Paul M.

Nguyen (OMV) Contemporary Philosophy, OConnor November 14, 2011 Essay Response to Chapter 5 6 Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, Christopher J. Eberle Christopher Eberle moves on, building upon his Chapter 4 theme of respect, which he says is quite easy to accept, to determine whether respect for one's fellow citizens' personhood and their evidential set, within which they might find public reasons to justify their support of coercive laws, necessarily entails the doctrine of restraint, that is, absent such a reason, a citizen must withhold support from such a law, even if non-public convictions within their evidential set would encourage support (thus restraint). Eberle takes on several thinkers' formulations of the related notions and analyzes them, distilling their rhetoric and logically reducing them to their essential components in order to consider them with respect to Eberle's own proposed ideal of conscientious engagement. In his analysis, like that of several Modern-era philosophers, Eberle seeks to validate the thinkers for their consistencies and the points that are in harmony with his own thought, and also to demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in their arguments. He also shows how careful distinctions can help the arguments he raises to better fit what he has already concluded as a highest ideal for engagement in a liberal democracy. Eberle begins with an argument by Lawrence Solum and shows that his argument, though it seems to proceed from two premises, actually proceeds immediately from one premise, the second being substantially equivalent to his conclusion (117). This time, Eberle did not need to make the case for his own ideal of conscientious engagement, because the argument he was presenting was unsound. However, it is important to note, as he introduced at the beginning of the chapter, that the illusion that respect requires restraint is often presented in an apparently sound manner, often wrapped up in rhetoric. One aspect of this rhetoric that Eberle distinguishes

is the language of success as contrasted with that of aspiration. This is critical for his argument, for he posits that granted a success requirement in respect for one's fellow citizens, the doctrine of restraint will follow necessarily. However, with only the aspiration to find a public reason for one's support of a coercive law, failure being permitted, restraint does not necessarily obtain. Eberle applies this to a handful of other thinkers, culminating with a direct address to John Rawls' liberal principle of legitimacy. Eberle then takes up the Strains of Commitment, under which he highlights the difficulty of satisfying Rawls' requirement to give public reasons for one's political actions. He begins by saying that Rawls' position, taken simply, simply is of little interest. However, he pushes the issue further to discover whether what Rawls declares to be the ultimate and universal conclusion of parties entering behind the veil of ignorance in the original position is, in fact, reasonable to assume in every case. Eberle draws upon more seasoned argumentation from the utilitarian school, based on the reality that Rawls' original position requires its participants to select principles of justice that allow them, upon emerging, to be satisfied with their state of life (occupation, beliefs, gender, age, etc) under those principles, regardless of that actual state, and so they will choose his equality of opportunity and difference (greatest assistance for the least advantaged, and greatest responsibility for the most advantaged) principles. Eberle declares that this position alone is not sufficient, and that his ideal of conscientious engagement is a better choice. Eberle's argument in favor of his ideal rests on considerations of the type in which we step into each others' shoes to learn whether we could accept the principles devised. Recall that Eberle is validating Rawls' construction of the original position while proposing an alternative and more convincing outcome. In Eberle's example of a theist, taken generally, since the theist will still act based on his beliefs in the political sphere (or find it extremely difficult to do otherwise, thus [inhibiting] him from living what he takes to be

a meaningful life [147]) regardless of his sufficiently public reasons whether to do so, the parties to the original position ought to select principles that allow him to do this for the good of society, granted that he has, in fact, sought public reasons for those actions.