!

nIvorsIfy of TunIs
IncuIfy of SocInI nnd Humnn ScIoncos
onrfmonf of IngIIsh
AcndomIc Yonr 20ll20l2





2
nd
year Anglophone Studies Course

Britain and the Rest of the World in
the 19
th
Century: Imperialism


Teachers: Awatef Ben Smida and Bechir Mechergui

Foreword
The second year Anglophone-studies Course is a text-based course that tries
to probe into the different phases of the British Empire during the
nineteenth century. The course is an attempt to analytically examine the
changes that altered the face of British Empire during the 19
th
century.
Students are expected to read texts beforehand and reflect on them before
the session. The course is an attempt to examine in depth the impact of the
British presence in the world to get an insight into the later developments
that characterized the history of the world at the beginning of the 20
th

century which is going to be studied during the second term.

Course Outline



Chapter 1: The Concept of the Empire

Chapter 2: The Motives for Imperialism

Chapter 3: The Motives for the British Imperial Experience

Chapter 4: The British in India from Expansion to Westernization

Chapter 5: The British in Africa form the End of Slavery to the Boer War

An empire in all but name: the mid-nineteenth century
The term empire` had its origin in a Latin word associated with notions oI
command` or power`. Generally, however, its meaning has been a little more
specialized though not much more. It was never a deIinitive or generic term
like republic` or democracy`. Its usage was determined more by historical
accident than by semantic design. Usually it could mean one oI two things. It
could mean simply the country presided over or the authority exercised by a
ruler who happened to be called an emperor. Or, more helpIully, it could mean
the territorial possessions oI a state (whose head might or might not be styled
emperor`) outside its strict national boundaries. It was in this latter sense that
Britain and her overseas territories in the late nineteenth century together
comprised an empire.
On the surIace this empire seemed an uneven and inconsistent kind oI political
entity, as indeed it was. Its diIIerent constituents were united in very little apart
Irom their common allegiance to the British crown. Even the degree oI this
allegiance, the extent to which the Queen`s ministers could presume on a
colony`s loyalty Ior help in a crisis, varied in practice Irom one part oI the
empire to another. There was no single language covering the whole empire, no
one religion, no one code oI laws, in their Iorms oI government the disparities
between colonies were immense: between the Gold Coast oI AIrica, Ior example
ruled despotically by British oIIicials, and Canada, with selI-government in
everything except her Ioreign policy, and here London`s control was only hazily
deIined. In between, Nigeria was ruled by a commercial company, the sates oI
Australia by their own prime ministers, Sierra Leone by a governor, Sarawak by
a hereditary English rajah, Somaliland by a commissioner responsible to India,
Egypt by a consul-general who in theory only advised` a native Egyptian
cabinet, Ascension Island by a captain as iI it were a ship. India was a Iull blown
oriental autocracy at its outer edges, but with a jumble oI princely states`

cluttering up its interior, where the local nawabs held sway under the protection
oI a British viceroy` responsible to an empress Victoria, who was merely
Queen oI the British Empire, but Empress oI this separate empire within it.
There was no kind oI overall logic which is chieIly why the British empire held
together at all. Government was adapted to local conditions, and the British were
happy with the discord oI it all so long as the music went on playing.
Underneath this conIusion, however, there was a kind oI rationality.
Fundamentally the empire true to its derivationwas a maniIestation oI
British power and inIluence, and whatever strange individual shapes they took
the colonies all shared this common characteristic, that they owed their origins
in some way to British economic, political and cultural predominance in the
world. This is almost a truism, but there is an important and less obvious rider to
it: that the colonies were not the only maniIestations oI that predominance.
Other countries outside the empire could be dominated or controlled by one
means or another Irom Britain almost as closely as her colonies more closely
than some. In a way Argentina was as much a British colony` as Canada, Egypt
or even Persia more strictly controlled by Britain than Nigeria. British
paramountcy was spread over a wide area.
The mid-Victorians themselves, or at least some oI them, knew how wide their
empire was spread. There was much disparaging talk oI empire at the time, but
generally what was objected to was a particular kind oI empire the old
mercantilist relationship with colonies Iorced to supply Britain`s industries with
raw materials, Iorbidden to compete with her in manuIactures, and prohibited
Irom trading with other countries.
Bernard Porter 1he Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism
185-197

There are six motives Ior imperial expansion, which seem Iundamental|
(a)%e Coloni:ing motive: the need to provide space Ior surplus, or dissident,
orin the case oI convict settlementscriminal population.
Imperialism` oI this sort should, oI course, more correctly be called
colonization`. But colonization has oIten involved the subjection oI
native peoplesa properly imperial` taskand colonies have usually
passed through a phase oI attachment to metropolitan empires.
(b)%e Economic Motive: at its more primitive a lust Ior loot or tribute; in a
developed Iorm a search Ior markets or materials; at its most sophisticated
this motive implies economic or commercial development supposed to be
mutually beneIicial.
(c)%e Aggressive Motive: desire Ior revenge, excitement, power or prestige,
whether Ior the Iun oI it or to impress others. The simple urge to trample
on weak but reIractory peoples, or to advertise power and strength, seems
to have inIluenced some imperialist monarchs, Ior instance the Assyrians,
in the past. This motive has not been lacking in modern times, though it
has come to play a subordinate role except when reIined into Iorms such
as the Iollowing: Empire building Ior the sake oI keeping up with the
Joneses`: the belieI that the acquisition or maintenance oI an Empire is, or
might become, necessary to enjoy Great Power prestige.
Fin-de-siecle theories, based on the survival oI the Iittest`, that the race
will be to the Ileet and the Iight to the strong; that nature is Iierce and
bloody and that peoples must either come out on top or go under.
(d)%e Strategic motive: the acquisition oI territory in order to saIeguard the
mother country and its lines oI communication, or to protect other
dependencies acquired Ior other motives.
(e)%e Missionary Motive: the ambition to proselytize; to convert other
people to religion, a culture or a way oI liIe.

(I)%e Leadersip Motive: the conviction oI superior ability to provide
orderly government, whether as a permanent proprietor or as a temporary
trustee.
Almost any combination oI these six motives is conceivable, though the Iirst
may involve the evacuation or extermination oI native peoples and to that
extent not be compatible with the two last. The original cause oI imperial
advance may not, oI course, be the same as the reasons given later to justiIy
iteither because it does not good enough, or because another object has in
Iact intervened. The two last motives, when sincere, may be thought
altruistic. The others make no pretence to be so; though reIined Iorms oI the
Economic Motive` can have an element oI altruism and strategic bases are
sometimes presented as sources oI local wealth. Because oI their apparently
altruistic character the Missionary` and Leadership` motives are most likely
to be invoked by civilized peoples who Ieel the need to justiIy their
expansion.
Richard Faber 1he Jision and the Aeed: Late Jictorian Imperialist Aims








%

The British Approach
The Colonizing Motive` led the way in some oI the more temperate parts oI
the Empire. It caused, notably, the Puritan settlements in New England, the
Quakers settlements in Pennsylvania, and the settlement oI loyalists in Nova
Scotia aIter the American Revolution. From the end oI eighteenth century
criminals were transported to Australia to remove the inconvenience which
arose Irom the crowded state oI the goals`
1
. There was planned colonization
oI Australia and New Zealand in the early nineteenth century.
The Economic Motive` was still more important. It lay at the bottom oI early
ambitions to discover a North-West Passage or to score a share in the
Spanish spoils oI the New World. It was the motive oI the London
Company`s expedition to Virginia under James I and the exploitation oI the
West Indies. It caused the East India Company to adventure to India and the
English Adventurers to trade into Hudson`s Bay. It was trade, primarily, that
brought about a British presence in West AIrica and in South-East Asia,
Singapore was occupied, in 1819, to break the commercial monopoly oI the
Dutch, with the Indonesian bases; Hong-Kong became a colony Ior the better
protection oI British merchants. BeIore the American Revolution Adam
Smith wrote that the maintenance oI commercial monopoly has hitherto
been the principal, or more properly perhaps the sole end and purpose oI the
dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies`. Even in the hey-
day oI Free Trade, commerce was a spur to imperial eIIort. As late as 1860
Palmerston wrote in a Foreign OIIice minute that the extension oI our West
AIrican trade was an object which ought to be actively and perseveringly
pursued` and that, iI necessary, a physical eIIort` should be made to protect
it.
The Aggressive Motive` appealed less to the shop keeping instinct. But a
sense oI adventure and romance inspired the early mariners and the
%

nineteenth century AIrican explorers. Adam Smith, attacking the mercantilist
system, argued that such Iorms oI dominion were unproIitable, but
recognized that the surrender oI authority over colonies would be mortiIying
to national pride.
1

The Strategic Motive` seemed particularly important in the shadow cast by
the Napoleonic Wars
2
, but it could never be ignored. Much oI the British
Empire was acquired in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century because,
or in the course, oI Anglo-French conIlict. Commercial rivalry may in turn
have helped to motivate this conIlict. But it was only because the rivalry
sharpened into war, that the British began to develop their military power in
India. Castlereagh occupied the Cape, in 1806, in order to prevent Holland,
Napoleon`s ally, Irom interIering with British trade. The extension oI the
British rule in India in the decades beIore the Mutiny
3
was partly strategic,
and partly aggressive, in impulse. The strategic value oI some oI the smaller
colonies was always apparent. The French and subsequently the British
occupied Mauritius because it lay on the Indian route. Concern Ior the Indian
route lay at the heart oI the British Strategy both beIore and aIter 1870. To
this extent the Strategic Motive`, in spite oI its importance, must rank as less
basic than the motives --economic, aggressive or altruisticwhich prompted
the retention oI the Indian Empire.
The Missionary Motive`, both in the British and French Empires, usually
contributed towards, rather than originated, imperial action. But it played its
part Irom the beginning. The missionary and the settler were oIten at odds;

1
klng's Speech aL Lhe openlng of arllamenL ln 1787
2
A serles of wars from 1799 1813 foughL beLween lrance when lL was ruled by napoleon and several oLher
Luropean counLrles lncludlng 8rlLaln 1hey ended when napoleon was defeaLed aL Lhe 8aLLle of WaLerloo
3
vlolenL acLlon Laken by lndlan soldlers ln 1837 agalnsL Lhelr 8rlLlsh offlcers whlch led Lo a general aLLempL by
Lhe people of norLh and cenLral lndla Lo Lake back power from Lhe 8rlLlsh 1he MuLlny evenLually falled And
Lhe 8rlLlsh esLabllshed conLrol agaln ln 1838

but there was a close alliance, throughout, between the missionary and the
trader; thus the Economic` and Missionary` motives went Irequently hand-
in-hand.
The Missionary Motive` was seldom strong enough by itselI to prompt the
annexation oI territory, though it oIten re-enIorced the case Ior giving
governmental support to traders. However, there were occasions when it was
the direct cause oI expansion. Sierra Leone was Iounded Ior philanthropic
reasons, in 1787, by the Abolition oI Slavery Society. EIIorts to root out the
Slave Trade, throughout the nineteenth century, involved strong measures on
the West and East Coast oI AIrica. The great Zanzibar slave-market was shut
down in 1873 aIter the Sultan was Iaced with the threat oI a blockade by the
Royal Navy. Nothing is more striking in British history than the expense and
energy devoted to the eradication oI a trade which, in the eighteenth century,
had made Liverpool and Bristol rich; there is no instance oI humanitarian
principles having so direct and sustained an eIIect on our overseas policies.
The abolitionists were single-minded men who succeeded in imparting to
oIIicial and public opinion their own absolute conviction oI the rightness oI
their cause. It was not surprising that this conviction should be strong; but,
even apart Irom slavery, no later Imperialist could quite reproduce the moral
certainty and optimism oI the early nineteenth century evangelicals.
Imperial motives were either Irankly selIish or, when altruistic, had a touch
oI missionary` Iervor. However, in practice British colonial administrators
were no doubt more concerned to govern than to proselytize. Similarly, those
who Ielt a desire to justiIy the British Empire in India did not need to detect
the dawn oI enlightenment there. They could simply point to the anarchy
which, it was already believed, would Iollow the Empire`s collapse.
Richard Faber 1he Jision and the Aeed: Late Jictorian Imperialist Aims

The 1840s were a period oI expansion in India and in South AIrica as well as
in New Zealand. Expansion in India was no trouble to the British taxpayer,
but in South AIrica as well as in New Zealand there was a distinct risk oI
unwelcome expense. The operations in India can be seen as the Iourth and
perhaps the last oI the waves oI expansion that swept the British Iorward to
rule the subcontinent. Both Give's expansion in Bengal and Wellesley's halI-
dozen years oI treaty-making and annexation were Iollowed by years oI
tranquility in which the British position seemed to have stabilized. The East
India Company shareholders hoped to use the peace aIter Wellesley's recall
to Iight oII the dangers oI competition Irom traders who wanted to sell cotton
goods made in England, but towards the end oI the Napoleonic Wars the
Governor-General Lord Hastings (previously Lord Moira, a politician in
Britain, and no relation to Warren Hastings) Ielt that the problems caused by
the Marathas, the Pindaris, and the Nepalese ought to be ended. Cavalry raids
to plunder nearby regions had been normal enough during the disorder oI the
breakdown oI the Moghul Empire in the eighteenth century, but the British
did not Iind this compatible with trade or with their ideas oI civilization, and
set about the work oI paciIying India and holding a monopoly oI the use oI
Iorce in their own hands. In the third wave oI expansion, 1814-20, the British
brought all India up to the River Sutlej, the Irontier oI the Punjab, under their
control. On the east side oI the Bay oI Bengal they took over most oI the
seacoast oI Burma in 1826, and Iurther to the south-east Sir StamIord RaIIles
in 1819 set up a colony on the island oI Singapore whose position on the
shortest route between India and China gave it good commercial prospects.
RaIIles spent most oI his time trying to make Bencoolen proIitable, but in the
event the site he had chosen Ior his new colony turned out to be much more
successIul.

'The people oI India submitted to British rule because it was inIinitely better
than that which obtained in India at the end oI the last century.'
1
The British
could bring peace when nobody else could, and iI they had not been accepted
by the Indians, the East India Company - heroic though many oI its
employees showed themselves to be - could hardly have conquered so large a
territory with such limited resources. The British Iound the process oI
conquest and expansion a little surprising; and Ior some years aIter the
completion oI Lord Hastings's wave oI conquests they remained uncertain
whether they could keep the political power they had gained, or would Iind it
convenient to do so. OIIicials like MetcalIe and Elphinstone who had played
important roles in the establishment oI the British position saw that their
government held power because the disorder oI the eighteenth century had
created a situation in which no other authority could resist the British. From
this they argued that aIter a period oI peace and recovery Indians would be
able to look aIter their own aIIairs again. From a diIIerent perspective
Macaulay, who had come to India to help carry out a very speciIic policy oI
westernization by draIting a uniIorm code oI law Ior the whole country,
could say that the day Britain leIt India would be the proudest day in her
history: the diIIerence was that Macaulay made it clear that this departure
was to come when India had been westernized - partly by making English the
language Ior ruling the country - while the men oI Lord Hastings's day were
still thinking oI the revival oI an earlier India. The change oI approach took
place while the British were making arrangements, during Lord William
Bentinck's period as Governor-General Irom 1828 to 1835, Ior administering
1
R. C. Dutt, England and India 1785-1885 (1897), 45. Dutt, one oI the Iirst Indians to enter the
ICS, added the generous but not limitless approval that it was better 'than any other rule which it is
possible to have at the present day

the territories gained and paying oII the debts incurred in Lord Hastings's
wars; by the end oI Bentinck's tenure oI oIIice it was clear that the British
were unlikely to leave India beIore they had carried out a policy oI Iairly
complete westernization. They had deposed the last Moghul Emperor,
proclaimed William IV as ruler oI India, and issued a standard rupee
(showing the king's head) to replace the great diversity oI coins that had
circulated previously.
The East India Company had been extremely reluctant to interIere with
anything more than the bare essentials oI political liIe in India. It did its best
to keep missionaries out, because it thought there was no need to convert
Hindus or Muslims and the attempt to do so might easily cause trouble. It
tried to make sure that the Iew newspapers that could not be prevented Irom
appearing were regulated to make sure they did not spread scandal or
discontent. It had retained the laws oI the Moghul Empire Ior the vast
majority oI its Indian subjects. Sometimes, as under Warren Hastings, the
policy oI avoiding change was Iollowed because the Governor-General had
considerable sympathy Ior the Indian way oI liIe and saw some loss in
disturbing it; sometimes, as under Cornwallis, the Governor-General had no
very high opinion oI Indians but thought that change would lead to conIlict,
unhappiness, and expense.
Change could not be avoided entirely; in the last decades oI the eighteenth
century the expansion oI the British cotton industry was destroying the
export trade in Indian textiles which the East India Company had built up in
the previous hundred years and , aIter India was opened to British textiles in
1813, great inroads were made in Indian domestic markets as well. Lord
William Bentinck could see that the collapse oI the industry was a serious
problem Ior parts oI Indian society but, quite apart Irom the pressure Irom
Lancashire which had led to the decision to open trade, with India to British

merchants, the Indian Civil Service contained many convinced Iree traders.
They put their case in a way that in later decades, when Indian manuIacturers
began asking Ior tariIIs, combined humane Ieelings with the pleasure oI
criticizing their political opponents; granted the obvious Iact that Indian
peasants were poor, and that reducing their living expenses by allowing them
the chance to buy economical Lancashire textiles would help keep them a
little Iurther Irom starvation, was it really Iair to deny them the opportunity to
take advantage oI the Iall in British export prices and push them back to the
edge oI subsistence so that a small minority oI weavers and Iactory owners in
Ahmadabad would have a captive market oI people who had to buy
expensive Indian products instead oI cheap British products? Reasoning oI
this sort encouraged the Civil Service in later years to see itselI as the Iriend
oI the Indian masses against the special interests who wanted to do well out
oI the enthusiasm Ior independence. In the early nineteenth century the
question was put in simpler terms, but the Civil Service already saw itselI as
the wise protector oI the people, saving them Irom their vices and Iollies. As
it became impossible to maintain the ban against missionaries and as British
opinion became more inIormed about India and more shocked by what it
learnt, intervention by the new rulers became unavoidable and was naturally
supported and even pushed Iorward by enthusiasts in Britain.
Hindu widows were expected to perIorm the rite oI suttee by throwing
themselves into the Ilames when their husband's body was being burnt; this
might have been tolerated (Ior only a small minority oI widows did it) iI they
had always done it voluntarily, but in Iact it was clear that they were oIten
killed by their relations, who Iorced them into the Ilames. In 1829 this
practice was made illegal; the struggle to suppress it lasted some years, and
provided one oI the more instructive anecdotes oI imperial improvement.
Some Indians appealed to Sir Charles Napier not to enIorce the new policy,

because suttee was an old and venerated custom; Napier replied that his
country had an old and venerated custom oI hanging people who burnt
widows alive, and he went on to say that he was entirely committed to
enIorcing national custom. No Indian was bold enough to ask him why his
country was exporting its customs to India, and yet the issue raised a problem
about good government and selI-government that might have puzzled any
political philosopher who approved oI national independence and
disapproved oI pushing widows into the Iire. The British in India could see
no signs oI national Ieeling, and had no qualms about changing customs they
disapproved oI. Female babies were not much wanted in India, and were
likely to be killed without too much thought or regret; the government
Iorbade inIanticide and, aIter a struggle that ran Ior about IiIty years, was
able by the 1860s to say that the practice had been more or less ended. The
government also conducted, during the 1830s, a brieI and successIul
campaign against thuggee, which was practised by a subcaste whose
religious belieIs committed them to joining groups oI passing travellers and
then murdering them. Politically this was one oI the easier reIorms to carry
out; once the existence oI the subcaste became known and police activity was
launched against it in 1836, nobody argued that this religious practice was
worthwhile. All three campaigns were naturally welcomed in Britain, and
probably all three oI them helped make the new rulers oI India even more
certain that they were the messengers oI civilization and that the Indians were
benighted.
Some Indians accepted this view; a Iew were converted to Christianity, but as
most converts came Irom the lower castes, responding to the pressures oI
Hinduism in much the same way as the people in the lower castes who had
become Muslims in earlier centuries, this did not represent a great shiIt in the
sentiments oI Indians in a position oI importance. A more signiIicant change

was the eIIort made by inIluential Hindus, oI whom Ram Mohun Roy is
accepted as the most thoughtIul and the most imaginative, to adapt Hindu
belieIs to the modern world which was pressing upon them. Bengal was the
centre Irom which British power and inIluence had spread over the rest oI
India, and it had become the seat oI government in 1833 when Calcutta
replaced Delhi as the oIIicial capital and the Moghuls were Iormally deposed.
It now also became the centre oI the Indian response to the great
transIormation. This response underlined the way that change in India was
always likely to be linked to religious changes: Young Bengal- a
westernizers` name, with obvious parallels in England, in Ireland, and in Italy
- enrolled members who were ready to go a long way in laying aside
restrictions on eating beeI, on travelling overseas, and on educating women
in order to deal with the new world that had burst in upon them.
The religious practices that were attacked as criminal by the British were
almost entirely Hindu - purdah Ior Muslim women was no crime and was not
attacked - but as the British became more certain that they would stay and
that India should be westernized they changed the administration in a way
that transIerred power Irom Muslims to Hindus. The revenue arrangements
were leIt unchanged in principle, and the taxes on salt, on opium, and on land
were retained. The British lowered the nominal rate oI land tax Irom the level
charged by the Moghuls, but they may have been more successIul in
collecting what they demanded. The Muslims' loss oI power was not deliber-
ate policy, but it was inevitable when the British decided there was no need
to continue to treat India as part oI the Muslim world, and this was all the
more natural because the establishment oI the boundary on the Sutlej meant
that many oI the Muslims oI the Moghul Empire were not at this point within
the British Empire in India. Until 1828 Persian had been the language oI

Iormal diplomacy;-when English was made the" language oI diplomacy it
merely recognized a change that had already taken place.
A larger change came when the new British code oI laws was introduced.
Under the old system the Hindu peasants who made up the vast majority oI
the population were able to run their own aIIairs under their own laws but
people in the ruling classes were normally governed in their relations with
each other by an essentially Islamic law. The new code ended the inIluence
oI Islamic teaching and the preIerence Ior Muslim witnesses oI the old
system. A large staII oI Indian subordinates was still needed to help run the
judicial system, but Hindus were employed rather more readily than
Muslims, because the Hindus oI Bengal took to British education very
quickly. Most oI the Muslims who had held power lived Iurther up the
Ganges valley, close to the old centres oI Moghul rule at Delhi and Agra, and
did not have the same opportunities Ior obtaining British education or the
same enthusiasm Ior it. The change Irom the old code to the new took twenty
years to carry out, and was quite visibly accompanied by a loss oI authority
by the Muslims, which was more a result oI replacing a land-based empire by
a sea-based empire than any British preIerence Ior the Hindus.
As the British position in India became more land-based, they paid more
attention to what was happening beyond the geographical boundaries oI the
subcontinent. The development oI the steamship Ior ocean travel in the 1820s
made it much easier to use the Red Sea, which had never been convenient Ior
sailing-ships, to go Irom India to Suez and then travel overland to
Alexandria. This was too expensive a route Ior goods, which would have had
to be unloaded and reloaded, but it enabled passengers to reach India in six
weeks or less, rather than spending six months going round the Cape. To
make this easier the government oI India established a coaling station to
reIuel its ships at Aden in 1839. Further north, it had been taken Ior granted
%

that the Iranian empire would hold back the Russians; aIter the Russo-Iranian
treaty oI Turkomanchai in 1828 showed this was not the case, the British
government in India began to consider whether to take over the very ill-
organized kingdom oI AIghanistan beyond the range oI mountains taken to
deIine the Irontier oI India and turn it into a IortiIied outpost against the
Russians. British India had no common Irontier with AIghanistan; Ranjit
Singh, the subtle, disreputable, and powerIul ruler oI the Punjab was
perIectly willing to see AIghanistan conquered and reduced to peace and
quiet but he did not want British troops marching through his territory so
they had to take a roundabout approach, marching west and north through
Sind. It was easy to Iind a rival claimant to the AIghan throne, Shah Sujah,
and in 1839 it seemed almost as easy to depose the reigning monarch Dost
Mohammed and establish the British nominee on the throne. The problem
was to keep him there: late in 1841 the AIghans rose in revolt, the British
retreated, and in the course oI their winter Ilight almost every one oI them
was killed and so, oI course, was Shah Sujah.
The British were not as upset by this disaster as might have been expected. A
punitive expedition was launched against Kabul which captured and
devastated the town and then withdrew. The next year Sind was oIIered a
treaty which would have reduced it to much the same position as the Indian
princely states; when this oIIer was reIused the British under Napier marched
Iorward and annexed it. The Sikh rulers oI the Punjab were alarmed by this.
II Ranjit Singh had still been alive he might have been able to hold them
back, but his successors thought it would be saIer to drive the British out oI
India, and in 1845 they crossed the River Sutlej and began plundering the
regions north-west oI Delhi. The battles that Iollowed were among the
hardest-Iought in the entire military history oI the British in India, though the
British could have won with rather less bloodshed under a more competent
%

general, but in a Iew months the Sikh kingdoms had been conquered and a
network oI British oIIicials installed to supervise the activities oI the Sikh
government. This device proved too subtle to work. The Sikhs rose in
rebellion a couple oI years later, were deIeated in another set oI exhausting
battles, and eventually in 1849 the Punjab was annexed. The British had
virtually completed their conquest oI India, though a Iew Iragments remained
to be absorbed later. Even the Russian problem had grown less serious
because Russian moves towards the western end oI AIghanistan had Iailed as
completely as the British in the south-western side oI the country.
T.O. Lloyd 1he British Empire 1558-1983

Africa and the End of Slavery
The advance in India had become a matter oI conquest and Iormal annexation.
British involvement in West AIrica in the 1830s and 1840s was much less
impressive, but turned out to be the Ioundation Ior later expansion. The abrupt
end oI legal slave-trading in 1807 did not end the practice, but it dislocated
AIrican society as much as the gradual building up oI the slave trade had done in
earlier centuries. British interest at the oIIicial level was concentrated on the
colony oI Sierra Leone. FOR IiIty years or more it was the administrative centre
Ior British possessions in West AIrica, and also was the centre Ior educating
AIricans and Ior training them as Christian missionaries who created a church
with solid local Ioundations in most oI the areas that came to speak English.

Sierra Leone was not the most prosperous part oI West AIrica. Its revenue did
not cover the cost oI government, and even aIter the Colonial OIIice took it over
the Church Missionary Society provided a subsidy oI about 2,000 a year.
Traders who wanted to make money went, as they had been going-Ior a century
and a halI, to the Gold Coast. Here they knew that the coastal traders with whom
they dealt, the Fanti, were not the major power in the region, but it was not clear
how they could respond to the growing power oI the Asanti conIederacy inland,
or to the disturbance caused by the check to the Atlantic slave trade. In 1821'the-
British government abolished the Council oI Merchants which had been running
the administration oI the coast, and installed a governor instead. In 1824 a war
with Asanti broke out in which the governor was killed and his army was
deIeated; the government decided the old policy had been sensible, and returned
authority to the merchants, oIIering a subsidy oI 4,000 a year to help pay Ior
the coastal Iorts.

The merchants were Iortunate enough to Iind the ideal man Ior the situation
among the British oIIicers posted on the Gold Coast at the time the government
withdrew. George Maclean was made President oI the Council oI Merchants in
1829 and turned out to be able to get on very well with the AIricans, establishing
treaty relations that led to peace and quiet on the coast. His legal authority was
very slight, and he certainly exceeded it, but in 1831 he made a treaty with
Asanti which served as the Ioundation oI a diplomatic structure oI trust which
persuaded the Asanti not to make any attacks on the Fanti which might Iorce the
British to choose between going inland to Iight or abandoning the AIricans who
had relied on them to keep the peace. In the 1830s Maclean established himselI
as a judge whose decisions the Fanti accepted, and to this limited extent he
became the ruler oI the region. In 1842 the government, perhaps encouraged by
seeing that it was possible to rule the coast peaceIully, returned to control the
region directly, and Maclean as a judicial assessor continued to exercise real but
restricted power among the Fanti. Trade developed a little Iurther east on the
coast, based on the palm-oil which AIrican traders brought down the mouths oI
the Niger (which were, as a result, called the Oil Rivers). This was a region
without any central authority to organize the AIricans Ior war, so it was easier
Ior merchants to go about their business without even the minimal authority that
Maclean represented Iurther west.
Ending the slave trade had a considerable eIIect on West AIrica, but ending
slavery itselI had a much greater eIIect on the West Indies. The abolition oI the
British trade, and even the steps taken to persuade the other European powers to
make it illegal at the end oI the Napoleonic Wars, had still leIt the institution
itselI apparently invulnerable. Though it might not be as socially acceptable as
in the past, its deIenders could Ieel conIident that nobody would undertake the
immense interIerence with the rights oI property that would be involved in
setting the slaves Iree, but the government showed some readiness to regulate

the owners by steps like setting up a register oI slaves to reduce the risk oI
concealed sales. AIter the establishment in 1823 oI the Anti-Slavery Society,
which was committed to Iull emancipation, the government went on to prohibit
the Ilogging oI Iemale slaves and the breaking-up oI slave Iamilies. The sugar
industry continued to Ilourish, but some revolts in the 1820s made it clear that
British taxpayers might Iind themselves being asked to pay to suppress a slave
rebellion. When the long period oI Tory rule, which seemed to have stretched in
an almost unbroken line Irom the emergence oI Pitt in 1783, was brought to an
end in 1830, a Whig government came to oIIice in an atmosphere oI public
enthusiasm Ior reIorm. The ending oI slavery, instead oI being just one out oI a
number oI worthy causes, became an issue on which the government had to try
to Iind a policy. A slave revolt in Jamaica in 1831, encouraged by hopes oI what
the government was doing, underlined the possibility that British taxpayers
might have to pay the military costs oI maintaining slavery, and this made the
government all the more eager to Iind a policy to end it.
According to long-established practice, questions oI this sort should have been
handled by the assemblies oI the islands concerned. But slavery was one oI the
very Iew colonial issues about which the British Parliament cared so much that
it was ready to assert the Iullness oI its power iI necessary. When the Iirst
Parliament elected aIter the expansion oI the right to vote in the great reIorm bill
met in 1833, it was clearly time Ior the West Indian assemblies to make the best
terms Ior compensation Ior emancipation that they could get. Eventually the
government agreed to pay 20m. in compensation - not the Iull cash value oI the
78,000 slaves to be Ireed, who were valued at about 45m., but still about halI a
year's normal government expenditure. In addition the government accepted the
argument that a period oI transition was needed Ior the sugar plantations to turn
into economic units run on wage labour, and so the slaves to be Ireed on 31 July
1834 were to remain as apprentices Ior Iour to six years, which meant they had

to work a 40-hour week Ior Iood and clothing, so that they would be in very
much the position oI the white indentured servants who had been tied to a
master Ior a Iixed period oI years. This system did not work well-, the masters
were too inclined to look back to slavery and the apprentices were too inclined
to look Iorward to Ireedom Ior the transition to do as much good as had been
hoped, and in 1838 it was ended by general consent.
The West Indies adapted to this great change Iairly successIully. They still had
their assured position in the British sugar market in the old colonial system, and
imports oI sugar were rising. In Jamaica there was enough idle land away Irom
the plantations Ior a large number oI the Ireed slaves to squat there and set up
smallholdings oI their own, so that the plantation owners never Ielt that they had
a really adequate supply oI wage labour. In the smaller islands there was much
less surplus land and the Ireed slaves turned to wage labour Ior want oI any
other way to earn a living, and these islands settled down to the new system
more easily than Jamaica did. Employers all over the British West Indies
complained oI the unwillingness oI the slaves to work Ior wages and set about
importing a supply oI more tractable wage labour Irom India or China
,
but their
political power in the islands remained unchallenged, though Iragile. The right
to vote depended on a Iairly low property qualiIication and, while very Iew
Iormer slaves could meet that qualiIication in the 1830s, the question was bound
to arise in a generation or two.
The ending oI slavery helped cause one piece oI imperial expansion that none oI
the supporters oI emancipation could possibly have expected. Slavery was seen
as a West Indian problem, but the government did realize that it also had to deal
with the slavery in South AIrica bequeathed by the Dutch. It tried to make
arrangements to pay compensation Ior Ireed slaves there as well, but owners oI
slaves in the more distant parts oI the colony would have had great diIIiculty in
going to collect the compensation, and in any case emancipation was seen even

by AIrikaners who owned no slaves as just another sign oI a general pro-black
bias among the British. Apart Irom this, AIrikaners suIIered Irom an almost
insatiable land-hunger; in 1834 the Governor, Sir Bejamin D'Urban, did
undertake a small advance Irom the existing boundary on the Fish River to the
River Kei which was accepted by the local missionary interest as a necessary
step towards establishing a manageable Irontier, but the new territory did not
have much to oIIer the AIrikaners.
In 1834 they began discussing moving Iorward north oI the Orange River and,
aIter a Iew scouting parties had gone ahead, the main body began moving north
in February 1836. They Ielt encouraged in their decision when the Governor
received instructions the Iollowing month that he was to withdraw Irom the new
land between the Fish and the Kei; the Secretary Ior the Colonies, Lord Glenelg,
stuck to the old policy that taking land Irom the AIricans was not morally
justiIied and would only stir them up to make the Irontier less stable than beIore.
Opinion in the Cape was dismayed by this; British and AIrikaner settlers were
agreed that the new Irontier and the new land to the east oI the colony were the
sort oI policy they wanted, and they blamed Glenelg Ior having listened to too
much uniIormed pro-black sentiment. Glenelg was undoubtedly an evangelical
who Ielt that the AIricans were not being treated Iairly, but he must also have
been aIIected by the Iact that D'Urban was remarkably ineIIicient about
explaining his policy. The step Iorward led to another KaIIir War, with the usual
Iinancial disadvantages: Cape revenues covered the civil costs oI government
but the British taxpayer had to contribute at least 100,000 a year to maintain
troops at the Cape and was now being asked to provide 500,000 to pay Ior what
in London looked like an operation to acquire new land Ior the settlers.
Compared with this, the Great Trek oI the Boers seemed Iairly harmless even
though it was undertaken by men who Ielt a deep hostility to the British
government. The AIrikaners were taking a risky step but they were not asking

the British government to support them, and it could hardly send battalions oI
troops to stop them crossing the Orange River.
About 6,000 Boers (Iarmers) went north Irom the eastern Cape Province. A
Iarmer liked to have 6,000 acres Ior raising cattle, and it is an indicator oI the
scale oI land-hunger that iI each oI the 6,000 trekkers had needed an individual
Iarm they would have settled a long strip oI land 30 miles wide Irom the Orange
to the Limpopo. Obviously the original trekkers went Iorward in Iamilies, and
would not need new Iarms on this scale in the Iirst generation, but some land
north oI the Orange could not be used even Ior cattle-raising, and the region was
not empty; there were Iewer AIricans than around the Fish River, but this was in
part because the soil was less Iertile. A Iair amount oI the land was relatively
thinly populated; at the same time as the Cape was being transIerred Irom Dutch
to British rule with all its eIIects on the position oI the AIrikaners, political
changes in Zululand were aIIecting the inhabitants oI the whole eastern side oI
Southern AIrica. Little oI this was visible to Europeans; what they saw was the
increasing pressure around the Fish River as AIricans Iled westwards to get
away Irom the eIIicient and bloodthirsty military organization which had been
unleashed by Chaka in Zululand in 1818 and in the course oI the next dozen
years had driven all other AIricans into Ilight. As a result the area north oI the
eastern Cape through which the trekkers moved was unusually empty. The
trekkers who kept to the northern axis oI march did encounter the Matabele, but
aIter an initial check were able to drive them Iurther on to the north and west.
The trouble was that this route, however satisIactorily empty, was not very good
land; a more attractive prospect opened up to the east, and many oI the trekkers
made their way up the Drakensberg and then down towards the sea.
This took them towards the centre oI Zulu power: the most dramatic moments oI
the AIrikaner epic oI the Trek are the murder oI the Boer leader Piet RetieI in a
treacherous attack by the Zulu king Dingaan, and then the successIul deIence

later in 1838 oI a laager on Blood River in which the Zulu army lost so many
men that it was unlikely to attack the AIrikaners Ior a generation. Another part
oI the AIrikaner epic deals with the reappearance oI the British, who thought it
was one thing to see the AIrikaners go oII into the distant interior, but another
matter to see them turn east towards the sea where they might establish a port
and become an international Iactor to be reckoned with. The best harbour had
already been settled in 1835 by Englishmen who named it aIter D'Urban, but the
British government could not decide whether to take responsibility Ior the
region or not. It moved in, it moved out, and Iinally committed itselI to holding
the seacoast. The trekkers Iound this irritating; the government clearly Ielt a
distrust oI the AIrikaners balanced by an acute desire not to spend any money,
so the trekkers would not want to be under British rule iI Natal was taken over.
AIter the eventual British annexation in 1844 the AIrikaners resumed their
original march to the north and, over the next twenty years, the new colony oI
Natal was settled by a white population that was much more uniIormly British
by descent than the population oI any other part oI southern AIrica. A rather
larger number oI immigrants came into the colony Irom India, though AIricans
naturally still made up the majority oI the population and the newcomers were
well aware that Zululand remained a Iormidable military state to the north, even
aIter the new king Panda and his trusted son and heir Cetewayo had established
a Iairly settled Iorm oI government there in the 1850s.
T.O. Lloyd 1he British Empire 1558-1983

The Boer War
The Boer War, or Anglo-Boer War (Oct. 11, 1899-May 31, 1902), war was
Iought between Great Britain and the two Boer (AIrikaner) republics--the
South AIrican Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State. Although it
was the largest and most costly war in which the British engaged between the
Napoleonic Wars and World War I, it was Iought between wholly unequal
protagonists. The total British military strength in South AIrica reached
nearly 500,000 men, whereas the Boers could muster no more than about
88,000.The Boers had unsuccessIully sued Ior peace in March 1901; Iinally,
they accepted the loss oI their independence by the Peace oI Vereeniging.
This episode was important in the history oI the British Dominions regardless
oI the British victory.

During that war, Canadians, Australians and other imperial troops Iought
with men Irom the British Isles. The appearance oI unity could in no way
hide the disconcerting tendencies. The imperial troops Iighting in the South
AIrican war experienced a strong sentiment oI nationalism rather than an
imperial one. Obviously the status oI Dominions needed to be clariIied.

Despite Joseph Chamberlain`s eIIorts to consolidate Imperial ties and to
Iound a Iederal council (the latter suggestion was even reIused by New
Zealand), nothing was made to improve Iree trade within the empire or to
consider a greater sharing oI the imperial deIence. It was, however, decided
that colonial conIerences should be held regularly every Iour years not just
on the occasion oI a royal jubilee or coronation. The colonial OIIice was
responsible Ior the organization oI these conIerences.
%


In 1911, the colonial conIerence became the imperial conIerence but the term
'Dominion was still unsatisIactorily used. It is true that this term could be
seen as an improvement when compared with the title 'selI-governing
colony but Iurther advance was needed to make these Dominions enjoy the
status oI states in the Iull sense. In Iact, these Dominions usually argued that
they did not play their part in the imperial Ioreign policy because they had
not been invited to do so.

The term 'Commonwealth appeared as an alternative to 'empire but it
should be made clear that the advocates oI that term did in no sense imply
any relaxation oI imperial ties; quite the contrary. They believed that the
empire had to Iederate or disintegrate- but most politicians rejected that
choice.