The Great Migration of 1971: I: Exodus Author(s): Partha N.

Mukherji Reviewed work(s): Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 9, No. 9 (Mar. 2, 1974), pp. 365-369 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4363448 . Accessed: 28/11/2011 03:42
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SPECIALARTICLES

The

Great

Migration

of

1971

1-Exodus
Partha N Mukherji This is an exploratory study of the evacuees who left East Bengal after the imposition of martial law on March 25, 1971, and sought refuge in India. According to official statistics, by the second week of December 1971 about 6.8 million evacuees had been housed in camps and another 3.1 million were staying with friends and relatives. As many as 827 state camps and 19 Central camnps accommodated one of the largest migrant movements in history. This three-part study concentrates on those w'io were temporarily settled at the Chandpara and Bokchora camps in the district of 24-Parganas in We;t Bengal. Part I deals with the socio-economic background of the evacuees, the events leading to their upe'ootment and the trek to sanctuary. Part II will examine the organisational set-up of the camps, the relatiotns between hosts and guests in and around the camps and the adaptive capacities of the evacuees in their new environment. Part 111 will deal with the migration back to Bangladesh and the manner in wh ch it was achieved. [I am thankful to the Department of Sociology, University of Delhi, for having given me a small grant and duty leave for my field work. I am also th2nkful to I P S Uberoi and to Andre Beteille for having taken a helpful interest in my work. My thaiks also to the members of the Sociological Research Colloquiium seminar. I am most grateful to Jayapra ash Narayan, the Bangladesh Legation in Calcutta, Abhoy Ashram, A P Sinha, and the Ministry of Labo-4r and Rehabilitation, all of whom gave nmeinvaluable help in doing my field work.]
THE time available for this study was six appromimately weeks, which included not only the period of field work but also the ti-me for the organisat-ion of research. The period of field work included ten days in Bangladesh of which five were spent in a village in the interior of Jessore district. Since the investigation had to be conducted by me single-handed, I had to move in such a way that the da a I would collect from a few persons in an ocean of ten million would nevertheless make some sense with reference to the problem I was investigating. I selected the Bongaon region of West Bengal for two reasons. Bongaon being one of the towns nearest to the border would have received evacuiees right from the beginning of the immigrant movement. Secondly, the liberation of Bangladesh would inevitably register its first impact in these camps immediately close to the border. The next stage of selection left little choice and offered little difficulty. I decided to work in the two camps which were under the relief jurisdiction of the Abhoy Ashram, my hosts. This solved the problem regarding my bonafides as a genuine researcher and helped establish rapport without any difficulty with the people in the camps. These camps were Chandpara Camp Nutmbei 2 and Bokchora, both located in the Bongaon sub-division of the 24-Parganas district. In each of these camps I tried to locate specific villages in Bangladesh. I had decided to concentrate on one village from each camp. While this was possible in Chandpara, where I selected the village of Mullakandi in Faridpur district, this was not possible in Bokchora. So I did what I thought was the closest approximationto this, namely, I interviewed people from villages which formed a very close cluster in the Chhianobboi Cram region of Jessore district. Such a mode of selection of respondents served a dual purpose. Not only would they provide information relevant to rural Bangladesh but also relating to their status as evacuees. It may be countered that such a mode of selection could have led to a biased understanding of the evacuee situation. This 'problem was tackled by the technique of group interviews. Detailed interviews were conducted with the aid of an interview guide. The questions were mostly open-ended and only suitable cues were suggested to clarify the questions when necessary. This left the main respondent and the group auidience a lot of leexvav to consider an(l respond consensually to the various aspects of the problem. The process of
consensuial understancdig also enabled

me to observe and note the various slants to the discussion (whenever such a discussion took place), from which a resultant emerged. It also enabled me to intervene whenever I felt that there was some obstacle in the consensual process. Hence, the interviews not only yielded responses to questions, but enabled me tcorecord the entire process of response. Fortuitously, the field work (which was conducted immediately after the liberation in the third and fourth weeks of December 1971) was happily timed at least in one very important respect - the evacuees spoke frankly and freely on several topics about which at any other time they would have felt inhibited. Finally, the limitations of an exploratory study should not be underestimated. I had not gone to the field preparedl to study a problem which had been worked out fully in terms of its theoretical implications. I did not have any clear anticipations of the kind of sociologically relevant empirical reality that I was likely to encounter. Hence it was like visiting an uncharted field.
S THE GUESi

Of the two camps that I studied I was able to do a base-line survey only
365

March 2, 1974
OF PATTERN OF EMIGRATION TABLE 1: IN CHANDENCAMPED THE EVACUEES

ECONOMIC AND POLITIGAL WEEKLY in Chandpara had engaged in some kind of trade or commerce. 85.6 per cent of these traders have been owners and/ or cultivators of land upto five acres. Hence it would appear that there was a tendency amongst these small landowners to supplement their inbcomeby trade. the economic status of Hindus in terms of landownership, especially in Hindu populated areas, was higher than that of the Muslims. Another point that I would like to mention is that all the evacuees in these two camps were Hindus. There was not a single Muslim family in the two camps with a total population of 17,500. The camp populations were almost wholly scheduled caste, the largest number were Namasudras followed by Rishis and Pods.
UPROOTMENT

PARA

AS ON DECEMBER 20,

1971 Towns

District

Villages

Jessore
Khulna

33
35

2
-

Faridpur Barisal
Kushtia

14 6
-

2 1
1

A glance at the distribution of cattle wealth clearly indicates that a very large percentage of those who possesfor Chandpara 2 camp with the help sed land also owned some cattle (79.4 of one of the camp inmates. Chand- per cent) and that the cattle wealth para had evacuees from five districts increased along with an increase in of East Bengal - Jessore, Khulna, landownership and/or cultivation. Faridpur, Barisal and Kushtia - coverThe point I am trying to pursue is ing a relatively wide area in what is now Bangladesh. These evacuees came simply that the evacuees in the camps from as many as 88 villages and six had strong rural roots and most of them had some economic stake which towns (see Table 1). Assuming that the relatively better- they had left behind. At the level of off immigrants would have either stayed qualitative assessment, the same imthe with their kdnsmen and friends or im- pression was gathered for both camps. If we add to the above indiprovised their own shelters at places having better advantage, the economic cators the fact that these regions in condition of the campers, we can Bangladesh are rich in numerous variereasonably accept, represented, by and ties of fruits and vegetables, and in large, the poorer strata of the immigrant fish and poultry, some idea of the ecofiomic background of the people I met population. However, how representative such can be understood. data would be of the respective regions Whatever the reliability of the data is a matter of conjecture. It is certainly for the regions of Jessore and Khulna, not a representative samnpleof the vil- I for one would be extremely cuirious lages/towns from where Chandpara to know the pattern of landholdings campers came, nor does it include among the Muslim ancd Hindu cornmuMuslim inhabitants of the same regions. nities in the overall landownership patAnd yet perhaps some knowledge of tern of the twoi districts in general. the socio-economic background of the More specifically, I would suspect that evacuees in this camp is not altogether TABLE 2: PATTERN OF LANDOWNERSHIP irrelevant. IN THE EVACUEES Table 2 shows that an oveiwhelmingly large percentage of the ChandOwn Land para campers owned some land of their Land Total 88 6
own (90.1 per cent). Of those who owned

I shall confine myself to the pattern

of uprootment in the two regions of East Bengal, namely the ManirampurAbhoynagar region of Jessore and the Gopalgunj region of Faridpur. The description that follows is a reconstruction of events reported by the interviewees. The more general details will perhaps find corroboration from information culled from other media of communication, whilst for the more specific details of locale and region, we have to rely on the statements of the interviewees. However, there was a remarkable amount of consistency regarding these details in separate group interviews, which leads to an increased credibility of the information collected. It will be recalled that in the Jessore region the Pakistan army met with unexpected resistance, keeping it confined in the cantonment for three days from March 26, 1971. Between March
AND CULTIVATION 2. CHANDPARA IN EAST BENGAL OF

(numbers) Own Land Own Land + Do Share + Give Cropping Land for Share Cropping

Total

land of their own, again an overwlhelmingly large percentage were owner cultivators or owner cultivators-cumshareeroppers (90.7 per cent). Only 9.3 per cent were either in a position to give land for sharecropping or were compelled to do so. Nearly 69.3 per cent of those who owned land, owned and/or cultivated more than one acre. The pattern of landownership does not necessarily indicate the real economic status of the group. For, quite a few in addition to owning land (for no land at all), engaged in petty and medium scale rural-based trade and business. Indirect evidence indicating this was adduced from statements of losses incurred as a consequence of looting of shops (see Table 3). ca-pers At least 16.4 per cent of the
366

Upto
1 acre 106
-

(Per cent)
106(30.7)

More than 1 and upto 2 acres More than 2 and upto 5 acres More than 5 adn upto 10 acres More than 10 and upto
15 acres

62 89 16
3 2

2 15 10
1 4
-

8 20 7

72 (20.8) 124 (35.9) 33 (9.6)

4 (1.2) 6(1.8)

More than
15 acres
-

Total (per cent) No land, no cultivation Grand Total

278 (80.6)

32 (9.3)

35 (10.1)

345 (100) 34 379

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

TAixLE 3:
STA1-EMENTlS

March 2, 197A1
10o LOOTING OF

SUS1AINED DUE CLAIMING LosSES SI-IOPS, By LANDO(W,7NERSHIP

(numbers)

Land Rs 1)00500

Shops Looted of the Amnountof 501- 10012001- 3000+ 3000 1000 2000

Total

No land
(N =34) 1 2
-

(perc'enlt)

5 (8.2)

Upto 1 acre (N (106) More than 1 More than 2 (N = 124) More than 5
awll Upto 2 acres (N=72)
all(1 Upto 5 acires

3
2

3
1

6
2

5
3

22(35.5)
10 (16.1)

1
1
-

1
-

1
1

5 6

16 (25.8)
8 (12.8)

More than 10 aii(l Upto 15 acires More than 1.5 acires

(N=6) Total (per Cent)
-

andI Upto 10 acr-es (N 33) (N = 4)

8 (12.8)

_I 7 (11.3)

_ 16 (25.8)

_ 11 (17.8)

1
20 (32.3)

1(1.6)
62 (100)

(Total N'=379) 7 and 24, the nationalist movement was so intense that black flags fluttered from almost all housetops in Jessore. When the East Pakistan Rifles and East Bengal Regiment iuittinied(on March 25 and reversed the direction of their guns, the Pakistan army was truly perplexed by the massive popuilar support against it. Almost all Bengalis, Hindus and Muslims alike, rallied round the Bengali soldiers and other volunteers and contributed generously with mainly cooked food, fruits and eggs. A nationalist suib-divisional officer summoned the people of the region to join in the liberation struiggle. The response was heartening and since the area had a large Hindu poptulation,the group which banded round himii conconsisted of a large proportion of Hindus. The 'Bibaril* Mtuslims oni the the massive influx of IHindu refugees into India. For, soon after the army r-egainiedcomplete suipremnacy, ohthe jective of flushing out the Hindus became a definite policy of the official machinery, the Bihari Muslims playing a dominant role in it. It was widely circulated in that region that Hindus had killed Muslims in large numbers and this propaganda caught up with the Bengali Muslims as well, especially the more fanatical elements. It is in the context of this backdrop of events that we have to understand the uprootment of Hindus, at least from the Jessore region. I must give a brief description of of the two regions of Jessore and Copalganj. The district of Jessore is clharacterised by a number of tlhickly populated Hindu pockets. Chchianobboi outskirts of Jessore anid inside the toNvn, Cram (literally, "Ninety-Six Villages") whose role had been identified as and "Egaro Khan" (literally, "Eleven against the nationalist mnovement, fell in Number") are two such pockets. a prey to the frenzied violence of this They are supposed to be clusters of liberation group. It seems many Bihari 96 and 11 villages, respectively with a Mutslim faimiilies had to pay wvith their Hindu population only. That is wlhy lives for hiaving identified with the these areas, particularly the forlm-er, Pakistanii authorities. had acquired appellations like "Clhcbotevent is being isolated and This to Hindustan" (Little Hindustan) and for the purposes of this simplified "Pakistaner Hindustan" (Pakistan's analysis witlh a view to understanding Hindustan). However, on the outskirts All non-Bernali Mtuslims are covere(d of Chchianobboi Gram there are villages Ifow1w) this blanket appellation. with mixed populations of Hindtis and 'Bihari' everi, it is truie that most Muslims. In contrast, the Gopalganj Mtislimis we're from the state of Bihar region in the district of Faridpur, has in Idclia.

a clearly mixed population. But since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's village is in the Gopalganj region, it is an Awami League stronghold. declared martial law, the Having state legitimised its use of force to control the 'disruptive' elements of the state. By barring the majority party (Awami League) and characterising its leadership as traitors, it could convict any of them on charges of treason. This threw the Awami League orgariisation into complete disarray. Subsequently, the other nationalist parties, the National Awami Party (Bhashani group) and the National Awami Party (Muzaffer group) also had to operate under cover. Sweeping powers were given to the army and the civil authorities to use force as they deemed fit. The opportunity was not lost to use the Hindus as scapegoats for rationalisations of cdeviantbehaviour of the Muislim Bengalis. Hinduis were projected corrtupting influience and the as the Awami League as their prey, for both had the objective of' destroying Pakistan. Such an ideology found favour with the dominant fanatic minorities everywhere, who having lost the battle of the ballot, were happily poised for the battle of bullets. It is In the context of these swiftly moving political events, that the exodus of the Hindus from Chchianobboi Gram has to be perceived. It is interesting to note that Chchianobboi Gram itself did -ot face the ordeal of mass killings or abductions; rather the Hindutis on the fringe villages set the alarm. It testifies to the high level of integration of such a large population, that they were able to take decisions about the entire cluster of 96 villages with a population estimated at nearly 1.4 million. Several meetings were held in Mashihati, Sundali and Panchbaria schoo(ls, where the leaders of the community got together, assessed IHindui the developments, and deliberatedlupon possible courses of action. They ruled out any collective resistance as they knew that to challenge the might of the army with an unarmed population would be an exercise in futility. When fringe market of Dhakuria was the looted and burnt, and the houses of the Hindus of Champakona looted for the second time in quick succession, Hindus from the adjoining that the areas came into Chchianobboi Cram. when even the . well-meaning And Muslim neighbours expressed inability to give them any security or moral 367

March 2, 1974

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

TABLE 4: DLisTRIBUTION OF CATTLE WEALTHI support because of danger to themselves AMONG TIHE EVACUEES OF CHANDPARA 2 on that account, the Hindu leaders decided that everyone would leave on Land Cattle (in units*) the same day. It seems likely that the '2-4 Total l-2-4+ anticipated wrath of the kinsmen of the Bihari Muslim;s killed in Jessore (per cent) weighed heavily on their minds. Thus sometime around the first or second Upto 1 acre IN= 106) 45 2 62 (22.6) 15 week of April 1971 (presumably the 1-2 = 72) began the four column deep, eight 5th) (N 45 1 61 (22.3) 15 mile long, exodus with every fanmily 2-5 (N= 124) 45 46 21 112 (40.9) taking whatever it could at the shortest 5-10 notice imaginable. (N =33) 10 30 (10-9) 13 7 evacuees testify tlhat there Many (N=4) 1 2 3 (1.1) were sympathetic Muslim Bengalis in the fringe villagyesand all along the 15? (-0 4 (N=6) 2 6(22) flight line, some of whom even shed Total 92 37 145 274 tears at their plight, helplessly witness- (per cent) (52.9) (33.6) (13.5) (100) ing a tragedv of such dimensions. Many and * Cow or bUlflock or 3 goats=1 uinit. C'alf = i' unit. Muslims provided shelter such gave them security during their flight. 36 miles on foot, was not a direction- ven miles from. Gopalganj. Thereafter, However, the evacuees, without excepless movement of the masses. There they split into small grouipsof ten and tion, were at a complete loss to explain was always a group of leaders deciding visited nearby villages, shooting, and the behaviouir of many Muslim Benthe suitability of halting points, arrang- burning houses indiscriminately. gali neighbours, with whom their relaing with the local leaders for the secuThe visits of gunboats and the intions had always been cordial, indulgrity of tlhe emigrants, and providing discriminate shooting in which Hindu ing in indiscriminate loot of whatever relief to persons who needed it, to the atid Awami League settlements were they could lay their hands on, from extent that this was possible. the favourite targets, became a frequent to cooking utensils to metal cattle the retaliation in jessore was occuirrence. For instance, the people of WVhile crockery. The more discreet vied with swift and the evacuation wholesale and Mullalkandi had to leave their village each other to assume charge of the abrupt, the Copalgani region being an by eight anii for the paddy fields with property during the absence of the Awami League stronghold and because their women and children and with owner-friend neighbour. This appeared of its defensible position, did not face food for the day. They kept themselto have been a universal phenomenon. any intervention for some time. T'he ves submerged under paddy standing (The exodus must have had a tremendous Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) had 3 feet high, in knee-deep mud water, demonstration effect both on those who established a training centre and was and returned homne only after dusk. the country to be rid of wanted preparing for -a showdown with the They would then hold a meeting with Hindus, and on the Hindus themselves.) Pakistan army. The fear that the army the village leadership and take stock reprisals on them would be all the more of the situation. They kept on playing The flight Xwas characterised by stray incidents of anti-social elernents severe due to the hospitality accorded this terrifying hide-and-seek game for trying to loot or abduct women. That td the Mukti Bahini, prompted some a fortnight. It was only when the Bengali elders to meet the neighbouring Muslims of Nijra village Muslim is why the women were put in the middle columns flanked on both sides Mtislim Leagtue leacder (also a Bengali) expressed helplessness in giving them by males. A number of volunteers, wlho had earlier suffered a crushing security and some of them turned youths from the Awami League and defeat at the polls but who was now Razakars and directed the army to school teachers, served as Pathachalaks enijoying the protection of the army. villages and homes which had to be (guides). They rendered invaluable The leader assured them that if they destroyed, and when the neighbouiring service to the scared refugees. In this were able to remove the Mukti Bahini village of Tentulia was burnt and human flood, husbands got separated from there they would be safe or else machine gunned, that they decided to from wives, and parents lost track of danger was imminent. The Mukti Ba- leave for-India - a decision made colchildren, but the evacuees took care of hini iTn deference to the wishes of the lectively for the entire village. withdrew to some unknown such problems and the volunteers tried people, trekked 150 miles, crossing They place. This was to let loose a strategy to be of help in such matters. three rivers (Madhumati, Naboganga At a place called Baghachora, they of terrorism. and Kapathakka)to reach India in ten In the first week of May, the armny had their first encounter Nvith the days. Once again the same pattern newly constituted Peace Committee made its first appearance. The soldiers of looting by the Muslims of the neighwhich had set up a picket there. Thle came on a gunboat, stationed it at bouring village(s) was reported. Manikda station at three am and then Committee collected Re oine, per head, The central point to be noted is that Rs five per bicycle and Rs ten per marched on to Gopalgani at seven a m cart, and disarmed theni of (a distance of one mile), looted the the uprootment of the Hindus was not bullock was anything with the remotest suggestion bank, destroyed the Awami League sporadic. The decision to emigrate agriculturi.al offices and set fire to the houses of the collective, taken by the leadership of of lethal value, including party supporters. They burnt the near- the Hindu community. This decision, implements and bamboo staffs. The four day flight covering about by Boltola Hat (biweekly market), se- again, was taken only when the Mus-

368

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WIEKLY lim comnmunitywas compelled to delink its ties or comnmon social bonds with the Hindus. This observation acquires added importance in view of tne fact that in the case of at least onievillage that I visited, where HinduMuslim ties were strong, the village tide(d over the stori in spite of similar kinds of terrorism by the Razakars and the armny. Also there were many instances of Hindus in predominantly Muslim villages remaining undisturbed. This gives rise to certain basic ques-

March 2, 1974

tions like: (a) Is such a delinking of a ties between the two commnunities resultonly of the state's coercivepower, and so is the case mentioned above exceptional? (b) Do these happenings also provide a basis for studying between the natureof social integration the two communities? Finally, it is clear that the policy of was to upthe martiallaw government ioot the Hindus, not to eliminate or them,and in this they seernexterminate ed to have succeededadmirably.

However, it needs to be underscored that my respondents were all Hindus and their manner of uprootment is only relevant to two small regions. It does not include the situation faced by the uprooted Muslims, nor does it include the Bengali Muslim - Bengali Hindu interaction in contexts different from those described above. Therefore caution should be exercised not to extend the generalisations beyond the boundaries of this study.

(To be Continued)

On

'Welfarismn

vs

'RadicalismX in
Pranab K Bardhan

Planning

In a polity like ours, the planner cannot be a mere technical adviser. He is an integral part of the, political process. In his capacity as a planner, he has two basic options. One is the easy way out of essentially playing the game as the politicians want hin to and of providing: them the opportunity to wrap their designs with the respectability of his technical expertise. The other option is ultimately that of exposure. The planner can translate the radical slogans of the political lead.ership into concrete programmes, sharply differentiate them from assorted gimmicks (like nationalisation), leave little scope for endogenous failures to be blamed on weather gods, Arab sheikhs or CIA agents, and in general spell out the hard choices and unpleasant policy implications in clear corcrete details easily recognisable by the public, so that the next time around it is slightly more difficutlt for the leaders to get away with the slogans, or to unanimously approve of the Plan in the party or in caNnet meetings and -then merrily go about flouting its priorities when it comes to action on detailed programmes. Such a planner's tenure may be necessarily brief, but he should uttilise this time towards building pressure groups for the constituency of the uzzorganised poor. Effective redistribution cannot come from voluntary abdication by the top, it has to be bargained for, and, if ner,essary, grabbed by the bottom. There is no substitute for the countervailing power of massive organisatikn of the poor. On the long and arduous road towards that go.7l, the planner's mc y only be a didactic role, raising the level of public edtcation and consciousness and improving the ability of the poor to see through the empty slogans dished out by the rich.
TIHE coldl days of Decemnberand Janiiary in Delhi this year became particularly bitter as one sadly watched the bizarre antics and rituals of the cannibalistic tribe of economists and assorted journalists over the Draft Fifth FiveYear Plan. The level of public discussion reached an all-time low. One could criticise the Plan only at the risk of inviting volleys of slander from the press of the ruling party and of its various lackeys. Agents of MacNamara or other supernational (or 'supernatural) authorities wetre unearthed and characters were merrily assassinated accompanilackeys. Agents of McNamara or socialism. While the critics of the Plan were mostly at the receiving end of the vicious public attacks, they in turn were often blaming the planners for the manuirous failures of the other branches of the government. None of them was prepared to provide a fully workecl-out anid viable alternative schemneand there were some wvho, wvhile being quite generous in their admiration for somne of the earlier Plans and their architects, w-ere indiscriminately miaking unchariin tal)le remarks about a Plan wvhich its basic structure is not all that different from those earlier Plans. If one brushes asidle all the frothy rhetoric, the venom of personal animosities and the mumbo-jumbo of moreThose wvhosupport such transfer programmes as a crucial part of what should be the l)asic strategy of planning are essentially extending the liberalFabian idea of a Welfare State in the context of a very poor country like ours; fre(luently they find allies in the advocates of Gandhian programmes of ruiraldevelopment. Needless to say, the supporters of these programmes encompass a much larger set of people than those adhering to liberal or Gandhian one commitments, socialist-than-thou would find that there are a few substan- ideas of welfare socialism. As oppostive issues regarding the basic approach. ed to these ideas stands the current planning orthodoxy in India by which to redistributive planning which need steel-cement-fertiliser-power-transmulch more serious debate. One such. the isstie relates to the desirability andi port comiiplexforms the core of the feasibility of redistribution through inas- Plan and various welfare and essentially programmes reemiploymiient-genierating sive programmes of direct transfers to main at the periphery. Both sides the poor in the form of provisions of essential consumer goods (public and. emphasise the need for curbing luxury and private), welfare services and mainly constumnption both are by and large agreedl on the prior political postulates public projects. ernployinent-gencrating
269