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Prcis on the Origin of Thoughts and HOTs in Explaining Consciousness by David M. Rosenthal In this prcis I summarize Rosenthals Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness and the role of thoughts in it as described in his Explaining Consciousness. I then argue that the necessary condition of the HOT theory is too strong, excluding consciousness from psychological events and the acquisition or development of new concepts in cases where it should not be excluded. The HOT theory developed by Rosenthal states that [individual] xs first-order psychological event e is conscious iff x has a higher-order psychological event e such that xs first-order psychological event e is the object of e. 1 The necessary and sufficient conditions for a psychological event being conscious given by HOT are therefore as follows, respectively: (N) if xs first-order psychological event e is conscious, then x has a higher-order psychological event e such that xs e is the object of e; (S) if x has a higher-order psychological event e such that xs first-order psychological event e is the object of e, then xs e is conscious. HOTs establish a relation of being aware on this theory, and are taken by Rosenthal to be necessary and sufficient for explaining that in virtue of which some mental events are conscious. If e is conscious, there is a HOT e that targets e. If there is no HOT e accompanying e, e is unconscious. As Rosenthal puts it, ...we are conscious of our conscious states by virtue of having thoughts about them (409). A HOT is a thought that is higher order because it is about other mental states (note that the HOT itself is not conscious unless there is a higher or third-order thought about it). Rosenthal characterizes a HOT as a noninferential, nondispositional, assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that very state (410). A HOT has the state it makes conscious by being aware of or targeting it as its object or content.2 So it is a thought that is not the result of an inference, because a states being [state] conscious involves ones being
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Welshon, Fall 2011, PHIL 4200 Handout #3. This is why the HOT theory a subspecies of intentionalism. 1

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noninferentially conscious of that state (409); it is an occurrent thought, since being disposed to have a thought about something does not make one conscious of that thing (410); and it is an assertoric thought, since the thought must assert that something is the case (viz., that the psychological state e that is targeted by the HOT e ), and so its likely that being in an intentional state whose mental attitude is not assertoric does not result in ones being conscious of the thing the intentional state is about. Yet while these characteristics say something about what a HOT is, the sense in which they are thoughts remains unclear. Focusing on the question of whether HOTs are thoughts that are linguistic, Rosenthal claims to avoid the chauvinistic consequence of the HOT theory that would restrict the domain of individuals that have conscious states to those that are capable of language. He does so by maintaining that HOTs need not be linguistic, as little conceptual richness is needed to be in ...intentional states [that can express HOTs] (418, fn.21). Yet allowing that HOTs can be expressed in terms of nonlinguistic concepts, despite broadening the domain of individuals that have conscious states to include some that are incapable of language, does not preclude the occurrence of HOTs expressed in terms of linguistic concepts. The examples Rosenthal provides purportedly show that learning new concepts or having a relatively large repertoire of concepts for sensory qualities ...is enough for [x] to come to be conscious of [xs] sensory states as having those [more fine-grained] qualities and ...nonconscious 3 HOTs are responsible for there being something its like for [x] to be conscious of [xs] sensory states in that way. Some concepts that make distinctions regarding (preexisting but nonconscious) sensory qualities are correctly thought to rely on language, and concepts implicated in Rosenthals examples are among such linguistic concepts. When it comes to tasting the subtleties of wine or picking out nuanced patterns in music, perhaps it is appropriate that the concepts expressed by the HOTs that make one
The term nonconscious seems to be used by Rosenthal in the sense that unconscious is used by Welshon (2011); namely, a psychological state, event or process [that] can be but occurrently is not conscious (p. 9).
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conscious of the corresponding tastes and patterns should rely on language, and that consciousness of these fine-grained sensory features is unique to language-competent individuals who are capable of having these concepts. But Rosenthals attempt to extend the property of consciousness beyond language competence is compromised by the presence of sensory organs possessed by organisms that are conscious but incapable of having linguistic concepts, which are capable of more fine-grained discriminations than analogous organs possessed by their language competent counterparts. It is implausible that dogs should have conscious states and olfactory sensations far more keen than those of humans, while humans have conscious states of more fine-grained olfactory sensations because of the more finegrained linguistic concepts that the latter is capable of having about olfactory experiences. If this is so despite its implausibility, it implies that sensory and perceptual systems are much less relevant to conscious states than they seem to be. Furthermore, when I see turquoise but have such course-grained color concepts that I can do no better than to call it blue and the concept blue is the resolution of the HOTs I am capable of having about psychological states of seeing color, what it is like for me to see turquoise is nevertheless different from what it is like for me to see blue. If so, my phenomenal states of consciousness can be more fine-grained than my concepts about them. Hence, x can have a conscious psychological state e without an e HOT to make it conscious. Not only do concepts contribute to the fine-grainedness of subjective-qualities of conscious states, but subjective-qualities inform the fine-grainedness of concepts, and while conceptual distinctions can aid awareness of the subtleties of sensory qualities, concepts are no more necessary for sensory qualities to be conscious than knowledge of music theory is a prerequisite for conscious experience of harmonic qualities in music. After all, how can concepts be acquired or become more fine-grained if they are necessary to have experience in the first place? Unconscious acquisition of concepts appears to be an unsatisfactory answer.