Jump to: navigation, search Dispute settlement is regarded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and as the organization's "unique contribution to the stability of the global economy".[1] A dispute arises when one member country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one or more fellow members considers to a breach of WTO agreements or to be a failure to live up to obligations. By joining the WTO, member countries have agreed that if they believe fellow members are in violation of trade rules, they will use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of taking action unilaterally this entails abiding by agreed procedures (Dispute Settlement Understanding) and respecting judgments, primarily of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the WTO organ responsible for adjudication of disputes. [2] A former WTO Director-General characterized the WTO dispute settlement system as "the most active international adjudicative mechanism in the world today."[3]
Contents
1 Dispute Settlement Understanding 2 From complaint to final report 3 Compliance 4 Compensation and retaliation 5 Developing countries 6 Notes 7 References
8 See also
Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members. World Trade Organization, Article 21.1 of the DSU
In 1994, the WTO members agreed on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes or Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (annexed to the "Final Act" signed in Marrakesh in 1994).[4] Pursuant to the rules detailed in the DSU, member states can engage in consultations to resolve trade disputes pertaining to a "covered agreement" or, if unsuccessful, have a WTO panel hear the case.[5] The priority, however, is to settle disputes,
through consultations if possible. By January 2008, only about 136 of the nearly 369 cases had reached the full panel process.[2]
The operation of the WTO dispute settlement process involves the parties and third parties to a case and may also involve the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, Source:Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes - A unique independent experts, and contribution several specialized institutions.[6] The General Council discharges its responsibilities under the DSU through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).[7] Like the General Council, the DSB is composed of representatives of all WTO Members. The DSB is responsible for administering the DSU, i.e. for overseeing the entire dispute settlement process. It also has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize the suspension of obligations under the covered agreements.[8] The DSB meets as often as necessary to adhere to the timeframes provided for in the DSU.[9]
Consultations, mediation, etc Panel set up and panellists appointed Final panel report to parties Final panel report to WTO members Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) Total = 1 year (without appeal) 60-90 days Appeals report 30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report Total = 1 year 3 months (with appeal)
Body and broadly representing the range of WTO membership. Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms. They must be individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, not affiliated with any government. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the panel's legal findings and conclusions. Normally appeals should not last more than 60 days, with an absolute maximum of 90 days.[15] The possibility for appeal makes the WTO dispute resolution system unique among the judicial processes of dispute settlement in general public international law.[16] Members may express their views on the report of the Appellate Body, but they cannot derail it. The DSU states unequivocally that an Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties, unless the DSB decides by consensus within thirty days of its circulation not to adopt the report.[17] Unless otherwise agreed by the parties to the dispute, the period from establishment of the panel to consideration of the report by the DSB shall as a general rule not exceed nine months if there is no appeal, and twelve months if there is an appeal.
[18]
[edit] Compliance
The DSU addresses the question of compliance and retaliation. Within thirty days of the adoption of the report, the member concerned is to inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and rulings. If the member explains that it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings, it is to have a "reasonable period of time" in which to comply. If no agreement is reached about the reasonable period for compliance, that issue is to be the subject of binding arbitration; the arbitrator is to be appointed by agreement of the parties. If there is a disagreement as to the satisfactory nature of the measures adopted by the respondent state to comply with the report, that disagreement is to be decided by a panel, if possible the same panel that heard the original dispute, but apparently without the possibility of appeal from its decision. The DSU provides that even if the respondent asserts that it has complied with the recommendation in a report, and even if the complainant party or the panel accepts that assertion, the DSB is supposed to keep the implementation of the recommendations under surveillance.[19]
context is semi-automatic, in that the DSB "shall grant the authorization [...] within thirty days of the expiry of the reasonable period", unless it decides by consensus to reject the request.[22] Any suspension or concession or other obligation is to be temporary. If the respondent state objects to the level of suspension proposed or to the consistency of the proposed suspension with the DSU principles, still another arbitration is provided for, if possible by the original panel members or by an arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the Director-General, to be completed within sixty days from expiration of the reasonable period.[22] While such "retaliatory measures" are a strong mechanism when applied by economically powerful countries like the United States or the European Union, when applied by economically weak countries against stronger ones, they can often be ignored.[23] This has been the case, for example, with the March 2005 Appellate Body ruling in case DS 267,[24] which declared US cotton subsidies illegal.[citation needed] Whether or not the complainant has taken a measure of retaliation, surveillance by the DSB is to continue, to see whether the recommendations of the panel or the Appellate Body have been implemented.[25]
[edit] Notes
1. 2. 3.
^ WTO "Understanding The WTO", World Trade Organization, accessed December 1, 2010. ^ a b Settling Disputes:a Unique Contribution, World Trade Organization ^ S. Panitchpakdi, The WTO at ten, 8
^ Stewart-Dawyer, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 7 ^ A list of covered agreements is included in Appendix 1 to the DSU ^ WTO Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, World Trade Organization ^ Article IV:3 of the WTO Agreement ^ Article 2.1 of the DSU ^ Article 2.3 of the DSU ^ A.F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 152 ^ Article 6.1 of the DSU ^ A.F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 153 ^ Faunce TA, Neville W and Anton Wasson A. Non Violation Nullification of Benefit Claims: Opportunities and Dilemmas in a Rule-Based WTO Dispute Settlement System in Bray M (ed) Ten Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Australian Perspectives. Office of Trade Negotiations of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.Commonwealth of Australia. 123-140 14. ^ Article 6.1 of the DSU 15. ^ Article 17 of the DSU. 16. ^ M. Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO, 275 17. ^ Article 17.14 of the DSU. 18. ^ Article 20 of the DSU. 19. ^ Article 21 of the DSU. 20. ^ a b Article 22.2 of the DSU 21. ^ Article 22.3 and 22.4 of the DSU 22. ^ a b Article 22.6 of the DSU 23. ^ Obijiofor Aginam, Food Safety, South-North Asymmetries, and the Clash of Regulatory Regimes, 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1099, 1112 (2007). 24. ^ United States Subsidies on Upland CottonPDF (969 KiB) 25. ^ Article 22.8 of the DSU 26. ^ A.F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 174 27. ^ Article 4.10 of the DSU 28. ^ Article 8.10 of the DSU 29. ^ Article 12.10 of the DSU 30. ^ Article 24 of the DSU 31. ^ Article 12.11 of the DSU 32. ^ K. Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on the WTO Law, 723-728
[edit] References
Lowenfeld, Andreas F. (1991 2007). "Preface - First Thoughts on Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization". In Pierre Pescatore, William J. Davey, Andreas F. Lowenfeld. Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement. Translations Publishers, Inc. ISBN 0-929179-48-X. Lowenfeld, Andreas F. (2002). "Dispute Settlement in the WTO". International Economic Law. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-825667-1. Panizzon, Marion (2006). "Good Faith Non-interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body". Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO. Hart Publishing. ISBN 1-841-13620-4. Panitchpakdi, Supachai (2006). "The WTO at ten: Building on ten Years of Achievements". In Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich, Jan Bohanes. The WTO at Ten: The
Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-52186314-7. "Settling Disputes:A Unique Contribution". Understanding the WTO. World Trade Organization. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. Retrieved 2007-03-11. Stewart, Terence P.; Dwyer, Amy S. (1991 2007). "The WTO Dispute Settlement System: an Overview". In Pierre Pescatore, William J. Davey, Andreas F. Lowenfeld. Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement. Translations Publishers, Inc. ISBN 0-92917948-X. Van der Borght, Kim (December 1999). "The Advisory Center on the WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality". Journal of International Economic Law 2 (4): 723728. doi:10.1093/jiel/2.4.723. http://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jieclw/v2y1999i4p723-28.html. Retrieved 2007-03-21. "WTO Bodies Involved in the Dispute Settlement Process". Dispute Settlement System Training Module. World Trade Organization. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s1p1_e.htm. Retrieved 2007-03-11.
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Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dispute_settlement_in_the_World_Trade_Organization" Categories: World Trade Organization | Dispute resolution Hidden categories: All articles with unsourced statements | Articles with unsourced statements from March 2007
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