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EN BANC [G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011] EMILIO GANCAYCO, PETITIONER, VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 177933] METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. JUSTICE EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (RETIRED), RESPONDENT, DECISION SERENO, J.: Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] promulgated on 18 July 2006 and the Resolution[2] dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648. The Facts In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA),[3] Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558. On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof."[4] An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.[5] Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line. At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby

creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco's request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands."[6] Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Council's (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7] The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions."[8] On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code)[9] in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10] Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing walls," of the ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant. On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition,[12] he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in

the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription. Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13] The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco.[14] It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco's 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the public's benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners' right to equal protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094,[15] Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition. IT IS SO ORDERED. The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly granted the appeal.[16] The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property, to wit: Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no "taking" for public use which must be subject to just compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the

commercial establishments thereat some kind of protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged. [17] Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco's private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated: WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows: 1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,[18] Series of 1956, issued by the City Council of Quezon City, is UPHELD; and 2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance is LIFTED. SO ORDERED. This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration.[19] On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues nor offer grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the Court.[20] Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions for Review before this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows: I. II. III. IV. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO'S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

The Court's Ruling

Estoppel The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was

estopped from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings. To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance "takes" private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its application. On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a "taking" of private property without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no "taking" yet to speak of. Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held: It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.) Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22] we likewise held: We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results in what it perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. (Emphasis supplied.) Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.

Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are valid exercises of police power . In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23] we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by local government units, to wit: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation. It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24] which states: To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section. Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.[25] With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza.[26] In that case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance on 28 November 2001 reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in

those areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood to lose billions of pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating: In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied) In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27] we also held: For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA. Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,[28] which was passed after the Quezon City

Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states: Section 102. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance. Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their respective jurisdictions. Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the arcade should be constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need to address this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we will not and need not delve into. To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction. The "wing walls" of the building are not nuisances per se. The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se. We disagree. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29] Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the

safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure. Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30] we held: We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.) MMDA illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco's property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended. However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide: SECTION 205. Building Officials. -- Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto. Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction. The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. -- In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this

Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits. In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued. When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. -- When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.) MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.[31] is applicable to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held: It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held: ...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz: Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely local matters. The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition. MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law's following provision, thus: Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. - The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary." There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of "a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor." The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance. As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28. Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of the structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a nuisance[32] and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the

building or structure by the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner.[33] MMDA's argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer,[34] the city government stated that "the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City." Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancayco's building. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

2
City of First Facts: n in in Manila 31 v. Chinese Community of (40 Phil concurring. 1916, for the city of Manila presented praying that certain a petitio Manila GR 14355, October Johnson 1919 (p): 4 Division, On

the 11th day of December, be expropriated the said

the Court

of First Instance of said specifically for that it

city,

lands, there The Chi nece it would

particularly described,

the purpose of constructing a pub Avenue. it would contending that that there was no

lic improvement, ssity of taking, disturb The trial strip der

the purpose of extending Rizal expropriation, public character and

nese Community opposed

already had

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of the dead. there was no each and all necessity for costs. the expropriation from all of the liability un the City

of land

absolved

of the defendants

the complaint,

without any finding as to

From the judgment,

of Manila appealed. Issue: anila Held: , nd ded er or Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of M

The exercise of the by its authorized

right

of eminent

domain,

whether

directly by the State a No sp

agents,

is necessarily in with

derogation of private rights, be strictly construed. tenacity, that right, and and, his the right to without

the rule in that

case is that and laws

the authority must greater with more sedulously, of an

ecies of property is held by the constitution When public purposes, of inhabitants. the plain The right and on a) n, h it. that but

by individuals

none is guar the freehold for great consent,

than

the legislature interferes the land not

appropriates

individual

meaning of the law should of expropriation can exercise the courts also In to that is not come to or an

be enlarged power in

by doubtly interpretation. a municipal they must in corporation, up ( not only find domai

inherent

before it When (b)

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some law must

exist

conferring the power of eminent

determine the question, authority is being First,

a law or

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the exercise of the right exercised conditions trial,

accordance wit the authori second, of the be co well k or and,

the law.

the present case there are two the City of Manila: be public. that either

imposed upon be private; finds that neither cannot It

ty conceded se conditions ntended nown d that fact

the land must

the purpose must

If the court, upon in

exists or the right

one of them fails, accordance

certainly it with law. The former

is being exercised or

is a

that

cemeteries

may be public or private. neighborhood, or

is a cemetery use

by the general

community,

church,

while only a family,

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portion to other

of the community or the public, it under

neighborhood authority.

uses the latter. And in in this

Where a

emeter be tak us

y is open

is a public use and no a general that which which fact, are held in

part of the ground can good faith for future

public uses and and

immunity extends to may be used by t

the unimproved is alleged, he general efinition rty. ied, r for If that

unoccupied parts, not denied, Chinese,

the cemetery

question

community of is true,

the general

acceptation question must right

of the d be den under the

of a public cemetery, the reason that

would

make the cemetery in

public prope

then, of course, But, for

the petition of the plaintiff whether or in its not

the city of Manila has no authority or the uses of and

law to

expropriate public property. its appropriation

the cemetery is public o especiall not be

private property, should

a public street, appropriation that to

y during the lifetime of those specially interested tery, be a question of great such purposes In Rizal until it concern, made for other

its maintenance as a ceme should the greatest necessit

is fully established

y exists therefor.

this case there is no

necessity of taking since there are ease the traffic situation. st

ways by which

Avenue may be expanded

The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the reet through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been e City. costs against offered to the city free of charge, thus, affirmed which answers

every purpose of th court, with

The Supreme Court, the appellant. the

the judgment

of the lower

have been offered to e City.

city free of thus,

charge,

which answers of

every purpose

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th

The Supreme Court,

affirmed the judgment

the lower court,

with

costs against the appellant.

2
FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 14355. October 31, 1919.]THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA ET AL.,defendants-appellees. City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.Crossfield & O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier & Sycip, Delgado & Delgado, Filemon Sotto, and Ramon Salinasfor appellees.SYLLABUS1. EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, RIGHT OF COURTS TO INQUIRE INTO NECESSITY OF. When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate privateproperty and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an-issue properly presented, concerning the questionwhether or not the purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of expropriationis not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must existconferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate publicproperty. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation must bepublic. If the court. upon trial, finds that neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails,the right to expropriate does not exist. If the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and theowner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.2 . ID.; ID. Upon the other hand, the Legislature may directly determine the n e c e s s i t y f o r appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exactlocation of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement,the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitablenessof the location selected, and the consequ ent necessity of taking the lands selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.3. ID.; ID. But when the law does not designate the property to be taken, nor how much maybe taken, then the necessity of taking private property is a question for the courts.4. ID.; ID. There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and a decision by the municipality that there existsa necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular case.5. ID.; ID. Whether or not it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipal itythe power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned.But whenever that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, thecourts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in a particular case, and not the general authority.6. ID.; ID. In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political andnot judicial in their character.7. ID.; ID. The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain8. ID.; ID. That government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely dependent on the legislative body without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free governmentseem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least nocourt of justice would be warranted in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them lurks in anygeneral grant of legislative authority or ought to be implied from any general expression of the people.The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being without avery strong and direct expression of such intention.9. ID.; ID. The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property isheld by individuals with greater tenacity and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, theplain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by

doubtful interpretation.10. ID.; ID. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity,and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and notfollow, the taking of the property. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not beconfused with the right to exercise it in a particular case.11. ID.; CEMETERIES, EXPROPRIATION OF. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is apublic use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority.12. ID.; ID. The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property. Per MALCOLM, J., concurring:13. EMINENT DOMAIN; POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. The Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized by the Philippine Bill to acquire real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.14. ID.; ID.; CITY OF MANILA. The city of Manila is authorized by the Philippine Legislatureto condemn private property for public use.16. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE PROPERTY; PUBLIC USE. The Legislature has the power toauthorize the taking of land already applied to one public use and devote it to another.16. ID.; ID.; ID., ID.; ID. When the power to take land already applied to one public use and devote it to another is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no question can arise.17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the publicfor another use which is inconsistent with the first without special authority from the Legislature or authority granted by necessary and reasonable implication.18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Land applied to one use should not be taken for another except incases of necessity.19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CEMETERIES; CLASSES. Cemeteries are of two classes: public and private.20. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC CEMETERY. A public cemetery is one used bythe general community, or neighborhood, or church .21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE CEMETERY. A private cemetery is one usedonly by a family, or a small portion of a community.22. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CHINESE CEMETERY, CITY OF MANILA. The ChineseCemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery.23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Cemeteries, while still devoted to pious uses, are sacred,and it cannot be supposed that the Legislature has intended that they should be violated in the absence of special provisions on the subject authorizing such invasion.24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Held: That since the city of Manila is only permitted tocondemn private property for public use and since the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a publiccemetery already devoted to a public use, the city of Manila cannot condemn a portion of the cemetery for a public street.D E C I S I O NJOHNSON, J p:The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila,may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?That question arose in the following manner:On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instanceof said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:"That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of landsituated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdictionof this court."The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of thelaws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described inparagraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcelsbe expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the restingplaces of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been

used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in saidcemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead,would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to someother place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, wou ld involve the destruction of existingmonuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injuryto the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which wouldhave to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or anypart or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a publicimprovement.The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, a nswering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not a public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to acquire the parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as acemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors; that monuments and tomb-stones of great value werefound thereon; that the land had become quasi-public property of a benevolent association, dedicated andused for the burial of the dead and that many dead were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed itnecessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and still offers to grant a right of way for the saidextension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so ordered, free of charge, would answer every publicnecessity on the part of the plaintiff.The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of theother defendants, answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as that presented by theComunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted in order to show thegeneral character of the defenses presented by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that theexpropriation was necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for saidexpropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchers and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into astreet for public purposes.Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio delRosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear and explicit reasons, supported by abundanceof authorities, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular-strip of land inquestion, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without anyfinding as to costs.From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its principal ground of appeal.The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority toexpropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in suchproceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of theland can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings,and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . maycondemn private property for public use."The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried intoeffect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the saidauthority may be exercised. From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the rightof eminent domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the PhilippineIslands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise thatright in the manner hereinafter prescribed."Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaintshall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned together

with the interest of each defendant separatelySection 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in questionexists, it shall then appoint commissioners.Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section248 gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff.If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand thecause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of theproperty and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of theplaintiff.It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find that theright to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing theplaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and toproceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislativeand not a judicial question.Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and that the courts cannotintervene except for the purpose of determining the value of the land in question, there is much legalliterature. Much has been written upon both sides of that question. A careful examination of thediscussions pro and con will disclose the fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority shouldgrant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that thecourts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporationto expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in thisjurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properlypresented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public.In other words, have not the courts in this jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions relating toexpropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No. 190) for final decision, to ask whether or not thelaw has been complied with ? Suppose, in a particular case, it should be denied that the property is notprivate property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that question? Or, suppose the defense is,that the purpose of the expropriation is not public but private, or that there exists no public purpose at all,may not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Can it be possiblethat said authority confers the right to determine for itself that the land is private and that the purpose ispublic, and that the people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially those who aredirectly affected, may not question one or the other, or both, of these questions? Can it be successfullycontended that the phrase used in Act No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that such right exists,"means simply that the court shall examine the statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether alaw exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the right of eminent domain ? Or, when the case arrives inthe Supreme Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall determine that no rightof expropriation exists," that that simply means that the Supreme Court shall also examine the enactmentsof the legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not a law exists permitting the plaintiff toexpropriate?We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriationis not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law mustexist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not onlyfind (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that theright or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present c ase there are twoconditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private;and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditionsexists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised inaccordance with lawWhether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public or private is also a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislatureconferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right

to ascertain upon trial whether the right existsfor the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon,those questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in this jurisdiction is compelled to standmute while his land is being expropriated for a use not public, with the right simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his la nd? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate lands, without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of those whohappen for the time being to be in authority ? Expropriation of lands usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the publicnecessity?As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority of the court to question thenecessity or advisability of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The divergence is usually found todepend upon particular statutory or constitutional provisions.It has been contended and many cases are cited in support of that contention, and section 158 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive that the necessity for taking property under theright of eminent domain is not a judicial question. But those who cited said section evidently overlookedthe section immediately following (sec. 159), which adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is taken inthe ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being takenfor a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts. While manycourts have used sweeping expression in the decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be safely said that the courts of thevarious states would feel bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by thelegislature, by an attempted appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible necessity of its use, or when the alleged purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme." Norwich City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn., 151;Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in support of the contention of the appellant, says:"The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine thenecessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may selectthe exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposedimprovement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, thesuitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site,are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people."Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and we are justified inmaking the statement that in each case the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is presented to the legislative department o f the government and thatdepartment decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a particular case, that thenand in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of the legislature and make inquiry concerning thenecessity. But in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry., etc. Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am.St. Rep., 622, 628] ), which is cited in support of the doctrine laid down in section 158 above quoted, thecourt said:"But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how much may be taken, then thenecessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided inlimine."The legislative department of the government very rarely undertakes to designate the precise propertywhich should be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present case, merely conferred generalauthority to take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidentlyasserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuableallegation which it is competent for the courts to decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42 Am. St.Rep., 402, 407].)There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent

domain, and a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons whythe right should be conferred upon municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the rightto a particular case. Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the advisability of granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case, andespecially so when, perhaps, the land in question was not within the territoria l jurisdiction of themunicipality at the time the legislative authority was granted.Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the rightof eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authorityis exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in thisjurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a further conclusiveauthority upon the question that the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is alegislative and not a judicial question. Cyclopedia, at the page stated, says:"In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediencyof exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to thesovereign power; the legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it (the necessity and the expediency) . . . . It (the legislature) may designate the particular propertyto be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be reviewed by the courts."The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support of the doctrine quoted. Whiletime has not permitted an examination of all of said citations, many of them have been examined, and itcan be confidently asserted that said cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessityand expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and notjudicial," show clearly and invariably that in each case the legislature itself usually, by a special law,designated the particular case in which the right of eminent domain might be exercised by the particular municipal corporation or entity within the state. (Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass., 125 [15Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y., 234 [6 Am. Rep., 70]; Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S. 390; U. S. vs.Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U. S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668; TractionCo. vs. Mining Co., 196 U. S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U. S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242 U.S.].)In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U. S., 239), the Supreme Court of the United States said:"It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property.For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature cannot authorize the takingof private property against the will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we find the Supreme Courtof Porto Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary, quoting approvingly the following, upon the questionwhich we are discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily determine in thefirst instance whether the use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a publicone or not, their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to correction by the courts,who may undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for whichit is proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not public but private." Many casesare cited in support of that doctrine.Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says: "At any rate, the rule is quitewell settled that in the cases under consideration the determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece or a certain amount of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo,etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R.A., N. S., 1024] ), the Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following doctrine fromLewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all such cases the necessity of public utility of theproposed work or improvement is a judicial question. In all

such cases, where the authority is to take property necessary for the purpose, the necessity of taking particular property for a particular purpose is ajudicial one, upon which the owner is entitled to be heard." Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457,489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of theinhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's, etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the Supreme Court of theState of Maryland, discussing the question before us, said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power ,(eminent domain) where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist,in order to accomplish the purposes of the incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to theexercise of the power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise.Any rule less strict than this, with the large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the right tocorporations, would likely lead to oppression and the sacrifice of private right to corporate power."

The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. The SpanishGovernor-General, in an order creating the same, used the following language:"The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by thespontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration,government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those bornand educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founde rs may be perpetuallyeffectuated."It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make thecemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must bedenied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate publicproperty.But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a publicstreet, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, shouldbe a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fullyestablished that the greatest necessity exists therefor.While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is a matter of publicknowledge that in the process of time sepulchers may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversedby streets and daily trod by the feet o millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead should not be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead arestill within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pioususes and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expresslyproviding that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at law, for the woundedsensibilities of the living, in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by acommon highway or street for public travel ? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacyof a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endearedto us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudablepurposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and thepreventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs.Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, therecord contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows

thatadjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purposeof the plaintiff.For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsMALCOLM, J., concurring:The Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized by the Philippine Bill to acquire real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, sec 63.) Aportion of this power has been delegated by the Philippine Legislature to the city of Manila, which ispermitted to "condemn private property for public use." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 2429.) TheCode of Civil Procedure, in prescribing how the right of eminent domain may be exercised, also limits thecondemnation to "private property for public use.' (Sec. 241.) As under the facts actually presented, therecan be no question that a public street constitutes a public use, the only remaining question is whether or not the Chinese Cemetery and the other property here sought to be taken by the exercise 'of the right of eminent domain is private property."As narrowing our inquiry still further, let it be noted that cemeteries are of two classes, public and private.A public cemetery is one used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church; while a privatecemetery is one used only by a family, or a small portion of a community (Lay vs. State, 12 Ind. App.,362; Cemetery Association vs Meninger [1875], 14 Kan., 312.) Our specific question, then, is, whether theChinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public, or a private graveyard. If it be found to be the former,it is not subject to condemnation by the city of Manila; if it be found to be the latter, it is subject tocondemnation.The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established during the Spanish administration in the Philippines bypublic spirited Chinese. The order of the Governor -General giving governmental recognition to thecemetery reads as follows: "The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been foundedand maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protectors, merchants andindustrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands, itsinternal administration, government and regime, must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditionalpractices of those born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the foundersmay be perpetually effectuated." Sometimes after the inauguration of the new regime in the Philippines) acorporation was organized to control the cemetery, and a Torrens title for the lands in question wasobtained.From the time of its creation until the present the cemetery has been used by the Chinese community for the burial of their dead. It is said that not less than four hundred graves, many of them with handsomemonuments, would be destroyed by the proposed street. This desecration is attempted as to the last restingplaces of the dead of a people who, because of their peculiar and ingrained ancestral worship, retain morethan the usual reverence for the departed. These facts lead us straight to the conclusion that the ChineseCemetery is not used by a family or a small portion of a community but by a particular race long existingin the country and of considerable numbers. The case, then, is one of where the city of Manila, under ageneral authority permitting it to condemn private property for public use, is attempting to convert aproperty already dedicated to a public use to an entirely different public use; and this, not directly pursuantto legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of the consulting architect.Two well considered decisions coming from the American state courts on almost identical facts are worthy of our consideration. The first is the case of The Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven ( [1875], 43 Conn., 234), oft cited by other courts. Here the City of New Haven, Connecticut,under the general power conferred upon it to lay out, construct, and maintain all necessary highways within its limits, proceeded to widen and straighten one of its streets, and in so doing took a small piece of land belonging to the Evergreen Cemetery Association. This association was incorporated under the general statute. The city had no special power to take any part of the cemetery for such purposes. It wasfound that the land taken was needed for the purposes of the cemetery and was not needed for the purposeof widening and straightening the avenue. The court said that it is unquestionable that the Legislature hasthe power to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public use and devote it to another. Whenthe power is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no question can arise. But, itwas added, "The same land cannot properly be used for burial lots and for a public highway at the sametime. . . .

Land therefore applied to one use should not be taken for the othe r except in cases of necessity. . . . There is no difficulty in effecting the desired improvement by taking land on the other sideof the street. . . . The idea of running a public street, regardless of graves, monuments, and the feelings of the living, through one of our public cemeteries, would be shocking to the moral sense of the community,and would not be tolerated except upon the direct necessity." It was then held that land already devoted toa public use cannot be taken by the public for another use which is inconsistent With the first, withoutspecial authority from the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and reasonable implication.The second decision is that Of Memphis State Line Railroad Company vs. forest Hill Cemetery Co.([1906], 116 Ten n., 400.) Here the purpose of the proceeding was to condemn a right Of way for the railway company through the forest Hill Cemetery. The railroad proposed to run through the southeastcorner of the Cemetery where no bodies were interred. The cemetery had been in use for about eightyears, and during this period thirteen hundred bodies had been buried therein. The Cemetery was under the control of a corporation which, by its character, held itself out as being willing to sell lots to any onewho applies therefor and pays the price demanded, except to members of the Negro race.It was found that there were two other routes along which the railroad might be located without touchingthe cemetery, while the present line might be pursued without interfering with Forest Hill Cemetery bymaking a curve around it. In the court below the railroad was granted the right of condemnation throughthe cemetery and damages were assessed. On appeal, the certiorari applied for was granted, and the supersedeas awarded. The court, in effect, found that the land of the Cemeter Company was devoted to apublic purpose, and that under the general language of the Tennessee statute of eminent domain it couldnot be taken from another public purpose. The court said that in process of time the sepulcheres of thedead "are made the seats of cities, and are traverse by streets, and daily trodden by the feet of man. This isinevitable i the course of ages. But while these places are yet within the memory and under the active careof the living, while they are still devoted to pious uses, they are sacred, and we cannot suppose that the legislature intended that they should be violated, in the absence of special provisions upon the subjectauthorizing such invasion, and indicating a method for the disinterment, removal, and reinterment of thebodies buried, and directing how the expense thereof shall be borne." Two members of the court,delivering a separate concurring opinion, concluded with this significant and eloquent sentence: "Thewheels of commerce must stop at the grave."For the foregoing reasons, and for others which are stated in the principal decision, I am of the opinionthat the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.STREET, J., dissenting:It may be admitted that, upon the evidence before us, the projected condemnation of the Chinese Cemetery is unnecessary and perhaps ill-considered. Nevertheless I concur with Justice Moir in the viewthat the authorities of the City of Manila are the proper judges of the propriety of the condemnation andthat this Court should have nothing to do with the questions of the necessity of the taking.MOIR, J., dissenting:I dissent from the majority opinion in this case , which has not yet been written, and because of the importance of the question involved, present my dissent for the record.This is an action by the city of Manila for the expropriation of lad for an extension of Rizal Avenue north.The petition for condemnation was opposed by the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" and Ildefonso Tambunting and various others who obtained permission of the trial court to intervene in the case.All of the defendants allege in their opposition that the proposed extension of Rizal Avenue cuts through apart of the Chinese Cemetery, North of Manila, and necessitates the destruction of many monuments andthe removal of many graves.The Court of First Instance of Manila, Honorable S. del Rosario, judge after the hearing the parties,decided that there was no need for constructing the street as and where proposed by the city, anddismissed the petition.The plaintiff appealed and sets up the following errors:1 . T h e court erred in deciding that the determination of the necessity and convenience o f t h e expropriation of the lands of the defendants lies with the court and not with the Municipal Board of thecity of Manila.2. The court erred in permitting the presentation of proofs over the objection and exception of the plaintiff tending to demonstrate the lack of necessity of the projected

street and the need of the lands inquestion.3. The court erred in declaring that the plaintiff had no right to expropriate the lands in question. 4 . T h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e c o m p l a i n t . The right of the plaintiff to expropriate property for public use cannot be denied. The "right of eminentdomain is inherent in all sovereignties and therefore would exist without any constitutional recognition . . .The right of eminent domain antedates constitutions . . . The right can only be denied or restricted byfundamental law and is right inherent in society." (15 Cyc., pp. 557-8.)This general right was recognized in the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure effective October 1st, 1901,which prescribed the manner of exercising the right. (Section 241 et seq.)It was further recognized in the Organic Act of July 1st, 1902, which provides in section 74 "that the Government of the Philippine Islands may grant franchises . . . including the authority to exercise the rightof eminent domain for the construction and operation of works of public utility and service, and may authorize said works to be constructed and maintained over and across the public property of the UnitedStates including . . . reservations." This provision is repeated in the Jones Law of August, 1916.The legislature of the Islands conferred the right on the city of Manila. (Section 2429, AdministrativeCode of 1917; section 2402, Administrative Code of 1916.)Clearly having the right of expropriation, the city of Manila selected the line of its street and asked thecourt by proper order to place the plaintiff in possession of the land described in the complaint, and toappoint Commissioners to inspect the property, appraise the value, and assess the damages. Instead of doing so, the court entered upon the question of the right of the city to take the property and the necessityfor the taking.The court says:"The controversy relates to whether or not the Chinese Cemetery, where a great majority of this race isburied and other persons belonging to other nationalities have been formerly inhumed, is private or public;whether or not said cemetery, in case it is public, would be susceptible to expropriation for the purpose of public improvements proposed by the city of Manila; whether or not the latter is justified of the necessityand expediency of similar expropriation before its right to the same would be upheld by the courts of justice; and whether or not the appreciation of said necessity pertains to the legislative or the judicialdepartment before which the expropriation proceedings have been brought."Relative to the first point, it is not necessary for the court to pass upon its consideration, in view of theconclusion it has arrived at the appreciation of the other points connected with each other."From the testimony of two reputable engineers produced by some of the defendants, it appears that theland chosen by the plaintiff for the extension of Rizal Avenue to the municipality of Caloocan is not thebest or the less expensive, although upon it there may be constructed a straight road, without curves or winding; but that in order to construct said road upon said land, the city of Manila would have to removeand transfer to other places about four hundred graves and monuments, make some grubbings, undergosome leveling and build some bridges the works thereon, together with the construction of the road andthe value of the lands expropriated, would mean an expenditure which will not be less than P180,000."Beside that considerable amount, the road would have a declivity of 3 per cent which, in order to cover adistance of one kilometer, would require an energy equivalent to that which would be expended in covering a distance of two and one-half kilometers upon a level road."On the other hand, if the road would be constructed with the deviation proposed by Ildefonso Tambunting, one of the defendants, who even offered to donate gratuitously to the city of Manila part of the land upon which said road will have to be constructed, the plaintiff entity would be able to save morethan hundreds of thousands of pesos, which can be invested in other improvements of greater pressure andnecessity for the benefit of the taxpayers; and it will not have to employ more time and incur greater expenditures in the removal and transfer of the remains buried in the land of the Chinese Community andof Sr. Tambunting, although with the insignificant disadvantage that the road would be a little longer by astill more insignificant extension of 426 meters and 55 centimeters, less than one -half kilometer,according to the plan included in the records; but it would offer a better panorama to those who would useit, and who would not have to traverse in their necessary or pleasure-making trips or walks any cemeterywhich, on account of its nature, always deserves the respect of the travellers. It should be observed that theproposed straight road over the cemetery, which the city of Manila is proposing to expropriate, does notlead to any commercial, industrial, or agricultural center, and if with said road it is endeavored to benefitsome

community or created interest, the same object may be obtained by the proposed deviation of theroad by the defendants. The road traced by the plaintiffs has the disadvantage that the lands on both sidesthereof would not serve for residential purposes, for the reason that no one has the pleasure to constructbuildings upon cemeteries unless it be in very overcrowded cities, so exhausted of land that every inchthereof represents a dwelling house."And it is against this ruling, that it lies with the court to determine the necessity of the proposed street andnot with the municipal board, that the appellant directs its first assignment of error.It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will construct streets and where, and thecourts sole duty was to see that the value of the property was paid the owners after proper legalproceedings ascertaining the value.The law gives the city the right to take private property for public use. It is assumed it is unnecessary toargue that a public road is a public use.But it is argued that plaintiff must show that it is necessary to take this land for a public improvement. Thelaw does not so read, and it is believed that the great weight of authority, including the United StatesSupreme Court, is against the contention."The question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and the former question is exclusively for the legislature, except that if the constitution or statute authorizes the taking of propertyonly in cases of necessity, then the necessity becomes a judicial question. " (McQuillen MunicipalCorporations, Vol. IV, pp. 3090091.)"In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediencyof exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those questions belongs to the sovereign power; the legislativedetermination is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it. It rests with thelegislature not only to determine when the power of eminent domain may be exercised, but also the character, quality, method, and extent of such exercise. And this power is unqualified, other than by thenecessity of providing that compensation shall be made. Nevertheless, under the express provisions of theconstitution of some states the question of necessity is made a judicial one, to be determined by the courtsand not by the legislature."While the legislature may itself exercise the right of determining the necessity for the exercise of thepower of eminent domain, it may, unless prohibited by the constitution, delegate this power to publicofficers or to private corporations established to carry on enterprises in which the public are interested, and their determination that a necessity for the exercise of the power exists is conclusive. There is norestraint upon the power except that requiring compensation to be made. And when the power has been sodelegated it is a subject of legislative discretion to determine what prudential regulations shall beestablished to secure a discreet and judicious exercise of the authority. It has been held that in the absenceof any statutory provision submitting the matter to a court or jury the decision of the question of necessitylies with the body of individuals to whom the state has delegated the authority to take, and the legislaturemay by express provision confer this power on a corporation to whom the power of eminent domain isdelegated unless prohibited by the constitution. It is of course competent for the legislature to declare thatthe question shall be a judicial one, in which case the court and not the corporation determines thequestion of necessity." (15 Cyc., pp. 629-632.)To the same effect is Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d Edition, section 597).I quote from the notes to Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports, p. 762, as follows:"Neither can it be said that there is any fundamental right secured by the constitution of the United Statesto have the questions of compensation and necessity both passed upon by one and the same jury. In manystates the question of necessity is never submitted to the jury which passes upon the question of compensation. It is either settled affirmatively by the legislature, or left to the judgment of the corporationinvested with the right to take property by condemnation. The question of necessity is not one of a judicialcharacter, but rather one for determination by the lawmaking branch of the government. (Boom Co. vs.Patterson, 98 U. S., 403, 406 [25 L. ed., 206]; United States vs. Jones, 109 U. S., 513 [27 L. ed., 1015];Backus vs. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S., 557, 568 [42 L. ed., 853].)"Speaking generally, it is for the state primarily and exclusively, to declare for what local public purposesprivate property, within its limits, may be taken upon compensation to the owner, as well as to prescribe amode

in which it may be condemned and taken. (Madisonville Tract. Co. vs. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S., 239, 252 [49 L. ed., 462] .)"Courts have no power to control the legislative authority in the exercise of their right to determine whenit is necessary or expedient to condemn a specific piece of property for public purposes. (Adirondack R.Co. vs. New York States, 176 U. S., 335 [~4 L. ed., 492].)"10 R. C. L. (p. 183), states the law as follows:"158. Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question. The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating privateproperty for a particular improvement or public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the locationselected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusivelyfor the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own viewsfor these of the representatives of the people. Similarly, when the legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to municipal or public service corporation or other tribunals or bodies, and has giventhem discretion as to when the power is to be called into exercise and to what extent, the court will notinquire into the necessity or propriety of the taking."The United States Supreme Court recently said:"The uses to which this land are to be put are undeniably public uses. When that is the case the proprietyor expediency of the appropriation cannot be called in question by any other authority." (Cincinnati vs. S.& N. R. R. Co., 223 U. S., 390, quoting U. S. vs. Jones, 109, U. S., 519.)And in Sears vs. City of Akron (246 U. S., 242), decided March 4th, 1918, it said:"Plaintiff contends that the ordinance is void because the general statute which authorized theappropriation violates both Article 1, paragraph 10, of the Federal Constitution, and the FourteenthAmendment, in that it authorizes the municipality to determine the necessity for the taking of privateproperty without the owners having an opportunity to be heard as to such necessity; that in fact nonecessity existed for any taking which would interfere with the company's project; since the city mighthave taken water from the Little Cuyahoga or the Tuscarawas rivers; and furthermore, that it has taken tentimes as much water as it can legitimately use. It is well settled that while the question whether thepurpose of a taking is a public one is judicial (Hairston vs. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U. S. 598 [52 L. ed.,637; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 331; 13 Ann. Cas., 1008] ), the necessity and the proper extent of a taking is alegislative question. (Shoemaker vs. United States, 147 U. S., 282, 298 [57 L. ed., 170, 184; 13 Sup. Ct.Rep., 361]; United States vs. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 685 [40 L. ed., 576, 582; 16 Sup.Ct. Rep., 427]; United States vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53, 65 [57 L. ed., 1063,1076; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 667].)"I think the case should be decided in accordance with foregoing citations, but one other point has beenargued so extensively that it ought to be considered.It is contended for the defense that this Chinese Cemetery is a public cemetery and that it cannot thereforebe taken for public use. In its answer the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a corporationorganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it owns the landwhich plaintiff seeks to acquire. The facts that it is a private corporation owning land would seem of necessity to make the land it owns private land. The fact that it belongs to the Chinese communitydeprives it of any public character.But admitting that it is a public cemetery, although limited in its use to the Chinese Community of the cityof Manila, can it not be taken for public use? Must we let the reverence we feel for the dead and the sanctity of their final resting-place obstruct the progress of the living? It will be instructive to inquire whatother jurisdictions have held on that point.On the Application of Board of Street Openings of New York City to acquire St. Johns Cemetery (133 N.Y., 329) the court of appeals said:". . . The board instituted this proceeding under the act to acquire for park purposes the title to land belowOne Hundred and Fifty-fifth street known as St. John's cemetery which belonged to a religious corporationin the city of New York, commonly called Trinity Church. It was established as a cemetery as early as1801, and used for that purpose until 1839, during which time about ten thousand human bodies had beenburied therein. In 1839 an ordinance was passed by the city of New York forbidding interments south of Eighty-sixth street, and since that time no interments have been made in the cemetery, but Trinity Churchhas preserved and kept it in order and prevented any disturbance thereof."It is contended on behalf of Trinity Church that under

the general authority given by the statute of 1887,this land which had been devoted to cemetery purposes could not be taken for a park. The authority conferred upon the board by the act is broad and general. It is authorized to take for park purposes anyland south of One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street. . . ."The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery purposes does not place them beyond thereach of the power of eminent domain. That is an absolute transcendent power belonging to the sovereignwhich can be exercised for the public welfare whenever the sovereign authority shall determine that anecessity for its exercise exists. By its existence the homes and the dwellings of the living, and the restingplaces of the dead may be alike condemned."It seems always to have been recognized in the laws of this state, that under the general laws streets andhighways could be laid out through cemeteries, in the absence of special limitation or prohibition. . . ."In Re Opening of Twentysecond Street (102 Penn. State Reports, 108) the Supreme Court of the Statesaid:"This was an action for the opening of a street through a cemetery in the City of Philadelphia. It was contended for the United American Mechanics and United Daughters of America Cemetery Associationthat by an act of the legislature of the State approved March 20th, 1849, they were forever exempt fromthe taking of any their property for streets, roads or alleys and this Act was formally accepted by theCemetery Company on April 9th, 1849, and there was, therefore, a contract between the CemeteryCompany and the State of Pennsylvania, which would be violated by the taking of any part of their property for street purposes. It was further contended that there were 11,000 persons buried in thecemetery."The court held that property and contracts of all kinds must yield to the demand of the sovereign and thatunder the power of eminent domain all properties could be taken, and that if there was a contract betweenthe State of Pennsylvania and the Cemetery Association, the contract itself could be taken for public use,and ordered the opening of the street through the cemetery."In Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports (p. 759), it is said:"Although it has been held, that where a state has delegated the power of eminent domain to a person or corporation, and where by its exercise lands have been subject to a public use, they cannot be applied toanother public use without specific authority expressed or implied to that effect yet, the general rule seemsto be that the fact that property is already devoted to a publ ic use, does not exempt it from beingappropriated under the right of eminent domain, but it may be so taken for a use which is clearly superior or paramount to the one to which it is already devoted." (Citing many United States Supreme Courtdecisions.)A few cases have been cited where the courts refused to allow the opening of streets through cemeteries,but in my opinion they are not as well considered as the cases and authorities relied upon herein.The holding of this court in this case reverses well settled principles of law of long standing and almostuniversal acceptance. The other assignments of error need not be considered as they are involved in the foregoing.The decision should be reversed and the record returned to the Court of First Instance with instructions toproceed with the case in accordance with this decision.

3
EN BANC[G.R. No. L-18841. January 27, 1969.]REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellant, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCETELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant. Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor CamiloD. Quiason for plaintiff- appellant.Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo for defendantappellant.SYLLABUS1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPROPRIATION OF PUBLICSERVICE UTILITIES; PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION LIKE EXPROPRIATION OF REALPROPERTY. Where the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone companyto permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of thegovernment service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by thecourt. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not beavailed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title andpossession. It is unquestionable that the real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to aneasement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connec tionbetween both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to aburden for public use and benefit. If, under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, inthe interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest,provided just compensation is paid therefor.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF PETITION BY COURT A QUO NOT PROPER IN INSTANTCASE. The Republic's cause of action to compel the PLDT to execute a contract with the former, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippinesunder such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of Bureau's facilities from the outside World if the severance of the interconnectionwere to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from properlydischarging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT toenter into a contract (and the prayer is no

essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case for compulsory rendering of inter connecting services by the telephone company upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just. And since the lower court found that both parties "arepractically at one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to r easonable compensation from plaintiff for the reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" the lower court should have proceeded to treat the caseas one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the justand reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CFI AND NOT THE PSC HAS AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE JURISDICTIONIN EXPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES. The plea that the court of first instance had nojurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the proper forum for the action was the Public ServiceCommission, under the law, the Public Service Commission has no authority to pass upon actions for thetaking of private property under the sovereign right of eminent domain. Furthermore, while the defendanttelephone company is a public utility corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties areunder the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public Service Commission, yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentalityof the National Government, hence, exempt under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of Telecommunications was created in pursuance of astate policy reorganizing the government offices and the determination of state policy is not vested in theCommission.4. REMEDIAL LAW; ESTOPPEL; GOVERNMENT NOT ESTOPPED BY THE MISTAKE OF ITS AGENTS. Section 79, subsection (b), of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947 does not limit theBureau of Telecommunications to non -commercial activities or prevents it from serving the generalpublic. It may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would belimited to government offices; but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, asauthorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Governmentnot to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application andenforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute andthat the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.5 . CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; FREEDOM TO STIPULATE TERMS AND C O N D I T I O N S ; PARTIES CAN NOT BE COERCED. Parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where noagreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and condition is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).6 . ID.; ID.; FRAUDULENT CONTRACT OR UNFAIR COMPETITION NOT P R E S E N T I N CASE AT BAR. The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition, andthat the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its contract, are untenable: (1) the competition ismerely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply, (2) the PLDT franchise is nonexclusive, that it is well-known that defendantPLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service and that its right to justcompensation for the services rendered to the Government telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved, and (3) when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines,defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and allembracing in nature and the acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledgethat the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by thedefendant to such extended use. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under itsnon-exclusive franchise.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.B.L., J p:Direct appeals, upon a joint record on appeal, by both the plaintiff and the defendant from the dismissal,after hearing, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 35805, of their respectivecomplaint and counterclaims, but making permanent a preliminary mandatory

injunction therefore issuedagainst the defendant on the inter-connection of telephone facilities owned and operated by said parties.The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through itsbranches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and duties, in additionto certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts:"SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the following powers and duties:"(a) To operate and maintain existing wire -telegraph and radio- telegraph offices, stations, andfacilities, and those to be established to restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such additional offices or stations as may hereafter be established to providetelecommunication service in places requiring such service;" ( b ) T o investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire -telephone or r a d i o telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities,towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements withthe present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned;" ( c ) T o p r e s c r i b e , s u b j e c t t o a p p r o v a l b y t h e D e p a r t m e n t H e a d , e q u i t a b l e r a t e s o f c h a r g e s f o r messages handled by the system and/or for timecalls and other services that may be rendered by said system;"(d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the international telecommunication service in agreement with other countries desiring to establish such service with the Republic of the Philippines; and"(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the InternationalTelecommunication Convention relative to the accounting, disposition and exchange of messages handledin the international service, and those that may hereafter be promulgated by said convention and adheredto by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines." 1The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public servicecorporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install,operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephonesystems of other countries. 2 The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case, but has contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business inthe Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic stationfor the reception and transmission of long dista nce wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operatebroadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act 3180) 3Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreementwhereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station,could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDTfor transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting parties agreed to divide thetolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulationthat either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. 4 On 2 February 1956, PLDT gavenotice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1956. 5Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government TelephoneSystem by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enablegovernment offices to call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usualform of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant,that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public ServiceCommission. 7 One of the many rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. 8 The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, 9using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) ownschedule of rates.

10 Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber couldmake a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreementwith RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would conveyradiotelephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. 11 Actually, theyinaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. 12On 7 April 1958, the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureauof Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private BranchExchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for theBureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government office s but even to serve privatepersons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if saidviolations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephoneconnections. 13 When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by theBureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephoneservices, from the rest of the world, except the United States. 15At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection. 16 The PLDT was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000pending applications. 17 Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone service.The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into aninterconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through theinterconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT repliedthat it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countriesprovided that the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public ServiceCommission and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues. 19 In its memorandum in lieu of oralargument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the defendant reduced its offer to 33 1/3% (1/3)as its share in the overseas telephone service. The proposals were not accepted by either party.On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long DistanceTelephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), p raying in itscomplaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such termsand conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against thedefendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore thosesevered.Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the severance of telephone connectionsby the defendant company would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April1958, issued an order for the defendant:"(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines that it has disconnected betweenthe facilities of the Government Telephone System, including its overseas telephone services, and thefacilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to sever the existing telephonecommunication between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make connectionover its telephone system of telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through thesaid Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities Of RCA Communications, Inc.; and (3) to acceptand connect through its telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreigncountries until further order of this Court."On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer, with counterclaims.It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contract of services with the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter intointerconnecting agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leasedto the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its facilities were being usedin fraud of its rights. The PLDT further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephoneoperations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendant'sown telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues.After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PL DT

to enter into anagreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94,establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing governmentoffices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or oughtto have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence theBureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of seriouspublic prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminaryinjunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims.Both parties appealed.Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains of the action of the trial court in dismissingthe part of its complaint seeking to compel the defendant to enter into an interconnecting contract with it,because the parties could not agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection, and of its refusal tofix the terms and conditions therefor.We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreementis had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate suchterms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, acontract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336,1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while theRepublic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of thegovernment telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriatedproperty; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burdenupon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that realproperty may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT'slines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different.In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities topublic ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require apublic utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, sothat the condemnation would be for public use.The Bureau of Telecommunications, under Section 78(b) of Executive Order No. 94, may operate andmaintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications throughout the Philippines by utilizingexisting facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement withpresent owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there isnothing in this Section that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the operations of said Bureau.A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from properlydischarging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT toenter into a contract (and the prayer is no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case for compulsory rendering of inter -connecting services by the telephone company upon such terms andconditions as the court may determine to be just. And since the lower court found that both parties "arepractically at one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from plaintiff for thereasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.This view we have taken

of the true nature of the Republic's petition necessarily results in overruling theplea of defendant appellant PLDT that the court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the proper forum for the action was the Public Service Commission. That body, under thelaw, has no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of private property under the sovereign right of eminent domain. Furthermore, while the defendant telephone company is a public utility corporationwhose franchise, equipment and other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of thePublic Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National Government,hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.The Bureau of Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices "to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of theRepublic of the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in itsoperation" (Section 1, Republic Act No. 51)and the determination of state policy is not vested in the Commission (Utilities Com. vs. Bartonville BusLine, 290 Ill. 574; 124 N.E. 373)Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below was in error in not holding that the Bureauof Telecommunications was not empowered to engage in commercial telephone business, and in rulingthat said defendant was not justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it had previously leased tothe Bureau. We find that the court a quo ruled correctly in rejecting both assertions.Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of Telecommunications, expresslyempowered the latter in its Section 79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines," and, in subsection (c),"to prescribe subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handledby the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by the system." Nothing inthese provisions limits the Bureau to noncommercial activities or prevents it from serving the generalpublic. It may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would belimited to government offices: but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, asauthorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Governmentnot to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application andenforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDTvs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; BenguetConsolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724)The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition, and that the Bureau wasguilty of fraud and abuse under its contract, are, likewise, untenable.First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much more thanthe supposed competitors can supply. As previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications atthe time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter of the defendant expressly provides:"Sec. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to anycorporation , association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electricaltransmission of messages or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: "(Act 3436)And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to thetrunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less publicand all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record onAppeal, page 216)The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff hadextended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by thedefendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the publichas patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too latefor the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not n ow at liberty to unilaterally sever thephysical connection of the trunk lines.". . ., but there is high authority for the position that, when such

physical connection has been voluntarilymade, under a fair and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized and established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in breachof the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that case, the public is held to have such an interest inthe arrangement that its rights must receive due consideration. This position finds approval in State ex rel.vs. Cadwallader, 172 Ind. 619, 636, 87 N.E. 650, and is stated in the elaborate and learned opinion of Chief Justice Myers as follows: `Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires aninterest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of independence, and it imposes upon the property such a publicstatus that it may not be disregarded' citing Mohan v. Mich. Tel. Co., 132 Mich, 242, 93 N.W. 629, andthe reasons upon which it is in part made to rest are referred to in the same opinion, as follows: `Whereprivate property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefitof the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject to therights of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit.' Allnut v.Inglis (1810) 12 East, 527. The doctrine of this early case is the acknowledged law." (Clinton-Dunn Tel.Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 74 S.E. 636, 638)It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact that said appellant did notexpect that the Bureau's telephone system would expand with such rapidity as it has done; but this expansion is no ground for the discontinuance of the service agreed upon.The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that Section 19 of the PLDTcharter reserves to the Government "the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, andto install, maintain and operate wires of its telegraph system thereon: Provided, however, That the Bureauof Posts shall have the right to place additional cross-arms and wires on the poles of the grantee by payinga compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by the Director of Posts and the grantee; "the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the plaintiff, contending that whatwas allowed free use, under the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said Section could not refer to the plaintiff'stelephone system, because it did not have such telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise.The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use isfor plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes.As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires,nor that they cause more damage than the wires of the telegraph system, or that the Government hasattached to the poles more than one ten-pin in cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter, we see nopoint in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT poles is not increased, wesee no reason why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires of the government should not beextended to its telephone line, any time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of communication.In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link between its network and thatof the Government is that the latter competes "politically" (sic) with its own telephone services. Considering, however, that the PLDT franchise is non- exclusive; that it is well-known that defendantPLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service, as shown by the number of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just compensation for the servicesrendered to the Government telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved, the objections of defendantappellant are without merit. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinatethe needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of itsservices under its nonexclusive franchise.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance

Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for acompensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankeeand Barredo, JJ., concur.

4.
EN BANC[G.R. No. L-12172. August 29, 1958.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL.,defendants-appellants. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.Prila, Pardalis & Pejo for appellants.SYLLABUS1 . M U N I C I P A L C O R P O R A T I O N ; C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L A W ; M U N I C I P A L O R D I N A N C E ; BUILDING PERMIT; UNDEFINED AND UNLIMITED DELEGATION OF POWER. Where anordinance of a Municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor'saction; expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit; enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal; and entirely lacks standards thus confering upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power togrant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56;Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE [2d], pp.394395)2 . I D . ; I D . ; I D . ; W H E N R E A S O N A B L E A N D O P P R E S S I V E . A M u n i c i p a l O r d i n a n c e i s unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their ownproperty; it then oversteps the bounds of police power without just compensation. We do not overlook thatthe modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort andhappiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare and, inits pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil.,580), the State may not, under guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of thecommunity. To legally achieve that result, the landowner should be given just compensation and anopportunity to be heard.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.B.L., J p:Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellantsJuan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipalityof Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building thatdestroys the view of the public plaza.It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-

appellant Juan F. Fajardo asmayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in questionproviding as follows:" S E C T I O N 1 . A n y p e r s o n o r p e r s o n s w h o w i l l c o n s t r u c t o r r e p a i r a b u i l d i n g s h o u l d , b e f o r e constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of thePublic Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of thebuilding or house.SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval." (Orig. Recs., P. 3)Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-inlaw, appellantBabilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a buildingadjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along thenational highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, therequest was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a buildingpermit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceededwith the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leasedproperty.On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of FirstInstance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs,as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, inthat "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highw ay to the said public plaza." From thisdecision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us becausethe appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard toguide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standardsare entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grantor deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56;Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392).The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the respondents. Itprescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city isclothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it to others; torefuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two are applying for precisely the same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of thecity authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances whichthus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in theinterest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule bywhich its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the aut horities cited above sustain thisconclusion."xxx xxx xxx"As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am.St. Rep. 180: 'It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established that municipal ordinancesplacing restrictions upon lawful

conduct or the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid, specifythe rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and must admit of the exercise of theprivilege of all citizens alike who will comply with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of theexercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal authoritiesbetween citizens who will so comply." (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE(2d), pp. 394-395).It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposedbuilding "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3);and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated onthe ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its beingseen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in thatit operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it overstepsthe bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. Wedo not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive tothe comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the generalwelfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs.Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their prope rty and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected onappellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, becauseit would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, beconstrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,being urban in character. T o legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard."An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonablepurpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves theowner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of thatburden." (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).'A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscationand is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment." (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451;also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114)."Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be saidto set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property mayproperly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no support in thegenius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine shocks thesense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public,and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 111. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:" S E C . 2 2 4 3 . C e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r s o f d i s c r e t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r . T h e m u n i c i p a l c o u n c i l shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:xxx xxx xxx( c ) T o e s t a b l i s h f i r e l i m i t s i n p o p u l o u s c e n t e r s , p r e s c r i b e t h e k i n d s o f b u i l d i n g s t h a t m a y b e constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a feewhich shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for eachbuilding permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of thissubsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund."Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal

council to requirethe issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the townand prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there isabsolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within themunicipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within thembefore it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null andvoid. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs deoficio. So ordered.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix,JJ., concur.

EN BANC[G.R. No. L-20620. August 15, 1974.]REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellant, vs. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI,ET AL., defendants-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.C . A. Mendoza & A. V . Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for defendant-appellees.D E C I S I O NZALDIVAR, J p:Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, anexpropriation proceeding.Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendantappellee, Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi hereinafter referred to as Castellvi),over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:"A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo-23666. Bounded on the NE by Maria NievesToledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing an area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga . . .";and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-Gozun),over two parcels of land described as follows:"A parcel of land (Portion of Lot 1-B, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. Bounded on the NE byLot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-B, Blk. 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NWby AFP military reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less, and registered inthe name of Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. . . .", and"A parcel of land (Portion of Lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254. Bounded on the NE by LotNo. 3, on the SE by school lot and national road, on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot 199BSwo 23666), on the NW by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or less, andregistered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, . . ."In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above -mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not morethan P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff

to take immediate possession of thelands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints threecommissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to beexpropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the landunder her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so ithad a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupyingher property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that theRepublic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereonat 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealizedprofits, and the costs of the suit.By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G. viuda de Gil, PalomaCastellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently, JoaquinV. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also allowed by the court to intervene as aparty defendant.After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10,the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actuallyplaced in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. 1In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged, among other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters hadalready been subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion hadalready been set aside for expansion sites of the already completed subdivisions; that the fair market valueof said lands was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and sheprayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interestthereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on February 11, 1960, and alsointervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Maria Nieves Toledo -Gozun, in his motion todismiss, dated May 27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the lands sought to be expropriated was at therate of P15.00 per square meter.On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendantToledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands. 2 On May 16, 1960 the trialCourt authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant todeposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court.In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation. 3The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch atFloridablanca, for the plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base,for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified themselves, proceeded to the performanceof their duties.On March 15, 1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after havingdetermined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommendedunanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvementsfound on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded. 4 TheCommissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case by defendants Castellvi andToledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per squaremeter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20per square meter. 5After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective memoranda, and the Republic,

after several extensions of time, had adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of theCommissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision 6 the dispositive portion of whichreads as follows:"WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances, and that the lands are titled, . . . therising trend of land values,. . . and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court findsthat the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for thethree lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just."xxx xxx xxx"The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozunsince (sic) the amount deposited as provisional value from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made tosaid defendant or deposit therefor is made in court."In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellviland when the instant action had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional valuethereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said (Castellvi) land as herein adjudged.The same rate of interest shall be paid from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudgedminus the amount deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run until full payment ismade to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. All the Intervenors having failed to produceevidence in support of their respective interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed."The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff."On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision wasagainst the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respectiveoppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additionalnewly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was denied by the court onJuly 12, 1961.On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the decision of May 26, 1961and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal fromthe decision of the trial court.The Republic filed various ex -parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on December 6, 1961.Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to the approval of the Republic'srecord on appeal, but also a joint memorandum in support of their opposition. The Republic also filed amemorandum in support of its prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December 27, 1961 thetrial court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal filed by the Republic, and the record onappeal filed by defendant Castellvi as having been filed out of time, thereby dismissing both appeals.On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record oil appeal, against which motion the defendantsCastellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, statingthat "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by theSupreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on app ealcontaining copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trialcourt approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended.Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees Castellvi and Toledo Gozunbefore this Court, but this Court denied the motion.In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the provisional value of her land.The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi'smotion in a resolution dated October 2, 1964.The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo -Gozun, dated October 6, 1969, praying that they beauthorized to mortgage the lands subject of expropriation, was denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the estate of the late DonAlfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings, filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement with the administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall

receive by way of attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the court may finally decide as theexpropriated price of the property subject matter of the case."Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings as just compensation;2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action;3 . I n o r d e r i n g p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t t o p a y 6 % i n t e r e s t o n t h e a d j u d g e d v a l u e o f t h e C a s t e l l v i property to start from July of 1956;4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first issue to be considered. We shallfollow the sequence of the Republic's discussion.1. In support of the assigned error that t he lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of theproperties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republicargues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege"to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it wasstipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more than half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years onthe land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national security. 7Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminentdomain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupa tion by condemnor upon theprivate property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such away as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee arguesthat in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for alease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying thelessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the"right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." 8Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in support of the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned the Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior toAugust 10, 1959. 9In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Forcesince 1947 under a contract of lease, typified by the contract marked Exh. 4 -Castellvi, the pertinentportions of which read:"CONTRACT OF LEASE"This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into by and between INTESTATE ESTATEOF ALFONSO DE CASTELLVI, represented by CARMEN M. DE CASTELLVI Judicial Administratrixx x x hereinafter called the LESSOR and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by MAJ.GEN. CALIXTO DUQUE, Chief of Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, hereinafter called the LESSEE,"WITNESSETH:"1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter reserved and the mutual terms, covenants and conditions of the parties, the LESSOR has, and by these presents does, lease and let unto the LESSEEthe following described land together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances thereof, viz:'Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752, parte de la hacienda de Campauit, situadoen el Barrio de San Jose, Municipio de Floridablanca, Pampanga . . . midiendo una extension superficialde cuatro milliones once mil cuatro cientos treinta y cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros cuadrados, mas omenos.'Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof are actually occupied and covered by thiscontract.'Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province of Pampanga . . .of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the registered owner(s) and with fullauthority to execute a contract of this nature."2. The term of this lease shall be for the period beginning July 1, 1952 the date the premises were occupied by the PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, AFP until June 30, 1953, subject to renewal for another year at the option of the LESSEE or unless sooner terminated by the LESSEE as hereinafter provided."3. The LESSOR hereby warrants that the LESSEE shall have quiet, peaceful and undisturbedpossession of

the demised premises throughout the full term or period of this lease and the LESSOR undertakes without cost to the LESSEE to eject all trespassers, but should the LESSOR fail to do so, theLESSEE at its option may proceed to do so at the expense of the LESSOR. The LESSOR further agreesthat should he/she/they sell or encumber all or any part of the herein described premises during the periodof this lease, any conveyance will be conditioned on the right of the LESSEE hereunder."4. The LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR as monthly rentals under this lease the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS & 58/100(P455.58) . . ."5. The LESSEE may, at anytime prior to the termination of this lease, use the property for any purpose or purposes and, at its own costs and expense make alteration, install facilities and fixtures anderect additions . . . which facilities or fixtures . . . so placed in, upon or attached to the said premises shallbe and remain property of the LESSEE and may be removed therefrom by the LESSEE prior to thetermination of this lease. The LESSEE shall surrender possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of this lease and if so required by the LESSOR, shall return the premises in substantially thesame condition as that existing at the time same were first occupied by the AFP, reasonable and ordinarywear and tear and damages by the elements or by circumstances over which the LESSEE has no controlexcepted: PROVIDED, that if the LESSOR so requires the return of the premises in such condition, theLESSOR shall give written notice thereof to the LESSEE at least twenty (20) days before the terminationof the lease and provided, further, that should the LESSOR give notice within the time specified above,the LESSEE shall have the right and privilege to compensate the LESSOR at the fair value or theequivalent, in lieu of performance of its obligation, if any, to restore the premises. Fair value is to bedetermined as the value at the time of occupancy less fair wear and tear and depreciation during the periodof this lease."6. The LESSEE may terminate this lease at any time during the term hereof by giving written notice to the LESSOR at least thirty (30) days in advance . . ."

5.
GR 119694. May 22, 1995.]PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by itsPresident Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. SYLLABUS1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROHIBITION AGAINST TAKING OFPRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION; COMPELLINGPUBLISHERS TO "DONATE" COMELEC SPACE, A VIOLATION OF. To compel print mediacompanies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2722(not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes.Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation": only once during theperiod from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or asoften as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of privateproperty. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarilycharged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in nonurban areas, may be very substantial indeed.The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not withoutpayment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority torequire newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772 -Aattempts to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need tobe examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking.The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heartof the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has beengranted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. Areasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws byComelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a validexercise of the power of eminent domain.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC FUNDS, NOT PUBLISHERS SOLELY, SHOULD BEAR COSTSFOR PUBLIC INFORMATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES. The ruling here laid down by theCourt is entirely in line with the theory of democratic representative government. The economic costs of informing the general public about the qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office aremost appropriately distributed as widely as possible throughout our society by the utilization of publicfunds, especially funds raised by taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., printmedia enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level of information on and the awarenessof the electoral process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated onthe same basis.3. ID.; POLICE POWER; REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE THEREOF NOTCOMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended thatSection 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space,"may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, madetoo casually to require prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently noinclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property mayindeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt toshow compliance in the instant

case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. Section2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to theindividual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of thecountry, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made todemonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted theComelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated responseto such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the policepower of the State.4. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OFSEC. 8 COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2772, WITHOUT ACTUAL CONTROVERSY, IS NOT RIPEFOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; CASE AT BAR. Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 should be viewed in thecontext of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections. There the Court sustained theconstitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, whichprohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except tothe Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid political advertisements which arereached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists which falloutside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. . . . Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of theComelec to establish a guideline for implementation of the above -quoted distinction and doctrine inNational Press Club, an effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A whilepossibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries andexpressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realisticallybe given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of veryspecific sets of facts. At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specificaffirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimedthat it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to beraised whether or not Section 8 of Re solution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of theComelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution . . . is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.R E S O L U T I O NFELICIANO, J p:The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its correspondingComelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPIis a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. cdphilOn 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:xxx xxx xxxSec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as 'ComelecSpace' from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senators and from March 21, 1995 until May 12,1995. In the absence of said newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city.Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. 'Comelec Space' shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulatedto enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.'Comelec Space' shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. (a) 'Comelec Space' shall be available to all candidates duringthe periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial among all candidates for the same office. All candidates concerned shall be furnished a copy of the allocation of 'Comelec Space'for their information, guidance

and compliance.(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of 'Comelec Space' from newspapers or publicationsbased in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall submit an application therefor, in writing, to the Committeeon Mass Media of the Commission. Any candidate desiring to avail himself of 'Comelec Space' in newspapers or publications based in the provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to theProvincial Election Supervisor concerned. Applications for availment of 'Comelec Space' may be filed atany time from the date of effectivity of this Resolution.(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election Supervisors shall allocate available'Comelec Space' among the candidates concerned by lottery of which said candidates shall be notified inadvance, in writing, to be present personally or by representative to witness the lottery at the date, time and place specified in the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the lottery may appeal to theCommission.(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on Mass Media or the Provincial Election Supervisor, as the case may be, sufficiently in advance and in writing of the date of issue and thenewspaper or publication allocated to him, and the time within which he must submit the written materialfor publication in the 'Comelec Space'.xxx xxx xxxSec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of thenewspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party.However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect thedetermination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publication that the accounts or viewspublished are significant, newsworthy and of public interest." (Emphasis supplied)Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI.These letters read as follows:"This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on Elections, you aredirected to provide free print space of not less than one half () page for use as 'Comelec Space' or similar to the print support which you have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, tomake known to their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to you their pictures,biographical data, stand on key public issues and platforms of government, either as raw data or in theform of positives or camera-ready materials.Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated in your publications anyday upon receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995 which is the day for campaigning.We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard." (Emphasis supplied)In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary restrainin gorder, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that itviolates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, againstthe taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at thesame time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude,contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues thatSection 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. 1On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from enforcingand implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed tovarious print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent to file aComment on the Petition. prcdThe Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772

does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free printspace in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliancewith that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely establishedguidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for andmode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues thateven if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, thesame would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor generalalso maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervisor or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print mediaenterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. 2At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec through its Chairman, Hon.Bernardo Pardo, in response to inquiries from the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court, statedthat Resolution No. 2772, particul arly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters dispatched tovarious members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those members to supply Comelec withfree print space. Chairman Pardo represented to the Court that that Resolution and the related letter-directives were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space which manypublishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to the 11 May 1992 elections. Indeed, the Chairman stated that the Comelec would, that very afternoon, meet and adopt anappropriate amending or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of which would forthwith be filed withthe Court. cdrepOn 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor general a ma nifestation whichattached a copy of Comelec resolution No. 2772 -A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of thisResolution follows:NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission on Elections RESOLVED toclarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No. 2772 as follows:1 . Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as requiring p u b l i s h e r s o f t h e different mass media print publications to provide print space under pain of prosecution, whether administrative, civil or criminal, there being no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section providedfor either in said Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known a s theOmnibus Election Code, on the grant of 'Comelec Space.'2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as constituting prior restraint on thepart of the publishers with respect to the printing or publication of materials in the news, opinion, featuresor other sections of their respective publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear from thelast sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall, 'unless the facts and circumstances clearlyindicate otherwise . . . respect the determination by the publishers and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.'This Resolution shall take effect upon approval." (Emphasis in the original)While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition ashaving become moot and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass upon the first constitutionalissue raised in this case. Our hope is to put this issue to rest and prevent its resurrection.Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression. Section 1 of Resolution No.2772-A did not try to redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 persists in itsoriginal form. Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That ResolutionNo. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letterswith some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intentionwas simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A writtencommunication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched bygovernment (here a constitutional) agency and signed by member of the

Commission presumably legallyauthorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such direction, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties inhering in the present situation.The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to seriousconstitutional objection.To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:"only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or has often as Comelec may direct during the same period? the extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon theuse of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertisingrates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be verysubstantial indeed. LexLibT h e t a k i n g o f p r i n t s p a c e h e r e s o u g h t t o b e e f f e c t e d m a y f i r s t b e a p p r a i s e d u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is thelegal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space attheir normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3 Similarly, it has not be en suggested, let alonedemonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement andadministration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only that,under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent Commissionwould be used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election information"(including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to theCourt a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court)simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars,notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the general public.The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not withoutpayment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of payingcompensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority torequire newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortion, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772 -Aattempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarilygiving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, againsttheir will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes.Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. Cdpr We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely in line with the theory of democraticrepresentative government. The economic costs of informing the general public about the qualificationsand programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as widely as possiblethroughout our society by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by taxation, rather thancast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media enterprises. The benefits which flow from aheightened level of information on and the awareness of the electoral process are commonly thought to becommunity-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the

same basis.As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if readas compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the policepower of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged consideration ontheir part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show thatthe police power essentially a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondentCommission. 4 Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. 5Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regardto the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in different parts of thecountry, to take private property of newspaper or magazi ne publishers. No attempt was made todemonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted theComelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated responseto such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in full again:Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political parties in Newspaper. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of thenewspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifest favor or oppose any candidate or politicalparty by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However,unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicates otherwise, the Commission will respect thedetermination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or viewspublished are significant, newsworthy and of public interest."It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in Resolution No 2772. In any case, Section8 should be viewed in the context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections. 6There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as the ElectoralReforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paidpolitical advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentatorsor columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the constitutionalguarantees of freedom of speech and of the press: LLjur "Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguisedas a donation, of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. Section 11 (b) does notpurport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-noteworthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinionby reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are notin fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum Section 11 (b) is not to be read asreaching any report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for bycandidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not restrict either thereporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs andactivities of any and all candidates for office constitutes the critical distinction which must be madebetween the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. . . ." 7 (Citations omitted;emphasis supplied)Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a guidelinesfor implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club, an effort notblessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while

possibly helpful, does not addsubstantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid politicaladvertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion byreporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only inactual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on thepart of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a littledifferently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to"supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of mediaof communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, andthe right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public-information campaigns and forumsamong candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credibleelections "is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space toComelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. cdll2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, th e Petition for Certiorari andProhibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part andSection 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present from and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADEPERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No.2772. No pronouncement as to costs.Narvasa, C.J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendozaand Francisco, JJ., concur.Quiason, J., is on leave.

6.
FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996.]ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig,Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Melecio Virgilio Emata Law Office for petitioners.The Solicitor General for respondents.SYLLABUS1. POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWER OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN;CONCEPT. Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and,

with less frequency, ascondemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothedwith any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant moreto regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as"the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for somepublic purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to bean essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. Theonly direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use withoutjust compensation." This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so toprotect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE GUIDELINES SET BY THE SUPREME COURT IN GUIDO VS. RURALPROGRESS ADMINISTRATION WERE NOT MEANT TO BE PRECLUSIVE IN NATURE ANDTHE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN SHOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING CONFINEDONLY TO EXPROPRIATION OF VAST TRACTS OF LAND AND LANDED ESTATES. The court,in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's power under Commonwealth ActNo. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale tobona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made thepronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly,the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. cdasia3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF "PUBLIC USE" EXPANDED. The validityof the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at allto be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that"public use" is strictly limited to clear

cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded.4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNIFICANT FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN EMINENT DOMAIN ISTHE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER AND NOT THE CASUALCONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT FOLLOW FROM SUCH EXERCISE. The attempt to give somereligious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is theprincipal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from the exercise of the power. Thepurpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late FelixManalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of theIglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia niCristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merelyincidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriationof property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. cdasiaD E C I S I O NVITUG, J p:In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 15January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled "Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo,et al."), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain isextant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared bythe National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national historical landmark.The facts of the case are not in dispute. llcdPetitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with anarea of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHIto have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 2 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a nationalhistorical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure.In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the

Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:"According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event,achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history.Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, hadmade contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has beenheld that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminentdomain may be authorized. . . .In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an agency of the Governmentcharged with the maintenance and care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and thedevelopment of historical sites that may be declared as national shrines, monuments and/or landmarks,may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question inaccordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedingsshould be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic."Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted acomplaint for expropriation 3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHIalleging, inter alia, that:"Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical Institute issued ResolutionNo. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Cultureand Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the 'Iglesia ni Cristo,' as a National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perforce needs the land as suchnational historical landmark which is a public purpose."At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it totake immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, thetrial court issued, on 03 August 1989, 4 an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed(P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once therequired sum would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro

Manila.Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provisionof Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. 5 Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, asuspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court.On 15 February 1990, following the filing of respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners' motionseeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. 6 Five (5) dayslater, or on 20 February 1990, 7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academicthe motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order. 8Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its nowdisputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that theremedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in anycase, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992resolution of the appellate court. LexLibWe begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates.Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, likepolice power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutionalgear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather thanto grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and mostexact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purposethrough a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. 9 It is a right to take or reassert dominionover property within the

state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential partof governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. 10 The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without justcompensation." 11 This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so toprotect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 12 to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the largenumber of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform. 13 Petitioners suggest thatwe confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses, 14 i.e., the cdasia". . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers,public buildings including schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads."This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lotsor farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that theCourt had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in natureand, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only tothe expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. 15The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in itsgeneral concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the characterizationgiven by various courts to the term; thus:"Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminentdomain. For condemnation purposes, 'public use' is one which confers some benefit or advantage to thepublic; it is not confined to

actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposedfacilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised byone or many members of public, a 'public advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to constitute apublic use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773."Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private property invirtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or bepersonally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that issufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L. Ed. 1186. The termmay be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. Itmay be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for aparticular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered withoutobvious general loss and inconvenience. A 'public use' for which land may be taken defies absolutedefinition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changingconceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by anincrease in population and new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn.,521, 245 A.2d 579,586." 17The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; itis not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. Theidea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. ThisCourt in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 18 quoting from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed.27), held:"We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of thepublic welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed.469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well asmonetary. It is within the power of the legislature

to determine that the community should be beautiful aswell as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case,the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide varietyof values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that theNation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. cdasia"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminentdomain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. NorthRiver Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. GettysburgElectric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427."It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co. 19 that:". . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to be one of constant growth. Associety advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which theresources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for 'whatever is beneficially employed for the communityis a public use'."Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaningshould be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy,as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As longas the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use . One is theexpropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is thetransfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It isaccurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfaresatisfies the requirement of public use." 20Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 21has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to

meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store". Fr. JoaquinBernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is aconcept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare". 22Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's)birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminentdomain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religiousperspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principalobjective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purposein setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo tothe culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia niCristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo thanby most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental andsecondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of propertydoes not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. 23Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity tobe heard; 24 contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings 25 thatcould have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property.Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court's order whichconsidered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila. 26 Both courts held correctly. The Republicwas not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which (thecontracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound.All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs. cdtaiSO ORDEREDPadilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.

7.
FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998.]MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent. Leo Luis P. Mendoza for petitioner.Robiso & Reyes for respondent.SYNOPSISPursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filedw i t h t h e R e g i o n a l Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, on September 20, 1993 a complaint f o r expropriation against private respondent over two parcels of land with a combined area of about 10,000square meters located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila and covered by TorrensCertificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the livingconditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housingproject.In an Order dated February 4, 1994, the trial court authorized petitioner to take possession of the subjectproperty upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market valuebased on its current tax declaration. Private respondent filed its answer alleging in the main that thecomplaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code. The trial court then nullified its February 4, 1994order and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's resolution. Hence,this petition.The Supreme Court held that the petition is not meritorious. The power of eminent domain is lodged in thelegislative branch of government which may delegate the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utilities. A local government unit may therefore exercise the power toexpropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control andrestraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. AIDTHCA local government unit, like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of privateproperty through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly andclearly requires an ordinance or a law for the purpose. A municipal ordinance is different from aresolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of alawmaking body on a specific matter. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinanceauthorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. On the other hand, the principle of resjudicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legalrequirements for its valid exercise are complied with.SYLLABUS1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; EXERCISE OF THE POWER OFEMINENT DOMAIN BY AN LGU; A MUNICIPALITY MAY EXERCISE THE POWER OFEMINENT DOMAIN PURSUANT ONLY TO AN ORDINANCE AND NOT A MERE RESOLUTION. Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down theparameters for its exercise. It provides as follows: "Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unitmay, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: . . . In the case at bar,the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of themunicipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorizedthrough an ordinance. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mereresolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; PETITIONER'SCOMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION; REASON. It is hornbook doctrine that". . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, thequestion submitted before the court for

determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaintitself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypotheticallyadmitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to b e true, may the court render a validjudgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" The fact that there is no cause of action isevident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. Theabsence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, theCourt of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed theexpropriation suit. ADcHES3. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA. The Court holds that theprinciple of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar theright of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as aninherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even bya prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can"reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." All separate interests of individuals in property are held by the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property,remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and theyhave the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." Thus, theState or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J p:A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expresslyand clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses thesentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of resjudicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legalrequirements for its valid exercise are complied with. LLphilStatement of the CaseThese principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review on certiorari of the July 22,1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA GR CV No. 48048, which affirmed in toto 3 theRegional Trial Court's August 9, 1994 Resolution. 4 The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit asfollows:"The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such rightmay be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is nosuch ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Paraaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action.Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior judgment. On September 29,1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudiceon May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same becamefinal. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the present action without violating the principle of [r]es[j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between theparties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The hereindefendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the 'Deed of Assignment Exchange' executed on June 13, 1990.WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The order dated February 4,1994 is vacated and set aside.This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED." 5Factual AntecedentsPursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the Municipality of Paraaquefiled on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. RealtyCorporation, over two parcels of land (Lots 2 -A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd -17917), with acombined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila,and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purposeof alleviating the living conditions of the

underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through asocialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously made an offer to enter into anegotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. 10Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134,issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, 11 giving it due course. Acting on petitioner's motion said courtissued an Order dated February 4, 1994, 12 authorizing petitio ner to take possession of the subjectproperty upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market valuebased on its current tax declaration.On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and acounterclaim, 13 alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it wasfiled pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local GovernmentCode); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. 14 On March 24, 1994, 15 petitioner filed its opposition, stressing that the trial court's Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by thetrial court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1994. 17 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court,raising the following issues:"1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of a ction.3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of procedure resulted intechnicality standing in the way of substantial justice.4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case." 18 As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision. RespondentCourt, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997, 19 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.Hence, this appeal. 20The IssuesBefore this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:" 1 . A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and e f f e c t o f a n ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when publicinterest is primarily involved." 21The Court's RulingThe petition is not meritorious.First Issue:Resolution Different from an OrdinancePetitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating anexpropriation case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" 22 because the terms"ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the localgovernmen t unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." 23 Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGUmay expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive toinitiate expropriation proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. 25 An LGUmay therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress andsubject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminentdomain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive andacting pursuant to an ordinance, exer cise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon

payment of just compensation, pursuant to theprovisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Provided, however, That the power of eminent domainmay not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and suchoffer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a depositwith the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on thecurrent tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paidfor the expropriated .property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value atthe time of the taking of the property." (Emphasis supplied)Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminentdomain:1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over aparticular private property. LexLib2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.3 . T h e r e i s p a y m e n t o f j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n , a s r e q u i r e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 9 , A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e Constitution, and other pertinent laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 27In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to aresolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals 28 to show that aresolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. 29 This case, however, isnot in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government Code,which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast,RA 7160, 31 the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resoluti on" and "ordinance" aresynonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolutionis merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 Anordinance possesses a genera l and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for aresolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. 33If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would havesimply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires thatthe local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, thelaw is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literalinterpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant case,there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible,absurd, or unjust.Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or privateright of the people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language from "resolution"under the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of propertyis held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the lawshould not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation." 36Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution toauthorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160,the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. 37 It is axiomatic that theclear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for itsimplementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of theimplementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that,

in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution,which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy." It merely upholdsthe law as worded in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and thelimitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU isin reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation,and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. 38 Indeed, "the national legislature is still theprincipal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." 39Complaint Does NotState a Cause of ActionIn its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sanggunian Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified allthe acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation. 40This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did notraise this point before this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. 41In any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriationfiled on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that". . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, thequestion submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaintitself. Whether those allegat ions are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypotheticallyadmitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a validjudgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?" 42The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation whichwas based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trialcourt's Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.Second Issue:Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res JudicataAs correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for the applicationof res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has beenrendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally allcases and proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. Thevery nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise thepower be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domainis plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of property which the State might need for publicuse." 46 "All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacitagreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, thehighest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the peoplein their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever thepublic interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot b e forever barred fromexercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, itdoes apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing anexpropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue;it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, asprescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. 48By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domainthrough a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others

are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs De Knecht, 49 theCourt ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by themere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the caseas to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriatethe same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise of itspower of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED. cdrepDavide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.

Section 21 Double Jeopardy People vs. Obsania [G.R. No. L-24447, June29, 1968] Paulin vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. 103323, January21, 1993] Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 95642,May 28, 1992] People vs. Balisacan [G.R. No. L-26376,August 31, 1966] People vs. City Court of Silay [G.R. No. L-43790, December 9, 1976] Esmea vs. Pogoy [G.R. No. L-54110,February 20, 1981] People vs. Pineda [G.R. No. L-44205, February16, 1993] People vs. Tampal [G.R. No. 102485, May 22,1995] Melo vs. People [G.R. No. L-3580, March 22,1950] People vs. Adil [G.R. No. L-41863, April 22,1977] People vs. Relova [G.R. No. L-45129, March 6,1987] Police Power Philippine Association of Service Exportersvs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988] Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7955, May31, 1957] Lutz vs. Araneta [G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955] Association of Small Landowners vs.Secretary of Agrarian Reform [G.R. No.78742, July 14, 1989] Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419,December 18, 1986] Department of Education, Culture and Sportsvs. San Diego

[G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989] Ynot vs. Intermediate Appelate Court [G.R.No. 74457, March 20, 1987] City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983] Power of Eminent Domain City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila [G.R. No. 14355, October 31, 1919] Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance TelephoneCo. [G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969] People vs. Fajardo [G.R. No. L-12172, August 29,1958] Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi [G.R. No. L-20620,August 15, 1974] Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February29, 1972] Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC [G.R. No 119694, May 22, 1995] Sumulong vs. Guerrero [G.R. No. L-48685,September 30, 1987] Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 106440,January 29, 1996] EPZA vs Dulay [G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987] Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp. [G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998 Power of Taxation Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R.No. L-10405, December 29, 1960] Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R.No. L-4871, May 26, 1954] Llladoc vs. Commissioner of InternalRevenue [G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965] Abra Valley College vs. Aquino G.R. No. L39086, June 15, 1988] Section 1Due Process of Law Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7955, May 31,1957] Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres [G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994] Ynot vs. Intermediate Appelate Court [G.R. No.74457, March 20, 1987] Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9,1998] Aniag vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 104961, October 7,1994] Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs.Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989] Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations [G.R No. 46496, February 27, 1940] Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993