Effects of Word-of-Mouth and ProductAttribute Information on Persuasion: An Accessibility-Diagnosticity Perspective

PAUL M. HERR FRANK R. KARDES JOHN KIM*

The effects of word-of-mouth (WOM) communications and specific attribute information on product evaluations were investigated. A face-to-face WOM communication was more persuasive than a printed format (experiment 1). Although a strong WOM effect was found, this effect was reduced or eliminated when a prior impression of the target brand was available from memory or when extremely negative attribute information was presented (experiment 2). The results suggest that diverse, seemingly unrelated judgmental phenomenasuch as the vividness effect, the perseverance effect, and the negativity effectcan be explained through the accessibilitydiagnosticity model.

everal studies have shown that word-of-mouth (WOM) communications often exert a strong influence on judgments of products. For example, consumers frequently rely on WOM when selecting an automotive diagnostic center (Engel, Blackwell, and Kegerreis 1969), when choosing a physician (Feldman and Spencer 1965), or when considering the purchase ofa new product or service (Arndt 1967; Brown and Reingen 1987; Reingen and Kernan 1986; Richins 1983). Prior research has focused primarily on the effects of communicator characteristics (e.g., similarity, credibility, trustworthiness) on interpersonal influence (Bearden and Etzel 1982; Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989; Price, Feick, and Higie 1989). Our research focuses on the manner in which information is presented (vividly vs. pallidly) and on the type of evidence available for processing (anecdotal vs. detailed attribute information). Our goal is to investigate the me-

'Paul M. Herr is assistant professor of marketing. Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN 46223. Frank R. Kardes is associate professor of marketing. College of Business Administration, University ofCincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221. John Kim was a doctoral student at the University ofCincinnati and is currently assistant professor of marketing. School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester Hills, Ml 48309. The authors wish to thank Russell Fazio, Richard Olshavsky, Martha Powell, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version ofthis article.

diation of WOM effects on persuasion and to identify additional moderating variables. One factor that is likely to mediate the effects of WOM on judgment is information vividness. Vividly presented information is inherently interesting, attention drawing, and thought provoking. Consequently, vividly (as opposed to pallidly) presented information tends to have a stronger influence on product judgments (for reviews, see Kisielius and Sternthal 1986; Nisbett and Ross 1980). However, the disproportionate effect of vividly presented information on judgment is unwarranted because manner of presentation does not influence the diagnostic or probative value of information. Taylor and Thompson's (1982) well-known review revealed that the vast majority of empirical investigations of the vividness hypothesis found effects of vividness on memory but not on judgment. Moreover, the few judgmental vividness effects that were observed are difficult to interpret because vividness was confounded with other informational variables.' Finally, they argue that judgmental vividness effects should be found only when the information context provides an opportunity for differential encoding of vivid versus pallid information. Consider the Borgida and Nisbett (1977) experiment. College students received either extensive and detailed course evaluations based on ratings from a large sample of students or brief, face-to-face, course comments from a single individual. Vivid WOM in454
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formation had a greater impact on course choices relative to the extensive but pallid course evaluations. However, this study has been criticized because the WOM communications and the course evaluations differed on many relevant dimensions (i.e., amount of information, information content, base rate vs. case information). We avoided these confounds in the present experiment by developing a control condition in which amount ofinformation, information content, and type of information were held constant. The only factor influenced by our vividness manipulation was the manner in which information was presented: half of the subjects were exposed to anecdotal information presented in a face-to-face manner (the vivid WOM condition), and half were exposed to the exact same information presented in a printed mode (the pallid condition). In addition, extensive and detailed Consumer Reports information about product features was provided to allow selective encoding of evidence. HI: Word-of-mouth communications should have a greater impact on product judgments relative to less vivid printed information.

Anecdotal Information
Subjects participated in small groups of four to six. One member ofthe group was a confederate who delivered the face-to-face, WOM communication after subjects had read the product description. None ofthe subjects knew the confederate. The confederate stated that she owned a computer similar to the described brand, and, in positive-anecdote conditions, she added, "It's the best computer I've ever owned. It's really easy to use, and I haven't had a single problem with it." In contrast, in negative-anecdote conditions she said, "It's the worst computer I've ever owned. It's really hard to use, and I've had nothing but problems with it." The experimenter asked the confederate to write the brand name of her computer on a slip of paper, said it was the described brand, and thanked and dismissed her. In pallid conditions, the same anecdotes were presented verbatim in a printed format transcribed from a ''Consumer Reports telephone interview with a college student."

Attitude Measures
After the confederate's departure, subjects evaluated the target product on three 11-point scales anchored by 0 and 10 (bad/good, favorable/unfavorable, desirable/undesirable). These ratings were averaged to form a single brand-attitude index (Cronbach's alpha = .95,

EXPERIMENT 1 Overview
Eighty-four undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (WOM or printed anecdote) X 2 (positive or negative anecdote) factorial design. Anecdotal information was presented either in a face-to-face (vivid) manner or in a printed (pallid) format. Anecdotal information and detailed Consumer Reports product attribute information were evaluatively inconsistent to permit assessment ofthe relative impact of anecdotal versus attribute information.

Attribute Relevance Measures

Subjects may focus more on vivid WOM information than on attribute information because vivid information is more attention drawing or because the attributes may be perceived as irrelevant (Borgida and Nisbett 1977). To rule out the second possibility, we administered attribute-relevance measures. For each of the seven attributes, subjects estimated the percentage of high- versus low-quality PCs possessing the attribute in question on scales from 0 (0 percent) to 10 (100 percent). Low quality was defined as average or low quality to ensure that mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories would be employed. Bayesian likelihood ratios were computed from these subjective probabilities by dividing the probability that a lowquality PC possesses a given attribute from the probability that a high-quality PC possesses the attribute. Attribute relevance or diagnosticity is expressed as the magnitude of the likelihood ratio or its reciprocal, whichever is larger (Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom 1983).

Attribute Information
Subjects received information, "condensed from Consumer Reports," about a new personal computer (PC). The description contained a brief summary of standard features (this summary was held constant across conditions), a ranking (the brand was ranked either third or seventeenth best of the 20 models tested), and information about seven attributes (memory, monitor, keyboard, hard-drive system, printer port, graphics, and clock speed). In positive-valence conditions, all attributes were described favorably (e.g., 640-KB memory, high-quality color monitor, separate cursor control and function keys on the keyboard), whereas in negative-valence conditions, attributes were described less favorably (e.g., 512-KB memory, lowquality monochrome monitor, inconveniently located cursor control and function keys on the keyboard).

Results
Brand attitudes as a function of anecdote format and valence are presented in the following tabulation.

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Anecdote formal Anecdote valence Positive Negative WOM 6.75 3.53 Printed 3.70 6.87

Higher scores indicate more favorable overall evaluations. Cell size is 18 for the negative printed anecdote format (lower right entry), and 19 otherwise. A 2 X 2 between-subjects analysis of variance performed on brand attitudes yielded the predicted vividness-by-valence interaction (F(l,71) = 111.73, p < .001, co^ = .59). The main effects were not significant (F's < 1). Simple-effect tests were performed to interpret the interaction while controlling for the compounding of alpha. In positive-anecdote conditions, more favorable brand attitudes were formed in WOM than in print conditions (X= 6.75 vs. 3.70; F(l,71) = 49.50, p < .001, oP- = .28). Conversely, in negative-anecdote conditions, less favorable brand attitudes were formed in WOM than in print conditions (X = 3.53 vs. 6.87; F(l,71) = 60.24,/? < .001, oj^ = .32). Thus, anecdotal information had a stronger impact on brand attitudes when it was presented in a vivid, face-to-face manner as opposed to a pallid, printed format. The observed vividness effect is even more impressive when one considers the diagnostic value ofthe attribute information that was provided. If an attribute is equally likely to be associated with a high- or low-quality product, that attribute does not enable the consumer to determine whether a product is high or low in quality. Thus, the attribute is nondiagnostic, and the likelihood ratio will equal 1. To the extent that the likelihood ratio differs from unity, a given piece of information is considered to be informative or diagnostic' Likelihood ratios were computed and averaged across the seven target attributes, and this index was subjected
'Bayes's theorem prescribes how beliefs should be updated in light of new evidence (for an excellent review, see Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom 1983). The theorem states that P(HIA) P(AIH) ^^ P(H) P(H/A) P(AIH) P(H)' in which, reading from right to left, P(H)IP(H) refers to the prior odds that the target product is a high- (as opposed to low) quality product; P(A/H)/P{A/H) is the likelihood ratio, which represents the degree to which attribute A ini^plies a high- (as opposed to low) quality product; and P(H/A)/PiH/A) refers to the posterior odds that H is true given ^. If the probability of observing A given that H is true is different from the probability of observing A when H is not true, the likelihood ratio will differ from 1, and the posterior odds will differ from the prior odds. The values ofthe numerator and denominator ofthe likelihood ratio are independent. Thus, A may imply H even if .4 is unlikely given H. provided that A is even more unlikely given H. Similarly, A may be nondiagnostic even if A is likely given H. provided that A is equally likely given H. Consumers tend to overlook these possibilities because they tend to focus on the numerator and neglect the denominator ofthe likelihood ratio (the pseudodiagnosticity efTect; see Fischhoff and BeythMarom 1983; Hoch and Deighton 1989).

to a 2 (anecdote vividness) X 2 (attribute valence) analysis of variance. The attributes were perceived as more diagnostic in negative {X = 4.63) than in positive {X = 2.61) valence conditions (F(l,71) = 6.78, p < .02). Moreover, likelihood ratios differed significantly from I in both negative (F(l,36) = 39.05,/7 < .001) and positive (F(l,37) = 26.04, /7 < .001) conditions. Anecdote vividness did not influence the perceived diagnosticity of the attributes ( F < 1), and the vividness-by-valence interaction also was not significant (F < 1). Thus, the results provide direct support for the proposition that negative infonnation is more informative than positive information, in the sense that it helps consumers discriminate between low- and high-quality products (Mizerski 1982; Wright 1974). More important, the results indicate that robust anecdote vividness effects on judgment were obtained even though highly relevant attribute information was available.

Discussion
The results of experiment 1 indicate that WOM communications have a strong impact on product judgments, relative to less vivid printed communications. Moreover, favorable brand attitudes are formed when a single, favorable WOM communication is presented, even when extensive, diagnostic attribute information is available. In contrast, the judgmental effects of printed anecdotal information are overwhelmed by detailed attribute information. Hence, the manner in which information is presented can produce strong judgmental effects, even when the diagnostic value ofthis information is controlled. These findings suggest that vividly (as opposed to pallidly) presented information is more accessible from memory and is weighed more heavily in judgment (see also Kisielius and Sternthal 1984, 1986; McGill and Anand 1989). Several studies have shown that, as information accessibility increases, the likelihood with which this information is used as an input for judgment and choice also increases (e.g., Biehal and Chakravarti 1986; Higgins and King 1981; Wyer and Srull 1986). Ease of retrieval is an important determinant of information utilization. To summarize, the results of experiment 1 suggest that information accessibility mediates the effects of WOM on persuasion. Experiment 2 was designed to extend these findings by investigating variables thought to moderate the effects of WOM on judgment (for an excellent discussion of the moderator-mediator distinction, see Baron and Kenny 1986).^ The accessibility-diagnosticity model was used to identify possible moderators.
^Moderator variables influence the direction or strength ofthe relationship between two variables, whereas mediator variables explain how one variable influences another (Baron and Kenny 1986). For a phenomenon to be understood, both enabling (mediating) and limiting (moderating) conditions must be specified.

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THE ACCESSIBILITY-DIAGNOSTICITY MODEL

According to the accessibility-diagnosticity model, accessible information is not used as an input for judgment and choice when more diagnostic or probative information is available (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Lynch, Marmorstein, and Weigold 1988). A piece of information is perceived as diagnostic if it helps the consumer assign a product to one (and only one) cognitive category. In contrast, information that is ambiguous (i.e., information that has multiple interpretations; see Hoch and Deighton 1989) or that implies multiple possible categorizations is nondiagnostic. Hence, diagnosticity refers to the extent to which a given piece ofinformation discriminates between alternative hypotheses, interpretations, or categorizations. To briefly summarize the Feldman and Lynch model, the probability that any piece of information will be used as an input for judgment or choice depends on (1) the accessibility ofthe input, (2) the accessibility of alternative inputs, and (3) the diagnosticity or perceived relevance of the inputs. Any factor that increases the accessibility of an input (such as a vividness manipulation) should also increase the likelihood with which that input will be used. Further, any factor that increases the accessibility of one input should decrease the accessibility and use of alternative inputs. Finally, diagnostic inputs that strongly suggest one categorization over alternative possibilities are more likely to be used than inputs that are ambiguous with respect to category membership (i.e., multiple categorizations are possible). The model emphasizes that perceived (as opposed to objective) diagnosticity determines the likelihood ofinformation utilization. Therefore, inferential biases are possible when consumers overestimate the diagnostic value of a given piece of information. For example, consumers are likely to overestimate the validity of their prior impressions for several reasons. Prior impressions are remarkably persistent and resistant to change because (1) ambiguous information is interpreted as consistent with the impression, (2) impression-consistent, nonambiguous information supports and increases one's confidence in the impression, and (3) impression-inconsistent, nonambiguous information is discounted or ignored (Hoch and Deighton 1989; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979, 1984). Hence, exposure to any type ofinformation, even contradictory information, will increase confidence in the validity of prior impressions. Consumers also tend to hold expectations about the diagnosticity of positive, neutral, and negative cues. Recent research on the negativity effect in impression formation has shown that extremely negative attributes generally have strong implications for category mem-

bership, whereas less negative features are commonly possessed by high-, average-, and low-quality products (Skowronski and Carlston 1987, 1989). For example, poor handling (an extremely negative attribute) is perceived as characteristic of only low-quality automobiles, but average handling (a neutral feature) can be found in many high-, average-, and low-quality automobiles. Extremely negative information is useful for categorizing a product as low in quality, whereas less negative information is less useful. In general, extremely negative cues are less ambiguous than positive or neutral cues (for exceptions, see Skowronski and Carlston 1987, 1989), especially in product-judgment contexts (as suggested by the results of experiment 1 and by Mizerski [1982]; Wright 1974). Hence, the impact of vivid and accessible WOM information should be reduced when more diagnostic information is available. Prior impressions are high in perceived diagnosticity because they suggest one interpretation of evidence to the exclusion of others. Extremely negative attribute information is diagnostic because it suggests one categorization (i.e., low quality) over other possibilities. H2: Vivid WOM communications should have a reduced effect on product judgments when a prior impression of the product is available (vs. not available) from memory. H3: Vivid WOM communications should have a reduced effect on product judgments when extremely negative attribute information is available (vs. not available).

EXPERIMENT 2 Overview
One hundred and twenty undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of 24 conditions in a 3 (positive, neutral, or negative attributes) X 2 (impression or memory set) X 2 (positive or negative WOM) X 2 (counterbalancing order: judgment before recall or vice versa) factorial design. Attribute valence and WOM valence were manipulated orthogonally to permit assessment ofthe relative contribution ofthese two types ofinformation to overall judgments.

Procedure
When subjects arrived at the laboratory, processing goals were manipulated through experimental instructions, attribute information about the target product (a new automobile) was provided, a WOM communication was delivered by a confederate, and judgment and recall measures were administered. Subjects were told either to form a coherent, overall impression ofthe described brand (impression set) or to memorize the attributes of the described brand

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TABLE 1 OVERALL EVALUATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF PROCESSING OBJECTIVES. ATTRIBUTE VALENCE, ANO ANECDOTE VALENCE (EXPERIMENT 2) Memory set Attribute valence Positive Neutral Negative Positive WOM 9.10, 6.44. 1.45. Negative WOM 8.20^ 5.49b 1.85. Impression set Positive WOM 8.33.6 5.41b 1.89. Negative WOM 7.38c
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Results
Effects of Prior Impressions on Judgmental Vividness Effects. Overall product evaluations as a function of processing goals, attribute valence, and WOM valence are presented in Table 1. To test the hypothesis that vivid WOM communications should have a reduced effect on product judgments when a prior impression ofthe product is available (vs. not available) from memory (Hypothesis 2), a series of planned contrasts was performed on overall product judgments.^ Because prior impressions are less likely to be available in memory set than in impression set conditions (Hastie and Park 1986; Kardes 1986; Lichtenstein and Srull 1985, 1987), WOM effects on judgment should be weaker in impression set than in memory set conditions. Consistent with this prediction, in positive-attribute conditions, a significant WOM effect was obtained in the memory set condition (X = 9.10 vs. 8.20, p < .05). However, unexpectedly, a significant WOM effect was also found in the impression set condition {X = 8.33 vs. 7.38, p < .05). Thus, partial support for Hypothesis 2 was found in positive-attribute conditions. A different pattern of results was found when neutral attributes were presented. In the memory set condition, more favorable judgments were formed in positivethan in negative-WOM conditions (X = 6.44 vs. 5.49, p < .05). Although a robust WOM effect on judgment was obtained in the memory set condition, no WOM effect was found in the impression set condition {X = 5.41 vs. 4.71, NS). Thus, consistent support for Hypothesis 2 was found in neutral attribute conditions. EffTects of Negative-Attribute Information on Judgmental Vividness Effects. To test the hypothesis that the presence of extremely negative attribute information reduces the effect of anecdotal WOM communications on judgment (Hypothesis 3), planned comparisons were performed separately in memory set and in impression set conditions. Although robust WOM effects on judgment were found when positive
'Planned comparisons should be performed instead of overall Ftests when interactions involving differences between specific cells are predicted (Hays 1981; Keppel 1982; Kirk 1982). Nevertheless, the reader may be interested in the results of omnibus F-tests. A 2 (impression or memory set) X 3 (positive, neutral, or negative attributes) X 2 (positive or negative WOM) X 2 (counterbalancing order) between-subjects analysis of variance was performed on overall evaluations. Counterbalancing order produced no significant main effects or interactions. Main effects were found for processing goal (F(l,95) = 6.97,/>< .01), attribute valence (F(2,95) = 474.44. p < .001), and WOM valence (F(l,95) = 7.90, p < .01). More favorable evaluations were formed in memory set than in impression set conditions, and more favorable evaluations were formed as attribute and WOM information increased in favorability. Significant processing goal by attribute valence (f(2,95) = 5.92, p < .01) and attribute valence by WOM valence (/=^(2,95) = 5 . 8 l , p < .01) interactions were also found.

2.21.

NOTE. Higher scores indicate more favorable overall evaluations. Means in the same row not sharing a common subscript differ at p < .05. n = 10 per cell (except in the lower right entry, for which n = 9).

(memory set). The description contained a brief summary of standard features, a ranking (the brand was ranked sixth, twentieth, or thirty-fourth best ofthe 40 brands tested), and information about nine important attributes (engine performance, transmission, handling, braking, ride, noise, displays, seating, and reliability). The attributes were described favorably (e.g., braking was smooth), neutrally (e.g., braking was usually smooth), or unfavorably (e.g., braking was abrupt). Subjects participated in small groups of four to six. After subjects had read the description, the confederate said that the car seemed similar to a car her father owns. In positive WOM conditions she added, "It's the best car he's ever had. He hasn't spent a dime on repairs since he bought it. He says if it ever wears out he'll get another just like it." In negative WOM conditions she said, "It's the worst car he's ever had. It seems like it's always in the shop being repaired. I think he's spent more to keep it running than it originally cost him." The experimenter asked her to write the brand name of the car on a slip of paper, said it was the described brand, and thanked and dismissed her.

Judgment and Recall Measures

After dismissal of the confederate, subjects were asked to recall as much attribute information as possible within a three-minute period, rate each attribute on scales ranging from 0 (extremely low quality) to 10 (extremely high quality), and judge the overall quality of the target product. Finally, subjects were thanked and debriefed. Two judges coded the recall protocols using a gist criterion, and high interrater reliability was attained (97 percent). Attribute ratings were averaged to form a single brand attitude index (Cronbach's alpha = .98, p < .001). This index correlated highly with the overall quality measure (r = .94, p < .001).

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or neutral attributes were presented to memory set subjects, the WOM effect was eliminated when extremely negative attributes were presented to memory set subjects (X = 1.45 vs. 1.85, NS). Similarly, in impression set conditions, no WOM effect was found when extremely negative attributes were presented (X = 1.89 vs. 2.21, NS). Thus, consistent support was found for Hypothesis 3 across processing-goal (impression vs. memory set) conditions. Judgment-Recall Correlations/Positive-Attribute Conditions. Judgment-recall correlations were examined to facilitate interpretation of the unexpected WOM effect on judgment obtained in the positive attribute-impression set cell. Prior research has shown that an impression set induces subjects to engage in on-line processing and to form separate evaluationbased and attribute-based representations in memory (Hastie and Park 1986; Kardes 1986; Lichtenstein and Srull 1985, 1987). Because independent representations are formed, a lack of correspondence between judgment and recall is likely to be observed. In contrast, a memory set prompts subjects to form an attribute-based representation in memory (no evaluationbased representation is formed). When memory set subjects are subsequently asked to evaluate a product, a judgment is .computed on the basis ofinformation that is retrieved directly from the attribute-based representation. Consequently, a strong judgment-recall correlation is likely to be observed. Consistent with this model, significant judgmentrecall correlations were found in memory set conditions (r = .51 and .59 for positive- and negative-WOM conditions, respectively, p < .05). Moreover, in impression set conditions, a nonsignificant relationship between judgment and recall was found in the positive-WOM cell (r = .26, NS). However, in the impression set-negative WOM cell, a significant correlation between judgment and recall was obtained (r = .64,> < .05). This unexpected finding implies that judgments formed in this cell were influenced significantly by memory for attributes. However, the uncertainty created by the inconsistency between the attribute versus the WOM information may have prompted subjects to adjust their judgments toward a more moderate position. This type ofjudgmental shift is observed frequently under conditions of uncertainty because a moderate stance is justified easily and is altered readily as additional information becomes available (Cialdini et al. 1973; Jaccard and Wood 1988). Judgment-Recall Correlations/Neutral-Attribute Conditions. As expected, nonsignificant judgmentrecall correlations were found in impression set conditions {p > .20). Unexpectedly, in memory set conditions, judgment-recall correlations differed as a function of WOM valence. In the positive-WOM cell, an inverse relationship between judgment and recall

was obtained (r = -.70, p < .05), whereas, in the negative-WOM cell, the judgment-recall correlation was not significant (p > .20). Thus, in the positive-WOM cell, as the number of neutral attributes that could be recalled increased, less favorable overall judgments were formed. In the negative-WOM cell, relatively unfavorable overall judgments were formed regardless of the number of neutral attributes available from memory. Judgment-Recall Correlations/Negative-Attribute Conditions. Finally, in negative-attribute conditions, nonsignificant judgment-recall correlations were found across impression/memory set conditions {p > .20) and across WOM-valence conditions {p > .20). These results imply that on-line judgments were formed in both impression and memory set conditions. This finding is consistent with previous research demonstrating that extremely negative information can prompt spontaneous judgment formation (Bettman and Weitz 1983; Weiner 1985).

Discussion
Although WOM communications were found to have a strong impact on product judgments in experiment 1, this effect was reduced when a well-defined prior impression was available from memory or when extremely negative attribute information was encountered. Unexpectedly, a WOM effect on judgment was found when positive attributes were presented to impression set subjects. Analyses of the relationship between judgment and recall, however, suggest that these subjects failed to form a clear, well-defined impression ofthe target product in the negative-WOM condition, presumably because the uncertainty created by the attribute valence-WOM valence inconsistency prompted a judgmental shift toward moderation (Cialdini et al. 1973; Jaccard and Wood 1988). When extremely negative attributes were presented, vivid WOM communications had no effect on product judgments. Because extremely negative information is perceived as highly diagnostic (experiment 1) and because diagnostic information can reduce the judgmental impact of less diagnostic but more accessible inputs, judgmental vividness effects were eliminated completely when extremely negative attribute information was provided.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Consistent with the accessibility-diagnosticity model (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Lynch et al. 1988), the results suggest that information accessibility mediates the effects of WOM information on product judgments (experiment 1). However, information-accessibility effects on judgment are reduced, when more diagnostic information, such as prior impressions or extremely

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negative attribute information, is available (experiment 2). Thus, information accessibility mediates the effects of vividly presented information on judgment, and the perceived diagnosticity of other available inputs moderates these effects. The results also imply that judgmental vividness effects are not as elusive as implied by previous research (Taylor and Thompson 1982). Robust vividness effects on judgment were obtained in two experiments employing two different product classes. Consistent with the accessibility-diagnosticity model, the results suggest that judgmental vividness effects are not elusive when (1) the judgment context provides the opportunity for differential encoding of vivid versus pallid information, (2) prior impressions are unavailable from memory, and (3) information having extremely negative judgmental implications is unavailable for processing. Many ofthe studies included in Taylor and Thompson's (1982) highly cited review failed to meet these criteria, and, consequently, judgmental vividness effects were unlikely to be observed. In addition to shedding light on the vividness controversy, the accessibility-diagnosticity model has the capacity to synthesize and integrate a wide variety of seemingly disparate judgmental phenomena. For example, the results of our experiments suggest that the vividness effect (Kisielius and Sternthal 1984, 1986), the perseverance effect (Lord et al. 1979, 1984), and the negativity effect (Skowronski and Carlston 1987, 1989) can be explained through the accessibility-diagnosticity model. Experiment 1 demonstrated that WOM communications have a greater impact on product judgments than less vivid printed infbrmation even when information content is held constant. Although the manner in which information is presented does not affect its probative value, vividly presented information has a disproportionate effect on judgment. Furthermore, consumers are likely to overestimate the diagnosticity of accessible information because alternative inputs are likely to be overlooked. Using the same methodology but a different product class, experiment 2 showed that the judgmental effects of accessible WOM information are reduced when other more diagnostic pieces ofinformation are available. Consumers trust their own opinions more than they trust the opinions of others (Hoch and Deighton 1989). Other individuals are likely to exhibit knowledge or reporting biases (see Wood and Eagly 1981), and, consequently, information provided by other sources is often ambiguous (i.e., multiple interpretations are possible). In contrast, self-generated information is less likely to be contaminated by knowledge or reporting biases (although, under certain circumstances, self-deception has been observed; see, e.g., Berglas and Jones 1978; Gur and Sackeim 1979). Moreover, selective encoding and selective retrieval

processes induce consumers to overestimate the validity of their prior impressions. In consumer settings, negative information tends to be more diagnostic or informative than positive or neutral information. Negative attributes strongly imply membership in one category (i.e., low quality) to the exclusion of others, whereas positive or neutral attributes are more ambiguous with respect to category membership. Positive and neutral features are associated with many high-, medium-, and low-quality products. Negative features, on the other hand, have stronger implications for categorization. Even when many positive features are exhibited (e.g., the soup has fresh meat, fresh Grade-A potatoes, and fresh vitamin-rich vegetables), a single extremely negative feature (e.g., the broth is rancid) can be highly informative. Consequently, negative-attribute information is weighed heavily in judgment. In conclusion, WOM communications often have a strong impact on product judgments because information received in a face-to-face manner is more accessible than information presented in a less vivid manner. Although WOM information is highly accessible from memory, its itnpact on judgment is reduced when more diagnostic information is available. Prior impressions are easy to interpret, and they influence encoding and retrieval processes in a manner that reduces the correspondence between objective and perceived cue diagnosticity. Consequently, prior beliefs (as opposed to other possible beliefs) are held with a high degree of confidence. Similarly, negative information tends to suggest one categorization over others. Information that strongly implies one hypothesis, interpretation, or categorization over other possibilities is weighed heavily in judgment, regardless of whether alternative possibilities are improbable or are simply overlooked. [Received June 1990. Revised August 1990.]

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Arndt, Johan (1967), "Role of Product-related Conversations in the Diffusion of a New Product," Journal of Marketing Research, 4 (August), 291-295. Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny (1986), "The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (December), 1173-1182. Bearden, William O. and Michael J. Etzel (1982), "Reference Group Influence on Product and Brand Purchase Decisions," Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (September), 183-194. , Richard G. Netemeyer, and Jesse E. Teel (1989), "Measurement of Consumer Susceptibility to Interpersonal Influence," Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (March), 473-481.

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