FERNANDO FAJARDO vs. Sheriff RODOLFO V.

QUITALIG Facts: Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in entitled Spouses Fernando Fajardo and Evangeline Perez vs. Maria Datuin, alleged that the complaint for ejectment which they was finally decided on July 29, 1999 against the defendant Courtt issued a Writ of Execution which was brought by the respondent Sheriff to the defendant Datuin on March 9, 2000. Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was served, defendant asked for a period of two (2) weeks for her to remove her personal properties on the land. After two (2) weeks he went to Sheriff Quitalig so that the Writ of Execution may be implemented but he was told that a restraining order was issued, but when he asked for it, the respondent told him that he left it in the office. On March 24, 2000, he and his lawyer went to the court to verify whether a restraining order has really been issued but they found out that there was none; so he told the respondent to implement the Writ of Execution. Respondent, accompanied by a policeman and the barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that morning but when they reached the place, respondent did not do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out her personal properties. His reason is that an employee of the Probation Office, Mr. Leonardo Martinez, talked to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order was brought to the place, and the respondent told him that the writ of execution can no longer be implemented. Respondent denied the charge. He asked for the dismissal of the case, because he had already implemented the Writ on August 24, 2000 as evidenced by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. The OCA found respondent to have been negligent in the performance of his duty as asheriffrecommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000. Ruling: The court agrees with the OCAs findings and recommendation. A review of the records of this case reveals that respondent enforced the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action taken on a writ of execution. Section 14 of Rule 39 of the Rules provides the manner in which the execution is to be implemented Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after duly serving it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000. Nonetheless, because of the request of the defendant and her promise that she would vacate the premises on March 23, 2000, he allowed her to remain there. However, when he came back on March 24, 2000, he was unable to enforce the Writ because of a TRO issued by the RTC of San Carlos, Pangasinan.

The respondent is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within 30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report of Service within the same period, (3) make periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the Reports. Aida Banez vs. Gabriel Banez Facts: the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, decreed the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net assets. Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996. She filed a motion for execution pending appeal. RTC granted the petitioners motion for execution of decision pending appeal. In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On March 21, 1997, the appellate court rendered its decision setting aside the motion for execution pending appeal. In the meantime, the trial court gave due course to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15, 1997 the entire case records to the Court of Appeals. Aida filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Gabriel had failed to file with the appellate court a Record on Appeal. Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners-appellant. In view of petitioners Motion to Withdraw her own appeal filed on November 27, 1997, and for failing to pay the required docket fee within the prescribed period under Rule 41, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appeal instituted by the petitioner Aida P. Baez is hereby DISMISSED. Issue: whether execution of judgment pending appeal was justified. 1st issue As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity. In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.

2nd issue Is an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are allowed? We do not think so.

Petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,] is required in this case. She concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner likewise prays that, in the event that we do not dismiss Gabriel Baez appeal, we should direct the appellate court to return the records of the case to the RTC of Cebu. Thereafter, according to her, respondent should file his record on appeal for approval and transmittal to the Court of Appeals. In the alternative, she prays that the appellate court retain only the pleadings and evidence necessary to resolve respondents appeal pursuant to Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135the Rules of Court, and return the rest of the case records to the RTC. Held : In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court held: Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the

second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or jurisprudence. PETITIONS DENIED

Durisol vs. CA FACTS Durisol obtained loans from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) a total amount of 3.8 Million on separate days. As a security therefore, petitioner executed a mortgage on two parcels of land located in Bulacan. After petitioner defaulted in the payment of loans, DBP instituted for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Durisols president Rene Knecht, borrowed from DBP the two CTC purportedly to obtain new title, to which DBP agreed. Meanwhile, the foreclosure sale was held, wherein DBP emerged as the highest bidder. The corresponding certificate of sale was issued to DBP. Petitioner however, filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure. The CFI upheld the validity of the foreclosure. Petitioner then appealed to the CA, which affirmed the CFI decision. Contrary to its promise, however, petitioner never returned the titles to DBP. Thus, despite having purchase the properties at the foreclosure sale, DBP was unable to register the property in its name. DBP then instituted an action before the CFI a petition for surrender of the Owners Duplicate of Title. The trial court rendered a Summary Judgment ordering petitioner to surrender the said titles within five days. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which, the lower court denied. Petitioner appealed the case to the IAC and there the appeal was granted. The case was then set for hearing where neither petitioner nor its counsel appeared. DBP was then allowed to present its evidence ex parte. Sixteen days later after the receipt of the copy of the resolution, petitioner filed a MR. The lower court denied the motion, it being filed out of time and for lack of notice of hearing. DBP then filed a motion for execution. More than four years later, petitioner instituted before the CA a petition to annul the trial courts decision, alleging for the first time alleging that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. Hence this petition. ISSUE WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for the issuance of a new duplicate owners certificate of title. WON petitioner was estopped from challenging the courts jurisdiction HELD Ground for Annulment of Judgment:

1. Extrinsic Fraud 2. Lack of jurisdiction A petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but also an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, which means the court, should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC formerly the CFI, is a court of general jurisdiction. All proceedings involving title to real or personal property, or specifically land registration cases, including its incidents such as the issuance of OCT, are matters cognizable by the RTC. RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except FEUD. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction, a judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void where a party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so at the first instance. Moreover, Rule 47, section 3 provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be filed before it is barred by laches or estoppel. While jurisdiction over the SM of a case may be raised at anytime of the proceedings estoppel or laches has not as a rule supervened. FALLO: DISMISSED Augusto vs. Judge Rios (pivate respondent: Omolon) FACTS Augusto sold the subject land located in Cebu property to Guillermo Omolon(private respondent). The latter caused the registration of the property. Cleofe Amolon, the surviving heir, filed a petition for the reconstitution of the the OCT before the court and which was granted. However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the RoD., Omolon was informed that the owners copy has already been issued to Ruben Augusto. He then filed a petition before the court against Augusto to have the OCT copies be surrendered to him. The RTC granted said petition. Petitioner Augusto then moved for MR but likewise denied. Augusto filed a Notice of Appeal but such was denied. Petitioners now filed an instant petition for certiorari under rule 65 alleging that RTCs grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE WON the order of the trial court directing petitioner to surrender the OCT is an interlocutory order, hence, not subject for appeal. HELD Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not from an interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. In contrast, an order is interlocutory, if it does not finally disposes of the case. In the case at bar, the order of the public respondent directing the petitioner to produce the owners copy of OCT in the office of the RoD for the annotation of the private respondents interest over the property is merely interlocutory and not final. Hence, not appealable by means of Writ of error. The public respondent had not fully disposed of the case as it had not yet ruled on whether to grant the private respondent prayer for the surrender of the owners copy of OCT. As gleaned from the order of the respondent judge, he believed that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the property and was disposed to dismiss the petition. LBPS vs. Amila

FACTS Petitioner obtained several notes from respondent bank amounting to 11.5 M with an average interest rate of 15.5% per annum. The loan was covered by several promissory notes and real estate mortgage. The promissory notes were restructured and consolidated into three promissory notes with an increase of 20% per annum for the first two and 30% per annum for that third note. Petitioner filed a complaint for reformation of documents and recovery of excessive interest rates alleging that additional oppressive and excessive charges were unilaterally imposed by respondent bank in violation of their agreement that the interest rate for the aggregate amount is only 20% and not 30%. And that the term for maturity is not 30 days but six months. Meanwhile respondent bank filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the foreclosure. The trial court denied the motion for the issuance of a TRO. ISSUE Won petition for certiorari is the appropriate remedy for the denial of petitioners motion for the issuance of TRO. HELD The order denying petitioners motion for the issuance of a TRO is an interlocutory order on an incident which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. The remedy against an interlocutory order is not certiorari but an appeal in case of an unfavourable decision. Only if there are circumstances that clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal that the remedy of certiorari is allowed, none of which is present in the instant case.

ESTINOZO vs. CA FACTS Petitioner represented to private complainants that she is a co-owner of the Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from the said complainants the payment and processing fees. Few months after, herein complaints were not yet deployed, hence, they seek for the return of their money and filed a complaint of Estafa against petitioner. The RTc found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. Within 15-day reglementary period to file MR or petition for Review, petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to file MR. the CA denied the motion. Petitioner filed an MR but likewise denied. Displeased with the series of denial, petitioner then filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. ISSUES WON Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy HELD The petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate courts issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45, expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. In this case appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action of certiorari, a limited form and review of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the question of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those

questions of law will not treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal not certiorari as a special civil action. The rule as it stands now without exception is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before this court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file MR. It is well to point out that with petitioners erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of MR or PR from the judgment of the CAs decision, the challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this court. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the loss of appeal--- certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his favour. When a judgment becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the judgment. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. FALLO: DISMISSED

MARMO vs. ANACAY FACTS Respondent Anacay is the bonafide co-owner, together with his deceased wife, Gloria P. Anacay, of a parcel of land located in cavite. They authorized petitioner Marmo to sell the subject property. Marmo sold the property to Danilo on an instalment basis. Anacay subsequently discovered that the TCT of the subject property was cancelled and was issued under the name of Marmo through a falsified Deed of Sale which was later transferred to Danilo. The respondent sought the annulment of the DS and cancellation of the TCT, in the alternative; he demanded petitioner Danilos payment with interest plus moral damages and attys. Fees. The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of respondents failure to include his children as indispensable parties. RTC denied petitioners MTD. They moved for MR but likewise denied. After the denial of their MR, petitioners elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. They charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition. ISSUE Will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order? WON there is grave abuse of discretion in ruling that respondents children are indispensable parties. HELD

In the case at bar, petitioners did not wait for the final resolution on the merits of the case from which an appeal could be taken, but opted to immediately assail the RTC orders through a petition for certiorari before the CA. the petition is inappropriate. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it does not dispose of the case, and, in effect, directs the case to proceed until final adjudication by the court. Only when the court issues an order outside or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, will certiorari be considered as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The respondents co-owners are not indispensable parties. The respondents claim in his complaint is personal to him and his wife ie. That his and his wifes signature were falsified. The issue therefore is falsification, an issue which does not require the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be determined without their presence because they are not parties to the document; their signatures do not appear therein. Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately protected by their co-owner and father. Since the complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the properties owned in common, and as such will redound to the benefit of all the co-owners. FALLO: DISMISSED. They are not indispensable parties to the resolution of the case.

JMM PROMOTIONS vs. CA FACTS JMM promotions hired private respondents and Theresa Domatican as entertainers in Korea. The three entertainers is a musical band, Domatican being the original vocalist. The band was set to leave however, a day before their departure; petitioner assigned Flores instead of Domatican to perform with the band in Korea. Private respondents performed as a group however, their career was short-lived as they were dismissed for poor performance. As a result they were asked to sign a quitclaim and were repatriated back to the Philippines. They filed a case of illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner. Alleging that had petitioner not replaced their vocalist, no premature termination could have happened. POEA ruled in favor of respondents and was affirmed on appeal by the NLRC.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking the reversal of the NLRC decision raising the defense that the CA erroneously sustained the findings of fact by the NLRC. that if it be true that Flores didnt perform well, then, they could not have lasted as a band for four months. ISSUE WON the SC can go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the Lower Courts and analyse, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo an and the CA were correct in their appreciation of the evidence. HELD as an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the SC is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched is the doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under rule 45 of the RRC as this mode pf appeal is generally confined to questions of law. We therefore take this opportunity once again to reiterate that only questions of law not questions of fact, maybe raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the RRC. This court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and analyse, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence. Petitioners arguments are based on factual and evidentiary matters which the SC does not inquire into in an appeal on certiorari. Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. The factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the SCand they carry even more weight when the CA affirms the factual findings of the trial court. Any exception to this principle must be clearly and convincingly proven. Petitioner however, failed to prove this case falls within the exception. FALLO: denied.

QBE INSURANCE (PHILS.) INC. By: MARCELINA F. VALLES, complainant, vs. CRESENCIANO K. RABELLO, JR., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 71 Pasig City, respondent. Facts: Complainant alleged that respondent sheriff unlawfully and maliciously dragged Q.B.E. Insurance Inc. when the latter falsely reported to the court through an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion that defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Company had changed its corporate name to Q.B.E. Insurance. On the basis of the patently perjurious information in respondents manifestation and motion, complainant averred, Judge Celso D. Lavia Order directing the implementation of the Writ of Execution against Rizal Surety under its new name QBE Insurance Inc. A year later respondent went to the offices of the QBE, served a Notice of Immediate Payment and then garnished its bank accounts. Despite the representations

of Atty. Ireneo U. Gacad, in-house counsel and Corporate Secretary of Rizal Surety, that said corporation is separate and distinct from QBE. QBE filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Order and 24 March 2003 Notice of Garnishment. Subsequently, on 11 April 2003, QBE filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. Instead of expediting service, respondent sent the notice of the filing of an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim to judgment obligee Haresh Ramnani by registered mail, rather than by personal service, and gave the latter 10 days within which to post the required indemnity bond. QBE added that although no indemnity bond was posted by judgment obligee Haresh Ramnani, respondent unlawfully refused to lift the garnishment on the bank accounts of QBE. Finally, QBE alleged that respondent was fully aware that the trial courts decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals and that the appellate court had issued an injunctive writ, enjoining and restraining the enforcement of the RTC decision yet he proceeded with the implementation of the Writ of Execution. Respondents denied all the allegations of the complaint stating that. the Order dated 20 May 2002 directed him to enforce the Writ of Execution against the judgment debtors, among them Rizal Surety. Complying with the trial courts Order, he tried to serve the Writ of Execution upon Rizal Surety but he failed to do so because he was informed that the latter had changed its name to QBE Insurance Inc. Subsequently, on 24 May 2002 he submitted an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion informing the court of this development. Consequently, the court issued the Order dated 27 May 2002, authorizing the enforcement of the Writ of Execution against Rizal Surety and/or Q.B.E Insurance Company, Inc. respondent he held in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Execution upon the instructions of the judgment obligee, Haresh Ramnani, on the ground that he would first investigate the alleged change of name of Rizal Surety with the Office of the Insurance Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission Mr. Ramnani verbally requested him to proceed with the execution of the writ as Ramnanis investigation revealed that QBE and Rizal Surety are indeed one and the same entity. This was followed up by a letter-request on 24 March 2003 from Ramnani and respondent then enforced the writ by serving a Notice of Immediate Payment to Rizal Surety and/or QBE at its office and by levying its bank accounts. Respondent added that after complainant filed its Urgent Motion to Lift Order and Notice of Garnishment which Mr. Ramnani opposed, the latter requested him in a letter dated 28 April 2003 not to act on the third-party claim since only the courts can determine the merits of the grounds relied upon by the complainant, which is essentially the same ground raised in their Urgent Motion to Lift Notice of Garnishment. Meanwhile, on 11 April 2003, QBE filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim anchored on the same arguments earlier raised in its Urgent Motion to Lift. The court on the charge that he defied the resolution of the CA granting QBEs Petition for Preliminary Injunction, respondent clarified that the injunction bond in the amount of fifty million pesos was never approved by the appellate court as it was allegedly defective. As a consequence thereof, no preliminary injunction was ever issued by the appellate court to restrain the enforcement of the Writ of Execution. QBE filed its Reply wherein it argued that under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it becomes the ministerial duty of the Sheriff or the levying officer to release the garnished property upon the filing of a third-party claim unless the judgment obligee, on the sheriffs demand, files an indemnity bond in a sum not less than the value of the garnished property. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for gross inefficiency and admonished to always discharge his responsibilities with due diligence and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Issue: Whether or not the sheriff properly executed his duty as an officer of the court. Held: As officers of the Court, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with utmost care and diligence, particularly in implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect the

efficacy of the process by which justice is administered. Respondent ought to be aware that execution could only be issued against a party and not against one who was not accorded his day in court and it was his bounden duty to see to it that the writ of execution would be implemented only upon properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Property belonging to third persons cannot thus be levied upon. It behooved respondent to confirm and establish the veracity of the information he received by making his own verification with the SEC. Instead of doing so, he unthinkingly accepted the representations of the employees of Rizal Surety and hastily filed the Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, informing the trial court, among others, that Rizal Surety had changed its corporate name to QBE Ins. Inc. This prompted the trial court to issue its 27 May 2002 Order, directing the implementation of the Writ of Execution against the properties of QBE. While respondents acts may not have been tainted with bad faith or malice, he nevertheless failed to discharge his duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. The fact that the trial court eventually denied QBEs Urgent Motion to Lift in its Order is inconsequential for purposes of determining respondents liability. The trial courts basis in denying QBEs motion consisted of the fact that the latter entered into a Business Run-Off Agreement with Rizal Surety whereby QBE agreed, among others, to handle all claims on policies of Rizal Surety and not for the reason stated in respondents ex-parte motion. respondents allegation in his motion initially became the basis of the trial courts Order which directed the implementation of the writ of execution against QBE. Respondent must be reminded that he should at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties and owing to the very sensitive function that he performs in the dispensation of justice, his conduct, moreover, must at all times be above suspicion. respondent could not be entirely faulted for his failure to immediately release and/or discharge the garnished bank accounts of the complainant. The remedies mentioned in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are without prejudice to any proper action that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim to the property. Such a proper action is entirely distinct from that explicitly described in Section 17 Rule 39, i.e., an action for damages brought by the third-party claimant against the officer within 120 days from the date of the filing of the bond for the taking or keeping of the property subject of the terceria. Quite obviously, this proper action would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. QBE, instead of availing of the remedy of terceria authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which would have been the proper remedy considering that QBE is not a party to the case against Rizal Surety, opted instead to file an urgent motion for the lifting of the notice of garnishment. QBE then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed. QBEs Urgent Motion to Lift and Affidavit of Third-Party Claim are based on the same grounds. Under the circumstances, respondent was left with little or no alternative but to wait for the trial courts resolution of the pending motion lest he be charged with usurping a function reserved for the courts alone. Respondent could not be faulted for QBEs gaffe in availing of the wrong remedy specially so in this case where QBE failed to show that respondents acts were motivated by malice or bad faith. WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.