Van Dorn, petitioner vs.

Romillo and Upton, respondents (1985) Nature: Certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of Pasay City RTC. Melencio Herrera, J.: Facts: Petitioner, a Filipino Citizen, and private respondent Upton, a US Citizen, were married in HK in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines; in 1982, the parties obtained divorce in Nevada wherefore afterwards petitioner Van Dorn has since remarried; Respondent Upton filed suit against petitioner in the Pasay RTC, demanding certain rights over petitioners business as conjugal property. Upton admits, after being married for ten years, they obtained a divorce from the Nevada District Court. However, private respondent maintains that under Philippine laws, in Article 15 of the New Civil Code, Philippine Citizens are still bound by laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, and legal capacities, even though living abroad. Therefore, he contends that the divorce obtained from the Nevada District Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy, and as such petitioner, being a Filipino Citizen, will still have conjugal obligations to fulfill. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case which the respondent court denied; thus, the present petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the divorce obtained from the Nevada District Court is valid and binding on a Filipino Citizen Held: Yes Ratio: The Supreme Court rules in favor of the petitioner. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art 16, NCC, only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Here, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves marriage. As held by the US SC in Atherton vs. Atherton, the marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer Van Dorns husband. He would have no standing to sue in this case as he is bound by the decision of his countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him. To consider Van Dorn as married still to Upton and still subject to a wifes obligations under the NCC cannot be just. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Quimiguing, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Icao, defendant-appellee (1970) Nature: Appeal from order of the Zamboanga del Norte CFI. Reyes, J.B.L., J.: Facts: Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex with Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation and without her consent (rape!); as a result Quimiguing became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao. Quimiguing claims support at Php 120.00/month, damages and attorneys fees. Icao moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since complainant did not allege that the

child had indeed been born; trial judge sustained defendants motion. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON the case merits the protection of Art. 40 NCC and if so then does the child have the rights, through the mother, to claim support. Held: YES. Ratio: Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The SC says that since, as provided in Article 40 NCC (the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it, provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following article), petitioner Quimiguings child, since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee. Disposition: Orders of the lower court reversed and set aside and case remanded to lower court for further proceedings. Geluz (petitioner), vs. Court of Appeals (public respondent) and Lazo (pvt respondent) (1961) Nature: certiorari. Reyes, J.B.L., J.: Facts: Oscar Lazo, wife of Nita Villanueva-Lazo, initiated litigation in CFI of Manila against petitioner Oscar Geluz, a physician. The facts show that Villanueva met Geluz for the first time in 1948. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband (Lazo) before they were married. To conceal pregnancy from her parents, she had Geluz perform abortion procedures on her. She became pregnant a 2nd time and as she found pregnancy inconvenient, Geluz performed another abortion procedure on her in 1953. In 1955, she became pregnant for the third time and again went to Geluz and had an third abortion, this time of a two-month old fetus for Php 50.00. Lazo at this time was in Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He did not know, nor consent, to the abortion. CA and CFI ruled in favor of Lazo, ruling that a husband of a woman, the latter voluntarily procuring her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same; Geluz was ordered to be made to pay Php 3,000.00 in damages, Php 700.00 in attorneys fees and costs. Hence, Geluz petition for certiorari to the SC. Issue: WON an unborn child is considered a natural person, and respondent invoke the provisional personality of the conceived child. Held: NO. Ratio: Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be born alive, provided it be born later with the condition, specified in the following article. Here, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mothers womb. Lazo, therefore, could not be given the damages he seeks from the petitioner for the death of his unborn child, through abortion, both for pecuniary and moral damages. The CA and trial court erred in fixing a minimum award of Php 3000.00 for the death of a person as

found in Art. 2206, NCC, because said provision does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality, being incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. Disposition: decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Vda. de Macabenta, claimant-appellee, vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., respondent - appellant Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission. Fernando, J.: Facts: Conrado Macabenta, laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., met a vehicular accident in September 13, 1961, which led to his death on September 29, 1961. The day following the accident (September 14) , he and his live-in partner for three months, Leonora Tantoy, were lawfully wed in a marriage ceremony solemnized in San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized upon his death (the General Manager of the company facilitated the marriage. The Claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of Conrado Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmens Compensation Commission claimant Php 2,708.00 as compensation and sum of Php 270.80 as attorneys fees. Issues: 1) WON the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act. 2) WON the child who was in the womb of the mother at the time of the accident, and subsequently born, can claim damages as a dependent, when her fathers civil personality was already extinguished before she was born. Held: 2) YES. The marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was married to him. Nor can there be any doubt that the child Raquel was born of such relationship and was already conceived before the fatal accident and the marriage. The child born of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the posthumous daughter of the deceased. Art. 40 of the NCC clearly stipulates that a conceived child is considered born for all purposes favorable to her provided the birth is

attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mothers womb. Here, the child is duly protected by said provision and then has rights to the claim. Disposition: Decision affirmed. Barlin, plaintiff appellee, vs. Ramirez, defendant appellant (1906) Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines. Willard, J.: Facts: Ramirez, having been appointed parish priest by the plaintiff Barlin, took possession of the Church in 1901 until a successor had been appointed in 1902. Defendant Ramirez refused to surrender the Church and Barlin filed a suit; the municipality of Lagonoy joined Ramirez as defendants, claiming possession and ownership of the Church and contesting Barlins authority and capacity to order that Ramirez be replaced and surrender the Church to the appointed successor. Issue: WON the Catholic Church is the rightful owner of the Church? Held: Yes. Ratio: The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands, and under Article 46 of the Civil Code, Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. Disposition: Judgment of the Lower Court affirmed. Republic of the Philippines and the Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Iglesia Ni Cristo, respondent Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Norte. Aquino, J.: Facts: INC of 1976 filed an application for confirmation and registration of its title over two parcles of land located at Calabaca and Capalonga with areas of 300 and 599 square meters, respectively, used as sites for chapels. The Director of Lands opposed the application. Issue: Can the INC, as a religious corporation and a corporation and corporation sole, register public lands under its name? Held: No. Ratio: The INC is not a Filipino Citizen. Only Filipino Citizens can register public lands under their name. The lands in question are still public lands until registered.