PARTY FRAGMENTATION IN BRAZIL

A SUBNATIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

Giuseppe Lobo Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Paper presented at 60th Annual Conference Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, University of Essex, 10-12 September 2010.

Fellow of the Council for Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), who acknowledges the assistance.

ABSTRACT

The researchs aim is to analyze the effect of institutional and political competition variables on the fragmentation of subnational party systems. Since the states use the same open-list proportional representation system, with the possibility of coalition and electoral districts with magnitude (M) ranging 24-94 in state elections, and 8-70 in the national elections, the study compares the effect of variables electoral district magnitude (M), political competition, electoral volatility, and combined effect of coalitions on the effective number of parties (N) both in transversal and longitudinal perspective. The database was compiled from electoral data from the last five brazilian state and national elections between 1990 and 2006 in 27 states.

Introduction: the Brazilian party system

One of the salient features of the current party system is the existence of a large number of political parties: 29. Throughout our party experience, no other party system has show so fragmented as the present. As pointed out by Nicolau (1996), the democratic transition began in 1985 is largely responsible for the proliferation of political parties in Brazil. The electoral laws created were extremely permissive and has great incentives for the creation of parties with the aim of incorporating radical leftist groups. That seems to be a mark of societies in transition to democratic regimes. The high number of political parties in a heterogeneous society means that different social groups are embedded in the political game. In several countries, the number of political parties is also great, particularly in federal countries with/or internal conflicts of ethnic, religious or cultural. The uniqueness of the brazilian case is the fact that several of these parties obtain success at the electoral arena. Few countries are close to Brazil when dealing with actual number of parties. Ranulfo (2007, p.277) highlights some aspects of the Brazilian institutional arrangement. The dynamics of federalism and limited nationalization of much of the political parties give rise to party organizations rather different from state to state. Another aspect noted by the author, is the fragility of a party systems institutional matrix in the current arrangement. While in previous democratic experience (1945-64) had a structured matrix around three parties (UDN, PSD and PTB) and the beginning of the democratization period between PDS and the PMDB, the current system still does not show a definite matrix, although PT and PSDB sketch something in majoritarian national level. Legislative elections, which adopt the open-list proportional representation, the distribution of votes within the list takes into consideration the performance of the party and each candidate individually. The brazilian parties are not cohesive (Maiwaring, 2001) and the labels can be pooled to both for the majoritarian - which is common in multiparty systems and proportional elections. Once coligated, the votes are counted like a single party and the candidates better positioned in the list are elected, even though his party has not achieved enough votes to reach

the necessary level1. In settings where parties are cohesive, transfers within coalitions does not seem to be problematic, how Desposato (2007) show.

Take the above representation as a hypothetical example of contest between candidates of two parties: A and B. A voter who to vote for the candidate A2, near the extreme left, you can see their vote transferred to the candidate A3, more rightist than your competitor from another party (B1), for example. Furthermore, the vow not involved allows voters to vote for candidates of a majority in a caption, and other proportionate. In Brazil, few voters who vote for parties. In general, vote for candidates regardless of the party they represent. Part of these incentives were present in previous democratic experience, however, the number of political parties was much lower than that observed today. Given this observation, we can ask what factors influenced the transition from a moderately fragmented party system (Melo, 2007) to a more fragmented systems in the world? The goal of this research is to identify the variables that phenomenon based on electoral data from the states. In general, the analysis is restricted to the Chamber of Deputies (Nicolau, 1996) despite the fact that the parties have their own electoral dynamics in the states. Although they use, under the constitutional imperative, institutional arrangements similar to the Union, state legislatures are unicameral.
NATIONAL LEVEL INSTITUTIONS BICAMERAL LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE

Cmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies)

Senado Federal (Senate)

Presidente da Repblica (President)

Fernando Limongi and Jairo Nicolau suggest the possibility of maintaining the coalition with the proportional distribution proportionately among the parties in the coalition as a way to prevent candidates from one party to be elected with the votes of other members of the coalition. See LIMONGI, F.; NICOLAU, J. Quatro pontos para uma reforma poltica. Revista Repblica, So Paulo, p. 100 - 105.

STATE LEVEL INSTITUTIONS

UNICAMERAL LEGISLATIVE

EXECUTIVE

Assemblia Legislativa (Assemblie)

Governo do Estado (Governador)

Regarding the choice of representatives, the main relevant difference between the states is the electoral districts magnitude. Both elections to the Chamber of Deputies as the election for the state parliaments (assemblies), the number of seats varies with the population of each state. However, the constitution requires a minimum representation of eight and maximum of 70 deputies by state device that increases the disparity between the actual representation and the ideal representation of each state. For the state elections, the districts range between 24 and 96 representatives. The district magnitudes at the state level corresponds to three times the representation of the state at the Chamber of Deputies until it reaches the number of thirty-six deputies. Reached this level, "will be increased by as many as there are federal deputies over twelve" (CF, art.27; see table below)
States grouped by District Magnitude 1990-2006, (Chamber of Deputies; State Assemblies) Lowest
Acre (8; 24) Amap (8; 24) Distrito Federal (8; 24) Mato Grosso do Sul (8; 24) Rio Grande do Norte (8; 24) Rondnia (8; 24) Roraima (8; 24) Sergipe (8; 24) Tocantins (8; 24) Amazonas (8; 25) Alagoas (9; 27) Mato Grosso (10; 28) Esprito Santo (10; 30) Piaui (12; 30) Paraba (12; 37) Santa Catarina (16; 40) Gois (17; 41) Par (17; 41) Maranho (18; 42) Cear (22; 46) Pernambuco (25; 49) Paran (30; 54) Rio Grande do Sul (31;55) Total: Chamber of Deputies: 513; Assemblies: 1.065 Fonte: CORPI/Cmara dos Deputados;TSE Bahia (39; 63) Rio de Janeiro (46; 70) Minas Gerais (53; 77) So Paulo (70; 94)

Higest

Considering that in Brazil, the states are the electoral districts in both the national and local elections, and that these have different magnitudes for different levels, you can compare, for

example, the effect of magnitude on party fragmentation. If the magnitude is an important variable for the formatting of the party system, legislatures should be more fragmented than the states' representation in the House of Representatives. The next session will describe the database used in the research. Then I discuss the centrality of the magnitude of electoral districts as a key determinant of party fragmentation, with the backdrop of the states. Finally, the preliminary findings and the researchs next steps.

Database
The database contains the latest election results in five brazilian national and state elections held between 1990 and 2006 in 26 states and the Federal District, totaling 270 observations. Since not all parties are important electorally and in view of the possibility of comparability of the study, used the effective number of parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) to measure party fragmentation. For these data, I used the data of Leex and Nicolau (see references). I also use the Index of Competitiveness and electoral volatility in the states have been calculated according to data from Leex. Data on coalitions are partially available. No information for the elections of 1990 and 1994 in the Superior Electoral Court. An alternative way of getting that information would go to court regional and / or secondary sources such as local newspapers.

District Magnitude and Number of Parties

Since the district magnitude is considered a crucial variable for understanding the fragmentation of party systems, as Taagepera & Shugart (1989) pointed, and that the institutions or, more precisely, the institutional engineering shapes the party systems format (Noris, 2004; Duverger, 1987), brazilian subsystems should present themselves less fragmented in the subset of nine states with M = 8, 24 and more fragmented in states with M <8; 24 being in a continuous state of So Paulo (M = 70, 96) who would have the highest fragmentation level. The number of political parties and the proportionality of the system depends largely upon the size of constituency. For Tavares, the district magnitude is the "most important strategic variable

in terms of institutional engineering that seeks to increase the proportion of parliamentary representation, or conversely, to focus the parliamentary party system in the scenario" (1994, p.338) That is, districts of high magnitude electoral systems tend to form more fragmented. Understood this way, the fragmentation of party depends on the size of electoral districts. For Rae (1967), the effect of the electoral system on the party system, as it made by Duverger, takes a secondary position. The mechanical effect of the number of districts is more relevant to the extent that "the proportion and number of parties grow as it grows the district magnitude." (P.337) Bennoit, in turn, points out that Duverger's Law has been duly tested in majoritarian systems, however, the consequence of the rules on plurality systems have received little attention (2001, p.203). In other words, the proportionality found in Duverger's Law is a consequence of district magnitude in proportional electoral systems. Hypothesis A1: The higher the threshold of exclusion, less party fragmentation. The assumption A1, as shown, enables the analysis of the effect of the magnitude of electoral districts on party fragmentation. However, the Brazilian electoral system has an intervening variable that should be taken into consideration.
Effective number of parties vs. Magnitude
State Assemblies, 1998-2006 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 20 50 60 70 Magnitude N (1998) N (2002) 30 40 80 90 100 Effective number of parties Effective number of parties Chamber of Deputies, 1998-2006

11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 0

N (2006)

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Magnitude

N (1998)

N (2002)

N (2006)

Data: Leex; TSE

In Brazil, however, we found considerable variation both longitudinal and transversal with respect to the conduct of party systems in the states. Districts of high magnitude, such as Rio Grande do Sul, have less fragmented party systems than other lesser magnitude. States with the minimum threshold (8, 24), present or fragmented party systems so that more states with M above the median. The most plausible explanation for this behavior seems to be the dynamics of competition in the states. As emphasized in the first session, the parties can gather as much as majoritarian elections in proportional. Once affiliated, the votes of the coalition are added together and calculated the ratio partisan, the seats are distributed among the strongest candidates in the list, regardless of party affiliation and performance of the parties. The coalition functions as a vapor barrier to overcome the limitation imposed by the electoral quotient. Machado (2002) noted that most of the candidates is elected by coalitions and in the districts of low, parties tend to coalesce frequently. This may be one explanation for the high fragmentation in the electoral districts of low, as shown by Bohn (2009, p.19).

A1A Hypothesis: The parties tend to form coalitions to be less in the districts of large magnitude. District magnitude, the second hypothesis A1 A, is the crucial information in the seam of the coalition states. The parties use this feature to make their electoral strategies and try to elect more representatives. If the hypothesis A1 A confirmed, then the parties tend to gather more on elections to the Chamber of Deputies to the Legislative Assembly. The national and state elections are held simultaneously under the same electoral rules. Thus, it eliminates the effect of the application to the Executive, since the candidates for state government and the presidency are the same, and the effects of the socio-economic and governmental crises. Given that the electoral districts are smaller in national elections and coalitions may be different for the Chamber of Deputies and for the Assembly in the same election, we can compare the behavior of parties at both levels.

Next steps: Connect it or not?

There are two basic interpretations for behavior that in the absence of a better term, appoint the coligacionista. The first, often defended by lawmakers, advocates that the parties met together to form governments and that they meet the programmatic principles - if not ideological common to the parties that belong to it. A second point of view, less idyllic, coligacionista assert that behavior is part of a survival strategy party. In this article, I assume the second condition. I use the rational assumption under which the formation of coalitions in proportional elections serves an electoral imperative for small parties, to overcome the performance clause imposed by the electoral quotient and, for large, the need to aggregate the most votes, that will later be converted into seats, to form an impressive bench, either support or oppose the government. In recent years, some authors have devoted themselves to the debate on electoral coalitions. Part of this research has as background the discussion on the need to ban coalitions in proportional elections. Braga (2003) argues that the dynamic state party distributing the benefits and losses due to the unevenness caused by coalitions and that the extinction of the scheme would not bring a change of the forces relevant party in the House of Representatives. On the one hand, the author assumes that the behavior of voters is static. Argument, instead, that the extinction of the mechanism leading the voter to act strategically, triggering a process of partisan realignment. A party that in two successive elections would not exceed the quotient party, would be doomed on the one hand, the erosion of their constituency, and secondly, the need to consider merging with other legends. Escape of this assumption, that ideological parties, enjoying the public resources for their operation, act as a pressure group or position taking parties2. If the assumption is valid party's survival, it is expected that the behavior coligacionista is observed as a function of ascending magnitude of electoral districts. In districts of lesser magnitude, the number of coalitions would be greater than in large districts, because the threshold would be lower than those.
2

In Brazil, the party funding is public, while the campaign is exclusively private. The electoral justice distributes party fund follows: 1% of the amount is distributed equally among all parties legally existing and the remaining 99% is distributed proportionally among the parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to financial transfers, the parties receive institutional incentives otherwise. Free insertion on television chain periodically and during the campaign (HPGE) is pointing for some researchers as a decisive factor for the strategy coligacionista.

Governance Hypothesis. Parties met together in statewide elections tend to coalesce is also in proportion. Need to create an indicator of coalition to characterize the preferred coalitions between parties. Political Situation Calculus. The parties tend to gather more on the elections for the House of Representatives that the elections to the legislatures, since the threshold is higher than in national elections. Simultaneous elections, the same context. The next research steps are to map the coalitions at both levels in order to identify, through network analysis, recurring patterns of coalition and which parties benefit from this mechanism and to observe whether the coalition made in proportional elections are congruent with the majoritarian.

Preliminary Conclusions
Brazilian party subsystems have great variety in terms of fragmentation and, although the magnitude of electoral districts is a relevant variable for understanding the problem, singularities of the brazilian electoral legislation and the possibility of coalitions in proportional seem to decisively influence the fragmentation of party subsystems. The next steps of the research consists precisely in trying to establish patterns of party coalition aiming to examine to what extent and which parties benefit from this feature as well as the congruence of the coalition.

References
Bohn, S. 2009. Should identical electoral systems generate identical party systems? evidences from Brazil. Paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Melo, C.R. 2007. Nem tanto ao mar, nem tanto a terra: elementos para a analise do sistema partidrio brasileiro. in Melo, C.R. & Saez, M.A. A democracia brasileira: balano e perspectivas para o sculo 21. Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG. Desposato, S. 2007. Reforma poltica brasileira: o que precisa ser consertado, o que no precisa fazer e o que fazer in Nicolau, J. & Power, T. Instituies representativas no Brasil: balano e reforma. Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, p.123-153.

Mainwaring, Scott. 2001. Politicians, parties, and electoral systems: Brazil in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, vol.24, no. 1, p.21-43. Nicolau, J. 1996. Multipartidarismo e democracia: um estudo sobre o sistema partidrio brasileiro (1985-94). Rio de Janeiro: FGV. Tavares, J.A.G. 1994. Sistemas eleitorais nas democracias contemporneas: teoria, instituies, estratgia. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumar.

Database
Nicolau, J. Dados eleitorais do Brasil (1982-06). http://jaironicolau.iuperj.br/banco2004.html Santos, W.G. dos. Almanaque de dados eleitorais: Brasil e outros pases. http://www.ucam.edu.br/leex/ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Resultados eleitorais de 1998, 2002 e 2006. http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/eleicoes