Two Meanings of Global Citizenship: Modern and Diverse James Tully, University of Victoria The Meanings of Global Citizenship

Conference Liu Centre and Trudeau Foundation, UBC, September 9-10, 2005

I. Two contested ways of thinking about global citizenship 1. As Professors Byers and Zacher point out in their Introduction, there is a range of meanings of the phrase global citizenship and disagreement over their relative importance and appropriate use. This is to be expected. All complex political concepts with a history are what Wittgenstein called family resemblance concepts. That is, they have a range of different uses and there is not one essential feature common to each meaning, but, rather, overlapping similarities and dissimilarities among their varied uses (family resemblances). As a result, their use in particular cases is always open to contestation and reasoned disagreement. These political concepts and their corresponding institutions and practices have been fought over historically and each generation inherits the variegated semantic field of uses handed down to them and continues the struggles over their meanings, accepting some features while modifying others, in an endless process of continuity and innovation. Global citizenship is no exception and is in fact the conjunction of two deeply contested concepts. 2. Among the various meanings of global citizenship today I would like to focus exclusively on two contested types. Many of the most important struggles on the planet are over these two meanings of global citizenship and the struggles themselves consist in the exercise of these two practices of global citizenship. 3. These two forms of global citizenship have different names in different literature: low intensity versus high intensity global citizenship, representative versus participatory, neoliberal versus democratic, restrictive versus non-restrictive, civil versus civic, global citizenship from above versus citizenship from below, hegemonic versus counterhegemonic, liberal democratic versus agonistic, global versus glocal, modern versus alternative modernities, hegemonic versus subaltern, and so on. The literature on low intensity versus high intensity global citizenship is one of the closest formulations to the analysis I present here of these two broad clusters of meanings and practices of citizenship. 4. I will call them modern and diverse. Both are modern in the sense of being exercised over the last 200 years, yet the former is closely identified with the singular form of citizenship distinctive of the modern West and its global processes of modernization and citizenization of the non-West, whereas the latter is associated with the idea of multiple or alternative modernities and modes of citizenship. Similarly, both

have a place for diversity, but the latter is closely identified with global struggles for a multiplicity of forms of citizenship and a multiplicity of practices of governance in which it is exercised, whereas the former restricts diversity to differences within the singular form and restricted location of modern global citizenship, on the claim that it is the universal type of global citizenship for all. 5. The reason why the concept of citizen and citizenship is indeterminate and has several meanings, such as modern and diverse citizenship, is that it is defined in relation to two equally polysemic concepts: the rule of law and constitutionalism on the one side and democratic participation and popular sovereignty on the other. Each meaning of citizenship interprets these two broad concepts of the rule of law and democratic participation in slightly different ways and weights them differently in relation to citizenship. When citizenship is defined in relation to the rule of law, then it is seen as an opportunity concept: a status a person or group has in virtue of being recognized as the subject of a normative order and the bearer of rights and duties. When it is defined in relation to democracy, then it is seen as an exercise concept: a practice or activity that citizens engage in within or over a normative order. Different meanings define and weight these two sides of citizenship differently and explain how they work together differently. Modern and diverse citizenship share this rich semantic field of nomos (the rule of law) and demos (democratic participation) but interpret it differently. Because the two meanings of citizenship share this rich semantic field of law and democracy, they are not simple dichotomies or binary opposites, but overlapping, criss-crossing and sometimes conflicting in their applications. 6. Modern and diverse citizenship meanings share the idea that citizens are the subjects or bearers of rights and duties guaranteed by the rule of law, that is, by some normative order or what I will call relations of governance. But, they disagree over the relevant rights and duties and over the range of normative orders that count as the rule of law. Modern citizenship restricts the rule of law to one canonical type of legal or constitutional order whereas diverse citizenship takes a wide and pluralistic range of normative orders to be instances of the rule of law. They also both agree that what differentiates civic citizens from civil subjects is that they participate in having a say over the relations of governance to which they are subjected and by which their conduct and interaction is coordinated and governed. This is the democratic element in citizenship: we the people who are governed by a system of rules or relationships of governance have a say over them. If the rules to which we are subject in practices of governance are imposed on us by an internal tyrant, a foreign imperial power, or a structure of institutions and processes that subjectifies us behind our backs, then, by definition, we are passive subjects rather than active citizens. We are thus unfree in the democratic citizen sense and our powers of citizenship of self-rule, popular sovereignty, and self-determination are said to be usurped, dispossessed, restricted or colonized. Furthermore, if an imposed system is exempt from democratic transformation by those unfreely subjected to it, and permits only forms of citizenship within its unalterable basic structure, then it is said to be closed rather than open (a constitutional democracy but not a democratic constitution, for example).

7. When the governed act as citizens and demand a say in the practices of governance to which they are subject, they bring this practice under shared authority: that is, under the shared authority of citizens and governors in negotiation. They thereby democratize the practice of governance. In virtue of participating in such activities, people who were passive subjects subjectified by governing relationships become active citizens, transforming the way they are governed and their form of self-consciousness and conduct, and governing their governors in a reciprocal way. They become free in the civic or citizenship sense. They become good citizens and, reciprocally, the rulers who are constrained to listen and negotiate, become good governors. 8. Having a say and being a citizen does not entail making the rules or governing directly, not does it require that the governed and governors are equal, although this is one end of the spectrum. In the Rousseauian tradition, for example, citizens are free only if they are the actual authors of the laws from some point outside of the law (the state of nature or constitutive assembly). Rather, it refers to the multiplicity of ways subjects can have a say over relationships of power between governors and governed in which they find themselves. In open systems they do this by challenging the ways they are governed, entering into negotiations with the powers that be in the various legal, political, cultural, social, civil institutions, movements and processes available for this, or in ad-hoc negotiations. They can participate individually or collectively, either directly or through trusted representatives, in local, national or global institutions, trying to reach agreements over how to modify or transform the relationships and rules in question, implementing the reforms, reviewing them, and starting over again. 9. Although both modern and diverse conceptions of global citizenship share this criterion of having a say over the rules to which the governed are subject, they define it and its cognate vocabulary in two contrasting and conflicting ways. For diverse global citizenship, the citizens right and responsibility of having a say over the relationships through which we are governed, and thus submitting it to shared democratic authority, applies in principle to any practice of governance in any area of life, just in virtue of being governed, and in diverse ways. For modern global citizenship, it applies to a restricted subset of practices of governance and in a limited range of ways. From the perspective of diverse citizenship, therefore, modern global citizenship is one singular and historically contingent form of citizenship masquerading as universal; whereas, from the perspective of modern citizenship, diverse citizenship is uncivilized, anti-modern and illegitimate. The central differences are, therefore, which practices of governance are open to citizenship and what modes of citizen practice are legitimate. 10. Diverse citizenship is prior to and complementary to modern citizenship in two senses. Within European states, the rights of participation associated with modern citizenship were fought and won by subjects who did not originally have these rights or the right to organize and fight for them. They exercised their diverse citizenship in centuries of struggles as individuals, workers, women, immigrants, Indigenous peoples, gays, lesbians, oppressed minorities, environmentalists and so on to gain the democratic rights that are sometimes institutionalized in modern citizenship. Second, the kind of

diverse citizen action of calling a relation of power into question and subjecting it to the shared authority of those subject to it, beyond the boundaries of the most recent formal institutionalization of modern citizenship, or conversely, the anti-democratic activity of downsizing the sphere of democratic citizenship, is a permanent feature of the development of modern citizenship. There is no fixed and universal meaning to modern citizenship because the exercise of diverse citizenship by the governed constantly challenges which relations of governance can be brought under shared authority and in what ways. Since modern citizenship is paramount today, I will begin with it and its historical development to a global form of citizenship. II. The Globalization of Modern Citizenship 1. The defining feature of modern global citizenship is that it takes its singular and restricted institutionalized form of citizenship as the uniquely civilized, modern and universal form. It is globalized by means of Western formal and informal imperialism, and all other forms of citizenship are defined in contrast as uncivilized, less-developed, pre- or anti-modern, dysfunctional, insurgent, or lawless, and thus illegitimate and illegal. 2. Modern global citizenship can be roughly defined in terms of three features. First, an individual is a citizen in virtue of a set of rights and duties, of formal equality and substantive inequality, relative to a formal legal system of civil laws that is effectively enforced by a coercive authority. The precondition of being a citizen in this civil sense is the imposition and effective enforcement of the rule of law from which the status of citizenship (rights and duties) derive. The imposition of law civilizes and thus creates citizens and civilization in this well-known Roman and Kantian sense. There are two predominant traditions of interpretation of the requisite set of rights and duties of modern citizenship at both the nation-state and global level: the liberal-democratic and neo-liberal wing and the social democracy and cosmopolitan democracy wing. 3. Second, regarding the democratic element of citizenship, citizens have a say in the making of laws by which they are governed in three ways: the practices and institutions of elected representative government, the judicial system of courts, and civil society (freedom of assembly, voluntary associations, social movements, NGOS, free press), which mediates between the constitutional state and the private capitalist economy. Since World War II more people have struggled for and won inclusion and a plurality of ways of participating in these canonical institutions (multiculturalism and multinationalism). The distinction between private and public constrains the exercise of citizenship in these three spheres to an island of democracy in a sea of non-democratic practices of governance in the economic, military and other private spheres. Politics tends to be defined by contests over the definition of the public and private by the two predominant traditions of interpretation of these institutions: liberal democratic and social democratic. 4. Third, individual citizens, voluntary organizations, international civil society networks, and capitalist corporations (as persons) have the cosmopolitan right (ius commercium) to

travel to and enter into any foreign country in the world, to enter into commercial relations with the local people or their governments, and to have their ensuing private property and private contracts coercively enforced under international private law and lex mercatoria, and by the local government, an imperial power, or an international league of modern or civilized nations of some kind. Every county has the correlative duty of hospitality to be open to free trade in this sense, even where there have been centuries of abuse of the right by imperial powers, and to protect the property and contracts of foreigners against local democratic control and expropriation. If the local government fails to uphold its duty of open door free trade, then the wronged imperial power (in the 19th century), or the UN, a single state or a coalition of states (in the 20th century), can intervene militarily to uphold the global cosmopolitan right of free travel and free commerce and structurally adjust the local constitution along modern citizenship lines, just as states protect the market freedoms of its modern citizens and modern foreign citizens in their own states. 5. The European imperial powers and the US globalized this form of modern citizenship. During the 19th century, European imperialism entered a second phase and colonized 85% of the globe. International law was reconfigured around the standard of civilization. The European imperial states (and the US after 1895) that had the three features of modern citizenship (above) defined themselves as civilized. They defined the non-European colonies and protectorates in contrast as uncivilized. The civilized imperial states were said to have the duty to civilize the peoples under their imperial control. This consisted in the duty of first forcefully opening non-European societies to the civilizing effects of free trade dominated by Europe: that is, to gain control of the resources, labour and markets of the non-European world and to integrate them into competing imperial economies under their respective ownership. Second, it consisted in imposing a formal system of colonial laws on the colonies, dominions and protectorates, paramount over local, customary law, as a kind of proto-modern citizenship. This imposed structure of law tended to dispossess the imperialized peoples of their own systems of law, forms of citizenship, and usurped their democratic control over their own resources and labour, rendering them subject to an alien system of economic and legal relationships, while at the same time protecting foreign corporations. Third, a plethora of voluntary and religious organizations exercised their cosmopolitan rights of global civil society to enter the colonies and help in the universal project of civilizing the natives, that is, of preparing them for eventual modern citizenship. 6. While this is a clear case of domination and imposed despotism from the perspective of diverse citizenship, it is seen as the burden of civilizing and modernizing backward or less-developed peoples, through various stages of economic and legal development and mandate systems, from the universal perspective of modern citizenship. The three processes (above) worked imperfectly, faced multiple resistances, and produced unintended effects, contrary to the unilateral theories of civilizational development. In summary, modern citizenship was globalized in two main ways before and during the 19thc: the replication imperialism of imposing formal colonies around the world; and the imposition and coercive protection of the cosmopolitan right of open commerce under

international law for corporations and voluntary civil society organizations (cosmopolitan imperialism). 7. In the twentieth century, the formal colonies were dismantled. Local political power was transferred to, or taken back by, westernized capitalist or socialist elites during decolonization. While the decolonized (but not de-imperialized) peoples dreamed of diverse forms of citizenship, self-reliance, local democracy, alternative modernities or a dialogical among diverse civilizations, the westernized elites, trapped in economic, military, technological and debt dependencies of the persisting imperial relationships, were constrained to continue what colonialism began: the destruction, overriding or subordination of local communities, economies and legalities, and the rapid development of nationalizing subaltern regimes of uniform modern citizenship and civilization dominated by the economies of the former imperial powers, or face the overwhelming force of military and financial power. 8. During the same period of decolonization and the Cold War, Western imperialism was transformed from formal colonial rule to informal, infrastructural governance over nominally free subaltern states. Informal interactive imperialism is a unique form of imperialism that is exercised over a world already rendered dependent, unequal and subject to the hegemony of the former colonial powers by centuries of replication and cosmopolitan imperialism. It consists in the exercise of various unequal relations of power (economic, cultural, educational, debt, financial, loans, bribes, aid) over the nominally free subaltern peoples to constrain them to continue to develop along the lines of dependent modern global citizenship, all backed up by the threat of military intervention to protect the commercial and other rights of modern citizenship. Postcolonial subaltern peoples, with all their internal divisions, have a limited yet indeterminate range of possible actions within this unequal field, from assimilation at one end through the multiplicity of ways of trying to modify the rules of the field from within, to outright confrontation at the other. The result is a much more complex and dynamic system of unequal interaction than during the period of formal colonial rule. 9. After World War II a set of global institutions were established, mainly by the United States, to govern this global imperial system of modern citizenship, primarily through the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, and, whenever possible, through the United Nations and voluntary coalitions of the former imperial powers (the G8). In the same period, the leadership of the system passed from the competing European imperial powers to the United States, which had a century of experience with informal imperialism in Latin America, under the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries. Woodrow Wilson gave expression to this new phase of western imperialism and the new form of corporation capitalism. It consists in recognizing the right of self-determination of all peoples, and thus is anti-colonial, and the right of the United States to intervene in former colonies to ensure they determine themselves in accordance with openness to free trade under US world hegemony. While proclaiming self-determination President Wilson invaded China, Haiti, Mexico and the Dominican Republic to open them to free trade and protect American corporations from local democracy, and saw no contradiction in so doing.

10. During the period of decolonization the imperial powers internationalized their former imperial duty to civilize the non-European world and the former colonies criticized the language of a standard of civilization used by the League of Nations. The rights and institutions of modern global citizenship and the duty to make the world over in its civilizational image were recast in the post-colonial terms of international rights, development, modernization, and democratization. 11. Similarly, international law is now said to promote a norm of democracy, meaning to recognize only liberal democratic countries that have elections, civil society, protect private property, and are open to capitalist development. Like the 19th century distinction between civilized and uncivilized states, the states that fail to meet these criteria are not liberal or democratic, but less-developed and thus in need of economic development and democratization imposed by the Western powers. The interpretation of the norm of democracy is contested at the global level by the two hegemonic Western traditions of modernization: the neo-liberal and cosmopolitan democracy wings. 12. Since World War II the means available to govern the conduct of whole countries and regions informally have increased exponentially. The WB and WTO, local elites, aid agencies, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, the global marketing of education, and multinational corporations work together in the least developed countries to break down their pre-modern ways and local self-reliance, integrate them further into the global economy, and build institutions of low intensity democracy. Under modernizing imperialism, the colluding civil society organizations play the role of the old religious societies and residential schools in the period of civilizational imperialism. 13. The transition to what Manuel Castells called network forms of economic, political, media and military organization in the 1980s increased the range and depth of global informal control of local self-governing nodes and global civil society immensely. The unilateral proliferation of global juridical regimes such as GATT, the expansion of TRIPPS and lex Mercatoria, and the neo-liberal revolution have privatized whole areas of life that were formerly open to modern or diverse forms of democratic citizenship, placing millions of people under the governance of multinational networked corporations in which they have no say. And the supranational (or imperial) legal regimes override and erode modern citizenship at the national level. 14. The turn to global securitization after 9/11/2001 has provided the pretext to restrict modern global citizenship even further than the neo-liberal revolution had achieved in the previous decade. The neo-liberal revolution reduced modern citizenship to the first feature, a narrow reading of the second, and a strengthening of the third; that is, the coercive enforcement of open door imperialism and market freedoms, often to the repression of the democratic feature, on the grounds that democratic freedoms will somehow naturally follow market freedoms. This is justified by the revival of Isaiah Berlins infamous Cold War argument that liberal institutions do not require democratic freedoms. Securitization deepens this trend, outlaws diverse citizenship altogether, and

intensifies the executive enforcement and incarceration mechanisms of modern citizenship. 15. Underlying the globalization and enforcement of modern citizenship in its national and cosmopolitan forms by means of informal imperialism are two military features. The first is the dependency of subaltern states on the US run global arms market to sustain a military force capable of protecting the property rights of local and foreign elites against their own democratic citizens. The second is the capacity of the US military to intervene immediately anywhere on the planet if any people challenge the imposed regime of modern citizenship. Governance by intervention (threatened or actual) is based on the full spectrum dominance of the United States over the globe by means of 725 military bases around the world (and over 900 within the US) and the constant patrolling of the globe by operatives, marines, navy, air force, satellites and the weaponization of space. The US military has divided the globe into four zones governed by four US Commanders in Chief (CINC) who make up the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the former governors general of colonial empires, and equally paramount over the customary laws of individual states in their respective regions. These imperial military relationships enforce the modernization model and structure the field of any possible democratic action of subaltern peoples. As the neo-liberal imperialists put it, the hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist McDonalds cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the US Air Force F-15. 16. Once these institutions and technologies of informal imperialism were firmly in place by the end of the Cold War, the imperial networks could be run somewhat analogously a large networked multinational corporation, more efficiently than they were run by the old cumbersome and expensive formal, competing colonial imperial systems of the nineteenth century (actually more like the old Charter Companies imperialism of British indirect rule). The disanalogy, of course, that the subaltern states, while all unequal, dependent and formerly colonized (as we have seen), are internally complex and conflicted, differently situated relative to each other, and are able to exercise a range of powers available to them within and against the hegemonic relations of global governance. 17. This whole project of globalizing modern citizenship and governing it by means of informal imperialism led by the US is laid out not only in the globalization literature of Fukuyama, Friedman, Ferguson, and Zakari, but also with great clarity in The National Security Doctrine of the United States of America (2002). Here the imposition of a regime of restricted modern citizenship by means of military intervention and continuous military intervention until replication elites are sufficiently socialized is said to open a country to market freedoms and global civil society; to bring freedom and democracy to oppressed peoples. This is said to be precisely the universal form of free citizenship all peoples of the world want and which the United States, in virtue of its economic and military superpower, is uniquely situated to deliver and exercise dominance. The spread of the types of freedom and low intensity democracy of modern global citizenship is the prevailing justification of western imperialism today, as we see for example in Iraq and Afghanistan.

18. Consequently, in addition to the globalization of modern citizenship by the imperial development of replication modern states and by means of the global protection of the cosmopolitan and commercial rights of modern citizens by international law and military intervention, there is also another kind of citizenship that develops around the global governors who enforce these two processes of citizenization. This is the less formal relationship between the governors of the global system and the various elites, subalterns, collaborators, influence peddlers, arms dealers, opinion moulders and courtiers. It would be easy to quote the democratic critics of modernization imperialism, but this corruption of democratic citizenship has caught the attention of the mainstream scholars and officials as well. Here is how Susan Strange, an international political scientist, describes the scene: What is emerging is, therefore, a non-territorial empire with its imperial capital in Washington DC. If the imperial capitals used to attract courtesans of foreign provinces, Washington instead attracts lobbies and agents of international companies, representatives of minority groups dispersed throughout the empire and pressure groups organized at a global scale As in Rome, citizenship is not limited to a superior race and the empire contains a mix of citizens with the same legal and political rights, semi-citizens, and non-citizens, such as the slave population in Rome The semi-citizens of the empire are many and are spread out. They include many people employed by big transnational firms that operate in the transnational structure of production that assists, as they all well know, the global market. This includes the people employed in transnational banking and, very often, the members of the national armed forces, especially those that are trained, armed by, and dependent on the United States armed forces. It also includes many scholars in medicine, the natural sciences and the social sciences, as in business management and economy, who view the American professional associations and universities as those peers before whose eyes they want to shine and excel. It also includes the people in the press and the mass media, for whom the American technology and the examples offered by the United States have shown the way, changing the established institutions and organizations. 19. How do the promoters and protectors of modern citizenship treat their citizens today? Here is how Samuel Huntingdon, a conservative realist, describes the form of rule practiced by the United States government (not unknown to Canadian citizens concerned about softwood lumber): To press other countries to adopt American values and practices on issues such as human rights and democracy; to prevent that third countries acquire military capacities susceptible of interfering with American military superiority; to have the American legislation applied to other countries; to qualify third countries with regard to their adhesion to American standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism, nuclear and missile proliferation and, now, religious freedom; to apply sanctions against the countries that do not conform to the American standards on these issues; to promote the corporate American interests under the slogans of free trade and

open markets and to shape the politics of the IMF and the World Bank to serve those same interests to force other countries to adopt social and economic policies that benefit the American economic interests, to promote the sale of American weapons and prevent that other countries do the same to categorize certain countries as pariah states or criminal states and exclude them from the global institutions because they refuse to prostrate themselves before the American wishes. 20. How well do the global leaders of the World Bank and WTO consult the democratic wishes of those they seek to democratize? As Iris Marion Young, a political theorist, comments on Globalization and its Discontents by Joseph Stiglitz, former head of the World Bank: Joseph Stiglitz argues that the global economic system is now run by a dictatorship of international finance. The global finance elites from the US and a few other G8 countries, from the IMF, World Bank and WTO, aligned with private financial and investment interests, effectively set the major terms of international and capital movement. Stiglitz acknowledges that these government, international organization, and business officials believe that they have the general interest of the worlds people in view. The problems is that their background training, social positions, and those to whom they are most directly accountable induce them to define this general interest in particular ways that are biased against the interests of most of the worlds poor. 21. And, how well does this system promote democratic citizenship and shared authority in the subaltern states? W.I. Robinson, a Third World area specialist, writes that the promotion of low intensity democracy is aimed not only at mitigating the social and political tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status-quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of social life in the 21st century international order. III. Diverse global citizenship 1. The continuing imperial globalization of modern citizenship in its lowest intensity form is clearly the paramount pattern of global politics today. Nevertheless, it does not proceed unopposed as a necessary, inevitable and universal process of development, as its proponents loudly claim. It is opposed by a multiplicity of global citizenship struggles to (1) reverse, reform and democratize from within the dwindling democratic freedoms of modern global citizenship (the social democratic agenda and proportional representation for example); and (2) expand and diversify the practices of democratic citizenship, in order to bring the anti-democratic relationships of governance of informal imperialism under the shared authority of the people and peoples who are subjected to them without their consent. As a result of these struggles, the processes of globalization are much more complex, interactive and indeterminate than the grand theories presume.

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2. From the perspective of diverse global citizenship, the unilateral imposition of modern global citizenship (or any institutionalized form of citizenship), without the say, negotiation and shared authority of the individuals and peoples who are subject to it, is the violation of their democratic freedom - the usurpation and subalternization of their political, economic, legal and cultural citizenship. Yet, as we have seen, this is precisely the basic injustice of globalization. Modern citizenship is too restrictive in Western societies and both imposed and too restricted in its colonizing forms. While it is designed to get at certain forms of oppression of the state over the liberal and market freedoms of the moderns it is too partial to get at the dominant forms of oppression and exploitation today. Indeed, as we have seen, it hides these other forms of oppression under the mantra of uniform modernization, globalization and democratization. 3. The relations of power and knowledge that govern our conduct and interaction as individuals, groups, classes, peoples and supranational communities in oppressive and exploitive ways are complex: multiplex, overlapping, criss-crossing and constantly changing. They are not all conveniently located in the state or the economy, and they are not controlled by a single class standing above the field of power, as the classic liberal and Marxists models held. To understand these diverse practices of governance, criticize them, and bring them under the shared democratic authority of those subject to them in culturally sensitive ways that do not engender new forms of oppression is an endless series of contextual tasks of citizenship tailored to the specific forms of unfree practices of governance by the people who are governed by them. This is the field of diverse citizenship. 4. The major problem of global citizenship today is the continuation and intensification of Western imperial rule in a new informal mode outlined in section II: the proliferation of informal imperial networks of economic, legal, cultural, media, security, and military relations of power and subjectification that not only bypass the diverse citizenship of the millions of people who are subject to them, but also manipulate, downsize or disregard the representative and legal instititutions of modern global citizenship that were historically designed to bring them under shared representative authority. This is a double crisis of modern and diverse citizenship. 5. As we have seen, the worst dimension of these processes of de-citizenization is the situation of the former colonized peoples within the informal relations of imperial domination and exploitation that govern the field of their possible political and economic actions. The weak, replication institutions of western modern global citizenship imposed on them during 500 years of imperialism and the dependent elites who profit from them remove their political and economic affairs from the popular sovereignty of the people. These structures in turn are subordinated to a system of international laws and economic relations over which they have no say but which determine their economic development to the benefit of the imperial powers and to the detriment and indebtedness of the local people, usually in the form of resource extraction, single-crop agriculture for export, and sweat shops. These global relationships in turn are governed by states, global institutions and multinational corporations over which they have no say.

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6. If they resist and try to bring these relationships under some kind of shared authority by practices of citizenship, courageous elected leaders are removed or assassinated, popular movements are repressed by their own elites, or military intervention and occupation defeats the movements, restructures the constitution, rebuilds the police force, works with civil society organizations to create a modernizing, export-oriented civil society, and builds a new global military base nearby. If citizens turn to selfdetermination, the classic tool of collective citizenship, they find that this has already been integrated into the repertoire of informal imperial rule since the time of formal decolonization. All this is justified in terms of bringing modern freedoms and democratization to a rogue or dysfunctional state. As Partha Chatterjee comments, Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. 7. Oxfam concludes that western modernization imperialism is a form of continuous low intensity warfare against democratic self-reliance. The majority of the worlds population in the (informally) imperialized states is now more impoverished than under earlier formal colonial rule, after three successive waves of modernization and democratization policies since Decolonization. 840 million people are malnourished. 6,000,000 children under the age of 5 die each year as a consequence of malnutrition. 1.2 billion people live on less than $1 a day and half the worlds population lives on less than $2 a day. 91 out of every 1,000 children in the developing world die before 5 years old. 12 million die annually from lack of water. 1.1 billion people have no access to clean water. 2.4 billion people live without proper sanitation. 40 million live with AIDS. 113 million children have no basic education. 1 in 5 does not survive past 40 years of age. There are one billion non-literate adults, two-thirds are women and 98% live in the developing world. In the least developed countries, 45% of the children do not attend school. In countries with literacy rate of less than 55% the per capita income is about $600. 8. In contrast, the wealth of the richest 1% of the world is equal to that of the poorest 57%. The assets of the 200 richest people are worth more than the total income of 41% of the worlds people. Three families alone have a combined wealth of $135 billion. This equals the annual income of 600 million people living in the worlds poorest countries. The richest 20% of the worlds population receive 150 times the wealth of the poorest 20%. In 1960, the share of the global income of the bottom 20% was 2.3%. By 1991, this had fallen to 1.4%. The richest fifth of the worlds people consume 45% of the worlds meat and fish; the poorest fifth consume 5%. The richest fifth consume 58% of total energy, the poorest fifth less than 4%. The richest fifth have 75% of all telephones, the poorest fifth 1.5%. The richest fifth own 87% of the worlds vehicles, the poorest fifth less than 1%. 9. Despite the horrendous inequalities of life-situations, the massive powers of inclusion and assimilation, and the brutal techniques of repression when these fail, subjects continue to try to act as citizens in a diversity of ways. Let me mention four important ways.

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The first is that the imperial globalization of restricted modern citizenship by colonial and post-colonial means has not been as deep and effective as its defenders and critics have presupposed. Beneath the veneer of globalization lies another world of legal, political, cultural, citizen and even economic pluralism that has survived, to varying degrees, within the interstices of the processes of modernization we have discussed. The entire imperial world picture of modern state-centred and global citizenship and its technologies of implementation are not universal and comprehensive in either theory or practice. There are alternative modernities, alternative civilizations, and alternative cosmopolitanisms, that are both the imaginaries and the lived experience of millions of people in the colonized world (as well as in the alternative cultures in the imperial states). The reason for this remarkable survival of alternative modernities, unknown to the dominate debate, is that western imperialism has always depended upon the collaboration of imperialized peoples and, as a result, those who have not been westernized have been able to keep their forms of legal and political associations and diverse modes of citizenship alive to some extent, under both colonial and informal imperialism. The most astonishing example of the survival of diverse citizenship is the survival and renaissance of 250 million Indigenous peoples who have survived 500 years of genocide, dispossession, marginalization, assimilation, colonial rule, and the imposition of western forms of government and economic organization. Consequently, the lived experience of the present age is very different and more multiplex than the flat world and smooth world that is seen through the neo-liberal and neo-Marxist world-pictures of globalizaton. 10. Second, even where people have been constrained to work within the imposed institutions of modern citizenship, they have been able think and act differently within and sometimes against the institutionalized form. The reason for this is that in any system of rule and subjection, there is always a certain room to maneuver in following the rules of the game; from the silent non-cooperation in total institutions of modernization like the army and the residential school, to the hidden scripts and arts of resistance, to some of the recent struggles of multiculturalism and multinationalism, to the more challenging exercises of diverse citizenship to radically transform these imposed institutions from the inside. The latter are exemplified by the non-violent forms of resistance, political and economic democracy, and self-reliant fair trade versus free trade practiced by Gandhi and Vandana Shiva. 11. Third, after decolonization and the turn to informal imperialism, millions of the worlds poor have been forced to migrate from the colonized world to the imperial centers to find work, and these diasporas are closely controlled and monitored by the powers-that-be. Despite the immense hardships and forms of discrimination and nonrecognition, they have refused to be servile subjects and have exercised their citizenship in new and untoward ways, modifying and culturalizing the straightjacket of modern citizenship in the capital cities and reversing the relations of communication, culture and community between imperial centre and colonies. This boomerang effect or journey back has created deeply diverse cultural communities in the capital cities and new diasporic supranational communities of immigrants with their home countries. These

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counter-imperial and counter-national forms of diverse citizenship are bound together by new kinds of citizen solidarity across similarities and differences that Paul Gilroy calls conviviality. 12. Fourth, because many of the hegemonic forms of power that undermine citizenship today take the form of informal networks, a new type of diverse citizenship has developed in opposition. These counter-hegemonic networks of the globalization of citizenship from below link together local nodes, organized in diverse citizenship ways, into global networks that have the capacity to act together to bring undemocratic relations of governance under the shared authority of the governed in various spheres. They think and act both globally and locally in what is called glocal diverse citizenship. Sometimes they act to confront undemocratic networks of power directly and force them to negotiate. Other times they act to bring undemocratic concentrations of power into the representative institutions and courts of national and global modern citizenship, helping to reform and strengthen these traditional institutions. The actors involved are often organized into NGO or CSO (civil society organization) forms of citizenship that directly counter the CONGOs (coopted NGOs) that work on the hegemonic side of a particular struggle. Here, the very relations of power that are employed to constrain them to adapt to a restrictive form of neo-liberal global citizenship turn out to be able to be used to challenge and modify these relations. 13. These networks of diverse citizens - who see themselves engaging in counterhegemonic globalization or globalization from below - take a multiplicity of forms and bring together a multiplicity of individual and collective actors from any node in the informal networks that govern our conduct and interaction, from the poorest peasants to international lawyers, retired business people and democratically-minded technical experts. There is not a privileged actor, a privileged set of institutions, or a privileged set of procedures in bringing oppressive networks of power under shared authority, as there were in earlier forms of citizen resistance to formal colonization. These older forms of collective citizenship such as revolutions of decolonization, nation-state building and the support of international voluntary organizations - have been found to be as inappropriate to the current situation as the single model of modern citizenship. These forms of citizenship are specific to the forms of power they address. Again, the reason this kind of diverse citizenship is possible and appropriate in our times is that there is always a limited room to maneuver within the informal relations of power; to modify them from within and even transform them. The diversity of forms can be seen in this short list of examples: Fair trade (in the interstices of free trade), the Landless Workers Movement, Food Sovereignty, Porto Allegro participatory democracy, the movements to democratize the UN, the Land Mines Convention, the International Forum on Globalization, the environmental movement, and countless others. Even in the highly structured world of international law, networks of officially unrecognized and uninvited citizen networks (non-state actors) can make a difference by working to change the international normative orders from within. 14. The World Social Forum has emerged as the forum for these four types of counterhegemonic diverse citizenship today. It stands in opposition to the World Economic

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Forum, the forum of hegemonic, neo-liberal citizenship. Representatives from thousands of alternative modernities, local struggles and glocal networks come to discuss their different forms of citizenship and learn from each other. This commitment to diverse citizenship is the first thesis of the WSF: Even as there is biodiversity and it must be defended, there is also demodiversity, and it must be defended as well. There is not, therefore, one form of democracy alone, i.e. liberal representative democracy. There are several other forms, such as direct, participatory, deliberative, intercultural democracy. But outside the Western world and culture there are still other forms of democracy which must be valorized. Take, for example, the autonomous government of the Indigenous communitiesas well as the traditional authorities in Africa or the panchayats in India. The point is not to accept uncritically any of these forms of democracy, but rather to make possible their inclusion in the debates about the deepening and radicalization of democracy. 15. The WSF works in two ways. First, instead of trying to force these diverse forms of citizenship into a single allegedly universal mould, the role of the forum is to enable translation among the diverse actors and their diverse ways of enacting citizenship, without hierarchy or reduction, so they are always aware of the partiality of their own perspective and do not try to impose it on others or falsely universalize it, as in the modern citizenship model. The point is to create, in every movement or NGO, in every practice or strategy, in every discourse or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it porous and hence permeable to other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses, and knowledges. Second, instead of constructing theories of citizenship in ivory towers, the WSF aims to link academic research more closely to citizen practice on the ground in networks of reciprocal elucidation between citizen groups and academics. Of course, a great deal of academic research is moving in this direction and the Trudeau Foundation supports fellows and scholars engaged in it. The Forum aims to go further and to create a popular university of social movements (PUSM). The objective is to make knowledge of alternative globalization (diverse citizenship) as global as globalization itself. 16. The most dangerous immediate threat to global citizenship today, both modern and diverse, is securitization and militarization of more and more areas of life. This trend severely restricts modern citizenship and represses diverse citizenship, thereby closing the door on glocal movements for self-reliant, democratic economic development against world poverty, and engendering the more extreme anti-democratic and almost mirrorimage terrorist networks in response, whereas what is needed is more openness to selfreliant democratic citizenship. But even in these extreme conditions, the average suicide bombers apparently do not believe in an anti-democratic theology or wish to colonize the West. They simply want the imperial powers to leave their homeland and their resources, and these are the only instruments of citizen action left to them. Yet these desperate actions provide the pretext for more rounds of securitization and further assaults on democratic citizenship.

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17. If this brief analysis has some plausibility, then the guarantee of global citizenship is neither securitization nor the imposition of one form of citizenship, but, as we know from our own history, the patient and obstinate diverse practices of citizens themselves.

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Endnotes The numbers refer to the sections in the text. I. Two contested ways of thinking about global citizenship 1. See James Tully, Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity, Stephen White and Donald Moon, eds., What is Political Theory (2004), 80-102. 3. The concept of low intensity citizenship and democracy was originally developed by Gills, B., Rocamora, J., Wilson, R., eds. Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (1993) and Robinson, W.I., Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (1996) in their studies of the democratization of Guatemala, Argentina, the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and Haiti. It is now widely used to contrast with high intensity, or broader and more participatory forms of citizenship. 4. I have discussed these two types of citizenship in more detail in Democracy and Globalization, in Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds., Canadian Political Philosophy, (2001), 36-62, and The Unfreedom of the Moderns in relation to their ideals of Constitutionalism and Democracy, Modern Law Review, 65, 2 (2003), 205-228. II. The Globalization of Modern Citizenship 4. See Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (2002) and Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiler of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001) for the historical development of this modern national and global system. 5. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (1984) and above, note 4. For a comparative analysis of how the European empires and the United States dispossessed the non-European world of its land by means of different legal systems, see John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World 1650-1900 (2003). For a review of recent work on the third dimension of the civilizing project, see Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (2002). Gong, Keene, and Koskenniemmi all argue that there have always been two systems of international law: one for the civilized sovereign states where the norm of non-intervention applies; and another for the relations between the civilized and uncivilized states, where intervention to protect the third feature of modern citizenship has always applied. After World War II and the founding of the United Nations and the global Bretton Woods institutions, the terms developed and developing, democratic and democratizing were substituted for civilized and uncivilized, but the dual system continued. Indeed, the language of civilized and uncivilized returned to the dominant discourse in the 1990s. For a recent reformulation of this doctrine, see The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001).

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6. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 98-179. For the role of the mandate systems, see William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (2003). 7. Prasenjit Duara, ed. Decolonization: Perspectives from then and now (2004). For the military dependency, see Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, Dependent State formation and Third World Militarization, Review of International Studies, 19 (1993), 321-347. For the debt dependency, see Noreena Hertz, The Debt Threat: How Debt is Destroying the Developing World (2004). 8. The concept of informal imperialism was introduced by Ronald Robinson, Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12, 2 (January 1984) 42-54, and Wolfgang Mommsen, The End of Empire and the Continuity of Imperialism, in Mommsen and Osterhammel, eds., Imperialism and after: Continuities and Discontinuities (1986), 333-358. It is now widely used by scholars of contemporary imperialism. For a recent overview of US informal imperialism, see Stephen Howe, American Empire: the history and future of an idea, OpenDemocracy 12 June 2003, 1-12, www.openDemocracy.net. I have discussed its distinctive logic in Law, Democracy, and Imperialism, Annual Law and Society Lecture, Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, March 10-11, 2005 (forthcoming). See also Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations, Millennium, 31, 1 (2002), 109-127. 9. For the rise of US informal imperialism to global rule through the 20th century, see Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelts Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (2003) and Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (2002). Bacevich shows the continuity of US open door informal imperialism from President Wilson to today. For a critical review of the Bretton Woods global institutions as instruments of imperial rule today, see Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) and below note 20. 10. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, and Smith, American Empire, and note 5 above. 11. This thesis of an international norm of democracy was originally advanced by Anne Marie Slaughter and Thomas Franck in the early 1990s. See the analysis and criticism of it from the perspective of diverse citizenship by Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (2000). 12. See the case studies of Ghana and Uganda by Alison Ayers, Demystifying Democratization: The Global Constitution of Liberal Politics in Africa, in Third World Quarterly (forthcoming, Winter 2005), Duncan Green, The Rise and Crisis of Market Economies in Latin America (2003), and Gills, et al, Low Intensity Democracy.

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13. For the network revolution and its effect on democratic citizenship, see James Tully, Communication Networks, Hegemony, and Communicative Action, Conweb Constitutional Papers (June 2005), www.qub.ac.uk/pais/Research/PaperSeries/ConWEBPapers/ . For the proliferation of lex Mercatoria and supranational legal regimes that restrict global democracy and override national democracy, see Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law and the Global Political Economy (2003). 14. For the defence of US imperialism in terms of the spread of neo-liberalism detached from democratic freedom, see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003) and William Odom and Robert Dujarric, Americas Inadvertent Empire (2004). For a critical account of the liberal informal imperialists, see Rahul Rao, The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Ignatieff), Millennium, 33, 1 (2004), 145-166, and Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (2005). For a similar criticism of the imperialism of the cosmopolitan or social democratic wing of globalization, see Patrick Bond, Top Down or Bottom Up?, and Benjamin Barber, Global Governance from Below, both in David Held, ed. Debating Globalization (2005), 82-93, 93-106, and David Helds reply, Ibid., 141-167. 15. For the global military empire, see Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (2004). It is outlined in the US militarys Joint Vision 2020 at www.dtic.mil/jointvision/. The famous quotation that the hidden hand needs the hidden fist comes from Thomas Friedman, a leading spokesperson for the new imperialism: The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999). 16. Bacevich, American Empire. 17. President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. See Johnson, Sorrows of Empire, for the analysis of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars in this light. 18. Susan Strange, Towards a theory of transnational empire, in E.O. Czempiel and J. Roseneau, eds., Global Change and Theoretical Challenge (1989). 19. Samuel Huntingdon, The Lonely Superpower, Foreign Affairs, 78, 2. Huntingdons thesis that the United States disregards the rules that it imposes on others when it is in their military and economic interest to do so is supported by Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (2005). 20. Iris Marion Young, Modest Reflections on Hegemony and Global Democracy, World Congress of Philosophy, Istanbul (2003). Michael Chossudousky, The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order (2003) agrees that the World Bank and World Trade Organization govern the developing world, and argues that the United States enforces their rules by means of its military dominance.

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21. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 6. See also Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: the Unmaking of the American Empire (2005) for similar conclusions. III. Diverse global citizenship 4. For a more detailed presentation of this claim, see Tully, Unfreedom of the Moderns, above I.4. 6. Partha Chaterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories (1993), 5. For a recent overview of this kind of history in Latin America, see Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War (2004). For a survey of the informal imperial control of self-determination revolutions during and after Decolonization, see Duara, Decolonization, and James D. Le Sueur, ed. The Decolonization Reader (2002). For a recent restatement of Chaterjees tragic conclusion, see David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: the Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (2005). 7. Jeremy Seabrook, The No-Nonsense Guide to World Poverty (2003), 53. All the statistics come from this volume and they are cited from United Nations publications. 8. Ibid. 9. For a recent world history of legal and political pluralism, see Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures 1400-1900 (2001). For the alternative modernities movement, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (2000) and Dilip P. Gaonkar, ed. Alternative Modernities (2001). For Indigenous Peoples, see Jeremy Mander and Victoria TauliCorpuz, Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples Resistance to Economic Globalization, a special report of the International Forum on Globalization and the Committee on Indigenous Peoples (2004). For a rejoinder to the flat world view of the grand theorists of globalization, see John Gray, The World is Round, The New York Review of Books, LII, 13 (August 11, 2005). 10. See Jai Sen and Anand Escobar, eds., Challenging Empires (2004) and Vandana Shiva, The Living Democracy Movement: Alternatives to the Bankruptcy of Globalization (2002). For the global contest between free trade and self-reliant fair trade, see Graham Dunkley, Free Trade: Myth, Realities and Alternatives (2004). 11. Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (2005). 12. For an overview of the field, see Louise Amoore, The Global Resistance Reader (2005). 13. One of the best introductions to this enormous field of diverse glocal citizenship is the syllabus of Professor Robert Hershey, Faculty of Law, University of Arizona, for Law 697B, Globalization and the Transformation of Culture: A curriculum for social inquiry and responsibility. For the social constructivist research on challenging and modifying

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international norms, see the work of Stephen Toope and Jutta Brune, and see the case study by Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Environmental Law, Non-State Actors and International Law, 3 (2003), 23-98. 14. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum: A Users Guide (2004), www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm_eng.pdf, accessed July 14, 2005, at 107 for the first thesis. 15. Sousa Santos, World Social Forum, 122-139 (on translation), and 140-148 (on Popular University of Social Movements). 16. This is also appears to be Kofi Annans view of the immediate threat and the proper democratic response. See Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all (21 March 2005). I also take the title, larger freedom, to be a diplomatic allusion to the contrast between low intensity and high intensity democracy. See Johanna Mendelson Forman, In Larger Freedom: Kofi Annans challenge, OpenDemocracy (23 March 2005). For the empirical research on the motivation of suicide bombers, see Robert Pape, Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005). 17. See I.10 above.

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