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MARBURY V MADISON (boots tirol) ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION (mini bernardo) VARGAS V RILLORAZA (dahls salamat) ARTICLE ON RULE OF LAW (keefe dela cruz) BOARD OF OPTOMETRY V JUDGE COLET DAVIDE; July 30, 1996 (bry san juan)
NATURE Certiorari to annul and set aside for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion the order of 25 August 1995 issued by public respondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 9574770 which granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the petitioners herein "from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. No. 8050] or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder." FACTS - Claiming to be prejudiced by R.A. No. 8050 (the Revised Optometry Law), private respondents in July 1995 composed optical shops and various optometry associations challenge its constitutionality on grounds of (1) fraudulent insertions in the reconciled bill, which amount to violation of procedural processes in the Constitution; (2) deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law since the law exposes optometrists to definite hazards; (3) undue delegation of legislative power when it provides penalty for violation of implementing regulations promulgated by the Board of Optometry pursuant to the law; and (4) for using terms which render the law void for vagueness. - An examination of the petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770 in Branch 29 of the RTC of Manila, disclosed that among the petitioners (now respondents) included in the caption of the petition were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of ChristianMuslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association

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of the Philippines (SMOAP) each allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, save for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. As likewise disclosed in the petitioners' Compliance filed with the trial court on 18 August 1995, the names of Miguel Acebedo, representing Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Miriam F. Llave, representing the OPAP; and Republica A, Panol, another petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-74770, did not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines, as evidenced by certifications issued by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), Private respondents COA and ACMO were neither registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as evidenced by the certifications issued by the latter. - Notwithstanding these procedural lapses, Judge Colet ruled in favor of the respondent optical shops and optometry associations. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON the the private respondents have locus standi1 to question the constitutionality of R.A. No, 8050 2. WON declaratory relief or prohibition is availing in this case HELD 1. Rato NO. Only natural and judicial persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. For failure to show their articles of incorporation as proof of their juridical personality, the cases insofar as optometry associations were dismissed. Acebedo Optical Shop, which had juridical personality, was nevertheless deemed not to have legal standing as it did not show personal and substantial interest. Reasoning - Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that
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they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770. - A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case at bench, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Moreover, since the names of private respondents Miguel Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave, and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry as authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines, they do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest in the case. Even further, although private respondents Roberto Rodis, Jr., Cyril Corales, and Elmer Villarosa claim to be practicing optometrists, the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation to make them real parties in interest to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050. 2. Ratio NO. A special civil action for declaratory relief can only prosper if it satisfies the following requisites: (1) the existence of a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. In this case, the first and the fourth are lacking. Reasoning - Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail for yet another reason. - It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief. Then, too, as adverted to earlier, the private respondents have

BRYAN SJs comment (not in the case) : Notice that the Court conflates the concept of real party in interest and locus standi. These two are different! See Kilosbayan vs Morato.

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not sufficiently established their locus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050. - The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, as well as of the Code of Ethics promulgated thereunder, if one has been issued. Even if there was before him a case involving the law, prudence dictated that the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ with undue haste. In the existence of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned acts is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

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petition for habeas corpus. Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. CA affirmed but the CA justices inserted opinions recommending to the Exec. Sec. to allow the respondent to leave the country. ISSUE WON it was proper for the Court of Appeals to recommend the release of Ang Cho Kio HELD - NO. The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly provided in the law - and such law is the provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: "Whenever a court has knowledge of an act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. "In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense." - Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in question, is not authorized under the aforequoted provision of Art 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary, under the Director of Prisons. We do not consider it proper that the majority of the justices in the special division make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive, after the same justices have said in their opinion "that the Chief Executive may determine alone and by himself, whether the condition attached to a pardon given by him had been violated; and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not interfere, however erroneous the findings may be." When the Chief Executive, exercising his powers pursuant to Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that Ang Clio Kio should be dealt with that way under the circumstances. For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to recommit Ang

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS V ANG CHIO KIO ZALDIVAR; June 23, 1970 (bry san juan)
NATURE Petition by certiorari, by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Prisons and the Executive Secretary, to render judgment ordering the striking out from the CA decision of the portions recommending to the Executive Secretary 'to allow the respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy to leave this country in the first available transportation abroad' but otherwise affirming the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus, with costs in all instances against respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy." FACTS - After serving six and one-half (6 1/2) years of his sentence for various offenses in the Philippines, Ang Cho Kio was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines. The condition was that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and never to return to the country. Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and actually left the Philippines for Taipei, Nationalist China, on July 28, 1959. - In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport on a Philippine Air Lines plane from Taipeh, travelling under the name "Ang Ming Huy." It appears that Manila was merely his transit point and that his ultimate destination was Honolulu. While he was in the Philippines, two friends invited him to stay longer. On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went to the Bureau of Immigration, where his friend Lim Pin signed a letter addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration requesting for a fourteen-day extension of stay in the Philippines for him. Ang Cho Kio was identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh on July 28, 1959. His identity having been established, Ang Cho Kio was arrested, and the immigration authorities conducted an investigation regarding his presence in the Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow him to proceed with his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on him, for having violated the condition of his pardon. - Ang Cho Kio filed for petition for habeas corpus. After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on January 31, 1967, rendered a decision dismissing the

MUSKRAT V US DAY; 1911 (ice baguilat)

FACTS Muskrat assails the constitutionality of Act of Congress of April 26, 1906 which increases the number of persons entitled to share in the final distribution of lands and funds of the Cherokees beyond those enrolled on September 01, 1902 (An Act to Provide for the Allotment of Lands of the Cherokee Nation for the Disposition of Town Sites Therein and for Other Purposes). ISSUE WON to provide for a judicial determination is within the judicial power conferred by the Constitution HELD No, judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. This power is not given to the courts as a body with revisory power over the action of Congress. It should first be presented as a judicial declaration of the validity of the act of Congress and presented in a case or controversy, to which the judicial power alone extends. Disposition Case remanded to the Court of Claims with directionos to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.

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Cho Kio to prison by allowing him to leave the country instead is indeed to interfere with the functions of the Chief Executive. It would be, as urged by the Solicitor General, an interference on, or an attempt to influence, the exercise by the Chief Executive of the political powers of his office. The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the Chief Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature. Disposition However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently constituted, only five are of the opinion that the recommendation embodied in the decision of the majority of the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in question, should be deleted front the decision. Two members of the Court are of a different opinion, and three others did not take part in the decision because of their official actuations relative to the case of respondent Ang Cho Kin before it reached this Court. There is therefore, one vote less than the majority of the Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the decision of the special division of the Court of Appeals stands. No costs.

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of the new constitution. The said plebiscite was scheduled on January 15, 1973. - December 17, 1972 Marcos temporarily suspended the effects of Proclamation 1081 in order to allow free debate with regards to the proposed constitution. Because of this, the Court decided to forego ruling on the case. - PD 86 organized the Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public questions. These assemblies would be asked a series of questions as to whether or not they favor the new society. - Proclamation 1102 Marcos announces the ratification of the new constitution through the Citizens Assemblies. Petitioners Claim: - Planas (the first among many other petitioners) filed a case seeking to enjoin the implementation of the said plebiscite for the reason that PD 73 has no force and effect. The calling of the plebiscite was a power lodged in Congress, not the executive. - There is also allegedly no proper submission to the people because of the imposition of martial law (no freedom of speech and expression, etc. along with lack of sufficient time to inform the people). - Petitioners also claim that the result of Citizens Assemblies should be considered null and void because: - The 1935 Constitution requires that ratification of the constitution should be participated in by qualified voters. The Citizens Assemblies included 15-year olds. - Secrecy of voting should be maintained. In Citizens Assemblies, voting was done through viva voce. - The Citizens Assemblies had no guidelines for free, orderly and honest elections which should govern the entire process. - Lack of time resulted to the formation of few Citizens Assemblies. ISSUES 1. WON the Court has the authority to pass upon the validity of PD 73 2. WON the President has the authority to issue PD 73 3. WON martial law affected the submission of new constitution HELD 1. The issue regarding the validity of PD 73 is justiciable. The contested decree is deemed to have the force and effect of legislation so the issue is justiciable. 2. The Court did not tackle this issue because the plebiscite had been postponed.

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3. On the issue of whether or not martial law affected the proper submission of the Constitution to a plebiscite, the ratification has rendered this issue moot and academic.

UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS V MICHELL REED; October 1946 (chris lao)

NATURE Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia FACTS - The Hatch Act enacted in 1940 declares unlawful certain specified political activities of federal employees. Section 9 forbids officers and employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government, with exceptions, from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns. Section 15 declares that the activities theretofore determined by the United States Civil Service Commission to be prohibited to employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the Civil Service Rules shall be deemed to be prohibited to federal employees covered by the Hatch Act. These sections cover all federal officers and employees whether in the classified civil service or not and a penalty of dismissal from employment is imposed for violation. - Certain employees of the executive branch of the Federal Government and a union of such employees sued to enjoin the members of the Civil Service Commission from enforcing the provision of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act, which forbids such employees to take any active part in political management or in political campaigns and for a declaratory judgment holding the Act unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the suit. Petitioner appealed. ISSUES 1. WON the complaint state a controversy cognizable in this Court. 2. WON such a breach of Hatch Act and Rule 1 of the Commission can, without violating the Constitution, be made the basis for disciplinary action against Poole. HELD 1. For adjudication of constitutional issues, concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions, are requisite. Reasoning

PLANAS V COMELEC CONCEPCION; January 22, 1973 (aida villanueva)

FACTS - March 16, 1967 Congress passed Resolution 2 (later amended by Resolution 4 adopted on June 17, 1969) which called for a convention to proposed amendments to the Philippine Constitution - The ConCon began to perform its functions on June of 1971. - While the ConCon was in session, President Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972 - November 29, 1972 the Convention approved the proposed constitution. The next day, the President called for a plebiscite through PD 73 for the ratification

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They declare a desire to act contrary to the rule against political activity but not that the rule has been violated. In this respect, the case at bar differs from the type of threat adjudicated in Railway Mail Association v. Consi. In that case, the refusal to admit an applicant to membership in a labor union on account of race was involved. Admission had been refused. In the Hill case an injunction had been sought and allowed against Hill and the union forbidding Hill from acting as the business agent, the union and the union from further functioning as a union until it complied with the state law. The threats here in the case at bar are closer to a general threat by officials to enforce those laws which they are charged to administer than they are to the direct threat if punishment against a named organization for a completed act that made the Mail Association and the Hill case cases justiciable. These appellants seek advisory opinions upon broad claims of rights protected by the Constitution. The generality of the objection is an attack on political expediency of the Hatch Act, not the presentation of legal issues. Such is beyond the courts competence to render a decision. Should the Courts seek to expand their powers so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over Constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories. The determination of the trial court that the individual appellants other than Poole, could maintain this action was erroneous (The court dismissed it though for finding the Act Constitutional). 2. Congress may regulate the political conduct of government employees within reasonable limits. Reasoning The determination of the extent to which political activities of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress. It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active participation in political management and political campaign. Disposition Affirmed

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than in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city as use as COMELEC space xxx and that the (Sections 3 and 4) COMELEC space shall be allocated, by the Commission, free of charge, among all the candidates within the are in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable candidates to make known their qualifications, stands on issues, platforms of government. More so, Sec. 8 of the Resolution prohibits news articles, opinions and features which would manifestly favor or oppose a candidate or a political party. - Commissioner Maambong sent letters to Business World, Malaya, PhilStar and Philippine Times Journal etc. directing them to provide free print space of not less than page for use as COMELEC space, pursuant to the Resolution No.2772, notwithstanding informing the candidates that election materials pertinent to the COMELEC space be submitted directly to the newspapers. ISSUES 1. WON Resolution violates prohibition that government shall not take private property for public use without just compensation 2. WON Resolution constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the state 3. WON Sec 8 of the Resolution is violative of the constitutional guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of expression. HELD Pre-Ratio - Solgen contends that the resolution is only establishes guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of COMELEC space. Even if it were mandatory, is would still be valid in the exercise of the police power of the state, and that Sec 8 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision and regulation of the COMELEC to ensure fair and impartial elections. - Even if COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2772-A to clarify the questioned provisions and which rendered the petition moot and academic, the Court still deliberated on the constitutional issues to prevent repetition and to put the issue to rest Ratio 1. Compelling print media companies to donate COMELEC space amounts to the taking of private personal property intended for public use or purpose, even if there were no sanctions to be imposed if the ordered not be followed. The extent of the taking is substantial as the monetary value of the donated COMELEC space may be very substantial

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A. Requites for expropriation for public use of private property necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The necessity element has not been shown by the COMELEC, notwithstanding its inability to show a reasonable relationship between the power of eminent domain and the enforcement and administration of election laws by the COMELEC. This cannot simply be assumed. B. Taking private property for public use with just compensation is authorized by the Constitution but this just compensation is exactly what the COMELEC sought to avoid by requiring the publishers to donate free print space. 2. The police power has not been delegated to the COMELEC, nor can does the Resolution fit the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. There was no showing of a national emergency, impetuous public necessity to warrant the disregard of individual business conditions of the newspapers. 3. Section 8 seems to represent the effort of the COMELEC to incorporate the distinction and doctrine given by the NPC case, distinguishing paid political advertisements and news reports, commentaries and the like. But this distinction can only be given operative meaning in actual cases or controversies, on a case-tocase basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts A. As the PPI has not alleged COMELEC action to this end that one of its members has suffered direct or imminent injury, this issue is not ripe for review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very list mota thereof, the constitutionality of Sec 8

CHAVEZ V PEA and AMARI CARPIO; July 9, 2002 (kooky talon)

NATURE Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order FACTS The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. Nov 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V COMELEC FELICIANO; May 22, 1995 (terry ridon)
NATURE Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS - PPI challenges the constitutionality of Resolution No.2772 issued by the COMELEC that (Section2) the Commission shall procure free print space of not less

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contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. Feb 4, 1977, then Pres Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, which was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.i On the same date, Pres Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Dec 29, 1981, then Pres Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that [A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA. Jan 19, 1988, then Pres Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters. Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of 1,578,441 square meters or 157.841 hectares. April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its

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Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then Pres Ramos, through then Exec Sec Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. Nov 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated Sept 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. Dec 5, 1997, then Pres Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court. April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on Oct 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Dec 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance

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of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999. March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under then Pres Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void. Petitioners Claims Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI, and thus he seeks to enjoin this loss. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI. With regard to respondents first claim (see below), petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review. Respondents Claims

Respondents say petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of signed Amended JVA containing terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioners prayer for a public disclosure. Also, petitioners prayer to enjoin signing of the Amended JVA is now moot since PEA and AMARI have signed the Amended JVA on Mar 30, 1999. The Office of the President has approved Amended JVA on May 28, 1999. PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose

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publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioners direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG, that in cases of on-going negotiations, the right to information is limited to definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the right does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the predecisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide. of administrative remedies.

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principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case. - The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention. 4. Ratio Since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. Reasoning The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. Constitutional issues involved: 1) right of citizens to information on matters of public concern -- to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos 2) application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens -- to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution - SC cited Chavez v PCGG where Court upheld right of a citizen to bring taxpayers suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public. Substantive 1. Ratio The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations. Reasoning The Court distinguished between information which the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information which the constitutional right to information requires PEA to

4.

WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this

suit. Substantive 1. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement. 2. WON the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution. 3. WON the Court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government. HELD Procedural Ratio Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Reasoning The signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract. 2. Ratio The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. 3. Ratio The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. Reasoning The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. The

1.

ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events

2.

WON the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts 3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion

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release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. PEA must prepare data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process. Information, however, on ongoing evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no official acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government. From this moment, the publics right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. - Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. This requirement negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. - The right covers three categories of information which are matters of public concern, namely: (1) official records (any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials) (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions (documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials) and (3) government research data used in formulating policies (research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies) - The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like

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relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations. - The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law. 2. The Court summarized its discussion of the sixth issue (2nd substantive issue) as follows: a) The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. b) The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. c) Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. d) Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the

PROF.
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. - Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. \ Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. - the Court traced the development of Philippine law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands, which took its root from the Regalian Doctrine, to wit: Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and Civil Code of 1889, Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission, Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 of Philippine National Assembly, Civil Code of 1950, 1973 Constitution, PD No. 1084 creating Public Estates Authority, and the 1987 Constitution. - Under Sec 2, Art XII 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated, unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. - Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified. The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. - PD No. 1085, coupled with Pres Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or

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disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and Pres Aquinos issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. - At the time then Pres Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are waters x x x owned by the State forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Sec 2, Art XII 1987 Constitution. - Executive Order No. 525, issued on Feb 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the government, which shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service. - The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, waters x x x owned

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by the State, forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man. - The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, tasks Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State. DENR exercises supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands, as well as exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country. DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. - DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. - Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. - under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through

PROF.
public bidding. It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEAs reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of public domain. - Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. - the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized by Congress, the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a statutory lien affecting title of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law. - The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands. - Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. As the central implementing agency tasked to

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undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that PEA shall hold lands of the public domain as well as any and all kinds of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs name does not automatically make such lands private. - To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos - The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State,

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or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk. 3. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

PROF.
plebiscite, whether singly or together, constitutional amendments it proposed 2. WON the phrase at an election in Sec. 1 of Article XV does not necessarily mean only one plebiscite but may be construed as signifying several plebiscites 3. WON the question of WON the Convention should submit the amendments it may propose in a single plebiscite or otherwise is a matter that goes into the wisdom of the action and outside the pale of judicial review 4. WON there is no need for a frame of reference on which the voters may base judgment as to questioned amendments acceptability HELD 1. NO. The submission by Congress of proposed amendments after each final adjournment of its joint constituent session and nor before such adjournment, is conclusive proof, not of the legal possibility of piecemeal submission of proposed amendments but, on the contrary, of the validity of the proposition that the constituent assembly has to become functus officio first before the Constitutional amendments it proposes may be submitted to the people for ratification. - No definite consensus has been reached as to whether the rest of the amendment process is exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of Congress or belongs concurrently to the Convention and Congress because some justices did not see the necessity of deciding the issue. The Court was unanimous in not seeing any reason for apprehension of failure in the funding of a separate plebiscite or of any plebiscite, even if it were held that the power belongs exclusively to Congress. 2. NO. the Court did not merely read and interpret the constitutional provision in question but went further and construed it, by going ascertaining the purpose and intent of the framers of the Constitution. Nothing in the Courts previous decision denies the possibility that the phrase an election: may comprehend more than one plebiscite. It held that between 2 possible interpretations, the one more consistent with the spirit of the provisions is that which proscribes piece-meal submission before the whole draft of the Constitution or all amendments to be proposed have been approved by the body. 3. NO. Movants confused wisdom of the questioned action taken by the Convention with the wisdom of the provision of Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution. What the Court discussed in the questioned Decision is not WON the Convention acted wisely but it simply held that there is wisom in the construction that piece-meal

TOLENTINO V COMELEC (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION) BARREDO; November 4, 1971 (lora alamin)
NATURE Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Supreme Court FACTS - The decision sought to be reconsidered held as null and void Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Convention which proposes the amendment of Sec. 1 of Article V of the Constitution by reducing the age requirement therein from 21 to 18 years without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and provides further that the said proposed amendment shall be submitted for ratification or rejection by the people in a plebiscite to be held coincident with the election on November 8, 1971. - The Decision was based on the reasons underlying the provisions of Sec. 1 of Article XV, from the ordinary import of which, the Court was convinced that it does not permit holding of more than one election or plebiscite for the submission to the people of any and all of the amendments. ISSUES 1. WON the Convention being at par with Congress acting as constituent assembly, can submit to a

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submission, before all the proposed Constitutional amendments as a whole have been approved, is not allowed by the Constitution. 4. NO. In the way the proposal is worded, read together with reservations tasked to it by the Convention , it is too much of a speculation to assume what exactly the amendment would really amount to in the end. Disposition The Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

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-Petitioner brought a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction, before the RTC Makati, alleging, among others, that he was suspended and dismissed from the service in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law; and that his constitutional right to security of tenure was violated by the respondents (as he claimed that he was a career executive service officer with tenurial protection). -RTC Makati issued on December 2, 1994 a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the respondents and/or their representatives from enforcing AO No. 152, and directing the parties to observe the status quo until further orders from the said Court. On December 23, 1994, the said Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. On January 10, 1995, the petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration. In his motion for reconsideration (after RTC Makati dsimissed petition) petitioner claimed that the PCAGC is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against him. - The case was then re-raffled to Hon. Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr. who, on December 13, 1995, handed down an Amended Decision, granting the petition and practically reversing the original Decision. The respondents appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the Amended Decision. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. -While the administrative and civil cases against the petitioner were pending, the criminal aspect of such cases was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation. On July 25, 1995, after conducting the investigation, Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding a probable cause and recommending the institution in the courts of proper Jurisdiction criminal cases for Falsification of Public Documents (13 counts) and Open Disobedience (2 counts) against the petitioner. -However, acting upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration Special Prosecution Officer II Lemuel M. De Guzman set aside the said Resolution of July 25, 1995, and in lieu thereof, dismissed the charges against Umali, in the Order dated November 5, 1996, which was approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Accordingly, all the informations against Umali previously sent to the Office of the City Prosecutor, were recalled. -On August 10, 1998, Commisioner Beethoven L. Rualo of the BIR sent a letter to the Solicitor General informing the latter that "the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case against Atty. Osmundo Umali" on the basis of the comment and recommendation submitted by the Legal Department of the BIR.

PROF.
ISSUES 1. WON AO no. 152 violated petitioner's right to security of tenure 2. WON petitioner was denied due process in the issuance of AO no. 152 3. WON petitioner can raise the issue of PCAGCs constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision 4. WON in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner, there is still basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO no. 152. HELD 1. No. Although tenurial protection limits the power of removal of the President, petitioner's claim of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. 2. No. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. 3. No. The issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below. 4. Yes (but) The charges included in AO No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the BIR that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked. Disposition Petition Granted. Administrative Order No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits.

UMALI V GUINGONA PURISIMA, March 29, 1999 (boots tirol)

NATURE Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1997. FACTS -On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. -On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director. President Ramos authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) for investigation. - The PCAGC duly informed petitioner of the charges against him, and directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of assets and Liabiliies for the past 3 years and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994 at the PCAGC Office. The petitioner filed his required Answer and appeared with his lawyer before the PCAGC. -After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner -On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 (AO No 152) dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his dismissal but the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1994.

REYES V COURT OF APPEALS QUISUMBING; December 10,1999 (dahls salamat)

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NATURE Review of CA Decision FACTS - The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax ordinances,among them are: 87 An ordinance imposing a municipal tax of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross receipt on business of printing and publication 91 An ordinance imposing a transfer tax equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the total consideration on the sale, donation, barter or any other mode of transferring ownership or title of real property situated in San Juan, Metro Manila, or its fair market value, whichever is higher -Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of these ordinance in n appeal with the DOJ because they were allegedly promulgated without previous public hearings, constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. -DOJ Sec dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time or more than 30 days from the effectivity of the ordinances as mandated by Sec 187 of the Local Governemnt Code. -Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, cited by respondent Secretary, provides as follows: "Sec. 187-- Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. -- The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally , That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction." -CA affirmed DOJ decision Petitioners' Claim -Respondent Secretary erred in declaring that they failed to file their appeal on time. Also, they assail Municipal Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101, for alleged

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failure of the Municipal Council of San Juan to conduct mandatory public hearings. Because of this, they claim the ordinances are inoperative, as though they were never passed. Consequently, no prescriptive thirty-day period to question the validity of the ordinance could toll to bar their appeal to the Department of Justice. - petitioners allege that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan did not comply with the prescribed procedure for enacting an ordinance because they failed to conduct public hearings. ISSUES 1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Secretary of Justice who dismissed the prohibition suit, on the ground that it was filed out of time 2. WON lack of mandatory public hearings prior to enacting Municipal Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101 render them void on the ground of deprivation of property without due process 3. WON the constitutional validity of Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code could be raised for the first time on appeal HELD 1. No. The law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory. A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to

PROF.
the Secretary of Justice within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause. 2. In Figuerres vs. Court of Appeals,8 where the municipality failed to conduct public hearings prior to enacting the revisions on the schedule of fair market values and assessment level of classes of real estate properties, the Court said:"Petitioner is right in contending that public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance imposing real property taxes. R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 186, provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges 'shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. 'However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidences showing that procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. x x x Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality." - We find Figuerres instructive. Petitioners have not proved in the case before us that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan failed to conduct the required public hearings before the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101. - It is a general rule that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance may not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action.11 This rule supplements the presumption in favor of the regularity of official conduct which we have upheld repeatedly, absent a clear showing to the contrary. 3.No.Given the circumstances in this case, we find no genuine necessity to dwell on the issue of constitutional invalidity of Section 187 in relation to issue of valid enactment of the subject ordinances, as shown in the foregoing discussion.

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-The constitutionality of an act of Congress will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised at the earliest opportunity and presented in an appropriate case, and is necessary to a determination of the case, particularly where the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. The constitutional validity of a statutory provision should not be entertained by the Court where it was not specifically raised below, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. Assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

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-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath -After his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts -On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner -On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments ISSUE WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute HELD Ratio When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued. Reasoning The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the

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constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. - In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145 - If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. -The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. Disposition The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.

ZANDUETA V DE LA COSTA VILLA-REAL; NOVEMBER 28, 1938 (apple maramba)

NATURE This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent FACTS - Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly -On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan -The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment

MIRASOL V CA QUISUMBING; FEBRUARY 1, 2001 (athe odi)

NATURE Petition for Review on certiorari FACTS - The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. They produce sugar for export. - Private respondent PNB financed the Mirasols sugar production venture for crop under a crop loan financing scheme. Under that scheme, the Mirasols signedCredit Assignments, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the petitioners atty-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latters sugar. - Then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 579 with the following provisions:

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authorized Phil Exchange Co. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the USA and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the DTI and by the Office of the President. It authorized PNB to finance PHILEXs purchases. It decreed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national govt. - PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols, still secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. However, since PNB failed to do an accounting of the proceeds of the sale, the Mirasols accrued higher withdrawals from the bank than their income. PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts, which the Mirasols failed to do. Therefore, PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. - The Mirasols asked again for the accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar insisting that, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under PD 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from export sales of sugar pertained to National Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes. - The Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB and PHILEX. ISSUES 1. WON the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. 2. WON PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional. 3. WON the Honorable CA committed manifest error in not applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil between respondents PNB and PHILEX. 4. WON the Honorable CA committed manifest error in upholding the validity of the foreclosure on petitioners property and in upholding the validity of the daccion en pago in this case. 5. WON the Honorable CA committed manifest error in not awarding damages to petitioners grounds relied upon the allowance of the petition HELD 1. NO.

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Ratio Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order but in assailing their constitutionality, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. 2. NO. Ratio The courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. Reasoning a. Issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of the case. It is primarily a case demanding for accounting and specific performance. b. presumption of constitutionality of statute (doctrine of separation of powers) 3. NO. Ratio Findings of the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence. SC is limited only to reviewing questions of law and factual issues are not within its province. 4. NO. Ratio Both the TC and CA found that the Mirasols admitted that they were indebted to PNB. Findings of the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence. 5. NO. Ratio Absent showing of bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. Petitioner failed to show malice or bad faith on the part of PNB in failing to render accounting.

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constituted in favor of KB a mortgage on several lots located in Alaminos, Laguna and Iba, Zambales - For failure of BMC to pay, KB filed application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. BMC filed Request not to give due course to the application bec (1) it is insufficient in form and substance and (2) BMC is willing to execute a dacion en pago in place of the mortgaged properties in Laguna. Also, BMC pointed out that KB included unauthorized penalties in statement of accounts and it did not comply w/ obligation to give 60day grace period. Lastly, BMC insists that the Mortgage Trust Indenture cant be foreclosed bec it wasnt registered w/ Register of Deeds. - KBs application was granted. Auction sale proceeded w/ KB as highest bidder. - BMC said the foreclosure sale shld be annulled bec (1) bid price was grossly inadequate (2) sale violated requirement on place of sale and posting of notice and (3) other creditor banks are amenable to the proposed dacion en pago instead of the foreclosure. - BMC also said that Sec 47 of the General Banking Act (RA No 8791) w/c reduced period of redemption for extra-judicially foreclosed properties fr 1 yr to until but not after registration of certificate of foreclosure sale w/c in no case shall be more than 3 mos after foreclosure w/cever is earlier is discriminatory and unconstitutional ISSUES 1. WON BMC is guilty of forum shopping 2. WON the foreclosure sale shld be annulled for the grounds cited by BMC 3. WON the assailed section of the Gen Banking Act shld be declared unconstitutional HELD 1. No. The venue of extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is the place where each of the mortgaged property is located. And since injunction is enforceable only w/in territorial limits of trial court, mortgagor is left w/o remedy as to properties outside the jurisdiction of issuing court unless an application for injunction is made w/ another court w/c has jurisdiction. Besides, BMC duly informed the courts. 2. This involves factual issues. Since SC is not a trier of facts, remand to appellate court is necessary. 3. It cannot be determined in this case bec the constitutionality is not the very lis mota of the controversy. Until an appropriate case is brought, the presumption of validity holds.

BENGUET MANAGEMENT CORP. V COURT OF APPEALS YNARES-SANTIAGO; September 18, 2003 (chris capul)
NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari FACTS - Petitioner Benguet Management Corp. and Keppel Bank acting as trustee of other respondent banks entered into a Loan agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture where BMC, in consideration of loan of P190M

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TY V TRAMPE PANGANIBAN; December 1, 1995 (aida villanueva)
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Petitioner Ty is a resident and a registered owner of land and buildings in Pasig. Petitioner MVR Picture is a corporation organized under Philippine laws and also owns land and buildings in Pasig. - Respondent Trampe is being sued in his position as presiding judge of a Pasig court. Two of his decisions involving the current issue are sought to be set aside. - Respondent Secretary of Finance is being sued in his position as the government official who approved the Schedule of Market Values which became the basis for the new tax assessments enforced by the assessor and treasurer of Pasig. - January 6, 1994 the assessor sent a notice to the petitioners regarding certain real properties located in Pasig. The petitioners, in turn, sent a reply through their counsel, asking the assessor for reconsideration. - The petitioners filed a petition to declare the new tax assessments null and void. Their petition was denied for lack of merit by the RTC on the following grounds: 1. According to the RTC, the Schedule of Market Values was based on RA 7160 and is thus valid legal. RA 7160 supposedly repealed PD 921 (which was the previous law in the matter). PD 921 requires the joint action of all assessors in the Metro Manila area in preparing such schedule. 2. RA 7160 (Secs. 226 or 252) provides that administrative remedies should first be exhausted before seeking judicial redress. The filing of the case is deemed premature. 3. The questioned assessments were in accord with the increase in price of real estate in the country. The increase in valuation ranged from 418.8% to 510%. If the petitioners had first exhausted administrative remedies, they would have known that such an increase was prevalent all over the country. Petitioners Claim - Petitioners claim that PD 921 was not repealed by RA 7160 because certain cases were decided based on the

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provisions of PD 921 even such cases arose when RA 7160 was already in effect. Respondents Comments - Respondents claim that PD 921 and RA 7160 cannot exist because of incompatibility, both dwelling on the issue of schedules of real property. - PD 464 was among those repealed by RA 7160. With PD 464 as the IRR, PD 921 cannot exist on its own. The cases cited by petitioners were decided after RA 7160 came into effect but these had to do with assessment before RA 7160 came into effect.

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- PD 921 states that the schedule shall be prepared by the city assessors of the district. - RA 7160 states that the schedule should be prepared jointly by the city, municipal and provincial assessors in Metro Manila. - The SC harmonized RA 7160 and PD 921 in the preparation of the schedule to show that these two laws are not incompatible. This has also shown that PD 921 can exist independently of PD 464: a. Assessors of every municipality in Metro Manila prepare the proposed schedule of values (in accordance with RA 7160).\ b. The Local Treasury and Assessment District meets (PD 921). This District shall be composed of assessors in QC, Pasig, San Juan, Mandaluyong and Marikina. In the said meeting, the assessors shall compare their individual assessments and then draw up a schedule of values for their district in accordance with the goal pf PD 921. c. The schedule agreed upon shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation (RA 7160). - Since PD 921 is still good law, the schedule drawn up by the Pasig assessor is illegal and void. 2. The petitioners do not need to exhaust administrative actions before seeking judicial relief. Ratio Administrative remedies need to be exhausted before seeking judicial relief except for cases which do not involve questions of fact but involve questions of law. Reasoning - As early as proceedings in the lower court, the parties agreed that the issues in the case are legal. - The questions raised do not merely involve the amounts raised but the validity of the increase. - If a taxpayer disputes the validity of a tax increase, he should first pay his taxes otherwise the treasurer would not act on his protest. - The petitioners in this case are questioning the very authority of the very authority and power of the assessor to impose the assessment and if the treasurer to collect the tax. - In the consolidated cases of Mathay, Puyat-Reyes and Javier, the Court heard the case even if the administrative remedies were not exhausted. There were factual issues in that case so the Court sought assistance from a fact-finding commission. No such factual issues are present in the current case.

ISSUES 1. WON RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) expressly repealed PD 921 2. WON the petitioners need to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief 3. WON the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory and therefore unconstitutional HELD 1. RA 7160 neither expressly nor impliedly repealed PD 921. Ratio If the legislature intends to repeal a certain law, it should have been expressly included in the repealing provisions. As for implied repeals, they are not favored unless there is a clear showing of repugnance between the two laws that they cannot co-exist. Reasoning - RA 7160 lists the laws it expressly repealed (in Sec. 534). The list did not include PD 921. - RA 7160 compared with PD 921: - In terms of scope, PD 921 embraces only the Metro Manila area whereas RA 7160 is national in scope. - PD 921 (promulgated in 1976) had the aim of evolving a progressive revenue program which would not unduly burden taxpayers in Metro Manila. - RA 7160 (effective 1992) aimed to make local government unit more autonomous in order to enable them to become more effective partners in national growth. - In terms of preparation of the schedule, PD 921 and RA 7160 differed with regard to those involved.

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3. There is no need to resolve the issue of constitutionality. Ratio The Court shall not resolve issues involving constitutionality if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Reasoning - The issue of constitutionality should be properly raised. - If the issue can be resolved on other grounds aside from constitutionality, the Court will choose that option.

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provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. - It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet and other appointive public officials from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner AntiGraft League of the Philippines further seeks the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions. - Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants. - The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the VicePresident being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

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ISSUE WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B HELD NO. Although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission saw it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. - Evidently, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. Such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment Under Section 13, Article VI, "No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2.), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government." - It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government" The prohibition imposed on the President and his official

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FERNAN; February 22, 1991 (jojo mendoza)
NATURE Two (2) petitioners seeking a declaration unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 of the

FACTS - Executive Order 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 provides, among others that, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefore. - Petitioners maintain that this EO which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office." - The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those

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family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment. -Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to improve upon said class prohibitions. - Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in -the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other hand, may hold any

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other office or position in the government during their tenure. - However, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term exofficio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.

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nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together. - The lower court sustained the challenge and held it ultra vires for the City of Manila to have enacted such ordinance. Hence this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in not indulging the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the ordinance especially in the absence of clear reasons, which would show its unconstitutionality 2. WON the lower court erred in holding the ordinance as violative of due process HELD 1. Ratio YES. The Judiciary shall not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation Reasoning. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 2. Ratio YES. An ordinance or statute enacted in the exercise of the States police power pursuant to a valid state objective (e.g., in this case, safeguarding public morals) shall not be deemed to have violated the due process clause in the absence of clear and convincing evidence. Reasoning

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATIONS ASS'N., INC., V CITY MAYOR OF MANILA FERNANDO; July 31, 1967 (bry san juan)
NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting an action for prohibition on the ground that Ordinance 4760 is unconstitutional. FACTS - On July 5, 1963 Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Assoc., a non-stock corporation dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels" assails the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760 (approved on June 14, 1963). The grounds adduced were: (1) unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P14,500.00 for second class motels and prohibit 18 year-olds from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. (2) invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination because it requires clients to fill up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the

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- There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it. - Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, firstclass motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and secondclass motels, P4,500 yearly. In the leading case of Lutz V. Araneta, this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform.

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FACTS - Through a Deed of Assignment, Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. (hereafter referred to as the corporation) through its president, Antonio Vic Zulueta, assigned its rights under Land Transfer Claim No. 82-757 unto petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales - Gonzales filed an action before the RTCof Manila to compel public respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to issue Land Bank Bonds for the amount of P400,000.00 in the name of petitioner instead of in the name of the corporation as the original and registered owner of the property - Defendant corporation was declared in default for failure to file its answer within the reglementary period while defendant Land Bank filed an answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action - At the pre-trial, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts - The lower court found the plaintiff entitled to the issuance of the Land Bank bonds - Land Bank of the Philippines filed an appeal before respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the lower courts decision Petitioners Claim Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in resolving the appeal in spite of the motion to certify this case to the Supreme Court Since the trial court rendered judgment on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the appeal from such a decision can only raise questions of law and therefore, respondent Petitioner relying on the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, maintains that by virtue of said deed, he stepped into the shoes of his assignor and acquired all the rights of the latter and it was error on the part of the appellate court to find that the aforesaid Deed of Assignment is not effective to authorize the Land Bank of the Philippines to issue the Land Bank Bonds in the name of petitioner upon compliance with the remaining Six (6) requirements for the first release thereof. ISSUES 1. WON the appellate court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of respondent Land Bank 2. WON respondent Land Bank can he compelled to issue Land Bank bonds in the name of petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment executed by the landownerassignor Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. in favor of petitioner. HELD 1. YES.

PROF.
Ratio The existence of a stipulation of facts between the parties does not automatically mean that the parties agreed on all the facts considering that stipulations may be total or partial. Reasoning In this instance, it was merely partial. A perusal of the Stipulation and Supplemental Stipulation of Facts, readily reveals that the same do not contain a complete or sufficient picture of the circumstances among the parties and that certain vital matters are left out in said stipulations. In view of the omissions in the Stipulations, the remedy of appeal before the appellate court resorted to by respondent bank and assailed by petitioner is proper because it involved not only pure questions of law but mixed questions of law and fact. 2. NO. Ratio It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and entitled to great respect. They have in their favor a presumption of legality. Reasoning There is no question that petitioner stepped into the shoes of his assignor, the defendant corporation. But petitioner overlooked the fact that when the corporation assigned its rights to him, the same was subject to the rules and restrictions imposed by respondent Land Bank on the matter of assignment of rights. In the promulgation of said rules and regulations, the Land Bank relied on the provisions of Section 76, R.A. 3844 as amended by P.D. 251. The act of assignment could not operate to erase restrictions burdening the right assigned. The assignee cannot, after all, acquire a greater right than that pertaining to the assignor. - Thus, when Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. assigned its rights, in favor of petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, the latter acquired the same subject to the restrictions on assignment of rights embodied in Resolution No. 75-68 dated February 25, 1975. - The Court was in total agreement with respondent appellate court's finding that it must be the Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. which should comply with all the requirements imposed by respondent bank to effect the release of payments under land transfer claims because of the restriction that the bonds will only be released in the name of the landowner-assignor corporation which may thereafter indorse the same to petitioner. In fact, in the decision of the trial court, Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. was directed to comply with the six (6) requirements 12 listed in paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated September 10, 1985. Since no appeal was taken by Ramos

GONZALES V LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES FERNAN; March 22, 1990 (lora alamin)
NATURE PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the trial court and denying the direct issuance of Land Bank bonds in the name of petitioner as assignee.

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Plantation Company, Inc. from said decision, said directive has become final and executory. - However, the decision of the appellate court dismissing the complaint of petitioner had the effect of reversing said directive, thereby leaving petitioner without legal authority to compel Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. to comply with the requirements of the Land Bank for the release of the bonds and thereafter to endorse the same to petitioner as assignee thereof. The decision of the appellate court should therefore be, as it was modified. Disposition The decision of the appellate court was MODIFIED. The directive to Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. contained in the lower court's decision was reinstated. Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. was ordered to comply within thirty (30) days from notice with the six (6) requirements listed in paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated September 10, 1985, and as soon as the bonds are released in its name, to immediately endorse the same to petitioner as assignee thereof.

A2010
-6 July 1989: Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, basing his action on Compensation Policy Guidelines (CPG) No. 80-4, alleged that there were excess payments of honoraria and issued a Notice of Disallowance disallowing P64,925 from the first voucher. PSU sought reconsideration but was denied. -Upon request of PSU, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a letter clarifying that the basis for the project's honoraria should not be CPG No. 80-4 which pertains to locally funded projects but rather NCC No. 53 which pertains to foreign-assisted projects. A copy of this clarification was sent to the COA upon request by PSU. Notwithstanding this clarification, COA still denied the next request for reconsideration. -December 1990: DENR informed Eslao of its acceptance of the PSU final reports on the review and evaluation of the government reforestation projects. Honoraria for the period from January 1989 to January 1990 were disbursed in accordance with NCC#53. COA resident auditor of PSU issued a Certificate of Settlement and Balances showing disallowance of alleged excess payment of honoraria, which Eslao was being required to return. ISSUES 1. Which set of provisions is applicable to the honoraria to be paid to PSU personnel who took part in the evaluation project: NCC#53or CPG#80-4? [subisssue: WON the evaluation project falls within CPG#80-4s definition of a special project.] 2. WON the projects duration stipulated in the MOA was implicitly extended by the parties. 3. WON COA has the option to choose which set of provisions to apply. 4. WON petitioner can claim for moral damages and reimbursement of legal expenses. HELD 1. MOA's "Budget Estimate" which, among others, provides in detail the duration of service for each member of the evaluation project as amended by the rates provided by NCC No. 53 must be the basis of the honoraria due to the evaluation team. Reasoning CPG#80-4 does not control, nor even relate to, the DENR evaluation project for at least 2 reasons: (a) the evaluation project was not a special project within the meaning of CPG#80-4; (b) that same evaluation project is a Foreign-Assisted Project to which NCC No. 53 is specifically applicable. -CPG#80-4, sec21 defines special project as an interagency or inter-committee activity or an undertaking by

PROF.
a composite group of officials/employees from various agencies which [activity or undertaking] is not among the regular and primary functions of the agencies involved. -Examination of the MOA and its annexes reveals that 2 groups were actually created: (1) a coordinating committee with members drawn from officials of the DENR and of the PSU; and (2) the evaluation project team itself composed exclusively of PSU personnel. -An inter-agency or inter-committee activity or undertaking must be actually carried out by a composite group of officials and employees from 2 or more participating agencies. In the case at hand, the project team actually tasked with carrying out the evaluation of the DENR reforestation activity is composed exclusively of personnel from PSU; the project team is not a composite group as required by the definition of CPG No. 80-4 of special projects. -Examination of the provisions of NCC#53 makes it crystal clear that the circular is applicable to foreignassisted projects only. It therefore amended the earlier CPG No. 80-4 by carving out from the subject matter originally covered by the latter all foreign-assisted [special] projects. 2. Ratio NO. Silence is not equivalent to consent since its ambiguity lends itself to error. Reasoning From the clear and detailed provisions of the MOA and Project Proposal in relation to NCC#53, consent to any extension of the evaluation project, in this instance, must be more concrete than the alleged silence or lack of protest on the part of the DENR. -The date when the DENR accepted the final project report is by no means conclusive as to the terminal date of the evaluation project. Submission of reports merely served to trigger the phased releases of funds. 3. Ratio NO. Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect (Warren Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations). -COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void. Reasoning Government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in an appropriate case by a competent court (and ultimately the Supreme Court.

ESLAO V COMMISSION ON AUDIT FELICIANO; September 1,1994 (marge alias)

NATURE Petition for certiorari to review and set aside the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) which denied honoraria and per diems claimed under National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 53 by certain Pangasinan State University (PSU) personnel including petitioner, Rufino O. Eslao, PSU president. FACTS -9 December 1988: PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DENR for an evaluation project (of 11 government reforestation operations in Pangasinan) funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). That same day, DENR issued to PSU a notice to proceed, to which the latter complied with. -30 January 1989: PSU Board of Regents approved the MOA, and PSU released the honoraria of the concerned PSU personnel (first voucher: P70,375). The rates were later found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of NCC#53, causing PSU to adjust the rates accordingly.

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4. Ratio NO. Petitioner failed to present evidence of bad faith or tortious intent warranting an award thereof. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty must be accorded to respondent COA. Disposition Petition granted. COA decision set aside.

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These are the 6 faces of PQs. We can divide them into 3, each representing a way of approaching constitutional law problems: [i] Textual approach (letter a) What does the letter of the constitution say? [ii] Functional approach (letters b and c) Are we capable of resolving the problem posd? [iii] Prudential or Political approach (letters d e and f) Are there overriding considerations which impel us to defer to the executive or legislative branch? I. POLITICAL QUESTIONS and HABEAS CORPUS The jusiticiability of habeas corpus decisions of the Pres. under the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution prior to Garcia-Padilla: 1 - Bracelon v Baker (1905) 2 - Montenegro v Castaneda (1952) 3 - Lansang v Garcia (1971) Political justiciable Barcelon Montenegro Garcia-Padilla In Barcelon, Court arrived at PQ by using the 3 approaches Textual since the text of the organic act had placed discretion at the hands of the Governor-General Functional exec and legislative depts. Have the machinery for verifying the existence of facts whereas the courts do not Prudential interference by the courts in the decision can result in tying the hands of those charged with maintaining order Montenegro is not doctrinally significant bec it merely accepted and applied the doctrine in Barcelon In Lansang, chief reliance was on the textual, and argued that Barcelon must be reversed Textual the grant of power to the Pres under Art, 7 Sec. 10 (1935 Constitution) was not absolute but was tied with 2 factual pre-conditions: a. there must exist invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof b. public necessity: must require the suspension of the privilege Garcia-Padilla replayed the records in Barcelon and Lansang, and applied the functional and prudential approach to arrive at a PQ conclusion. / NonNot political Justiciable /

PROF.
Analysis of Conflicting Results On the Textual Approach: Factors why Garcia-Padillas textual approach to the question is stronger than Barcelon: [a] Constitution has a textually broader source of constitutional power imminent danger of invasion vs. actual invasion [b] Barcelon involved power delegated to a colonial govt inferior in status to the power of a duly elected Pres -- J. De Castro in Padilla: ConCon of 1935 had the opportunity to modify the Barcelon (1905) doctrine or at least to place a legislative check on Pres power, but even after debate it did not. He then concludes that the constitutional text represents the distilled wisdom of the ConCon However, the ConCon of 1971 introduced textual modifications that reversed the doctrine. The ConCon if it did not agree with Lansang (1971) could also have reversed it but it did not. Hence, which distilled wisdom has remained bottled for consumption? So on the whole textual argument for a PQ conclusion hangs limp. -- J. Abad Santos: Lansang doctrine demonstrates a lack of contact with reality. How so? The answer is obvious. Court must rely on the Executive w/c has the appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method w/c had to be used in Lansang. Court heavily relied on classified info by the military. It was like a case of the defendant judging suit. The prudential approach as expressed in terms of faith in the President has only J. De Castro as sponsor. Adding these up: Even if on the textual approach the position for judicial intervention is strong it does not necessarily follow that the Court will intervene. The Court has 2 kinds of escape hatches: [1] the functional and [2] the prudential approaches. On a number of occasions the Court has slipped through these hatches. Example: Javellana v Exec Secretary: That there is no further judicial obstacle to the Constitution considered in force and effect, SC found itself functionally and prudentially unable to dispute Pres finding that the new Constitution has been ratified by citizens assemblies. -- In fact it is also possible for the Court on the basis of the same set of facts and guided by the same constitutional text initially to consider a problem political, then after the political dust has cleared, somehow consider the same problem justiciable. Example: Avelino v Cuenco: WON there was quorum when Cuenco was selected Senate Pres after the walk out of the Avelino faction, SC said it was political while Senators were still in a growling mood, but when all was calmed down SC said it was justiciable and used simple arithmetic to declare there was a quorum.

THE FACES AND USES OF THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: REFLECTION ON HABEAS CORPUS, THE PCO AND BAIL JOAQUIN BERNAS (rean balisi)
Pre-Note: This article tackles the meaning of Political Questions used in the habeas corpus cases, the PCO (Presidential Commitment Order) cases, and the Right to Bail cases. Bernas defines Political Questions through settled jurisprudence in the first part. He integrates this in his analysis of the cases tackled in this article, of which he divides into 3 parts namely: [a] habeas corpus, [b] PCO, and [c] the right to bail. POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1) The abstract meaning of Political Questions (PQ) in Taada v Cuenco: Political Questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. (2) The many faces of PQs as enunciated in Baker v Carr: Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found: [a] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to a coordinate political department [b] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it [c] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion [d] the impossibility of courts undertaking independent resolution w/o expressing lack of the respect due to coordinate branches of government [e] an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made [f] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question

Lansang

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On the Pattern: The pattern in the resolution of problems involving assertive presidency when there are obstacles to a simple application of a constitutional text: a. Either the prudential and functional approaches dominate the reading of the constitutional text, or b. The resolution of the constitutional problem is postponed to a more propitious time. Judicial intervention will not take place at all until the emergency is safely past. The Court will see to that Q: How about the judicial activism in Lansang? Is it a departure from the pattern? No. Lansang is doctrinally less bold than what it appears to be. The Court in fact assumed very limited review jurisdiction; to go no further than to satisfy itself NOT that the Pres decision is correct BUT that in suspending the writ, the Pres sis not act arbitrarily. In times of crisis, real or orchestrated, will a court accuse the Pres of arbitrariness? Chances are it will not. The Court will more likely to see in the word of Baker v Carr, an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made Hence the turn about in Garcia from Lansang is no surprise. On Bernas 2 Observations: [a] Political Questions doctrine must be viewed in the context of the dynamics of separated powers. In Marbury v Madison: we first see the revolutionary doctrine that the Court could pass on the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive and of Congress. [b] On J Abad Santos argument in support of PQ conclusions. He says that the Court should maintain a detached attitude to refrain from giving seal of approval But can the Court escape complicity be mere silence? The nature of the power of judicial review is such that when the Court chooses to be silent about constitutional issues brought before it, the Court by that fact is silently vocal and thereby affirms and legitimizes what it dares not reprobate. Hence, dormant or assertive, the Court must accept it share of praise and blame. If it wishes not to, modestly turning away judicial eyes from an offending deed will not do II. POLITICAL QUESTIONS and PCO Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is an order of preventive detention issued by the Pres as Commanderin-Chief. Basis of this power: a.

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The crisis powers of the President Article 7 Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. (1) to call on the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, (2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) to declare martial law b. LOI 1211, which is an order issued by the Pres to his subordinates for the arrest and detention of persons committing crimes in PD 2045 with respect to which the privilege of the writ remains suspended by the same PD 2045. 3 Questions posed by PCO: (1) Does the Pres have power to order arrest and detention in times of crisis? (2) Must the order of arrest and detention conform with the requirements of a valid warrant? (3) Is the person detained through a PCO entitled to bail? Analysis of PCO and PQ Q: Granted however, that the Pres has the power to order preventive detention, is his order beyond judicial review? Garcia-Padilla and Morales say the PCO is beyond judicial review. But can the answer really be as simple as that? In Garcia-Padilla and Morales, the enquiry is not possible not because the nature of the detention is preventive but because the means of enquiry, the privilege of the writ, has been suspended. Bernas: Note that the privilege of the writ is merely suspended. [a] While the Pres may have final discretion on WON to call on the armed forces or to suspend the privilege or to impose martial law, it does not follow that everything he does in the name of necessity or that everything he orders the armed forces to do is legal. [b] if the PCO in Morales and Garcia Padilla are not subject to judicial enquiry now, it is not because they are orders of preventive detention but because the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus temporarily prevents enquiry into their legality. [c] And since by its nature a suspension of the privilege is temporary, the exclusion of the courts into the legality must also be temporary. I submit therefore that the Court in GarciaPadilla and Morales rendered the nation a distinct disservice by creating the impression that the PCOs are conclusively valid Q: If then hey are not conclusively valid, what are the standards for measuring the legality of the detention? 2 purposes for enquiry into the legality of the detention

PROF.
(a.) determining criminal or civil liability of the persons responsible for the arrest and detention (b.) for the release of the person detained It is said that the standard, is the good or bad faith of the executive ordering the arrest. So long as the such arrests are made in good faith and honest belief that they are needed to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion executive immunity. However, immunity from liability is one thing, the legality of keeping a person in detention is another thing. The suspension of the writ while it prevents enquiry into the legality of the detention, does not legitimize the detention. Once the suspension is lifted, the legality of the detention can be examined by the courts to determine WON the person detained should be released. Hence, mere good faith or bad faith of the executive cannot be the standard. Must the standards be the requirements for a valid warrant? J. Concepcion says that the PCO is a warrant issued by the Pres and therefore must comply with the requirements of a valid warrant in the same manner and to the same extent as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge. But this is just Obiter Dictum because the Courts ruling in Garcia-Padilla and Morales found the arrests to be justifiable as exceptions to the ordinary requirement of a warrant. Bernas: The rule in the Constitution for validity or arrests whether with or without warrant, or whether warrant be issued by a judge or by any other responsible officer authorized by law, is that the arrest must be based on the existence of a probable cause NOT good or bad faith of the executive. III. POLITICAL QUESTIONS and THE RIGHT TO BAIL Garcia-Padilla and Morales clearly teach that in a situation where the privilege of the writ is suspended, bail should not be granted otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the writ would be frustrated. It may be noted that the emphasis of Garcia-Padilla and Morales is on the funcrtional and practical reasons for making bail unavailable. In Nava v Gatmaitan, it was argued that if bail must be granted. It can only be granted after hearing for the purpose of examining the weight of the evidence justifying detention. But that precisely is the heart of the suspension of the writ to freeze temporarily enquiry into the justification of the detention. How then is the

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court to determine whether bail is due as of right if the office in custody of the detainee is not legally bound, because of the suspension of the privilege, to present evidence in support of the detention. Bernas: Once formal charges are filed, bail becomes available because the filing of formal charges entails executive waiver of the effects of the suspension of the privilege. This is necessarily so because the essential effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ is withhold enquiry, whereas the necessary effect of the filing of formal charges is to open up enquiry. In support of this, the majority in Nava and in Garcia-Padilla and Morales said that release on bail may be necessary for the preparation of a proper defense. 2 Supplementary Arguments: (1) The suspension of the privilege suspends only one constitutional right and leaves all others unaffected. (see Ex parte Milligan cited in Nava v Gatmaitan to the effect that the framers of the American constitution limited the suspension of one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.) (2) The loss of the right to bail implicit in the suspension of the privilege must yield to the guarantee of the right to bail explicit in the Constitution. CONCLUSION -- The question in Garcia-Padilla and Morales is not so much whether the President has the questioned constitutional powers. He has them. The important question is whether he and those who act for him have used them and will continue to use them wisely, justly, and humanly, and whether the SC will continue to be the last bulwark of our liberties. -- The clamor against unmitigated PCO is not against collective self-defense as such but against a perceived disproportion between the national need and the measures taken to respond to that need. -- Beyond the need for balance in the actual exercise of leadership is the need for recasting the structures of power. As J. Fernando says: If constitutionalism would assuredly be triumphant, the grant of power to the President to suspend the privilege of the writ and to impose martial law should be stricken from the constitutional text. Faith alone in the presidency as J. De Castro puts it will not suffice. -- The Garcia-Padilla and Morales decisions ride on the momentum of judicial generosity to the President and affirm presidential prerogative in excess of what is needed for the moment. Where will it ever end?

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PROF.
- Tanada now contends that Cuencos and Delgados election to the SET are null and void for they were nominated not by the party with the 2nd largest number of votes but by a member of NP for the Committee of Rules. ISSUES 1. WON the substantial issue involved is a political question 2. WON the election of Cuenco and Delgado as members of the SET is valid and lawful HELD 1. No. Although the constitution gives the senate the exclusive power to choose the senators who will form part of the SET, it also provides for the manner in which the power is to be exercised. Judicial review is the power to determine whether the exercise of power is within the limits inherent in the delegation of power. - Citing an American commentator (Willoughby): Where discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. - Citing In re McConaughy (American case) ..What is generally meant when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. - A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. - Such is NOT the nature of the issue in this case. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate power of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. 2. No. The constitution gives the party with 2nd largest number of votes (CP in this case) the right, not a privilege, to nominate 3 senators to the SET.

TANADA V CUENCO CONCEPCION February 28,1957 (maia rieza)

NATURE Petition for a preliminary injunction on respondents restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and on respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of his corespondents while action is pending, and to make injunction permanent after the hearing, ousting respondents from position in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. FACTS - The senate, after the November 1955 elections, was composed of 23 senators from the Nacionalista Party (NP) and 1 senator (Senator Tanada) from the Citizens Party (CP). The constitution provides, with regard to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET): - "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." - The NP nominated 3 senators to the SET, namely: Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez, Cipriano Primicias. Tanada nominated himself for CP. Then, Primicias, acting on behalf of the Committee of Rules, nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado (both members of NP) to fill the 5 th and 6th seats in the SET, despite objections from Tanada. (Bottomline, 5 of the 6 seats allocated for senators in the SET are filled by NP, only 1 by CP). All nominations were voted upon and accepted by the senators, after which technical secretaries and private assistants were assigned to Cuenco and Delgado (no mention if the other senators were assigned such personnel, but only CUencos and Delgados are relevant).

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The provision that the SET shall be composed of 6 senators is equally mandatory with the provision that the CP shall nominate 3 members to the SET. - The main objective of the framers in providing for the establishment of the SET is to ensure judicial impartiality in the disposition of electoral contests. It is clear that the framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the electoral tribunals. The procedure prescribed in the constitution is vital to the role of the SET, as is constitutes the essence of the tribunals. Hence, compliance to said procedure is mandatory. - Ideally, the composition of the SET should be 3-3-3 (3 SC Justices, 3 majority party senators, 3 minority party senators). With the current senate composition, it would be 3-3-1. Tanada obviously did not nominate other senators for it will further disadvantage the minority in the SET (the composition will be 3-5-1). - The Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. Disposition Petition granted.

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three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further that the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary. - With the provision "Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the intent is clear and mandatory that at all times the SET shall have nine Members. Thus, the senate is justified in acting as it did.

PROF.
BAKER V CARR BRENNAN; March 26, 1962 (anton arcilla)
NATURE Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. FACTS - Plaintiff Charles Baker was a Republican who lived in Shelby County, Tennessee, the county in which Memphis is located. His complaint was that though the Tennessee State Constitution required that legislative districts be redrawn every ten years according to the federal census to provide for districts of substantially equal population, Tennessee had not in fact redistricted since the census of 1901. By the time of Baker's lawsuit, his district in Shelby County had about ten times as many residents as some of the rural districts. His argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive the "equal protection under the laws" required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and was obsolete because of a significant growth and population shift since 1900. - Defendant Joe Carr was sued in his position as Secretary of State for Tennessee. Carr was not the person who set the district lines the state legislature had done that but was sued ex officio as the person who was ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections in the state and for the publication of district maps. - The State of Tennessee argued that legislative districts were essentially political, not judicial, questions, as had been held by a plurality opinion of the Court in Colegrove v. Green (1946), wherein Justice Felix Frankfurter declared that, "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket." Frankfurter believed that relief for legislative malapportionment had to be attained through the political process. ISSUES 1. WON the issue is a justiciable question. 2. WON the State of Tennessee should reapportionment;

LABRADOR [dissent]
- That there must be 6 senators in the SET is equally mandatory as the procedure such senators shall be elected to the SET. The composition of the senate (23-1) is a situation that the framers obviously did not imagine, - The majority ruling is objectionable on the ff. grounds: 1. it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine 2. it denies to the Senate the power to elect members of the SET, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority, contrary to the constitutional provision 3. it would make the supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the SET shall be composed of 9 members 4. the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the SET shall thereby be correspondingly reduced - That Tanada did not nominate 2 other senators amounts to a waiver of the privilege to nominate members to the SET, thus such privilege may be exercised by the other party to preserve the mandate of 9 members. While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the SET has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.

SEPARATE OPINION PARAS [dissent]

- There should invariably be 6 members from the senate in the SET. Fluctuations in the total membership in the SET were not and could not have been intended. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the SET, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no minority party represented in the senate, the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. - It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate

undergo

HELD - The Court's 6-2 ruling in favor of the plaintiffs forced state legislatures to reapportion their seats to reflect population shifts before the elections that were to occur in the fall of 1962. It also decreed one person, one vote as part of the United States' constitutional heritage and

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opened the door to challenging state voting procedures and malapportionment on constitutional grounds. - Ratio The reapportionment of state legislative districts is not a political question, and is justiciable by the federal courts. Reasoning The Court split 6 to 2 in ruling that Baker's case was justiciable, producing, in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J. Brennan, three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, proposing a six-part test for determining which questions were "political" in nature. Brennan declared: a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; b) that a justifiable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; c) because appellees raise the issue before this Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes. - "A citizen's right to vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution." - "The mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection is little more than a play upon words." Cases which are political in nature are marked by: 1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;" as an example of this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political questions" 2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;" 3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" 4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;" 5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;" 6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

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- Baker v. Carr and subsequent cases fundamentally altered the nature of political representation in America, requiring not just Tennessee but nearly every state to redistrict during the 1960s, often several times. As this re-apportionment increased the political power of urban centers it has often been credited with paving the way for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Primary and Secondary Education Act of 1966.

PROF.
These cases arose out of the efforts of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of Executive Order No. 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage service, and the equally determined efforts of the PPA and its officials, the herein petitioners, to block enforcement of the executive order, even as they promulgated their own orders FACTS GR No: 103716 Pete Prado (Sec. Of Transpo and Comm, and Chair of PPA) v. CA, UHPAP - On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA. - However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation; that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations.4 - The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement EO 1088 effective November 16, 1986. This in turn drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who would charge rates under EO 1088. - The PPA instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 4386, fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in EO 1088. - Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7,1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, against the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Hernando Perez, and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Solis, Jr. It sought a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate implementation of EO 1088, as well as a temporary restraining order to stop PPA officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against UHPAP members charging rates in accordance with EO 1088. - Regional Trial Court of Manila issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the PPA from threatening the UHPAP, its officers and its members with suspension and other disciplinary action for collecting pilotage fees pursuant to EO 1088. - On March 16, 1987, the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippines, William Lines, Inc., Loadstar Shipping

SEPARATE OPINION HARLAN AND FRANKFURTER [dissent]

- I can find nothing in the Equal Protection Clause or elsewhere in the Federal Constitution which expressly or impliedly supports the view that state legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the voice of every voter. Not only is that proposition refuted by history, as shown by my Brother Frankfurter, but it strikes deep into the heart of our federal system. xxx Its acceptance would require us to turn our backs on the regard which this Court has always shown for the judgment of state legislatures and courts on matters of basically local concern. - In the last analysis, what lies at the core of this controversy is a difference of opinion as to the function of representative government. It is surely beyond argument that those who have the responsibility for devising a system of representation may permissibly consider that factors other than bare numbers should be taken into ' account. The existence of the United States Senate is proof enough of that. To consider that we may ignore the Tennessee Legislature's judgment in this instance because that body was the product of an asymmetrical electoral apportionment would in effect be to assume the very conclusion here disputed. Hence we must accept the present form of the Tennessee Legislature as the embodiment of the State's choice," or, more realistically, its compromise, between competing political philosophies. The federal courts have not been empowered by the Equal Protection Clause to judge whether this resolution of the State's internal political conflict is desirable or undesirable, wise or unwise.

PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION V CA MENDOZA; January 22, 1997 (eva sison)
NATURE

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Co., Inc. and Delsen Transport Lines, Inc., after obtaining leave, filed a joint answer in intervention. - On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties the fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in EO1088. - The administrative order provided: Section 3. Terms/Conditions on Pilotage Service. - The shipping line or vessel's agent/representative and the harbor pilot/firm chosen by the former shall agree between themselves, among others, on what pilotage service shall be performed, the use of tugs and their rates, taking into consideration the circumstances stated in Section 12 of PPA AO No. 03-85, and such other conditions designed to ensure the safe movement of the vessel in pilotage areas/grounds. - The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and academic and that consequently EO 1088 had ceased to be effective. - The UHPAP opposed the motion; filed on May 25, 1988 a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the validity of AO 02-88. - Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered a decision holding that AO 02-88 did not render the case moot and academic and that the PPA was under obligation to comply with EO 1088 because the order had the force of law which the PPA could not repeal. - The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition for review. In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court GR No: 100481(Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines, Conference of Interisland Ship Owners and Operators, United Petroleum Tanker Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. CA, UHPAP, MPA - Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari filed before RTC Manila, (Civil Case No. 88-44726), the UHPAP and the Manila Pilots Association (MPA) sought the annulment of A.O. No. 02-88, which in pertinent parts provided: Section 1. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the provision of pilotage in ports/harbors/areas defined as compulsory in Section 8 of PPA AO No. 0385, entitled, "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports" shall be open to all

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licensed harbor pilots/pilotage firms /associations appointed/accredited by this authority to perform pilotage service. - The UHPAP and MPA, as petitioners below, contended (1) that AO 02-88 was issued without the benefit of a public hearing; (2) that EO 1088 had not been repealed by any other Executive Order or Presidential Decree and, therefore, should be given effect; and (3) that AO 02-88 contravened P.D. No. 857. - On August 21, 1989, the Philippine Interisland Shipping Association, Conference of Interisland Shipowners and Operators, United Petroleum Tanker Operators of the Philippines, Lighterage Association of the Philippines, and Pilotage Integrated Services Corp., were allowed to intervene. - On September 8, 1989, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court, enjoining the PPA from implementing AO No. 02-88 and, on October 26, 1989, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners therein. - Respondents and the intervenors below filed a joint petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the decision of the trial court. But their petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the issue raised was purely legal. - The parties separately filed petitions for review before this Court. The first one, by the PPA and its officers, was docketed as G.R. No. 100109, while the second one, by the intervenors, was docketed as G.R. No. 100481 - The petition filed by the government in G.R. No. 100109 was dismissed for failure of petitioners to show that the CA committed a reversible error.8 On the other hand, the petition of the intervenors in G.R. No. 100481 was given due course. G.R. No. 107720 - Following the denial of its petition in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA issued on July 31, 1992, AO 0592, placing harbor pilots under the control of the PPA with respect to the scheduling and assignment of service of vessels. The PPA cited as justification "pilotage delays ... under the set-up where UHPAP & MPA assign the pilots. Intentionally or otherwise, several vessels do not receive the pilotage service promptly, causing them operational disruptions and additional expenses /costs. " - Private respondents UHPAP and MTA viewed the matter differently. On October 28, 1992, they asked the RTCManila to cite PPA officials in contempt of court. - On the same day, the trial court issued an order restraining the herein petitioners from implementing AO 05 -92. However, the PPA proceeded to implement its order, prompting the UHPAP and MPA to move again to cite petitioners in contempt, even as they questioned

PROF.
the validity of AO 05 -92. - Accordingly the trial court issued another order on November 4, 1992, reiterating its previous order of October 28, 1992 to petitioners to refrain from implementing A.O. No. 05-92 pending resolution of the petitions. - Making a special appearance, petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the court and moved for the dismissal of the petitions for contempt. Allegedly to prevent the disruption of pilotage services, petitioners created a special team of reserve pilots to take over the pilotage service in the event members of UHPAP/MPA refused to render pilotage services. - For the third time respondents moved to cite petitioners in contempt of court. Again petitioners questioned the court's jurisdiction and manifested that they were adopting their previous motion to dismiss petitions for contempt filed against them. - On November 17, 1992, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and set the contempt petitions for hearing on November 19, 1992. Hence, this petition. - Pending resolution of this case, the Court ordered the parties to maintain the status quo as of October 31, 1992. ISSUES 1. WON Executive Order No. 1088 is valid and petitioners are bound to obey it 2. WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of intervenors from the decision of the Trial Court invalidating Administrative Order No. 02-88 of the PPA (G.R. No. 100481) 3. WON the Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the contempt charges against petitioners HELD 1. Ratio The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O No. 1088. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Reasoning - EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 1088 PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE OR PUBLIC PHILIPPINE PORTS. WHEREAS, the United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines has clamored for the rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of

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uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, whether public or private; Section 1. states the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on tonnage for services rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels SEC. 3. All orders, letters of instruction, rules, regulations and other issuances inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. SEC. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. - Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its power under its charter to fix pilotage rates. - There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power; that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. - It is not an answer to say that E. O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character. - Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. No. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. - Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the Services Tendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District." - It is worthy to note that E.O. No. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or

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decrease rites, charges or fees. The reason is that its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports." - Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wage-fixing powers, by virtue of the former's plenary power of legislation. The result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking - Being a mere administrative agency, PPA cannot validly issue orders or regulations that would have the effect of rendering nugatory the provisions of the legislative issuance - Petitioners refused to implement E.O. No. 1088 on the ground that it was issued without notice to the PPA and that it was nothing but a "political gimmick" resorted to by then President Marcos. But lack of notice to the PPA is not proof that the necessary factual basis for the order was wanting. Moreover, an inquiry into legislative motivation is not proper since the only relevant question is whether in issuing it the President violated constitutional and statutory restrictions on his power. - in La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas," mutatis mutandis may be applied to the cases at bar; His obligation was to collect the revenue for the government in accordance with existing legal provisions, executive agreements and executive orders certainly not excluded. He would not be living up to his official designation if he were permitted to act otherwise. He was not named Collector of Customs for nothing... 2. Ratio. It is now settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication on the merits of a controversy. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the joint appeal on the ground that the issues raised were purely legal questions. Reasoning Both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review to this Court. The government's petition was dismissed for lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. The dismissal of the government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition for the review of the same decision of the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is based on substantially the same grounds as those stated in the government's petition. Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct.

PROF.
- It must be noted that while the court a quo had clearly recognized the intricate legal issue involved, it nevertheless decided it on the merits which apparently resolved only the procedural aspect that justified it in declaring the questioned order as null and void. While We recognize the basic requirements of due process, the same cannot take precedence in the case at bar in lieu of the fact that the resolution of the present case is purely a legal question. - in Murillo v. Consul the Supreme Court laid down the rule that "if an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, and in the latter Court, the appellant raised naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction," then with more reason the case at bar public appellants thru the Sol.gen manifested that the controversy has reference to the pure legal question of the validity of the questioned administrative order should be dismissed. Consequently, - It is significant to note that the Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PPA have conceded the finality of the dismissal of their appeal. Thus, the administrative policy, the validity of which herein petitioners seek to justify by their appeal, has already been abandoned by the very administrative agency which adopted it, with the result that the question of validity of A. O. No. 0299 is now moot and academic. 3. Ratio By accepting the dismissal of their petition for review, petitioners rendered execution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to disobey the court's final injunction as embodied in its decision would be properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that private respondents' complaint must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful processes of a court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as the order previously prohibited by the court. Reasoning PPA subsequently promulgated Administrative Order No. 05-92, under which the PPA assumed the power of scheduling and assigning pilots to service vessels. The UHPAP and the MPA saw the adoption of this system as a return to the "Open Pilotage System" and, therefore, a violation of the trial court's decision invalidating the "Open Pilotage System." They considered this to be a contempt of the trial court. - Petitioners moved to dismiss the motions for contempt against them. They contend that even if the motions were filed as incidents of Civil Case, the RTC-Manila did

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not have jurisdiction to hear them because the main case was no longer before the court and the fact was that the contempt citation was not an incident of the case, not even of its execution, but a new matter raising a new cause of action which must be litigated in a separate action, even as petitioners denied they had committed any contumacious act by the issuance of A.0. No. 05-92. - Private respondents maintained that their petitions were mere incidents of Civil Case and that the trial court has jurisdiction because in fact this Court had not yet remanded the case to the court a quo for execution of its decision. Private respondents complain that petitioners are trying to circumvent the final and executory decision of the court through the issuance of A.O. No. 05-92. - the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44726 enjoined petitioners from implementing the so called "Open Pilotage System" embodied in A. O. No. 02-88. If, as alleged, A.O. No. 05-92 is in substance a reenactment of A.O. No. 02-88, then there is basis for private respondents' invocation of the trial court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt. - Still it is argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction upon the perfection of their appeal, from its decision. That is indeed true, "The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts' committed after perfection of the appeal." The trial court would have jurisdiction only in. the event of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the case to the trial court. Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts. Disposition WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED. We conclude that E.O. No. 088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. Finally, the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No, 1088 or alter it. Much less could the PPA abrogate the rates fixed and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage service to the contracting parties. We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private respondent, subject to any valid defense which petitioners may interpose.

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FACTS: - In this petition, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Commissioner of Customs jointly seek the reversal of the Decision, 1 dated February 16, 1995, of herein public respondent, Hon. Apolinario B. Santos, Presiding Judge of Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The following facts, concisely related in the petition 2 of the Office of the Solicitor General, appear to be undisputed:

PROF.
without authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pending investigation. 3 Subsequently, BIR officer Eliseo Corcega submitted to his superiors a report of the inventory conducted and a computation of the value-added tax and ad valorem tax on the articles for evaluation and disposition. 4

Private respondent Guild of Philippine Jewelers, Inc., is an association of Filipino jewelers engaged in the manufacture of jewelries (sic) and allied undertakings. Among its members are Hans Brumann, Inc., Miladay Jewels, Inc., Mercelles, Inc., Solid Gold International Traders, Inc., Diagem Trading Corporation, and private respondent Jewelry by Marco & Co., Inc. Private respondent Antonio M. Marco is the President of the Guild. - On August 5, 1988, Felicidad L. Viray, then Regional Director, Region No. 4-A of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, acting for and in behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued Regional Mission Order No. 109-88 to BIR officers, led by Eliseo Corcega, to conduct surveillance, monitoring, and inventory of all imported articles of Hans Brumann, Inc., and place the same under preventive embargo. The duration of the mission was from August 8 to August 20, 1988 (Exhibit "1"; Exhibit "A"). - On August 17, 1988, pursuant to the aforementioned Mission Order, the BIR officers proceeded to the establishment of Hans Brumann, Inc., served the Mission Order, and informed the establishment that they were going to make an inventory of the articles involved to see if the proper taxes thereon have been paid. They then made an inventory of the articles displayed in the cabinets with the assistance of an employee of the establishment. They listed down the articles, which list was signed by the assistant employee. They also requested the presentation of proof of necessary payments for excise tax and valueadded tax on said articles (pp. 10-15, TSN, April 12, 1993, Exhibits "2", "2-A", "3", "3-A").

Mr. Hans Brumann, the owner of the establishment, never filed a protest with the BIR on the preventive embargo of the articles. 5 - On October 17, 1988, Letter of Authority No. 0020596 was issued by Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos to BIR officers to examine the books of accounts and other accounting records of Hans Brumann, Inc., for "stocktaking investigation for excise tax purposes for the period January 1, 1988 to present" (Exhibit "C"). In a letter dated October 27, 1988, in connection with the physical count of the inventory (stocks on hand) pursuant to said Letter of Authority, Hans Brumann, Inc. was requested to prepare and make available to the BIR the documents indicated therein (Exhibit "D").

Hans Brumann, Inc., did not produce the documents requested by the BIR. 6

Similar Letter of Authority were issued to BIR officers to examine the books of accounts and other accounting records of Miladay Jewels, Inc., Mercelles, Inc., Solid Gold International Traders, Inc., (Exhibits "E", "G" and "N") and Diagem Trading Corporation 7 for "stocktaking/investigation far excise tax purpose for the period January 1, 1988 to present." - In the case of Miladay Jewels, Inc. and Mercelles, Inc., there is no account of what actually transpired in the implementation of the Letters of Authority.

CIR V SANTOS HERMOSISIMA; August 18, 1997 (chris lao)

The BIR officers requested the establishment not to sell the articles until it can be proven that the necessary taxes thereon have been paid. Accordingly, Mr. Hans Brumann, the owner of the establishment, signed a receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized under Authority of the National Internal Revenue Code (dated August 17, 1988), acknowledging that the articles inventoried have been seized and left in his possession, and promising not to dispose of the same

In the case of Solid Gold International Traders Corporation, the BIR officers made an inventory of the articles in the establishment. 8 The same is true with respect to Diagem Traders Corporation. 9 - On November 29, 1988, private respondents Antonio M. Marco and Jewelry By Marco & Co., Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Metro Manila, a petition for declaratory relief with writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against herein petitioners and Revenue Regional Director Felicidad L. Viray (docketed as Civil Case No. 56736) praying that Sections 126, 127(a) and (b) and 150(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Hdg. No. 71.01, 71.02, 71.03, and 71.04, Chapter 71 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines be declared unconstitutional and void, and that the Commissioner

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of Internal Revenue and Customs be prevented or enjoined from issuing mission orders and other orders of similar nature. . . .

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and other precious metals are duty free in Hongkong, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The Court finds the questioned statutory provisions confiscatory and destructive of the proprietary right of the petitioners to engage in business in violation of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution which states, as follows: No person shall be deprived of the life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . But the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental low before it was finally enacted. (emphasis ours).The respondents presented an exhaustive study on the tax rates on jewelry levied by different Asian countries. This is meant to convince us that compared to other countries, the tax rates imposed on said industry in the Philippines is oppressive and confiscatory. This Court, however, cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other countries should be used as a yardstick in determining what may be the proper subjects of taxation in our own country. It should be pointed out that in imposing the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting through the legislative and executive branches, is exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling out or one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation." The trial court is not the proper forum for the ventilation of the issues raised by the private respondents. The arguments they presented focus on the wisdom of the provisions of law which they seek to nullify. Regional Trial Courts can only look into the validity of a provision, that is, whether or not it has been passed according to the procedures laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence. Granting arguendo that the private respondents may have provided convincing arguments why the jewelry industry in the Philippines should not be taxed as it is, it is to the legislature that they must resort to for relief, since with the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This

PROF.
Court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Disposition : petition is hereby GRANTED, and the Decision in Civil Case No. 56736 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

On February 9, 1989, herein petitioners filed their answer to the petition. . .. - 14 On October 16, 1989, private respondents filed a Motion with Leave to Amend Petition by including as petitioner the Guild of Philippine Jewelers, Inc., which motion was granted. . . . - The case, which was originally assigned to Branch 154, was later reassigned to Branch 67. - On February 16, 1995, public respondents rendered a decision Declaring Section 104 of the Tariff and the Customs Code of the Philippines, Hdg. 71.01, 71.02, 71.03, and 71.04, Chapter 71 as amended by Executive Order No. 470, imposing three to ten (3% to 10%) percent tariff and customs duty on natural and cultured pearls and precious or semi-precious stones, and Section 150 par. (a) the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended, renumbered and rearranged by Executive Order 273, imposing twenty (20%) percent excise tax on jewelry, pearls and other precious stones, as INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE and EFFECT insofar as petitioners are concerned. ISSUES 1. WON the Honorable Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition. 2. WON the petition states a cause of action or whether the petition alleges a justiciable controversy between the parties. 3. WON Section 150, par. (a) of the NIRC and Section 104, Hdg. 71.01, 71.02, 71.03 and 71.04 of the Tariff and Customs Code are unconstitutional. HELD 1. Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition since "jurisdiction over the nature of the suit is conferred by law and it is determine[d] through the allegations in the petition," 2. The petition states a cause of action and there exists a justiciable controversy between the parties which would require determination of constitutionality of the laws imposing excise tax and customs duty on jewelry. 3. The Court finds that indeed government taxation policy trats(sic) hewelry(sic) as non-essential luxury item and therefore, taxed heavily. Aside from the ten (10%) percent value added tax (VAT), local jewelry manufacturers contend with the (manufacturing) excise tax of twenty (20%) percent (to be applied in stages) customs duties on imported raw materials, the highest in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, imported gemstones

GARCIA V CORONA YNARES-SANTIAGO; December 17, 1999 (keefe dela cruz)

NATURE Petition to declare Section 19 of RA 8479, a new law enacted to deregulate the downstream oil industry, as unconstitutional. FACTS - As a result of Tatad v. Secretary of the Dept of Energy, RA 8180, entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes", was declared unconstitutional - Congress enacted RA 8479, a new deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. - Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of Congress, has now brought this petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full deregulation at 5 months, unconstitutional. - Petitioner contends that Section 19 of RA 8749, which prescribes the period for the removal of price control on gasoline and other finished products and for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry, is patently contrary to public interest and therefore unconstitutional on the basis of allowing monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, because within the short span of five months, the market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly of the 3 private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex, and Petron ISSUES WON the five-month period before full deregulation prescribed in Section 19 of RA 8749 is unconstitutional. HELD Ratio - Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is not against the legality of deregulation as a policy. Petitioner does not expressly challenge deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective.

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- In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice. It would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis for the determination - Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and the President have the duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to ensure that it works. This is something which cannot be adjudicated into existence. This Court is only an umpire of last resort whenever the Constitution or a law appears to have been violated. There is no showing of a constitutional violation in this case. Reasoning It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

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- On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimediv[3] the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.v[4] - Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. - Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition, this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city; and 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. - Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.vi ISSUES 1. WON RA 8806 is violated the one subject-one bill rule in Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) of the Constitution, hence unconstitutional. (No.) 2. WON RA 8806 is violated the Art. X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution in merging two municipalities into one city, hence unconstitutional. (No.) 3. WON the plebiscite was held beyond 120 days after the approval RA 8806, thus invalid for violation Sec. 54 of the said act. (No.) 4. WON COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information

PROF.
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite HELD 1. Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (emphasis ours) - Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence. - It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.]The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. 2. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia: Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. - Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done. - This contention is devoid of merit. Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase A municipality or a cluster of

CAWALING V COMELEC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; October 26, 2001 (sarah cabrera)

NATURE Two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. FACTS - On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.ii[1] - Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, iii[2] the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.

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barangays may be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code: Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation. - Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,] and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. 3. Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Act. - The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. - The publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera, it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the

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120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000. - The COMELEC is correct. - In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides: - Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. - Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix another date for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of the law. - To give section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada . 4. Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption that the COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite. Disposition Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PROF.
upon the President authority to "regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the exportation of materials abroad and to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, through such department or office as he may designate." - July 10, 1946, the President, acting upon the authority vested in him by Commonwealth Act No. 728, promulgated Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. 3), prohibiting the exportation of certain materials enumerated in section 1 thereof but allowing the exportation of other merchandise, like scrap metals, provided an export license is first obtained from the Philippine Sugar Administration. Section 2 of E.O. 3 was subsequently amended by E.O. 23 fixing the export license fee to be charged for the exportation of merchandise, including scrap metals, allowed in E.O. 3. - April 24, 1947, the Chief of the Executive Office, by authority of the President, sent a communication to the Philippine Sugar Administration authorizing the exportation of scrap metals upon payment by the applicant of a fee of P10 per ton of the metals to be exported. Subsequently, the Cabinet, upon recommendation of the National Development Company, approved a resolution fixing the schedule of royalty rates to be charged on metal exports. - Petitioners, on several occasions, exported large amounts of scrap metals and paid P 248,634.85 for license fees and royalties. This amount was collected by the Sugar Quota Office under the authority granted to it by the Chief of the Executive Office and the resolution of the Cabinet above mentioned. - November 17, 1949 and September 26, 1950, petitioners filed formal claims with the Auditor General for the refund of said license fees and royalties on the ground (a,) that Commonwealth Act No. 728 does not authorize their collection; (b) that the Cabinet has no authority to provide for such collection and therefore its resolution of October 24, 1947 is null and void; and (c) that Commonwealth Act No. 728 is inoperative being an export law not approved by the President of the United States pursuant to the provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Philippines. - May 21, 1952, the Auditor General denied the claims for refund; hence, petitioners interposed this present petition for review. ISSUES Procedural (focus of case) WON the petitioners are estopped from invalidity of Commonwealth Act No. 728 Substantive

PHIL. SCRAPPERS, INC. V AUDITOR GENERAL BAUTISTA; January .31, 1955 (jat tabamo)
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Auditor General denying the claim of petitioners for the refund of the royalty fees paid by them to the Sugar Quota Office FACTS - July 2, 1946, Congress enacted Commonwealth Act No. 728 outlawing the exportation of agricultural or industrial products, merchandise, articles, materials and supplies to any destination without a permit from the President of the Philippines. Section 2 of this Act confers

claiming

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1. 2. 3. WON Commonwealth Act No. 728 authorizes the collection of said license fees and royalties WON the Cabinet has authority to provide for its collection WON Commonwealth Act No. 728 is valid as an export law on the ground that it was not approved by the President of the United States pursuant to the provision of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution of the Philippines

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joint act of the legislature and the executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. (This was not in the case but this is what may be extracted from the Courts reasoning). Reasoning In their claim for refund, the record shows that petitioners maintain that Commonwealth Act No. 728 is inoperative because it has never been submitted to the President of the United States for approval, but there is no showing by competent evidence that such is the fact in order that such claim may merit consideration. On the other hand, it appears that Commonwealth Act No. 728 was approved on July 2, 1946 and the Executive Orders of the President of the Philippines implementing said Act were issued much after the proclamation of the Philippine Republic, and it is to be presumed that the President has acted on the matter knowing that the law has been complied with. Disposition petition is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

PROF.
steps should be taken to have the contract annulled.... Going beyond that particular challenge, and setting for the pronouncements, policies and programs of the Authority, plaintiffs sought a decree restraining these activities as repugnant to the Constitution, and also asked a general declaratory decree with respect to the rights of the Authority in various relations. (These stockholders though only comprise 1/9 of the preferred stock and less than 1/45 of all securities outstanding) - The defendants, including the Authority and its directors, the Power Company and its mortgage trustee, and the municipalities within the described area, filed answers and the case was heard upon evidence. The District Court entered a final decree annulling the contract of January 4, 1934, and enjoining the transfer of the transmission lines and auxiliary properties. The court also enjoined the defendant municipalities from making or performing any contracts with the Authority for the purchase of power, and from accepting or expending any funds received from the Authority or the Public Works Administration for the purpose of constructing a public distribution system to distribute power which the Authority supplied. The court gave no consideration to plaintiff's request for a general declaratory decree. - The Circuit Court of Appeals limited its discussion to the precise issue with respect to the effect and validity of the contract of January 4, 1934. The Circuit Court of Appeals accordingly considered the constitutional authority for the construction of Wilson Dam and for the disposition of the electric energy there created. In the view that the Wilson Dam had been constructed in the exercise of the war and commerce powers of the Congress and that the electric energy there available was the property of the United States and subject to its disposition, the Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the decree of the District Court was erroneous and should be reversed. On plaintiffs' application we granted writs of certiorari. ISSUE WON the act of Congress which authorized the contract is constitutional

HELD Procedural Petitioners are estopped Ratio A person who obtains a license under a law, and seeks for a time to enjoy its benefits, cannot afterwards, and when the license is sought to be revoked, question the constitutionality of the act. - Generally, one who, under the requirements of a statute or ordinance, applies for and accepts, together with its attendant benefits, a license or permit, of a franchise, or a certificate of public convenience and necessity, if the application and acceptance are voluntarily made, cannot thereafter attack the statute or ordinance containing the requirement as unconstitutional. Reasoning Petitioners had acted on Commonwealth Act no. 728 and invoked its benefits when they exported scrap metals. They are therefore estopped or prevented from setting up its invalidity or unconstitutionality. Substantive 1. Ratio Res Judicata (the first two issues have already been resolved in a previous case) Reasoning The present case is similar to the one recently decided by this Court, Marc Donnelly & Associates, Inc. v. Manuel Agregado, et al., (95 Phil. 1452), wherein the issues raised are practically the same as those involved herein and wherein this Court held that the collection by the Government of the license and royalty fees in question was valid and legal. For the purposes of this decision, it would suffice for us to incorporate herein by reference what we said in the decision rendered in the above mentioned case. There is, however, one question raised herein which was not raised in the previous case which has reference to the alleged invalidity of Commonwealth Act No. 728 on the ground that it being an export law the same was not approved by the President of the United States pursuant to the provision of the Ordinance appended to our Constitution. 2. Ratio Separation of Powers; the Court pays proper respect for the acts of the co-equal branches of government. Presumption of constitutionality: being a

ASHWANDER V TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 1936 (terry ridon)

FACTS - On January 4, 1934, the Tennessee Valley Authority, an agency of the Federal Government, entered into a contract with the Alabama Power Company, providing (1)for the purchase by the Authority from the Power Company of certain transmission lines, sub-stations, and auxiliary properties for $1,000,000, (2) for the purchase by the Authority from the Power Company of certain real property for $150,000, (3) for an interchange of hydroelectric energy, and in addition for the sale by the Authority to the Power Company of its "surplus power," on stated terms, and (4) for mutual restrictions as to the areas to be served in the sale of power. - The Alabama Power Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Alabama, and is engaged in the generation of electric energy and its distribution generally throughout that state. - Plaintiffs are holders of preferred stock of the Alabama Power Company. Conceiving the contract with the Tennessee Valley Authority to be injurious to the corporate interests and also invalid, because beyond the constitutional power of the Federal Government, they submitted their protest to the board of directors of the Power Company and demanded that

SEPARATE OPINION BRANDEIS [concur]

Yes. The act of Congress which authorized the contract is constitutional.

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- Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it. - The Legislature, by Act No. 1, approved January 24, 1935, and effective immediately, provided that a utility of the State may sell all or any of its property to the Tennessee Valley Authority without the approval of the Public Service Commission or of any other state agency, BEFORE the merits of the case were heard On the Standing of Stockholders to Question Decisions of Management - The fact that the bill calls for an enquiry into the legality of the transaction does not overcome the obstacle that ordinarily stockholders have no standing to interfere with the management. Xxx The function of guarding the public against acts deemed illegal rests with the public officials. - Within recognized limits, stockholders may invoke the judicial remedy to enjoin acts of the management which threaten their property interest. - BUT they cannot secure the aid of a court to correct what appear to them to be mistakes of judgment on the part of the officers. Courts may not interfere with the management of the corporation UNLESS there is bad faith, disregard of the relative rights of its members, or other action seriously threatening their property rights. This rule applies whether the mistake is due to error of fact or of law or merely to bad business judgment. It applies, among other things, where the mistake alleged is the refusal to assert a seemingly clear cause of action, or the compromise of it. If a stockholder could compel the officers to enforce every legal right, courts, instead of chosen officers, would be the arbiters of the corporation's fate. - The directors represent all the stockholders, and are presumed to act honestly and according to their best judgment for the interests of all. Their judgment as to any matter lawfully confided to their discretion may not lightly be challenged by any stockholder, or at his instance submitted for review to a court of equity. - Even where property rights of stockholders are alleged to be violated by the management, stockholders seeking an injunction must bear the burden of showing danger of irreparable injury, as do others who seek that equitable relief. Xxx There was no finding that the property interests of the plaintiffs were imperiled by the transaction in

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question, and the record is barren of evidence on which any such finding could have been made. The Practice in Constitutional Cases - The fact that it would be convenient for the parties and the public to have promptly decided whether the legislation assailed is valid cannot justify a departure from these settled rules of corporate law and established principles of equity practice. On the contrary, the fact that such is the nature of the enquiry proposed should deepen the reluctance of courts to entertain the stockholder's suit. - It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. - The Court xxx has restricted exercise of this function by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies, and that they have no power to give advisory opinions. Series of rules under which Court has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision - The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. - The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. Xxx It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. - The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." - The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. - The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Xxx Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the

PROF.
denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. - The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits - When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. Furthermore - If the Company ever had a right to challenge the transaction with the Tennessee Valley Authority, its right had been lost by estoppel before this suit was begun, and, as it is the Company's right which plaintiffs seek to enforce, they also are necessarily estopped. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act became a law on May 18, 1933. Between that date and January, 1934, the Company and its associates purchased approximately 230,000,000 kwh electric energy at Wilson Dam. Xxx Moreover, the plaintiffs, in their own right, are estopped by their long inaction. Although widespread publicity was given to the negotiations for the contract and to these later proceedings, the plaintiffs made no protest until August 7, 1934, and did not begin this suit until more than eight months after the execution of the contract. - Even where by the substantive law stockholders have a standing to challenge the validity of legislation under which the management of a corporation is acting, courts should, in the exercise of their discretion, refuse an injunction unless the alleged invalidity is clear. - If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void, xxx (but) the Court will never resort to that authority but in a clear and urgent case. - But if I could rest my opinion in favor of the constitutionality of the law on which the question arises on no other ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone would xxx be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. - This declaration [that an act of Congress is unconstitutional] should never be made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch of the

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government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.

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the bench, the bar, and the academe in foreign lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with law and that the Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the executive branch, therefore, the Travel Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the impression be created that such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more than munificent bequests in a paupers will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified the more so in the light of the answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his prayer in his Manifestation and Reply that under the circumstances mentioned in the petition, petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the Answer. - From the docket of this Court, it appears that other petitions of this character had been filed in the past, namely, Santos v. The Special Committee on Travel Abroad, Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, and Gonzales v. Special Committee on Travel. In the aforesaid cases, as in this and the earlier Salonga petition, there was no occasion to pass on the merits of the controversy as the certificates of eligibility to travel were granted. The necessity for any ruling was thus obviated. Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court may be faced again with a situation like the present which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last April 22, 1980, he emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights. The freedom to travel is certainly one of the most cherished. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center, the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any way responsible for any delay. Disposition Petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

PROF.

TEEHANKEE [concur]
- In Salonga vs. Medalla after the therein public respondents in charge of the Travel Processing Center had issued in 1978 to herein petitioner the corresponding travel permit or certificate, I remarked "that the issuance of the travel certificate necessarily is a recognition of petitioner's right to travel under the present circumstances." - The circumstances have not changed in any manner. Petitioner Is the holder of a Philippine passport issued on March 3, 1980 and valid up to March 1982 and has urgent medical appointments and official engagements as the only Filipino member of the Board of Trustees of the United Board for Higher Christian Education in Asia based in New York. His last trip abroad was from February 21, 1980 - March 15, 1980 without any complaint from any government agency. There seems no valid basis for the delay in the issuance of petitioner's travel permit (which he had long applied for on April 1, 1980) and for his representative to have had to follow up in vain daily from the scheduled release date of April 11, 1980 until he was constrained to file the present petition on April 18th as his scheduled trip on April 23rd was in jeopardy (while all other applications had already been long acted upon favorably). - Under the antecedents, with petitioner having previously established his right to travel as sanctioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which duly issued him his passport, petitioner has cause to complain that he should not be placed by respondents on their "watch list", without benefit of previous notice and hearing so as to be afforded the opportunity to rebut whatever adverse information might have been compiled or given in secret against him. - Finally, it is not amiss to call the attention of the public officials concerned to the provisions of Article 27 of the Civil Code that "Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the fatter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken."

SALONGA V HERMOSO FERNANDO; April 25, 1980 (ricky cantre)

NATURE Mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to petitioner Jovito Salonga of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case. FACTS - Jovito R. Salonga filed this petition because he was included in the watchlist of the Travel Processing Center which essentially bars him from traveling abroad. - This is the second time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Medalla, the case became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted. - In the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor General dated April 21, 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. A xeroxed copy was enclosed. ISSUE WON the petition should be given due course. HELD No. Ratio This petition had assumed a moot and academic character since the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. Reasoning Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its function conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights of the keynote address of president Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of the ban on international travel. Such a pronouncement, it is the experience of the undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United States as well as in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present emergency regime had elicited the commendation of members of

JAVIER V COMELEC CRUZ; September 22, 1986 (kiyo miura)

FACTS -petitioner and private respondent were candidates in the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections

SEPARATE OPINION

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-Javier enjoyed popular support but Pacificador had the perquisites of being a nominee of KBL -on the eve of the election, several of Javiers followers were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the respondents men, who, along with Pacificador, faced a trial for the said murders -elections continued in Antique amidst this atmosphere of fear and intimidation -the 2nd division directed the board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but suspend its proclamation, later directing the board to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the case -owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and Pacificador was proclaimed winner by the 2nd Division of the said body -petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because it was made only by a division and not by the Comelec en banc as required by the Constitution -while the case was being considered, petitioner was gunned down in broad daylight -the new solgen moved to dismiss the case due to the abolition of Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute; however, the court found the blatant defilement of the purity of suffrage to be of paramount interest thus denying the motion ISSUE WON the second division of Comelec had the authority to proclaim Pacificador the winner of the 1984 elections HELD NO Applicable provisions may be found in Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution: Sec 2: (Comelec) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. Sec 3: The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. -The petitioner argues that the Constitution explicity states that contests involving members of the Batasang

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Pambansa are to be heard and decided en banc. The respondent, citing the same provision, points out that Comelec may sit in 3 divisions; the (then) former solicitor general also concurred w/ respondents claim that contests as stated in Sec 2 and cases in Sec 3 do not refer to pre-proclamation controversies, but rather to instances wherein either party has assumed office and the other seeks to ouster him for the position. The Court defines the terms as such: >contests: any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office >election, returns and qualifications: all matters affecting the validity of a contestees title -the Court finds it irrational to grant more powers to the divisions than the whole; the Constitutions framers certainly did not intend for there to be an administrative pre-proclamation stage and a judicial post-proclamation stage with separate jurisdictions -Comelec thus has the authority to hear all cases from the beginning to the end of elections -the purpose of hearing cases en banc is to ensure careful consideration in hearing cases; to allow this only after elections may be too late as it may be exploited as a delaying tactic Obiter Due process: the relationship between the Commissioner Opinion and Pacificado almost made certain that the decision would be unfavorable to the petitioner. The Court demands the cold neutrality of the impartial judgefair play cans for equal justice. Disposition Were it not for the supervening events that legally rendeed the case moot and academic (abolition of Batasang Pambansa; the disappearance of the office; petitionerss death), the petition would have been granted and the decision of Comelec set aside as violative of the Constitution.

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against the Land Tenure Administration, the Auditor General, and the Solicitor General, to restrain them from instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitioner Company's land ("Tatalon Estate"), as expressly and specifically authorized by RA 2616. They claimed that RA 2616 was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the property had been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public. This is the prohibition case as will be referred to below. - On Nov. 18, 1960, Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Quezon City CFI (to whom the prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction. - After injunction was issued, the evictees petitioned the CFI to suspend the order of demolition of their houses, on the grounds that they were tenants of the Tatalon Estate; that Sec. 4 of RA. 2616 says that, After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in Sec. 2 of this Act shall have been initiated and during the pendency of the same, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against the present occupant, and no ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued However, Judge Nicasio Yatco of CFI of Quezon City denied the suspension, because no expropriation proceedings had been actually filed. - Evictees appealed to CA. Tuason & Company, Inc., moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction of the Court of Appeals, pointing out that said Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of certiorari proceedings and to issue injunctions was only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In its ruling CA refused to lift the preliminary injunction. But upon motion of one of the respondents, the Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previous writ of preliminary injunction, "In the sense that said writ lifts, quashes or dissolves the writ of preliminary injunction issued by Judge Caluag, respondent Land Tenure Administration may thus properly file the complaint for expropriation as authorized by Republic Act No. 2616." Hence, this appeal by petitioners. ISSUES 1. WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to lift, quash, and dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction issued by Judge Caluag in the prohibition case pending in his court 2. WON Judge Caluag acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the preliminary injunction in the prohibition case HELD

J.M. TUASON & CO. V COURT OF APPEALS REYES.; December 26, 1961 (rean balisi)
FACTS - In 1955, CFI Rizal rendered judgments in the ejectment cases against Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon which was affirmed by the CA. CFI then issued writs of execution against Rosete and Dizon as prayed for by landowner Tuason & Company. - On Nov 16, 1960, the landowner J. M. Tuason & Company applied for a writ of prohibition in CFI Q.C.

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1. The writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is null and void for want of jurisdiction. Reasoning: The authority of said Court to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus is expressly limited by statute to their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and it has been repeatedly ruled by us that the jurisdiction of the CA to issue such writs must be based on the existence of a right to appeal to it from the judgment on the merits in the main case. Without such right of appeal, the CA is without jurisdiction to interfere, for that Court is purely a creature of statute. Since the issuance of orders for execution after the judgment of ejectment had become final are not appealable; and since the prohibition case involved the constitutionality of RA 2616, an issue of which the CA could not take cognizance, said Court clearly had no authority to interfere by prerogative writ in either litigation, for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Judge Caluag was, therefore, not bound by the writs so issued by the CA. 2. The preliminary injunction issued by Judge Caluag was merely an incident to the main (prohibition) case, and evidently had for its object to prevent that the principal case and any remedy to be granted therein should be rendered moot and nugatory by the filing of the condemnation proceedings sought to be prohibited.2 Obiter This is what is important for our purposes, on the topic Who may exercise Power of Judicial Review) [a] That the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 2616 could be invoked as a defense in the expropriation proceedings does not alter the right of respondent Tuason & Company to invoke it in the prohibition case, without awaiting the initiation of the condemnation case. In any event, the issue of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of time and effort to appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of the property sought to be condemned if it turned out that the condemnation was illegal. - It is urged by amicus curiae that Courts of First Instance have no jurisdiction to entertain actions assailing the constitutionality of statutes or treaties, because Sec 10 of Article VIII of the (1935) Constitution
2
Issuance of the injunction was authorized by 7 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dealing with writs, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. "Sec. 7. Expediting proceedings. Preliminary injunction. The court in which the petition is filed, or a judge thereof, may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant a preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings." Authority is likewise derived from section 6 of Rule 124, concerning the powers and duties of courts: "When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect may be employed by such court or officer."

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prescribes that "No treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court." - This contention is, however, destroyed by the terms of Sec 2 of Article VIII, wherein the (1935) Constitution itself inhibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court. "Of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive orders or regulations is in question." Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both provisions together, it is readily discerned that the two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court, required by Sec 10 of Article VIII, conditions only the decisions of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. [b] (We can relate this Obiter later on when we take on the Power of Eminent Domain of the State.) The effectivity of Sec 4 RA 2616, discontinuing ejectment proceedings against the present occupants, and restraining any act of disposition of the property, is justifiable only if the Government takes possession of the land in question by depositing its value. It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recover possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his title is left as an empty shell. The land owner would then be deprived of those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is virtually taken from him without compensation and in violation of the Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R. A. 2616 does not even provide for a deposit of the current rentals by the tenant during the pendency of the proceedings (cf. R. A. No. 1162, section 5). The Bill of Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation", and Article XIII, Sec 4, in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals", prohibit any disturbance of proprietary rights without payment of just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants can not, by itself alone, lawfully

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suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of the property.

LOZANO V MARTINEZ YAP; December 18, 1986 (jonas azura)

NATURE Consolidated petitions for certiorari to review denial by lower court of motions to quash FACTS - The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. - BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. ISSUES

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Procedural WON it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the orders denying their motions to quash Substantive 1. WON BP 22 offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt 2. WON BP 22 impairs freedom of contract 3. WON BP 22 contravenes the equal protection clause 4. WON BP 22 unduly delegates legislative and executive powers 5. WON the enactment of BP 22 is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on 3rd Reading HELD Procedural Ratio No. While as a general rule it is premature to elevate an interlocutory order to the Supreme Court, we have in justifiable cases intervened to review the lower court's denial of a motion to quash. Reasoning In view of the importance of the issue involved here, there is no doubt in our mind that the instant petitions should be entertained and the constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the other, in order to put to rest the doubts and uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the general public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the disposition of cases involving the enforcement of the statute. Substantive 1. Ratio NO. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Reasoning It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The

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harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 2. Ratio NO. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Reasoning Checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. 3. Ratio NO. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Reasoning The argument that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. 4. Ratio NO. What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws, which meansthe power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. Reasoning The logic of the argument that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee, stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement o the offended party is farfetched. 5. Ratio NO. It is clear from the records that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the body on 2nd Reading. Reasoning A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraph in question which the body approved on 2nd Reading. Part of the confusion was due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the

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amendment period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten the complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved. In any event, before the bill was submitted for final approval on 3rd Reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report stated that "the clause in question was . . . an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on 2nd Reading. Disposition Judgment is rendered granting the petition to reverse the finding of unconstitutionality. Petitions to reverse the dismissal of motions to quash are dismissed.

PERNITO ARRASTRE SERVICES V MENDOZA December 29, 1986 (ajang pineda)

NATURE Petitions resolved in a consolidated decision seeking to permanently restrain the Philippine Ports Authority from taking over the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte. The petitioners invoke the constitutional right to due process of law and to nonimpairment of contract. FACTS - November, 1972: Ad Hoc Committee on Waterfront Services was created by the Government to study the problems of arrastre and stevedoring operations in various ports in the Philippines - Among the problems pinpointed were the: o proliferation of the oppressive "cabo system" o increase in the incidence of violence and thefts in the ports o need to streamline port operations o ensure the smooth flow of water borne commerce in international and domestic trade o promote regional development through improved port facilities - April 23, 1973: the Committee recommended the integration of arrastre and stevedoring operations in each port so that ultimately only one contractor would be authorized to service that port

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- May 8, 1975: the Bureau of Customs issued Memorandum Order No. 28-75, providing for the merger of all existing cargo-handling contractors in each port. - To effect such in the Port of Tacloban, the Bureau of Customs required the merger of 6 existing labor contractors into 4 corporations and then to just 1 - Accordingly, four organizations were formed, namely: (1) Tacloban Waterfront Labor and Arrastre Service Cooperative, Inc., or TWALSCI which absorbed herein petitioner Eastern Leyte Arrastre Service; (2) San Juanico Pumpboats and Motor Launches Stevedoring and Delivery Service, Inc., (3) Sealand, Inc., and (4) Tacloban Port Services, Inc. - On December 23, 1975, PD 857 took effect through which, the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs with regard to arrastre and stevedoring operations were transferred to and vested in the respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) - PPA was authorized among others, to "regulate the rates or charges for port services or port related services and "to levy dues, rates, or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for services provided by or belonging to the Authority or any other organization concerned with port operations." - Furthermore, pursuant to said decree, respondent PPA imposed a ten percent (10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of arrastre and stevedoring services. - PPA also adopted as its own, the Bureau of Customs' policy of integrating the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in each port. This policy was applied to the port of Tacloban where the four arrastre/stevedoring operators, mentioned earlier, agreed to merge and form one of the petitioners herein, the Leyte Integrated Port Services, Inc. (LIPSI). - February 27, 1978, petitioner Pernito Arrastre Services, Inc. and other arrastre operators filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for declaratory relief and mandamus against the PPA, assailing the validity of the integration policy which would, in effect, authorize only one arrastre operator in each port in the Philippines and the authority of PPA to collect ten percent (10%) of the gross arrastre and stevedoring charges paid to operators. - On March 31, 1978, the trial court issued a writ of injunction, prohibiting the PPA, pendente lite, from enforcing its policy of integration in the Cebu City port and directing it to allow the petitioners to operate individually and independently as arrastre and stevedoring contractors. However, with respect to the collection of the ten percent (10%) charge by PPA, the court ruled that it was going to presume its

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reasonableness in the meantime since PPA was merely following the rate fixed by the Bureau of Customs. - Not satisfied with the court's order, respondent PPA filed a petition for certiorari before this Court as a result of which a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the trial court from enforcing its order. - the respondent PPA's take-over through PPA-TAPS of arrastre operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate the constitutional right of the petitioners to non-impairment of contracts - So on June 1, 1979, PPA-TAPS took over the actual management and operations of arrastre and stevedoring services in the port of Tacloban. - According to respondent PPA, after such take-over, the dockworkers were placed on regular payrolls; their social security premiums were promptly paid and all illegal exactions from their pay were stopped; they were issued free uniforms and hard hats for safety and protection; and they organized a genuine labor organization, the Tacloban Port Service Labor Union (TAPSLU) for the protection of their rights. Petitioners' Claim - Petitioner Eastern Leyte contends that PPA's take over constitutes an impairment of the contract executed by and between itself and respondent INTERCO, which cannot be justified because a valid impairment of contract is only applicable to franchises issued by the government to operators of public utilities which involve public interest, public welfare, public health, and public safety - PPA's take over constitutes an impairment of contract and a deprivation of property without due process of law - challenges the constitutionality of the repealed portion of P.D. 505 1 and Section 6(a) (v) of P.D. 857 2 as being violative not only of the due process and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution but also of the right to free enterprise by creating the dangerous blanket of a monopoly in restraint of trade, which creation is subject to the respondent PPAs whims and caprices. - questions the validity of the ten percent (10%) charge imposed by PPA ISSUES WON the respondent PPA's take-over through PPA-TAPS of arrastre operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate the constitutional right of the petitioners to non-impairment of contracts HELD

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No. Ratio - the arrastre operations in the various ports in the Philippines are affected with public interest; the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations; Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of general welfare - Undoubtedly, therefore, the State in the exercise of its police power through its agency, the PPA, has the power to revoke the temporary permits of petitioners, assuming the existence of valid temporary permits, and take over the operations of the port of Tacloban whenever the need to promote the public interest and welfare both of the stevedoring industry and the workers therein justifies such take over. This Court has already ruled that the statute which gives PPA the authority to implement the take over cannot be assailed on the constitutional grounds raised by the petitioners. Thus, whatever right, if any, that the petitioners may have acquired on the basis of the temporary permits earlier given them must yield to the State's valid exercise of police power. - Neither can petitioners argue that their right to nonimpairment of contract had been violated the subservience of the contract clause to the police power enacting public regulations intended for the general welfare of the community has been settled by this Court. - Furthermore, the records will bear out the fact that only petitioner LIPSI has a temporary permit issued by PPA. The rest of the petitioners were either merely allowed or tolerated to operate in the port of Tacloban. However, even on the assumption that all of them were able to secure temporary permits from PPA, still, this does not vest any property right on them and hence, petitioners cannot allege a violation of their right to non-deprivation of property without due process of law. - Petitioners, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process of law because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so." - On the contention that the ten percent (10%) is excessive for regulatory purposes and that the power to regulate does not include the power to impose fees for revenue purposes It is within the sound discretion of the PPA to impose a reasonable charge or rate on arrastre and stevedoring operators which it deems to be

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most appropriate and advantageous to the government under the circumstances; the court has found the ten percent (10%) share of the government in the earnings from stevedoring and arrastre services a reasonable consideration for the use of government premises, works, facilities, and services, not to mention the supervision inherent in the upgrading and improvement of port operations, of which said services are an integral part. - Finally, in the matter of whether the take over by the PPA violates the prohibition against monopolies in restraint of trade, we hold that in industries affected with public interest, a regulated monopoly is not necessarily proscribed, if such is deemed necessary in order to protect and promote public interest. - "Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word 'regulate' in the Constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. . . . 'Competition can best regulate a free economy. Like all basic beliefs, however, that principle must accommodate hard practical experience. There are areas where for special reasons the force of competition, when left wholly free, might operate too destructively to safeguard the public interest.

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the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. - The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. - Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.2 - In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows: "1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by the municipality of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its present location; 2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Virac is not unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner; 3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in violation of the provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and may be abated; 4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes final and that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against petitioner". Respondents Claim Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Petitioners Contention On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution

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and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. ISSUES 1. WON Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional 2. WON the court gave the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses. 3. WON the ordinance is discriminatory in refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted. HELD 1. Ratio When an ordinance meets the criteria that it (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable, the court shall uphold its validity. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria, thus it is valid and not unconstitutional. Reasoning Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. - Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: "The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 2. Ratio A mere statement of the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose shall not be deemed as giving the ordinance a meaning other than what it says.

TATEL V MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC NOCON; March 11, 1992 (eva sison)

NATURE Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No. 291 of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. FACTS - on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by

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Reasoning The trial court did not give the ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952,6 reads: "AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID, GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT". Section I provides: "It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire accident." Section 2 provides: "Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those warehouses now in existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the above-described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a lapse of time given for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouse shall be exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided further, that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted into noninflammable products and materials warehouses." - In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse, The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. - The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear 3. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. The mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in

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the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it. Reasoning The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. Note: As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance. Disposition WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

PROF.
check he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government. ISSUE 1. WON BP 22 is unconstitutional 2. WON a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing obligation is within the coverage of B.P. 22 HELD 1. NO. the constitutionality of the "Bouncing Check Law" has already been sustained by this Court in Lozano v. Martinez3 and the seven (7) other cases decided jointly with it. 2. YES. Private respondent contends that although a memorandum check may not differ in form and appearance from an ordinary check, such a check is given by the drawer to the payee more in the nature of a memorandum of indebtedness and, as such, partakes of the nature of a promissory note, and should be used upon in a civil action. The court ruled otherwise and stated that a memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check. with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bonafide holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. It has the same effect as an ordinary check. If private respondent seeks to equate memorandum check with promissory note, as he does, to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22, he could very well have issued a promissory note, and this would have exempted him from the coverage of the law. In the business community, a promissory note, certainly, has less impact and persuadability than a check. - Definition of check: "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand., "[a] written order or request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party having money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on presentment, to a person therein named or bearer, or to such person or order, a named sum of money", "[a] draft drawn upon a bank and payable on demand, signed by the maker or drawer, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money to the order of the payee," - A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and

PEOPLE V NITAFAN BELLOSILLO; October 22, 1992 (javi bautista)

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. FACTS - Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before respondent court with violation of B.P. 22 in an Information alleging "That on January 10, 1985, in the City of Manila the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Fatima Cortez Sasaki Philippine Trust Company Check No. 117383 dated February 9, 1985 in the amount of P143,000.00, well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice." - Private respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B. P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the

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issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment " (italics supplied). Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus. - Also, the members of the then Batasang Pambansa intended the bill to be comprehensive as to include all checks drawn against banks as they decided to delete such words as draft or order since the bill was mainly directed against the pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no funds. - A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence, it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued in partial fulfillment of a preexisting obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a preexisting debt, is malum prohibitum.

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Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power. - because of the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former Pres. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations but the ban was rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. - the Sec of DOLE , subsequently issued Dep Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC) tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad on January 6, 1994, pursuant to EIAC's recommendations, Sec of DOLE issued Dep Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and after hurdling the test, training and certification requirement, they were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA - Thereafter, DOLE, following EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. 1. Dep Order No. 3-A - additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists. 2. Dep Order No. 3-B - Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests. 3. Dep Order No. 3-E - minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom. 4. Dep Order No. 3-F - guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test. - on January 27, 1995, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP) filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1. violated the constitutional right to travel 2. abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3. deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law

PROF.
> FETMOP said that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property and consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the orders - On February 2, 1992, petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995 - However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint - On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court dismissed the same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power ISSUES 1. WON this constitutes valid exercise of police power 2. WON there is a violation of property rights without due process 3. WON the non-impairment clause is violated 4. WON there is a violation of equal protection clause HELD 1. YES Ratio Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good and because of presumption of validity, burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the orders, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Reasoning - salus populi est suprema lex > embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power > inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," which is the "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers > nature and scope of police power by Justice Malcolm, in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro + "The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT INC. V CA KAPUNAN; August 5, 1996 (owen ricalde)
NATURE Petition for writ of preliminary injunction Department Orders 3-A, 3-B, 3-E, and 3-F against

FACTS - Petitioners are JMM Promotion and Management, Inc., and Kary International, Inc which are employment agencies who cater to Filipino entertainers to Japan - limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the instant controversy - Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment - By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the

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comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual." - A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leads us that ARB a nd other requirements are pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. Factual Circumstances - diaspora of Filipinos was augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions. - women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991, the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson. - during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse." - Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. - The ARB requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and performing artists. - nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), the requirement for registration of returning performers, the requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of

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work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers - The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in > Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. > the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. - the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. > in Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon, in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers: What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. 2. NO Ratio So long as Professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists. Reasoning - A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. - however, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals - According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in

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which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others - to pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions 3. NO Ratio Non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon) 4. NO Ratio Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. Reasoning - the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders further the Constitutional mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. Disposition finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED

UNITED STATES V TORIBIO CARSON; January 26, 1910 (rach mayuga)

NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol convicting the defendant for violating Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 FACTS - Toribio slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the

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information. - This was done without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Act No. 1147 (An Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle) - The animal was slaughtered in the town of Carmen, in the province of Bohol, where there is no municipal slaughterhouse. - Appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasurer. - Relevant provisions are as follows: SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested. SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption. SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. - Appellant contends that proper construction limits prohibition to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer. ISSUES 1. WON the prohibition contained in Sec. 30 is limited to slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughterhouse

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2. WON Sections 30-33 of Act No. 1147 are unconstitutional and violative of the Due Process Clause a) WON provisions constitute taking of property for public use in the exercise of right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of the owners b) WON it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power HELD 1. No, prohibition refers to slaughter of large cattle anywhere. Ratio Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Reasoning The prohibition refers to (1) the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit. - Primary purpose of Act 1147: to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen - To achieve this, it provides an elaborate and compulsory system of identification. Had the contested provisions been interpreted otherwise, it would defeat purposes of the Act. - One of secondary purposes of Act 1147: to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. - Not essential for an explanation to be found for express prohibition of the "killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse". But it is not improbable that it is specifically mentioned to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding. 2.a) No. Ratio The restraint placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. It is an exercise of the

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States police power. Reasoning In a civil society, every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation. (Com v. Alger) 2.b) No. Ratio To justify the State in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (Lawton v. Steele) Reasoning The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection. For several years prior to the enactment of the statute: - An infectious disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in the Islands. This was detrimental to the countrys material welfare since agriculture was the principal occupation of the people. - Production of rice fell off to the extent that people were compelled to spend millions in its importation. - Efforts were also made by govt to increase supply of animals by importation. According to official reports, such animals should be conserved and redistributed throughout the country. - Coincident with the sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing theft of carabaos. - It must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. - Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. - Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co: this "general police power of the State, persons and property are

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subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. - Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations: A particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Disposition Judgment affirmed.

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extent of the above-cited provision. From judgment this appeal has been duly perfected. ISSUE WON the ordinance is constitutional. HELD - YES. It is held to be valid and not to constitute an invasion of private property rights without due process of law. - The police power of the state is properly exercised where it appears (1) that the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. - The ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power of the city, in that its sole purpose and aim is to effect these ends by affording better sanitary regulations as well as increased facilities for protection to property from loss by fire. - The purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of fire and disease. The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings within the city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion reasonably necessary to secure the end in view. - it prevents the huddling and crowding of buildings in irregular masses on single or adjoining tracts of land, and secures an air space on at least one side of each new residence or other building constructed in the city. - it promotes the safety and security of the citizens of Manila and of their property against fire and disease, especially epidemic disease, by securing the easy and unimpeded approach to all new buildings - That the ordinance is not "unduly oppressive upon individuals" becomes very clear when the nature and extent of the limitations imposed by its provisions upon the use of private property are considered with relation to the public interests, the public health and safety, which the ordinance seeks to secure. this

PROF.
CRUZ; December 10, 1990 (bri bauza)
NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 34. FACTS - This involves the constitutionality of a presidential decree which, during the Marcos regime, was at that time regarded as sacrosanct. - PD No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation of the AGRIX Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. Section 4(1) thereof provides that all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished. - Earlier, AGRIX had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land in Los Banos, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. - Pursuant to the decree, private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the meantime, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna for the cancellation of the mortgage lien. Private respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting petitioners to file a second case in the same court to stop the foreclosure. - The trial court annulled not only the challenged provision, but the entire PD No. 1717 on the grounds that: 1) The presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of separation of powers; 2) the law impaired the obligation of contracts; and 3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. - Petitioners claim that private respondent is estopped from contesting the validity of the decree. They cite Mendoza v AGRIX Marketing where the Court, after noting that petitioners filed claims with the AGRIX Claims Committee, dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners are estopped from contesting the validity of the decree 2. WON the exercise of police power is applicable in this case

FABIE V THE CITY OF MANILA CARSON, 1912 (glaisa po)

NATURE - APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. FACTS - Fabie et al are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms part of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which is inclosed between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero and lying within the corporate limits of the city of Manila. - They sought to obtain from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the property in question. - The purpose of the building was to serve as a guard house in which watchmen might be stationed in order to prevent the carrying away of zacate from the premises. - Permit was denied by the city authorities on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not conform to the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 124, which provides: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved." - It is the contention of the appellees herein that this provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process of law. - The lower court found in favor of appellees and declared the ordinance null and void, at least to the

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY V PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK

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HELD 1) Ratio Estoppel is not applicable in a situation (like the Marcos regime) where the only feasible option was to conform. Reasoning The Court points out that, in the case at bar, the filing of the claim pursuant to the decree was done in 1980, when President Marcos was the absolute ruler of this country and his decrees were absolute law. Private respondent was aware of that reality and knew that it had no choice under the circumstances but to conform. The Court also differentiates this case from Mendoza in that in the latter, the petitioners received settlement after filing their claims whereas in the present case, private respondent has not been paid a single centavo on its claim. Moreover, the petitioner in Mendoza limited itself to the question of estoppel and did not challenge the validity of the claim. 2) Ratio A legislative act based on police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject (the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state) and a lawful method (the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.) Reasoning The indispensable link to the welfare of the greater number has not been established. On the contrary, the decree only favors a special group of investors who have been preferred over the legitimate creditors of AGRIX. The decree also demonstrates oppressiveness patent on its face. The right to property in all mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and charges owing to the creditors of AGRIX is arbitrarily destroyed. [impairment of obligation of contracts] No consideration is paid for the extinction of the mortgage rights, interests and other charges. [deprivation of life, liberty and property] The decree also lumps secured creditors with unsecured creditors and places them on the same level in the prosecution of their respective claims. [equal protection clause] Moreover, New Agrix Inc. (not a government owned or controlled corporation) was created by special decreenotwithstanding the provision of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, that: Sec. 4, The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general law, provide for the formulation, organization or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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The temporary restraining order dated August 30, 1988, is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioners.

PROF.
case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. Petitioners then took the case to the SC. ISSUES 1. WON the BOT and BLT promulgated the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by PD NO. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process. 2. Granting arguendo that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by PD No. 101, WON the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to: (1) equal protection of the law; (2) substantive due process; and (3) protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. HELD 1. Yes. PD No. 101 gives to the Board a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan, or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners therefore cannot justifiable claim that there deprived of procedural due process. 2. No. Not applying the phase-out rule on taxis to other vehicles does not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons similarly situated. What is required is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Further, fixing by BOT of the lifetime ceiling of six years for taxicabs is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The product of experience shows that in six years, taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment fully depreciated. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. - The Boards reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA V BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION MELENCIO-HERRERA; SEPTEMBER 30, 1982 (jaja estoy)
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Board of Transportation. FACTS Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. Respondent Board or Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 7742 which aims to phase out and replace old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars, and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. Petitioners then filed a petition with the BOT seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. The case was heard and testimonial and documentary were presented. A Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or decided already to enable them to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased out on Jan. 1, 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the

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those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of ht challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights.

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vehicles is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. - the LOI is a denial of due process, more specifically, of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on weekends and holidays,, and that others not included in the ban enjoy unrestricted freedom. - Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power - petitioners dispute what they characterize as an erroneous and arbitrary presumption that heavy car owners unnecessarily use and therefore waste gasoline whenever they drive their cars on weekends and holidays. - petitioners stigmatize the ban as defeating its avowed purpose in the case of the affluent who own not only heavy limousines but also many small cars [as] they may be compelled to use at least two small cars - they also referred to the high cost of taxis or other public transports for those not able to afford expensive small cars, but only one heavy, possibly old model. - they also cited the case of many eight cylinder vehicles which because of their weight have been registered as light but in fact consume more or as much gasoline as the banned vehicles. - petitioners concluded that the ban imposed, in result and effect is class legislation. Respondents' Comments - respondents denied the allegations that the classification of vehicles to H and EH on the other hand and light and bantam on the other hand was violative of the equal protection clause and the regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates specified a transgression of due process. - respondents also denied that there was undue delegation of legislative power, and referred to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. - they also raised the procedural objection that what is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an adjudication of a case or controversy. ISSUES Procedural WON the case warrants the exercise of judicial review. Substantive WON LOI 869 and consequently, Memorandum Circular No. 39, are unconstitutional.

PROF.
a. WON LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of the due process clause. b. WON LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of the equal protection clause. c. WON Memorandum Circular No. 39 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD Procedural YES. Ratio The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v Vera) Reasoning The ban applies to petitioners who are the registered owners of an eight cylinder 1969 Buick, and the vendees of a six cylinder Willys Kaiser jeep, which are both classified as heavy or H. To that extent, the enforcement of the LOI will amount to a deprivation of what otherwise would be a valid exercise of a property right. They fall squarely within as to who may raise a constitutional question. Substantive NO. Ratio The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. Reasoning There is a need for factual foundation of invalidity. There being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face. (ErmitaMalate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc v City Mayor of Manila)

BAUTISTA V JUINIO FERNANDO; Jan 30, 1984 (kooky talon)

NATURE Petition for Prohibition to review the decision of the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. FACTS - petition is filed by spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista, challenging the validity of an energy conservation measure which was a response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974. - Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979, bans the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EX (extra heavy) plates on weekends and holidays, from 12:00 am Saturday morning to 5:00 am Monday morning, 1:00 am of the holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday. Motor vehicles of the following classifications are exempted: a) S (Service) b) T (Truck) c) DPL (Diplomatic) d) CC (Consular Corps) e) TC (Tourist Cars). - Pursuant to LOI 869, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications Alfredo L Juinio, and then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission Romeo P Edu, both respondents, issued on June 11, 1979 Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles found violating the LOI. Petitioners' Claim - petitioners allege that while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH

a.

NO. Ratio Due process cannot validly be invoked since in the interplay between a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of ones property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Reasoning To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. Police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Assoc, Inc v City Mayor of Manila) - moreover, the action (LOI 869) taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Substantive due process, which is the

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epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less infringed.

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which is merely an accessory to the LOI cannot also be related to RA No. 4136. - LOI 869 is constitutional but its application pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 39 is not. - Observation: the prohibition against the use of certain vehicles during certain times has not been uniformly and consistently enforced. We are a nation surrounded by rules but many of which are not enforced or enforced indifferently. This situation breeds contempt instead of respect for law. A few rules that are consistently enforced are better than many which are violated with impunity.

PROF.
and expenses they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices defined. 2. it was further asserted that there was no need for such a provision as the income tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income. - Executive Secretary and Secretary of Justice denied the conclusion of law: 1. that when a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntary assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated form his public life. 2. the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiffs normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power ISSUES 1. WON the presumption on legislative validity should prevail 2. WON by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause 3. WON it violates the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure 4. WON it violates the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination HELD 1. Yes. In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of validity must prevail. In the present case, there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could be based. 2. No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1969 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. The standard of due process is

b.

NO. Ratio To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of the law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. The principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. NO. Ratio The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Reasoning The imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. However, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification, and to apply such portion would be ultra vires. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

MORFE V MUTUC FERNANDO; 1968 (yella bautista)

FACTS - Congress enacted 1960 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. - One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year - This provision was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. - The lower court held that such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause. - Petitioners assert that: 1. it is an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials, premised as it is on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption that they are corrupt at heart and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of their financial condition, income,

c.

SEPARATE OPINION ABAD-SANTOS [dissenting in part]

- the portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39 which provides for penalties consisting of fine and suspension or cancellation of the certificate of registration for owners of motor vehicles violating the LOI is clearly illegal for the LOI is absolutely and completely devoid of legal sanctions and consequently the implementing circular cannot prescribe them. It is elementary that only the legislature can prescribe penalties. RA No. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, has no relevance to the LOI. Such being the case, the circular

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responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. This act is only part of the police powers of the State. 3. No. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. 4. No. What the inhibition against self-incrimination seeks to prevent is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to await the existence of actual cases. The issue on whether it is an insult to the personal integrity of the official is a political question which the Court refuses to pass upon.

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PROF.
ALALAYAN V NAPOCOR FERNANDO; July 29, 1968 (giulia pineda)
NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS - Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna filed for declaratory relief proceedings to test the validity of a section of an amendatory act empowering Napocor in any contract for the supply of the electric power to a franchise holder receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder shall not realize a net profit of more than 12% annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses. Respondent, under such provision, could likewise renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy, so that the provisions of the Act could be taken effect. - The statutory provision as assailed on the ground that as a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as the sue process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed upon. - The lower court and the SC sustain in its validity. - Even prior to the amendatory act, the contracts petitioners entered into with the respondent are to continue indefinitely unless and until either party would give to the other 2years prior notice in writing of its intention to terminate the same. - June 18, 1960 the act authorizing the increase of the capital stock of Napocor to P100M took effect. - June 17, 1961 the challenged legislation became law, but including a rider as mentioned above. Mention was made that the Napocor approved a rate of increase of at least 17.5% with the threat that in case the petitioners would fail to sign the revised contract, Napocor would cease to supply, distribute and service electric power and energy to them. - The petitioners sought for the unconstitutionality of the act. Soon after, Philippine Powaer and Development Company moved that the case be dismissed, thereby leaving Alalayan the sole petitioner ISSUE WON the amendatory act is unconstitutional

ISSUE WON the exercise of police power, in this case, the abolition of the share tenancy and the compulsion on the landowner and / or tenant to enter into the leasehold system is unconstitutional on the ground that the freedom of contract is violated and that it is a deprivation of property without due process of law HELD NO, it is not unconstitutional. The assailed decision is affirmed. Reasoning - Said legislation is justified by the right of the state to exercise its police powers. - Individual rights to contract and to property, had to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. - In the case at bar, the exercise of such a power was the result of the intention of Congress to do away with the share tenancy completely. However, as this was then considered premature, a compromise was arrived at by giving the tenant the choice between continuing with share tenancy or electing leasehold tenancy. 5 This right was embodied in section 14 of Republic Act 1199, as amended. - Realizing that despite the option, conditions were such that the tenants, completely controlled by landholders, were not in a position to exercise the same, Congress stepped in and exercising the police power of the state, abolished share tenancy. - Even if the challenged provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code be declared unconstitutional, the effect would be the same for the Code provides that while the National Land Reform Council has not declared the Code operative in the region, the provisions of Republic Act 1199, as amended, would apply. - Police power is broad enough to be exercised on the basis of the economic need, and not only in matters involving health, moral s and public safety, for the public welfare. The SC does not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. - It must be pointed out that just compensation is not required in the exercise of police power. And besides, the constitutionality of a law may not be made to depend on the effects of a conclusion based on a stipulation of facts entered into by the parties. Otherwise, the law would be constitutional in certain cases and unconstitutional in others.

VDA. DE GENUINO V COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS BENGZON; February 26, 1968 (edel cruz)

NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations FACTS - 22 tenants in the land of Vda. de Genuino filed a complaint against her on the grounds that they want to convert their tenancy relationship from share tenancy to leasehold tenancy pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act 3844, 1 in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, 2 as amended. - Vda. de Genuino questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of Republic Act 3844. - The Court of Agrarian Relations denied defendant's prayer for dismissal on the ground that the issue of constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) will not directly affect the tenants' rights in the case because even if said sections were declared unconstitutional, Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, providing also for change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy, which was already held constitutional by the Supreme Court, would still apply. - As to the limitation in Section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of the maximum rental, it ruled that the limitation was not really burdensome, for the decrease of 5% of the owner's share, 4 is offset by the advantages he gets under the law. - MR was denied by the respondent court. - The issue has become moot since the Supreme Court had upheld the legality of the change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy at the tenant's option pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, as amended.

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HELD Ratio - The provision in question cannot be impugned on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional requirement that the bill cannot embrace more than one subject to be expressed in its title. - It can neither be nullified on the ground of depriving liberty to contract without due process of law. Reasoning - The provision merely calls foe all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in the title. It suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. - As long as due process is observed, the alleged nullity of a legislative act of this character can only be shown if in fact there is such denial. In the absence of any evidence to demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would be no basis for its nullification. Disposition Wherefore, there being no showing that Sec 3 of RA 3043 is unconstitutional, the decision of the lower court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed.

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there is no such emergency existing. It further stated that the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners. - Hence this action. ISSUES 1. WON Municipal ordinance 4841 is constitutional 2. WON the appearance of the Solicitor General is required in proceedings where the constitutionality of a particular statue is in question HELD 1. Ratio No. The authority of the municipal corporations to regulate is essentially an exercise of its police power. Said power is however subject .to qualifications, limitations or restrictions demanded by the regard the respect and the obedience due to the prescription of the Constitution particularly of the Bill of Rights. In this particular case, since the interest of the City of Manila is to address an emergency, the action must be temporary in nature as by its very nature an emergency is likewise temporary. The ordinance did not stipulate an end to the regulation contrary to its being temporary in nature. The ordinance is unconstitutional. 2. Ratio NO. The appearance of the Solicitor General in actions where the constitutionality of a statute, treaty, law, ordinance is in question is left to the discretion of the Court. The non appearance of the SG does not affect the validity or of the proceedings or the jurisdiction of the trial court.

PROF.
front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, and that the Land Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices (EWD) to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15% of the acquisition cost and that he shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. -On November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 which now allows the motor vehicle owner to procure from any source the EWD. -Respondent Edu issued the implementing rules and regulations but these were not enforced as Pres. Marcos suspended the installation of the EWD. The suspention was lifted through Letter of Instruction7 and the immediate implementation directed. Through the Memorandum Circular No. 32, respondent Edu issued the implementing rules and regulations for the installation of the EWD. -the petitioner was an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as wen as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Oder No. I issued by the Land Transportation Commission. He prayed for the declaration of the Letters of Instructions and the Memorandum Circular as void and unconstitutional and for a temporary restraining order. -The court granted the restraining order and required the respondents to reply within 10 days from notice, which the respondent did (through Sol-Gen) upon 2 motions for extensions which were granted Petitioners contention The said Letter of Instruction No. 229 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 (1) clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power; thus violating the provisions on due process and equal protection of law; (2) an oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of New Society, being compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device or a better substitute to the specified set of EWDs; (3) is infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel, and unconscionable to the motoring public; and (4) onesided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because it will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy the EWD

HOMEOWNERS ASS0CIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA CONCEPCION; 1967 (romy ramirez)
NATURE Action for a declaratory relief FACTS - On December 31, 1963 the Municipal Board of Manila approved Ordinance Number 4841 regulated the rentals of lots and buildings for residential purposes. The ordinance essentially limits the increase in rent of lots to an amount in excess of the proportion, percentagewise, in the increase of the assessed value of the land leased or subleased and to ten percent per annum of the assessed value of the building leased or subleased. - The regulation was presumably due to the state of emerngy in the matter of providing housing accommodations especially to the poor at reasonable rates. - The petitioners-appellees brought action at the CFI of Manila which rendered the judgment declaring said ordinance ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio. The CFI ruled that the power to declare an state of emergency pertains exclusively to Congress and that

AGUSTIN V EDU FERNANDO; February 2, 1979 (cha mendoza)

NATURE ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition. FACTS -On Dec. 2, 1974, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, which was in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals ratified by the Philippine Government under PD No. 207, which requires all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles to have with them at least 1 pair of triangular, collapsible reflectorized early warning device in red and yellow, to be used whenever stalled/disabled/parked for 30+ minutes on any street or highway, to be installed at least four meters away to the

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Respondents Contention The respondents denied the petitioners allegations, stating that the (1) mid allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation. the Answer, (2) in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams,19 Morfe v. Mutuc,20 and Edu v. Ericta.21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs. and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified.22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. ISSUES 1. WON the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the Police powers of the State 2. WON the petitioner had rebutted the presumption of validity of the exercise of police powers with the issuing of the Letter of Instruction and Memorandum Circular 3. WON the imposition of possession of EWDs oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory 4. WON the premises of the petitioner could be used as grounds for ruling the unconstitutionality of the said orders 5. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power 6. WON the Vienna Convention could be used as a basis for the said orders 7. WON the orders were unconstitutional for violating the Equal Protection of the Law HELD 1. YES. (defined Police Powers)*** focus of the case**** Ratio The police power is a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an

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individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfares Other Definitions - CJ Taney: nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty -Calalang v. Williams: identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. -J. Malcolm: 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. -J. Cardozo: : 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the wellbeing of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' 2. NO, it would be a rare occurrence for the court to invalidate a legislative or executive act clearly intended for public safety, and without sufficient factual basis for support. Ratio The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute." Reasoning Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: 'Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here" 3 NO, the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes -Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under

PROF.
adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. -All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. 4. NO, the petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. Ratio The Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.' Reasoning The Justices 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions.

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5. NO, The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of nondelegation of legislative power is equally without any support wellsettled legal doctrines. - To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifical. ly. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. -the principle of non-delegation has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption. within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practicaly all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. 6. YES, the Philippines ratified the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and should comply with it. Ratio It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality. Reasoning Incorporation Doctrine 7. NO, the court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the part of petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical.

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Ratio the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon. and adequately argued. Reasoning "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. Disposition WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

PROF.
entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." Sustaining the ordinance is based on the general welfare clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. Disposition The appealed order of the lower court is affirmed.

VELASCO V VILLEGAS FERNANDO; February 14, 1983 (joey capones)

NATURE Appeal from judgment of lower court FACTS Petitioner-appellants filed a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitionersappellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." They admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. ISSUE WON the attack against the validity can succeed [Note: SC affirmed lower courts judgment that it is not an appropriate case. However, they issue above would lie assuming there was an appropriate case.] HELD Ratio The ordinance is a police power measure. Reasoning The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an

MELCHOR V MOYA FERNANDO, 1983 (glaisa po)

NATURE Appeal on Certiorari from decision of CFI FACTS This is a certiorari proceeding by way of appeal instituted by then Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Jr. from the adverse decision of respondent Judge declaring the Presidential Decree No. 20 amending Republic Act No. 6359, the Rent Control Law unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid police power measure. ISSUE WON the aforementioned act is unconstitutional. HELD - NO. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 20 amending Republic Act No. 6359, the Rent Control Law, more than justifies the plea for the reversal of the decision of respondent Judge Jose L. Moya, declaring the aforesaid Act unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid police power measure. - The Article on the Transitory Provisions of the 1972 Constitution is explicit; Presidential Decrees promulgated or issued, or acts done by Presidential Ferdinand E. Marcos "shall be part of the law of the land [to] remain valid, legal, binding, and effective" except when "modified, revoked, or superseded" by him as "incumbent President or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the [now Batasang Pambansa]." - In Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, SC upheld the power of the President to issue decrees having the force and effect of law by virtue of the above provision even after the effectivity of the Constitution as well as in the separate Gutierrez v. Cantada, SC left no doubt about the binding force of the Rent Control Law.

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- The Gutierrez decision is reinforced by a constitutional question of an analogous character having been therein resolved. As set forth in the opinion of that case: "He would have this Court declare that Republic Act No. 6359 is violative of the equal protection clause. The imputation that a police power measure of that character intended to remedy the deplorable situation of lessees suffers from such infirmity, is far from persuasive. It cannot be stigmatized as class legislation. There was a clear need for such a statute. It was enacted to promote the public interest and the general welfare. The State is not compelled to stand idly by while a considerable segment of its citizens suffers from economic distress. - Only recently, in Agustin v. Edu, reference was made to the 'broad and expansive scope of police power' citing Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as 'nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.' Correctly was it characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.' - Police power stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the [then] Chief Justice, 'acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity. . . .' Under that standard, the finding of respondent Judge that there was lack of substantive due process certainly is bereft of plausibility. - The explanation for the conclusion arrived at by respondent Judge is based on doubts entertained by him about the validity of the Act reinforced by the views expressed on the floor of the Senate by a number of senators, who arc distinguished members of the bar. What he failed to take into account is that notwithstanding such adverse views, the Congress enacted the law. That was a clear manifestation of the matter having been thoroughly discussed, with all aspects of the question accorded due consideration. - The Gutierrez opinion renders even more indubitable the lack of conformity with settled constitutional principles of the decision sought to be reviewed. Thus: "When the ejectment suit was filed on April 22, 1972, Republic Act No. 6359 was in full force and effect. As noted earlier, for a period of two years from July 14, 1971, the right of the lessees to remain could not be disputed for as found by the lower court the lease was not for a definite period. Hence, the reversal of the decision of the City Court of Caloocan City by respondent Judge in his decision of February 14, 1973.

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As a matter of fact, as of that date,' Presidential Decree No. 20 was in full force and elect. The suspension of actions for ejectment was for an indefinite period. Inasmuch as it is a police power legislation, it was applicable to leases entered into prior to that date. The applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. From Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, such a doctrine has been repeatedly adhered to by this Court. As was held in Ongsiako v. Gamboa, decided in 1950, a police power measure being remedial in character covers existing situations; otherwise, it would be self-defeating. in Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court, took note of the contention 'that as the contracts of employment were entered into at a time when there was no law granting the workers said right, the application as to them of the subsequent enactment restoring the same right constitutes an impairment of their contractual obligations.' Then he made cleat why the Court was of a contrary view as 'the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment ... is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.' So it must be in this case. - Presidential Decree No. 20 is in the nature of an amendment to the assailed legislation, Republic Act No. 6359. It would be illogical in the extreme if an amendatory act is given full force and effect and yet the statute it sought to amend would be declared as being tainted by an unconstitutional infirmity.

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clubs/cabarets, which passed the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan - RA 938 allegedly authorizes the Municipal Council to not only regulate but to prohibit the establishment of night clubs. - two cases for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction were filed with the CFI of Bulacan alleging: 1. The ordinance is null and void because a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business 2. it is violative of the petitioners right to due process as the license previously given to petitionerse was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing 3. under presidential decree 189, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including nightclubs has been transferred to the Department of Tourism - the lower court upheld the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance and dismissed the cases ISSUE Substantive WON municipal corporations may enact this ordinance, considering that a. they are granted the police power to enact such regulations and ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers conferred upon it by law and as shall seem necessary to provide for the healthy and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, etc, and b. RA 938 allegedly authorizes municipal councils to prohibit nightclubs HELD No. This ordinance is invalid. Ratio Ordinances that are not 1. reasonable, 2. consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, and 3. consistent with the laws or policy of the state shall not be considered valid. Reasoning such ordinances are not valid if they contravene the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, against public policy, unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating; the ordinance passed must be a reasonable exercise of the power. - The assailed ordinance is characterized by overbreadth: The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by absolute prohibition. Ratio When an RA is amended such that its content is no longer within the limits of the subject expressed in its title, acts based on such inconsistent amendments shall be invalid.

DE LA CRUZ V PARAS. FERNANDO; 1983 (mini bernardo)

NATURE Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the CFI of Bulacan FACTS - Petitioners de la Cruz, et al, had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue to operate night clubs - the night clubs are well lit, have no partitions, and the operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts, or to go out with customers - the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, ordered through its legislative machinery the closure of its night

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Reasoning RA 938 was entitled AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.enacted in 1953, granting the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment of night clubs etc. In 1954, it was amended to include not only the power to regulate but also the power to prohibit. The title, however, remained unaltered. THUS: the power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. - The Constitution mandates every bill shall embrace only one subject expressed in the title. The title of this ordinance limits to regulating. Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and nullified. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional.

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be one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargohandling services in a given port. -On April 11, 1980, the President issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1005-A which directed the PPA to accelerate the rationalization of all cargo-handling services and to evaluate all recognized cargo-handling contractors and port related service operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order to insure effective utilization of port facilities, prevent pilferage and/or pinpoint responsibility for it and provide services to major ports vital to the country's trade and economy -PPA created a Special Evaluation Committee. The Committee took into account certain factors with their corresponding percentage weights in its determination, who among the existing operators, is most qualified for an award of an exclusive contract. Ocean Terminal Services Inc (OTSI) was rated 95% topping all the rest by a wide margin. -On April 28, 1980, the Committee submitted its report recommending the conclusion of a management contract with OTSI being the most qualified. PPA adopted the recommendation. -On June 27, 1980, a management contract was executed by and between PPA and OTSI. On August 19, 1980, the President approved the exclusive management contract between PPA and OTSI -Petitioner Phil Integrated Port Services, Inc (PIPSI) filed an action against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, injunction with preliminary injunction. The case was presided over by respondent Judge Alfredo Lazaro. On July 29, 1980, the respondent court issued a restraining order ex-parte, enjoining respondents PPA and OTSI from implementing the exclusive contract of stevedoring between them. -On August 21, 1980 petitioners, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on August 22, 1980, respondent court issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include the petitioners Anglo-Fil et al., under the benefits of such order. -On August 30, 1980, PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders "in view of the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the countervailing public interest involved." -On September 1, 1980, respondent Judge lifted the restraining order. -Petitioners Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, filed the present petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Petitioners claim

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-that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by respondent Judge was clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. -that there were no considerations of public interest which supported the lifting. On the contrary, the lifting allegedly permitted a situation palpably against public interest, that is, confiscation of petitioners' business and those similarly situated. -that although a permit to operate is a privilege, its withdrawal must comply with due process of law just like the practice of law, medicine, or accountancy, and that not only property rights are involved but their very livelihood, their right to live. -that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property ISSUES 1. WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he lifted ex-parte the TRO he had earlier issued also ex-parte 2. WON the PPA-OTSI exclusive Management Contract executed pursuant to P.D. No. 857 and LOI No. 1005-A is valid HELD 1. NO. There was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction because subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the respondent court heard the parties on the petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Also, it is not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Furthermore, the duration of the restraining orders was "until further orders from the court." In lifting said restraining orders on September 1, 1980, respondent judge merely exercised the prerogative he earlier reposed upon himself to terminate such orders when circumstances so warranted. 2. YES. Public Interest and Police Power of the State -The subservience of the contract clause to the police power enacting public regulations intended for the general welfare of the community is clear-cut. It is settled that neither the contract clause nor the due process clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. Unless there be a repugnancy to the limitations expressly set forth in the Constitution to protect individual rights, the government enjoys a much wider latitude of action as to the means it chooses to cope with grave social and economic problems that urgently press for solution.

ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORP. V LAZARO GUTIERREZ; September 2, 1983 (boots tirol)

NATURE Consolidated petitions for certiorari seeking to annul the order of the CFI Manila issued ex-parte, lifting the restraining orders it had previously issued FACTS -Plaintiffs, among others, were engaged in and allowed to operate stevedoring services on the basis of special permits granted by the Bureau of Customs. -PD No. 505, as amended by PD No. 857, transferred arrastre operations, including administration and management of the South Harbor, Port of Manila from the Bureau of Customs to Phil Ports Authority (PPA). -On January 19, 1977, a memorandum order was issued temporarily allowing the different port operators or contractors who have existing permits, licenses, contracts, and other kinds of memorandum agreement issued by the Bureau of Customs to continue their services on a hold-over capacity until the PPA implements its own policy guidelines. -On May 27, 1977, PPA Memorandum Order No. 21, series of 1977, was passed implementing the policy on integration to `insure efficiency and economy in cargohandling operation and provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and the government as well.' It declared that there should only

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- The Manila South Harbor is public property owned by the State. The operations of this port, including stevedoring work, are affected with public interest. Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of general welfare. A single contractor furnishing the stevedoring requirements of a port has in its favor the economy of scale and the maximum utilization of equipment and manpower. In turn, effective supervision and control as well as collection and accounting of the government share of revenues are rendered easier for PPA than where there are 23 contractors for it to oversee. Property Rights and Due Process -The contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is without merit. The petitioners were operating merely on "holdover" permits. Petitioners, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process because what was given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. -The absence of arbitrariness or bad faith is manifest in the selection procedure adopted. The award in favor of OTSI was the result of an evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by the PPA. Disposition. Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondents are, however, directed to comply with the guidelines on the absorption of bona fide stevedores and as thus modified, the temporary restraining order dated October 21, 1980 is made PERMANENT.

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and unjust deprivation of his job." Anything less would be to fail to live up to what the Constitution ordains.

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supplying stevedoring or arrastre services, or both which was wasteful and inefficient. - May 4, 1976 the Board of Directors of petitioner PPA passed Resolution No. 10, approving and adopting a set of Policies on Port Administration, Management and Operation adopting as its own the Bureau of Customs policy of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port -To implement its policy of integration, petitioner PPA issued on May 27, 1977, Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides, in its pertinent parts. as follows: In order to ensure utmost efficiency and economy in cargo handling operations, to provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and all other port users, and the government as welt it is the policy of the Authority that there should be only one arrastre-stevosdors operator/contractor to engage in cargo handling services in a port. Conformably with this policy, it is necessary that two or mom contractors presently operating within the same port premises who desire to continue or renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one organization within a prescribed period after receipt of due notice from the Authority. -October, 1977, the eleven port services contractors in the Cebu City Port formed the United South Dockhandlers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as USDI). The latter corporation was recognized by petitioner PPA and granted a special permit on November 4, 1977, to handle exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a management contract. -February 27, 1977, private respondents Pernito, et al. (numbering 18 in all) instituted an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages against petitioner PPA and USDI. -They alleged in their pleadings that they were among the more than fifty independent arrastre/stevedoring contractors doing business in the Cebu City port prior to the issuance on May 8. 1975 of Bureau of Customs Memorandum Order No. 28-75; that they joined the merger of contractors into ten arrastre/stevedoring corporations; that following the issuance by the PPA of its Memorandum Order No. 21, the matter of total merger became an issue because the small contractors including respondent Pernito, et al., refused to be assimilated with the big contractors which were allegedly controlled by shipping companies;that after assurances that the interest of small operators would be

TEEHANKEE [dissent]
-the Court's majority judgment has prematurely prejudged the serious and substantive questions raised by petitioners in their complaint filed and pending in the court below for nullification of the exclusive stevedoring contract granted by PPA to OTSI which they assert to have been executed not in the public interest and in confiscation of the established businesses of petitioners and their fellow stevedoring companies in violation of due process and their right to equal protection of the law. These serious questions involve factual questions which involve presentation and evaluation of evidence and determination of the facts and figures, which seem to have been preempted and foreclosed by the Court's majority judgment - when all that is before us in this special action is whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in lifting the temporary restraining order he had previously issued against the implementation of he questioned exclusive stevedoring contract.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V MENDOZA ALAMPAY; September 11, 1985 (dahls salamat)
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS -July 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 505 was promulgated creating the petitioner Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). -The Decree was subsequently amended by Presidential Decree No. 857 dated December 23, 1975. -Under the Decree, the PPA is entrusted with the function of carrying out an integrated program for the planning, development, financing and operation of ports and port districts throughout the country. The powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs concerning arrastre operations were transferred to, and vested in, the petitioner PPA. -Upon assumption of its functions, petitioner PPA made a thorough investigation and study of port problems. -It found that stevedoring services (on-ship work) in the Philippines were separated from arrastre services (dock work). each one being provided by separate contractors and that there were too many companies/organizations

SEPARATE OPINION FERNANDO [concur]

-I feel I should add emphasis to the full respect that must be accorded the constitutional rights of laborers belonging to other labor organizations, as they could be affected by the contract between the PPA and OTSI. -I commend the reiteration of the Court of "the guidelines earlier issued that no bona fide stevedore or worker should be deprived of employment he used to enjoy simply because of the execution and implementation of the disputed Management Contract. This absorption of bona fide workers is an act of social justice. When a person had no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary

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protected, the eleven licensed corporations agreed to merge their resources and formed the USDI. Pernito, et al., further alleged that the controlling interests in USDI reneged on their commitments to the small stockholders; that as a result respondent Pernito, et al., left USDI and applied with PPA for separate permits to operate their services, but their (Pernito, et al.) applications were denied. Apart from questioning the denial of their applications, Pernito, et al. likewise questioned the 10% of gross receipts being collected by PPA from arrastre and stevedoring contractors. -March 31,1978, respondent judge issued an injunction order which, among other things, enjoined PPA, pendants lite, from implementing its policy of integration and allowing Pernito, et al. to freely operate arrastre and stevedoring services in the port of Cebu. -April 17, 1978, respondent judge, without notice and hearing. allowed a certain Aquino Arrastre Services and a certain Watergate Arrastre Services to intervene and extended to them the benefits of the injunction. -PPA filed petition for certiorari and prohibition to review decision of cfi -Pending action on the instant petition, SC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from effecting the questioned orders of March 31, 1978 and April 17, 1978. ISSUES 1. WON the Petitioner PPA has the power to require integration of arrastre/stevedoring services in Philippine ports. 2. WON PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and void for being violative of a) Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution on private monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, and b) Section 20, Act 3518 prohibiting combinations, mergers, or acquisition in restraint of trade. 3. WON the questioned orders restored the status quo before the present controversy 4. WON the questioned orders constitute a judicial interference in purely administrative functions HELD 1. Yes. Petitioner PPA has power to regulate and require integration of arrastre and stevedoring services in Philippine ports. 2. No. PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly because the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of

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Cebu is only USDI, actually USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted themselves as USDI.But over and above the matter of whether the monopoly has been created, the overriding and more significant consideration is public interest. PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision on monopolies. 3. Long before the case below was filed, Pernito, et al., was in conformity with the integration policy of the PPA. They never questioned its validity and legality. In fact, in the petition for declaratory relief and mandamus they filed below, they even admitted having pleaded with PPA for the integration of the eleven (11) arrastre operators into two (2) corporations: one corporation to be composed of the arrastre corporations controlled by shipping magnates and the other one to be composed of the bona fide small arrastre operators to service the needs of small and medium sized vessels or that, in the alternative, the eleven be integrated into one arrastre corporation, 51% to be owned by the bona fide arrastre operators and 49% by shipping magnates.Although these alternative proposals were rejected by PPA, Pernito, et al., Continued to accede and conform to the integration policy when they agreed to join USDI after obtaining some concessions from its big stockholders. It was only when the controlling interests in USDI allegedly reneged on their alleged commitments to Pernito, et al., that the latter seceded from USDI and applied for separate permits. -The status quo or the last actual peaceable uncontested status Preceding the pending controversy therefore, indicate a time when Pernito, at al., had no permits of their own to operate in the port of Cebu. 4. Yes. Respondent judges orders allowed 19 individual operators to handle cargoes along with USDI which is an evident encroachment of PPAs power to regulate arrastre and stevedoring services at the port of Cebu ad to determine who are qualified to operate such services. -It is settled rule that unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters (Monark International, Inc, vs. Noriel, 83 SCRA 114). -Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse of discretion so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others (See Meralco Securities Corporation vs. Savellano, 117 SCRA 804). -In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true

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with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment of discretion and to findings of fact. (Pajo vs. Ago, and Ortiz, 108 Phil. 905". Disposition Petition Granted

TABLARIN V GUTIERREZ. FELICIANO; July 31, 1987 (apple maramba)

NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the RTC of Manila FACTS -The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education (public respondent) and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (private respondent). -On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. -The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. -The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled - Petitioners filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with this Court ISSUES Procedural WON a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order Substantive

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON 1. 2. 3.

WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 constitute undue delegation of power? WON the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process WON the portion of MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 which provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution

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reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." -Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. -They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case. - Regarding Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision - Section 1 when read in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV would tell one that the State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." Substantive Ratio 1. The general principle of non delegation of legislative power, which both flows from and reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world 2. The sovereign has the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority to secure and promote all the important interests and needs-in a word, the public order-of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 3. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Reasoning 1. The principle of non-delegation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modem government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation.'

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Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. - The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract - The Court believes that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act 2. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. - The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine - The NMAT is reasonably related to the government objective of protecting the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. 3. The appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change. Disposition We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

HELD Procedural Ratio NO. A court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. Reasoning In the case at bar, the petitioners invoked a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2391, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, a. 1985. The provisions invoked are: (a) Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect of human rights." (b) Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." (c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human liberation and development." (d) Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all." (e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,

BALACUIT V CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE GANGAYCO; 1988

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(ice baguilat)
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS Balacuit questions the constitutionality of Ordinance 640 which requires any person, group of persons, entity or corporation in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between the ages of 7 and 12 years of age to charge half of the said ticket, penalties are given to those who break the said ordinance. Petition was denied in the lower courts hence this case. ISSUE WON such ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power HELD Yes, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It should not be arbitrary, unusual and an unnecessary restriction. Such was not proven by the Municipal Council. Such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be reasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. Proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. Disposition Decision of trial court reversed and set aside. Ordinance 640 is declared unconstitutional and null and void.

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NATURE Petitions to review the motions for reconsideration FACTS Alarmed by the worsening traffic congestions in Makati, then Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut instructed the Municipal Engineers Office to conduct studies on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village, particularly Jupiter and Orbit Streets, to alleviate the traffic jam in that area. - Bel-Air Village Assn (BAVA), through its representative, purportedly agreed on the opening of the said streets during the meeting with them. Therefore, backed up with the Ordinance, the gate of BAV was removed and demolished. Thus, this complaint. Petitioners Claims According to BAVA, the opening of the Orbit Street was unjustified for the following reasons: a. They never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. b. The Torrens titles covering these streets do not contain annotation that they are subject to encumbrances. c. Their properties should not be deprived without due process of law and without just compensation. Respondents Comments In response, private respondent argued that: a. The Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corporation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets contains provision that the said streets shall be used, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public. b. Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation. The demolition of the gate and the opening of the streets are valid acts of police power. c. BAVA were properly notified of the demolition. Such notice is compliance enough with due process. ISSUE WON the Mayor acted arbitrarily in opening Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic HELD NO. Ratio If the act of state is warranted by the demands of common good, the state may exercise its police power.

PROF.
Police Power - State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. It is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty - plenary power of the State to govern its citizens. (Marshall) Disposition DENIED with finality

DEL ROSARIO V BENGZON GRIO-AQUINO; December 21, 1989 (chris capul)

NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Secretary of Dept of Health FACTS This class suit filed by officers of Association wants the Court unconstitutional, hence null and void, Generic Act of 1988 (RA No 6675) Administrative Order No. 62 Philippine Medical to declare as some provisions of and Implementing

ISSUES 1. WON the Act provides unequal treatment of govt physicians, dentists, veterinarians on one hand and private practitioners on the other [ Petitioners say that while the former are required to use only generic terms, the latter may write brand name in parenthesis below generic name] 2. WON prescribing the correct medicine for patient becomes the act of the salesgirl at the drugstore and no longer act of the physician, dentist or veterinarian. [This is because salesgirl is authorized to substitute prescribed medicine w/ another belonging to same generic group, accdg to petitioners.] 3. WON the prohibition against use by doctors of no substitution in prescription is valid 4. WON the Act impairs obligation of contract bet physician and his patient 5. WON prescribing graduated penalties for violation is against provision on excessive fines and cruel and degrading punishment HELD 1. No. Paragraph B provides for all medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners. 2. No. On the contrary, pharmacists must not fill violative prescriptions and impossible prescriptions. Also, while it is true that outlets are instructed to inform

SANGALANG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT SARMIENTO; August 25, 1989 (athe odi)

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the buyer abt drugs w/ same generic name together w/ prices, the salesgirl merely informs customer, but does not determine the medicine. The choice is still w/ the customer alone. * Therapeutic effect of a drug doesnt depend on brand but on therapeutic or active ingredients. 3. Yes. It secures the patient the right to choose bet the brand name and its generic equivalent. 4. No. No contract ever results fr constultation. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient just as patient may take or refuse doctors advice. 5. No. These are the teeth of the law. It is neither cruel, inhuman or degrading. It is no different from penalties imposed on lawyers.

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- The prohibition is in derogation of medias role to provide adequate channels of public information relevant to election issues. - It also allegedly abridges the freedom of speech of the candidates and limits the right of voters to information because of the reduction in the volume of information regarding the candidates. ISSUE WON Section 11(b) of RA 6646 is unconstitutional HELD No, the said section of RA 6646 is not unconstitutional. Ratio Section 11(b) is only of limited applicability and does not hinder the right of the media to express themselves freely through their opinions. Reasoning - The objective of Section 11(b) of RA 6646 is to equalize the situation of the rich and poor candidates by preventing that rich candidates would have greater advantage. - The COMELEC as been granted the power to regulate the utilization of media during election periods, according to Art. 9, C(4). - The freedom of expression clause should be viewed in the light of Art. 9, C(4) of the Constitution which may be seen as a special provision only during election period. - The rights of a free press are not unlimited. - The Court considers that Section 11(b) has not gone beyond the permissible bounds of supervision and regulation of the media. - Section 11(b) is circumscribed by important limitations of applicability: - Only applies during election period. - Only applies to the purchase and sale or print space or airtime for campaign and other political purposes. It does not reach commentaries and opinions of mediamen.

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FACTS - Philippine Radio Corporation (PRC) is a private corporation engaged in the business of commercial radio broadcasting which owns and, until the commission of the acts complained of in the petition, maintained and operated Radio Station DWRN at Naga City. On April 18, 1986, defendant Ramon Diaz of the PCGG, issued a sequestration order placing DWRN, and all its assets under the control and possession of the respondent PCGG. - The sequestration order was implemented by Sibulo and Rosales, giving them possession and control of said Radio Station DWRN and took over the management of said radio station from its Station Manager Celso Baguio, - PRC claims that PCGG agents caused the ouster of the Station Manager of DWRN from his office, designated dismissed employees of DWRN to take charge of vital aspects of operations, held untimely staff meetings, broadcast irresponsible statements denouncing DWRN as 'ill-gotten wealth' despite the fact that neither the PCGG nor the proper court made a ruling thereon, cancelled all scheduled radio programs including all contracted commercials and replaced all scheduled radio programs with unauthorized announcements and broadcasts. -PRC claims: that PCGG agents have orchestrated a broadcast campaign using the facilities of DWRN to condemn, vilify and subject Radio Station DWRN and its management to public contempt and ridicule; that the issuance and implementation of the sequestration order and the takeover letter and the arbitrary and unlawful acts taken thereunder are illegal, null and void; that in its letters to the PCGG, it, through counsel, citing the absence of legal and factual basis for the issuance of above-named orders and conduct of the foregoing proceedings, requested and demanded the recall of the sequestration order and the discontinuance of the actions undertaken by respondents; that despite the legitimate protests of the plaintiff, PCGG refused, without offering any valid justification, to lift the sequestration order, to revoke the take-over letter and to recall respondent POGG agents; that the afore-stated take-over of DWRN by the PCGG is unwarranted and illegal, being expressly prohibited by the PCGG's own rules and regulations; and that a petitioner has no other plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law from the arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and void acts of respondents." - On the other hand, PCGG alleges that the PCGG, on April 18, 1986, through its then Commissioner Diaz and on the basis of "reasonable grounds" or prima facie evidence, issued a Sequestration Order over Station

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V COMELEC FELICIANO; March 5, 1992 (aida villanueva)

NATURE Petition to review decision of COMELEC FACTS - Three petitions have been consolidated in this case. The petitioners include representatives of the mass media which have been prohibited from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements, two candidates for public office (one national, the other provincial) in the May 1992 elections and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to information has been curtailed. - Petitioners argue that RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987), Section 11(b) is unconstitutional because it invades the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression - The law states that the prohibited forms of election propaganda shall include the use of mass media (either for free or for a fee) for political propaganda. - This should be taken together with BP Blg. 881 (Sec. 90 and 92) wherein the COMELEC can procure space in a publication where people can announce their candidacy. The COMELEC shall also procure radio and television air time to be dedicated to the same purpose. The said air time shall be divided equally among the candidates. Petitioners Claim: - This prohibition is tantamount to censorship because it singles out and imposes criminal sanctions on publications with a specific kind of content, i.e., political propaganda during the 1992 election period.

PCGG V NEPOMUCENO PARAS; April 20, 1990 (jojo mendoza)

NATURE Special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order is the assumption of jurisdiction and interference with the orders and functions of the PCGG by Judge Jose U. Nepomuceno of the RTC of Naga City in the civil case Philippine Radio Corporation v. PCGG.

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DWRN, Naga City, allegedly owned by Ambassador Cojuangco, (together with Station DWRN also of Naga City, allegedly owned by Ambassador Benedicto) operated byPRC. Same was implemented on May 2, 1986. A request by the PCGG operating team for an inventory of real and personal properties of the PRC was unjustifiably rejected and ignored by Station Manager Baguio who even refused to submit his monthly report of disbursement of funds attendant to the radio station's operations and allow a PCGG member to inspect the books of PRC. This prompted PCGG team member Betito to make a discreet investigation which resulted in the discovery of serious anomalies committed by said station manager consisting, among others, of concealment of properties of the sequestered station. By reason thereof, the PCGG authorized the take-over of the station on October 14, 1986. Immediately after receiving the take-over.order, Mr. Baguio requested that he be given an opportunity to talk with his employees, which request was granted, but which opportunity was used by said manager to induce the entire personnel to stage a permanent boycott. As a result of the boycott, DWRN had to go off the air due to lack of personnel and technicians to man the operations of the station. It was found out later that a certain Domingo Eclarinal was responsible for the 'tampering and destruction of the fuse and transmitter main switch." Thus, broadcast operations were on and off the air, prompting Officer-inCharge Betito to temporarily hire personnel to man the daily broadcast operations of DWRN. Volunteer announcers and reporters were likewise accepted. - A month after the take-over by the PCGG, PRC filed an action for Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order and for the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Naga City.Instead of filing an answer, the PCGG filed a "Motion to Dismiss and Opposition", raising therein purely legal issues without denying any of the facts pleaded in the complaint. These issues were: (a) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the PCGG; (b) the petition raises political questions; (c) PRC failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (d) DWRN is not entitled to any restraining order or preliminary injunction; and (c) petitioner PCGG or any of its commissioners are immune from civil suits. - Judge Nepomuceno, without ruling on the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, issued the now-assailed order of, granting the prayer for the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. - PCGG contends that on the strength of the trial court's order, station manager Celso Baguio illegally took over the station, ordered the immediate shutdown of the

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studio transmitter, stopped normal broadcasting operations and ordered the inventory of the properties therein. PCGG member Betito failed to eject anymore said station manager and his companions who forcibly took over DWRN and was left with no other choice but to receive a copy of the writ of preliminary injunction. Mr. Baguio has since then and up to the present been in physical possession of the radio station. ISSUES 1. WON the regional trial courts have jurisdiction over the PCGG and properties sequestered and placed in its custody. 2. WON the sequestration and take-over orders issued by PCGG are valid. 3. WON the take-over of DWRN amounted to an infringement on the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of expression, constituting censorship and/or prior restraint of radio programs HELD 1. NO. From the enumeration of the powers of the PCGG in Section 3 of EO 1, it is evident that the PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of these functions the PCGG is considered to be a co-equal body with regional trial courts. It is a well-recognized rule that co-equal bodies have no power and authority to control the other. The lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts is recognized in Section 9, paragraph (3) of B.P. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. However, it must be stressed that the Court of Appeals is not vested with appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the PCGG. This is found in Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his wife, members of their immediate family, close relative, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees. In Section 2 thereof, it is provided that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof" - It is undoubtedly the intent of the sovereign people to ensure that the exclusive authority of the PCGG, that the PCGG, its commissioners, agents, staff, would not be subject to complaints such as the one subject of this petition and thereby ensure that the PCGG would not be

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controlled in the sequestration processes necessary to carry out PCGG's assigned tasks. - The provisional remedies in the case at bar are founded in the police power of the state, which rests upon public necessity and upon the light of the state and of the public to self-protection. The public interest and the general welfare are subserved by sequestering the purported ill-gotten assets and properties and taking over stolen properties of the government channeled to dummy or front companies is stating the obvious. The recovery of these ill-gotten assets would greatly aid our financially crippled government and hasten our national economic recovery, not to mention the fact that they rightfully belong to the people- While as a measure of self-protection, if, in the interest of general welfare, police power may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, it may similarly be exercised to protect the government itself against potential financial loss and the possible disruption of governmental functions. Police power as the power of self-protection on the part of the community bears the same relation to the community that the principle of self-defense bears to the individual. Truly, it may be said that even more than self-defense, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and of the government's own properties involves the material and moral survival of the nation, marked as the past regime was by the obliteration of any line between private funds and the public treasury and abuse of unlimited power and elimination of any accountability in public office, as is a matter of public record and knowledge. 2. YES. The PCGG did not have the least intention to take-over the operations of Station DWRN, as the PCGG was only constrained to act in such manner due to the arrogance and uncooperativeness displayed by its Station Manager. Baguio's deliberate refusal to cooperate and comply with the persistent requests to give an inventory of the properties of the radio station and submit a monthly report of disbursement of funds attendant to its operations prompted PCGG team member Betito to make a discreet investigation which resulted in the discovery of gross anomalies being committed by Baguio, that is, "concealment of properties of the sequestered station."Said discovery impelled the issuance of the take-over order in order to give life to the purpose of sequestration which is to prevent the destruction, concealment, or dissipation of illegally-acquired wealth. In the case at bar, the acts of the PCGG team members or fiscal agents in taking over the radio station were intended to preserve the funds, assets, or properties of DWRN.

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- The PCGG cannot exercise acts of dominion over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. The act of sequestration, freezing, or provisional takeover of property does not import or bring about a divestment of title over said property; does not make the PCGG the owner thereof. In relation to the property sequestered, frozen, or provisionally taken over, the PCGG is a conservator, not an owner. Therefore, it cannot perform acts of strict ownership; and this is specially true in the situations contemplated by the sequestration rules where, unlike cases of receivership, for example, no court exercises effective supervision or can upon due application and hearing, grant authority for the performance of acts of dominion. - Equally evident is that the resort to the provisional remedies in question should entail the least possible interference with business operations or activities so that, in the event that the accusation of the business enterprise being ill-gotten be not proven, it may be returned to its rightful owner as far as possible in the same condition as it was at the time of sequestration. - In this case, the activities performed by the PCGG agents do not constitute acts of ownership though certainly they may have exercised some measure of control in the operation and management of the radio station itself. This intrusion into the management and operation was, however, brought about by the exigencies of the situation. The ouster of Mr. Baguio was prompted by the discovery of his ill activities of concealing DWRN properties; the acceptance of volunteers and designation of employees to man the operations of DWRN was due to lack of personnel who intentionally boycotted their work in the Station; the replacement of the scheduled radio programs was due to expiration and cancellation of the station's contracts (which contracts were not renewed by the parties). The actuations of the PCGG agents were only necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose of preventing the disposal, dissipation, or concealment of the radio station's properties. Thus, the sequestration and takeover orders issued by the PCGG in the present case are legal and valid. 3. NO. It is manifest from the pleadings filed by the parties that DWRN's conduct as a radio station is not being regulated or restrained in this case within the meaning of Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Respondents' claim that the PCGGs acts expose the radio station to breach of contracts and constitute a violation of the Freedom of Speech and Press deserves scant consideration. The proceedings undertaken by the PCGG fiscal agents cannot be regarded as a regulation, abridgment of speech, a "prior

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restraint", or censorship taken in the context of the aforesaid constitutional guaranty. It may not be amiss to reiterate that the take-over, together with the other acts committed in connection therewith, were prompted by the uncooperativeness of the Station Manager and the discovery of his illegal activities of concealing properties of DWRN. The resulting events (designation of employees due to lack of personnel, cancellation of contracts due to expiration and failure to renew the same, replacement of radio programs) occurred in order to give the radio station a semblance of normal broadcasting operations and were manifestly intended to preserve the assets, funds and properties of the said station. The acts of the fiscal agents in taking-over the radio station were justified by the urgency and necessities of the situation, never intended to regulate and to censor within the meaning of the guarantees of freedom of speech and the press. The position taken by respondents is therefore out of place.

PROF.
compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can. (2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its exercise. (3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. (4) The resolution and the memorandum circular are not valid acts of the Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the POEA. - In their comment, the public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should be dismissed because, among others, the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. ISSUES 1. WON POEAs and its governing boards resolutions constitute undue delegation of legislative power 2. WON the resolutions are violative of the equal protection clause 3. WON the resolutions are violative of the freedom to contract clause HELD 1. NO. There is valid delegation of legislative power to administrative bodies when there are standards such as fair and equitable practices, which would guide them in exercising their discretion. Reasoning - With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. - Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES V POEA DAVIDE; April 21, 1995 (bry san juan)
NATURE Original action to declare POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 1, s. 1994 and POEA Circular no. 05, s. 1994 fixing and promulgating rates for death and workmens compensation of Filipino seafarers in oceangoing vessels as unconstitutional FACTS - Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipownerprincipals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that: (1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." 2. NO. Classification/distinctions made under the law shall not be deemed to be violative of equal protection provided that it: (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Reasoning - There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its contention of inequality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. - It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.14 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between landbased and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities. 3. NO. The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause, otherwise it would alter longestablished constitutional doctrine that police power is above the contract clause. Reasoning - The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects

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within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. - The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter longestablished constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause. Disposition WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioners.

PROF.
- The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed the decision. - The Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. ISSUES 1. WON the Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975 2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents' remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof HELD 1. NO. Pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. The Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues: - "Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957 Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. - As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, the statements of Justice Isagani Cruz is enlightening: - "Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will

PNB V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT PANGANIBAN; January 18, 1996 (lora alamin)
NATURE Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, "by authority of the President." FACTS - Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. - Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of the mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question. - Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots. - Acting on suits brought by private respondents, the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) ruled that PNB may collect from private respondents only the "remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer.

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prevail over the contract.Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate order." 2. NO. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents. Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. Disposition Petition was DENIED. No costs.

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- Preferred share of stock entitles the holder thereof to certain preferences over the holders of common stock. The most common forms may be classified into two: (1) preferred shares as to assets <gives the holder thereof preference in the distribution of the assets of the corporation in case of liquidation>; and (2) preferred shares as to dividends <the holder of which is entitled to receive dividends on said share to the extent agreed upon before any dividends at all are paid to the holders of common stock>. - Preferences granted to preferred stockholders do not give them a lien upon the property of the corporation nor make them creditors of the corporation, the right of the former being always subordinate to the latter. Shareholders, both common and preferred, are considered risk takers who invest capital in the business and who can look only to what is left after corporate debts and liabilities are fully paid. - Redeemable shares are shares usually preferred, which by their terms are redeemable at a fixed date, or at the option of either issuing corporation, or the stockholder, or both at a certain redemption price. ISSUES 1. WON RPBank can be compelled to redeem the preferred shares issue to RFRD Corp 2.WON RFRD Corp is entitled to the payment of interests as a matter of right without necessity of a prior declaration of the dividend 3. WON the claim of RFRD Corp is barred by prescription or laches HELD 1. NO Ratio A directive issued by the Central Bank Governor obviously meant to preserve the status quo and to prevent the financial ruin of a banking institution, limiting the exercise of a right granted by law to a corporate entity, may be considered as an exercise of police power. - The constitutional guaranty o non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the state, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights. Reasoning Except as otherwise provided in the stock certificate, the redemption rests entirely with the corporation and the stockholder is without right to either compel or refuse the redemption of its stock. - While the stock certificate does not allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested in RPBank. - The terms and conditions set forth in the stock certificates use the word "may". StatCon: the word

PROF.
may denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. - Redemption may not be made where the corporation is insolvent or if such redemption will cause insolvency or inability of the corporation to meet its debts as they mature. 2. NO Ratio Payment of dividends to a stockholder is not a matter of right but a matter of consensus. (Corporation Law, sec16; Corporation Code, sec43) - Interest bearing stocks, on which the corporation agrees absolutely to pay interest before dividends are paid to common stockholders, is legal only when construed as requiring payment of interest as dividends from net earnings or surplus only. 3. YES Ratio A right of action that is founded upon a written contract prescribes in 10 years (Art 1144, NCC). Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Reasoning The letter-demand made by Robes and RFRD Corp to RPBank was made almost eighteen years after receipt of the written contract in the form of the stock certificate. - The terms and conditions set forth in the stock certificate clearly indicate that redemption of the preferred shares may be made at any time after the lapse of two years from the date of issue. Had Robes and RFRD Corp been vigilant in asserting their rights, the redemption could have been effected at a time when RPBank was not suffering from any financial crisis. Disposition Peition granted. CFI Rizal decision set aside. Complaint against RPBank dismissed.

REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK V AGANA, SR. HERMOSISIMA; March 3, 1997 (marge alias)
NATURE Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari seeking the annulment of a previous decision of CFI Rizal favoring Robes-Francisco Realty and Development Corporation (RFRD Corp) and Adalia F. Robes action for specific performance against Republic Planters Bank (RPBank). FACTS - 18 Sept 1961: RFRD Corp secured a loan from RPBank in the amount of P120k. Instead of giving the legal tender totaling to the full amount of the loan, RPBank lent such amount partially in the form of money and partially in the form of 2 stock certificates worth P4k each. - 31 Jan 1979: Robes and RFRD Corp proceeded against RPBank and filed a complaint anchored on their alleged rights to collect dividends under the preferred shares in question and to have RPBank redeem the same under the terms and conditions of the stock certificates. - RPBank filed a Motion to Dismiss, but this was deied. After the submission of the respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution, with CFI Rizal ordering RPBank to pay Robes and RFR Corp the face value of the stock certificates as redemption price, plus 1% quarterly interest thereon until full payment. Obiter Definitions

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES V COMELEC MENDOZA; April 21, 1998 (maia rieza)
FACTS - Petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. assail the validity of B.P. Blg. No. 881, sec.92, which requires radio and television broadcasters to give free time (to be known as COMELEC Time) to the COMELEC during the campaign period. The law reads: B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code) SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45. 1978 EC). SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. - TELEBAP is suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. GMA is suing as an operator of radio and broadcasting stations under a franchise granted by Congress. - Grounds for assailing validity are: deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation (radio and TV companies allege lost profits from the requirement of giving free airtime), denial of radio and television broadcast companies of equal protection of laws (print media companies are entitled to compensation for COMELEC Space, while radio and TV companies are required to furnish COMELEC Time free of charge), and excessive power given to COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. ISSUES Procedural WON petitioners have standing Substantive WON B.P. Blg. No. 881, sec.92 is a valid exercise of police power of the state a. WON it deprives broadcast companies of property without due process and just compensation b. WON the it invalidly amends the grant of franchise (through RA7252) to GMA c. WON there is unequal protection of laws d. WON requirement of COMELEC Time is a valid exercise of states power to regulate use of franchises

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PROF.
newspaper and print media. Newspapers and books are found only in metropolitan areas and in municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. TV is also becoming universal. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance. Thus, the distinction between newspaper and print media companies, and radio and TV companies, is justified. d. Yes. First of all, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. Secondly, the prohibition in 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on political ads) is only half of the regulatory provision in the statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space and air time for allocation to candidates. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and program of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Broadcast companies are public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Disposition Petition dismissed.

HELD Procedural Yes and no. TELEBAP do not have standing as citizens, taxpayers, or registered voters. As citizens, members of TELEBAP have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of the law. As registered voters, the law does not concern their right to suffrage. As taxpayers, the case does not involve the exercise by the congress of its taxing or spending power. The mere fact that the TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies. On the other hand, GMA has the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. As an operator of radio and television stations, they are substantially affected by the enforcement of the said law. Substantive Yes. a. No. Radio and television broadcasting companies are not deprived of property without due process for they do not even own the airwaves and frequencies which they allege to be deprived of with the enforcement of the law. All broadcasting stations are licensed by the government, thus they are only operating their franchise as a privilege, hence subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good requires. The exercise of the privilege may be reasonably burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide free airtime to COMELEC. b. No. the questioned law antedates the franchise grant to GMA, thus it is deemed to have been incorporated with the franchise grant. Therefore, GMA is under the duty to render adequate public service time, to enable the government to communicate with the people on matters of public interest. The COMELEC Time is and should be considered as part of the public service time broadcast stations are required to furnish the government. In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege. c. No. the law does not give unequal protection between the radio and television companies on the one hand, and the newspaper and magazine companies on the other. The freedom of radio and TV companies is somewhat limited in scope than the freedom accorded to

SEPARATE OPINION ROMERO [dissent]

- Section 92 of BP 881, insofar as it requires radio and television stations to provide Comelec with radio and television time free of charge is a flagrant violation of the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation - while it is inherent in the state to appropriate property for public use, this has never been understood to include taking property without compensation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

- Section 9 Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads "No private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation," gives us two limitations on the power of eminent domain: (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property. - Apparently, Sec 92 of BP 881 justifies expropriation under the guise of police power regulation which cannot be validly done. Police power must be distinguished from the power of eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, there is a restriction of property interest to promote public welfare or interest which involves no compensable taking. When the power of eminent domain, however, is exercised, property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, necessitating compensation therefor. -Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the community - The fact that one needs a franchise from government to establish a radio and television station while no license is needed to start a newspaper should not be made a basis for treating broadcast media any differently from the print media in compelling the former to "donate" airtime to respondent Comelec - I vote to declare assailed provision of the law unconstitutional

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PROF.
- In 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus I Hydroelectric Plant Project, Mangondato demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR initially refused, asserting that it already paid financial assistance to the city of Marawi. Mangondato claimed that the subject land was his private property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title T-378-A. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. - NAPOCORs National Power Board resolved to pay Mangondato P100 per square meter, for 12,132 square meter portion plus 12% interest/year. Pending determination whether P100 is the fair market value of the property, NAPOCOR paid Mangondato P1,184,088. - It was later discovered that the subject land was industrial, and the market value was P300 for those along the highway and P200 for those not along the highway. NAPOCORs regional legal counsel recommended to the Board that the fair market value of the property is P100 per sq. m. Mangondato disagreed and submitted that the fair market value of his land is even more than P300/ sq. m., but that for expediency, he is willing to settle for P300/ sq. m. plus 12% interest per annum. - In March 1992, the parties executed a Deed of Sale where NAPOCOR acceded to Mangondatos provisional payment of P100/ sq. m. without prejudice to his pursuance of claims for just compensation and interest. Mangondato was paid a total of P2,199,500 for the 12995 sq. m. land. ISSUE At what point should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed: at the date of the taking or the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain? HELD Ratio NAPOCOR is ordered to pay monthly rentals in the amount of P15K from 1978 xxx and the property is condemned in favor of NAPOCOR effective July 1992 upon payment of the fair market value of the property at P1000 per sq. m. or a total of P21,995,000.00 Reasoning SEC. 4. Order of Condemnation. xxx the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

PANGANIBAN[dissent]
- provision is unconstitutional for it confiscates priate property without due process and without just compensation, and denies broadcast media equal protection of laws. -The State does not own the airwaves and broadcast frequencies. It merely allocates, supervises and regulates their proper use. Thus, other than collecting supervision or regulatory fees which it already does, it cannot exact any onerous and unreasonable post facto burdens from the franchise holders, without due process and just compensation. Moreover, the invocation of the "common good" does not excuse the unbridled and clearly excessive taking to a franchisee's property - Assuming arguendo that the State owns the air lanes, the broadcasting companies already pay rental fees to the government for their use. Hence, the seizure of air time cannot be justified by the theory of compensation. - Airwaves and frequencies alone, without the radio and television owners' humongous investments amounting to billions of pesos, cannot be utilized for broadcasting purposes. Hence, a forced donation of broadcast time is in actual fact a taking of such investments without due process and without payment of just compensation. - I vote to declare assailed provision unconstitutional

VITUG [concur and dissent]

- I assent in most part to the majority opinion, particularly in holding that TELEBAP does not have standing and that the assailed law is a valid exercise of the states police power - the assailed law has not failed in meeting the standards set forth for its lawful exercise, i.e., (a) that its utilization is demanded by the interests of the public, and (b) that the means employed are reasonably necessary, and not unduly oppressive, for the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the law. - (dissent part) I cannot consider COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A, particularly Section 2 thereof (wherein COMELEC will PAY for airtime, but is considered invalid by the majority for being contrary to BP No. 881), as being in contravention of B.P. No. 881. There is nothing in the law that prohibits the COMELEC from itself procuring airtime, perhaps longer than that which can reasonably be allocated, if it believes that in so opting, it does so for the public good.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V COURT OF APPEALS PANGANIBAN; March 11, 1996 (anton arcilla)
NATURE Review on certiorari assailing Decision of CA. FACTS - In 1978 the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) took possession of a 21,995 square meter land which is a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974. - NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City, and NAPOCOR had paid the city financial assistance of P40.oo per square meter.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

- The time of the taking normally coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence many rulings of the Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing the complaint consistent with previous provision. Exception: Where the Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated. - It is difficult to conceive how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase in the value of owners land. NAPOCOR has the burden of proving that its occupancy and usenot ordinary inflation and increase in land valueswas the direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992. The elements of taking are: 1. expropriator must enter private property; 2. entrance into private property must be longer than momentary period; 3. entry should be under warrant or color of legal authority; 4. property must be devoted to a public use xxx; 5. utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. - Given these elements, NAPOCORs petition should be denied on ground that the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority for it believed the property was public land. NAPOCOR refused to compensate Mangondato; buying the property a decade after occupancy was an attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. NAPOCOR refused to exercise the power of eminent domain. - Intent to expropriate was manifested only when they declared that payment shall be effected ibky after Agus I HE project has been placed in operation. Hence, there was no taking for eminent domain in 1978. - Regarding valuation of P1000 per sq. m., it can be gleaned from the records that the court-andthe-parties-appointed commissioners did not abuse their authority in evaluating the evidence submitted to them nor misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence. The commissioners may well be considered an expert, with general knowledge of the appraisal of real estate, so that their opinion on the valuation of the property cannot be lightly brushed aside.

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PROF.
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area - After trial, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. - Petitioners alleged the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. ISSUES 1. WON Ordinance No. 7738 is void and unconstitutional 2. WON the ordinance violates the due process clause and is an oppressive exercise of police power 3. WON the ordinance violated the equal protection clause HELD 1. YES. The Ordinance is ultra vires and therefore null and void. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 2.YES. The due process clause serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. - This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called

CITY OF MANILA V LAGUIO TINGA; April 12, 2005 (sarah cabrera)

NATURE Petition praying for the reversal of the decision of the RTC, enjoining the City of Manila from enforcing Ordinance No. 7783 FACTS - MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as defendants herein petitioners. MTDC prayed that Ordinance No. 7783, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. - The Ordinance pertinently reads: SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to: 1. Sauna Parlors, 2. Massage Parlors, 3. Karaoke Bars, 4. Beerhouses, 5. Night Clubs, 6. Day Clubs, 7. Super Clubs, 8. Discotheques, 9. Cabarets, 10. Dance Halls, 11. Motels, 12. Inns. SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section. SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate

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procedural due process and substantive due process. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the governments action. - The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. - Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met - To successfully a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. - The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. - The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral

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welfare of the community. The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. - If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. Means employed are constitutionally infirm - It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property. - Liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motels premises be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. - Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom. It is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. - Modality employed is unlawful taking - The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be

PROF.
used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. - The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. The principal purpose of the guarantee is to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. (There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.) While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. - The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. This is a taking of private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole. - The Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance

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confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. - Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property. 3. YES. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. - Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. - In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. - The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the ErmitaMalate area but not outside of this area. A noxious

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establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. - The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitution, one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish,is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives. Thus, the discrimination is invalid. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires - The Ordinance is in contravention of the Local Government Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. - Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants or certain forms of amusement or entertainment which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit. - The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers, ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.

PROF.
- Petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. - If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Councils powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance. - Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. - The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. Disposition Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED.

CIR V CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION PANGANIBAN; April 15, 2005 (chris lao)

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FACTS - The 20 percent discount required by the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not merely a tax deduction from the gross income or gross sale of the establishment concerned. A tax credit is used by a private establishment only after the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before the tax is computed. RA 7432 unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus, the provisions of the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such grant are void. Basic is the rule that administrative regulations cannot amend or revoke the law. - The CA narrated the antecedent facts as follows: > Respondent is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in retailing of medicines and other pharmaceutical products. In 1996, it operated six (6) drugstores under the business name and style Mercury Drug. > From January to December 1996, respondent granted twenty (20%) percent sales discount to qualified senior citizens on their purchases of medicines pursuant to Republic Act No. [R.A.] 7432 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. For the said period, the amount allegedly representing the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens totaled P904,769.00. > On April 15, 1997, respondent filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1996 declaring therein that it incurred net losses from its operations. > On January 16, 1998, respondent filed with petitioner a claim for tax refund/credit in the amount of P904,769.00 allegedly arising from the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to qualified senior citizens in compliance with [R.A.] 7432. Unable to obtain affirmative response from petitioner, respondent elevated its claim to the Court of Tax Appeals [(CTA or Tax Court)] via a Petition for Review. > On February 12, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a Decision dismissing respondents Petition for lack of merit. In said decision, the [CTA] justified its ruling with the following ratiocination: x x x, if no tax has been paid to the government, erroneously or illegally, or if no amount is due and collectible from the taxpayer, tax refund or tax credit is unavailing. Moreover, whether the recovery of the tax is made by means of a claim for refund or tax credit, before recovery is allowed[,] it must be first established that there was an actual collection and receipt by the government of the tax sought to be recovered. x x x.

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Prescinding from the above, it could logically be deduced that tax credit is premised on the existence of tax liability on the part of taxpayer. In other words, if there is no tax liability, tax credit is not available. - Respondent lodged a Motion for Reconsideration. The [CTA], in its assailed resolution, granted respondents motion for reconsideration and ordered herein petitioner to issue a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of respondent citing the decision of the then Special Fourth Division of [the CA] in CA G.R. SP No. 60057 entitled Central [Luzon] Drug Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue promulgated on May 31, 2001, to wit: - However, Sec. 229 clearly does not apply in the instant case because the tax sought to be refunded or credited by petitioner was not erroneously paid or illegally collected. We take exception to the CTAs sweeping but unfounded statement that both tax refund and tax credit are modes of recovering taxes which are either erroneously or illegally paid to the government. Tax refunds or credits do not exclusively pertain to illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes as they may be other circumstances where a refund is warranted. The tax refund provided under Section 229 deals exclusively with illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes but there are other possible situations, such as the refund of excess estimated corporate quarterly income tax paid, or that of excess input tax paid by a VAT-registered person, or that of excise tax paid on goods locally produced or manufactured but actually exported. The standards and mechanics for the grant of a refund or credit under these situations are different from that under Sec. 229. Sec. 4[.a)] of R.A. 7432, is yet another instance of a tax credit and it does not in any way refer to illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes, x x x. - Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA affirmed in toto the Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) ordering petitioner to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of respondent in the reduced amount of P903,038.39. It reasoned that Republic Act No. (RA) 7432 required neither a tax liability nor a payment of taxes by private establishments prior to the availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such credit is not tantamount to an unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just compensation for the taking of private property for public use. ISSUE WON respondent, despite incurring a net loss, may still claim the 20 percent sales discount as a tax credit. Section 4a) of RA 7432 grants to senior citizens the privilege of obtaining a 20 percent discount on their

PROF.
purchase of medicine from any private establishment in the country. The latter may then claim the cost of the discount as a tax credit. But can such credit be claimed, even though an establishment operates at a loss HELD We answer in the affirmative. Tax Credit versus Tax Deduction - Although the term is not specifically defined in our Tax Code, tax credit generally refers to an amount that is subtracted directly from ones total tax liability. It is an allowance against the tax itself or a deduction from what is owed by a taxpayer to the government. Examples of tax credits are withheld taxes, payments of estimated tax, and investment tax credits. - Tax credit should be understood in relation to other tax concepts. One of these is tax deduction -- defined as a subtraction from income for tax purposes, or an amount that is allowed by law to reduce income prior to [the] application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. An example of a tax deduction is any of the allowable deductions enumerated in Section 34 of the Tax Code. - A tax credit differs from a tax deduction. On the one hand, a tax credit reduces the tax due, including -whenever applicable -- the income tax that is determined after applying the corresponding tax rates to taxable income. A tax deduction, on the other, reduces the income that is subject to tax in order to arrive at taxable income. To think of the former as the latter is to avoid, if not entirely confuse, the issue. A tax credit is used only after the tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before. Laws Not Amended by Regulations - The law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. In fact, a regulation that operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity; it cannot prevail. - It is a cardinal rule that courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x x. In the scheme of judicial tax administration, the need for certainty and predictability in the implementation of tax laws is crucial. Our tax authorities fill in the details that Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. The regulations these authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that these will be followed by the courts. Courts, however, will not uphold these authorities interpretations when clearly absurd, erroneous or improper.

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- In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled up the intent of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a sales discount. The administrative agency issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature. - In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A regulation adopted pursuant to law is law. Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law.[ Tax Credit Benefit Deemed Just Compensation - Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 deny the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain. Be it stressed that the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to these establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use - The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. The discount privilege to which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. - As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by RA 7432, respondent becomes entitled to a just compensation. This term refers not only to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the correct amount of the discounts given, but also to the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the payment of property taken by the State, such issuance -- when not done within a reasonable time from the grant of the discounts -cannot be considered as just compensation. In effect, respondent is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of its revenues while awaiting actual receipt, through the certificate, of the equivalent amount it needs to cope with the reduction in its revenues. - Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Tax measures are but enforced contributions

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exacted on pain of penal sanctions and clearly imposed for a public purpose. In recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth. - While it is a declared commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432, social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. For this reason, a just compensation for income that is taken away from respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax credit that our legislators find support to realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact. - To put it differently, a private establishment that merely breaks even-- without the discounts yet -- will surely start to incur losses because of such discounts. The same effect is expected if its mark-up is less than 20 percent, and if all its sales come from retail purchases by senior citizens. Aside from the observation we have already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair to an establishment if the discounts will be treated merely as deductions from either its gross income or its gross sales. Operating at a loss through no fault of its own, it will realize that the tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is inutile, if not improper. Worse, profit-generating businesses will be put in a better position if they avail themselves of tax credits denied those that are losing, because no taxes are due from the latter. RA 7432 is an earlier law not expressly repealed by, and therefore remains an exception to, the Tax Code -- a later law. When the former states that a tax credit may be claimed, then the requirement of prior tax payments under certain provisions of the latter, as discussed above, cannot be made to apply. Neither can the instances of or references to a tax deduction under the Tax Code be made to restrict RA 7432. No provision of any revenue regulation can supplant or modify the acts of Congress. Disposition : Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

PROF.
Appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Trial Court rejecting petitioners motion to dismiss the Republics petition for expropriation. FACTS - Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila - When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of PD 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark - The Secretary of Justice confirmed that such site so invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized - Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the RTC of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI - Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution ISSUE WON the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a parcel of land so declared by the NHI as a national historical landmark by virtue of being the birthplace of Iglesia Ni Cristo founder Felix Manalo. HELD YES Ratio - The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. - The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. Reasoning

MANOSCA V CA VITUG; January 29, 1996 (keefe dela cruz)

NATURE

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- Eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty. The provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. - The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. - The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, quoting from Berman v. Parker: The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. - It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co., that: A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use. Disposition All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

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to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value. - The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] a.k.a. the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in this action said that: it was not either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. - IN SHORT: The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. While the defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the

PROF.
same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. - TC-decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed. ISSUES 1. In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation 2. WON the City of Manila, in exercising its right of eminent domain, can expropriate the land in question HELD 1. YES. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. - When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Reasoning On the SCs jurisdiction, Decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or statutory provisions. - IF: the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, THEN: the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation. - IF: the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes THEN: SC thinks the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. - The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law.

CITY OF MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA JOHNSON.; October 31, 1919 (edel cruz)
NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila FACTS - For the purpose of public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the City of Manila to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city. - The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

- In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. 2 NO. The record does not show conclusively that the City o Manila has definitely decided that there exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff. - Also, since the cemetery in question is alleged as public property, the City of Manila has no authority to expropriate public property; it can only expropriate private property. (BERNAS: The Court asserted here that a cemetery open to the public is already in public use, and no part of the ground could be taken for OTHER public uses under a general authority. Summary The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, BUT that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. Disposition The judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

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one public use and devote it to another. When the power is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no question can arise. But, it was added, "The same land cannot properly be used for burial lots and for a public highway at the same time. . . . Land therefore applied to one use should not be taken for the other except in cases on necessity. . . . There is no difficulty in effecting the desired improvement by taking land on the other side of the street. . . . The idea of running a public street, regardless of graves, monuments, and the feelings of the living, through one of our public cemeteries, would be shocking to the moral sense of the community, and would not be tolerated except upon the direst necessity." It was then held that land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for another use which is inconsistent with the first, without special authority from the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and reasonable implication. B) Memphis State Line Railroad Company vs. Forest Hill Cemetery Co. ([1906], 116 Tenn., 400.) - The court, in effect, found that the land of the Cemetery Company was devoted to a public purpose, and that under the general language of the Tennessee statute of eminent domain it could not be taken for another public purpose. The court said that in process of time the sepulchres of the dead "are made the seats of cities, and are traversed by streets, and daily trodden by the feet of man. This is inevitable in the course of ages. But while these places are yet within the memory and under the active care of the living, while they are still devoted to pious uses, they are sacred, and we cannot suppose that the legislature intended that they should be violated, in the absence of special provisions upon the subject authorizing such invasion, and indicating a method for the disinterment, removal, and reinterment of the bodies buried, and directing how the expense thereof shall be borne." Two members of the court, delivering a separate concurring opinion, concluded with this significant and el

PROF.
land described in the complaint, and to appoint Commissioners to inspect the property, appraise the value, and assess the damages. Instead of doing so, the court entered upon the question of the right of the city to take the property and the necessity for the taking. - The question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and former question is exclusively for the legislature, except that if the constitution or statute authorizes the taking of property only in cases of necessity, then the necessity becomes a judicial question. (McQuillen Municipal Corporations, Vol. IV, pp. 3090-3091.) - In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those questions belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative determination is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it. It rests with the legislature not only to determine when the power of eminent domain may be exercised, but also the character, quality, method, and extent of such exercise. And this power is unqualified, other than by the necessity of providing that compensation shall be made. Nevertheless, under the express provisions of the constitution of some states the question of necessity is made a judicial one, to be determined by the courts and not by the legislature. - It is contended for the defense that this Chinese Cemetery is a public cemetery and that it cannot therefore be taken for public use. In its answer the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it owns the land which plaintiff seeks to acquire. The facts that it is private corporation owning land would seem of necessity to make the land it owns private land. The fact that it belongs to the Chinese community deprives it of any public character. - In Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports (p. 759), it is said: Although it has been held, that where a state has delegated the power of eminent domain to a person or corporation and where by its exercise lands have been subject to a public use, they cannot be applied to another public use without specific authority expressed or implied to that effect, yet, the general rule seems to be that the fact that property is already devoted to a public use, does not exempt it from being appropriated under the right of eminent domain but it may be so taken for a use which is clearly superior or paramount to

STREET [dissent]
I concur with Justice Moir in the view that the authorities of the city of Manila are the proper judges of the propriety of the condemnation and that this Court should have nothing to do with the question of the necessity of the taking.

SEPARATE OPINIONS MALCOLM, [concur]

He cited 2 cases similar to the present case: A) Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven ([1875], 43 Conn., 234) - The court said that it is unquestionable that the Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land already applied to

MOIR [dissent]
- Clearly having the right of expropriation, the city of Manila selected the line of its street and asked the court by proper order to place the plaintiff in possession of the

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the one to which it is already devoted. (Citing many United States Supreme Court decisions.) *Moir votes to reverse the decision of CFI and to proceed with the case.

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property provisionally at the amount stated and ordering that the plaintiff be placed in possession, it being made to appear that a certificate of deposit for the amount stated had been delivered to the provincial treasurer. - The three respondents interposed a demurrer questioning the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes. - Contemporaneously with the filing of their demurrer, the same parties moved the CFI to revoke its order of September 15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession. This motion is based substantially on the same ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of legislative authority for the proposed expropriation, but it contains one additional allegation to the effect that the deposit in court of the sum of P600,000, had been made without authority of law. In support of this contention it was shown, by means of an informal communication from the Insular Auditor, that the money in question had been taken from the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by Acts Nos. 2784 and 2785 of the Philippine Legislature for the use of the Militia Commission. This appropriation showed, upon the date said deposit of P600,000 was made, an unexpended balance of P1,144,672.83. - On October 3, 1919 the Judge of the CFI overruled the demurrer interposed by the three parties mentioned and denied their motion to vacate the order granting possession to the Government. ISSUES 1. WON the Government has the authority to maintain expropriation proceedings upon the initiative of the Governor-General. 2. WON expropriation proceedings can be maintained by the Philippine Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. HELD 1. Yes. Ratio Expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the Governor-General, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that already on the statute books. Reasoning The performance of the administrative acts, necessary to the exercise of the power of eminent domain in behalf of the state is lodged by tradition in the Sovereign or other Chief Executive. Therefore, when the Philippine Legislature declared in section 64 of the Administrative Code, that the Governor-General, who

PROF.
exercises supreme executive power in these Islands (sec. 21, Jones Act), should be the person to direct the initiation of expropriation proceedings, it placed the authority exactly where one would expect to find it, and we can conceive of no ground upon which the efficacy of the statute can reasonably be questioned. The contention that the authority to maintain such a proceeding cannot be delegated by the Legislature to the Chief Executive is in our opinion wholly erroneous and apparently has its basis in a misconception of fundamentals. The real check which the modern Legislature exerts over the Executive Department, in such a matter as this, lies not so much in the extinction of the prerogative as in the fact that the hands of the Executive can always be paralyzed by lack of money something which is ordinarily supplied only by the Legislature. 2. Yes. Ratio The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution or statutes. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. Reasoning The power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers. The provisions now generally found in the modern laws or constitutions of civilized countries to the effect that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation have their origin in the recognition of a necessity for restraining the sovereign and protecting the individual. If the Government complies with the requirements of law relative to the making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be at once given to it, just as is permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized by law to exercise the power of eminent domain. Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of pins; and in the case of a forced taking of property against the will of the owner, all that can be required of the government is that it should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise.

VISAYAN REFINING CO. V CAMUS & PAREDES STREET; December 3, 1919 (ricky cantre)
NATURE Original petition, directed to the Supreme Court, containing an alternative prayer for a writ of certiorari or prohibition to stop the condemnation proceedings instituted by the Government of the Philippine Islands, and now pending in the CFI of the Province of Rizal. FACTS - On September 13, 1919, the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land of an area of about 1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is located in the municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and lies along the waterfront of Manila Bay, a few miles south of the city of Manila. The property is desired by the Government of the PI for military and aviation purposes. - Condemnation proceedings were begun by the Attorney-General on September 15, 1919, by filing a complaint in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands in the CFI of Rizal. Numerous persons are named in the complaint as defendants because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property intended to be expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded appear the names of the three petitioners herein, namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally owners of different portions of the property in question. - The Attorney-General was directed immediately upon filing the complaint to ask the court to give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated, after the necessary deposit should be made as provided by law. Accordingly in the complaint itself the Attorney-General prayed the court promptly and provisionally to fix the sum of P600,000 as the total value of the property and to put the Government in immediate possession when said sum should be placed at the disposition of the court. An order was accordingly made on September 15, 1919, by the Honorable Judge Manuel Camus, of the CFI of Rizal, fixing the value of the

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Disposition The Writ prayed for in the petition is DENIED.

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Camp Claudio, and this decision for present purposes must be taken as final and conclusive. The P600,000 deposit is merely the provisional determination of the value of the land by the competent court, and in no way jeopardizes the financial interests of the owners of the property. No additional security is required since the sovereign power has waived its right to be sued, has pledged the public faith, and cannot obtain title until the owners receive just compensation for their property.

PROF.
1. WON plaintiffs action for declaratory relief is improper because there has already been a breach by plaintiff of RA 1383 2. WON RA 1383 contemplates the exercise of the power of eminent domain (rather than the exercise of police power) 3. WON assuming arguendo that RA 1383 involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, the same does not violate the Constitution HELD 1. No. The defendant claims there has been a breach of RA 1383, invoking Sec 2 Rule 66 which provides a contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof. -The answer filed by the defendant states there has been no breach of said law because no actual physical turnover of the Baguio Waterworks System has been made so far. -unless the provision is carried out by administrative action, it cannot be said that the transfer has been effected and the requisites for an action for declaratory relief are present 2. No, it does not constitute the exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate, destroy or appropriate the plaintiffs property but rather directs the transfer of all such waterworks under the single agency NAWASA, w/ payments of equal value of NAWASAs assets -defendant insists that the Waterworks are public works for public service; the Court states that the Waterworks are owned by the plaintiff in its proprietary character and thus cannot be taken away w/o observing the safeguards set by the Constitution to protect private property 3. Art XIII Sec 6 of the 1935 Constitution provides: The State may, in the interest of National Welfare establish and operate industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government. Art III Sec 1(2) of the same Constitution provides: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. -there is nothing in the record to show that the defendant has transferred any asset of NAWASA no plaintiff as just compensation for the expropriated property. The act does not specify what assets are to be given and whenuntil this is clarified, the act is considered violative of the Constitution and Plaintiffs property may not be taken. The decision appealed from is affirmed.

SEPARATE OPINION MALCOLM [concur]

- The power of eminent domain is expressly vested in the Government of the Philippine Islands by section 63 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. The Philippine Legislature has, in turn by section 64 (h) of the Administrative Code of 1917, expressly delegated to the Governor-General the specific power and duty to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands. When, therefore, the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be begun in the CFI of Rizal with the object of having the Government obtain title to the site commonly known as "Camp Tomas Claudio," he was merely acting as a mouthpiece of American sovereignty, pursuant to a delegated power transmitted by the Congress of the US to the Government of the PI and lodged by this latter Government in the Chief Executive. - In the existing Philippine Bill of Rights is a provision that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." It seems undeniable (A) that Camp Claudio was "private property," and (B) that it was being "taken for public use," namely, for military and aviation purposes. - Another provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights is, "that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." The same Organic Act provides for an Auditor who shall "audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, all expenditure of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust, by the Government. His administrative jurisdiction is made " exclusive." The Philippine Legislature could, of course, have specifically appropriated an amount for the purchase of the Camp Claudio site just as it could have specifically enacted a law for the condemnation of such site, but instead it preferred to include in the general Appropriation Acts, under the heads of The Philippine National Guard or Philippine Militia, a large amount to be expended in the discretion of the Militia Commission, which may "use the funds appropriated for other purposes, as the efficiency of the service may require." This transfer of power to the Militia Commission, like the delegation of some of the general legislative power to the Governor-General, raises no constitutional bar. The Insular Auditor has stated that there is in the treasury over a million pesos available for the condemnation of

CITY OF BAGUIO V NAWASA BAUTISTA-ANGELO; August 31, 1959 (kiyo miura)

FACTS - plaintiff is a municipal corporation organized under its Charter with principal base of business in Baguio while defendant is a public corporation created under RA 1383 based in Manila. - 9/19/55: the Pres. issued EO 127, outlining the procedure by w/c government-owned waterworks and sewage systems would be transferred to the defendant w/in 90 days of the order - 4/25/56: plaintiff filed in the CFI of Baguio a complaint for declaratory relief against defendant (a public corporation created by RA 1383 contending that said act does not include the Baguio Waterworks System; and assuming it does, said act is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff of ownership and control of the waterworks system without due process of law - 5/22/56: defendant filed motion to dismiss, contending that the act is a proper exercise of the States police power; it constitutes the States right to eminent domain; Nawasa is public property over w/c legislature has control and the provision being unambiguous needs no construction - 6/21/56: the court denied the motion to dismiss; defendant argued that declaratory relief is improper since the Baguio waterworks system had already been transferred to defendant - 7/6/56: the Court held tat the Waterworks system was private property and that the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the Baguio waterworks system was not just compensation -defendant filed a motion for reconsideration w/c was denied, hence this appeal ISSUES

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REPUBLIC V PLDT REYES; January 27, 1969 (rean balisi)
FACTS -This is a direct appeal by both plaintiff and defendant of the decision of CFI Manila from the dismissal of their respective complaint and counterclaims, but making permanent a preliminary mandatory injunction therefore issued against the defendant on the inter -connection of telephone facilities owned and operated by said parties. -The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications (BOT/Buereau). That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94 -The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries -In 1933, defendant PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc.3 entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the U.S. and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Phils to the U.S. -After its creation in 1947, BOT set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. -On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents.

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- On 7 April 1958, defendant PLDT complained to the BOT that said Bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. Receiving no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the U.S. -BOT had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. The could not come up with agreement since proposals were accepted by neither party. -On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, PLDT, in the CFI of Manila, praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. Ruling of Trial Court: [a] lower court could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; [b] that under Executive Order 94, establishing the BOT, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, [c] in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. Both parties appealed. ISSUES 1. WON PLDT can be compelled to enter into an interconnecting contract with BOT 2. WON BOT was not empowered to engage in commercial telephone business 3. WON BOTs commercial services constituted unfair competition, hence, was guilty of fraud, abuse or misuse under its contract with PLDT

PROF.
4. WON PLDT was justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it had previously leased to the Bureau HELD [1] NO & YES. Ratio (a) Parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence (b) While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.4 Reasoning Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to, allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. [2] NO. EO No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the BOT, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines," and, in subsection (c), "to prescribe subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handled
4

An American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radiotelephone and radio telegraphic communications services (Act 3180)

This Ratio and the reasoning below is what is important for our purposes under The Power of Eminent Domain, subtopic of Just Compensation

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by the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by the system." Reasoning Nothing in these provisions limits the Bureau to noncommercial activities or prevents it from serving the general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to government offices: but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. [3] NO. Ratio Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject to the rights of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit. Reasoning [a] The competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. As previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the demands for service are notorious even now. [b] The PLDT charter expressly provides: "Sec. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of messages or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise" (Act 3436) [c] As ruled by the trial court, "when the BOT subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant PLDT knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" Further, the acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to

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unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines. [4] Same as the ratio in the third issue. Disposition CFI Decision affirmed except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the PLDT to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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promote social justice. They were well-aware of the problem of inequality of wealth. - A generous scope was accorded to the police power and eminent domain prerogatives of the state, even if the exercise thereof would cover terrain previously thought of as beyond state control, to promote social justice and the general welfare. On the exercise of the power of expropriation - There need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is without limit. There are two requisites. 1. Just compensation - the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking - It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity - The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property - There must be a consideration then of all the facts which make it commercially valuable. The question is what would be obtained for it on the market from parties who want to buy and would give full value. Testimonies as to real estate transactions in the vicinity are admissible. It must be shown though that the property as to use must be of similar character to the one sought to be condemned. The transaction must likewise be coeval as to time. To the market value must be added the consequential damages, if any, minus the consequential benefits 2. Another requisite for the exercise of the states power of eminent domain is that the taking should be for public use. On the issue of equal protection - Petitioners assert they they are denied equal protection, since the Tatalon Estate is singled out by the RA in question. - The Court looked into the intent of the legislators. The intent of the said act is to sell the expropriated lots to their present bona fide occupants, who are mostly veterans of WW2. It is the earnest desire of this group of patriotic and loyal citizens to purchase the lots at a minimum cost. Also, population in Quezon City has significantly increased, posing a serious housing problem to city residents. The bill will not only solve this

JM TUASON V LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION FERNANDO; February 18, 1970 (monch bacani)
NATURE Special civil action for prohibition FACTS - RA 2616 provided for the expropriation of the Tatalon estate in Quezon City jointly owned by the J. M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor. - Thereafter, respondent Land Tenure Administration was directed by the then Executive Secretary to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. - petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed before the lower court on November 17, 1960 a special action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondents praying that the above act be declared unconstitutional, seeking in the meanwhile a preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation proceeding - trial court declared said act as unconstitutional ISSUES Procedural 1. WON state cannot be sued without its consent 2 WON executive secretary must be impleaded Substantive WON RA 2616 is unconstitutional HELD Examining the Constitutional provision on the power of eminent domain. - It can be seen that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to in drafting the said provision was to

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problem but will also implement the land-for-the-landless program of the present Administration. - Moreover, there is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal to follow a system of priorities. It could thus determine what lands would first be the subject of expropriation. This was what they did when they authorized the expropriation of the Tatalon estate. On the issue of denial of due process - Such a fear is unwarranted. In the course of the expropriation proceedings, there undoubtedly would be a judicial determination as to the party entitled to the just compensation. As of now then, such a question would appear at the very least to be premature. Disposition RA 2616 is not unconstitutional

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ISSUES 1. WON the property involved is the private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila 2. WON RA 4118 is valid and not repugnant to the Constitution HELD 1. Ratio NO. As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. The legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use. Reasoning In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality. Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use. 2. Ratio YES. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property. Reasoning RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government. It was enacted upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The foregoing sequence of events clearly indicates a pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land involved. Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get

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from the Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. Disposition the appealed decision is hereby reversed

FANULARA V TUASON INC. ANTONIO; January 31, 1973 (ajang pineda)

NATURE An original action by the barrio captain of Barrio Tatalon, in his own behalf and in representation of 1,500 "bonafide" occupants of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City, to enjoin the respondent Corporations, J.M. Tuason & Co. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. from - bulldozing and fencing any portion of the Tatalon Estate - and/or from selling any of the lots therein - and/or from filing ejectment cases against the "bonafide" occupants of the estate - the respondent City Engineer of Quezon City from issuing "building and fencing permits" to purchasers of lots within the Tatalon Estate - and the respondent City Sheriff of the same city from "implementing writs of execution" or "orders of demolition" issued against the occupants of the estate. - The petitioner also seeks for the issuance of an order to compel the presiding judges of the Courts of First Instance and City Courts of Quezon City to dismiss the cases of accion publiciana or for ejectment filed by said Corporations against the aforesaid occupants. FACTS - November 10, 1960, the Land Tenure Administration was directed by the Executive Secretary to initiate proceedings for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate - Petitioner relies upon RA2616, Sec.4 - In view of recent developments, since the submission of this case, the parties were required on November 24, 1972, to comment whether or not in their view, the case has been rendered moot. - There is no averment however in the petition that any expropriation proceeding has in fact been actually instituted before the courts. ISSUE WON there is cause of action HELD

SALAS V JARENCIO ESGUERRA; August 30, 1972 (jonas azura)

NATURE petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS - On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets containing a total area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. RA 4118 was passed which subdivided said lot for resale by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants. - The City of Manila made a complete turn-about. The City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.

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- In the absence of any proceeding for expropriation instituted before the courts, petitioner has clearly no cause of action. Ratio - It is true that Republic Act No. 2616, nsofar as it expropriated singularly a particular private property, had survived the challenge of being discriminatory, and was declared free from constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, this Court has also ruled that Section 4 thereof, which places a restraint upon the exercise and enjoyment by the owner of certain rights over its property, is justifiable only if the government takes possession of the land and is in a position to make a coetaneous payment of just compensation to its owner. There could not be any other way by which the validity of the provision may be sustained. - Mere declaration of intention by the government to expropriate w/o expropriation proceeding in court does not restrict owners exercise of his domicile rights over his property - nothing had been presented in the case at bar, to show that an action for expropriation of the lots allegedly occupied by the 1,500 persons named in Annex "A" of the petition has actually been instituted and is being pursued by the government, nor is there proof that the supposed appropriated amount of P10,000,000.00, for the purchase of the Tatalon Estate by the government, has been duly certified as available for that purpose. Under such circumstances no valid ground has really been established to restrict respondents' exercise of their dominical rights over their property.

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reservation; containing an area of 759,299 sqm) and against defendant- appellee b) Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over two parcels of land (1st land bounded on the NW by AFP military reservation; containing an area of 450,273 sqm and the 2nd land bounded on the SE by school lot and national road; containing an area of 88,772 sqm) - In its complaint, the Republic alleged that the fair market value of the lands according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. - On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10. - In her "motion to dismiss" on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged that the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit. - After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669. 10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. - In her "motion to dismiss," dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had already been set aside for expansion sites of the already completed subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of

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P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus 'interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00. - On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P1 07,609.00 as provisional value of her lands.2 On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank. In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation. - The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, , Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan. - On March 15, 1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands. they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and ToledoGozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to ToledoGozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded. - The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case - by defendants Castellvi and ToledoGozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter - and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.5 - The trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision: "WHEREFORE, that the lands are titled,the rising trend of land values, and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten pesos per square meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just. The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozun since the amount deposited as provisional value from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made. In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant action had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value thereof was actually deposited in court, on the

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI ZALDIVAR; August 15, 1974 (eva sison)
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga; an expropriation proceeding. FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, filed on June 26, 1959 a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee a) Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi over a parcel of land Floridablanca, Pampanga (bounded on the SE by national road; on the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP

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total value of the said (Castellvi) land as herein adjudged. - On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and ToledoGozun filed their respective oppositions. - On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961. - On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the decision of May 26, 1961 and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court. - Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to the approval of the Republic's record on appeal, but also a joint memorandum in support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a memorandum in support of its prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December 27, 1961 the trial court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal filed by the Republic, and the record on appeal filed by defendant Castellvi as having been filed out of time. thereby dismissing both appeals. - Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration," and an amended record on appeal, against which motion the defendants filed their opposition. - On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court." Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant ToledoGozun did not appeal. - In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's. ISSUES 1. WON the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action 2. WON the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings is just compensation

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3. WON a 6% interest on the adjudged value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956 should be paid 4. WON the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence should me approved HELD 1. Ratio A property for the purposes of eminent domain shall be considered to have taken place when the two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use must be present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property. The two essential elements were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. Reasoning The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement it was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more than half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national security. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in support of the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned the Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior to August 10, 1959. -- In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease. The Republic urges that the "taking" of

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Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement. - The lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP. The entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic. - Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. - Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,16 the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. - Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. 2. Ratio. In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the worth of the property in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted should be inquired into. In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. In the present case, the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. Reasoning The Court particularly took into consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal that in the year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land of Toledo Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter. The Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959. - We find evidence showing that the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production of

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agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain. - Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of its proximity to the air base and due to the fact that it was not being devoted to agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it into a subdivision for residential purposes. The taxes due on the property have been paid based on its classification as residential land"; - The location of the Castellvi land is at the left side of the entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by roads, the poblacion, the municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are close by. The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are also near. - The lands of Toledo-Gozun are practically of the same condition as the land of Castellvi. They adjoin the land of Castellvi, are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along the road. These lands are near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel, the Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the poblacion of Floridablanca - The Republic cites the case of Republic vs. Narciso which involved lands that belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, and to one Donata Montemayor, which were expropriated by the Republic in 1949 and which are now the site of the Basa Air Base. In the Narciso case this Court fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands that are sought to be expropriated in the present case being contiguous to the lands involved in the Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic that the price that should be fixed for the lands now in question should also be at P.20 per square meter. We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. While the lands involved in the present case might have a fair market value of P.20 per sqm in 1949, it can not be denied that ten years later the value of those lands had increased considerably. -in Republic vs. Sabina Tablante, which was an expropriation case filed on January 13, 1959, involving a parcel of land adjacent to the Clark Air Base in Angeles City, where the court fixed the price at P18. 00 per square meter - In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, this Court said: "A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or modify the report of the commissioners if the facts of the case so justify where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or

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where the amount allowed is either palpably inadequate or excessive." 3. Ratio If a landowner had agreed to receive the rentals she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the Republic and she could not at the same time be entitled to the payment of interest during the period when she was receiving such rentals on the amount awarded her as the just compensation of her land. Reasoning The Republic, therefore, should pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her land, minus the provisional value that was deposited, only from July 10, 1959 when it deposited in court the provisional value of the land. - In ordering the Republic to pay the said 6% interest the lower court held that the Republic had illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from the expiration of the lease until the Republic was placed in possession of the land by an order issued - What really happened was that the Republic continued to occupy the land of Castellvi after the expiration of its lease on June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi filed an ejectment case against the Republic in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. However, while that ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain in the present case and was placed in possession of the land on August 10, 1959, and because of the institution of the expropriation proceedings the ejectment case was later dismissed. 4. Ratio In eminent domain proceedings, in order that evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands must, among other things, be shown to be similar. Reasoning After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic filed a motion for a new trial, based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence (a deed of absolute sale showing that a parcel of sugar land having an area of 100,000 sqm in Floridablanca was sold for P.14 per sqm; a deed of sale of some 35,000 sqm of land in Floridablanca for P.21 per sqm; a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land having an area of 4,120,101 sqm in Floridablanca for P.09 per sqm) - To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that even with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of such a nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted.

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Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows: (a) the lands of appellees Carmen vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for public use; (b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square meter; (c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her land, with interest al the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land that have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809,00 that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and (f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of Court. IT IS SO ORDERED.

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOS FERNANDO; December 18, 1979 (javi bautista)
FACTS - On June 14, 1979, this Court received a pleading entitled Compromise Agreement stating: 1. The respondent Province of Cebu represented in this act by Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas, duly authorized by proper resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, hereby agrees to immediately appropriate and pay full back wages and salaries as awarded by the trial Court in its decision to all the private respondents-employees from and after July 1, 1968, the date of their termination, up to the date of the approval of the herein Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Supreme Court, except for those who are qualified for compulsory retirement whose back salaries and wages shall be limited up to the effective date of their retirement; 2. That the private respondents-employees waive, as they hereby waive, their demand for reinstatement;

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3. That private respondents-employees who an qualified for compulsory retirement as of the date of approval of this Compromise Agreement shall be allowed to retire in accordance with the existing retirement laws with the private respondent Province of Cebu appropriating and paying the Government's share of the GSIS retirement and insurance premiums. For Purposes of this Compromise Agreement, the services of the private respondents-employees from July 1, 1968 shall be considered continuous and uninterrupted; 4. That the respondent Province of Cebu agrees to pay gratuity pay and/or optional retirement benefits to private respondents-employees qualified for optional retirement as of the date of the approval of this Compromise Agreement, under R.A. 660, as amended, and whose services shall likewise be deemed continuous and uninterrupted for purposes of this Compromise Agreement provided that where the law grants an employee the option to choose under what law he should retire, such option shall be recognized in respect to the herein private respondents-employees; and provided that the decision of the GSIS relative to any question of retirement shall be final and binding; 5. That private respondents-employees shall be entitled to collect their accumulated sick leave and vacation leave pay which shall be paid from JJ funds to be held in trust for the purpose as well as benefits under the Medicare and Workmens Compensation Act; 6. Those private respondents-employees who have died shall be paid back salaries and wages and retirement benefits through their heirs up to the time of their death upon presentation of the corresponding death certificate or other satisfactory proof; 7. That the petitioner Commissioner of Public Highways (now Minister of Public Highways) and his subordinates, as well as respondent officials and/or former officials of the Province of Cebu, are absolved of any and all personal and other civil liabilities of whatever nature; 8. That "upon approval by this Honorable Supreme Court of the herein Compromise Agreement the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower Court is deemed automatically vacated and lifted but the amounts covering the salaries and back wages as well as those covering the retirement and insurance premiums of respondent Province of Cebu payable to the GSIS pertaining to the retirement of private respondentemployees qualified to retire under paragraphs 3 and 4 hereof shall be earmarked for the payment of said obligations and shall be held in trust by the Province for said purposes; 9. That the amounts payable to the employees concerned represented by Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza subject

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to said lawyer's charging and retaining liens. [Whereas], the Honorable Supreme Court is most respectfully prayed to approve the foregoing Compromise Agreement and to render judgment which shall be immediately executory in accordance therewith. ISSUE WON the Court Agreement. should approve the Compromise

PROF.
- shortly thereafter, DPH decided to make proposed extension through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with substantial houses; that upon learning of the change, the owners of the residential houses filed on April 15, 1977 a formal petition to President Marcos asking MPH to the adoption of original plan of EDSA extension through Cuneta Avenue instead of new plan going through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets - Pres. Marcos directed then Min. Aquino to explain within 24 hours why the proposed project should not be suspended and on April 21, 1977 Aquino submitted his explanation defending new route - Pres. Marcos referred the matter to Human Settlements Commission (HSC) for investigation and recommendation and after formal hearings where parties can ventilate their views and present pieces of evidence, HSC submitted report recommending reversion of extension of EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue - notwithstanding the report and recommendation, MPH insisted on implementing the plan to make extension of EDSA go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets - in February 1979, government filed in CFI Rizal (Pasay City) presided by Judge Pedro Bautista a complaint for expropriation against owners of the houses along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among them is the petitioner; the complaint is docketed Republic of the Philippines v Concepcion Cabarrus Vda de Santos et al - in March 19, 1979, petitioner filed motion to dismiss on following grounds > court had no jurisdiction over subject matter of the action because the complaint failed to allege that the instant project of expropriation bore the approval of the Ministry of Human Settlements and the Metro Manila Governor pursuant to PD Nos. 824, 1369 and 1517 > choice of property to be expropriated made by MPH was arbitrary and erroneous > complaint was premature as plaintiff has never gone through serious negotiations with the defendant for the purchase of her property > complaint relied on an arbitrary and erroneous valuation of properties and disregarded consequential damages - in March 28, 1979, an urgent motion for preliminary injunction was also filed - in June 1979, The Republic of the Philippines filed motion for issuance of writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground that Republic made required deposit with PNB

HELD - Yes. At first there was n opposition to its approval by counsel for respondents. However, in an ex parte manifestation, the objection was withdrawn and that the respondents also seek for the approval of the agreement. Since the objection was withdrawn, the agreement was approved by the court. - since this is a case under the topic of just compensation, it should be noted that the private respondents are employees who have been out of job since their termination from their work.

DE KNECHT V BAUTISTA FERNANDEZ; October 30, 1980 (owen ricalde)

NATURE - Petition for certiorari and prohibition by Cristina de Knecht against Hon. Pedro Bautista as Judge presiding over CFI of Rizal (Pasay City) - praying for relief annulling the order for immediate possession in the expropriation proceedings and to desist form further proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for immediate possession FACTS - 10 years ago, government through Department of Public Works and Communication (now MPH) prepared Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposed extension, Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project, would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard, being a straight route taking into account the direction of EDSA - in the implementation of this project, on December 13, 1974, then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of Dept of Public Highways directed City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for construction and/or improvement of buildings and other structures located within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue

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- petitioner further contends that Respondent Court lacked or exceeded jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order to take over and enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be expropriated the petition having raised a constitutional question which respondent court must resolve before it can issue an order to take or enter upon the possession of properties sought to be expropriated - petitioner assails choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets on ff grounds > cannot be without rhyme or reason > condemnor many not choose any property it wants > where legislature has delegated power of eminent domain, the question of the necessity of taking a particular line for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject to review of courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion > choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness, or capriciousness and due process requires determination as to WON proposed location was proper in terms of public interests > even the claim of Min. Aquino that there would be a saving of P2M under the new plan must be reviewed for it bears no relation to the site of the proposed EDSA extension > logically, proposed extension must point to south not to detour north as the EDSA extension would be linked to the Cavite Expressway > equal protection of the law mist be accorded not only to the motel owners along Cuneta (Fisher) Avenue, but also of solid and substantial homes and quality residential lands occupied for generations - respondents maintain that the respondent court did not act without jurisdiction or exceed in its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dated June 14, 1979 authorizing Rep of Phils to take over and enter the possession of the properties sought to be expropriated bec the Rep has complied with all the statutory requirements which entitled them to have immediate possession of the properties involved - defending the change in EDSA extension, respondents said > residents of Del Pan and Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposed project > Cuneta Ave line goes southward and outward (form the city center) while the Del Pan and Fernando Rein Street follows northward and inward direction > both lines meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria TF both are acceptable > in choosing Del Pan-Fernando Rein, the govt did not choose to save the motels of Cuneta Ave but bec it

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wanted to minimize the social impact factor or problem involved ISSUE WON the Republic of the Philippines validly exercised its right to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation HELD Ratio NO. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken (JM Tuason & Co Inc v Land Tenure Administration) Reasoning - basis for right of Rep of Phils in taking private property for public use upon payment of just compensation Art IV Sec 2 (1973) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation - basis for government limitation on choosing private property JM Tuason & Co Inc v Land Tenure Administration it is obvious that the landowner is covered by the mantle of protection die process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates the state power to act in an oppressive manner That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. - it is odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard was changed granting that > direction of FR-DP is northward and inward although both lines meeting satisfactorily planning and design criteria > Sol Gens reason is to minimize social impact factor or problem involved while in fact buildings along Cuneta Ave are mostly motels and even if there are more people affected, HSC suggested coordinative efforts with National Housing Authority in relocation and resettlement - HSC considered functionality, social impact and cost A. Functionality - physical design of highway, inclusive of engineering factors and traffic management consideration - straighter and shorter alignment preferable to one that which is not and Alignment 1 (Cuneta Ave) is straighter than Alignment 2 (Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets) - Dir Goco of DPH admitted that Alignment 2 is three meter longer than Alignment 1 - Alignment 1 is definitely the contour conforming alignment to EDSA whereas Alignment 2 affords greater radius of unnatural curvature as it hooks

PROF.
slightly northward before finally joining Roxas Boulevard - Alignment 1 which is farther away from Buendia Ave than Alignment 2 is the better alignment from the viewpoint of the construction of the grade separator or interchange, a necessary corollary to the project * choice of Alignment 2 which is 3 meters longer can have serious repercussions on the energy conservation drive and from larger perspective of national economy considering that no less than 50,000 vehicles a day will have to traverse an extra 3 meters B. Social Impact - number of property owners A1 73 A2 49 - incidence of non-resident owners A1 25 (34.3%) A2 31 (63.3%) - number of actually affected residents A1 547 A2 290 (estimated) - average income of residents A1 majority income below P350 and P350-P500 A2 figures not available * evident that social impact is greater on residents of A1 C. Cost - right-of-way acquisition cost depends on nature of properties to be affected and relative value thereof - right-of-way- acquisition cost difference factor is only P269,796 not P2M as alleged by DPH and P1.2M by the oppositors * cost difference is minimal and is practically nil in consideration of issues involved - HSC recommendations > EDSA extension to Roxas Boulevard necessary > right-of-way acquisition cost difference factor is minimal as to influence the choice > the negotiated sale approach to compensation as proposed should apply to whichever alignment is selected > factor functionality militates strongly against selection of Alignment 2 while factor of great social and economic impact bears grievously on residents of Alignment 1 > choice boils down to soul-searing and heartrendering choice between people on one hand and progress and development on the other > HSC recommends Alignment 1 however before undertaking actual steps in expropriating properties on Alignment 1 HSC recommends the ff as absolutely binding and imperative preconditions

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+ preparation and execution of comprehensive and detailed plan for relocation and resettlement of the adversely and genuinely affected residents of Alignment 1 with coordinative efforts of HSC, NHA, etc with concrete, self-sufficient community with infrastructure, market, school, church, etc + prompt payment of fair and just compensation through negotiated sale approach + conduct public hearings before undertaking future expropriation of private property for public use Disposition From foregoing facts of record and recommendation of HSC, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets as EDSA extension is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing Rep of Phils in taking immediate possession of properties sought to be expropriated. Petition for certiorari is granted. The order authorizing Rep of Phils to take possession of private property is set aside. And respondent judge permanently enjoined from taking further action in Rep of Phils v Concepcion Cabarrus Vda de Santos et al except to dismiss said case.

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- March 19, 1979 De Knecht filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties - March 29, 1979 De Knecht filed an ex parte ugent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain RP from taking of immediate possession and control of property - June 1979 RP filed motion for issuance of writ of possession of the property on the ground that it had made required deposit (10% of the amount of compensation stated in complaint) with the PNB - June 14, 1979 CFI issued writ of possession authorizing RP to take possession of the properties sought to be condemned - July 16, 1979 De Knecht filed with SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against CFIs order - Oct 30, 1980 SC granted petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent judge was permanently enjoined from taking any further action on civil case. Choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which EDSA should be extended to Roxas Blvd is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. - Feb 17, 1983 BP Blg. 340 was passed - Sept 2, 1983 RP filed Motion to Dismiss expropriation case due to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating same properties and for the same purpose. - Sept 2, 1983 CFI dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the law. - Dec 18, 1986 Motion for reconsideration also denied. - Dec 28, 1988 CA reversed ruling of CFI and issued an Order dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court on the ground that the choice of Rein-del Pan Streets is arbitrary - RP filed this petition for review ISSUE WON an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation HELD Yes. Ratio While it is true that such final judgment of the SC becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the State to take private properties for public use upon the payment of just compensation is provided in the Constitution and our laws. BP Blg. 340 was based on supervening events that occurred after the 1980 De Knecht decision which now justifies expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets.

PROF.
Reasoning - Expropriation of lands by the government may be undertaken not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners, but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. - What supervening events occurred? Social impact factors that persuaded SC that extension was arbitrary had disappeared: (1) All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. (2) 80% of EDSA outfall and 30% of EDSA extension had been completed - Only De Knecht remained as the solitary obstacle to project that would solve drainage and flood problem as well as minimize traffic bottleneck in the area. - BP Blg. 340 effectively superseded the final and executory SC decision. Disposition Petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. Order of CFI Rizal in Pasay is reinstated.

SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concur]

- BP Blg. 340 is NOT a legislative reversal of our finding in De Knecht v. Bautista, that the expropriation of the petitioners property was arbitrary. - Supervening events have changed the factual basis of that decision to justify subsequent enactment of the statute. - We are sustaining the legislation because we have found that under the changed situation, present expropriation is no longer arbitrary. It is not because we concede that lawmakers can nullify findings of the Court. - This decision is NOT a reversal of the original De Knecht case, which was decided under a different set of facts.

REPUBLIC V DE KNECHT GANCAYCO; February 12, 1990 (rach mayuga)

NATURE Petition to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals FACTS - As early as 1977, DPWH began work on westward extension of EDSA outfall of the Manila and suburbs flood control and drainage project. - Projects were aimed at (1) easing traffic congestion in Baclaran area; (2) controlling flood by construction of outlet for Estero Tripa - RP acquired needed properties through negotiated purchase in lands along Taft Avenue up to Roxas Blvd. Inluding lands in Fernando Rein-del Pan streets (abt 8085% of lands involved in project whose owners didnt raise objections as to arbitrariness on choice of project and of the route) Procedural History - Feb 20, 1979 RP filed in CFI Rizal an expropriation proceedings against owners of houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets (among them Cristina De Knecht and Cabarrus and 15 others)

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V ERICTA GUTIERREZ; June 24, 1983 (bri bauza)
NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.

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FACTS - Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF provides: Sec. 9. At least six percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. - Seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. - Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII at Quezon City a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. The respondent alleged that the same was contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Code, and the Revised Administrative Code. - Respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void. - Petitioners argue that the taking of respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land taken is for public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. - Respondent Himlayang Pilipino stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to the power of promoting welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Whereas, in the present case, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. ISSUE WON the provision in the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

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PROF.
757, of a parcel of land, with an area of 25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent Austria, and needed for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project. Later on, petitioner was able to secure an order placing it in his possession. Thereafter, respondent Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amount of P6,600, a sum which was equivalent to the value of the property assessed for taxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to PD No. 42. There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Sec. 92 of PD No. 462 which states Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. In determining such compensation when private property is acquired by government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Petitioner argues that the owners declaration at P1,400, which is lower than the assessors assessment, is the just compensation for the respondents property, respondents thus being precluded from withdrawing any amount more than P1,400. Respondent Judge, however, issued an order which according to petitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws. There was a Motion for Reconsideration. Its basis is the provision in PD No. 1224 In the determination of just compensation for such private lands and improvement to be expropriated, the government shall choose between the value of the real property and improvements thereon as declared by the owner or administrator thereof or the market value determined by the City or provincial assessor, whichever is lower, at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint. It was then submitted that under the said statutory provision, the owners declared market value at P1,400 which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is the just compensation of respondent Austrias property sought to be expropriated. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WON the rule introduced by PD No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees upset the constitutional provision on just compensation. HELD No. In view of the urgency of the housing problem, the various decrees mentioned earlier were issued for the purpose of assuring that the government would be in a financial position to cope with such basic human need,

HELD Ratio Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. Reasoning The police power granted by the Quezon City Charter to regulate businesses does not involve the power to prohibit nor to confiscate. Police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest limitation on governmental power, the conflict between this power of the government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives the person of his private property without due process of law, even without compensation. In the cases of Case v Board of Health and Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v City Mayor of Manila, it was held that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity. But it does not lie in this case. The ordinance amounts to an expropriation without compensation which is not covered by the QC Charter. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V REYES FERNANDO; June 29, 1983 (jaja estoy)
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations. FACTS A complaint was filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations against private respondents for the expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No.

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which in the Philippines, under the welfare state concept, and according to the express language of the Constitution, is an obligation cast upon the State. The issue in this petition involves the application of a rule introduced by PD No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not only promotes social justice but also ends the baneful and one-sided practice abetted by the collusive acquiescence of government officials and employees, of underdeclaring properties for the purpose of taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same properties are to be acquired by the government for public purposes. Put to the test, therefore, is the power of the government to introduce rationality in the laws and to discourage a deceitful practice that is not only ruinous to the government coffers but also undermines its effects at awakening a democratic responsiveness of the citizenry toward good government and its economic and social progress. The courts should recognize that the rule introduced by PD No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice on the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property.

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and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.5 - PTA deposited with Phil National Bank Cebu City Branch an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to PD 1533. Lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of premises and directed the issuance of writs of possession. - May 25, 1982 petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Judge. Petitioners' Claim - Petitioners raise the following issues: a) the complaints for expropriation lack basis because the Constitution does not provide for the expropriation of private property for tourism or other related purposes b) the writs of possession or orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession is premature because the public use character of the taking has not been previously demonstrated c) the taking is not for public use in contemplation of eminent domain law d) the properties in question have been previously declared a land reform area; consequently, the implementation of the social justice provision of the Constitution on agrarian reform is paramount to the right of the State to expropriate for the purposes intended e) Proclamation No 2052 declaring certain barangays in Cebu City, which include the lands subject of expropriation as within a tourist zone, is unconstitutional for it impairs the obligation of contracts f) since the properties are within a land reform area, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations, not the lower court, that has jurisdiction pursuant to Pres Decree No. 946 g) The forcible ejectment of defendants (herein petitioners) from the premises constitutes a criminal act under Pres. Decree No. 583 ISSUE (SC adopted the issues raised by petitioners, and discussed accordingly) HELD - There are three provisions of the (1973) Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Sec 2 Art IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Sec 6, Art XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be
5

PROF.
operated by the government. Sec 13, Art XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. - provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned. (Sec 6, Art II; Sec 12, Art XIV) - the equitable diffusion of property ownership in the promotion of social justice implies the exercise, whenever necessary, of the power to expropriate private property. Likewise, there can be no meaningful agrarian reform program unless the power to expropriate is utilized. - Petitioners search of the word tourism in the Constitution would be in vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, etc. the programs to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and according to place. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. - the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. These constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. - Petitioners contention that public use means literal use by the public is unduly restrictive and outmoded. This may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. This is not the case in the Philippines. - Another major obstacle faced by petitioners is that no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism. The judiciary has to defer liberally to legislative discretion in the review of programs for economic development and social progress unless a clear case of constitutional infirmity is established. From the very start of constitutional government in our country, judicial

HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA V REYES GUTIERREZ; October 26, 1983 (kooky talon)
NATURE Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. FACTS Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, or the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao, including the proposed Lusaran Dam in Cebu City and in the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the province of Cebu, as tourist zones. - Philippine Tourism Authority filed four complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTAs express authority to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for the development of integrated resort complexes of selected

PTA lays down in full its purposes in Sec 5, paragraph B(2) PD 564. See case.

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deference to legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain proceedings. - SC quoted Chief Justice Enrique Fernando: The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The Constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. At present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. - Petitioners have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The area being developed into a tourism complex is more than 808 hectares. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares, of which only 8970 sq meters is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation patents. The 8970 sq meters pacel of land is not even within the complex but forms part of the 32 hectares resettlement area. - the invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. Parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good. - With regard to the issue of prematurity, the SC held that under Pres Decree No. 42, as amended by Pres Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceeding is authorized to take immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and the improvements, with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court, upon deposit with the Phil National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property expropriated. - As to the petitioners claim that their forcible ejection is a criminal act under PD No 583, SC held this is not valid. PD 583 prohibits the taking cognizance or implementation of orders designed to obstruct the land reform program. It refers to the harassment of tenantfarmers who try to enforce emancipation rights. It has nothing to do with the expropriation by the State of lands needed for public purposes. Disposition Petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

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PROF.
improvements been made on the said areas and that the area covers ground which is rugged in terrain for which the Philippine Military Academy could have no use. - TC held that in view of the fact that the defendants are no longer challenging plaintiffs right to condemn the property, subject of the instant case, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is hereby declared to have lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. - Petitioner filed a motion stating that at no time had it manifested, either expressly or impliedly, that it was no longer challenging the plaintiffs right to expropriate its former mineral claims. - Acting on the motion, TC makes it of record that, pending negotiations between the government and Benguet Consolidated, Inc., said corporation has not waived its right to challenge plaintiffs right to condemn the mineral claims in question. - A Board of Commissioners was formed to assess and establish the reasonable amount of compensation - On February 28, 1963, the Board of Commissioners submitted their report recommending the payment of P43,703.37 to the ten defendants as just compensation for their expropriated properties. - The TC rejected the boards report and made its own findings and promulgated a decision awarding various sums to the defendants without, however, including the amount to be paid to Benguet Consolidated for the expropriation of its four mining claims. - Benguet Consolidated objected to the courts decision - TC issued an order fixing the just compensation of the surface area of the four claims of Benguet Consolidated in the amount of P128,051.82 with interest at 6% per annum from May 6, 1950 - On June 28, 1985, the IAC promulgated a decision setting aside the trial courts decision an issued its own order. - Petitioner now assails the decision of the appellate court ISSUES 1. WON in expropriation proceedings an order of condemnation may be entered by the court before a motion to dismiss is denied 2. WON expropriation proceeding is constitutional 3. WON there was just compensation given to Benguet Consolidated, Inc HELD 1. Yes. In this case, the ruling on the motion to dismiss was deferred by the trial court in view of a possible amicable settlement. After the trial court entered an

MAKASIAR [concur and dissent]

- it appearing that petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in question and thus do not fall within the purview of the Land Reform Code, petition should be dismissed on that score alone. - the welfare of the landless and small land owners should prevail over the right of the PTA to expropriate the lands just to develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only. The government is instituted primarily for the welfare of the governed and there are more poor people in the country than the rich. The tourism industry is not essential to the existence of the government, but the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity should take precedence over the development of the tourism industry.

TEEHANKEE [dissent on the grounds stated in Makasiars separate opinion]

- Petitioners have the personality to file the petition at bar, as conceded by public respondent itself in having filed the expropriation case against them

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. V REPUBLIC GUTIERREZ; 1986 (yella bautista)

FACTS - On June 18, 1958, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio a complaint for expropriation against ten defendants, among them Benguet Consolidated, Inc. - The Republic stated that it needed the property for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine Military Academy. It also averred that it had occupied since May 6, 1950 the area covered by the mining claims of the defendants and had already installed therein permanent buildings and other valuable improvements with no less than P3M in the belief that area was unoccupied portions of the public domain, and that according to the Appraisal Committee the reasonable and fair market value of the rights and interests of all the defendants which will be affected by these eminent domain proceedings cannot exceed the total sum of P532, 371.40. - Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that, insofar s it is concerned, the Republic did not need and has not occupied the areas covered by the abovementioned mining claims and neither have

SEPARATE OPINION

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order of condemnation over the objection of the petitioner, the court issued an order to the effect that the trial court makes it of record that, pending negotiations between the Government and Benguet Consolidated, Inc. said corporation has not waived its right to challenge plaintiffs right to condemn the mineral claims in question. Then the order of the lower court denying the motion to re-open the case was not challenged by the petitioner. Instead, it filed its second motion for clarification. Thus, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the proceedings of condemnation followed by the court. 2. Yes. Petitioners claim that its mineral claims were located since 1933. It argues that by such location and perfection, the land is segregated from the public domain even as against the government. The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that the petitioners property is no longer part of the public domain. The power of eminent domain refers to the power of government to take private property for public use. The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain covers all forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes rights which are attached to land. 3. Yes. The conclusion of the Commissioners are the result of documentary evidence presented by the parties, testimonies of several mining experts and executives of mining companies, and ocular inspections of the mining claims involved in this case. The court finds no reason to disturb the lower courts findings on the matter of just compensation because the petitioner has not advanced any reason to reject such findings. The appellate court however should have provided for the payment of legal interest from the time the government took over the petitioners mining claims until payment is made by the government.

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domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). - Not all the reserved area was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land owned and registered in the name of the SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. EPZA offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sate of the property. - EPZA filed with the then CFI of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against SADC, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. - October 21, 1980- Dulay issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises. - February 17, 1981- Dulay declared EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation. He also appointed certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. - June 19, 1981- the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. - July 29, 1981- EPZA filed a MR on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. - November 14, 1981- the CFI denied the petitioner's MR and gave the latter ten (10) days within which to file its objection to the Commissioner's Report. - February 9, 1982- EPZA filed this present petition to stop the trial court from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.

PROF.
ISSUE WON PDs No 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court? If so, then in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower * Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional? HELD NO - The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation UNCONSTITUTIONAL and VOID. - The courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to appoint commissioners, pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, for such purpose. Reasoning - The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. - The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shag prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation - SC: the CFI correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle (as envisaged by the Constiution) or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well -established doctrine, is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." - This is what the CFI said:

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY V DULAY GUTIERREZ; April 29, 1987 (edel cruz)
NATURE Petition for CERTIORARI preliminary restraining order and MANDAMUS with

FACTS - January 15, 1979- Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public

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It is a well -entrenched ruling that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from which the consequential benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after the date of actual taking." (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60). - Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of just compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the landowner's right of due process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by the Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123)] - SC: Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. - The tax declarations presented by EPZA as basis for just compensation were made when land was not only much cheaper but constituted only a fraction of their true market value. SADC was not even the owner of the properties at the time. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. - Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. - The owners are NOT estopped from questioning the valuations made by assessors. - It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. Disposition: petition is DISMISSED. The TRO issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

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GUTIERREZ; May 21, 1987 (giulia pineda)
NATURE Two petitions: the first challenges the constitutionality of PD 1669, which provides for the expropriation of the property known as the Tambunting Estate; the second challenges the constitutionality of PD 1670, which provides for the expropriation of the property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog FACTS - June 11, 1977 the President issued LOI 555 instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR) and LOI 557 adopting slum improvement as a national housing policy. - July 21, 1977 the Governor of Manila issued EO 6-77 adopting the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program which included Tambunting Estate and SunogApog area in its priority list for a zonal improvement program (ZIP) as the NHA described these areas as blighted communities. - March 18, 1978 fire razed Tambunting Estate. After which, the President and the Metro Mla Governor made public announcements that the national government would acquire the property for the fire victims. The President designated NHA to negotiate with the owners the properties for acquisition, but the negotiations failed. - December 22, 1978 The President issued Proc No. 1810 declaring all sites identified by the Metro Mla local government to be included in the proclamation of the President - January 28, 1980 the President issued the challenged PDs, which provided inter alia the expropriation of the said lots making the NHA the administrator of the national government. This gave the NHA the authority to possess, control, dispose, and the power to demolish the properties. The city assessor is given the authority to determine the value of the properties taking into account the existing conditions such that the value is not to exceed P17M for Tambunting and P8M for Sunog-Apof, payable to the owner within the period of five years in five equal installments. - April 4, 1980 the NHAs general manager wrote to the register of deeds of Manila with the request that the certificates of the properties be cancelled and that new certificates be issued to the Republic of the Philippines. The RoD requested for the submission of the owners copy of the certificates to be able to implement the said decrees. - Elisa Manotok, one of the owners received a letter from the NHA informing her that they have deposited P5M as

PROF.
the first installment for Tambunting and Sunog-Apog. She was also informed that she was free to withdraw her share in the properties upon surrender of her titles and that if she failed to avail herself of the offer, the NHA would take the necessary legal steps to implement the said decrees. - August 19, 1980 Manotok wrote a letter to NHA alleging that the amount of compensation was not just compensation, even expressing doubts about the constitutionality of the said decrees. She said that she did not believe she was neither obliged to withdraw the said amount nor surrender her titles. - Some of NHA instructed the tenant-occupants of the properties not to pay their rentals due to the said PDs. Because of which, the owners of Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog filed petitions to declare the said PDs unconstitutional. - The lessees filed a motion for leave to intervene together with their petition to intervene as they are owners of the houses and buildings on the properties to be expropriated. Petitioners' Claim - Both of the PDs are unconstitutional because: (1) they deprive the petitioners of their properties without due process and equal protection of law as they were automatically deprived of their ownership without a chance to oppose the expropriation (2) the petitioners were deprived of their right to just compensation, as there was a limit in the amount of compensation even directing the City Assessor to consider certain conditions of the properties in question. (3) As for Tambunting Estates, aside from the residential houses in the area there are buildings and structures of strong materials which were leased to proprietors of business establishments under long term contract lease from which the owners of the lot get substantial income. Respondents' Comments - The power of eminent domain is inherent in the state and when the legislature or the President exercises such power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of just compensation become political in nature - The constitution lays down no procedure by which the authority to expropriate may be carried into effect, Rule 67 of the RROC which is invoked by the petitioners may be said to have been superseded by the challenged decrees insofar as they are applicable to the properties in question. ISSUES

MANOTOK V NHA

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WON the challenged PDs are constitutional HELD The challenged PDs are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to NHA - Tambunting is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated without any proceeding whatsoever. Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to pretect his property rights. - There was no showing as to why the properties were singled out in the expropriation through decrees or what was necessarily impelled the particular choices or selections. In expropriations through legislation, there are debates and public hearings before a statute is enacted. In the petitions, the PDs do not show any reason for the choice of the properties as housing projects. Ratio The PDs are violative of the pertitioners right to due process therefore failing the test of constitutionality. The decrees do not by themselves provide for any from of hearing or procedure by which petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Disposition Whereforem the petitions are hereby granted. Presidential Decree Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apog area expropriated, are declared unconstitutional and therefore, null and void ab intio.

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- In the disposition order of the CFI, the court held the following > the Villaroya family are the owners of the land in question > the Province of Sorsogon was ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P49,500. representing the value of the land within one year from the decision or to vacate the place and deliver possessionthe Vilaroya > the conveyacing of the property to the government upon payment of the government > the division of the proceeds of the sale among the Villaroyas or upon failure of the government to pay, the division of the property among the Villaroyas on the agreed basis > the dismissal of the case against the Municipality of Gubat - After another eight years, the government still had not paid the Villaroyas for the property despite the fact that the family had tried to comply with the conditions/documentations required by the Commission of Audit. - Prior to actual payment ion or about November 5, 1980, the COA additional conditions from the Villaroyas. - Thinking that the government was not really serious about the transaction, the Villaroyas took possession of a portion of the property using as basis the original decision of the trial court and when the government tried to disturb their possession of the property, the Villaroyas file a Motion to restrain interference by defendants with possession of Plaintiff on July 15, 1982 before the lower court. The lower court restrained the government from intereing with the possession of the Villaroyas and ordered te partition of the property as was originally ordered in the March 28, 1974 decision. - the government filed this petition review with the SC citing as grounds the finality of the original order and the non enforcement of the same due to the fault of the private respondents. ISSUE WON the Villaroyas are entitled to take back possession of the property HELD Ratio - No. The procedure taken by the respondents which was sanctioned by the lower court is not sanctioned by law. The correct procedure was to have the petitioner declared in default and asked for an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the alternative found in

PROF.
the original judgment. which was the partition of the land among the Villaroyas. - The SC, in order to put finis into this controversy, ruled the following > the additional requirement imposed by the COA is declared unreasonable. > the Villaroyas have complied with all the requirements of the COA > The petitioner cannot deny payment to the respondents. > Directing the trial court to seize any o the patrimonial property or cash savings of the Provincial Government of Sorsogon to implement the decision should there be further delays in the payment to the Villaroyas. Disposition The questioned order of the then CFI is set aside. The original judgment of March 28, 1974 is reinstated and immediate payment be effected with interests at the legal rate from March 27, 1975. Possession of the property is to be restored to the Gubat High School.

SUMULONG V. GUERRERO CORTES; September. 30, 1987 (cha mendoza)

NATURE PETITION to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XXIV. FACTS -December 5, 1977: the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing. -The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. -Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. - The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224. - January 17,1978: respondent Judge issued a writ of possession to the NHA. - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGONV VDA DE VILLAROYA OZAETA; 1987 (romy ramirez)

NATURE Petition to review order of the CFI of Sorsogon, Branches II & III FACTS - The respondents, Villaroya family, owned a 16,500 square meter land in the Municipality of Gubat, Province of Sorsogon. Sais property was occupied by the Gubat High School and was developed into an athletic field. - The family filed the original action on March 30, 1957 payment of the property . The final resolution in their favor was handed down on March 28, 1974.

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Petitioners Claims: They had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration. 2) Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause, specifically: a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated; b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose; c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court; d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors; e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every case of expropriation. ISSUES 1. WON the said expropriated lands would be for Public Use a. WON socialized housing, as defined in PD 1224 falls within the confines of public use b. WON it was valid for the NHA to expropriate the private lands of the petitioners regardless of the size and no matter how small 2. WON the provisions of PD 1224 is unconstitutional, depriving the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be a just compensation 3. WON the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction resulting to grave abuse of discretion by issuing without notice and without hearing the writ of possession, and denying the motion for reconsideration (violates the due process clause) HELD 1. a. YES, socialized housing falls within the confines of public use. Ratio As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play, As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is

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the expropriation of land% to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use Reasoning Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution (Art XI, Sec 7 of 1973 Consti, Art II, Sec 9 and Art XIII, Sec 9 of the 1987 Consti). -Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once. -The use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees. b. YES. ]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the country. Ratio The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis. Reasoning The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. -The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for the

PROF.
purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. The Constitutional provisions on the subject are clear: -The stewardship concept, under which private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation. 2. YES, provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional. Ratio These provisions are the same provisions in PDs which were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives. Reasoning Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. -Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops, Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. 3. YES, the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction by issuing without notice and without hearing the writ of possession and denying the motion for reconsideration. Ratio It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. Reasoning Requisits for issuing a writ of possession in expropriation proceedings:

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(1) There must be it Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination al just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; anti (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June 28, 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs. SO ORDERED. Orders annulled Case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

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derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." Petitioners filed this petition assailing the constitutionality of said decree and prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund. Petitioners Claim The decree was an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles. Respondents Comments Impropriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasijudicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion No cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of nonpayment of the purchase price by their predecessorin-interest decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing ISSUES Procedural WON certiorari is the proper remedy Substantive WON Pres. Dec 293 is constitutional HELD Procedural Ratio The extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Reasoning Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied

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the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally. Substantive Ratio Until and unless a suit claiming default in payments is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title of a buyer and the purchases from it of portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected. Reasoning Title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act." While there is a possibility that full payment was not given, the remedy is for the government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the manner provided by Act No. 190 for the foreclosure of mortgages. PD 293 was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law. Disposition Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.

TUASON V REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN CITY NARVASA; January 29, 1988 (joey capones)
NATURE Petition for certiorari assailing Presidential Decree No. 293 constitutionality of

FACTS The Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, a Carmel's Torrens title over the lot was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. On September 14, 1973, Pres. Marcos, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public. The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the socalled "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price, hence, the title to said land has remained with the government. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those

SEPARATE OPINION

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TEEHANKEE [concur]
These arbitrary, capricious and oppressive decrees, tailored to suit the deposed President's every wish and whim, were the product of unrestrained power, as the deposed President took over the entire government with the imposition of martial law in September, 1972.

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"1. To Mita Lumampao, the sum of P20,000 minus P4,001.82 which she had already withdrawn plus P3,000 attorney's fees; and "2. Sebastian Cosculluela, the sum of P200,000.00 which is the reasonable estimate of his actual and consequential loss by reason of the taking of his 3 hectares of land, destruction of the sugarcane therein and the reduce in the yield of his sugarcane farm due to water lagging and seepage; plus attorney's fees of P10,000 and litigation expenses of P5,000.00." - Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision in that the attorney's fees and litigation expenses were reduced from P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 to P5,000.00 and P2,500.00 respectively. - On motion of the petitioner, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the judgment of the appellate court. - Republic filed a motion to set aside the order as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, contending that the funds of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) are government funds and therefore, cannot be disbursed without a government appropriation. - Lower court issued an order modifying its order directing instead that the respondent Republic deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the name of the petitioner, the amount adjudged in favor of the latter. - Republic filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to annul the orders. - CA rendered the questioned decision setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court on the ground that public or government funds are not subject to levy and execution. - The NIA took possession of the expropriated property in 1975 and for around ten (10) years already, it has been servicing the farmers on both sides of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project in Iloilo Province and has been collecting fees therefor by way of taxes at the expense of the petitioner. On the other hand, the petitioner, who is already more than eighty (80) years old and sickly, is undergoing frequent hospitalization, and is made to suffer further by the unconscionable delay in the payment of just compensation based on a final and executory judgment. - Petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court as being violative of his right to just compensation and due process of law. He maintains that these constitutional guarantees transcend all administrative and procedural laws and jurisprudence for as between these said laws

PROF.
and the constitutional rights of private citizens, the latter must prevail. -The respondent Republic argues that while it has no intention of keeping the land and dishonoring the judgment, the manner by which the same will have to be satisfied must not be inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence, and that is, that public funds such as those of the respondent NIA cannot be disbursed without the proper appropriation. ISSUE WON to set aside the writ of execution would be an abridgment of petitioners right to just compensation and due process of law. HELD - YES. No person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. - The property of the petitioner was taken by the government in 1975. The following year, respondent NIA made the required deposit of P2,097.30 with the Philippine National Bank and within the same year, the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project was finished. Since then, for more than a period of ten (10) years, the project has been of service to the farmers nearby in the province of Iloilo. It is, thus, inconceivable how this project could have been started without the necessary appropriation for just compensation. - No government instrumentality, agency, or subdivision has any business initiating expropriation proceedings unless it has adequate funds, supported by proper appropriation acts, to pay for the property to be seized from the owner. Not only was the government able to make an initial deposit of P2,097.30 but the project was finished in only a year's time. We agree with the petitioner that before the respondent NIA undertook the construction of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project, the same was duly authorized, with the corresponding funds appropriated for the payment of expropriated land and to pay for equipment, salaries of personnel, and other expenses incidental to the project. The NIA officials responsible for the project have to do plenty of explaining as to where they misdirected the funds intended for the expropriated property. - As a rule, the legislature must first appropriate the additional amount to pay the award. In the present case, the Barotac Viejo Project was a package project of government. Money was allocated for an entire project.

FELICIANO [concur]
Presidential Decree No. 293 is constitutionally offensive for still another reason: it constitutes a bill of attainder, prohibited not only under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions but also under the 1973 Constitution. In more modem terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty the deprivation of life or liberty or property not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an Identified person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) Without a prior charge or demand, without notice and healing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it.

CONSCULLUELA V CA GUTIERREZ, August 15, 1988 (glaisa po)

NATURE This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying the orders of the trial court on the ground that said orders in effect, sought the enforcement of a writ of execution against government funds. FACTS - Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project. -The trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation and ordered the public respondent to pay the following amounts:

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Before bulldozers and ditch diggers tore up the place and before millions of pesos were put into the development of the project, the basic responsibility of paying the owners for property seized from them should have been met. - Another distinction lies in the fact that the NIA collects fees for the use of the irrigation system constructed on the petitioner's land. It does not have to await an express act of Congress to locate funds for this specific purpose. The rule in earlier precedents that the functions and public services rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects (Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, supra, at p. 625) is not applicable here. There is no showing of any public service to be disrupted if the fees collected from the farmers of Iloilo for the use of irrigation water from the disrupted property were utilized to pay for that property. - Nowhere in any expropriation case has there been a deviation from the rule that the Government must pay for expropriated property. -This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause. (Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects for rent or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems and sells water rights to farmers, it would be the height or abuse and ignominy for the agencies to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of just compensation to the former owners. - Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in operation since 1976. The project is benefitting the farmers specifically and the community in general. - Obviously, the petitioner's land cannot be returned to him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate

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expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used.

PROF.
HELD The time at which just compensation should be fixed is the time of actual taking possession by the expropriating entity. Ratio When the expropriating agency takes over a property prior to an expropriation suit, the Court rules that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking. Reasoning Normally, where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property, the just compensation is fixed at the time of the filing of the complaint. - this is provided by the RoC, - in instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, as in this case, the Court has ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not the time of filing an action for eminent domain. - this is because the value of the land may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken, there may have been a natural increase in the value due to general economic conditions, etc. The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. - the value of the Ansaldos property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit., which by the way, still has yet to be done. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the challenged decision of the Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED, and the Department of Public Works and Highways is DIRECTED to forthwith institute the appropriate expropriation action over the land in question so that the just compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance with the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. No costs.

ANSALDO V TANTUICO NARVASA; 1990 (mini bernardo)

NATURE Expropriation case FACTS - 2 lots of private ownership were taken by the Govt and used for the widening of a road more than 43 years ago, without the benefit of an action of eminent domain, or agreement with its owners, albeit without protest from the latter. - owners made no move until 26 years later. They wrote to ask for compensation. - Secretary of Justice rendered the opinion that just compensation should be paid in accordance with PD 76: basis of payment of just compensation of property taken for public use should be the current and fair market value thereof as declared by the owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. - commissioner of Public Highways requested assessor to make redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos property. - auditor of Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the current and fair market value, and not on the market value at the time of taking. - Commission on Audit didnt adopt recommendation, determined amount based on the time of taking of the lots, 1947. - ruling was reiterated twice. - Ansaldos have appealed to this court. ISSUE WON the time at which just compensation should be fixed is the time of actual taking possession by the expropriating entity, or only after conveyance of title to the expropriator pursuant to expropriation proceedings duly instituted, since its only at such time that the constitutional requirements of due process may be fully met.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V COURT OF APPEALS (boots tirol) MARINE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V REYES (dahls salamat)

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MERALCO V. PINEDA MEDIALDEA; February 13, 1992 (apple maramba)
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari. FACTS - On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance of Rizal - Complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters - Despite petitioners offers to pay just compensation, and attempts to negotiate with the respondents, the parties failed to reach an agreement - Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss the petitioner's legal existence and the area sought to be expropriated as too excessive. - Respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a motion for contempt of court alleging, among other things that petitioner's corporate existence had expired in 1969 and therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws. - On January 13, 1975, the court issued an Order authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated - On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. - Respondents motion was denied - When the presiding Judge Nelly Valdellon-Solis retired, respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed. - The petitioner on October 30, 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing private respondents' property. - On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties. - On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the Napocor. In

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view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended - On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment. - Respondent court granted the motion for payment on December 4, 1981 - On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank. - Respondent court granted the Omnibus Motion on December 21, 1981 - Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982 praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00. - On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 and to declare private respondents in contempt of court for forging or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of petitioner's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. - In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property. - On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt - Hence, this petition ISSUES 1. WON the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation 2. WON prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings 3. WON NAPOCOR should be impleaded in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least as party plaintiff HELD 1. Ratio In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation

PROF.
Reasoning - No. The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. -Sec. 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with this Court Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property taken. -In the case of Municipality of Bian v. Hon. Jose Mar Garci the procedure for eminent domain was reiterated - There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. - The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. -The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. -Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners -Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. -Petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents - Respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court 2. Ratio Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Reasoning Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court 3. Ratio A party which purchases parcels of land subject of expropriation proceedings, should be impleaded either as substitute for the former owner or as party plaintiff. Reasoning - Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings. -Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. -The same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco -It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff. Disposition The petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9, 1982 issued by the respondent judge insofar as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the lower court for trial with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners. Further, the National Power Corporation is impleaded as party plaintiff therein

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PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION V PANIS QUIASON; 1993 (ice baguilat)
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - PCA won a favorable decision in the MTC of Manila to eject occupants of a land with 4842.90 sq. meters adjacent to it. It petition for a writ of demolition but was enjoined by the MTC. The City of Manila filed a civil case for the expropriation of such land. PCA petitioned against such but was denied hence this petition. - The land was formerly part of the Fabie Estate that was later acquired by the City of Manila and thereafter subdivided. The lot in question was then sole by its owner Dolores Fabie-Posadas to PCA. Subsequently the City Council of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the subject land. ISSUE WON the City of Manila may expropriate the land for urban land reform HELD Yes, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila grants such power. The Charter expressly grants general power over the City of Manilas territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain. Public use includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage which includes urban land reform and housing. This is further recognized in Article 8 Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Disposition Petition denied

PROF.
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. - Procedure > Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. > San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. - TC Held: Issued a writ of possession - CA Held: Ordered the trial court to set aside its writ of possession and suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. ISSUE WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementor of the agrarian reform program HELD NO. Ratio If the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use, the exercise of the power of the eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657), which requires the approval of DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land. Reasoning - LGU Code provision (Sec 9, BP 337) A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. - Modern interpretation of public purpose - There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of public purpose. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (bridges, roads, public plazas) before taking thereof satisfy constitutional requirement. Now, it means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. - Therefore, the expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V CA QUIASON; May 17, 1983 (athe odi)

NATURE Appeal by certiorari of the decision of the CA FACTS - The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and

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establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of CamSur. - Jurisprudence views the power of expropriation to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program. Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents

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- Land Bank claims that there is a distinction between the deposit of compensation under RA 6657 (Sec 16) and the payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 of the same law. - The right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited pertains to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner. - It has no reference to the amount deposited in the trust account according to Sec 16 because the latter amount is only provisional. Respondents Comments - Respondents argued that AO #9 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Land Bank in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR. - DAR and Land Bank merely earmarked or deposited in trust the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. ISSUES 1. WON there was an error in declaring that DAR AO #9 was null and void as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or bonds 2. WON the respondents are entitled by right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust HELD 1. DAR overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued AO #9. Ratio There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because RA 6657 states specifically that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. Reasoning - It is explicit in RA 6657 that the deposit must be made in cash or LBP bonds. - An action of an administrative agency may be disturbed if there is an error of law or grave abuse of power of discretion. 2. Yes, the respondents are entitled to the immediate release of their compensation. Ratio Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being

PROF.
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Reasoning - To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DARs valuation and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties is an oppressive exercise of the eminent domain. - The title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator upon full payment of the just compensation.

NPC V CA (chris capul)

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V COURT OF APPEALS FRANCISCO; October 6, 1995 (aida villanueva)
NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Petitioners are Pedro Yap, heirs of Emiliano Santiago and AMADCOR. - Sept 1992 Yaps transfer certificate of titles were cancelled for two parcels of land by the Leyte Registrar of Deeds and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries based on the request of DAR. About P700,000 had been earmarked for Yap for the parcels of land. - Heirs of Santiago owned land in Laur, Nueva Ecija. Without notice to the Santiago heirs, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking to pay rentals to the Land Bank for the use of their farm lots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest. The Land Bank reserved about P135,000 in trust in the name of Santiago. - AMADCOR is a corporation which owns two parcels of land in Quezon. Compensation for the parcels of land was established and a trust account was set up in the name of AMADCOR. - October 20, 1994 lower court ruled in favor of respondents Petitioners Claims - DAR claims that AO #9 is a valid exercise of its rulemaking power pursuant to RA 6557, - Land bank claims that the issuance of the certificate of deposits was in consonance with circulars where the words reserved/deposited were used.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V COURT OF APPEALS (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION) FRANCISCO; July 5, 1996 (aida villanueva)
NATURE Motion for reconsideration for a decision of the SC FACTS (Please see attendant facts in the first case) Petitioners Claims: - The opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of RA 6657. - No legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of money depostted in trust for the landowners. - The deposit contemplated by Section 16 of RA 6657, absent any specific indication, may be either general or special, regular or irregular, or other forms as long as it complies with the general rule. - The establishment of the trust fund is based on the refusal of the landowners to accept the offered compensation. ISSUE WON the establishment of trust funds for the landowners was in compliance with the general rule laid down by RA 6657. HELD No, Section 16 of RA 6657 was specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners.

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Ratio When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction but only for application. Reasoning - The expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner and not the government in a situation where the odds are stacked against his favor. - His only consolation is to negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. - The petitioners themselves recognize the need of the landowners for the compensation that they even allowed 50% withdrawal of the compensation.

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DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. - Wycoco decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings before the DARAB and instead filed a case for determination of just compensation with Cabanatuan City RTC. Impleaded as party-defendants therein were DAR and LBP. - Wycoco filed a manifestation informing the DARAB of the pendency of the agrarian case before the RTC acting as a special agrarian court; prompting DARAB to issue an order dismissing the case to give way to the determination of just compensation by the RTC. - RTC ruled that the only issue left was for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation of the land in question and subsequently rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. RTCs decision, taking judicial notice of the prevailing market value of agricultural lands within the locality, fixed the compensation for the entire land area at a total of P13.43M, and awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. - CAs final decision affirmed the RTC decision with slight modifications, deducting from the compensation due Wycoco the amount corresponding to the portion which was found to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic. ISSUES 1. WON RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just compensation 2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, WON the compensation arrived at is supported by evidence 3. WON Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell 4. WON the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits are valid HELD 1. YES Ratio Direct resort to the Special Agrarian Court is valid. The DAR, as an administrative agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies. Reasoning - sec 50 & 57 of RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988) - EO405 (1990), sec1: LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed

PROF.
under land reform and the just compensation to be paid for their taking. - procedure for determination of just compensation (see p.76) - Although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, DAR and LBPs conformity to the pre-trial order which limited the issue only to the determination of just compensation estopped them from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. *The issue of whether Wycoco violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was rendered moot and academic in view of the DARABs dismissal of the administrative case to give way to and in recognition of the courts power to determine just compensation. 2. NO. Ratio The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. - While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Reasoning - sec3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence - Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. 3. NO. Ratio The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of CARP is essentially lodged with DAR. Reasoning That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area. 4. NO. Ratio The interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. - The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. Reasoning In LBP v. CA: SC struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in LBP bonds contemplated in Section

NPC V COMELEC (jojo mendoza) WHITE PLAINS HOMEOWNERS ASSOC V CA (bry san juan) NHA V HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO (lora alamin) LAND BANK OF THE PHILS V WYCOCO YNARES-SANTIAGO; January 13,2004 (marge alias)
NATURE -Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals. -Counter-petition for mandamus to compel Cabanatuan City RTC to issue a writ of execution and to direct Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo to inhibit himself from Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF). FACTS -In line with CARP, Feliciano F. Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his 94.17ha riceland to DAR for P14.9M. After DARs evaluation of the application and LBPs determination of the just compensation, a notice of intention to acquire 84.57ha of the property for P2.28M was sent to Wycoco. The area DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. -Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting DAR to indorse the case to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by

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16 (e) of RA 6657. - Pursuant to this decision, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust accounts in the name of landowners into deposit accounts. - The trust account opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation. - The just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. Disposition Wycocos petition for mandamus dismissed. Case for determination of just compensation remanded. Petition for cetiorari partially granted.

A2010
failure to puprsue the implementation of the deeds amounted to laches. - RTC ruled in favor of Diaz and ordered NIA to pay 4 million for the land and almost 6.7 million for loss of palay and 500k for attorneys fees. CA upheld RTCs ruling, but struck down the 6.7 million award for losses and 500k attorneys fees. ISSUES 1. WON laches bars respondents claims 2. WON this case should be remanded to the trial court for the appointment of commissioners to determine the compensation due to the private owners 3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of P4 million to respondent as compensation for the property HELD 1. No. Laches is a doctrine of equity and is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. In this case, both equity and law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use. Although eminent domain is an inherent power if the state, there are still limits to such power. One such limit is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Otherwise, the title over the expropriated property cannot pass to the government. The 13-year interval between the execution of the deeds and the filing of the complaint does not bar the claim for compensation. As was held in Napocor v Campos, Jr., the owners action to recover land or the value thereof does not prescribe. Moreover, NIA is party to blame for the delay, because of its stalling and prolonging of the negotiations with the respondent. 2. No. NIA is deemed to have waived the right to have commissioners determine the compensation due to the private owners when it did not follow the procedure for expropriation. The present case is not an action for expropriation for NIA never filed expropriation proceedings despite its ample opportunity to do so. Thus, NIA is estopped from belatedly protesting the lack of commissioners. 3. Yes. The respondent is still entitled to compensation, but 4 million is excessive. When ones land is taken by the government, remedies available are: recovery of property if feasible, or demand for payment of just compensation for the land taken. In this regard, just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and who desires to sell, fixed

PROF.
at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, just compensation must be computed as of the time of taking of the land. In this case, the land was valued at P1.39 in 1972. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount due to the property owner but also payment to him of the amount due within a reasonable time from the taking. Respondent is certainly entitled to legal interest and damages by reason of NIAs inexcusable delay. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the taking. Respondent is thus entitled to just compensation for the 22,073 square meter Canal Sites at P1.39 per square meter, with legal interest from the time of the taking of the Canal Sites in 1972 until the amount due is fully paid. Taking occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. As such, respondent is entitled to compensation for the land affected by the construction of the canal sites. Since respondent himself prayed that land be returned to him if circumstances permit, this remedy should be given. Disposition Decision affirmed with modifications.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V CA AND DIAZ CARPIO; March 31, 2005 (maia rieza)
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of decision of CA FACTS - private respondent Diaz owned around 172 hectares of tenanted agricultural land (devoted to the planting of palay) in Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) bulldozed around 10 hectares of the property to build 2 irrigation canals, but the entire property became prone to flooding due to the side-burrow method used by NIA in the construction of the canals. NIA completed the canals without instituting expropriation proceedings or indemnifying the owners. Respondent sought compensation, but NIA did not give any. In 1980, NIA belatedly offered to buy the portions of the property, and signed 3 Deeds of Sale for the property. However, the sale did not push through and the deeds of sale were never implemented. In 1993, respondent filed an action for damages and just compensation against NIA. NIA claimed respondents

REPUBLIC V LIM SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; June 29, 2005 (anton arcilla)

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - September 5, 1938: the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil for expropriation with CFI Cebu, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. LOT 932: registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon (25,137 sq. m.) LOT 939: registered in the name of Eulalia Denzon (13,164 sq. m.) - After depositing P9,500 with PNB pursuant to the Order of the CFI, the Republic took possession of the lots. On

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

May 14, 1940 the CFI ordered the Republic to pay the Denzons P4,062.10 as just compensation. - 1950: Jose Galeos (one of the heirs) filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter. Nestor Belocura, another heir, brought the claim to the Office of President Carlos Garcia, but to no avail. - September 20, 1961: Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio (successors-in-interest) filed for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. - July 31, 1962: CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right over the Lots because of the Repulics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic (the court adjusted the market value at P16,248.40). - May 19, 1966: The Supreme Court held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of said Lots, there having no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Still, the Court ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value (Lots are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated). - 1964: Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim (respondent) as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Title for Lot 932 was issued in his name. On August 20, 1992, Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title. Action to quiet title: law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property. RTC: judgment declaring Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. CA: Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners. The Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the court while continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. CA affirmed decision of the RTC. SC: Denied the petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error. Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality. ISSUES

A2010
1. WON the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation 2. WON Lim may recover possession of Lot 932 HELD 1. Ratio Lim is still the rightful owner of Lot 932. Reasoning SEC. 9, ART III: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. - This provision from the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individuals rights. - From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. It is the obstinacy of the Republic that merited dismissal. It allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It shows lack of respect for private rights and to the rule of law. Just compensation:

PROF.

1) 2)

Correct determination of the amount to be paid;

Payment for the property within a reasonable time from its taking. - Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. The party may be treated as trespasser ab initio. - Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid. The title does not pass from the owner without his consent until just compensation has been made to him. 2. Ratio In cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. Reasoning 57 years have passed and the Republic has not paid the rightful owners. The Republics failure to pay just compensation can only be construed as deliberate refusal on its part. - Not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need xxx will excuse the bypassing of an individuals rights. A person invoking a right guaranteed under Art. III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

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