Islam and Democracy Contemp SArab Affairs 3.3.july Sept 2010

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Contemporary Arab Affairs
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Islam and democracy
Fahmy Howeidya a Al-Ahram Journal, Cairo, Egypt Online publication date: 05 July 2010
To cite this Article Howeidy, Fahmy(2010) 'Islam and democracy', Contemporary Arab Affairs, 3: 3, 297 333 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2010.494405 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2010.494405
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Contemporary Arab Affairs Vol. 3, No. 3, JulySeptember 2010, 297333
Islam and democracy*

Fahmy Howeidy
Al-Ahram Journal, Cairo, Egypt
howeidy@gmail.com FahmiHuwaydi 0 3000002010 2010 & Francis Original Article 1755-0912 Francis Contemporary Arab Affairs 10.1080/17550912.2010.494405 RCAA_A_494405.sgm Taylor and (print)/1755-0920 (online)
Downloaded By: [University Of British Columbia] At: 00:10 13 September 2010
This paper reviews how the civilizational discourse of Islam differs from that of democracy but doesnt necessarily mean that it contradicts it. Knowing that this juxtaposition promotes diversity and distinction, this paper elucidates the factors of ambiguity that surround this religion and system in order to uncover the real dimension of their distinction. The paper is organized as follows: first, it presents seven characteristics of the Islamic state. Next, it discusses the importance of consultation (al-sh ura) and the necessity of questioning the rulers in Islam. Third, the article answers the question Where does democracy correspond to Islam and where does it differ?. Several prominent opinions are examined in the fourth part, before displaying the main positions from the 1980s, vis--vis democracy, in part five. Part six exhibits the fatwas of al-Qaradawi. At the end of the article, the paper emphasizes the approaches that can be taken towards Islamic ruling (shar ah).
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Keywords: political system; Islamic governance; democracy; ummah; shari ah (Islamic legal rulings); doctrinal schools
Islam is wronged twice: once when it compared with democracy, and once when it is said that it is against democracy. Comparison between the two is erroneous, but so are claims of incompatibility; and this is the matter which is in need of an extrication in the first instance and clarification in the second. Comparison is excusable from the methodological angle between Islam which is a religion and a message containing principles for organizing the acts of worship of people and their ethics and dealings with one another and between democracy, which is a system of rule and a device for participation as well as a theme borne by a number of positive values. It is true that there is much which might be said in the context of this juxtaposition, but the civilizational dimension of the issue ought to be clear on the consideration that Islam has its particular civilizational initiative, whereas democracy is a part of an alternative civilizational initiative. This difference should not be taken in the sense of contradiction or rivalry where the realm of correspondence remains persisting on the basis of some basic values and the ultimate ideal, but rather it should be comprehended in the scope of diversity and distinction. In other regard, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the subject, in its totality, is akin to surveying a vast sea of ambiguities some simple, others compound. It is the matter which impels the researcher to transcend the bounds of simply laying out the ideas and investigating them to engage in an attempt to uncover the subjects of ambiguity and interference and to extricate and liberate the elements of the case in
Email: howeidy@gmail.com *This paper was first published in Arabic in Al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, vol. 15, no. 166, pp. 437. The original referencing system has been retained.
ISSN 1755-0912 print/ISSN 1755-0920 online 2010 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2010.494405 http://www.informaworld.com
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order for them to be appreciated in their actual dimensions or within their true framework. The position of the Muslims and not Islam towards democracy resembles an important focal point mired in ambiguities when it is burdened to a large degree by the heavy weight of history; and memory plays a decisive role in instilling doubts and barriers and possibly even rejection and aspersions of blame as well. Democracy is for some, in our time, not viewed only as a system of government predicated on freedom, political participation, multiplicity (of political parties) and so forth, but rather as a symbol of a Western initiative to exercise domination and heap humiliation upon the Arabs and the Muslims; and its media discourse, at least, reflects a manifest hostility towards Islam. From this standpoint, the refusal of democracy from the vantage point of these persons should not be considered as a rejection of it in its essence, but rather, in truth, as a rejection of the initiative which it represents. This is the fine line which many do not notice in their apprehensive assessments of some Islamists vis--vis democracy with the possible exception of two Western researchers John Esposito and James Pescatori who paid attention to this point in their important study published under the title of Democracy and Islam. The study mentions that some Islamist groups condemned the Western styles of democracy and the form of government which was forcibly entered into their countries by Britain; and their negative reaction was, in fact, an expression of their general rejection of European colonial authority and a defence of Islam against greater dependency on the West more than it was a total rejection of democracy.1 This is what explains, to a large extent, the position of wide sectors of mainstream Muslims, especially those which manifested in strength during the Algerian parliamentary elections, when some raised the banners rejecting democracy and criticizing the Constitution and the (National) Charter, when they were demanding sh ura (consultation) and resort to the Qur an for judgement. When I was availed of the opportunity for discussions with some of them, I discovered that they considered democracy to be part of the merchandise of the Western plan which they viewed as being embodied in the ignominy and humiliation of the French occupation, whereas their rejection of the Constitution and the (National) Charter was because they were worded in terms of socialism and they did not refer to Islam. In addition to the fact that the West remains connected to domination and colonialism in the Arab-Islamic memory, it is also for many in the past an analogue for moral corruption at times and for unbelief at others. It is historically confirmed that the fathers of the Western Church were the first to attribute unbelief to the Muslims when they did not acknowledge their religion or their Prophet; whereas Muslims considered the acknowledgement of their prophets to be a part of the Islamic faith, and the Qur an categorized them as people of the Book (ahl al-kitab). Many among Muslims have long-harboured latent suspicions about the West and its attempts to realize particular political goals. They were facilitated in that by the circumstances of the conceptual and cultural backwardness that enveloped the ArabIslamic world. We may notice, for instance, that the Ottoman Sultan Selim III stepped down at the beginning of the 19th century (1807 CE) as a result of the fatwa accusing him of imposing upon the Muslims systems of the unbelievers (al-kuf ar) where the Ottoman mufti At a Allah al-Effendi decreed: Every sultan who introduces the systems of the Franks and their customs and imposes upon his subjects to follow them is not fit to rule.2 In modern Iranian history, there are events which resemble this. When Shah Muhammad Al Mu z affir al-Dn al-Q aj ar (1907 CE) wanted to confront the national
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movement, he made it public that the law which the movement was seeking was against the shar ah (i.e., Islamic law) because it was positivist and Western, and in this he utilized a fatwa of one of the fuqaha Fadl Allah Nur claiming that the constitutional system was against Islam, for that reason. When the Islamic caliphate (i.e., the Ottoman) was abolished in 1924, Kamal Attaturk appointed himself President of a secular state in Turkey, and Shah Reza Khan took the opportunity to reaffirm his monarchy, claiming that the republican system was in contravention of Islam on the consideration that those who advocated it were importing ideas of the unbelieving West and that they abolished the office of the caliph of the Muslims and put in its place a republican system.3 Perhaps one of the most curious exploitations the resulting ambiguities in the collective Islamic memory is what Ahmad al-Sham, the Yemeni politico, confirmed in his memoirs about the 1948 Revolution against Imam Yahya al-Mutawakkil, in which he participated, which did not succeed and which announced in its first communiqus the call for the establishment of constitutional government.4 In the first days of resistance to the revolution, Imam Ahmad dispatched a call to action and an advisory to the sheikhs and notables of the tribes in Yemen, and in it was the text:
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Would you be pleased with the killing of the renowned Imam Yahya and his sons and with replacing the shar ah of Allah with rule by (positive) law, and exchanging the Qur an, the book of Allah, for the constitution and having Yemen follow the Christians?
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This was because at that time the term constitution (dust ur) was considered to be opposed to the Qur an, and its reputation had been besmirched to the degree that if one were to ask what the meaning of constitution was, the reply relying on al-Sham would be: That your house is not yours, your wife is not yours and your religion is not yours! There is a famous story from Egypt in the same context where it is related that (Pasha) Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid entered himself as a candidate in the elections of the (Representative) Founding Association for principles of democracy in the protectorate of al-Daqhaliyah before the First World War. When his opponent wanted to demolish his support, he made it public that the democracy for which the Pasha was calling was a Western concept which permitted women to marry four (husbands) in parity with the husband in his marriage to four women. This assertion was sufficient to bring down Lutfi al-Sayyid in the elections! Ahmad al-Sham says that the attribution of constitutionalist or haddastur became one of the most vile of aspersions that a person might cast on his opponent or enemy at that time and for a number of years thereafter. He adds further that people in San a , after the arrest of the revolutionaries, were shouting Long live Imam Ahmad and Death to the republicans. And after they spent a period in the prison of the Imam, the head of the jailers came, one time, and informed them: Be informed of good news, the Imam will release you all after the arrest of the constitution and his wife in the house of the faq h. Such was the well-established impression in the collective Islamic memory about the various terminologies of the Western initiative, and these were entirely negative as may be seen, for some of the reasons we have mentioned. And it is impossible to expunge these impressions in any attempt to extirpate the widespread roots of tension in the Islamic reality in regard to the sum total elements of Western experience, with democracy being at the forefront of these.
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If it is our purpose to orient towards the other side, then we will find that there are matters that we ought to clarify, the most crucial of which can be encapsulated in the following four observations:
The first observation pertains to the point of departure of rule of law for the Western authoritative point of reference and its considering it to be the source by which standards of public welfare and rectitude are measured for citizens and the particular orientation towards the issuance and dependence on the certificates of good conduct for the countries of the Third World. It is a principle which is deemed to warrant preservation, merit caution and demand recourse not exclusively in regard to the experience of the West, but out of respect for subjectivity, and appealing to civilizational/cultural specificity, where a person cannot hope to assess the measure of success of his nation (ummah) except on the basis of its taking from or correspondence say its contrition to the Western model. It is a position which diverges of a necessity from the affirmation of respect for shared human values and, similarly, for the supreme ideal that is the product of human experience and about which the majority of people concur, on the consideration that they are equals in terms of creation, and not on the basis of it being lessons in etiquette or perquisites of civilization imposed from above on the weak or by the dominator on the dominated. The second observation can be summed up in the question: Is it possible for us to criticize Western democracy as its own sons criticize it now in loud voices or is it for us merely to submit to it as it was sent down and to preserve it and recite it as an anthem morning, noon and night? That is the vast development in the means of communication and its tremendous capability to influence have stirred up ongoing debate in Europe especially about the utility of political parties and the role of television in cultivating awareness and possibly in distorting it the matter that has become capable of shaping public opinion, which might express particular vested interests and might not reflect the desires of the people and their preferences. It is a development which casts doubt on discourse about the sovereignty of the people, for instance, and which calls for a re-evaluation of a number of instrumental presuppositions of democracy. The third observation is inherently connected to the previous two and is represented in the question: Are we appointed to implement the Western model of democracy in the form that it is followed in those countries despite the possible differences between the nature of the societies and their composition? The question supposes that there is a difference between democratic values (shared, questioned and other) and between the model or the form that corresponds to how these values are being implemented in reality (parties, the House of Representatives or the senate or the caliphate). We are not discussing abiding by the value, as that is a subject of agreement without debate, but rather the discussion rests on the approach which must be followed in effecting that abidance, where such supposes in this case that there will be a natural change in the social fabric. If the circumstances of Egypt, for example, permit the establishment of political parties, the establishing of the like of these parties in another country where tribal, ethnic or sectarian circumstances are rooted, might be a path to tearing apart the unity of the nation and fragmenting it (Lebanon being an example of that and Yemen possibly another).
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The fourth observation is that we are confronting a crossroads worthy of note in dealing with the question of democracy from the standpoint that we live in a potent state of schizoid paradox where there is acceptance of democracy at the national or regional level yet there are coups against democracy in the international arena, which are governed in the main according to the criterion of brute force and nothing else. So the decision rests with the strong and woe to the weak, and if the majority of countries, or the majority of people and their inhabitants and senior democrats in their countries are themselves arrogant oppressors in the international arena, raising the banners of multiplicity and tolerance within but posting the declarations of pax romana on the outside. This is the matter which clearly implies that dealing and cooperating with democracy transpires exclusively on the basis of self-interest and not on ethical bases.
What is intended by these observations is not to detract from the matter of democracy or to renounce it or to bypass it. We assert that what it represents of values and what it offers of guarantees remains the most preferable way of effecting the realization of political participation and protecting freedoms in the present circumstances. Despite any negative factors or shortcomings which it may exhibit, it is with its defects, incalculably superior to its alternatives among systems of government or methods of politics. The desired aim of what we have asserted is the liberation of the question and the delineation of the framework which governs our point of view in dealing with democracy its costs and values and thus this is nothing more than an attempt to constrain the course of dialog, and guide the comprehension of the aspects of the subject and not to expropriate these in any way. This is an introduction which I deemed necessary before delving into the heart of the matter, in order to remove some of the basic obscurity that leads to the supposed battle between Islam and democracy. It is a skirmish which I suspect has its primary origins in a greater ambiguity in understanding the view of Islam of the political system and legitimate bases for establishing society and constructing the world. First: Seven focal points of the Islamic state If understanding any problem is half way to solving it, then if that understanding is not proffered in the question of the battle between Islam and democracy, then I will be as a guarantor clearing the path before the solution. If it is the case that we are faced, in the truth of the matter, with an example of a misunderstanding between the two sides, then it is the case that Islam has the greater share of ambiguity. For that reason, we will not answer now the question of how we can resolve the battle, nor the question of the source of the ambiguity, but rather we will try to liberate the subject first through confirming the conception of Islam for building the political state, in order that we may be entirely explicit about the realities of the subject we are researching as it is impractical to discuss any issue, where each can understand it in a way alternative to the other. This conception can be read from three angles: one which pertains to basic features and characteristics; a second which pertains to means; and a third which is predicated on goals and intents. We will not be able to improve upon this reading unless we consider each angle individually. We will begin with the first point and inquire: What are the characteristics of state as Islam conceives of them? We are able to delineate seven characteristics and they are as follows.
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(1) The trusteeship (wil ayah) of the ummah (over itself) as it is the decision-maker and its acquiescence/good pleasure is the condition upon which the perpetuity of its choice rests:
The vast majority of the masses of our compatriots (i.e., the Sunnis) and among the Mu tazilah and the Kharijites and the Naj aryah assert that the means to its confirmation (that is, the imamate or the leadership) is the choice (ikhtiyar) of the ummah.5
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The matter is indeed like this as the ummah possesses the general leadership, and it alone has the right to choose the imam or to remove him that is, to end his term and impeach him as it installs him and supervises him and possesses the primary right/duty in regard to him.6 This connotation is precisely that which is affirmed by the most prominent contemporary ulama of the usul (fundamental source principles of religion), just as our teacher Muhammad Yusuf Musa wrote in this context: the source of sovereignty is the ummah alone and not the caliph, because he is a trustee over it in matters of religion and in directing their affairs according to the shar ah of Allah and his Messenger. Thus, he derives his authority from them, and they have the duty to advise him as well as to orient him and to rectify (his actions) if he errs. Rather, they have the duty to remove him from the office to which he has been entrusted by their choice if they find what necessitates his removal. It is logical that the source of sovereignty is the original grantor of trust not the deputized trustee (al-na ib al-wakeel).7 Among that which Uthm an Khall, Professor of Constitutional Law, mentions in this regard is that Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) does not consider the trustee (al-wal ) as possessing a right to sovereignty, rather he sees that sovereignty is the right of the ummah alone which the wal exercises as an employee or a trustee of it, so it is able to remove him if it finds what justifies that.8 As the matter is such, sheikh Abd al-Wahab Khilaf, took the position that:
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The place of supreme leadership in Islamic government is tantamount to the place of supreme leadership in any constitutional government because it derives its authority from the ummah as represented by the people accorded authority (ul al-hall wa al iqad); and it is for this sultan to remain in their trust and looking out for their interests; thus the ulama of the Muslims have decreed that the ummah can depose the caliph for a reason that necessitates it.9
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We, then, are talking about elected civil authority from the representatives of the ummah and its abiding by the shar ah of Islam does not transform it into a religious authority according to the prevailing conception in the experience of the West, which is linked to claims of divine mandate and perpetual monopoly of authority where religion in it remains the source of law and values and not a source of authority in any case. The imam Muhammad Abduh was one who vociferously rebutted this dubious contention from the beginning of the twentieth century, when he mentioned that one of the fundamental sources (usul) specified by Islam is: the overturning of religious authority and eradication of its bases And, he added in regard to another subject of his contentions that Islam:
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demolished constructing this authority and erased its traces, so that there did not remain among the masses anything of its name or contour. Islam did not confer authority upon any after Allah and His Messenger over the creed ( aq dah) of anyone, nor control over his faith. Furthermore, the Messenger upon him be peace and blessings was a
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conveyor [of the message] and a warner, not one who dominated or who had control as Allah the Most Exalted said: So remind [them], verily, you are one who reminds, and you do not have control over them.10 And he did not grant anyone of his line the right to dissolve [pacts] or conclude [them], not on earth nor in heaven; rather the faith liberates the believer from every overseer in what is between him and Allah, other than Allah Himself the Muslim whatever his status in Islam, whether high or low, is not charged with anything except with the duty to give advice and guidance.
The Imam summarizes his view in a single sentence:

There is no religious authority in Islam aside from the authority of righteous preaching and calls for the good and condemnation of evil, and it is an authority which Allah conferred upon the lowliest of Muslims and whereby He clips the wings of its highest, and just as it is granted to the highest, it is partaken of by the lowest. 11
(2) Society is culpable (mukallaf) and responsible (mas ul). Establishing the reli gion and building in the life of the world as well as supervision of the general welfare are among the responsibilities of the ummah and not the authority alone.12 An indication of this is that the Quranic discourse is directed towards the culpability of the ummah in a number of subjects: O you who believe, be steadfast in justice (surat al-nisaa Q 4: 135); O you who believe honor your pacts and cooperate in goodness and piety and do not conspire in sin and animosity (s urat al-ma idah Q 5: 1-2); let there be among you an ummah which calls to the good and commands what is right and forbids what is wrong (s urat Al- Imran Q 3: 104). From the standpoint of this discourse a society can be classified as a guarantor of its interests, mobilizing all its vital sectors for rectification and reform through its observance of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong. And this is a culpability which covers all of the activities and actions of the society from wrongdoings of the street and the marketplace to the injustices of the rulers and the appointees, even to the extent that Imam al-Ghazali considered it:
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the greatest axis in the religion if its carpet has been rolled up and its knowledge and work have been neglected then its prophethood been disabled and religiosity dwindled, and chaos has become general and deviation [from what is right] has become widespread and ignorance has become commonplace and corruption has spread dangerously and lawlessness has increased, and the lands have been ruined and the slaves [i.e., people] have perished.13
It is an obligation of the ummah, and an analogue of faith that: the believing men and the believing women are trustees over one another, they command what is right and they forbid what is wrong and they perform the prayers (surat al-tawbah Q 9: 71) This is even to the extent that Imam al-Ghazali mentions that: whoever abandons commanding the right and forbidding the wrong has gone out from among these believ ers specified in the verse.14 Such is also the case when the Qur an indicates that the curse which fell upon those of bani Israel who disbelieved is attributable to them because: they did not prohibit the wrong they were doing (s urat al-m a idah Q 5: 79). According to this clearly specified culpability, every individual or group in Islamic society has its share of responsibility for rectifying the course and defending the well being of the ummah. In another regard, al-zakat (alms) which is one of the pillars of Islam and faith, is considered the like of another culpability which calls the society to self-sufficiency where it becomes obligatory on everyone capable to contribute a share of his wealth, which will contribute towards the provision of this security. In this
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giving of his, he does not proffer a contribution nor a good deed in common parlance but rather he performs a duty towards others out of his wealth, termed according to the expression of duty unto Allah the Most Exalted. We are, then, in the context of a society, present in the matter of law (al-shar ) and its rulings, which is not waiting for solicitation from an authority nor permission from a government where its presence is dictated according to divine culpability. As for the possible form by which this presence can be effected, the people can formulate it according to the circumstances of their time. As such, what is important is that society maintains the mechanisms of its self-propulsion and does not become a victim of power or resigned before it. History bears witness that Islamic society was burgeoning with multiple entities and institutions which assumed this function from among groups of ulama , judges and muftis to guilds of crafts and artisans, to the sheikhs of the tribes and clans and the skeikhs of Sufi orders and heads of sects.15 Along with this, the mosque was a centre for cultural dissemination. And the waqf (charitable endowment) was a major independent institution established by people through their giving, and it performed its weighty role in meeting the needs of the social defence of the ummah. And whoever peruses what Mustaf a al-Siba wrote in his book Min Rawa i Had aratina (From the Wonders of Our Civilization) and what Muhammad Amn affirmed in his doctoral thesis on Al-Awq af wa al-H ayat al-Ijtima yah fi Misr (Charitable endowments and social life in Egypt), perceives the extent to which the charitable endowments of waqf provided for the various social and cultural needs of society in terms of schools, institutes, libraries and mosques to places of refuge, hospitals and hotels; that is not inclusive of other aspects of life which reached the extent of the expropriation of charitable endowments for the benefit of those seeking marriage, matrons, and to entertain the sick, even to the degree that it extended to care for sick animals, crippled horses and stray dogs.16 Thus Islamic society was running itself by itself many centuries before the appearance of the concept of civil society for which some yearn in our time. (3) Freedom is the right of society, where the human being exercising his freedom is the obverse side of al-tawh d (the divine unicity of Allah) and the enunciation of the shahadatayn (two testaments of faith) in confirmation of the profession of his servitude to Allah alone, and his liberation from any authority of anyone among people.
]a ar m [c a]r [a m c aa m []c r m i]a [c r aa ]r m [c
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Verily Allah reveals to us His desire only, but he does not compel us to abide by this desire. He grants us the freedom of choice, and we, by virtue of that, are capable if we so will to submit and choose His shar ah, just as we are able, if we so will to go against His commands and bring down his shar ah from our consideration and therefore bear the consequences because whatever the choice is, the result falls on us. 17
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The most significant practices of freedom are those which obtain in choice and opinion as there is no compulsion in religion: righteousness has been made clear from error (surat al-baqarah Q 2: 256); and he said: the truth is from your Lord, so whoever so wills let him believe and whoever so wills, let him disbelieve (s urat al-kahf, Q 18: 29); Say: Believe or do not believe (surat al-isra Q 17: 107); And if your Lord had so willed, He could have caused everyone who is on the earth to believe, all of them altogether; so would you coerce people until they believed? (surat Yunus Q 13: 99). Thus, the ruling of Islam in regard to freedom of belief is:
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prohibition of any person encroaching upon or harassing another for the reason of his belief in a particular creed and attempting to impose his creed and convictions upon him. Imposition of the creed is impossible, and reprimanding others for their creeds is completely rejected.18
If freedom in Islamic law represents an established general source principle in the scope of the creed, over and beyond other human life areas, is it possible after that to assert that the teachings of this religion restrain the view of people in other spheres of their social and political life? Political freedom in our contemporary terminology is not anything but a derivative of an Islamic fundamental general principle which is the freedom of the human being from the standpoint of his being a human, specified in decisive texts in the Qur an and the sunnah. Sufficient indication is for us to mention the had th of the Messenger of Allah where he said to his Companions: None of you is a sycophant: one who says I am with the people, if people are good, then I will be good, if people are bad then I am bad.19 Freedom of belief is subsumed under freedom of speech which is unfettered in Islamic thinking, except in one regard and that is that opinion not be derisive of religion or attacking it where such is a violation the general order of the state.20 The matter is not strictly the permissibility of expression of opinion as it is elevated to the status of existence when it pertains to the expression of truth and what is right given that the texts of Islamic shar ah specify that it is a sin for which there is punishment in the afterlife to remain silent about wrongdoing, which should be renounced according to law. (4) Equality between people is among the source principles (us ul) of Islam as all are created from a single soul and all of them possess inviolable dignity specified by the Qur an for the human being, according to these characteristics without regard to his denomination or race. The Prophet indicted the meaning of the single origin of humanity in his farewell khutbah (sermon): Verily your Lord is One, and your progenitor is one, i.e., Adam; and in the Qur an we find:
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O you people, We created you from a male and a female and made you peoples and tribes that you might know one another. Verily, the most dignified of you with Allah are the most pious among you. Indeed, Allah is knowing and aware. (su rat al-hujarat, Q 49: 13)
ua m [r ]c aa m [r ]c
The apparent meaning of the address in the verse is in reference to all people, and Muhammad Izzah Darwazah comments on this in his book Al-Dustur al-Qur an (The Quranic Constitution) saying: What is intended by it [i.e., this verse] is the lack of any specification of discrimination between human beings for whatever reason.21 As for piety (al-taqwa), the verse indicates that it is what distinguishes people, so there is no effect on the principle of equality in the life of people, given that the sphere of distinction according to piety is the afterlife and not the life of the world that is, before Allah and not among people. Distinction in this regard should not be conceived of as having an effect in implementation of the laws of the shar ah upon all people; or, in other words, there will not be any effect on the principle of equality before the law specified by the texts of Islamic shar ah.22 If this equality is among that which people have come to know in this age, then it should not be forgotten that Islam first proclaimed it fourteen centuries ago, the law of Rome was prevalent in the Levant and Arabia Felix in the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. According to Roman law, people were categorized as either free
ua ]c [r m
aa m []c r
aa m []c r
]a ar m [c
mr [] ia c
aa m [r ]c
mr [a i] c
m i] [c a r
306
F. Howeidy
or not free. The free were of two classes, the free whose ancestry was Roman and those who were not natives and these were Latin. As for those who were not free, there were four types: slave, manumitted, semi-liberated, and landed peasants. Only the original native free Romans enjoyed political rights during most of the periods of Roman history; as for others, they were deprived of these.23 Also, Aristotle says in his book Politics that fitrah (inborn nature) is that which made the barbarians slaves for the Greeks (and these are the teachings of the Peripatetic school) that the gods created two types of human being: a superior type endowed with reason and will, and they are the Greeks according to the nature of the situation; and a second type which the gods did not endow with anything other than bodily strength and what pertains to it and they are the barbarians (the non-Greeks) the gods willed that there be division along these lines for the barbarians to shore up the deficiency among the Greeks (bodily strength), the matter which necessitated that the others remain slaves subjugated to the service of the superior kind those possessed of rightly guided reason.24 It is imperative that we realize in this context that the Muslims when they observed the Greek cultural heritage in the Abbasid era, drew the impression that all which they found was sound; however, they did not elect to choose the political theses some of which had been translated by al-Farabi, for example, because they saw themselves as not in need of them, but rather as their being at a more advanced stage.25 (5) The different other has his law. From the moment that the unitary origin of humanity and the dignity of every group of human beings were decreed in the Quranic discourse, the other attained his rights to dignity and law, simply by virtue of being a human. The Prophet of the Muslims once stood up in observance of a passing funeral procession when it was said to him: The deceased is Jewish. He replied: Isnt he a [human] soul? When Imam Ali bin Abi Talib dispatched his deputy and commander Malik al-Ashtar to Egypt he said to him: Let you feel in your heart mercy for the subjects and affection and kindness towards them [any given] one of them is either a brother to you in religion or an equal to you in creation. Over and above this, the Qur an decrees in regard to a number of subjects that differences between people are signs from Allah and one of his normative sunnah (normative modes/laws) in the universe. The Most Glorious and Exalted created different people for a wise reason that he willed:26 O you people, we crated you from a male and a female and we made of you peoples and tribes that you might know one another (surat al-hujar at, Q 49: 13); and He created the heavens and the earth and the differences in your tongues and your colors; verily in that are signs for the worlds. (surat al-rum, Q 30: 22); and If your Lord had willed He could have made all people into a single ummah (community/nation), but they have not ceased to differ, except those to whom Allah has shown mercy and it is for that [purpose] that He created them. (surat Hud Q 11: 118-119). This was the background against which the other attained his position of legitimacy in Islamic discourse. There was no problem with regard to the Jews or Christians on the consideration of them being people of the Book. And their prophets were the prophets of the Muslims and to believe in their having been sent was part of the Islamic faith. Also, the Sabaens and Magians were considered protected peoples (ahl dhimmah) and during the reign of Umar bin Abd al- Azz, he expanded the category to include them among the protected people of Allah and His Messenger.
]a ur m [c aa []c m r ua ]r m [c ua ]r m [c ua ]r m [c ua ]r m [c
aa m [c ]r
307
There were and have not ceased to be differences and variations persisting across the doctrinal schools (madhahib) in matters of religion which are more particular and more sensitive the matters which lead the Islamic reason to accept all the differences of the other in matters of the world, which are lesser than matters of religion in particularity and sensitivity. The dawn of Islam did not impinge upon any other religion, it did not occur to it to impinge upon the view of the other and from this standpoint multiplicity of religions was permissible; which made the acceptance of multiplicity/diversity in matters of the world permissible from the standpoint that variations in creed were permissible and such facilitated the way, by necessity, for differences in the climate of political and social reform. (6) Injustice is forbidden and resisting it is a legal obligation. Injustice according to the Islamic understanding is not only among the major wrongs and sins, and not only indicative of the corruption of civilization as Ibn Khaldun said, but rather all these constitute hostility towards the right of Allah and violation of the principles of justice which were the intended goal of the Message and prophethood as we will clarify below. In a had th quds : [Allah says] O my slave (i.e., human being), I have forbid den injustice for Myself and have made it forbidden among you, so do not be unjust/ commit wrong. Prevention of injustice is one of the reasons for the orientation of the Quranic discourse: in order to warn those who do wrong and to give good tidings to the doers of good (su rat al-ahqaf, Q 46: 12). In warning of its perpetration against people, the Qur an decrees: verily the path [of retribution] is directed towards those who wrong people and who commit excesses in the earth without right; for those there is a painful punishment (surat al-shura Q 42: 42). In point of fact, Islam has permitted fighting for the sake of repelling injustice: those who have been wronged are permitted to fight, and Allah is able to grant them victory. (surat al-Hajj, Q 22: 39). And is not permitted for Muslims to make public displays of what is reprehensible except in one case and that is when they are exposed to injustice where the Qur an specifies: Allah does not like the display of what is reprehensible except in the case of one who has been wronged (surat al-nisa , Q 4: 148). Furthermore, there is inducement to resist injustice and this resistance is legitimate and legally justified: in the accounts of Prophetic had th is: The best word is speaking the truth before a deviant sultan; and the sayyid of martyrs Hamzah bin Abi Talib and his men went up against an imam who was astray and he enjoined him (to do right) and forbade him (to do wrong) and he killed him for this. And (there is a had th) that if people see a wrong doer, and they do not take him by the hand (to restrain him from committing injustice), then they are liable to be subjected to a collective punishment with him joint and several. This last had th is of considerable import as it implies that Allah threatens those who remain silent about injustice with punishment if they acquiesce to it. There are number of indications of this meaning in the Prophetic discourse such as when the Prophet said: By Allah, verily you shall command what is right and forbid what is wrong and take the wrongdoer by the hand and restore the right of the one who has been wronged, and if not, then Allah will strike the hearts of some of you by others. In relation to this, the Muslim fuqaha concluded that justice was mandatory and injustice absolutely rejected in the lands of Islam to the extent that Ibn Taymiyyah said: The wrongdoer deserves retribution and reprimand, and this is an agreed upon source principle (asl) [of Islamic law] and the fuqah a have specified that textually and I know of no dissent in that regard.27 This creedal obligation to resist the offender under the aegis of the Islamic state does not have a correlate in any other legal system. In addition to that it is tantamount to:
mr [a ic ] m i] [c a r ]a ur m [c aa ]r m [c
aa m [c ]r
ua m [r ]c
ua m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
ua ]r m [c
ua ]r m [c
aa m [r ]c
mr [a ic ]
mr [a i] c
mr [a i] c
ac ]a m [r
aa []c m r
aa m [c ]r
308
F. Howeidy
effective guarantee of the affirmation of public oversight/censure, in which the Muslim does not consult in his judgment anything other than his Islamic conscience and the constitution of Islam, that is, its legal system; all of this is removed and independent from the institutions of authority of the Islamic state, and in apposition to them. 28
(7) The law is above all. The legitimacy of authority in the Islamic state is contingent upon its engaging and perseverance in abiding by working according to the Islamic legal system in toto, without differentiating between the rules governing the conduct the conduct of the Muslim whether as a citizen or a ruler or between these basic values and the salient events as found in the Qur an and sunnah.29 In other regard, the sovereignty of the shar ah and the submission of all to it both rulers and ruled there is what implies a higher law above the law, just as there is a ceiling which does not permit itself to be exceeded or the manipulation of it. The independence of the referential authority of Islamic law far removed from the authority of the state and the caprice of rulers provides an important guarantee in confronting excesses of executive power, especially in the countries of the Third World where the authorities control the representative parliaments and employ them in the service of their whims. This does not necessarily constitute a fetter on the duty of specialists in society in promulgating the laws or deriving what they see fit and for the public good among rulings. That is a guaranteed right, without doubt, and indeed there is a provision that exercising of that right and duty remain predicated on a particular authoritative reference that is removed from whim and outside of the sphere of the hegemony of the state. It is exemplified in the texts of the Qur an and the sunnah and this authoritative reference is supposed to represent the scales of justice and the to preserve the highest principles for regulating the movement of society and its wishes. Islamic fiqh posited a complete and organic separation between the side that formulates Islamic law and derives it and between the political authority which is entrusted with its execution and rule. This separation is also that which distinguishes the shar ah from the democratic system entirely, and it preceded its development by more than a millennium.30 The farthest reaches of constitutional thought in the experience of the human intellect are found in the separation of powers, and the consideration that legislative powers are one of three legislative, executive and judicial and, thus, that this separation provides considerable guarantee against the excess of executive power; however it does not accord a guarantee against excessive powers of the legislative branch, especially in cases where the ruler promulgates law or creates the authority which does so. The Islamic conception solves this problematic and provides a form which protects the ummah from the tyranny of executive and legislative authorities when it elevates the law above caprice and self-interest. These are the most important characteristics of the Islamic view of the political system, and it remains for us to discuss the means that Islam specifies for it and the intents it seeks.
mr [a i] c mr [a i] c
Two: Abiding by shura (consultation) and seeking council for information These seven aforementioned characteristics are expressive of a grand aspiration which cannot be reached without clear mechanisms guided by the specific goals that will be fulfilled in the end.
ua m [r ]c aa m []c r
aa m []c r
aa m []c r
309
When the researcher flips through the pages of the Islamic discourse searching for these instruments or means, he realizes that they are on the basis of two basic points of focus which are al-shur a (consultation) and the obligation to question the rulers. As for the case where one is looking for these sought after goals, he will find that the Islamic discourse distils these into a single word: justice (al- adl). That path drove me to attempt to investigate the nature of al-shura in the view of political Islam through a number of sources; and, my attention was caught by the book Fiqh al-Shura wa al-Istisharah (The Fiqh of al-Shura and Seeking Advice) by Tawfq al-Shaw which transcends by a great deal the picture typically imprinted on peoples minds. It is no longer the principle basis of the Islamic system; it has become the cornerstone of the various activities of society.
]a ur m [c aa []c m r
ua ]r m [c
aa [c m ]r
ua ]r m [c
aa ]r m [c
aa ]r m [c
m i]a [c r
aa m [c ]r
m i]a [c r
Many have tread in the study of al-shu ra on the consideration that it is a principle upon which the system of rule rests, which fetters the authority of the rulers. However, we study it here on the consideration that it is a general and comprehensive theory for the principles upon which individual freedom, rights of the people, solidarity of the society and all the political, social, fiscal, economic and other aspects are based. 31
ua ]r m [c aa ]r m [c
Al-Shaw continues:
aa m []c r m i]a [c r
The study of al-sh u ra as a general theory begins, in our view, with the rights of the human being and his freedoms and the authority of the ummah and its sovereignty. It confirms that human rights in our shar ah are not restricted to individual rights only the freedom of opinion and the freedom of ownership and to dispose of ones property [as deemed fit] but rather, an individuals rights are connected to participation in the decisions of the group to his right to participate in it in regard to its wealth and resources, as a result of the social solidarity which necessitates joint responsibility just as does al-h aw.32
ua m [r ]c aa m [r ]c
And, he concludes in regard to another subject that al-shura is socialism of opinion and thought alongside socialism of wealth.33 He defines his goal in his major research by saying:
ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c
Settled in my mind is the necessity of adopting the general theory of al-sh u ra in Islamic shar ah as the perfection of the theory of Abd al-Razaq al-Sanhuri of the khilafah (caliphate), which was the subject of his doctoral dissertation in political science at the University of Lyon in 1936, and the most important characteristic of the caliphate in the view of al-Sanhuri was the principle of the unity of the ummah, and unity in our view is indivisible from freedom. Al-shu ra is the Islamic expression of freedom because it is freedom of thought and opinion and a guarantor of the rights of individuals, groups and peoples upon which the Islamic political system ought to be based. 34
ua m [r ]c aa m ]r [c
m ia [] c r
a]a m [c r
m ia ]c [r
Al-Shawi is not the first person to assert that al-shura represents a general method in the dynamic movement of Islamic society. Others among the fuqaha , ulama and researchers echoed the idea and al-Shawi mentions of them sheikh Mahmoud Shaltut; and, these relied for support on the saying of the Most Exalted: Those who answer their Lord, establish the prayer and their matter is shura (consultation) between them; and, among that which we have enriched them, they spend. (surat al-shura, Q 42: 28). And the term their matter (amrihim) is comprehensive and abso lute, which means that is comprehensive and sufficient to delineate all matters which have a public character, according to the expression of Muhammad Asad.35 Along with this, and despite the tremendous number of studies published in the last decade dealing with the subject of the Islamic political system or those which are
ua m ]r [c aa m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
]a ur m [c
aa [c m ]r
ua m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
]a ur m [c
m i]r [c a
ua m [r ]c
aa ]r m [c
310
F. Howeidy
ua m ]r [c aa m [r ]c
dedicated to the question of al-shura, we find that the important contribution made by al-Shawi in his research (840 pages) is his distinguished ijtihad whereby he desired to extract from al-shura a general theory fully integrating sources and essential princi ples. Despite that our discussion of al-shura in this regard comes in the context of the exhibition of the Islamic conception of the political system, and it casts light on its being chief among means specified by the shar ah as a focal-point for rule. We were not able to direct the course in that direction without an expose of the ijtihad of al-Shawi in the question of al-shura first due to its importance and uniqueness and secondarily due to the fact that it is the most recently published research on the subject at least in Egypt. If we consider the ranks of those asserting that al-shura is a genuine value in Islamic society we would find that it covers a much wider area than the limits of the political system; although, we are focusing here on its role within these limits on the consideration that this is what concerns us here. It is important to mention that we indicate that depending on democracy as a basis and a system of government was the fruit of a long and costly struggle, especially for reformers and revolutionaries who were pitted against the forces of various authorities in Europe, in particular whether represented by nobles or Church fathers or both. However, al-shura, when it took its place in the discourse of Islam and within the bases of its society, was not the result of a battle or the result of a forced outcome necessity, but was rather a divine imposition of legal culpability which was sent down in the Qur an upon the heart of Muhammad for those who believe in the message of the seal of the prophets; and, as for those who do not believe in it, then they endeavour to evaluate it according to historical facts as having been a result of prescient and penetrating reformism aimed at creating a righteous, stable and enduring society and building it up as well as anchoring unshakeable foundations for it.36 The role which al-shura plays as a means or an instrument for the expression of the Islamic political initiative has features which can be delineated through the following observations:
aa m ]r [c ua ]r m [c aa ]r m [c ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c
mr [a ic ]
]a ar m [c
]a ur m [c
aa [c m ]r
]a ur m [c
]a ar m [c
]a ur m [c
aa ]r m [c
aa m []c r
]a ur m [c
]a ar m [c
If some of the pious ancestors al-salaf knew al-shura as soliciting in akarah) the people of opinion (ahl al-ra y) in the matter, then consultation (mudh following them, then the contemporary definition for it is: taking decisions in light of the opinions of specialists in the subject-matter of the decision, in every affair among the public affairs of the ummah.37 As for the Quranic text: And their matter is shura between them, it clearly indicates that all the affairs of the Islamic ummah ought to be discussed by all the representatives of society as the term between them indicates society as a whole men, women, Muslims and non-Muslims and representation of the society in the majlis al-shura parliament which may bear any other name as long as the function is fixed; and, there is no way to accomplish this, except through elections.38 There is a difference between the people of al-shura and those of ijtihad which ought to be mentioned: the first are the people of opinion (ahl al-ra y) in the ummah, who are supposed to represent society in all its strata, currents and denominations and there are those who represent the non-Muslims, if they exist, and this goes without saying. As for the ahl al-ijtihad, they are the people of knowledge among the fuqaha (jurists) of the Muslims who entrust them with ijtihad in deriving the legal rulings of the shar ah, where it is assumed that
][a ur m c ][a ar m c ]a ur m [c aa ]r m [c ua m ]r [c aa m [r ]c ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
]a ac m [r
aa ]r m [c
aa m [r ]c
mr [a i] c
311
the shar ah is the basis of law and legislation; and thus, the condition of Islam is mandatory for them (i.e., for the fuqaha ). It goes without saying that the people of al-shura are those in the representative parliament where as the people of ijtihad are the scientific committee (hay ah ilm yah) who are nearer to the concept of an association or board of senior ulama or group of Islamic researchers or the Majlis al-Islamy al-A la (the supreme Islamic council). Muslim fuqaha are accustomed to terming the ahl al-shura as the ahl al-hal wa al- aqd (i.e., the people of authority or literally those who were given the power to conclude and dissolve pacts) which expresses a historical conception that developed at the dawn of Islam as a result of the circumstances of the Prophetic emigration (hijra) (to Medina) and the establishment of the first Islamic state. It is not obligatory that they be called by this term whoever commissions them with functions and specializations which were commissioned to the ahl al-hal wa al- aqd in the first Islamic state. However, what is obligatory (al-wajib) is that these functions and specializations are engaged in by a group from among the ummah which has been trained for that in every society or time in what one of them needs of the required abilities and competence to undertake this obligation.39 There is another difference of the utmost importance between al-shura (consul tation) and al-istisharah (seeking advice). Al-istisharah is the asking for the opinion or advice from one who is in a position of trust vis--vis the person asking for it. Someone asking for al-istisharah alone possesses the right to make a decision in the matter for which he has sought the opinion. As for al-shura, it is the legitimate (Islamic-legal) group means whereby the group or the ummah issues a decision in one of its general/public affairs. Al-istisharah is not obligatory and the opinion given to the one seeking it is not binding upon him. As for al-shura, it is both obligatory and binding.
m] [a ic r ]a ar m [c ua m [r ]c aa m [r ]c aa ]r m [c
]a ar m [c
m] [a ic r
aa m [r ]c
aa m ]r [c
ua m ]r [c
aa m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
ua ]r m [c
mr [a i] c
Tawfiq al-Shaw emphasized this contrast in his aforementioned book and mentioned that the lack of attention of some to this has plunged them into speculation that al-shur a is not binding at a time when if they realized the qualitative distinction between al-shura and al-istisharah, they would not have engaged in this argument in the first place.40 This matter is, in fact, like this, as the view adopted by the majority of our contem porary fuqaha is that al-shura is binding in the beginning and the end. Abd al-Qadir a will not have Awdah has a new observation in this context and he asserts that al-shur meaning if it does not take the opinion of the majority; that is, if it is not binding.41
aa ]c m [r m ][a ic r ua ]r m [c aa [c m ]r aa [c m ]r aa m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
ua m ]r [c
aa m [r ]c
]a ar m [c
]a ar m [c
aa m [r ]c
ua ]r m [c
aa m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
ua ]r m [c
aa m [r ]c
ua ]r m [c
aa m [r ]c
aa m []c r
ua m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
Freedom is the essence of al-shura. If freedom of opinion is not guaranteed for all, then there is no room for any discussion of al-shura. It follows that confis cation of opinion aborts the value of al-shu ra and divests it of its content. Among the observations of sheikh Mahmud Shaltut in this regard is his assertion that: Islam posited the principle of al-shura, and it had at the dawn of Islam a status such that it glorified the name of Islam in asserting the right of the human being; further, the basis in it was complete freedom of expression of opinion.42
ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c ]a ur m [c ]a ar m [c ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c
The meaning of al-shura guarantees for society the basis of freedom of consulta tion and genuine dialogue deriving from equality in the right of thought and defending opinion. For the sake of this, it is necessary that those who believe in Islamic shura
]a ur m [c aa m ]r [c
312
F. Howeidy
proclaim that they when they hold fast to it as a basis for the constitutional system in society intend, first and in essence, what al-shura imposes of provision of complete freedom for all in dialogue and exchange of opinion in absolute freedom before or after any decision is taken.43
]m ua [r c ]a ar m [c
is for the ummah to remove a ruler if he deviates The second focal point of what we have termed the means specified by Islamic political discourse is the necessity of questioning the rulers (musa alah al-hukkam). And it will be recalled here that the matter is not merely a duty of the ummah to inform him and then back down from him, but it is a legal obligation of the shar ah where the ummah is guilty of sin and is taken to account before Allah if it is negligent in carrying it out. In the noble Qur an is: Do not incline towards those who do wrong as hellfire will touch you (surat Hud, Q 11: 113); and: these villages, We destroyed them when they committed wrong and we made their destruction a pledge (surat al-Kahf, Q 18: 59). In a Prophetic had th is: Verily, people, if they see the wrongdoer and they do not take him by his hand, then they are on the verge of Allah making punishment general [joint and several]. Therefore, first, the ummah constantly oversees the ruler in that which it is obliged in commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong; second, in what is an obligation for it of the duty of al-shura; third, in what it is commanded in giving advice; fourth, in what it has of duty in its being the primary side in the pact of the imamate, when it according to the dictates of that contract is granted the right to rule and install him as an imam in authority and where he (i.e., the imam) is nothing but a trustee for it (i.e., the ummah) so it has the right to ask him about his work.44 Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first caliph, realized this fact and proclaimed it to people immediately upon taking charge of the Muslims and he made his famous statement: I have been given charge of you, but I am not the best of you. If I do good, then support me; and if I do evil, then set me straight. Umar bin al-Khattab expressed the same meaning in his talk with people when he said he had duty to obey what Allah had commanded, and that they had the duty to give advice even if it harmed him. One day he asked people to indicate to him his crookedness, and one of them replied: By Allah, if we knew there were any crookedness in you, we would have set it straight with our swords. There was nothing for the Commander of the Faithful to do but to give praise to Allah that He had put among the Muslims one who would resist the crookedness of Umar with his sword. The Muslim fuqaha have a lot of extremely clear discourse on confirming the duty of the ummah to rectify its rulers and their responsibility to take them to account if they do not remain on the straight path, so they are appointed to set these rulers straight and to remove them if there is no other alternative. Diya al-Din al-Rayyis collects the views of the fuqaha on this precise point and included them in his valuable book al-Na ar yat al-S yas yah al-Islam yah (Islamic z Political Views).45 By way of example, among these opinions are the following:
aa m [r ]c
aa m ]r [c
m] [a ic r
ua m ]r [c
aa m []c r ua m ]r [c
ua ]r m [c
m] [a ic r
]a ur m [c
]a ar m [c
aa m [r ]c
aa m [r ]c
mr [a i] c
aa [c m ]r
mr [a i] c
aa m [r ]c
mr [a i] c
aa [c m ]r
mr [a i] c
What Imam al-Shafa reported that the imam is removed on account of corruption and deviance; and the same is true for every judge or emir. What Abd al-Qadir al-Baghdadi decreed that the imam when he goes astray (diverges) from that (i.e., the correct path), the imamate was a standard for him
m i]a [c r
313
to turn him from his error to being correct or to turn away from him to another; and their way in it is like his way with his successors and his judges and his followers. If they deviate from his sunnah, he will rectify them or change them. That is the rectification of all is the obligation of the ummah on the ruler and whoever represents him. Either he is rectified or he steps down and is withdrawn. Among that which Abu Hamid al-Ghazali mentioned in this context; that as for the unjust sultan his wilayah (trusteeship) should be ended; and he should either step down or it is obligatory to remove him; and, he is not in reality a sultan. As for Imam al-Aji author of al-Mawaqif (Positions), he said: It is for the ummah to pull out the imam and remove him for a reason that necessitates this. The commentator added in the gloss: For example, that which may be found which will bring about the imbalance of the circumstances of the Muslims and the disintegration of the matters of religion as much as they have a say in his tenure to regulate and elevate it.
aa [c m ]r m ia ]c [r ]a ar m [c
The imam Ibn Hazm set down his opinion along the following lines: what is oblig atory, if there occurs anything of deviance and if, say, the imam is spoken to about that and forbidden it; then if he is precluded from it and returns the truth and submits, then there is no way to remove him and he becomes the imam as he was, and it is not permissible to remove him. If he is precluded from carrying one of the obligations incumbent upon him, and he does not desist, then it is mandatory to remove and to install in his place other than him who will engage in the truth. This is the same who would say in regard to another subject that the imam must be obeyed in what the book of Allah and the sunnah of His Messenger drive us to; so if he goes astray in anything of these, he should be prevented from that and the hadd punishment and truth should be applied to him; and if there is no safety from harm except by removing him, then he is to be removed and another will take his place. Tawf q al-Shaw reports that the side from which the decision in the matter of censure and rectification (of the ruler) should issue is that of the people of al-shura who represent the ummah; where it is supposed that these are the same who selected the ruler to represent the ummah. Therefore, they have the duty to set him straight and revoke his contract. As for individuals it is for them to behave within the limits which they are granted by the principle of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong; and, they must abide by what the ummah decrees among proceedings systematizing supervision and oversight and rectification. And the first of their rights which cannot be suspended or denied is that they should stand and accuse the ruler of deviation; however, those who make specific charges and who issue the binding decision in regard to him are the people of al-shura or the side which the ummah elected in free elections.46 The goal in all of this is the spread of justice which is the goal of the Message and the basis of dominion. These are the supreme values which all should consider and which imbue their struggles. When the banners of Islam are flown and its teachings executed and its hudud (penalties) implemented, and when that does not end in justice and fairness, then this indicates directly that the Message has been divested of its content and that means are incapable of reaching the intended ends. Quranic texts are clear in indicating this, and among these are the sayings of the Most Exalted:
[ a] mc i r aa m [c ]r m ia ]c [r ]a ur m [c aa ]r m [c ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c ua m ]r [c
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We sent aforetime our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the book and the balance (of right and wrong), that men may stand forth in justice; And we sent down Iron, in which is (material for) mighty war, as well as many benefits for mankind . (su rat al-H ad d, Q 57: 25)
ua ]r m [c m i] [c a r
In comprehending this matter Ibn Taymiyah said:

The intended meaning of sending the Messengers and sending down the Book and people engaging in justice is in the rights of Allah and the rights of His creation so whoever turns away from the Book he is set straight by the sword. 47 Verily Allah commands you justice and good . (su rat al-Na hl, Q 16: 90)
ua ]r m [c
Verily, Allah commands you to tender things entrusted to their people, and if you judge between people to judge in justice . (su rat al-Nisa , Q 4: 58)
ua ]r m [c ]a ac m [r
Say: I have believed in what Allah sent down of the Book, and I am commanded to set you straight [in justice]. (su rat al-Shu ra, Q 42: 15)
ua ]r m [c ua ]r m [c aa ]r m [c
Notice that the address here is in the language of the divine command and not in the way of explanation or recommendation.
Do not let the machinations of a people make commit [crimes] or be unjust be just as that is closer to piety. (su rat al-Ma idah, Q 5: 8)
Justice, here, is an absolute not a relative value, meaning that it is obligatory to abide by it or in the confrontation of enemies as it is with ones on people and the caliphs. In this we cite al-Zamakhshari: In this is a mighty admonition that justice (al- adl) (and to be just) is mandatory with the greatest of the enemies of Allah, then how powerful is it in, and what is supposed in regard to its necessity with believers who are the friends and the beloved? The Commander of the Faithful Umar bin al-Khittab wrote to one of his agents saying:
As for justice, there is no dispensation/license with regard to it neither from near nor far, and neither in times of tribulations or comfort. If it were shown to us, it would be stronger and more able to extinguish deviance and more able to suppress the false than deviance.48
Transmitted about al-Mawaridi is his assertion about the principles that restore and rectify the world so that its affairs become organized and its affairs are appropriately disposed is comprehensive justice calling to the thousands and searching for obedience, building the lands and increasing by it wealth, and increasing the lineage of the house of the sultan. Some rhetoricians relate his saying that: Justice is the scale of Allah which he set up for creation and which he installed for truth.49 Ibn Taymiyah said:
People do not disagree that the recompense of the wrongdoer is evil and that the recompense of the just person is noble; and thus, it is reported that Allah aids the just state even if it is unbelieving; and he does not aid the unjust state even if it is believing.
And, he says in regard to another subject:
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Justice is the order of everything, if a matter of the world persists on the basis of justice, then it persists; and even if whoever is responsible for it will have a reward in the afterlife; and whatever is not on the basis of justice will not persist, even if the one responsible for it has faith and is not rewarded in the afterlife.50
We are not able to enumerate the texts and remnants which make justice a central value in the Islamic discourse as these are beyond count; even to the extent that an entire book on legal science would not be able to deal with all of them. From the moment that justice in the text of the Qur an was considered a goal of all the messengers and the heavenly books, the value of justice progressed after al-tawh d (the unicity of Allah) and became the standard whereby to measure the veracity of Islamic practice where every practice either approached the reality of the message of Islam or distanced from it according to the measure of its respect for the value of justice or its violation of it. From this standpoint, tell me where you are in relation to justice, and I will tell you where you are in relation to Islam! Third: al-Rays; a testimony, 40 years old Where does democracy correspond to Islam and where does it differ? There is no doubt that we must notice the ambiguity and the accompanying debate in this matter which represents a new phenomenon in Arab-Islamic society, which came into prominence during the last two decades in which this Islamic situation developed in this random fashion which we notice; where the schools of rightly guided education were absent. So, we witness this development in the body, but regression in the intellect, and this is the matter that precipitated these conceptual distortions, the hidden signs of which have yet to return for any. It is regrettable that many read the Islamic phenomenon and judge it on the basis of the latest press releases and nothing else in recording the phenomenon and some of these are perverse, and in other instances the product of exceptional conditions. However, the fair researcher if he is able to follow the current Islamic literature in Egypt and the Arab world and analyse its content from the beginning of the century at least he will come away with an entirely different impression wherein there is no mention of the skirmish with democracy and no conflict with the Western Liberal initiative. And if we are aware of the difference between the democratic experience in the West and the colonial politics of the Western nations, then we will realize that the conflict has remained confined to the second sphere and not to the first. What the most prominent of our fuqaha wrote from Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida to Mahmoud Shaltut on the subject of the system of rule or the political view of Islam agrees in its general framework with the various values of democracy. Furthermore, what the two sheikhs Abduh and Rida said about it in the tafs r of al-Manar51 and what sheikh Shaltut mentioned in the context of The Basic Princi ples of Government52 removes any ambiguity in the subject. The matter does not differ in the context of the Islamic movement, and what Hasan al-Banna wrote in this context during the 1940s addressing the masses of the Muslim Brotherhood that: There is nothing in the foundation principles of the representative [parliamentary] system which negates the principles that Islam posited for the system of government and as such:
aa ]r m [c
it is not far removed from the Islamic system nor alien to it. Given this consideration we also say with confidence that the basic principles on which the Egyptian Constitution
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rests are not in conflict with the principles of Islam and not far removed from the Islamic system or alien to it.53
Because this was the position of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, it should not be surprising that he gave a lecture along the same direction at the Muslim Youth Association headquarters in 1948 under the title Islamic Democracy. Perhaps the most famous thing written under this rubric at that time was the book by Abbas Mahmud al- Aqqad entitled Democracy in Islam (1952) where he asserted in its Introduction: The concept of democracy was engendered by Islam for the first time in the history of the world.54 Space does not permit details of the other views which were expressed about this position; however, we wished only to call attention to the Islamic dealing with the democratic experience that proceeded according to the basis of a rapprochement with it; and that occurred in the framework of the engagement with the imperial West, regardless of whether represented in the French occupation or the British. I mean that the Islamic intellect behaved consciously when it distinguished between what was related to civilization in the West and what was political; and, it did not begin from a point of rejection or opposition to whatever was Western as transpired in the 1950s where such was ascendant in the shadow of the confrontation between the Egyptian nationalist movement and British colonialism, which resulted in the July 1952 Revolution. The situation was factoring in emergence of a distinct critical view of the Western Liberal experience, and it is the view which crystallized after the Revolution in the call for an independent Arab initiative; which would fight an engagement with the Western system, shortly thereafter. Some months before the July 1952 Revolution, the book Islamic Political Theories by Professor of History at Dar al-Ulum Muhammad Diya al-Din al-Rayyis was published in Cairo. We consider him to be the first classifier and discussant of the profusion of points of correspondence and differences between Islam and democracy, proceeding also in his book from the standpoint of rapprochement and not conflict even if he remained clear in his delineation of points of distinction and independence. Given the importance of this early treatment of the issue, we will allow for details of it as it is more informative than citing many other sources during the four subsequent decades which attempted and have not ceased to attempt to delimit the values wherein Islam correlates with democracy and those in which they differ. Al-Rays says: There are many aspects of correspondence between Islam and democracy, however the aspects of divergence are more numerous.55 In delimiting the aspects of correspondence, he directs his reader to the chapters of his book which deal with the concept of the political contract between the ummah and the ruler and the responsibility of rule. He concludes from this that there are not only between Islam and the democratic system aspects of resemblance from the political standpoint: but, rather what democracy contains of elements or the best of the characteristics which distinguish it are encompassed by Islam. In explaining that he says:
m ia ]c [r
If what is meant by democracy is that it is as Lincoln defined it government of the people, by the people and for the people, then this connotation is represented without doubt in the system of the Islamic state with the exception that the people should be understood in Islam in a particular or comprehensive sense.
He continues thereafter:
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If what is meant by democracy is that which has become associated with it usually among the existence of particular political or social principles such as the principles of equality before the law and the freedom of thought and creed as well as the realization of social justice and so forth; or the guarantee of certain rights such as the rights to life, freedom and work and what resembles these, then, there is also no doubt that all of these principles are realized and these rights are guaranteed in Islam except that it is necessary to realize that the view of Islam towards these rights, from the standpoint of the natural origin, might differ. They might be considered rights of Allah, and they might be considered rights shared between Allah and the slaves [i.e., humans]; and they might be considered blessings and not rights or be ascertained as though they reflect the original status of things or that they constitute the law which Allah posited for existence or alfit rah (inborn nature). However, despite all that, these differences have no effect on the view of the nature of these characteristics or situations; the result is one, and that is that the human being is guaranteed all these matters.
As for the case where what is intended by democracy is that its system is a consequence of it and it realizes the principle of a separation of powers, then this also is manifest in the Islamic system. Legislative authority here, which is the most important among powers in any democratic system, is posited with the ummah alone and separate from the authority of the imam or the head of state. Legislation derives from the Book [i.e., the Qur an] and the sunnah or the ijma (consensus) of the ummah or ijtihad (independent legal reasoning). In this, it is independent of the imam, and in fact, is above him as the imam is bound and constrained by it. The imamate, in reality, is nothing more than a leadership/presidency of executive authority. The judiciary is independent also as it does not adjudicate according to the opinion of the ruler or the president, but rather does so in accordance with the legal rulings (ahkam) of the shar ah that is, the command of Allah and it cannot but judge this way so long as it is desired for it to remain an Islamic judiciary.
ac m ]a [r aa m [r ]c ]a ac m [r m i] [c a r
The concept of ijm a which is among the particulars of Islamic shar ah and which is unique in its advocacy of it, supports the assertion that it is specific to the ummah and its will and that it has a position superior to that in which it might enjoy in any other democratic system, however perfect. The Muslims had decreed before Rousseau appeared and others like him to talk about public will and to glorify it that the will of the ummah is infallible and that it is of the will of Allah, and it was made a source of legis lation (al-tashr ), even if it depends in the end on the dual sources of the Book and the sunnah. From the academic standpoint, this will is represented in the ijma of the mujtahidin among the ulama of the ummah .
]a ar m [c m i]r [c a ]a ac m [r
m i] [c a r
]a ar m [c
Furthermore, he discusses the differences between Islam and democracy and he clarifies them in three matters as follows:
The first matter: the intended meaning of the word people or ummah (nation) in modern democracy as is known in the Western world is a people bounded by geographical boundaries living in a single region where its individuals are grouped on the basis of connections of shared blood, race, language and customs. That is, democracy is directly associated with nationalism (al-qawmiyah) or racism and it is consistent with fanatical group tendencies or racism. Islam is not like that as the ummah according to it, in the first instance, is not connected to a single place or to blood or language as these are artificial or accidental or secondary connections; the connection, in the original sense, is oneness in the creed (alaq dah) that is, in the conception and conscience of everyone who is convinced of the concept of Islam, from any race or color or nation, and he is a member in the state of Islam. The view of Islam is humanitarian and its horizons are global. This is not prohibitive, but rather this might be necessary in order to realize the public good; it might be obligatory legally that there persist within this public sphere, private spheres regional or nationalist for the sake of organization or the realization of national or local goals which do not conflict with the general goals. If other connections exist and these are oneness of nation and origin, language and other than these alongside the
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essential connection which is the oneness of creed, this is certainly stronger for the existence of the ummah and the coming into being of the state. The second matter is that the aims of modern Western democracy, or any democracy in future times, are temporal or material goals directed towards realizing the happiness of an ummah or people especially from the standpoint of realizing its demands in this life of the world directed, for example, in the development of resources or the raising of wages or war gains. However, the goals of the Islamic system or Islamic democracy if such a term is correct while it might subsume the like of these goals in this world and might accord them what they merit of attention while moving away from the concept nationalist prejudice combines alongside these, spiritual goals. Rather, the spiritual goals are first and primary and the highest. Ibn Khaldun says in his definition of the imamate as we have seen it is for the realization of the welfare of the people in the afterlife and the temporal follows this when the states of this world all revert according to the Legislator to their consideration in regard to the good of the afterlife. So, the Islamic state ought to consider its works for the afterlife as being the end goal and engage in all good works commanded by the religion, which lead to the good pleasure of Allah and realize the spiritual requirements of the human being. Similarly, it makes the religion or moral law the criterion for measuring its works and its conduct. The third matter is that the authority of the ummah in Western democracy is absolute. The ummah has the absolute right and possesses sovereignty, and it or the majlis (parliament) which it elects promulgates law or abrogates it. The decisions which this majlis hands down become mandatory law which is executed, and these must be followed even if they come in contradiction to moral law or conflict with general human welfare. Modern democracy, for example, declares war for the sake of sovereignty of a people over another or to usurp control of a market or to colonize a place or to attain a monopoly over sources of oil. And, by way of example, it spills blood without end and slaughters countless human souls, and all of humanity suffers as a result of this. However, in Islam the authority of the ummah is not absolute like this, but rather it is constrained by the shar ah: by the religion of Allah, of which every individual is convinced and obeys. It is not able to behave except within the limits of this law; and, this law is contained in the Book [i.e., the Qur an] and the sunnah. Also, if it is acknowl edged that the universal will of the ummah is one of the sources of law, then it is understood that this will depends on what came in the Book and the sunnah also in some form; and, this right itself might have conferred according to the dictates of the matter by them; and if it is supposed that among the characteristics of the will of this ummah is that it will not diverge from the truth that is, it will not deviate from the method delimited by these two sources. The ummah in Islam or, say if you will, in Islamic democracy abides by moral law and is constrained by its principles; and, the religion has imposed upon it obligations and charged it with responsibilities.
m ia [c ]r
Diya al-Dn al-Rayys concludes from his expose that Islam does not correlate with other commonly known systems on the political map as the ruler is not the possessor of sovereignty as Islam is not an autocracy; nor is it the men of religion or the gods as it is not a theocracy; nor is it strictly law alone as it is not a nomocracy; nor is it the ummah itself as it is not a democracy in this narrow meaning. The correct answer is that sovereignty in it is dualistic, so the sovereign is two matters combined which should remain inseparable. The establishment of the state and its survival cannot be imagined except with the existence of this correlation. These two matters are one: the ummah; and two: the law or shar ah of Islam. The ummah and the shar ah are the possessors of sovereignty in the Islamic state.
aa m [c ]r m ia ]c [r m ia ]c [r
a]c m [a r
mr [a i] c
The Islamic state, then, is according to this form, a unique system particular to Islam. The assertion that it correlates to any other known system is not correct; and thus, there
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ought to be posited for it a special terminology which describes it according to a term representative of its true nature. And as long as the like of such a term is not clear or has not yet been found, it is sufficient now to indicate it according to its comprehensive characteristic that it is an Islamic system.
He adds lastly that:

If there is no doubt about utilizing the term democracy while minding the previous essential differences, then it is possible to describe this system in an approximate sense as a human, global, religious, moral, spiritual and material democracy all together. Or, it may be possible when these connotations are represented in the mind to combine all these characteristics in a possible expression and say it is an Islamic democracy.
Fourth: The ceiling remains the problem In a general sense, most of the subsequent writings which depicted the political system did not draw on democracy as a thing attaching to value or function especially what is connected to it of shared rights, answerability, and choosing the ruler and the ummah exercising its sovereignty in all of that. There is a growing awareness of the independent element of Islamic discourse, its civilizational initiative. There are a number of indications which point to the error of comparing between Islam, which has creedal depth and its broad message which encompasses the dynamic of society in its entirety in its expressions and practices and moral values, and between democracy as an instrument in the political system. Among that which is said in this context is that It is not just nor scientific to term a system which is fourteen centuries old with either a modern or an ancient term which might correlate to it in some matters yet differ from it in others.56 Furthermore, the number of writings has multiplied which focus on clarifying that al-shur a transcends democracy in its role on the consideration of it being a principle which transcends the boundaries of politics to administration of other activities of society; and in its original creedal nature and being accounted as an Islamic-legal culpability and not merely a political obligation. The previously mentioned book by Tawf q al-Shaw, Fiqh al-Shura wa-l Istisharah is the most recent study to treat this point at great length. However, greater caution which preoccupies many researchers and has incited fear among some of the activists in the Islamic sphere after it was directed towards what we have termed the ceiling of democratic practice (which al-Rays touched upon). Is it possible for this practice if initiated to infringe upon the shar ah and exceed its bounds? Is it acceptable to submit to the authority of the ummah in democratic discourse at the expense of Allah in Islamic discourse? We find a great faq h such as Abu al-A la al-Mawdud saying of democracy: It has nothing to do with Islam, and it is not correct to apply the term democracy to the system of the Islamic state. He adds that the term divine government or theocracy is more applicable in expressing the Islamic system. However, he hastens to caution that European theocracy differs entirely from divine government (Islamic theocracy):
ua ]r m [c aa [c m ]r mc [ ar i] aa m []c r m i]a [c r ua ]r m [c aa m [r ]c aa ]r m [c
m] [a ic r
mr [a i] c
ua m [c ]r
aa m [c ]r
ua m [c ]r
m i]a [c r
It is in Europe a special class of custodians, legislating law for people on their own accord, according to their whims and their goals; and, they impose their divinity on the general masses of people in the lands while hiding behind the divine law. The like of this government is more apt to be called Satanic government than it is divine government. 57
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As for the theocracy which Islam brought, our master al-Mawdudi adds:
Its matter is not possessed autocratically by a class of custodians or sheikhs; rather, it is formed by the hands of the Muslims in general, and they are the ones who take charge of their matter and engaging in their affairs in accordance with what is transmitted in the Book and the sunnah.
Thus, al-Mawdud prefers to apply the terms democratic theocracy or divine democratic government to Islamic government because he grants Muslims in it restricted popular rule, and executive authority is not composed except according to the opinion of the Muslims, and by their hands are such removed and such installed. Thus, in all the affairs for which there is not an explicit ruling of the shar ah, there is nothing decisive except the ijma (consensus) of the Muslims. Finally, after al-Mawdud affirms the necessity to observe and abide by the shar ah of Allah in the exercise of the ummah of its authority, he says that from this standpoint, Islamic rule goes back to being democratic except in the case where there exists a decisive text of the shar ah, as it is not for any among Muslims, rulers or ulama to change anything of it. From this standpoint, it is correct to apply the term theocracy58 to the (type of) rule. Defence of the democratic value is basic position which is unconstrained among Islamist researchers whose studies into the Islamic political system and that question of al-shura have increased since the beginning of the 1970s. Rather we notice that sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, known for his traditional defence of democracy since 1949 when he published his book Al-Islam wa al-Istibdad al-S yas (Islam and Political Autocracy) counters Muhammad Qutb who criticized borrowing from other political schools and among them democracy who in his book on Al-Tarb yah al-Islam yah (Islamic Education) opines:
ua m [c ]r m ia ]c [r
m] [a ic r
ua ]c m [r
m ]a ic [r
]a ar m [c
]a ur m [c
aa ]r m [c
Those who assert in their claims: we take from Islam such and such and we take from democracy and socialism such and such and we remain Muslims [ought to recall the Quranic verse] Would you believe in some of the Book and disbelieve in some? The recompense of whoever does that is none other than disgrace in the life of the world and on the Day of Resurrection, they will be sent to the fiercest torment. (su rat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 85)
]ua m [r c
Sheikh al-Ghazali discusses this view and responds to it in his book The Constitution of Cultural Unity among Muslims saying:
This talk needs to be reigned in as democracy is not a religion to be put in the ranks of Islam. It is a systemization of the relation between the ruler and the ruled. We consider it to see how it confers individual dignity on the supporter and the opponent equally and how it sets its legal barriers to prevent the individual from excess and to not encourage the violator to say with a full mouth No, where he does not fear imprisonment or arrest. Tyrannical autocracy was the ghoul which consumed our religion and our life so is it forbidden to seek good for the Muslims so that they might borrow some of the procedures undertaken by other nations when they have been subjected to the like of our travails? The means which serve our creed and our betterment are a part of general human thought; there is no relation between it and the desired end. We have seen that advocates of conflicting philosophies have transferred much in this sphere without any hardship. The hardship, in its entirety is that we should abandon our religion and renounce its u u l (source principles) and values, out of a predilection for another point s of view, imported from the East or the West.59
ua ]r m [c
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Fifth: two positions from the 1980s: i tizaz (pride) and ikhti am (contention) s While this basic position withdrawn from democratic values remained clear and decisive for various contemporary Islamist researchers, the period of the 1980s witnessed two additions to it, expressive of an increased caution vis--vis democracy. One of these came out of differences and exploitation of the civilizational initiative, and the other came out of the rejection of the Western model in all the givens of its experience. The first position crystallized in what Saf al-Dn Abd al-Fatta h, teacher of political science at the University of Cairo, expressed in his doctoral dissertation that was published in the book entitled al-Tajd d al-S yas wa al-Waqi al- Arab al-Mu a r; s Ru yah Islam yah (Political Renewal and the Contemporary Arab Reality; An Islamic View). His suppositions reflect an orientation of a generation among young Islamist researchers who were engendered by the [Islamic] Revival al-Sahwah and who brought out for us a serious academic endeavour expressing extreme pride in what the Islamic civilizational initiative has to give, decisive emphasis on the affirmation of its unique and distinctive nature, and continuous warning about slipping into a course of blind imitation of the Western system. Among that which Saf al-Dn calls for in his dissertation is the construction of an Islamic political science independent in its points of departure and terminology; and, he provides a model for that for which he calls. He draws support for his warning against the importation of systems of the West and democracy at the forefront of these on a number of considerations at the forefront of which are the following:
Whatever is imported from an un-Islamic ummah with the goal of its benefit will not yield a good result which will guarantee the utmost effectiveness because it does not emanate originally from the conscience of the ummah and the creed of the Muslims. These systems and institutions which are employed to solve the problems of the Islamic ummah will no doubt be entirely or partially contradictory or in the best of circumstances lacking, in what will lead to their distortion. Faith in the Islamic creed imposes upon the ummah to endeavour to build its organizations and derive its solutions from the Book and the sunnah, in order to correct its faith and rectify its life. The Islamic creed imposes upon those convinced of it to put to the test any system other than its own, regardless of how close the resemblances may be because acceptance by the Muslims of that system as it is and without clarification might lead to submitting to the defeat of their systems and the order of their creed or to scepticism in regard to them or serve as a means to draw them out from their creed.60
Whereas Sayf al-Din proceeds from a point of pride (in Islam) and ends in differences and not a conflict with democracy, there is a segment of the Islamist youth who have proceeded from a standpoint of anger and confrontation and who have ended in rejection of democracy and opposition to it, fearing it itself and not the civilizational initiative it represents. The literature of the Jama ah al-Islamyah banned in Egypt represents this latter orientation. In two studies of the Jamaah one on Muhakamat al-Ni am al-S yas z (The Trial of the Political System) and the other by the title of Al-H arakah al-Islam yah wal- Amal al-H izb (The Islamic Movement and Political Party Work), 61 the group considers democracy to be the antithesis of Islam.
aa m [c ]r m ia [c ]r aa ]r m [c aa ]r m [c m] [a ic r aa ]r m [c m] [a ic r
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They assert in this that the sovereignty of the people conflicts with the absolute rule (hakim yah) of Allah and that to consider the people to be the source of authority and legislation is a type of jahil yah (i.e., a period of ignorance such as the so-called pre-Islamic Jahiliyah). This is because the promulgation of law is not granted to any creation but is strictly relegated to Allah alone. As for freedoms, democracy posits these without any restraints or conditions, and this conflict with Islamic obedience in addition to it being a gateway to major corruption. Democracy specifies the principle of multiple (political) parties whereas in Islam there is nothing other than Hizb Allah (the party of God) and Hizb al-Shayt an (the party of Satan). Democracy posits equal ity between people where there is no difference between a believer and an unbeliever (kafir) or a corrupt person (f asiq) whereas the Qur an decrees: Should We render Muslims the like of criminals? (surat al-Qalam, Q 68: 35) Even if the question is posed in a discussion of the afterlife and not the life of this world. This talk represents an anomaly in the general Islamic discourse; and, despite the fact that those close to the Islamic situation are aware of its limited scope and influence, a person is not able to hold back his astonishment in regard to the extent of its echo as reflected in the discourse of the media almost to the extent that the picture is turned upside down so that one might assume that what is the anomaly is actually the norm and the norm is actually the unique exception in this. We would not be able to indicate this position if it were not for the emphasis on presenting an exhaustive picture of the methods of Islamist thought vis--vis the issue of democracy, even what might be limited and anomalous among the trends of this thought. It seems that this anomaly has exerted pressure on some of our fuqaha and has impelled them to issue fatwas in the matter of democracy to dispel the doubts which have been stirred up about it and to put the matter in its correct context.
aa m []c r aa ]r m [c a]c [a m r ua ]r m [c
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Sixth: Thus gave sheikh al-Qaradawi a fatwa The well-known faq h and scholar of us ul, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, was asked in Algeria: Is it correct that democracy is of unbelief (kufr)? And this question was repeated a number of times to him, so he wrote an opinion on the subject in this context in the newest printing of his book Fatawa Mu as irah (Contemporary Fatwas) writing:
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What is strange is that some people judge democracy to be a blatant evil, and yet they do not know it well, do not dive into its essence or aspire to its rationale, with the exception of the consideration of form and themes. Among the principles asserted by our predecessors among our ulama is that judging a thing derives from the conception of it, so whoever judges something of which he is ignorant, he is judged to be mistaken even if he by chance happens to hit the mark randomly as this is a shot in the dark. Thus it is confirmed in the had th that the judge who judges in ignorance is in hellfire just as the one who knows the truth but judges according to other than it.
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Is democracy for which the peoples of the world call, and for which the great number of masses fight in the East and the West, which some peoples attained after bitter struggles with the forces of excess, for which blood was spilled and thousands sacrificed even millions as in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and in which many Islamists see acceptable means to reign in the capriciousness and recalcitrance of individual rule as well as to de-claw political authority from which our Muslim peoples have suffered is this democracy evil or tantamount to unbelief as some hasty and shallow people assert?
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The essence of democracy far removed from academic definitions and terminology is that people choose who rule them and who administers their affairs and that neither a ruler nor a system which they despise should be imposed upon them and that they should have the right to censure the ruler if he errs and to remove him if he deviates. Further, it implies that the people cannot be driven in directions or towards economic, social, cultural or political modes which they do not acknowledge and with which they are not pleased where if some of them oppose such they are exiled and punished in exemplary fashion, or even tortured and killed. This is the essence of true democracy in which humanity finds a direction and practical approaches such as elections and public referenda as well as the preponderance of the majority, the multiplicity of political parties, the right of the minority to opposition, freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary, etc. So, is democracy in its essence as we have mentioned it incompatible with Islam? Where does this incompatibility come from? What is the indication from the operative injunctions of the Book and the sunnah which supports this claim? The reality is that the person who considers the essence of democracy finds that it is of the heart of Islam, and he disavows that people should be led in prayer by an imam whom they detest and with whom they are not pleased it. In a had th (it is reported): For three, their prayer does not rise above their heads so much as a finger-width and he mentions the first of these: A man who acts as imam for a people in prayer when they detest him (transmitted in Ibn Majah). And when this is in regard to prayer, how is it in matters of life and politics? In a sound had th (it is transmitted): the best of your imams that is your rulers are those whom you love and who love you, and for whom you make supplications and who make supplications for you; and, the worst of your imams are those whom you anger and who anger you and those whom you curse and who curse you (transmitted by Muslim on the authority of Awn bin Malik).
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The Qur an has launched an attack of utmost harshness against rulers who intimate divin ity on earth those who take the slaves of Allah as slaves for themselves, such as Nimrud whose position vis--vis Abraham is mentioned along with that of Abraham towards him: Have you not considered the one who argued with Abraham about his Lord (merely) because Allah had given him kingship? When Abraham said, My Lord is the one who gives life and causes death, he said, I give life and cause death. Abraham said, Indeed, Allah brings up the sun from the east, so bring it up from the west. So the disbeliever was overwhelmed (by astonishment), and Allah does not guide the wrongdo ing people. (su rat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 258).
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This excessive ruler supposed that he gave life and death, just as the Lord of Abraham who is the Lord of the worlds gives life and death, and therefore that people ought to worship him just as they worshipped the Lord of Abraham! To demonstrate his claim to giving life and death, he brought two men who were passing down the road and he pronounced a death sentence on both of them without any crime. He executed one of them immediately and said, Look here. Ive given death. Then he spared the other and said, Ive given life. Am I not, in this, giving life and death? And the like of him is Pharaoh who called out to his people: I am your Lord the Most High (su rat al-Na zi at, Q 79: 24) and who said in jest: O you notables, I have not informed you of a god other than me. (su rat al-Qasas, Q 28: 38).
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The Qur an exposes an unholy alliance between three despicable sides: first, the oppressive ruler with intimations of divinity in the lands of Allah who usurps control over the slaves of Allah and who is represented by Pharaoh; second, the political opportunist functionary who subjugates his intelligence and experience to the service of the excessive ruler (al-t agh yah) and who shores up his rule and tames his people
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into submission to him, and such is represented by Hamon; and third, the capitalist or feudalist who benefits from the rule of the excessive ruler and who supports him and spends some of his wealth in order to gain more wealth from the sweat of the brows of the people and their blood, and such is represented by Qarun. The Qur an mentions this triumvirate allied in sin and animosity and its standing in opposition to the message of Moses until Allah took them to task. And, We sent Moses with our signs and clear authority to Pharaoh, Hamon and Qarun and they called him a magician and a liar. (surat Ghafr, Q 40: 2324). And [as for] Qarun, Pharaoh and Hamon, Moses had come to them with clear demonstrations but they were arrogant in the earth, but they could not defeat [him]. (surat al- Ankabut, Q 29: 39). What is incredible is that Qarun was of the people of Moses and not of the people of Pharaoh; however, he oppressed his own people and took sides with their enemy Pharaoh. This along with Pharaohs acceptance of him with him is indicative of the material benefit that brought them together despite their ethnic origins and lineage. Among the great aspects of the Qur an is that it connects between idolatrous excess (al-tughy an) and the spread of corruption which is the cause of the destruction of nations and their ruin as when Allah the Most Exalted says: Have you not seen how Allah dealt with the:
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Ad [people], the people of Aram possessors of high buildings the like of which were not created in the lands, and the Thamud who carved out their homes in cliffs. And Pharaoh possessed of [ropes and] posts of those who were excessive in the lands and so corruption was increased in them. Thus, Allah cast down upon them the voice of punishment, verily your Lord is waiting [for you]. (su rat al-Fajr, Q 89: 612)
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The Qur an expresses excess (al-tughyan) with the utterance highness/aloof ness (al- ulu) meaning arrogance (al-istikbar) and attempting to take control of the creation of Allah through humiliation and draconian coercion as Allah says of Pharaoh: He was high among the excessive (surat al-Dukhan, Q 44: 31); Verily, Pharaoh was high [and mighty] in the earth and he made its people into factions weakening one group among them slaughtering their sons and sparing their women. Verily, he was among those spreading corruption. (surat al-Qasas, Q 28: 4). Thus, we see that being high (and mighty) and spreading corruption are correlates. The Qur an does not restrict its attack against excessive rulers intimating divin ity alone, but rather it groups with them their peoples and populations who follow their orders, who travel in their orbits and who submit to them; and, it charges them (i.e., the people) with responsibility along with them. Allah the Most Exalted says of the people of Noah: Noah said: Lord, they rebel against me and follow him who does not increase his wealth or his offspring except in loss. (surat Nuh, Q 71: 21). And Allah, glory be to Him, says of the Ad, the people of (the prophet) Hud: And those Ad [people] rejected the signs of their Lord and rebelled against His messengers and they obeyed the command of every draconian and obstinate [ruler]. (surat al-Hud, Q 11: 59). Allah the Most Magnificent says of the people of Pharaoh: He frightened his people so they obeyed him; indeed they were a corrupt people. (surat al-Zukhruf, Q 43: 54); and
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they followed the command of Pharaoh and the command of Pharaoh was not rightly guided. And his people will be brought forward on the Day of Resurrection and thrown
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into the fire and painful is that into which they are thrown and in agony are those thrown [in]. (su rat Hu d, Q 11: 9798)
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People are held responsible, or at least in part because they are the ones who make Pharaohs and excessive rulers and he is an expression of the masses and the like of them when they ask before Pharaoh: What made you Pharaoh? and, he will respond: I did not find anyone to stand up against me! And among those who are most responsible along with the excessive rulers are the instruments of power those whom the Qur an terms soldiers (al-junud) and by which it intends the military forces which are the fangs and claws of political power and the scourges by which to terrorized the masses if they rebel or think about rebelling. The Qur an says: Verily Pharaoh and Hamon and their soldiers were in error (surat al-Qasas, Q 28: 8); So we took him and his soldiers to task and cast them into the sea. So see how was the punishment of the wrongdoers. (surat al-Qasas, Q 28: 40). Like that, the Prophetic sunnah attacks the unjust and draconian princes who would drive people with a harsh stick; and if they speak out, nobody will answer them; and they are those who will disintegrate in fire like a grass mat. Similarly, it attacked those who march in their orbits and who carry burning incense between their hands among the helpers of injustice. And the sunnah finds fault with the ummah in which fear is spread so that it is not able to address the wrongdoer. On the authority of Abu Musa, it is reported that Messenger of Allah said: Verily in hellfire, there is a valley, and in the valley there is a well called habhab and it is incumbent on Allah to make very obstinate oppressor reside there (transmitted by al-Tabaran with a good isnad). And, on the authority of Mu awyah it is related that the Prophet said: There will be imams after me making assertions and none will respond to them for what they say; and they will plunge into the fire like monkeys (transmitted by Abu Ya l a al- Tabar an). On the authority of Jabir, the Prophet said to Ka b bin Ujrah:
aa m [c ]r ]a ur m [c ua m [r ]c
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Seek refuge with Allah from the principality of fools. So, Kab asked, What is the principality of fools? The Prophet replied: There will be princes after me who are not guided by my guidance and who do not follow my sunnah, so whoever believes them in their lies and supports them in their injustice, such are not of me and I am not of them, and they will not be subject to my defense. As for those who do not believe them in their lies and who do not support them in their injustice, such are of me and I am of them, and they will be party to my defense. (transmitted by Ahmad bin Hanbal and al-Bazar)
On the authority of Muawiyah (through an ascending chain of transmitters): An ummah will not be sanctified if judgments in it are not according to truth, and the weak does not take his share from the strong without being spurred (related by al-Tabar an). On the authority of Abdullah bin Umar (through an ascending chain of transmitters): If you see my ummah afraid of saying to the unjust, O you wrongdoer, then bid farewell to them (reported by Ahmad bin Hanbal in al-Masnad). Islam specified al-shura as a basis among bases of Islamic life and made it incum bent upon the ruler to seek council and incumbent upon the ummah to advise, even to the extent that it made advice (al-nas hah) tantamount to religion in its entirety. Among it is advice for the ummah of the Muslims, that is their princes and rulers. Similarly it made the commanding of what is right and the forbidding of what is wrong a mandatory obligation; rather it rendered the best jihad a word of truth spoken
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to the deviant sultan; and the meaning of this is that it made resisting internal excess and corruption weightier with Allah than resistance against external invasion because the first is often times a cause of the second. Indeed, the ruler in the view of Islam is a trustee of the ummah and an employee of it; and it is an original right/duty to take him to account or to remove him from the trusteeship and especially if he breaks its obligations. The ruler in Islam is not an infallible authority but rather a mortal who is correct as well as mistaken, who is just as well as deviant; and, it is the duty of the common Muslims to block him if he errs and to set him straight if he swerves. This is what the greatest rulers after the Messenger of Allah proclaimed, the Rashidun caliphs for whom we are commanded to follower their sunnah and to hold on with our teeth on the consideration that it constitutes an extension of the first teacher Muhammad. The first caliph Abu Bakr says in his first khutbah:
O people, I have been given trust over you and I am not the best of you. If you see that I am right, then support me; and, if you see that I am wrong then block me. Follow me in what I obey Allah, and if I rebel against Him, then you are not obliged to follow me.
Umar, the second caliph, says: It is a mercy from Allah, anyone that guides me to my own faults. And he said, O you people, any of you who sees in me crookedness, then let him set me straight. One from among the masses responded: O son of Khit ab, if we see crookedness in you, we will rectify it with the edge of our swords! A woman replied to him while he was standing on the minbar, and he did not find any fault in that, but instead he said: The woman is correct and Umar is mistaken. Ali bin Abi Talib said to a man who was opposing him in a matter: I have been correct and I have erred. Above every one possessed of knowledge is one who knows better. (su rat Yu suf, Q 12: 76).
aa m [c ]r ua ]r m [c ua ]r m [c
Seventh: It is our right to borrow from the particular advantages of democracy Islam preceded democracy in decreeing the principles upon which its essence persists; however, it left the details to the ijtihad of the Muslims in conformity with the usul (source principles) of their religion and the welfare of their world as well as the development of their life according to time and place and the renewal of the circumstances of the human being. The distinguishing characteristic of democracy is that, during its protracted struggle against injustice and tyrants among patriarchs, kings and princes it was able to arrive at forms and means which are considered, up until today, to be the ideal guarantees for the protection of people from the domination of draconian rulers. There is no harm for humanity or its thinkers and leaders to contemplate other forms and approaches in order that it might arrive at what is better and more ideal. However, to facilitate that and for it to be achieved in the reality of people, we see it necessary for us to draw on the approaches of democracy in order to realize justice and al-shura as well as respect for human rights and to be able to stand in the face of the excess of high and mighty sultans of the earth. Among the principles specified in the shar ah is that any thing which is necessary to fulfil an obligation is, itself, obligatory; and, in the case of the demands of the legal
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intents of the shar ah, if there is a means specified to achieve these, then such a means takes the legal force of that intent. There is no legal basis in the shar ah which prohibits borrowing a theoretical or practical concept from non-Muslims. The Prophet, in the Battle of the Trench (al-khandaq) adopted the idea of digging a ditch, which was a method of the Persians. He also benefited from polytheist prisoners at the battle of Badr from among those who knew how to read and write in teaching the children of the Muslims writing, despite their polytheism; as wisdom is what the believer ought to seek, and when he finds it, he has a right to it. I have indicated in some of my books that it is among our rights to borrow from others ideas, approaches and systems that which benefits us so long as these does not conflict with the text of an operative legal injunction or a fixed legal principle. It is incumbent for us to transform and modify what we borrow and to augment it as well as to give to it abundantly of our spirit in order to make it a part of us and so that it will lose its original typology. If we consider a system such as the system of elections or voting, it is in the view of Islam bearing witness (shahadah) to the suitability of the candidate. It is necessary that the voter meet the necessary conditions that a witness must meet that he be just and willing as Allah said: And let the just among you bear witness (surat al-T alaq, Q 65: 2); and among those who are willing among the witnesses (surat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 282). And anyone who bears testimony that someone is unrighteous is righteous has committed the major sin of false testimony (shahadat al-zur), and the Qur an has compared this to taking partners (shirk) with Allah when it has said: So avoid the filth of idols and avoid uttering falsehood (al-zur). (surat al-H aj, Q 22: 30). Furthermore, whoever bears witness that a candidate is fit simply because he is a relative or from ones town or for some personal benefit which will accrue from him, such a person has disobeyed the command of Allah the Most High: and engage in bearing witness for Allah (surat al-T alaq, Q 65: 2). As for whoever fails to meet his voter obligation, so whoever was competent and trustworthy failed (to be elected) and someone unworthy wins by a majority who cannot be described as strong and trustworthy, then such a person has withheld testi mony (katama shahadah) of the sort which the ummah is most in need. The Most Exalted has said: and the witnesses must not decline if they are called (surat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 282); Do not withhold testimony, and whoever withholds it, it is the sin of his heart (surat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 283). The like of this can be said, from the outset, in regard to the candidate running for election and his necessary qualifications. In addition to these constraints and orientations of the electoral system, we will render it in the end an Islamic system, even if it was originally borrowed from others. What we would like to focus on here is what we emphasized at the beginning and that is that the essence of democracy is decisively in agreement with the essence of Islam if we return to it in its authentic sources and draw from its pure springs from the Qur an and the sunnah and the works of the Rashidun caliphs, not from the history of deviant princes and kings of evil or from the fatwas among the deviant destroyers among the ulama of the sultans, and not from the devoted but hasty who are not well-informed. Some might say that democracy means the rule of the people by the people and this is necessarily a rejection of one who asserts that absolute rule (al-hakim yah) belongs to Allah; however, this is not a sound assertion. It is not necessary that calling
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for democracy is suggesting that the rule of Allah belongs to the human being as for most of those calling for democracy, this has never crossed their minds. What they mean and are stressing is the rejection of coercive dictatorship; the rejection of the rule of the affairs of the people by tyrannical autocrats of deviant and draconian sultans. True, all that these people intend from democracy is that the people should choose their rulers as they wish and take them to account for their actions; to reject their orders if they contravene the constitution of the ummah or in Islamic terms: if they command rebellion (i.e., against Allah); and to have the right to remove them if they deviate and sin and do not heed advice or warning. I would like to note here that the principle absolute rule belongs to Allah al-hakim yah li-llah is an authentic Islamic principle upheld by all scholars of usul in their researches into Islamic-legal rule and the ruler. They concur that the ruler is Allah the Most Exalted and that the Prophet conveyed for and about Him as Allah is the one who commands and prohibits, who makes (things) lawful or forbidden and who rules and legislates. The assertion of the Kharijites There is no rule except Allahs is an assertion which is true in its essence; however, what is denied to them is their taking the word out of its context and their interpretation of it to mean the rejection of arbitration (al-tahk m) by a human being in the struggle. This contravenes the text of the Qur an which specifies arbitration in more than one subject, among the most famous of these being the arbitration between spouses if dissension occurs between them. For this reason, the Commander of the Faithful Ali responded to the Kharijites by saying: a word of truth where what is intended is false, and he described their assertion as a word of truth but chastized them for intending by it what is false. How could it not be true when it is taken explicitly from the Qur an itself: verily rule is not except unto Allah (surat Yusuf, Q 12: 40). The rule of Allah for creation is incontrovertible and absolutely certain, and it is of two types:
mr [a i] c aa m [r ]c ua ]r m [c mr [a i] c ua m [r ]c ua m [r ]c
The universal rule of ordination hakim yah kawn yah qadar yah meaning that Allah acts in the universe and implements His command through which his ordinations proceed; and he rules creation according to his sunnan (i.e., normative practices) which do not change what He has made known of them and what not. In regard to this is the saying of the Most Exalted: and Allah rules and there is no obstacle to His rule, and he is swift of taking to account (surat al-Ra d, Q 13: 41). What is meant here is the rule (hukm) of Allah in regard to divine ordination not in regard to legislation and command. The rule of legislation and command hakim yah tashr yah amr yah and this is the rule of culpability (al-takl f); command and prohibition; and to abide by what is best; and this is what was exemplified in that with which Allah dispatched the messengers and in sending down the books; and, in these He promulgated the laws, laid down the obligations, made lawful the lawful and forbade the forbidden. This is what no Muslim who is content with Allah as his Lord, Islam as his religion and Muhammad as Prophet and Messenger would reject.
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The Muslim who calls for democracy does so on the basis that it constitutes a form of rule embodying the political principles of Islam in the choice of ruler, the specification of al-shur a and advice, commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong, resisting deviance and rejecting rebellion (against Allah) especially if it gets to the degree of blatant unbelief.
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What confirms this is that the (Egyptian) Constitution textually specifies along with upholding democracy that the religion of the state is Islam and that Islamic shar ah is the source of law; and this is confirmation of the supreme rule of Allah that is the supremacy of His shar ah and that it has the supreme word. An explicit and clear article might be added to the Constitution that every law or system which contravenes the decisive principles of the shar ah is void and in reality this is a confirmation not an establishing (of something new). Thus, it is not the case that calling for democracy on the consideration that it constitutes the rule of the people is a substitute for the rule of Allah if there is no contradiction between the two. If that were a necessary precondition of democracy, then the correct assertion among the rightful among the ulama of Islam is that the obligatory of the madhab is not to the madhab and that it is not permissible to accuse people of unbelief or being corrupt or taking them to account according to the constraints of their madhab; as it is possible that they might not abide by these strictures or even, that they might never think about them at all. Among the evidences according to this group among Islamists that democracy is an imported principle which has no connection to Islam is that it is based on the adjudication of the majority and its consideration of it to be the possessor of the right to install the rulers and to facilitate matters and to accord preponderance to one of the various matters. So, voting in democracy is the rule and authoritative reference and whatever view passes by absolute majority or by limited majority in certain circumstances is the view which is executed, and maybe this (view) is a mistake or false. Islam, however, does not account this means and does not preference one opinion over another on the basis of majority agreement to it, but rather it considers it in its essence: is it correct or incorrect? If it is correct, then it is implemented and even if there is only one vote in favour of it or none at all. If it is incorrect, then, it is rejected even if there are 99 out of 100 votes in favour of it. The texts of the Qur an indicate that the majority is always in the ranks of the false and erroneous and on the side of idolatrous excess (al-taghut) as is exemplified in the saying of the Most Exalted: And if you obey most of whoever is on the earth, they will lead you astray from the path of Allah (surat al-an am, Q 6: 116); And most people not believers, even if you are vigilant (surat Yusuf, Q 12: 103). The Qur an reiterates the like of following Qur anic refrains: and most people do not know (surat al-a raf, Q 7: 187); rather most of them do not reason (surat al- ankabut, Q 29: 63); but most people do not believe (surat Hud, Q 11: 17); and however most people are not grateful (surat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 243). Similarly, it is indicated that the people of good and righteousness are the minority as in the saying of Allah: few of My slaves are grateful (surat Saba , Q 34: 13); and except those who believe and work righteous deeds, and few are they (surat S a d , Q 38: 24). And, thus is the assertion turned back on the one who asserts it when he is in error or mistaken. In a Muslim society, we ought to be talking about democracy more than those who work and use their reason and who believe and are thankful. We are not talking about a society of rejecters or people astray from the path of Allah. Furthermore, there are matters which do not enter into the sphere of voting and which are not subject to taking votes because they are among the fixed principles which do not accept change, except in the case where the society changes itself and is no longer Muslim. There is no place for voting in the decisive matters of al-shar ah and the basic premises of the religion and what is known of it of a necessity. Voting is in matters of
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ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) which will bear more than one opinion as well as an affair of the people wherein they may differ such as in the choice of a candidate for a particular office even for the office of the head of state; or for example in the promulgation of traffic laws or building codes or zoning laws for commercial establishments, factories or hospitals and so forth among that which enters into what the fuqaha term deferred welfare (al-masalih al-mursalah) such as making the decision to declare war or not or to impose particular taxes or not; to declare a state of emergency; to determine the term of the head of state and the possibility of his re-election and for how long, etc. If opinions differ in these issues, would they be left unresolved or would they be resolved? Is there preponderance without a numerical majority, or must there be preponderance? The logic of reason and law and reality dictate that there is no doubt about preponderance; and, preponderance in a situation of dissent is numerical superiority (i.e., the majority). So the opinion of two is closer to being correct than that of one. In a had th is that: Satan is with the person alone (al-wahid), but he is more distant from two (reported by al-Tirmidhi). It has been confirmed that the Prophet said to Abu Bakr and Umar: If the two of you are in consensus about some matter of consultation, I will not go against you (transmitted by Ahmad). The meaning of that is that two voices (or votes) take precedence over one even if it is the voice of the Prophet, so long as this remains far removed from the sphere of promulgation of law and the conveying of that which is from Allah the Most Exalted. As we know, the Prophet followed the majority view in the Battle of Uhud and he went outside the city of Medina to meet the armies of the (Meccan) mushrikun when his view and that of the senior Companions had been to remain within and to fight from within the city from its streets and alleys. More clear than this is the position of Umar in case of the six members of the sh ur a who were appointed for the caliphate, and that the majority should choose one among them, and subsequently that it would be for the rest to listen and obey. In the case of a stalemate of three against three, they would choose a candidate from outside them and that would be Abdullah bin Umar; and if he did not accept, then it would be from the three among whom was Abd al-Rahman bin Awf. A Prophetic had th affirms the principle of al-sawad al-a a am and the z command to follow it and the term refers to the masses of the common people and the greatest number of them. It is a had th which is reported a number of ways some are strong and supported by numbers of ulama according to view of the masses in matters of the caliphate, on the consideration of that being among the causes of its preponderance, if there is not a significant number which opposes it. The imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali took the position in some of his writings in favour of preponderance when two views were equivalent. There are those who may say that preponderance is what is correct even if no one is with it; as for what is incorrect, it is rejected even if 99 out of 100 are for it. What is decisive and correct in the matters is that which is confirmed and explicitly textually specified in the shar ah and this determines the contention; it does not broker dissension or accept opposition, and this is very rare and that about which is said: the group does not agree with the truth, so even if you are alone [you must]. As for the cases of ijtihad among those for which there is no text or for which a text will permit more than one exegesis or for which there is an opposing view or
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one stronger than it, then there is no harm in recourse to preponderance to settle the dispute and voting is one way to do that known to humans and a preferred method among intellectuals and Muslims among them. There is nothing in Islamic law which prohibits it; rather, there exists in the texts and the precedents that which supports it. The first and foremost thing which afflicted the Islamic ummah in its history is the neglect of the principle of al-shura. The caliphate of the Rashidun was transformed into mordacious monarchy termed by some of the Companions as Cesarian that it was infected by tyranny and imperialism transferred to the Muslims from the kingdoms which Allah caused them to inherit; and they should have drawn from these a lesson to avoid their rebelliousness and the depraved vices which were a cause of the downfall of their states. Furthermore, nothing has afflicted Islam and its ummah and da wah (call) in the Modern era except the crimes of tyrannical rule taking control over people by the sword of the arrogant and their gold. Nothing has disabled the shar ah or imposed secularism and necessitated the alienation of people except hegemony and draconian rule and the use of iron and fire. Nothing has struck the Islamic movement and da wah or punished those engaged in these and its sons and exiled them and turned them into refugees except the tremendous burden of tyrannical rule conspicuous at times and veiled at others and in the guise of spurious calls for democracy that the forces hostile to Islam issue publicly and which they confront from behind a curtain. Islam did not persist and its da wah did not spread nor did its revival come into prominence nor was its cry raised except through what it was granted of limited freedom wherein it found the opportunity to respond to the inborn nature of people with which it conforms and so that the adhan (call to prayer) for which it yearns may be heard and so that the intellects to which it calls may be convinced. The first battle of the Islamic da wah, the Islamic revival and the Islamic movement in our age is the battle of freedom. It is necessary for all those who covet Islam to stand in a single row in order to call for it, defend it as it cannot be done without and there is no substitute for it. It is important for me to affirm that I am not among those who are enamoured with using words of foreign origin such as democracy and so forth in order to express Islamic concepts. However, if the term and its use have become widespread among people, then our ears will not be deaf to it; rather it is incumbent that we know its connotation when it is spoken so that we do not understand something other than its reality or confer upon it what it does not connote or what is not intended by those uttering it and talking about it. Here, we will have judged it in sound and balanced fashion. It will not prejudice or harm us that the term has come from others as judgement does not turn on names and titles, but rather on what is named and content. In any case, many among writers and those engaged in the da wah use the term democracy and find no harm in doing so. Abbas Mahmud al- Aqqad authored a book entitled Islamic Democracy and Khalid Muhammad Khaild went so far as to consider democracy to be Islam itself. (This was pursued in our book The Islamic Revival and the Concerns of the Arab-Islamic Nation.) Many Islamists seek democracy as a form of rule, a guarantee of freedoms and a measure of security against the excess of the ruler and for the reason that true democracy represents the will of the ummah not the will of the individual ruler and his group of beneficiaries. It is not sufficient to raise the banner of democracy at a time when its spirit is being battered in prisons opened wide and whipped with scourges and when
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through state of emergency rulings every person possessed of a free opinion is pursued as well as whoever asks of the ruler Why? to say nothing of saying: No. I am among those seeking democracy in its being a practical means and as a measure to realize our goal in a dignified life wherein we will be able to call to Allah and to Islam as we believe in it without us being thrown into the darkness of the gaols or the gallows and nooses being readied for us. It remains for me to recall that some ulama have not ceased to assert until today that al-shura is for the purpose of information and not binding; and that the ruler can seek advice but it is not incumbent upon him to abide by the view of the people of al-shura the ahl al-hal wa al- aqd. As has been mentioned elsewhere it is clear that al-shura has no meaning if the ruler can seek council and then do whatever he wishes to do throwing the opinion of the people of al-shura against the wall. If such is the case, then how can these people be termed the ahl al-hal wa al- aqd as they are known from our cultural heritage, when they neither dissolve nor conclude (any pacts)? Ibn Kathir mentioned in his tafs r on the authority of Ibn Mardawayh that Ali bin Abi Talib was asked about al- azm (i.e., making a decision) in the saying of the Most Exalted: And consult them in the matter and when you have come to a decision, then put your trust in Allah (surat A l- Umran Q 3: 159); and, he responded: [It means] consult the people of opinion and follow them. If, in the matter there are two opinions, then what has afflicted our ummah and has not ceased to do so up until today, as a result of tyranny is backing up the asserted opinion with mandatory and binding shura. Whatever the differences, if the ummah or the group sees fit to abide by the view that al-shura is binding, then differences will be alleviated and what is agreed upon will become mandatory and a legal obligation. The Muslims have their conditions and if a leader or emir is chosen on this basis and this condition, then it is not permissible him for to back down from this contract and to abide by another opinion as the Muslims have their conditions and to abide by a contract is an obligatory duty. When it was suggested to Ali bin Abi Talib that he be sworn the bay ah (i.e., the pledge of allegiance) on the basis of the Qur an, the sunnah and the deeds of the two sheikhs that is, Abu Bakr and Umar before him, he rejected this that is, abiding by the work of the two sheikhs because if he accepted that it would have been binding upon him. And in this, Islamic al-shura. approaches the spirit of democracy, or if you will: the essence of democracy approaches the spirit of Islamic shura. And, all praise to the Lord of the Worlds.
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Notes
1. John L. Esposito and James Piscatory, Democratization and Islam, Middle East Journal,
45 (1991), art. 3, p. 434. Fahm Huwayd , The Qur an and the Sult an, p. 65. Ibrahim Disouq Shatt a , Al-Thawrah al-Iran yah, pp. 4960. Ahmad al-Sh a m , Riya h al-Taghy r fi al-Yaman, p. 90. s Ab u Mans ur Abd al-Q a hir bin T a hir al-Baghd a d , U ul al-Dn, p. 279. Muhammad Diy a al-D n al-Rayy s, al-Na aryat al-S yasyah al-Islamyah, p. 217. z Muhammad Y usuf M usa, Ni am al- H ukm f al-Islam, p. 124. z Ibid., p. 126. Al-Shaykh Abd al-Wahab Khilaf, al-Siyasah al-Shar yah, p. 58. Surat al-ghashiyah, Qur an 88: 2122. Muhammad Abdu, al-A mal al-Kamilah, Jama aha wa H aqaqaha wa Qadama laha Muhammad Amarah, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Al-Mu assasah al- Arab ya l-al-Dirasat wa al-Nashr). 12. Mussa, Ni z am al- H ukm Fi al-Isl am, p. 116.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
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26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.
Ab u Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazal , I hya Ulum al-Dn, Vol. 2, p. 306. Ibid., p. 307. Hussein M u nis, Alam al-Islam, p. 239. Mu s t af a al-Siba , Min Rawa i Had aratina, p. 115. Muhammad Asad, Minhaj al-Islam f al- H ukm, Tarjamat Mansur Muhammad Ma d (Beirut: Dar al- ilm li-l-Malay n, 1964), p. 19. Al-Say d Jawad Mu s t afaw , H uquq al-Insan fi al-Islam (Teheran), p. 24. a Muhammad Sal m al- Awa, f al-Ni am al-Syas l-il-Dawlah al-Isl am[c ir ]yah, p. 215. z m Ibid., p. 190. z Zafir al-Qasim , Ni am al- H ukm fi al-Shar ah wa al-Tarkh al-Islam, Vol. 1, p. 85. Al- Awa, Fi al-Ni am al-Syas li-l-Dawlah al-Isl amyah, p. 229. z Maru f al-Dawal b , al- H uquq al-Rumanyah, p. 464. Fahm Huwayd , Muwat inun La Dhamyun, p. 86. Ibrah m Dsuq Shita, Hadha al-Tad l l al-Dimuqra t an al-Islam wa Nadhar yatihi fi al-S yasah , Al- H ayat (20 July 1992). Y usuf al-Qar d aw , al-Sah wah al-Isl amyah bayn al-Ikhtil aq al-Mashr u wa-l-Tafarruq al Madhmum, p. 59. Abu Muhammad Al bin Ahmad bin Hazm al-Andalus , al-T uriq al- H ikmyah, p. 14. Muhammad Taha Badaw , Ba h th fi al-Nizam al-S yas al-Islam , in Manahij al Mustashriqn al- S adir an Maktab al-Tarbah al- Arab l-Duwal al-Khalj bi-l-Ta awun ma al-Muna zamah al- Arabyah li-l-Tarbyah wa-l-Thaq afah wa-l- Ulum, Vol. 2, p. 127. Ibid., p. 125. Tawf q al-Shaw , Fiqh al-Shura wa-l Istisharah, p. 459. Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 29. Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., p. 46. Asad, Minhaj al-Islam fi al-Hukm, p. 89. Al-Qasim , Ni z am al-Hukm fi al-Shar ah wa al-Tarkh al-Islam, Vol. 1, p. 66. Al- Awa, Fi al-Ni z am al-Syas li-l-Dawlah al-Isl amyah, p. 179. Asad, Minhaj al-Islam fi al-Hukm, p. 89. Al- Awa, Fi al-Ni z am al-Syas li-l-Dawlah al-Isl amyah, p. 203. Al-Shaw , Fiqh al-Shura w-al-Istisharah, p. 120. Abd al-Qadir Awdah, al-Islam wa Awd a una al-Syasyah, p. 126. Muhammad Shalt ut, al-Islam Aqdah wa Sharah, p. 440. Al-Shaw , Fiqh al-Shura w-al-Istisharah, p. 293. Al-Rayyis, al-Na zaryat al-Syasyah al-Islamyah, p. 339. Ibid., p. 340. Al-Shaw , Fiqh al-Shura w-al-Istisharah, p. 331. Taq al-D n Ahmad bin Abd al-Hal m bin Taym ya al-Haran , al-Syasah al-Shar yah fi Islah al-Ra w-al-Ra yah, p. 26. Ab u Ja far Muhammad bin Jar r al-Tabar y, Tarkh al-T abary: Tarkh al-Umam w-al Muluk, Vol. 3, p. 585. Ab u al-Hasan Al bin Muhammad al-M award , Adab al-Dn w-al-Dunya, p. 119. Taq al-D n Ahmad bin Abd al-Hal m bin Taym ya al-Haran , al-H asb, pp. 6, 94. Muhammad Abduh and Rash d Rid a, Tafsr al-Manar, Vol. 4, pp. 162163. Mahmoud Shalt ut, Min Tawjhat al-Islam, p. 567. Hasan al-Banna, Majmu at al-Rasa il (Mushkilatun a fi Daw al-Ni z am al-Islam), p. 398. Abbas Mahm ud al- Aqqad, Mawsu at al- Aqq ad: al-Qur an w-al-Insan, Vol. 4, p. 687. Al-Ray s, al-Na zaryat al-Siyasyah al-Islamyah, pp. 378386. Al-Qasim , Ni z am al-Hukm fi al-Shar ah wa al-Tarkh al-Islam, Vol. 1, p. 388. Ab u al-A la al-Mawd ud , Na zaryat al-Isl am wa-Hadyhi fi al-Syasah w-al-Q anun w-al Dastur, p. 33. Ibid., p. 35. Ab u Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazal , Dustur al-Wihdah al-Thaqaf yah bayn al-Muslimn, p. 211. Sa f al-D n Abd al-Fattah Isma l, al-Tajdd al-Sy as wa al-Waqi al- Arab al-Mu a r: s Ru yah Islamyah, p. 90. Jama ah al-Islam yah, research titled Muh akamat al-Ni z am al-Syas included in a secret bulletin Kalimat al- H aq.
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