA is indeed constitutional Whether the case been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius (60 percent of Sagittarius equity is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while 40 percent is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius? Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, whether it still be proper to resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP FTAA What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of the Article XII of the 1987 Constitution Held: Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 may not be deemed unconstitutional. A careful perusal of the statute itself and its implementing rules reveals that neither RA 7942 nor DAO 99- 56 can be said to convey beneficial ownership of any mineral resource or product to any foreign FTAA contractor. WMCP FTAA uncovers no indication that it confers upon WMCP ownership, beneficial or otherwise, of the mining property it is to develop, the minerals to be produced, or the proceeds of their sale, which can be legally asserted and enforced as against the State No. The basis for declaring the FTAA void still has to be revisited, reexamined, and reconsidered. It not per se defective or unconstitutional. It was questioned only because it had been issued to an allegedly non-qualified, foreign-owned corporation. The decision has yet to become final, to all intents and purposes, the FTAA must be deemed valid and constitutional. The Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now. The provision in question was intended to refer to agreements other than those for mere financial or technical assistance. It should be interpreted as allowing foreign corporations to do large-scale exploration within the State, for the former is in reality not capable of doing it given the lump sum of money needed and the risk of the undertaking. It is given that even the basic services naturally shouldered by the State are not adequately provided to the people. In relation to this, the Court agreed that the framers were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII. Doctrine: In La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, the court restrained itself from intruding into policy matters to allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using mineral resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. The Judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official functions. Let the development of mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of the government. The questioned provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.