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1
Recursive Logic Frames
Saharon Shelah
Institute of Mathematics
Hebrew University
Jerusalem, Israel
Jouko V a an anen
Department of Mathematics
University of Helsinki
Helsinki, Finland
October 21, 2004
Abstract
We dene the concept of a logic frame, which extends the concept
of an abstract logic by adding the concept of a syntax and an axiom
system. In a recursive logic frame the syntax and the set of axioms
are recursively coded. A recursive logic frame is called complete (re
cursively compact, countably compact), if every nite (respectively:
recursive, countable) consistent theory has a model. We show that
for logic frames built from the cardinality quantiers there exists at
least completeness always implies countable compactness. On the
other hand we show that a recursively compact logic frame need not
be countably compact.
1 Introduction
For the denition of an abstract logic and a generalized quantier the reader
is refereed to [4], [13], and [14]. Undoubtedly the most important among
abstract logics are the ones that have a complete axiomatization of validity.
This is an extended version of Preprint # 593 of the Centre de Recerca Matem` atica,
Barcelona. The second author is grateful for the hospitality of the CRM in April 2004.
This research was supported by The Israel Science Foundation. Publication number
[ShVa:790]
[10].
Logic with the generalized quantier
1
1
x(x, y) [x : (x, y)[
1
[27].
Logic with the conality quantier
Q
cof
0
xy(x, y, z) x, y) : (x, y, z) is a linear order
of conality
0
[24].
Logic with the cubquantier
Q
cub
1
xy(x, y, z) x, y) : (x, y, z) is an
1
like linear order
in which a cub of initial segments have a sup [24].
Logic with the MagidorMalitz quantier, assuming
Q
MM
1
xy(x, y, z) X([X[
1
x, y X(x, y, z)) [15].
The extension L(
) is
0
compact (i.e. every countable set
of sentences, every nite subset of which has a model, has itself a model)
and observed that L(
0
) is not. In 1963 Gerhard Fuhrken [7] proved that
L(
) is
0
compact if
0
is small for (i.e. if
n
< for n < , then
n<
n
< ). His proof was based on the observation that the usual Los
Lemma
n<
M
n
/F [= n < : M
n
[= F
1
This quantier is usually denoted by Q
1
.
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for ultralters F on and rst order sentences can be proved for
L(
) if
0
is small for . The
0
compactness follows from the Los Lemma
immediately.
Vaught [27] proved
0
compactness of L(
1
) by proving what is now
known as Vaughts TwoCardinal Theorem and Chang [5] extended this to
L(
+
) by proving (
1
, ) (
+
, ), when
<
= . Jensen [9] extended
this to all under the assumption GCH+2
) is
recursively axiomatizable and
0
compact for all > . Also, if GCH holds,
then L(
) is
0
compact for all > . We still do not know if this is
provable in ZFC:
Open Problem: Is it provable in ZFC that L(
) is
0
compact for all
> ? In particular, is it provable in ZFC that L(
2
) is
0
compact?
The best result today towards solving this problem is:
Theorem 1 ([26]) It is consistent, relative to the consistency of ZF that
L(
1
,
2
) is not
0
compact.
and every regular cardinal is a successor cardinal (i.e. there are no weakly
inaccessible cardinals),
Our approach is to look for ZFCprovable relationships between complete
ness, recursive compactness and countable compactness in the context of a
particular logic in the hope that such relationships would reveal important
features of the logic even if we cannot settle any one of these properties per se.
For example, the countable compactness of the logic L
1
,
2
,
3
, . . .)
cannot be decided in ZFC, but we prove in ZFC that if this logic is recur
sively compact, it is countably compact. We show by example that recursive
compactness does not in general imply countable compactness.
2 Logic Frames
Our concept of a logic frame captures the combination of syntax, semantics
and proof theory of an extension of rst order logic. This is a very gen
eral concept and is not dened here with mathematical exactness, as we do
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not prove any general results about logic frames. All our results are about
concrete examples.
Denition 2 1. A logic frame is a triple L
= L, [=
L
, /), where
(a) L, [=
L
) is a logic in the sense of Denition 1.1.1 in [4].
(b) / is a class of L
axioms and L
= (L, [=
L
, /) is recursive if
(a) There is an eective algorithm which gives for each nite vocabu
lary the set L[] and for each L[] a second order formula
2
which denes the semantics of .
(b) There is an eective algorithm which gives the axioms and rules
of /.
3. A logic frame L
= L, [=
L
, /) is a , )logic frame, if each sen
tence contains less than predicate, function and constant symbols,
and [L[][ whenever the vocabulary has less that symbols alto
gether.
4. A logic frame L
= L, [=
L
, /) is:
(a) complete if every nite /consistent L
recursive compactness
completeness
The weakest condition is thus completeness. We work in this paper al
most exclusively with complete logic frames investigating their compactness
properties.
Denition 3 A logic frame L
= L, [=
L
, /) has
1. nite recursive character if for every possible universe
3
V
[= (L
is complete L
is recursively compact).
2. nite character if for every possible universe V
V
[= (L
is complete L
is countably compact).
3. recursive character if for every possible universe V
V
[= (L
is recursively compact L
is countably compact).
Finite (recursive) (, )character means nite (respectively recursive) char
acter with countably compact replaced by (, )compact. Strong char
acter, means (, )character for all .
Example 4 Let
L(
+
) = L(
+
), [=
L(
+
)
, /(
+
)),
where
M[=
+
) has as axioms the basic axioms of rst order logic and
+
(x = y x = z)
x( ) (
+
x
+
x)
+
x(x)
+
y(y), where (x, ...) is a formula of
L(
+
) in which y does not occur
+
yx x
+
y
+
xy,
and Modus Ponens as the only rule. The logic L(
+
) was introduced by
Mostowski [18] and the above frame for =
0
by Keisler [12]. The logic
frame L(
+
) is an eective , )logic frame. The logic frame L(
1
) is
countably compact, hence has nite character for a trivial reason. If =
<
,
then by Changs TwoCardinal Theorem, L(
+
) is countably compact, in
fact (, )compact ([22]). If V=L, then L(
+
) is (, )compact for all
(Jensen [9]).
Example 5 Suppose is a singular strong limit cardinal. Let
L(
) = L(
), [=
L(
)
, /(
)),
where /(
) is (, )compact
for each < ([11],[22]).
Example 6 Suppose is strong limit Mahlo
4
cardinal. Let
L(
) = L(
), [=
L(
)
, /(
)),
where /(
)
is (, )compact for each < ([21],[22]).
Example 7 Suppose is a regular cardinal. Let
L(Q
cof
) = L(Q
cof
), [=
L(Q
cof
)
, /(Q
cof
)),
4
is 0Mahlo if it is regular, (n + 1)Mahlo, if there is a stationary set of nMahlo
cardinals below , and Mahlo if it is nMahlo fo all n < .
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where M[= Q
cof
1
) = L(Q
cub
1
), [=
L(Q
cub
1
)
, /(Q
cub
1
)),
where M[= Q
cub
1
xy(x, y, z) if and only if x, y) : M[= (x, y, z) is an
1

like linear order in which a cub of initial segments have a sup, and /(Q
cub
1
)
has as axioms the basic axioms of rst order logic, and axioms from [3]. The
logic frame L(Q
cub
1
) is countably compact ([24]), hence has nite character
for a trivial reason. We shall give explicit axioms for the logic frame later.
Example 9 MagidorMalitz quantier logic frame is
L(Q
MM
) = L(Q
MM
), [=, /
MM
),
where
Q
MM
+
) is an eective , )logic frame. The logic
frame L(Q
MM
+
) is complete, if we assume 3, 3
and 3
+, but there is a
forcing extension in which L(Q
MM
1
) is not countably compact [1].
Example 10 Let
L
= L
, [=
L
, /
),
where /
is a
is complete also if
1. =
+
and
<
= , or
2. is strongly inaccessible, or
3. is weakly inaccessible, is regular and
( < )( < )(
< )[10],
although in these cases the completeness is not as useful as in the case as L
and L
. L
is (, )compact. L
,
extending L(
in that it allows
quantication over sequences of variables of length < , but instead of con
junctions and disjunctions of length < , the logic L
1
allows conjunctions and
disjunctions over sets of formulas indexed by a a set in a complete ultral
ter on a cardinal < . The logic L
1
is [, < )compact, [, < )compact,
has the Interpolation property and other nice properties.
The denition of logic frames leaves many details vague, e.g. the exact
form of axioms and rules. Also the conditions of a recursive logic frame would
have to be formulated more exactly for any general results. Going into such
details would take us too much astray from the main purpose of this paper.
3 Logics with recursive character
We now investigate the following quite general question involving an innite
sequence (
n
)
n<
of uncountable cardinals:
Question: For which sequences (
n
)
n<
of uncountable cardinals is the logic
L(
n
)
n<
0
compact?
As the preceding discussion indicates we cannot expect a general solution
in ZFC. Extreme cases are
1.
n
=
1
for all n < .
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2.
0
is small for each
n
.
3. Some
n
is the supremum of a subset of the others.
in which case we have a trivial solution (in case 2 we have Los Lemma and
therefore
0
compactness, and in case 3 we have an easy counterexample to
0
compactness).
Let us call a logic recursively compact if every recursive set of sen
tences, every nite subset of which has a model, itself has a model. Naturally
this concept is meaningful only for logics which possess a canonical G odel
numbering of its sentences. Let us call a logic recursively axiomatizable
if the set of (G odel numbers of) valid sentences of the logic is recursively
enumerable. By a result of Per Lindstr om [14] any recursively axiomatizable
logic of the form L(
n
)
nm
is actually recursively compact. This raises the
question:
Question: For which sequences (
n
)
n<
of uncountable cardinals is the logic
L(
n
)
n<
recursively axiomatizable?
We give an axiomatization / of L(
n
)
n<
. We do not know in general
whether this / is recursive (or r.e.). We give a combinatorial characteri
zation of sequences (
n
)
n<
for which the logic frame (L(
n
)
n<
, [=, /) is
complete.
In the presence of an axiomatization / we can redene our compactness
properties. Rather than requiring that every nite subtheory has a model we
can require that every nite subtheory is /consistent in the sense that no
contradiction can be derived from it by means of the axioms and rules of /.
It turns out that this change is not signicant in the sense that in our main
result we could use either. However, this modied concept of compactness
reveals an interesting connection between completeness and compactness:
we can think of completeness (every consistent sentence has a model) as a
compactness property of oneelement theories. In this sense recursive com
pactness is a strengthening of completeness.
For example, if A
1
),
then it is consistent that L(
2
), A
2
), A
0
compactness (equivalently recursive compactness) of L(
n
)
n<
.
There is a basic reduction of generalized quantiers of the form
to rst
order logic. This was established by Fuhrken [6]. A model M, . . . , A, <, . . .)
is called like if A, <) is a like linear order (i.e. of cardinality with
all initial segments of cardinality < ). Fuhrken established a canonical
translation
+
of L(
) were
reduced to questions of axiomatization and
0
compactness of rst order
logic restricted to like models.
If =
+
the reduction is slightly simpler. Then we can use (, )
models, i.e. models M, . . . , A, . . .), where [M[ = and [A[ = . The study
of model theory of (, )models makes, of course, sense also if ,=
+
even
if this more general case does not arise from a reduction of L(
).
There is an immediate translation of the logic L(
n
)
n<
to rst order
logic on models that have for each n < a unary predicate P
n
and a
n
like
linear order <
n
on P
n
. Let us call such models (
n
)
n<
like models. Mutatis
mutandis, our approach applies also to logics of the form L(
n
)
n<m
.
For easier notation we x A
n
, <
n
) such that the sets A
n
are disjoint and
for each n the structure A
n
, <
n
) is a wellorder of order type
n
. We say that
a
0
, . . . , a
n
) [
n<
A
n
]
<
is increasing if its restriction to any A
m
, <
m
)
is increasing in A
m
, <
m
).
Denition 13 A triple
T = E
a
: a
n<
A
n
), A
n
, <
n
) : n < ), h
n
: n < )),
where
(E1)
Each E
a
is an equivalence relation on [
n<
A
n
]
<
such that equiva
lent sets have the same cardinality.
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(E2)
If a A
n
, the number of equivalence classes of E
a
is <
n
.
(E3)
h
n
: [
n<
A
n
]
<
A
n
.
is called a (
n
)
n<
pattern.
Let us now try to use the pattern to construct a (
n
)
n<
like model. Let
us assume that our starting theory T has the property that every nite subset
has a (
n
)
n<
like model. We assume the vocabulary L of T has cardinality
< min
n
: n < . Let L
the
Skolemclosure of T. Let c
a
, a
n<
A
n
, be new constant symbols. Let <
n
be the predicate symbol the interpretation of which we want to be
n
like.
Consider the axioms
(T1)
(Skolemclosure of T).
(T2)
<
n
c
for <
n
in A
n
.
(T3)
P
n
(c
a
) for a A
n
(T4)
P
m
(t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
)) t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) <
m
c
hm({a
0
,...,an})
,
where a
0
, . . . , a
n
) [
n<
A
n
]
<
is increasing and t is a Skolemterm.
(T5)
t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) = t(c
b
0
, . . . , c
bn
) ((t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) <
m
c
a
)
(t(c
b
0
, . . . , c
bn
) <
m
c
a
)) for all Skolemterms t and all increasing
a
0
, . . . , a
n
), b
0
, . . . , b
n
) [
n<
A
n
]
<
such that
a
0
, . . . , a
n
E
a
b
0
, . . . , b
n
, whenever a A
m
.
Let be an arbitrary nite subset of (T1)
(T5)
. Let M be a (
n
)
n<

like model of T
. Let D
m
be the set of a A
m
such that c
a
occurs
in . Let us expand M to a model M
and induce in a
canonical way a (
n
)
n<
pattern
T
= E
a
: a
n<
A
n
), A
n
, <
n
) : n < ), h
n
: n < )) (1)
as follows: If a A
m
, then dene for increasing a
0
, . . . , a
n
), b
0
, . . . , b
n
)
[
n<
A
n
]
<
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a
0
, . . . , a
n
E
a
b
0
, . . . , b
n
M
[= t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) = t(c
b
0
, . . . , c
bn
)
((t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) <
m
c
a
) (t(c
b
0
, . . . , c
bn
) <
m
c
a
))
for all Skolemterms t occurring in .
and
h
m
(a
0
, . . . , a
n
) = minb A
m
: t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
)
M
<
m
c
M
b
for all Skolemterms t occurring in
An cardinal identity is a triple
I = E
a
: a
n<
D
n
), D
n
, <
n
) : n < ), h
n
: n < )) (2)
where
(I1) The D
m
, <
m
) are disjoint nite linear orders, D
m
= for all but nitely
many m. The cardinality of
n<
D
n
is called the size of I.
(I2) Each E
a
, a D
m
, is an equivalence relation on T(D
m
) such that equiv
alent sets have the same cardinality.
(I3) h
m
: [
n<
D
n
]
<
D
m
is a partial function.
An example of an cardinal identity is the restriction
TD = E
a
D : a D
n<
D
n
), D
n
, <
n
)D : n < ), h
n
D : n < ))
of (
n
)
n<
pattern to a nite D. An cardinal identity
I = E
a
: a
n<
D
n
), D
n
, <
n
) : n < ), h
n
: n < ))
is a subidentity of another cardinal identity
I
= E
a
: a
n<
D
n
), D
n
, <
n
) : n < ), h
n
: n < )),
in symbols I I
n<
D
n
n<
D
n
such that
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(S1) D
m
: D
m
, <
m
) D
m
, <
m
) is orderpreserving.
(S2) d
0
, . . . , d
n
E
a
d
0
, . . . , d
n
d
0
, . . . , d
n
E
a
d
0
, . . . , d
n
holds
for d
0
, . . . , d
n
, d
0
, . . . , d
n
[
n<
D
n
]
n
.
(S3) h
m
(d
0
, . . . , d
n
)
m
h
m
(d
0
, . . . , d
n
) if d
0
, . . . , d
n
[
n<
D
n
]
n
.
Let I(T) be the set of all subidentities of TD for nite D. We write
(
n
)
n<
(I),
if I belongs to I(T) for every (
n
)
n<
pattern T. Let I((
n
)
n<
) be the set
of all I such that (
n
)
n<
(I), i.e.
I((
n
)
n<
) =
I(T) : T is a (
n
)
n<
pattern.
Denition 14 A (
n
)
n<
pattern T is fundamental if I(T) = I((
n
)
n<
).
Suppose now that there is a fundamental (
n
)
n<
pattern T. Let us see
how we can nish the constructions of a like model for T. We built up a
(
n
)
n<
pattern T
such that TD T
+
) is compact. [22]
3. If
.
Example 20 The logic L(
n
)
0<n
fails to be
0
compact for trivial rea
sons. Still every fragment containing only nitely many generalized quanti
ers is
0
compact.
If each
n
is Mahlo, then any pattern is fundamental.
Corollary 21 [21] If each
n
is Mahlo, then L(
n
)
n<
is compact and
recursively axiomatizable for each < min
n
: n < .
The results of this Section could have been proved also for a nite se
quence (
n
)
n<m
of uncountable cardinals, with obvious modications.
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3.1 The character of L(
n
)
n<
Our goal in this Section is to give the axioms / of L(
n
)
n<
and prove that
L(
n
)
n<
/) has recursive character. Since L(
n
)
n<
is the union of its
fragments L(
n
)
n<m
, where n < , we rst introduce an axiomatization of
L(
n
)
n<m
and discuss its completeness.
3.1.1 Logic with nitely many quantiers
Keisler gave a simple and elegant complete axiomatization for L(
1
) based
on a formalization of the principle that if an uncountable set is divided into
nonempty parts, then either there are uncountably many parts or one part
is uncountable. If =
<
, this works also for L(
+
), but it certainly
does not work for L(
c
a
: a
nN
A
n
, L containing unary
predicates P
n
, n N, and the nite set of rst order sentences in the
vocabulary of M induce the cardinal identity
I = E
a
: a
n<
D
n
), D
n
, <
n
) : n < ), h
n
: n < ))
dened as follows: Let D
n
be the set of a A
n
for which c
a
occurs in . If
a D
m
, then dene for increasing a
0
, . . . , a
n
), b
0
, . . . , b
n
) [
n<
D
n
]
<
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1
a
0
, . . . , a
n
E
a
b
0
, . . . , b
n
M
[= t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) = t(c
b
0
, . . . , c
bn
)
((t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
) <
m
c
a
) (t(c
b
0
, . . . , c
bn
) <
m
c
a
)
for all Skolemterms t occurring in .
and
h
m
(a
0
, . . . , a
n
) = minb D
m
: t(c
a
0
, . . . , c
an
)
M
<
m
c
M
b
for all Skolemterms t occurring in ,
(or undened).
This concept is the heart of our axiom system/
m
. Suppose is a sentence
in L(
n
)
n<m
. Fuhrken introduced a reduction method by means of which
there is a rst order sentence
+
in a larger vocabulary such that has a
model if and only if
+
has a (
n
)
n<m
like model.
Denition 22 A sentence of L(
n
)
n<m
in the vocabulary L is said to
be /
m
consistent, if for all I I((
n
)
n<m
) and all nite
+
there
is a model M of such that M and induce I. The set /
m
of axioms of
L(
n
)
n<m
consists of all sentences of L(
n
)
n<m
for which is not
/
m
consistent.
The denition of the axioms /
m
may seem trivial as we seem to take
all valid sentences as axioms. However, whether all valid sentences are
actually axioms depends on whether we can prove the completeness of our
axioms. Also, while there is no obvious reason why the set of valid sen
tences should be recursively enumerable in I((
n
)
n<
), the set /
m
of axioms
certainly is.
Lemma 23 Suppose is a sentence of L(
n
)
n<m
and has a model. Then
is /
m
consistent.
Proof. Suppose I I((
n
)
n<m
) and
+
is nite. Suppose M is a
(
n
)
n<
like model of . Then M and induce a (
n
)
n<
pattern T. Since
I I((
n
)
n<
), there is a nite D such that I TD. Thus M and
induce I. 2
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Lemma 24 If there is a fundamental (
n
)
n<m
pattern, then every /
m
consistent
sentence of L(
n
)
n<m
has a model.
Proof. Suppose is an /
m
consistent sentence of L(
n
)
n<m
. Let T be
a fundamental (
n
)
n<m
pattern. Let T =
+
. It suces to show that the
theory (T1)
(T5)
(T5)
n<
A
n
for which
c
a
occurs in . Note, that if we let I = TD, then I I((
n
)
n<m
). By
assumption, T
n<
D
n
]
<
are increasing and of type s, d
r
0
, . . . , d
rn
E
a
d
s
0
, . . . , d
sn
, a D
i
,
and
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1
(c) x
h({dr
0
,...,drn
})
i
H
n
i
(x
r
0
, . . . , x
rn
)
whenever h(d
r
0
, . . . , d
rn
) D
i
.
Any model Mof
I
and any choice of a conal suborder A
n
, <
n
) of P
n
, <
n
)
M
of type
n
(for n < ) gives rise to a (
n
)
n<m
pattern T
i
a
0
, . . . , a
n
E
a
b
0
, . . . , b
n
If (F
n
i
)
M
(a
0
, . . . , a
n
) <
i
a or (F
n
i
)
M
(b
0
, . . . , b
n
) <
i
a then
(F
n
i
)
M
(a
0
, . . . , a
n
) = (F
n
i
)
M
(b
0
, . . . , b
n
).
and
h
i
(a
0
, . . . , a
n
) = (H
n
i
)
M
(a
0
, . . . , a
n
).
We have written into the sentence
I
the condition that I is not in I(T
).
On the other hand, if I / I((
n
)
n<m
), it is easy to construct a model of
I
.
Moreover, if I
0
, . . . , I
n
/ I((
n
)
n<m
), it is not hard to construct a model of
I
0
. . .
In
.
Let I
n
, n < , be a list of all I / I((
n
)
n<m
). Without loss of generality,
this list is recursive in /
m
. Suppose the set of valid L(
n
)
n<m
sentences
is r.e. in /
m
. Now we use an argument (due to Per Lindstr om [14]) from
abstract model theory. Let A be a set of natural numbers which is cor.e. in
/
m
but not r.e. in /
m
. Say,
n A k((n, k) B),
where B is recursive in /
m
. Let P be a new unary predicate symbol and
n
the rst order sentence which says that P has exactly n elements. Let T be
the theory
n
I
i
: k i((n, k) B), and C = n : T [=
n
. We
show that C A. Suppose T [=
n
. If n / A, then there is k such that
(n, k) / B. Let M be a model of
I
j
: i < k
m
. If
n
I
i
T,
then i < k, whence M [=
I
i
. So M [= T, a contradiction. Since C is r.e.
in /, there is n A C. Thus there is M [= T such that M [=
n
. Since
k((n, k) B), the sentence
n
I
i
is in T, and thereby true in M for
every i. Since M [=
n
, M [=
I
i
for all i. Let T be the (
n
)
n<m
pattern
that M gives rise to. T is necessarily a fundamental (
n
)
n<m
pattern. 2
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Summing up:
Theorem 26 Suppose (
n
)
n<m
is a sequence of uncountable cardinals. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. /
m
is a complete axiomatization of L(
n
)
n<m
.
2. L(
n
)
n<m
,/
m
) is recursively compact.
3. L(
n
)
n<m
is compact for all < min
0
, . . . ,
m1
.
4. There is a fundamental (
n
)
n<m
pattern.
Corollary 27 L(
n
)
n<m
,/
m
) has nite character.
We do not know if /
m
is recursive, except in such special cases as in
Corollaries 18 and 21.
Recall the denition of I(
+
, ) in [26] and [19].
Proposition 28 1. Suppose I(
+
, ) is recursive, and either A
is recur
sive or there is a universe V
V in which L(
+
), A
) is recursively
compact, then L(
+
), A
1
), A
). Then L(
+
), A
+
), A
) is complete. Let L(
+
) say in
the language of set theory that
I
holds for all I / I(). Since I(
+
, ) is
recursive, this can be written in L(
+
). We show that is consistent with
the axioms A
: If A
is recursive, L(
+
), A
. On
the other hand, if there is a universe V
in which L(
+
), A
) is recursively
compact, then in V
there is a fundamental (
+
, )pattern, and hence in V
also in V .
By completeness has a model. Thus there is a fundamental (
+
, )pattern
and L(
+
), A
) is
0
compact.
2. Completeness implies (
1
,
0
) (
+
, ). We know that I(
1
,
0
) is
recursive ([25]). Since (
1
,
0
) (
+
, ) implies I(
1
,
0
) = I(
+
, ), also
the latter is recursive. Now we use part 1. 2
Corollary 29 The logic frame L(
+
), A
), where A
1
) and is an arbitrary cardinal, has nite character.
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3.1.2 Logic with innitely many quantiers
The axioms / are simply all the axioms /
m
m < , put together.
Proposition 30 If L(
n
)
n<
,/) is recursively compact, then there is a
fundamental (
n
)
n<
pattern.
Proof. Let I
n
, n < , be a list of all I / I((
n
)
n<
). Without loss of
generality, this list is recursive in /. Note that if I / I((
n
)
n<
), then there
is an m such that I / I((
n
)
n<m
), so we can use the sentences
In
. Let T
be the set of all
In
, n < . This theory is recursive in / and it is nitely
consistent. Hence it has a model. The (
n
)
n<
pattern the model M gives
rise to is clearly fundamental. 2
Theorem 31 Suppose (
n
)
n<
is a sequence of uncountable cardinals. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. / is a complete axiomatization of L(
n
)
n<
.
2. For every m < there is a fundamental (
n
)
n<m
pattern.
Theorem 32 Suppose (
n
)
n<
is a sequence of uncountable cardinals. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. L(
n
)
n<
,/) is recursively compact.
2. L(
n
)
n<
is compact for all < min
n
: n < .
3. There is a fundamental (
n
)
n<
pattern.
Corollary 33 L(
n
)
n<
,/) has recursive character.
Example 34 If
n
=
n
for 0 < n , then L(
n
)
n<
,/) is complete
but not
0
compact and thereby does not have nite character.
Above we investigated like models and related them to logic frames
arising from generalized quantiers. Similar results can be proved for models
with predicates of given cardinality and also for models with a linear order in
which given predicates have given conalities, but these results do not have
natural formulations in terms of generalized quantiers.
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4 A logic which does not have recursive char
acter
We show that there is a logic frame L
IX
I and X is closed under
unions of increasing sequences. Let D(A) be the lter on H(A) generated by
all ltrations of A.
Denition 36 The generalized quantier Q
St
is dened by
A [= Q
St
xy(x, y, a)
if and only if A = (A, R
), where R
/ D(A).
Respectively, the generalized quantier Q
Cub
, denable in terms of Q
St
and
1
, is dened by
A [= Q
Cub
xy(x, y, a)
if and only if A = (A, R
), where R
D(A).
It follows from [24] and [3] that L
(Q
St
) equipped with some natural
axioms and rules is a complete countably compact logic frame.
Denition 37 If S
1
, then the generalized quantier Q
St
S
is dened by
A [= Q
St
S
xy(x, y, a)
if and only if R
is an
1
like linear order of A with a ltration I
: <
1
such that
<
1
((I
has a sup in R
) S).
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The syntax of the logic
L
St
is dened as follows: L
St
extends rst order logic by the quantiers Q
1
,
Q
St
and the innite number of new formal quantiers Q
St
Xn
(we leave X
n
unspecied).
If we x a sequence S
0
, S
1
, ...) and let Q
St
Xn
be interpreted as Q
St
Sn
, we
get a denition of semantics of L
St
. We call this semantics the S
0
, S
1
, ...)
interpretation of L
St
. Thus L
St
has a xed syntax and xed axioms, given
below, but many dierent semantics, depending on our interpretation of
X
0
, X
1
, . . .) by various S
0
, S
1
, ...).
Denition 38 We call a nite sequence = S
0
, S
1
, ...S
n
) (or an innite
sequence S
0
, S
1
, ...)) of subsets of
1
stationary independent, if all nite
Boolean combinations of the sets S
i
are stationary.
Denition 39 The axioms of / are
(Ax1) The usual axioms and rules of L(Q
1
).
(Ax2) Q
St
xy(x, y, z) (, , z) is an
1
like linear order.
(Ax3) Q
St
Xn
xy(x, y, z) Q
St
xy(x, y, z).
(Ax4) Independence Axiom Schema: Any nontrivial Boolean combination of
the set S
n
interpreting the X
n
is stationary, i.e. , where is
the conjunction of the formulas
(a) (, , z) is an
1
like linear order.
(b) Q
St
X
i
xy((x, y, z)
i
(x, z)
i
(y, z)), i=0,...,l.
and is the conjunction of the formulas Q
St
xy((x, y, z)
i<l
((y, z))
(i)
),
for all : l 2.
(Ax4) Pressing Down Axiom Schema:
[Q
St
xy(x, y, u) xz((z, x, u) (x, z, u))]
zQ
St
xy((x, y, u) (x, z, u) (y, z, u))
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The axioms of L
St
are the above added with the usual axioms and rules
of L
.
Denition 40 Suppose S
0
, S
1
, ...) is stationary independent. We dene a
new recursive logic frame
L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) = L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...), [=, /),
where / is as in Denition 39. Let L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) be the extension of
L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) obtained by allowing countable conjunctions and disjunctions.
The standard proof (see e.g. [3]) shows:
Lemma 41 1. The logic frames L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) and L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) are
complete for all stationary independent S
0
, S
1
, ...).
2. L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) has a model in an S
0
, S
1
, ...)interpretation for some
stationary independent S
0
, S
1
, ...) if and only if has a model in an
S
0
, S
1
, ...)interpretation for all stationary independent S
0
, S
1
, ...).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 41 is that the set V al(L
St
) of
sentences of L
St
which are valid under S
0
, S
1
, ...)interpretation for some
(equivalently, all) stationary independent S
0
, S
1
, ...) is recursively enumer
able, provably in ZFC, and the predicate has a model, where L
St
,
is a
ZFC
1
denable property of .
By making dierent choices for the stationary independent S
0
, S
1
, ...),
we can get logics with dierent properties. Clearly there is a trivial choice
of S
0
, S
1
, ...) for which L
St
fails to have countable compactness. On the
other hand, CH fails if and only if there is a choice of S
0
, S
1
, ...) which will
make L
St
countably compact. We make now a choice of S
0
, S
1
, ...) which
will render L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) recursively compact but not countably compact.
Let us x a countable vocabulary which contains innitely many sym
bols of all arities. Let T
n
, n < , list all Ax(L
St
)consistent recursive L
St

theories in the vocabulary . Let
n
be a new disjoint copy of for each
n < . Let
L
St
:
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(a) T
n
translated into the vocabulary
n
.
(b) <
is an
1
like linear order of the universe.
(c) Q
St
Xn
xy(x <
y P
n
(x) P
n
(y)).
(d) x
n
(P
n
(x))
(n)
.
Lemma 42 There is : 2 such that
has a model.
Proof. Let consist of the sentences (a)(c). By Lemma 41, has a model
M of cardinality
1
in the S
0
, S
1
, ...)interpretation for some stationary in
dependent S
0
, S
1
, ...). Get a new : 2 by Cohenforcing. Then in the
extension V []
n
(S
n
)
(n)
= .
Thus V [] satises the
1
sentence
(
0
, S
1
, ...) be stationary independent such that
has a model
M
in the S
0
, S
1
, ...)interpretation.
Theorem 43 The recursive logic frame L
St
(S
0
, S
1
, ...) is recursively compact
but not countably compact.
Proof. Suppose T is a consistent recursive theory in L
St
. W.l.o.g. T = T
m
for some m < . Thus M
n
gives immediately a model of T. To
prove that L
St
is not countably compact, let T be a theory consisting of the
following sentences:
(i) <
is an
1
like linear order.
(ii) Q
St
S
n
xy(x <
y P
n
(x) P
n
(y)) for n < .
(iii) Q
St
xy(x <
y P(x) P(y)).
(iv) x(P(x) (P
n
(x))
(n)
) for n < .
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Any nite subtheory of T contains only predicates P
0
, ..., P
m
for some m, and
has therefore a model: we let P
i
= S
i
for i = 0, ..., m and
P = (P
0
)
(0)
... (P
m
)
(m)
.
On the other hand, suppose A, <
, P, P
0
, P
1
, ...) [= T. By (ii) there are
ltrations D
n
: <
1
) of <
and clubs E
n
such that for all n and for all
E
n
<
1
: D
n
) = S
n
.
By (iii) there is a ltration F
: <
1
) of <
such that
B = <
1
: F
has a sup in P
is stationary. Let E
n
E
n
be a club such that C
= D
n
= F
for
E
B and a = sup F
. Then a P. Hence
a
n
(P
n
)
(n)
by (iv). As a = sup D
n
n
)
(n)
,
contrary to the choice of . We have proved that theory T has no models. 2
Thus L
St
does not have nite character. We end with an example of a
logic which, without being provably complete, has anyhow nite character:
Recall that
S
for S
1
is the statement that there are sets A
,
S, such that for any X
1
, the set S : X = A
is stationary.
Denition 44 Let L
be the extension of L
by Q
1
, Q
St
and Q
St
S
, where
o =
1
, if there is a bistationary S with
S
but no maximal one
S, if S is a maximal bistationary S with
S
We get a recursive logic frame L
= L
(x < y) has no
model, so L is incomplete. Suppose there is a bistationary S with
S
but no
maximal one. Then the consistent sentence < is an
1
like linear order
Q
St
xy(x < y P(x)) Q
St
S
n+1
)
n<
is
a good example. The results about its countable compactness under CH and
countable incompactness in another model of set theory leave us perplexed
about the nature of the logic. Having recursive character reveals something
conclusive and positive, and raises the question, do other problematic logics
also have recursive character. Our logic L
St
is the other extreme: it is al
ways completely axiomatizable, but a judicious choice of S
0
, S
1
, ...) renders
it recursively compact without being countably compact.
Open Question: Does the MagidorMalitz logic L(Q
MM
1
) have recursive
character?
L(Q
MM
1
) is countably compact whenever holds ([15]). But L(Q
MM
1
)
may fail to be countably compact ([1]). The question is whether L(Q
MM
1
) is
countably compact in every model in which it is recursively compact.
References
[1] Uri Abraham and Saharon Shelah. A
2
2
wellorder of the reals and
incompactness of L(Q
MM
). Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 59:132,
1993.
[2] Jon Barwise. Some applications of Henkin quantiers. Israel J. Math.,
25(12):4763, 1976.
[3] Jon Barwise, Matt Kaufmann, and Michael Makkai. Stationary logic.
Ann. Math. Logic, 13(2):171224, 1978.
[4] J. Barwise and S. Feferman, editors. Modeltheoretic logics. Springer
Verlag, New York, 1985.
[5] C. C. Chang. A note on the two cardinal problem. Proc. Amer. Math.
Soc., 16:11481155, 1965.
[6] G. Fuhrken. Skolemtype normal forms for rstorder languages with a
generalized quantier. Fund. Math., 54:291302, 1964.
26
7
9
0
r
e
v
i
s
i
o
n
:
2
0
0
4

1
0

2
1
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
:
2
0
0
4

1
0

2
1
[7] Gebhard Fuhrken. Languages with added quantier there exist at least