X,
X
= mean and variance of X
~
X = estimation of X
X
i
= inertial position of aircraft i expressed as the
vector [ x
i
y
i
z
i
|
T
(i =1, 2)
x
i
k
= sample i for state x
k
at discrete time k
z
1:k
= measurement history up to time k
= angular acceleration
X
i
= baseline vector between secondary antenna i
and primary antenna on the same airplane
= carrier wavelength
(i)
(j)
= geometric range
!
(j)
= angular velocity of aircraft j expressed as the
vector {!
x
; !
y
; !
z
]
T
()
(i)
(j)
= parameter about aircraft j associated with
Global Positioning System satellite i
I. Introduction
T
HE current midair collision avoidance systemuses range-based
sensors such as primary surveillance radar, secondary surveil-
lance radar, and a trafc alert and collision avoidance system
(TCAS). TCAS provides distance measurements, altitude informa-
tion, etc., between airplanes. However, the current TCAS cannot
provide full three-dimensional information [1]. Great benets are
achievable from the Global Positioning System (GPS) such as
accuracy and coverage with minimum system size. One negative
aspect of the current TCAS is the number of unnecessary alarms [i.e.,
false alarms (FAs) and unnecessary resolution advisories (RAs) [2]].
Because FAinduces RA, and the RAcan induce a conict, the FAcan
become as risky as miss alarms (MAs).
Collision detection algorithms using GPS have been studied, but
they are based only on GPS code information [3,4]. The GPS code
estimates of position can be used for level-ight airplanes, but
carrier-phase (CP)-based navigation systems are essential to meet the
Received 29 January 2009; revision received 12 April 2009; accepted for
publication 12 April 2009. Copyright 2009 by the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. All rights reserved. Copies of this paper
may be made for personal or internal use, on condition that the copier pay the
$10.00 per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood
Drive, Danvers, MA 01923; include the code 0021-8669/09 and $10.00 in
correspondence with the CCC.
(i)
(j)
=
(i)
(j)
N
(i)
(j)
S
(i)
c(t
(j)
T
(i)
)
I
(i)
(j)
Tr
(i)
(j)
mp
(i)
(j)
(i)
(j)
(2)
To construct measurements between two antennas, each absolute
measurement in Eqs. (1) and (2) is differenced. The common errors in
the measurements are assumed to be canceled out by differencing
between the measurement equations, but uncommon errors, such as
noise and multipath error, cannot be canceled out.
If the baseline between antennas is long (100300 km), the
ionospheric and tropospheric delay errors cannot be considered as
common errors between antennas. Corrections to these errors can be
made if we assume that the ionospheric and tropospheric delay errors
are modeled as a Klobuchar model and Hopeld model, respectively,
and can therefore be eliminated or ignored [8].
Multipath error has a major effect on degrading the accuracy in CP
GPS positioning estimation and on the success of nding the correct
integer ambiguity for the integer-ambiguity-resolution algorithms.
The multipath error is usually modeled as a sinusoidal oscillation. If
the geometry between GPS satellites and reector does not change
quickly, the multipath error appears as a bias over short time periods.
To simulate the effect of the multipath error on the PF estimates,
we introduce a bias to represent the multipath error to the CP
measurements.
B. Difference Operation
For the short-baseline case (i.e., the baseline length is less than
100 km), many errors such as S
(i)
, c(t
(1)
T
(i)
), I
(i)
(1)
, and Tr
(i)
(1)
in the
observation in Eqs. (1) and (2) are considered to be a common error
associated with both antennas and assumed to be eliminated or
reduced by double-difference (DD) operation. In DD, the measure-
ments for twoantennas fromone satellite are subtracted, and then that
measurement for two satellites is again subtracted. The DD
measurements for the code and CP between antennas 1 and 2 and
GPS satellites i and j are dened as
Vp
(ij)
(12)
(p
(i)
(2)
p
(j)
(1)
(p
(i)
(2)
p
(i)
(1)
) ~Vp
(ij)
(12)
VMp
(ij)
(12)
Vn
(ij)
(12)
(3)
2078 HWANG AND SPEYER
V
(ij)
(12)
~V
(ij)
(12)
VN
(ij)
(12)
Vmp
(ij)
(12)
V
(ij)
(12)
(4)
E[Vn
(ij)
(12)
| =E[V
(ij)
(12)
| =0 (5)
where E[| represents the expectation.
The measurements equation in the vector form for all visible GPS
satellites i and j in common can be rearranged as
VP =[ Vp
(12)
(12)
Vp
(23)
(12)
Vp
(n
s
1n
s
)
(12)
|
T
V=[ V
(12)
(12)
V
(23)
(12)
V
(n
s
1n
s
)
(12)
|
T
(6)
cov [VP| =
P
; cov[V| =
(7)
where cov[| represents the covariance operator.
Equation (4) has the DD ambiguity term VN
(ij)
(12)
. After the DD
ambiguity is known, Eq. (4) can be used for much more precise
measurements than with the code. However, this unknown integer
ambiguity cannot be computed directly in this form, because the term
V
(ij)
(12)
is not known either. Therefore, the hypothesis tests over the
ambiguity candidates are usually employed [12].
Fromthis point on, we only use Vor Vsymbols as DDor single-
difference values, respectively, and omit the ()
(ij)
(12)
symbol.
C. Initialization
To obtain an initial position, code information is used. The
estimate of the absolute position of antenna 1 (X
1
) can be obtained by
a least-squares method using undifferenced code measurements from
Eq. (1):
P
(1)
%
(1
/
)
=A
^
X
1
n (8)
where
%
(1
/
)
=[
(1)
(1
/
)
(2)
(1
/
)
(n
s
)
(1
/
)
|
T
; A=[ H
T
1
/ 1 |
P
(1)
=[
(1)
(1
/
)
(2)
(1
/
)
(n
s
)
(1
/
)
|
T
;
^
X
1
[ X
1
c t
(1)
|
T
where X
1
is the difference between a linearization point X
1
/ and X
1
,
%
(1
/
)
is a undifferenced range vector fromX
1
/ to all GPS satellites, and
nis the vector of error terms including the common errors, multipath,
and noise. The estimation of X
1
is given as
~
X
1
=X
1
/
~
X
1
, where
~
X
1
can be obtained by the least-squares method as
[
~
X
1
~
t
(1)
|
T
=(A
T
A)
1
A
T
(P
(1)
%
(1
/
)
) (9)
For a short baseline, the estimation
~
X
1
will be taken as the true
position value for X
1
, and then the relative positioning problem
comes down to estimating the relative position between
~
X
2
and X
1
.
The initial estimation of
~
X
2
is required as an initial condition for the
PF. The DD code information can be used for the initial value of
~
X
2
:
VP V%
2
/ =A
d
X
2
Vn (10)
A
d
=[H
(2)(n
s
)
2
/ H
(1)(n
s
1)
2
/ |
T
(11)
where X
2
/ is an arbitrary linearization point for X
2
, X
2
is a relative
position between X
2
and X
2
/ , and
V%
2
/ =[ V
(12)
(12
/
)
V
(23)
(12
/
)
V
(n
s
n
s
1)
(12
/
)
|
T
Then the estimation of the position of antenna 2 by the DD code is
given by
~
X
2
=X
2
/
~
X
2
, where
~
X
2
=(A
T
d
A
d
)
1
A
T
d
1
P
(VP V%
2
/ ) (12)
The initial velocity can be computed directly from the Doppler
shift measurements:
V
(ij)
(k)
=[H
(j)
k
V
(j)
H
(i)
k
V
(i)
| [H
(i)(j)
k
V
k
|; k =1; 2
(13)
where H
(i)
k
is the direction matrix between antenna k and GPS
satellite i, V is the velocity vector, and V is the vector form for the
single-difference Doppler shift measurements of antenna k.
D. Position Sample Particle Filter
We present our approach to handling the CP integer-ambiguity-
resolving problem with the PF. More details of the constructing PF
for CP measurements are given in [11]. We denote the sampled
particles from the initial pdf of states at time k =0 as x
i
0
~p(x
0
[z
0
)
(i =1; . . . ; m
s
). Each sample x
i
k
is a 6 by 1 vector and represents a
realization of position and velocity for antenna 2, [ X
2
V
2
|, in the
ECEF coordinates. Therefore, the samples x
i
k
(i =1; . . . ; m
s
) can be
obtained by picking m
s
number of independent points in three-
dimensional position space and velocity space. The distribution of
samples can be assumed to be Gaussian or uniform. The mean is
estimated in Sec. II.C, and the variance is given by a priori statistics.
Building the likelihood pdf for the states p(z
k
[x
i
k
) is the most
important part of the PS-CP-GPS algorithm. To develop the PF
algorithm using the position space samples, consider the DD CP
measurements:
V% =V VN V (14)
where V% is the vector of the DD geometric range between
satellites and X
1
, X
2
. Equation (14) can be linearized around
~
X
2
by
using estimates in Eq. (12):
Fig. 1 Communication for data link.
HWANG AND SPEYER 2079
V%
o
A
d
X
2
=V VN V (15)
We use both the nonlinear version of the measurement equation (14)
and the linearized version of the measurement equation (15). The
given particles will be applied to the nonlinear equation (14).
Before we use the nonlinear measurements equation, an estimate
of the integer ambiguity, VN, is to be made. Consider an
annihilator E constructed from the left null space of the direction
matrix A
d
:
E =null(A
T
d
) (16)
such that E
T
A
d
=0. The notation null() denes the null space of
(). This annihilator of A
d
is not unique, but exists when the row
number of A
d
is greater than four. Multiplying E
T
on both sides of
Eq. (15) and rearranging provide
E
T
VN
L
E
T
(V%
0
V V)= (17)
Dene VN
L
as an ambiguity from the linearized measurements
from Eq. (17). Because the position-dependent term is eliminated,
Eq. (17) is independent of the position samples. However, the
ambiguity VN
L
is not integer-valued because of V. If we could
nd any integer ambiguity that is close to E
T
VN
L
when projected
by the left annihilator E
T
, then the probability of being the true
integer ambiguity is high. From Eq. (14), the integer ambiguity is
computable if V% is given. In fact, a position part of each sample x
i
can be substituted for X
2
, and therefore m
s
samples basically generate
m
s
DD ranges between X
1
and the position part of each particles x
i
k
(V%
i
). The oat ambiguity estimates for each position samples x
i
k
are computed using V%
i
from Eq. (14) as
V
~
N
i
V(%
i
) (18)
When the integer property of the ambiguity is applied, the expected
estimates of the integer ambiguities corresponding to each sample
can be obtained by rounding off as
VN
i
[V
~
N
i
|
round off
(19)
These integer-valued ambiguities are compared with the ambiguity
estimate VN
L
from the linearized equation (17). By the round-
off operation, the integer ambiguity estimate VN
i
for the ith
sample is independent of the noise under the assumption that the
summation of the DD noise V and a portion of common error
assumed to be eliminated in the DD measurements is less than
=2 (~19=2 cm: L
1
frequency CP). Because the common errors
are assumed to be ignorable in the short-baseline case, this as-
sumption holds as long as the summation of the uncommon error
(noise and multipath) does not exceed =2. However, it is not
trivial to check the magnitude of the noise and multipath in the
DD measurements. We take care of the effect of the noise and
multipath by simulation. Each sample position provides an integer
ambiguity, but only one of the integer ambiguities is the true in-
teger ambiguity, because the samples far from true position will
provide the wrong integer value.
If the noise in the measurements is assumed to be Gaussian, the
conditional pdf p(z
k
[x
i
k
) can be modeled as
p(z
k
[x
i
k
) =C
1
exp{
1
2
(r
i
)
T
(E
T
E)
1
(r
i
)] (20)
where the residual is
r
i
=E
T
(VN
i
VN
L
) (21)
In the frame of sequential importance sampling [10] PF, the update
of weight can be expressed with the given pdf of each sample in
Eq. (20) as
w
i
k
=
w
i
k1
C
1
exp{
1
2
(r
i
)
T
(E
T
E)
1
(r
i
)]
m
j=1
w
i
k1
C
1
exp{
1
2
(r
j
)
T
(E
T
E)
1
(r
j
)]
(22)
The expectation of the position at time k with the sequentially
updated weights in Eq. (22) can be obtained as
E[(x
k
)| =
m
s
i=1
(x
i
k
)w
i
k
(23)
Finally, samples x
i
k1
drawn according to the importance density
q(x
k1
[x
i
k
; z
1:k
) =p(x
k1
[x
i
k
)
can be used for evaluating the weight of particles at time k 1 using
Eq. (22) for the resampling step of the PF.
E. Precise PF Position Estimates Results
A simulation was implemented for evaluating the estimates of the
relative position of airplanes in ight in the vicinity of Los Angeles
International Airport. The basis for our experiments was a sequence
of GPS satellite positions and a sequence of simulated positions of
two airplanes communicating with each other. The orbit tracks of the
GPS satellites were obtained from the International GNSS Service
for 19 November 2007.
r
z
_ r
z
_
r
_ r
_
X
12
;
X12
); V
i
~N(
V
12
;
V12
) (29b)
The mean and variances of the relative position and velocity
estimation can be obtained from the PF described in Sec. II.
The UPR at t
c
can be propagated using the particles in Eq. (29) as
R
UPR
(t
c
) ={X
i
(t); i =1; . . . ; m
s
; t {t
c
; t
c
Tau]] (30)
with the simple dynamics for the constant velocity,
_
X
i
(t
c
) =V
i
(t
c
)
and
_
V
i
(t
c
) =0. The detection of potential collisions are
implemented by monitoring the probability of collision. The
probability of collision can be estimated by the overlapped area
between the UPR of the intruder and the SRTof own A/C as [19]
pr (t
c
) =
_
X(t)SRT
p(X)dX = E[c(f(X(t)))| (31a)
t [t
c
; t
c
Tau|; c(f(X(t))) =
_
1 if f(X(t)) SRT
0 if f(X(t)) = SRT
(31b)
where f(X(t)) is the UPR during time period t, which is approxi-
mated by R
UPR
(t
c
) in Eq. (30). The probability of collision can be
approximated by the particles for UPRusing a MCapproximation as
pr(t
c
) =
1
m
s
m
s
i=1
c(R
UPR
(t
c
)) (32)
and the alarm for collision is given at time t
c
if pr(t
c
) is greater than
the designed threshold probability ".
3. Monte Carlo Simulation in Constant-Velocity Flight
The numerical experiments are implemented to analyze the
condition and performance of both the TCAS II and TCAS IV with
respect to the relative velocity and CPAin case the velocity vectors of
own A/C and intruder A/C are a constant vector.
In the MCsimulation, the collision tests involve the monitoring of
the predicted tracks of neighboring intruders around own A/C that
are statically located around the origin in the relative domain. Alarge
number of trials between two A/C are performed. Each trial is
characterized by relative velocity and CPA. The CPA of the trials are
distributed uniformly with distances between 0 and 22,000 ft, where
the FA can possibly occur. The magnitude of the relative velocity is
distributed uniformly between 5 and 900 kt. One trial of the MC
simulation proceeds in three steps.
1) An intruder begins to approach with a constant relative velocity.
2) As an intruder A/Capproaches gradually, each detection system
checks the collision using tests given in Eq. (25) for a low-relative-
speed intruder, Eqs. (26) and (27) for a TCAS II detection system,
and Eq. (28) for TCAS IV.
3) If an intruder cannot pass the tests, the detection system gives a
warning. When an intruder reaches a predesigned CPA without the
collision warning, one trial ends. We assume that the navigation
information can be communicated at every computation time (i.e.,
1 s) without delay in the nonterminal area. In the terminal area, the
update of navigation information may be delayed, but effects of the
delay in dense trafc areas is beyond the scope of this paper.
The MC simulation results, shown in Fig. 4 (left), indicate that a
large number of FAs are given with regard to TCAS II. The circle,
cross, and dot symbols represent no alarm for no collision, false
alarm for no collision, and correct alarm for collision, respectively.
The DMOD line shows the horizontal-miss-distance safety thres-
hold. Because the DMOD is much larger than the altitude threshold,
the intruder can pass by above or below the own airplane without
crossing the SRT. The FArate increases for trials in which the relative
Fig. 4 False alarm zone for TCAS II (left) and III (right).
HWANG AND SPEYER 2083
velocity is higher than 100 kt, because the estimated HMD increases
for the velocity higher than 100 kt. The condition of possible FA can
be observed fromFig. 4 (left). For example, when the relative closure
rate is 400 kt, the TCAS II may generate a FA associated with an
intruder passing by with a miss distance between 400 ft (altitude
threshold) and 9500 ft.
The FA for TCAS IV is plotted in Fig. 4 (right). The simulation
environment is identical to TCAS II system experiments. The
position accuracy used for generating the collision UPR are 3 cm
(~0:1 ft) rms for CP, and the velocity accuracy used is 3 cm=s
(6 ft=m). The symbols in Fig. 4 (right) are the same as the TCAS II
case. The FA takes place only around the nearby SRT of own A/C.
Note that the conditions of the FA for the TCAS IVare affected only
by the uncertainty of estimated relative position and estimated
relative velocity, but not by the relative velocity itself. However, the
FA rate of TCAS II detection is affected by the miss distance and
relative velocity.
4. Probability of False Alarm in MC Simulation
Estimating the FA rate by the ratio of the number of FA
occurrences to the number of MC trial time varies according to the
distribution of the CPAof the intruders course. In other words, if the
CPA of each trial are distributed densely around the PV with the
given number of total MCtrials, a lower FArate is expected, because
many trials will end up with a true collision event. Therefore, to
determine the probability of FAs independently of the distribution of
the CPA, the results of all trials are classied according to their miss
distance.
If the relative velocity range is limited between 5 and 900 kt, the
FA for TCAS II can occur within the range of about 11,000 feet, as
shown in Fig. 4. Therefore, we are interested in the CPAs of trials
distributed within the range of 15,000 ft to the own A/C. The miss
distance is divided into 30 bins, and each bin covers 500 ft. The FA
probability of the bth bin is approximated separately as
pr(FA(b)) =
1
m
b
m
b
bi=1
c(X
bi
) (33)
where
c(X
bi
) =
_
1 if X
bi
= FA
0 if X
bi
FA
b =1; . . . ; 30 (15,000/500), m
b
is the number of trials ending up
with an alarmin the bth bin, and X
bi
is the results of the ith trial in the
bth bin. The estimation of the probability is carried out separately for
each bin, and the probability of FA for each bin pr(FA(b))) in
Eq. (33) is not dependent on the total number of trials or the
distribution of the CPA. The probability of FA for each system is
estimated from MC simulation using Eq. (33). The probabilities of
FA estimated in Eq. (33) for the TCAS IV system and TCAS II
system are shown in Fig. 5. Table 2 shows the bin numbers (relative
distances) in which the FA probability is almost zero. The trends in
the FAprobability are not monotonic, because the shape of the SRTis
not a sphere (DMOD ; altitude threshold). For GPS CP, the
intruder passing by own A/Cwithin 100 ft has a higher than 40% FA
probability. However, this FA probability is not made in the most
realistic setting, because the body is assumed to be a point and the
actual size of the body is not considered in this simulation.
B. Maneuvering Flight
When the own airplane encounters an intruder approaching near
the airport terminal area, the approaching trajectory has some
curvature in either the vertical or horizontal direction or both. In that
case, the future trajectory cannot be represented by only the current
position and velocity. One example of the limitation of the UPR or
HMD lter with a constant velocity for a parallel approach is shown
in Fig. 6. The collision may not be detected in time at points 1, 2, and
3. Instead, the curvature of the approaching A/C should be predicted
more precisely with 3-D attitude and angular velocity information.
Therefore, the collision avoidance systemshould be analyzed for the
case in which the approach trajectory of the own and intruder is not
limited by the constant-velocity assumption and the own and intruder
are able to change their forwarding speed and direction in either the
horizontal or vertical direction or both. As mentioned at the
beginning of Sec. III, the ADSB collision detection system and the
TCASII and TCASIVare considered. When the ight motion of A/C
is coupled in both the horizontal and vertical directions, the future
trajectory for the ADSB system is predicted by the heading and turn
rates, whereas the TCAS IVuses 3-D attitude and angular velocity,
which is used to predict the 3-D maneuvering ight trajectory.
1. TCAS II Collision Detection
The TCAS II collision detection for maneuvering trajectories uses
tests similar to the constant-ight assumption. However, the HMD
lter in Eq. (27) cannot be used, because the HMD estimation is
based on one-dimensional range, and the change in the range
(the HMD estimate) does reect the change of velocity vector in
3-D. Therefore, the applicable tests for the TCASII are only Eqs. (25)
and (26).
2. TCAS IV
System faults or human error can cause large deviation from the
intended trajectory. It is especially important when the intruder
approaches from a close parallel trajectory, as shown in Fig. 6. This
situation should be detected as soon as possible. Attitude information
(Appendix A) can be used effectively to predict this type of future
trajectory.
As stated, the GPS CP measurements of the intruder are assumed
to be transmitted to own ship as well as the attitude parameters
represented by the Euler angles Eu =[ | and angular veloc-
ity !. Then the position and velocity states of intruder in navigation
frames X
2;N
and V
2;N
and the coordinate transition matrix mapping a
vector from a body frame to a navigation frame A(Eu) are estimated
using the CP measurements. The estimated state information of own
A/C (i.e., A/C 1) is available at any time, whereas the information
of A/C 2 is available only through broadcasting. Therefore, the ac-
curacy of the UPR during the projected time is critically dependent
on the timeliness and accuracy of information from A/C 2. We
assume that the states of A/C 1 are available instantly and are treated
as a true value. The transmitted data from A/C 2 determine the
Fig. 5 Probability of false alarmfor GPS-based and TCAS II detection
system.
Table 2 Probability of FA for TCAS IV (code, CP) and
TCAS II (300=600=900 kt)
Bin number
a
1 8 19
TCAS IV: CP, % 20 1 0
TCAS IV: code, % 41 4 0
TCAS II, % 100 82 8
a
The relative distances is bin 500 ft.
2084 HWANG AND SPEYER
uncertainty of the projected trajectory. The particles approximating
the states of A/C 2 are
UPR
i
(t
c
) =[ X
i
V
i
Eu
i
!
i
|; i =1; . . . ; m
s
(34)
X
i
N
~N(
X
2;N
;
X(2;N)
); V
i
B
~N(
V
2;B
;
V2;B
) (35)
Eu
i
~N(Eu;
Eu
); !
i
~N( !
2
;
!2
) (36)
where the mean and variance values can be obtained by the CP-GPS-
PF navigation system as addressed in Secs. II and IVand in [11].
To properly represent the projected future trajectory, the UPR is
propagated according to the available information, including the
attitude parameter and angular velocity, the equations of motion for
A/C 1 and A/C 2, as
_
X
1;N
_
V
1;B
_
Eu
1
_
_
_
_
=
A(Eu
1
) V
1;B
!
1
V
1;B
C(Eu
1
) !
1
_
_
_
_
;
_
X
i
2;N
_
V
i
2;B
_
Eu
i
_
_
_
_
_ =
A(Eu
i
) V
i
2;B
!
i
V
i
2;B
C(Eu
i
) !
i
_
_
_
_
(37)
where
C(Eu
1
) =
1 st tc
0 c s
0 ssec csec
_
_
_
_
(38)
A(Eu
1
) =
cc scs cs scc ss
sc ccs ss ccc sc
ss ss c
_
_
_
_
(39)
X
1;N
is the position of A/C 1 in the navigation frame, V
1;B
is the
velocity of A/C1 in the body frame, Eu are the Euler angles of A/C1,
and A is the transition matrix mapping a vector from the body frame
to the navigation frame. The angular velocity is assumed to be
constant duringrelative trajectory tracking. The Euler angles are used
for orientation and are consistent with the navigation message.
The UPR for the relative trajectory at time t
c
is approximated as
R
UPR
(t
c
) ={X
i
2;N
(t) X
1;N
(t); i =1; . . . ; m; t [t
c
; t
c
Tau|]
(40)
Once R
i
UPR
(t
c
) is computed, it is propagated up to R
i
UPR
(t
c
Tau)
and the UPR is updated by Eqs. (3440) whenever new information
from A/C 2 is available. The collision test is given by Eq. (32).
3. ADSB-Based Collision Detection in Maneuvering Flight
When a maneuvering intruder approaches, the ADSB detection
system differs from the TCAS IV in that only the horizontal ight
direction and the change in its direction are available. However, the
TCAS IVis capable of transmitting 3-Dattitude and angular velocity
information. In this section, the collision detection system, based on
the information assumed to follow the RTCA/DO-242A [14] for its
data protocol, is discussed for a maneuvering approach trajectory.
It is assumed that yawangle and the z-axis angular velocity can be
used for heading and turn rate. This assumption is valid when the
sideways velocity in the y axis of the body frame (i.e., sideslip) is
small relative to the oncoming airow. The equation of motion of A/
C1 is identical to that given in Eq. (37). When the ADSBinformation
of A/C 2 (i.e., position, velocity, , and !
2;z
) are received, the
kinematic equations of motion for A/C 2 can be obtained as
_ n
2
_ e
2
_
d
2
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
=
cos() v
2;x
sin() v
2;y
sin() v
2;x
cos() v
2;y
v
2;d
!
2;z
!
2;z
_
_
_
_
_
_
(41)
where the position of A/C 2 in the navigation frame is given as
X
2;N
=[ n
2
e
2
d
2
|
T
; the velocity in the navigation frame and in
the body frame are [ v
2;n
v
2;e
v
2;d
|
T
and [ v
2;x
v
2;y
v
2;z
|
T
,
respectively; and !
2;z
is a variation in the z-axis angular velocity. In
fact, the turn rate
_
in Eq. (41) is affected not only by heading rate,
but also by bank angle. When the A/Chas a nonzero bank angle, this
bank angle cause a variation of the horizontal trajectory. The varia-
tion of !
2;z
from the bank angle can be written as !
2;
=
g=[V
2
[ tan(), where g is the gravitational force, and [V
2
[ is the norm
of the velocity vector of the A/C2. When we consider the estimation
error in the transmitted angular velocity as !
2;z
, the total variation of
angular velocity by the bank angle effect and angular velocity error
becomes !
2;z
=!
2;z
!
2;
. The horizontal UPR of the ADSB
collision detection system is shown with a solid line in Fig. 7. For
practical reasons, the UPRfor the ADSBsystemis approximated and
described by a dotted line in Fig. 7, and we restrict the maximum
value of the bank angle (max [[) to 35 deg. Then the angle of the
approximated ADSB UPR generated from the variation of !
2;z
is [3]
=atan
_
1 cos([!
2;z
[ Tau
sin([!
2;z
[ Tau)
_
(42)
The collision test for both own and intruder can be made in the
horizontal and vertical directions independently by
Fig. 6 Limitation of constant-velocity-based UPR.
Fig. 7 UPR of ADSB collision detection system.
HWANG AND SPEYER 2085
[X
12;hor
V
12;hor
Tau[ DMOD; [d
12
v
12;d
Tau[
altitude threshold atan
_
v
12;e
v
12;n
_
atan
_
v
12;e
v
12;n
_
(43)
where X
12;hor
=[ n
12
e
12
|
T
, V
12;hor
=[ v
12;n
v
12;e
|
T
,
=atan(e
12
=n
12
), and ()
12
=()
2
()
1
.
4. MC Simulation For Maneuvering Flight
A simulation is implemented to analyze FA and MA probabilities
when the ight trajectory is not straight and level. The simulation
allows the airplane to change the attitude and angular velocity so that
the approach trajectory between own and intruder can reect realistic
encounters. The rms errors in Table A1 are used for the errors in the
Euler angles and the angular velocity estimates. The process of
simulation for each trial is similar to that of the constant-velocity case
in Sec. III.A.3.
1) Both an intruder and own airplane begin to approach with a
constant relative velocity. The magnitude of the velocity of each A/C
is distributed uniformly between 50 and 400 kt.
2) The own airplane predicts the UPR using Eqs. (3440) for
TCAS IVand using Eqs. (41) and (42) for the ADSB-based system.
3) Either own or intruder or both start to make a turn with an
angular velocity !
1
for the own airplane and !
2
for the intruder at
t
turn
seconds before both reaching the CPA, where t
turn
is uniformly
distributed between 5 and 30 s; !
i
(i =1, or 2) for three directions in
the body frame are distributed uniformly in [0:1; 0:1| deg =s.
4) As the intruder A/C approaches or becomes more distant by
gradually turning, each detection system checks the collision using
tests given in Eqs. (25) and (26) for TCAS II, the test in Eq. (43) for
ADSB-based, and the test in Eq. (32) for TCAS IVat each current
time t
c
.
5) If an intruder cannot pass one of any the tests, the corresponding
detection system gives a warning. When the distance rate to the
intruder turns positive without a collision warning, the trial ends.
6) After a number of MCtrials are nished, the probabilities of FA
and MA for each system are estimated by Eq. (33).
When both own and intruder approaches are maneuvering, the FA
and MA rates are determined by a combination of several factors
such as miss distance, relative velocity, turn rate, turning point, data
link update frequency, etc. Therefore, the FA and MA zones cannot
be characterized as in the constant-velocity case shown in Fig. 4.
Table 3 shows the FA and MA rates for a MC simulation with over
30,000 trials. In the maneuvering ight, the FAprobability represents
a ratio of the unnecessary alarmover the total number of alarms. A4-
sigma (99.99%) standard deviation is used for the error of the CP-
based position and velocity estimates in the simulation for TCAS IV
to ensure reliability. As a result, no MA occurred during simulation,
whereas the FA rate is increased.
Even though the SRT test in Eq. (25) of TCAS II generates high
FAs, the test is essential to avoid the MAwith regard to low-relative-
velocity A/C. The reason for the increase in the FAprobability for the
TCAS II in Table 3 is that the HMD lter is not used for the
maneuvering ight. The ADSB-based system has a MA with a
0.004% probability. This event occurs when the navigation message
at discrete time t
k1
predicts a distance that is very close to the PV
when in straight and level ight, but at time t
k
, the intruder makes a
steep turn and touches or passes through the boundary of the PVof
the own airplane. However, the collision avoidance system cannot
detect this contact until time t
k1
, because the information is assumed
to be transmitted at 0.5 Hz. This situation cannot be avoid by more
accurate navigation data, but by a faster message update rate. To
avoid MA occurrence, airplanes in the close vicinity should transmit
the ADS-Bmessages to eachother with a higher communication rate.
IV. Conclusions
Anewrobust and practical approach for estimating the navigation
states using CP (carrier phase) is addressed, and a CP-GPS-based
airborne collision detection system is presented for the next-
generation air trafc alert and collision avoidance system. The CP-
GPS-based collision detection system (TCAS IV) is compared with
the current TCAS (TCAS II) system and the ADSB-based collision
detection system. The FA (false alarm) and MA (miss alarm) prob-
abilities of each collision detection system are determined through
MC (Monte Carlo) simulations.
The PF approach is used for the GPS CP navigation estimation
problem to handle the integer ambiguity problem. The samples are
drawn from the 3-D position space coordinates, and so the GPS CP
navigation system is insensitive to changes of the available GPS
satellites and cycle slips. Therefore, the position-sample-based PF is
more robust in realistic operations than the traditional integer-
ambiguity-resolution-based CP algorithms. Furthermore, the PS-
CP-GPS can combine the geometry of multiple antennas directly into
the attitude determination for additional redundancy and fast
convergence performance.
To take full advantage of GPS CP measurements in the collision
detection system, we assume that the information transmitted by the
collision detection system includes the GPS CP measurements,
rather than transmitting only estimated navigation states. In doing so,
two major benets are addressed: accuracy and redundancy.
1) Because of the inaccuracy of the current TCAS II, the TCAS II
detection system is not used when precise navigation and detection
are required. For example, TCAS II does not issue advisories for the
intruders for which the altitude is lower than 360 ft and is therefore
not usually used for the landing or takeoff phases [2]. The relative
position and velocity between one antenna on own airplane and
another antenna on the intruder were estimated as accurately with a
mean and rms errors of relative position less than 1 cm (0.15 ft) and
2.1 cm (0.32 ft), respectively. Therefore, the CP-GPS-based (with
PS-CP-GPS PF) collision detection system can provide an accurate
collision detection method.
2) Because the accuracy of the GPS CP relative position estimates
is not susceptible tothe accuracyof the absolute position estimates by
the code, the GPS CP collision detection system provides inde-
pendent redundant information in addition to the GPS code-based
detection.
The prediction of the intruders trajectory can be made based on the
estimated navigation states. As noted, the attitude and angular
velocity of the intruder are estimated by the GPS navigation system
of each airplane and transmitted to other airplanes as well as CP
measurements. Then the relative position and velocity of own to the
intruder are estimated based on the transmitted CP measurements
from the intruder. The error in the navigation states introduces a
variation in the predicted trajectory. If an intruder approaches with a
constant velocity on a collision course, both the TCAS II and
TCAS IV (CP) can detect the intruder with 100% probability.
However, TCAS II and TCAS IVgenerate 31.6 and 1.3%probability
of a FA in the same MC simulation, respectively. When the intruder
and own airplane approach with a curved maneuvering trajectory, the
TCAS IVpredicts the trajectory using the attitude information of the
own and intruder to predict the future trajectory more precisely. The
TCAS IV shows less than a 23% (0%) probability of FA (MA),
whereas the TCAS II and the ADSB-based system show about 75%
(0%) and 74% (0.004%) probabilities of a FA (MA), respectively.
Because TCAS II or the ADSB-based system do not provide
accurate three-dimensional attitude information, these collision det-
ection systems should apply the worst-case assumptions to overcome
their limitations. Although this assumption is required for a zero-
miss alarmrate, a large number of unnecessary alarms are inevitable.
Table 3 FA/MA probability comparison (30,000 trials)
FA
a
MA
a
FA
b
MA
b
TCAS II, % 31.638 0 74.921 0
TCAS IV
c
, % 1.332 0 22.349 0
ADSB, % 73.585 0.004
a
Constant velocity.
b
Maneuvering.
c
GPS CP.
2086 HWANG AND SPEYER
Therefore, transmitting the attitude information as well as the CP
measurements for precise position and velocity estimates between
nearby airplanes can enhance the precise tracking of the approach
trajectory for reliable collision detection and decrease FA rates
signicantly.
Appendix A: Attitude Determination
I. Baseline Vector Estimation in Position Coordinate Space
Consider the relative position from the primary antenna (i.e.,
antenna 1) to the secondary antennas (i.e., antenna i, where
i =1; . . . ; n
B
) on the body of own airplane in the inertial frame X
i
.
Each secondary antenna provides one baseline vector. When the
body rotates with the angular velocity and no other external source of
the angular velocity is assumed, the angular velocity should be
included in the state as well. The baseline vectors and the angular
velocity are considered in augmented states as
X
a
[ X
1
X
2
X
n
B
!| (A1)
The dimension of X
a
in Eq. (A1) is 3 (n
B
1) by 1.
If it is assumed that the body is rigid and the antennas geometry in
the body frame is known, X
a
can be simplied. For example,
suppose that the GPS antennas are arranged as an orthogonal tripod.
Then the geometry relationship among the baseline vectors can be
written as
[X
1
[ =[X
2
[ =[X
3
[ =b (A2a)
X
1
X
2
=X
1
X
3
=0 (A2b)
X
3
=X
1
X
2
(A2c)
If three components of the rst baseline vector X
1
=[x
1
; y
1
; z
1
|T
are given, only two components of X
2
are required to express X
2
and the other baseline vectors X
i
(i =3; . . . ; n
B
). For example, we
additionally pick x
2
and y
2
for X
2
, then X
2
and X
3
can be
expressed as
X
2
=b
X
2
[X
2
[
(A3)
where
X
2
={ x
2
y
2
z
2
]
T
=
_
x
2
y
2
x
1
x
2
y
1
y
2
z
1
_
T
X
3
=b
X
3
[X
3
[
(A4)
where
X
3
=X
1
X
2
In this way, the augmented state X
a
=[ X
1
; X
2
; X
3
; !|
T
can be expressed by only ve parameters (x
1
, y
1
, z
1
, x
2
, and y
2
)
and the angular velocity of the body !. This simplication holds for
arbitrary but known antenna geometry. The simplied state is written
as
~
X
a
=[ x
1
y
1
z
1
x
2
y
2
!
T
|
T
(A5)
The augmented state X
a
is now a function of the simplied
augmented state
~
X
a
. Consequently, the estimate of n
B
baseline
vectors reduces to estimating eight parameters in the simplied
augmented state. Both X
a
and
~
X
a
can be used to represent the
baseline vectors. Note that the ambiguity-based algorithms make use
of the baseline distance, whereas the position sample PFmakes use of
not only the baseline distance, but also the geometries between
antennas.
In the attitude determination using the PF, the pdf of the state is
approximated using the kinematic equation (A6) and the n
B
-
augmented CPmeasurements equation (A7). The baseline vectors on
the rigid body rotate with the body frame. The rate of change of the
state is given as
_
X
a
=
V
_ _
=
V
1
V
2
.
.
.
V
nB
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
=
! X
1
! X
2
.
.
.
! X
nB
_ !
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
(A6)
Noweach particle is sampled to represent
~
X
a
, which represents the
full state X
a
. Because
~
X
a
has only eight independent parameters for
the n
B
baseline vectors, each sample has eight dimensions. The initial
samples for the state can be drawn from the initial estimates by the
code measurements. The details of initial baseline estimation by the
code and Doppler measurements are discussed in Sec. II. The number
of independent samples m
s
at time k =0 is obtained by picking m
s
independent and identically distributed samples distributed uni-
formly. Note that the A/Cin this paper starts ina constant vector ight
mode and the initial ! used is [ 0; 0; 0 |
T
. Then each particle for
the simplied augmented states X
i
a
can be obtained from corre-
sponding particle
~
X
i
a
using the relationships in Eqs. (A3) and (A4).
The augmented CP measurement equations for n
B
baselines is
similar to Eq. (14) as
z
k
=
V
1
V
2
.
.
.
V
n
B
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
=
V%
1
V%
2
.
.
.
V%
n
B
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
VN
1
VN
2
.
.
.
VN
n
B
_
_
_
_
_
_
V
1
V
2
.
.
.
V
n
B
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
(A7)
V=V% VN V (A8)
where V
i
, V%
i
, VN
i
, and V represent the DD CP
measurements, the DD range, DD ambiguity, and DD CP noise
vector for the ith baseline, respectively. Note that we use the same
symbols of V, V%, VN, and V for both the single-baseline
and multibaseline cases. The dimension of the vectors V, V%,
VN, and V in Eq. (A7) is n
B
(n
s
1), where n
s
is the number
of GPS satellites.
The integer ambiguity estimates for the samples for all baseline
can be obtained, similar to Eq. (18), as
VN
i
=
_
1
(V%
i
)
_
round off
; i =1; . . . ; m
s
(A9)
Similarly, the linearized CP measurement equation (15) can be
written for multibaseline vectors as
V%
o
A
m
X
a
=V VN V (A10)
where
A
m
=
A
d1
0 0 0 0
0 A
d2
0 0 0
0 0
.
.
.
0 0
0 0 0 A
dn
B
0
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
(A11)
and A
di
is the direction matrix for DD measurements of the ith
baseline. The dimension of A
di
and zeros in Eq. (A11) is (n
s
1) by
3. Because the baseline vector length is much smaller than the GPS
satellites altitude, the differences between A
di
are ignorable, and the
same A
d
dened in Eq. (11) can be used for all A
di
.
The ambiguity from the linearized measurements equation can be
computed by multiplying the null space matrix of the augmented
direction cosine matrix A
m
to Eq. (A10):
HWANG AND SPEYER 2087
E
T
m
VN
L
=E
T
m
V(%
0
)= (A12)
where
E
T
m
=diag(E
T
1
; E
T
2
; . . . ; E
T
n
B
) =diag(E
T
; E
T
; . . . ; E
T
)
E
i
is a left annihilator, which eliminated the direction matrix suchthat
E
T
i
A
di
=0. Because all A
di
are the same, E
T
i
can be replaced by
same E
T
as in Eq. (16).
The likelihood density of each sample at time k is given as
p(z
k
[X
i
k
) =C
1
exp{
1
2
(r
i
)
T
(E
T
m
VN
L
E
m
)
1
(r
i
)] (A13)
where
r
i
=E
T
m
(VN
i
VN
L
) (A14)
Finally, following the same processes as in Eqs. (20) and (23) leads to
the estimates of the state.
Once the baseline vector estimate is given in the inertial coordinate
frame, the attitude determination is considered as in Wahbas
problem[20]. Wahbas problemis to nd the orthogonal matrix A(q)
as a function of a quaternion that minimizes the loss function:
J(A) =
1
2
n
B
i=1
W
i
[X
bi
A X
i
[
2
(A15)
where the baseline vectors in the body frame are written as X
bi
(i =1; . . . ; n
B
), n
B
is the number of baseline vectors, and W
i
represents the weight. The q method in the next section is used to
estimate the quaternion among many solution suggested for Wahbas
problem in this paper, because the q method is the rst one used
practically and widely [21] and does not suffer from a singularity
problem. It is well known that the Euler angle method is not stable
when the attitude varies more than 90 deg. Therefore, the quaternion
parameters are considered during estimating and are transformed
into Euler angles for reliability.
II. q Method
The qmethod is an optimal way to estimate attitude matrix A(q) as
a function of the quaternion with n
B
2 vector observations. The
loss function in Eq. (15) can be rewritten as
J(A) =
1
2
n
B
i=1
W
i
(X
bi
A X
i
)
T
(X
bi
A X
i
) (A16a)
From the property of the transition matrix, A
T
A =I
33
. The
minimization problem of J(A) becomes that of maximizing as
max g(A) max
A
n
B
i=1
(X
T
bi
AX
i
) (A17)
where X
bi
=
W
i
_
X
bi
and X
i
=
W
i
_
X
i
.
Parameterizing A(q) with the unit quaternion q as [22]
A(q) =
2(q
2
1
q
2
4
) 1 2(q
1
q
2
q
3
q
4
) 2(q
1
q
3
q
2
q
4
)
2(q
1
q
2
q
3
q
4
) 2(q
2
2
q
2
4
) 1 2(q
2
q
3
q
1
q
4
)
2(q
1
q
3
q
2
q
4
) 2(q
2
q
3
q
1
q
4
) 2(q
2
3
q
2
4
) 1
_
_
_
_
(A18)
one solution of Wahbas problem is given as a normalized eigen-
vector associated with the largest positive eigenvalue of K, such that
g(A) =q
T
Kq (A19a)
where
K =
S I Z
Z
T
_ _
44
; Z =
B
23
B
32
B
31
B
13
B
12
B
21
_
_
_
_
(A19b)
S =B B
T
; =Tr(B) (A19c)
B [ X
b1
X
bn
B
| [ X
1
X
n
B
|
T
(A19d)
where B
ij
is the {i; j]th argument of the matrix B.
III. Simulation Results of Attitude Determination
Simulation results are presented for the attitude determination
using PS-CP-GPS PFwith multiple antennas. Four antennas are used
to estimate the attitude of an airplane on level ight. The geometries
of the antennas are the same orthogonal tripod as given in Eq. (A2),
Fig. A1 Euler error (in degrees).
Table A1 Attitude error estimate
Parameter Mean RMS
Euler, deg
a
0.0967 0.0069 0:0476 0.6810 0.4921 0.6163
Quaternion
b
0:0000 0.0002 0:0001 0.0002 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005
Angular velocity, deg/s 0.0009 0.0005 0:0002 0.0022 0.0028 0.0027
a
Roll, pitch, and yaw.
b
q1, q2, q3, and q4, deg/s.
2088 HWANG AND SPEYER
and the baseline length between antennas is 2 m (6.56 ft) for all
antennas. Other simulation inputs such as data frequency, errors in
the simulation measurements, etc., used for attitude determination
are the same as the data used in Sec. II.E. Figure A1 shows the error of
the estimated quaternion and the error of the Euler angles
transformed from the quaternion estimates. The mean error and rms
error for the Euler angles and quaternion estimates are shown in
Table A1.
Acknowledgment
This work was partially supported by NASA Ames Research
Center grant NNA06CN22A.
References
[1] Parkinson, B. W., and Spilker, J. J., Jr. (eds.), Global Positioning
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