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3 & 4 MALOLOS V ASIA PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION 147 SCRA 61 PARAS; January 07, 1987
FACTS - Petitioner Josephine Cruz Malolos (deceased) is represented by her heirs Emmanuel, Maria Marinela and Maria Marjorie, all surnamed Malolos. - APCOR purchased from E. Francisco Liners Company, Inc. a postdated Far East Bank and Trust Company check in the amount of P105,000.00 issued in the latter's favor by petitioner, Josephine Cruz Malolos. - On purchase, Francisco Liners executed a Deed of Assignment of said check and as payee, endorsed the same in favor of private respondent before getting the discounted proceeds. - When deposited on its maturity date, the aforesaid check was dishonored for the reason that petitioner's bank account had already been closed. - APCOR demanded from Francisco Liners and also from petitioner, in her capacity as drawer of the check, the payment of said check, but the obligation remained unpaid. - APCOR filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment against E. Francisco Liners, Co., Inc., Elias A. Francisco, and petitioner (in her capacity as drawer of said check). - Respondent Judge issued an Order of Attachment. - Josephine Cruz Malolos died and her counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint as against her pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. - Private respondent opposed the aforementioned motion and argued that Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court admits of exceptions and one of them is when an attachment has been levied on some of the properties of the defendant, on motion of the plaintiff, to secure the payment of the latter's money claim in which case the pending action should not be dismissed but may be continued against the executor or administrator, invoking the ruling in the case of Macondray Co., Inc. v. Dungao. - Respondent Judge ruled in favor of private respondent and denied the motion to dismiss. ISSUE

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WON an attachment levied on some properties of the defendant constitutes an exception to the general rule of non-survival of the money claim as provided for in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. HELD - NO. There is no question that the action in the court below is for collection or recovery of money. - It is already a settled rule that an action for recovery of money or for collection of a debt is one that does not survive and upon the death of the defendant the case should be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially provided in the Rules of Court. This is explicitly provided in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court . - Dy v. Enage: The language of Section 21 of Rule 3 is too clear in this respect as to require any interpretation or construction. It very explicitly says that when the action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner specially provided by the rules, meaning, Section 5 of Rule 86 and its related provisions. - Earlier, Secs. 119 and 700 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) from which this Rule was derived were interpreted by the Supreme Court in Pabico v. Jaranilla, et al. to be mandatory in character and confers no jurisdiction upon the Court. - The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or intestate proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims which shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased. - The purpose of the rule is to avoid useless duplicity of procedure ---- the ordinary action must be wiped out from the ordinary court. - The case of Macondray v. Dungao, supra, cited by private respondent to support its position does not fall squarely with the case at bar. - In the above-cited case, the facts are as follows: (1) the promissory note executed by defendant Dungao represented the purchase price of the car and trucks which said defendant bought from Macondray on installment; (2) a writ of attachment was issued on August 16, 1949, but this was later on dissolved on September 21, 1949, when the defendant put up a surety bond; and (3) the promissory note sued upon in the

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cited case was secured by a mortgage on personal property and the proper action should have been a foreclosure of mortgage. - In the present case, the money claim arose out of a pure and simple debt, which as aforementioned, under the provision of Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court shall be dismissed and must be brought before the probate court. - In the light of the foregoing considerations, the conclusion is inevitable that the trial court deviated from the procedure laid down by the provisions of the Rules. The fact that a writ attachment has been issued cannot provide an excuse for such deviation, as a writ of attachment is a remedy ancillary to the principal proceedings. Consequently, if it is mandatory, under Rule 3 Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court that the principal proceeding or action be dismissed for nonsurvival of the money claim, the purpose of the attachment which is to secure the outcome of the trial no longer exists and so with the reasons for the issuance of the writ in this case, insofar as the deceased debtor is concerned. - Corollary thereto, it has been held that a court order which violates the Rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion as it wrecks the orderly procedure prescribed for the settlement of claims against deceased persons designed to protect the interests of the creditors of the decedent. Allowing the private respondent to attach petitioners' properties for the benefit of her claim against the estate would give an undue advantage over other creditors against the estate. Therefore, under the same principle, a writ of attachment already issued in connection with a money claim which has to be dismissed because of the death of the defendant before final judgment cannot provide an exception to the general rule, and must accordingly be dissolved. Disposition Resolution of respondent Judge SET ASIDE

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. V. IAC AND THE PUVATS 151 SCRA 652 GUTIERREZ, J; June 30, 1987
FACTS -In Civil Case No. 59506 of CFI Manila, entitled 'Luzon Surety Co., Inc., v. Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., et al.,' judgment was rendered

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against the defendants, including Gil Puyat, for the principal sum of P20T with interest. The judgment became final on April 13, 1967, but was not enforced. Within the prescription period, Civil Case No. 93268 was instituted to revive the earlier judgment. -When Gil Puyat died, a claim against his estate was filed in Sp. Proc. No. Q-32291 of CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the principal sum of P178,507.76, including interests, unpaid premiums and stamps, and attorney's fees and costs of suits. The administrators opposed the claim for the reason that it is unenforceable and barred by laches for no steps were taken by the claimant to secure a writ of execution against defendant Gil Puyat during his lifetime to enforce any of the two judgments. -RTC QC dismissed the case. IAC dismissed the petitioner's appeal by ruling that the prescription of an action is not counted from the expiration of the five-year period within which the judgment may be enforced by a mere motion but from the finality of that judgment. MFR was denied. [CA: When the claim against the estate was filed on Sept 1, 1982, more than seventeen years had elapsed from the time judgment in Civil Case 59506 became final and more than five years after the finality of its revived judgment in Civil Case 93268. Clearly, the right of claimant to satisfy the original judgment had long prescribed.] Petitioner says: the period of ten (10) years prescribed in the statute of limitations should be counted not from the date of the finality of the original judgment but from the date of the finality of the revived judgment. Relevant provisions: *Articles 1144, NCC: The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: xxx 3. Upon judgment. *Rule 39.6, RoC: Execution of motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. ISSUE WON the action has prescribed HELD: YES.

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-The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was not enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268 within the prescriptive period to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May 24, 1974. This judgment became final and executory sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On September 1, 1982, the petitioner filed a claim in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. What is sought is a second revival of the judgment that had become final in 1967. This can no longer be done due to the lapse of the allowable period. -It is now settled that the ten-year period within which an action for revival of a judgment should be brought, commences to run from the date of finality of the judgment, and not from the expiration of the five-year period within which the judgment may be enforced by mere motion (Art. 1152, Civil Code). -The source of R39.6 is Sec.447 of the Code of Civil Procedure which in turn was derived from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. The rule followed in California in this regard is that a proceeding by separate ordinary action to revive a judgment is a new action rather than a continuation of the old, and results in a new judgment constituting a new cause of action, upon which a new period of limitations begins to run. -PNB v. Deloso (32 SCRA 266), citing Gutierrez Hermanos v. De La Riva 46 Phil., 827 (1923): the ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from the date of finality of the judgment and not from the expiration of five (5) years thereafter. Three reasons were there advanced, to wit: (1) Correlating the relevant provisions, the conclusion one arrives at is that after the expiration of the five years within which execution can be issued upon a judgment, the winning party can revive it only in the manner therein provided so long as the period of ten years does not expire from the date of said judgment (2) Right of the winning party to enforce the judgment against the defeated party begins to exist the moment the judgment is final; and this right, consists in (a) having an execution of the judgment issued during the first five years next following, and in (b) commencing after that

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period the proceeding to revive it, a remedy to be pursued only before the judgment prescribes (i.e., during the five years next following) (3) If it is held that the winning party has still ten (10) years within which to revive the judgment after the expiration of five (5) years, then the judgment would not prescribed until after fifteen (15) years, which is against the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. -Failure of the Puyats to raise prescription in their "Comment to Claim" does not imply the waiver of such defense. In the instant case, there is no new issue of fact that arises in connection with the question of prescription. All the pertinent dates showing that the petitioner's enforcement of the judgment under Civil Case No. 93268 has already prescribed can be found in the petitioner's allegations in the "claim" as well as its evidence filed in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291. This removes the case from the general rule that prescription if not impleaded in the answer is deemed waived. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

GONZALES V LOOD ALBANO V AGTARAP ARELLANO; March 25, 1912

FACTS -Lucio Agtarap owned several parcels of agricultural land and at his death left four sons, one of whom, Silverio, died. Upon the death of Silverio Agtarap, his widow, Juana Domingo, began special proceedings for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband by petitioning for an administrator and Rodrigo Albano was appointed. -As such administrator Rodrigo Albano instituted a civil action against the other three heirs of Lucio Agtarap. -The following are pertinent facts in this case: (1) It is proven that Lucio Agtarap is the legitimate father of Silverio, Cornelio, and Nicolas Agtarap and the grandfather of Melecio Agtarap; (2) it is admitted that Lucio Agtarap died leaving property; (3) it is proven that the property left at his death by Lucio Agtarap has been seized by his said descendants, now the defendants, without giving Silverio his share; (4) it is proven that, at the least, the property was left by Lucio Agtarap.

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-According to law, one-fourth of this property belongs to Silverio Agtarap. -The judgment of the court directs that one-fourth part of this property be delivered to the administrator of the intestate estate of the late Silverio Agtarap, as his legacy, so that, after proper proceedings, their respective portions may be adjudicated to the widow and other heirs of the said Silverio. ISSUE WON the heirs of Silverio should receive of the estate of Lucio and what is the proper procedure HELD -Yes he should through a special proceeding. The necessary procedure of a special proceedings in the intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap, in which may properly be presented the claim of the administrator of the said intestate estate on behalf of Juana Domingo for her "legal portion as widow," as well as the proceedings for proving that Eugenia Agtarap is a legitimate daughter in order to have her declared the sole heir of the whole of the said fourth part of the property which corresponds to him whom she calls her legitimate father. -A trial held for such purpose it will determine who are the heirs of the intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap; whether she who calls herself his legitimate daughter, Eugenia Agtarap; or his brothers Cornelio and Nicolas and his nephew Melecio, all surnamed Agtara. The lawful usufruct pertaining to the widow will depend upon whether the alleged daughter or the brothers and nephew of the deceased are entitled to the inheritance, for if she who claims to be the daughter, Eugenia Agtarap, be declared the sole heir of the deceased Silverio Agtarap, the widows share would be different from what it would if the defendants in this case, as brothers and nephew of the deceased Silverio Agtarap, are declared to be the sole heirs ---- in accordance with the various provisions of the Civil Code in this respect. Only in such special proceedings, wherein the necessary orders can be issued and executed, can findings be made as to who are the heirs and what portions to them, the nature of their titles, and in case of usufruct what part pertains to each. Disposition: Affirmed

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MORELAND, DISSENTING Nowhere in the law of these Islands is an administrator given power to bring an action for the partition of real estate. The persons and the only persons authorized to bring such an action are those mentioned in section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Civil Code does not authorize such an action as the present.

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its improvements thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above mentioned. The court, however, having its attention called to the fact that the omission of this property from the inventory would leave the estate insolvent, made an order, directing the administrator to restore said item to his inventory. But Court made a new order, approving the omission by the administrator of said property from the inventory. Hence this appeal. - Appellants arguments: [a] assuming that the assignment to Jung by Ankrom of the equity of redemption of the latter in the tract of land was affected in fraud of creditors, they have an interest in the payment of the appellant's claim. [b] it was the duty of the administrator to retain the possession of this tract of land and thereby place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, the burden of instituting any action that may be necessary to maintain the rights of the transferee under said assignment. - The administrator contends: the assignment is valid and apparently does not desire to enter into a contest over the question of its validity with the person or persons claiming under it. ISSUE WON the appellants remedy of appeal is proper HELD NO. - The precise remedy open to appellants (Heirs of Gregoire) is clearly pointed out in Sec. 713 of Code of Civil Procedure1. Under this provision, When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or
1

HEIRS OF GREGOIRE V. BAKER 51 PHIIL. 75 STREET; November 19, 1927

NATURE Appeal from an order of CFI FACTS - J. H. Ankrom, resident of Prov. of Davao, died on Sept. 18, 1922. The appellee, A. L. Baker, was qualified as his administrator. Baker filed his inventory of the assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrens cert. of title and with an area of more than 930 hectares. In this inventory, said tract of land, with improvements, was estimated at nearly P60K. - The heirs of Rafael Gregoire, appellants herein, filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in SC of Rep. of Panama. This claim was allowed by the commissioners in the estate of Ankrom, and no appeal was at any time taken against the order so allowing it. - As the affairs of the estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestate proceedings were being conducted the administrator discovered that 1 years before his death, Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property in question in favor of the Phil. Trust Co. to secure that company from liability on a note of P20K. 2 days after this mortgage had been executed Ankrom appears to have made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J.G. Jung, of Ohio, for a purported consideration of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. - In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented an amended inventory, omitting the tract of 930 hectares with

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appellants remedy is to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors. - Heirs of Gregoire argue that inasmuch as no appeal was taken from the order, directing the administrator to include the land in question in the inventory, said order became final, with the result that the appealed order, authorizing the exclusion of said property from the inventory, should be considered beyond the competence of the court. - This contention is untenable. Orders made by a court re inclusion of items of property in the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at any time during the course of the administration proceedings. Such order in question NOT final in the sense necessary to make it appealable. In fact we note that the appealed order was expressly made w/o prejudice to the rights of creditors to proceed in the manner indicated under Sec. 713 of Code of Civil Procedure. Disposition Order appealed from not being of an appealable nature, so appeal must be dismissed, with costs against the appellants

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view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment. -Before answering the complaint, defendant died. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include heirs of deceased. The heirs filed MTD, and by order of Aug 12, 1960, the court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made partydefendant; and that the action being for recovery of money, testate/intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein. MFR denied ISSUE WON the action survives HELD YES. Ratio Rule 88.1 enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: 1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; 2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and 3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property. Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from CFI Samar that the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and have agreed to dismiss this appeal. Disposition The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the questions raised therein. This appeal is, therefore, ordered dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

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FACTS - In 1941, Celestino Salvador executed a deed of sale over 7 parcels of titled land and 2 parcels of untitled land, situated in Bigaa, Bulacan in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed in 1955 a suit for reconveyance of said parcels of land in the CFI of Bulacan, Br. I. In 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, 21 persons were substituted as plaintiffs in the action for reconveyance. - Meanwhile, special proceedings for the probate of his will and for letters testamentary was instituted in the CFI of Bulacan, Br. II. Dominador Cardenas was appointed special administrator. He filed an inventory of properties of the estate covering the same parcels of land subject matter of the reconveyance action. Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was appointed executor of said will. 23 persons were instituted heirs in the will. Of these, 9 were not among the 21 alleged relatives substituted in the reconveyance case; and of the 21 substituted alleged heirs, 7 were not instituted in the will. - Br. I (reconveyance court) rendered judgment ordering the spouses Alfonso and Anatolia to reconvey the parcels of land to the estate of Celestino Salvador. The spouses appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the reconveyance judgment, with the correction that reconveyance be in favor of the 21 heirs substituted as plaintiffs. - Pursuant to an order of Br. II (probate court) one of the parcels of land, Lot 6, was sold so that with its proceeds debtors who filed claims may be paid. PNB bought it for P41,184 which was then deposited in the same bank by the administrator, subject to court order. - In 1964, the defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance over the parcels of land in favor of Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same as not in accordance with the judgment, Br. I ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed in favor of the 21 persons substituted as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly, a new deed of reconveyance was made and a new TCT was subsequently issued in the name of the 21 persons. - In 1965, Br. I ordered PNB to release the P41,184 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to the 21 plaintiffs in the reconveyance case. Apparently,

AGUAS V LLEMOS 5 SCRA 959 REYES, JBL; Aug 30, 1962

FACTS -March 14, 1960: Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar to recover damages from Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on Feb 23, 1960, 8am; that in administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable.

SALVADOR v. STA. MARIA 20 SCRA 603 BENGZON; June 30, 1967

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although the passbook was given by the administrator to said 21 persons, no release was made, as the PNB awaited Br. II's order. - Meanwhile, in 1966, Br. II approved various claims against the estate amounting to P33,872.58. Br. II ordered the return of the passbook to the administrator; and release to the administrator by the PNB of the P41,184 or so much as is needed to pay the debts of the estate. After failing to get reconsideration of the order, the 21 substituted heirs filed this special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON the P41,184 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6 belong to the estate. HELD YES. Ratio The right of heirs to specific distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of the debts. Reasoning Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts. They only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment reconveyed to them, not to the estate, the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for debts of the estate. - Such contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they claim are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. Their right as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having received the same, therefore, in the reconveyance action, was perforce in trust for the estate, subject to its obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts of the estate being first satisfied. - At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone appears more than sufficient to pay the debt and there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will receive how much as

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heirs, the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after payment of the debts. Disposition Petition DENIED.

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NO - It has not been shown that the estate or the intestate succession of the deceased, Jose de la Rosa, was ever opened or that an inventory has ever been presented in evidence, notwithstanding that at the time of the death of De la Rosa, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) was already in force, and that in accordance with its provisions the estate of the deceased should have been administered and liquidated. - In accordance with the provisions of the Act No. 190 it is understood that estate or intestate succession of a deceased person is always accepted and received with benefit of inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of said deceased with their own property, but solely with that property coming from the estate or intestate succession of said deceased. - The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the estate and deciding as to the claims against said estate - After the death of a person the only entity which may lawfully represent a testate or intestate succession is the executor or administrator appointed by the court charged to care for, maintain, and administer the estate of the deceased in such of lands, or for damages done to such lands, shall be instituted or maintained against him by an heir or devisee, until such time as there is entered s decree of the court assigning such lands to the heir or devisee, or until the time or period allowed for paying the debts of the estate has expired, unless the executor or administrator surrenders the possession of the lands to the heir or devisee. - The heir lawfully succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his inheritance only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of said deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by law to consider all claims against the estate of the deceased and to attend to or consider the same

PAVIA v DELA ROSA G.R. No. L-3083 TORRES; March 18, 1907
FACTS - Francisco Granda was appointed executor under the will of Pablo Linart, in which will the minor Carmen Linart was made the only universal heir. - Granda died and was substituted by Jose de la Rosa, who took possession of the personal property of the estate, amounting to 10,673 pesos, Mexican Currency, as well as the lot owned by testator; - Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf, and as guardian of Carmen, executed a power of attorney in behalf of de la Rosa, and the attorney having accepted such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a careless manner, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and wasting the capital, and causing damages amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency, owing to the fact of having retired or disposed of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos Mexican currency, together with interest thereon amounting to 360.25 pesos. - In the complaint, it was alleged that the executor and attorney De la Rosa neglected to appraise, count, and divide the estate of Linart notwithstanding his duty to do so, and leased the testators house to his own relatives at a much lower rental than could have been obtained. - Jose de la Rosa died, leaving the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa as his only heirs and representatives. - As special defense, defendants allege that they are not responsible for the personal actions of the person from whom they derived their possession and title, against whom the plaintiffs neglected to bring action during his lifetime, and even then being without any justifiable reason. ISSUE WON the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa are responsible for the personal acts of Jose dela Rosa HELD

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is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent judge or court. - Whatever may be the rights of action on the part of Rafaela Pavia and the minor, Carmen Linart, the latter represented by the former as guardian, as to the obligations assumed by Jose de la Rosa, now deceased, it must be prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the estate of said deceased Jose de la Rosa, whose executor or administrator is at this time the only representative of the estate or intestate succession of said deceased; and that in view of this fact and considering the law before us, they should not have brought action against Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa for the mere fact that they were the sisters of said deceased Jose de la Rosa, inasmuch as it is actually shown that the defendant De la Rosa died intestate or left during his lifetime any will, or that the two defendants are the heirs of the deceased by virtue of an executed will or by reason of existing law, or whether or not the deceased has left properties, or who is the executor or administrator of the said properties, or whether the properties belonging to the estate of the deceased brother of the defendants were ever adjudicated or partitioned by virtue of an order of court in favor of the defendants. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed, reserving to the plaintiffs to right to institute proper action against the executor or administrator of the properties of the estate of the deceased in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force.

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- Half of the hacienda was sold w/ consent of Javellana, P985 remaining in his possession from the proceeds. - Maximino alleges that as Javellana had already rcvd products of hacienda, hes no longer entitled to retain any portion of the legacy, nor demand that he shld respond for other debts / expenses, bec w/ the value of the portion inherited by heirs Francisco & Sofia Jalandoni, there was more than would be required to pay other debts of estate and expenses. - Javellana alleged that it wasnt proper to ask by motion for relief that Maximino claimed. Complaint shldve been filed and action brought against legatees or parties concerned and not against administrator alone. He alleged that Francisco & Sofia Jalandoni shldnt be considered heirs but simply as legatees. He also alleged that the amt w/ him was not P985 but P949.29 - Judge granted the motion. Javellana appealed. ISSUES 1. WON the legatees are liable to pay debts / expenses of the estate 2. WON separate action is proper for the reliefs prayed for HELD 1. YES (Order granting Maximinos motion shld be reversed) - Testator left no lawful ascendants / descendants. He distributed all his prop in legacies, notwithstanding manner in w/c he designates his nephews Francisco & Sofia Jalandoni, such nephews are likewise legatees. - The will of testator must be respected & complied with. He imposed on his entire estate the obligation to pay his debts w/ products of the same. He prescribed manner in w/c same shall be done until all obligations are extinguished. - Code of Civil Procedure: If testator makes provision by will or designates estate to be appropriated for payment of debts & expenses, they shall be pd accdg to will. But if provision made by will or estate isnt sufficient, such part of the estate as is not disposed of by will, if any, shall be appropriated for that purpose. - Since those who benefited fr the will have not rcvd a universal succession to the estate, but certain prop expressly stated in the will, they shld be considered merely as legatees, w/o right to rcv share of the prop of the deceased until after his debts have been pd. None of the parties

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interested in the will is invested w/ the character of heir. - In this case, the parties in interest were indiscriminately designated as heirs or legatees. - Code of Civil Procedure: As to specific devises, Sec 729 provides exemption fr payment of debts & expenses if theres sufficient other prop. - Debts & expenses, in this case, must be pd pro rata by legatees in manner provided in the will or in accordance w/ Code of Civil Procedure. 2. NO - Any challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to the authentication, every demand / claim w/c party in interest may make must be acted upon and decided w/in same special proceedings, not in a separate action. Judge having jurisdiction in administration of estate shall take cognizance of question.

LIWANAG v CA 14 SCRA 922 CONCEPCION, J.; August 14, 1965

FACTS Gliceria Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio Liwanag. A creditor instituted against her as special administratrix proceedings for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage in favor of the said creditor. Liwanag moved to dismiss on the ground that she cant be sued as special administratrix. CFI denied. She went up to CA on certiorari. CA eventually denied. ISSUE WON a mortgagee can bring an action for foreclosure against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased person HELD YES. - The Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the

BENEDICTO V. JAVELLANA 10 PHIL 197 February 21, 1908

FACTS - For enforcing will made by Maximo Jalandoni, his bro, Maximino Jalandoni petitioned that the administrator / executor, Julio Javellana, be directed to pay him P985 w/c he held in lieu of land donated to petitioner. - Maximino alleged that 1/2 of Hacienda Lantad was bequeathed to him, w/c was subject to payment of debts / expenses of estate w/ respect to products of 1903-1904, and w/c had already been applied to that object by administrator Javellana.

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mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets. - Clearly, the creditor can sue the administratrix, even a special one. Otherwise, the prescriptive period would continue to run against creditors, until a regular administrator is appointed, and the purpose of the mortgage defeated.

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administratrix; (b) that the plaintiff, as well as the defendants, and the notary who prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware of these facts, and they led her to believe that she had the authority to dispose of the dredge in her name and by themselves ISSUE WON Pagilinan, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of Julio Orelleno, was authorized to sell the dredge belonging to said estate HELD No. -In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. -A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchase. (Huse vs. Den, 85 Cal., 390.) -A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of an order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of jurisdiction, does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding administrator. (Wyatt's Adm'r vs. Rambo, 29 Ala., 510.) -Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney. -Pagilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without the authority of the court, and the

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contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.

SANTOS v ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA CACERES OSTRAND; April 5, 1924

FACTS - Engracio Orense, a resident of the municipality of Guinobatan, Albay, died in 1918. He left a will, according to which 6 parcels of land were left to the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) as trustee for various purposes, subject to a usufruct in favor of his wife who, in the absence of descendants, ascendants and collateral heirs of the deceased, was made his universal testamentary heir. - The will was probated in 1919 and the wife was appointed executrix. She stated that the deceased had obtained a franchise to establish and operate an electric light plant in the town of Guinobatan and had signed a contract with the Pacific Commercial Company (PCC) whereby the latter agreed to furnish him the machinery for the plant; that the machinery had began to arrive and that company was demanding payment of the second installment of the purchase price and that she was bound to continue to pay 10 monthly installments in order to completely extinguish the obligation; that she had no funds with which to meet the obligation. She was granted authority to sell or mortgage the liberty bonds or obtain a loan of P10,000 from the bank. - Upon her motion, the court declared her the universal heir of the testator and provided that the various legatees under the will should not take possession of their respective legacies during the lifetime of the appellant or while "the debts of the deceased occasioned by the establishment of the electric light plant in Guinobatan remained unpaid." The court also approved the nominal partition of the estate, whereby the six parcels of land above referred to were duly assigned to the RCC. - Thereafter, she filed another 2 motions praying for authority to sell the parcels of land which were devised to the RCC, for the debt to PCC and the bank. Both contained the indorsement of Julian Ope, the parish priest of Guinobatan. The court granted both motions. - Before her motion to sell 7 small parcels of riceland had been acted upon, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres, a

GODOY V ORELLANO 42 PHIL 342 VILLAMOR; November 17, 1921

FACTS -On January 13, 1919, in consideration P1,000 received by her, a document was executed by Felisa Pagilinan giving Eusebio A. Godoy an option to buy for the sum of P10,000, a dredge which was alleged to be a common property of the vendor and of the Orellano siblings -One of the conditions was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge within twenty days -It was also provided that said option was granted in accordance with the power of attorney executed by Pagilinan's coowners who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by her, their attorney-in-fact. -Pagilinan's coowners did not ratify the option contract. -Before the expiration of twenty days, Godoy was ready to make complete payment of the price, but Pagilinan failed to deliver the dredge. -Godoy brought suit in the CFI against Pagilinan and Orellano siblings praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him of the sum of P9,000 -The defendants Orellano alleged as a special defense that the dredge in question was the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI of Manila, and under the administration of Felisa Pangilinan; that the said dredge is under judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the court has never authorized the sale -Felisa Pagilinan alleges among other things that: (a) That the dredge which was the subjectmatter of the option is property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, of which she is the

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corporation sole, filed a motion asking that the order authorizing the sale of the property willed to the RCC be revoked on the ground that parish priests have no control over the temporalities of the RCC and that, therefore, the consent given by Father Julian Ope was invalid and of no legal effect and that the debts to which the proceeds of the sale are to be devoted are not the debts of the deceased, but were incurred during the administration of the estate by the administratrix through the mismanagement of its property. - Court revoked the authority to sell. ISSUES 1. WON the motion for the revocation of the license to sell was presented out of time and after the order granting the license had become final 2. WON the court erred in revoking the authority to sell HELD 1. NO At the time of the granting of the licensed, a distribution of the estate of the deceased had been made, the order of distribution had become final and the title to the estate in remainder devised to the RCC had become vested. As far as the title to the property was concerned, the administration proceedings were then terminated and the court had lost its jurisdiction in respect thereto. There might still be a lien on the property for the debts of the deceased and legitimate expenses of administration, but it seems obvious that the court could have no jurisdiction to foreclose this lien and order the property sold unless some sort of notice was given the holder of the title. No notice, neither actual nor constructive, was given in the present case. It does not even appear that the order of sale was recorded in the office of the registry of deeds as required by subsection 7 of section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of sale was therefore void for want of jurisdiction in the court and could be vacated at anytime before it had been acted upon and sale made and confirmed. 2. NO The appellant also maintains that the court below erred in vacating the order of sale upon an unverified motion and without the presentation of evidence. In answer, we may say that the court could property take judicial notice of the fact that the corporation sole, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres is the administrator of the temporalities of that church in the diocese

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within which the land in question is situated and that the parish priest have no control thereover.

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a. The appellees by signing the deed of sale in token of approval bound themselves as completely and as effectively as if they had signed the document as vendors, or co-vendors with the administrator. b. Estoppel. Heir, by their conduct in remaining silent when a sale of a decedent's property is made by the executor or administrator, or by so conducting themselves as to consent or assent in the consummation of the sale, may estop themselves from subsequently questioning the validity of the sale. The applicable estoppel by deed, a bar which precludes a party from denying the truth of his deed. Prejudice is not an essential element of this kind of estoppel. c. Equitable estoppel or estoppel by misrepresentation fits as well into the facts of this case. Disapproval of the sale would result in material injury or detriment of the vendees. d. By reason of the sale, and relying on the good faith of these heirs, the vendees, it is inferred from the contract, agreed to the cancellation of the mortgage and stopped collecting interest. With the loans cancelled, the mortgage or mortgages were not foreclosed upon the expiration of their terms. According to the administrator, in his request for authority to sell, he had not paid interest on the entire loan since 1939. e. The subsequent increase in value of the property was not a sufficient reason for turning down the conveyance. Unless fraud, mistake or duress intervened in the sale and there is no charge that any of these vices intervened, the heirs by their assent placed themselves outside the protection of the court. They can not be heard to say that the sale was detrimental to their interest. f. When there are no creditors or all the debts have been paid, "the heirs have the right to ask the probate court to turn over to them both real and personal property without division; and where such request unanimous, it is the duty of the court to comply with it, and there is nothing in section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 1, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court) which prohibits it." (Del Val vs. Del Val, 29 Phil., 534539.) The right to demand the delivery of property includes the right to dispose of it in the manner the heir please. DISPOSITION The order appealed from is reversed and the court below shall enter a new order approving the sale and ordering the

VDA. DE CRUZ vs. JESUS ILAGAN TUASON ; September 30, 1948

FACTS - The administrator, one of the children and heirs of the decedent, with the approval of all other children and heirs of the decedent, executed "an absolute deed of sale" over two parcels of land for P18,000 in favor of Severo Cruz and his wife. - The heirs of the deceased, except Santos Ilagan, the administrator, filed a written opposition to the sale. Judge Paredes, Jr., held that the sale was "improper." Because the sale was, in effect, primarily, intended to pay the mortgage debt, and to sell the aforesaid property preferentially to the mortgagee. ISSUES 1. WON the subject matter of the sale, being in custodia legis, the sale "could only be validly affected under and by virtue of an express authority of the Court having cognizance of the proceedings and only upon strict compliance with the formalities prescribed by law. 2. WON the sale is improper HELD 1. NO. Ratio That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such administration (Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols) . 2. NO. "A sale which the representative makes, with the written assent of all legatees or distributees of the estate, is in effect their sale as well as his, and, if made in good faith, ought to bind strongly provided that all the persons assenting are sui juris." Reasoning

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delivery of the lands in question to the vendees or their successors in interest, with costs against the appellees

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- Court authorized the administrator of the estate to sell the property of the deceased in the form and manner most advantageous to the estate. - Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed a petition requesting approval by the court of the sale of said property to Pedro Santos for the sum of P22,000. The administrator sold the property to said vendee, who gave a better price than that offered by Genara Pineda, which was for P20,000 only. - Court approved said sale, and on July 10, 1928, ordered the vendee Pedro Santos to immediately deliver to the administrator of the estate the price of the property amounting to P22,000. - Heirs of the estate filed a motion praying that the sale of the property as well as the decree of the court approving the same be set aside on the following grounds: (a) That the administrator sold the real property of the estate without having first sold the personal property; (b) that Damiana Manankil, the widow of the deceased, who was also an heir of the estate, did not give her conformity or consent to said sale; (c) that no notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the estate was served upon the heirs, either personally or by publication; and (d) that no hearing was held on said application of the administration. - The administrator filed his answer to the motion, alleging (1) that said real property was sold because the personal property of the deceased was insufficient to meet the obligations of the estate; (2) that the real property of the estate was sold upon the initiative and with the written consent of the heirs and consequently they are now estopped from attacking the validity of said sale; (3) that notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the estate was not necessary inasmuch as the requirements of the law had been virtually satisfied by the written consent of the heirs to the sale; and (4) that the written consent of all of the heirs was not necessary because the law does not specifically require the consent in writing of all of the heirs. - Judge Lukban issued an order sustaining the validity of the sale to Pedro Santos of said land and the machinery and building thereon for the sum of P22,000, and denied the motion of the heirs to set aside said sale. ISSUE

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WON the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regulating the sale of the estate of the deceased and prescribing certain formalities, were not complied with in the sale of the real property in question, and consequently the sale is null and void. HELD YES. Consent of all of the heirs is necessary because each and every one of them is interested in the estate and because the law does not state that the consent of the majority of the heirs is sufficient to bind all of the heirs. The phrase "the consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees and legatees," used in section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be susceptible of any other interpretation than that the consent of all the heirs, etc. is necessary. - The written consent of the widow Damiana Manankil, who was also an heir of the deceased, to the application of the administrator for authority to sell the property of the estate, was not obtained. Furthermore, the widow Damiana Manankil was not notified of the application of the administrator for authority to sell the property of the estate, neither was said application set for hearing. - Section 722 requires a compliance with the formalities as to written consent of heirs, notice of hearing of the application, and hearing of the application before a decree authorizing the sale may be issued. Therefore, the decree of the lower court authorizing the sale of the property in question is not in conformity with the provisions of sections 714 and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because (1) the written consent of all of the heirs was not obtained, (2) the heirs were not notified of the hearing on said application, and (3) no hearing was held on said application ; and, consequently, the sale of the property of the estate, effected by the administrator in pursuance of said decree of the court, is null and void. - In the present case it is true that the heirs, after the sale of the property in pursuance of the order of the court, and after said sale had been approved by the court, made a deposit with the clerk of a sum of money sufficient to pay the existing indebtedness. We are at a loss to understand why the lower court did not even then accept the offer made by the heirs to pay the indebtedness and thereby save the estate from

BAUN v. BAUN 53 Phil. 654 JOHNSON; October 24, 1929

NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Tarlac sustaining the validity of the sale made by the administrator of the estate of Jacinto Baun, of a piece or parcel of land together with the machinery and building thereon belonging to said estate, and denying the motion of the heirs to set aside said sale. FACTS - The administrator of the estate filed a motion, requesting authority to sell personal and real properties of the estate, in order to pay its debts. The motion alleged (a) that the estate was indebted to the Asociacion Cooperation del Credito Rural de Tarlac in the sum of P1,000, with interest at 10%; (b) that it was also indebted to Manuel Urquico in the sum of P7,412.22, with interest at 12%; and (c) that the estate was without sufficient funds to meet said obligations. - Heirs of the estate, with the exception of Damiana Manankil, widow of the deceased, filed their written conformity to the proposed sale of the only real property of the estate described in the inventory, consisting of a parcel of land and the machinery and building thereon. They also stated that Genara Pineda offered P20,000 for said property and that they considered said offer as most advantageous and beneficial to their interest. Said written conformity was signed by Alejandro Calma in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, and by Celedonia Baun, with the consent of her husband Lorenzo Mallari. - Court appointed Jose P. Fausto, as guardian ad litem of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, heirs of Jacinto Baun, with special reference to the proposed sale of the real property of the estate. - Said guardian ad litem filed his report, recommending favorably the proposed sale of the land and the machinery and building thereon to Genara Pineda at the price offered by her.

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the further expense of litigation, in accordance with the provisions of the law. FACTS - 1918, CFI Negros Occidental issued a decree appointing Cecilia Ortaliz as administratrix of estate of Jose Ortaliz Jordan with power to authorize Gil Montilla, among other things, to mortgage to any entity 8 lots; but that the heirs did not give their written consent to the administratrix to make out said power of attorney and to execute said mortgage. Authorization states: "Under such conditions as may be deemed most advantageous to the interests of the estates, etc., etc. . . . of Jose Ortaliz Jordan." No power was given to Cecilia to appoint the substitute of Gil Montilla in said power-ofattorney, but neither is there a prohibition against it in said authorization. - Heirs of Ortaliz allege: > Ernestina, Elisa, and Jose Ortaliz, were declared and ratified in the intestate proceedings of Vicenta Montilla, and Jose Ortaliz y Jordan as the only legitimate and universal heirs of the decedents > by virtue above stated declaration are the legitimate and absolute owners of all the estate left by Jose Ortaliz and Vicenta Montilla, consisting of 8 lots > neither the universal heirs nor their predecessors ever executed any mortgage deed in favor of PNB or any document relating to the mortgage of realty for the increase of corporate capital and exclusive benefit of the Maao Sugar Central Company, Inc. > RD illegally recorded an illegal order of CFI authorizing administratrix without first obtaining the written consent of the heirs, to mortgage the property, not for purposes of administration but solely for business and speculation > RD knew that CFI had no jurisdiction to issue such order > authorization given by CFI to administratrix plainly stated that the administratrix was bound to mortgage said property `for the exclusive benefit of said intestate estates,' but the administratrix through her attorney-in-fact, Gil Montilla, illegally mortgaged said property `for the exclusive benefit of the Maao Sugar Central Company, Inc., a corporation with which the estates were not connected,' and to the serious and utter prejudice of the interests of the intestate estates, as by such a mortgage for

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millions of pesos the property is encumbered forever without any benefit or compensation; > administratrix's illegal power and the unlawful mortgage executed by Gil Montilla, infringed upon the order and RD also illegally recorded it in the registry of deeds > Maao Central Co., Inc. illegally mortgaged said realty for millions of pesos for their own interests and to the serious and utter prejudice of the interests of the intestate estate > administratrix died and RD continued thereafter to give effect to the illegal power of said administratrix and refused to consider it terminated > heirs Ortaliz requested RD to cancel said illegal encumbrances but RD refused > PNB although fully aware that said realty was adjudicated in favor of heirs Ortaliz refused to deliver the original title - CFI (1929) > ordered RD to cancel liens in favor of PNB ISSUE WON mortgage of properties of estate by attorney-in-fact of administratix is valid given that heirs did not give their consent HELD NO Ratio The written consent of the heirs, devisees, and legatees is required because they, as presumptive owners, are the persons directly affected by the sale, and mortgage as well, of the decedent's estate, since a mortgage implies a sale in case of default in paying the debt. The sale of mortgage must be made for the purpose of paying the debts and expenses of administration, because the creditors of the decedent are indisputably entitled to collect their credits even before the distribution of the estate. And, lastly, the sale or mortgage must be beneficial to the heirs, because, in providing for the administration of decedent's estates, the law aims to protect the heirs as well as the creditors of the decedent. Reasoning - SEC. 714. Realty may be sold or encumbered though personal realty not exhausted. When the personal estate of the decease is not sufficient to pay the debts and charges of administration without injuring the business of those interested in the estate, or otherwise prejudicing their interests, and where a

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testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of such debts and charges, the court, on application of the executors or administrator with the consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees, and legatees, residing in the Philippine Islands, may grant a license to the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber for that purpose real, in lieu of personal estate, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgaging or encumbrance or real estate would be beneficial to the persons interested and will not defeat any devise of land; in which case the assent of the devisee shall be required. - According to their provision of law, the probate court may authorize the sale or mortgage of real property, even when there is still some person property, subject to the following conditions: (a) application of the administrator be accompanied by the written consent and approval of the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippine Islands >>did not give their consent nor approval to the mortgage in question (b) sale or mortgage is necessary in order to pay off debts and expenses of administration >>mortgage was not necessary to pay off the debts and expenses of administration (c) sale or mortgage is beneficial to the heirs and other persons interested in the estate >>no evidence that mortgage has been beneficial to the heirs; as a matter of fact, Gil Montilla, the attorney-in-fact, mortgaged the said property for the exclusive benefit of the Maao Sugar Central Co., Inc. - The convenience or benefit to be derived from the sale or mortgage is not the only thing to be considered before a court authorizes a sale or mortgage; the principal requirement is that the heirs give their written consent and approval, for they are the owners of the property to be sold or mortgaged, and cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. Disposition Judgment affirmed in so far as it orders RD to cancel the liens in favor of PNB

ESTATE OF GAMBOA V FLORANZA 12 Phil 191 / G.R. No. L-4069 December 5, 1908
FACTS

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- The commissioners of the estate allowed a claim in favor of Balbino Jaucian for P2,720, which was secured by a mortgage on real estate. They expressed an opinion as to the preferential rights to which this creditor and another mortgage creditor would be entitled in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale. - On the 27th of August, 1906, the administrator presented a petition asked that the court appoint a day for hearing upon the question as to the preference which these creditors enjoyed. - On the 22nd of October, 1906, the court without hearing any parties interested, directed the administrator to ask for: (1) an order directing the sale of the mortgaged property; (2) the mortgage debt be paid from the proceeds of the sale, (3) what remained be distributed among the other creditors. This is one of the orders appealed from. - On the 23rd of October, 1906, the administrator complied with the order of the 22nd of October - On the 12th of November, 1906, the court, without notice and hearing to the parties, ordered the sale of the property to pay the mortgage debt to Balbino Jaucian. It provided that notice of the sale should be given in a certain way. This is the second order appealed from. - 14th of December, 1906, the administrator filed a report of the sale with property sold for P3,005, and asked that the sale be confirmed. - No record that sale ever had been confirmed. On the contrary, it seems that the land upon which the mortgaged house stood did not belong to the estate but belonged to the widow. - The estate insists that the questions as to the preferential right of Jaucian was determined by the commissioners in their report and that report, not having been appealed from, such determination is final and conclusive. BUT the provisions of the code are clear that commissions had no authority to make any ruling whatever in relation to preferential rights which some creditors might have over others. (See sec. 686 and following sections, and sec. 735, Code of Civil Procedure.)

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- It is claimed by the Floriza that, under the provisions of section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Jaucian waived his mortgage lien by presenting his claim before the commissioners. ISSUES 1 WON CFI acting as probate court erred in ordering the sale of the property to satisfy a specific debt 2 WON CFI erred in ordering the sale of the property without notice and hearing as per CivPro requirements HELD: 1 YES - The code states in its sections 714 to 721 various conditions under which the real estate of the deceased may be sold for the payment of debts. There is nothing in any one of these sections nor in any other sections of the code which indicates that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, has any power to order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of paying a mortgage debt which is a lien thereon. - It may be that the court would have authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the purpose of paying other debts of the estate, but there is nothing giving the court authority to sell it for the purpose of paying that specific debt. 2 YES - The court entirely failed to comply with the provisions of section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section requires the administrator to present a petition asking for the sale of the real estate. It also distinctly provides that, when such petition is made, the court shall appoint a time and place for hearing it and shall require notice of the petition and of the time and place of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of general circulation, and that the court may order such further notice given as it deems proper. - No attempt was made to comply with the provisions of the law. No notice whatever was given to any of the persons interested of the application for license to sell.

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Disposition: The orders appealed from are reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the law.

DE JESUS (LEON) V DE JESUS (EUSEBIA) GR L-16553 REYES, JBL; November 29, 1961
NATURE Appeal from order of CFI Bataan FACTS - in the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Melecio De Jesus, widow-administratrix Ines Alejandrino submitted and inventory of the estate, including a lot in Hermosa, Bataan covered by a TCT in the name of Melecio - Eusebia (sister of Melecio) filed a money claim against the estate, but this was never heard. Subsequently, Ines, Eusebia, and the heirs of Cirilo (brother of Melecio) entered into a stipulation of facts, recognizing that siblings Melecio, Eusebia, and CIrilo were co-owners of the lot in Hermosa, Bataan, and that the said lot was registered in Melecios name only in trust. A supplemental agreement was executed whereby Eusebia agreed to waive and renounce her money claim against the estate. These agreements were approved by the probate court the very next day they were executed and submitted for approval - Years later, Ines son Leon replaced her as administrator of the estate. In such capacity, and joining as plaintiff his mother, Leon filed an action for annulment of the stipulations entered by Ines with Eusebia and Cirilo, for lack of jurisdiction and lack of requisite notices to all interested parties. Eusebia, et al. filed a motion to dismiss (based on prescription and res judicata), which the probate court granted. Hence, this appeal ISSUE WON the stipulations in question are void and ineffective, either for lack of jurisdiction of the probate court to act on them, or for lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the deceased HELD YES, the stipulations are void for lack of notice

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Ratio It is mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself, is completely void. Reasoning Rule 90.9 provides that authority can be given by the probate court to the administrator to convey property held in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries of the trust only after notice given as required in the last preceding section; i.e., that. no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper (Rule 90.8). - Here, it is quite probable that there was no such notice, because the heirs were all minors when the proceedings in question took place. It would have been necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for them before they could be validly served said notice, yet the records here do not show that such appointment of guardian was obtained. In fact, any such appointment appears improbable, considering that the stipulations in question were approved the very next day following their execution and submission for approval. It must be observed that in 1948, before the promulgation of the NCC, parents as such were not legal representatives of their children before the courts and could not dispose of their property without judicial authorization. - As this question or notice would ultimately decide the validity or invalidity of the entire proceedings in the probate court leading to the approval of the contested stipulations, plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove their claim that no such notice was given them. If proved, the claim would likewise dispose of the defense of prescription put up by defendants in their MD, for an action to set aside completely void proceedings is imprescriptible and can not be barred by lapse of time. - Unquestionably, the probate court had jurisdiction to approve the stipulations under Rule 90.9, which permits the probate court, whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, to authorize the executor or administrator to deed such property to the person or persons for whose use and

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benefit it was so held. There being no controversy between Ines and the siblings that the latter and Melecio co-own the lot and that it was registered in Melecio's name only in trust for all the coowners, there was no need to file a separate action to an ordinary court to establish the common ownership of the parties over said property; and the probate court could approve, as it did, the agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their common ownership of the property and the trust character of the exclusive title held by Melecio, especially since the parties themselves state that such agreement was entered into to forestall future litigation and to foster family relations, and in addition, Eusebia had agreed, in consideration of the court's approval of said agreement, to waive a money claim against the estate, so that approval of said agreement would really redound to the benefit of the estate and the heirs. - As for the ruling of the RTC that Leon is estopped from questioning the agreements voluntarily entered into by former administratrix Ines, suffice it to repeat what was said in Boaga vs. Soler: a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land; and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor that are not conformable to law. Disposition Appeal granted. Order reversed and case remanded for trial on the merits

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legatees, Maxima Santos Vda. De Blas executed her own will obliging herself to honor said wishes of her husband. Specifically, she vowed to give her husbands heirs and legatees, of her share in the conjugal partnership. The husbands heirs and legatees (me anak kasi itong si Blas sa prior marriage niya) sued on the promise of Maxima the second wife. SC held that the promise in the will is valid and ordered Judge Palma to proceed with the distribution of properties accordingly). NOW - On July 26, 1961, plaintiffs, petitioners herein, filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a motion for the execution of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-14070. - Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was issued by the clerk of the lower court on August 24, 1961, and notice thereof served upon respondent Rosalina Santos on August 29, 1961, giving the latter 10 days within which to comply with the same. - Instead of complying with the order, respondent executrix, on September 15, 1961, filed a motion to set the case for hearing, alleging that it would be difficult to comply with the court's order unless the following questions were first resolved: (1) what properties are to be conveyed by the executrix; (2) to whom conveyance is to be made; and (3) in what proportions conveyance should be effected. - This motion was opposed by herein petitioners as well as by Marta Chivi on the ground that the decision of this Court was clear enough on the questions raised and could be complied with without the necessity of adducing evidence. A reply to this opposition was filed by respondent executrix and a rejoinder thereto presented by petitioners. ISSUE WON respondent executrix is justified in refusing to comply with the order of the Court on the ground that it is vague and impossible to execute since no specific allocation of properties were made (no designation as to who are entitled to receive which property). HELD NO.

BLAS ET. AL. VS. JUDGE CECILIA MUOZ-PALMA 4 SCRA 900 LABRADOR, J. (1962)
NATURE Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Judge Cecilia Muoz Palma FACTS (NOTE: I CULLED OUT THIS ONE FROM AN EARLIER CASE COZ ITS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT CASE WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE 1961 DECISION: In deference to her husbands wishes embodied in a last will and testament where the latter expressed desire to convey properties to certain heirs and

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Ratio The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons is to assign the whole of the properties left for distribution to the heirs in a certain definite proportion, an aliquot part pertaining to each of the heirs. This method or plan of distribution and partition of estates is provided for in section 1 of Rule 91, which reads thus: "Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. Testimony taken on controversy preserved. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. . . . " Reasoning The project of partition mentioned in the dispositive part of our decision sought to be enforced, which is the project of partition in Civil Case No. 6707 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, contains the following resume of the properties received by Maxima Santos in various capacities in the settlement of the estate of her husband, Simeon Blas: 1/2 of all properties left by the deceased as her share in the conjugal partnership property P339,440.00 1/3 free disposition 113,146.66 1/3 of strict legitime devised to Lazaro Blas and sold by the latter to the widow 37,715.56 Total P490,302.22 - The properties received by Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership properties is expressly stated to be P339,440.00. In accordance with the promise made in Annex "H", to convey and deliver to the heirs of the deceased husband one-half thereof, the value of the properties that she was obliged to convey and deliver is one-half of said properties, or

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P169,720. Following what we have stated above, that the practice in the settlement of assets of deceased persons is to assign to each heir or participant a certain aliquot portion, undivided if division is difficult to carry out, the share to be assigned by Maxima Santos is P169,720 divided by P490,302.22 or approximately 34.61 1/3%. In order to carry out the decision of this Court, therefore, the administratrix should have been compelled or ordered to convey and deliver the 34.61 1/3% of the total amount of the properties that she received in the project of partition. - The procedure to be followed is that outlined in section 8 of Rule 90 which reads as follows: "Sec. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. The deed executed by such executor, administrator, or clerk of court shall be as effectual to convey the property as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime; but no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper; nor if the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator will thereby be reduced so as to prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend." - The above-quoted section is applicable because the deceased Maxima Santos had agreed and promised to convey in her will one-half of her share in the conjugal assets to such of the heirs of her husband as she may designate. If the administratrix Rosalina Santos is reluctant to execute the deed as ordered by the Court, the deed of conveyance and delivery of the properties may be executed by the clerk of court, in which case, as declared by the rule, the deed shall be as effectual to

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convey the property as if executed by the deceased in her lifetime. - We note that the petitioners prepared a deed of conveyance to be signed by the clerk of court, BUT THE ERROR IN THE SAID DEED OF CONVEYANCE LIES IN THAT IT INCLUDES ALL OF THE PROPERTIES MENTIONED IN THE PROJECT OF PARTITION, ADJUDICATED TO MAXIMA SANTOS WHICH, AS ABOVE INDICATED, SHOULD NOT BE THE CASE, BECAUSE WHAT WAS ACTUALLY ADJUDICATED TO HER IN THE PROJECT OF PARTITION INCLUDED NOT ONLY HER SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY, BUT ALSO WHAT SHE RECEIVED FROM HER HUSBAND OUT OF THE FREE PORTION, AND WHAT SHE HAD PURCHASED FROM AN HEIR OF HER HUSBAND. - It is to be noted further that in order to have the document executed and approved by the court, the specific steps prior to the execution of the deed of conveyance as pointed out in the last part of the above-quoted section must be strictly followed.

VILLANUEVA VS CHAVEZ 24 Phil 170 CARSON; January 25,1913

NATURE Appeal from an order of CFI of Iloilo dismissing a complaint filed in a separate action incident to the proceedings had in connection with the administration of the estate of Gualberto Galve, deceased, wherein plaintiffs-appellants sought to establish and recover a claim against the estate. FACTS - Hugo Chavez was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Gualberto Galve. A committee was duly appointed to appraise the assets of the estate and to hear and pass upon claims. The claimants, heirs of Lucio Villanueva, deceased, presented to the committee a claim amounting to some P5,575.80. This claim was allowed by the committee, but the administrator gave notice of appeal to the CFIt. This notice was incorporated in the report of the committee, which was filed. - Counsel for the administrator filed a formal notice of appeal setting forth therein that they

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had just been apprised of the filing of the report of the committee. Claimants submitted their formal objections to the allowance of the appeal on the ground that it had not been presented within the period prescribed by law. CFI held that the notice of appeal filed at the time when the committee admitted the claim, which was duly incorporated in their report, was a sufficient compliance with the statutory provisions in this regard, and directed the claimants to file a complaint against the administrator and thus bring the question at issue to trial as in any other ordinary action. - To this order claimants excepted, and again the court directed that a civil action be instituted. On the 24th day of July claimants submitted a bill of exceptions to the trial court which the court refused to testify. Claimants then applied for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court to compel the trial judge to certify the bill of exceptions. The application for the writ was denied by the Supreme Court on August 12, 1911. On the 24th day of October the administrator reported to the CFI that he was ready to make distribution of the estate, and the court thereupon directed that he proceed to the distribution, and at the same time entered an order disallowing the claim of these claimants on the ground of their failure to prosecute the same to final judgment in accordance with the repeated order of the court. It appears that the claimants had no notice as to the action of the court in this regard, and that they were not advised that an application would be made by the administrator for an order of distribution on the 24th day of October. On the 28th of October, four days after the entry of the order directing the administrator to proceed with the distribution and disallowing the claimant's claim, claimants filed their complaint against the administrator for the amount of their claim. Two days thereafter, on the 30th day of October, the administrator was duly notified of the filing of this complaint. Four days thereafter, on the 4th of November, without notice to claimant and in his absence, the administrator presented his accounts and receipts to the Court of First Instance, and on his motion his accounts and the receipts covering the distribution of the estate were accepted and approved, and an order entered discharging the administrator. It appears from the opinion of the trial judge that he had no notice of the filing of the complaint at

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the time when he approved and allowed the administrator's accounts and the report of his proceedings under the order for distribution; and it is clear that the administrator, although he had due notice four days prior to the date of the order discharging him, did not advise the court of that fact at the time when he procured the issuance of the order of discharge. - The administrator filed his answer to claimant's complaint that he was no longer the administrator of the estate of Gualberto Galve, deceased, that his accounts had been settled and distribution made under the order of the court, and that he had been finally discharged and was without legal capacity to defend the action. Claimants contended that he was in fact the administrator at the time of the filing of the suit, that he had notice thereof prior to the time when he procured the order for his discharge. Claimants further alleged that the administrator had fraudulently concealed this knowledge from the court; that at the time of the filing of the suit the proceeds of the estate had not yet been distributed; and that they had no knowledge of the settling of the administrator's accounts, until they were advised of it by his pleadings filed on the 20th of November, setting forth those facts. Claimant's allegations as to lack of notice are not controverted in the record and must therefore be taken to be true. The case was heard upon the pleadings and the court entered an order dismissing the complaint upon the following grounds: (1) Because final distribution was ordered on the 24th day of October, four days before it was filed, and on the same day the claim had been disallowed by the court because of claimant's failure to file their complaint in compliance with the court's order. (2) Because all of the estate having been distributed under an order issued four days prior to the filing of the suit, no property remained in the hands of the administrator. ISSUE WON the action against the administrator for the recovery of the claim against the estate may be prosecuted against him to judgment, where it appears that he has procured the erroneous dismissal of the action, the erroneous disallowance of the claim, and the issuance of orders of the distribution of the estate and for his own discharge which are erroneous in so far as the claimants are affected thereby. HELD YES

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Ratio The claimants, under these circumstances, are entitled to proceed with their action against the administrator, and that the order directing the dismissal of their complaint must be reversed. The supreme court of Mississippi, in discussing the rights of creditors to recover from the estates of deceased debtors, under the Mississippi statutes, says that: "It is only after the payment of all existing debts due from the estate and not barred by the statute of limitations, or upon their payment being properly secured as provided by law, that the administrator may lawfully proceed to the distribution of the estate." Reasoning When is it that an executor or administrator may make a full settlement of the administration? The statute answers, when the estate has been fully administered by the payment of all the debts. When is it, that upon final settlement, the court shall order the executor or administrator to make immediate distribution of all the property in his hands? The answer is, when the estate has been fully administered by the payment of all the debts. It is not to be presumed that whilst the claims of creditors, the primary objects of the trust, remain unsatisfied, the court would order an immediate distribution of all the property in the representative's hands among the secondary objects of the trust, the legatees and distributees. It is not in the power of the court to discharge an executor or administrator until the trusts are fully executed, except in the case of removal or resignation, when the administration de bonis non shall be granted as in case of the death of the executor or administrator, and with like effect on all the proceedings by or against the executor or administrator. From this view of the law, it will clearly appear that while there are valid and subsisting debts against the estate, the executor or administrator cannot be legally discharged from the trust of his administration, except by death, resignation, or removal; and upon the happening of either of these events, it is provided that administration de bonis non shall be granted. This keeps the doors to the estate open, so that the creditors may have an opportunity to collect their claims against it. But if, as is insisted, the settlement of an estate, purporting to be final, precluded existing creditors from instituting suits against the executor or

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administrator for the collection of valid and subsisting claims against the estate, great wrong and injustice would be the result, and the primary purpose, object, and policy of the law, in granting administration upon estates of decedents, would be defeated. To hold the estate liable, notwithstanding such settlement, would, in our opinion, accord with the spirit and policy of the law, and subserve the ends of justice, and it would constitute no hardship upon the executor or administrator, as by a faithful discharge of his duties he would have it in his power to wind up and completely finish the administration of a solvent estate, within a reasonable time, by giving the proper notice to creditors to present their claims within the time prescribed by the law, and all claims against the estate, of which he had no notice, within the time limited by the law, after publication of such notice, would be barred, and could no longer be regarded as valid and subsisting debts against the estate. And the law thus being complied with, the executor or administrator, after paying all the debts of which he had any knowledge within the time limited by the statute, could safely make a final settlement of the estate, and a distribution thereof among the legatees or distributees. But to hold that a settlement, purporting to be a final settlement of an estate, made without a compliance with the requisitions of the law, would be conclusive upon creditors would put them completely at the mercy of the executor and administrator and the legatees and distributees. Disposition: The orders of the trial judge declaring claimants' action abandoned, disallowing their claim, and dismissing their complaint should be revoked

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- From the month of May, 1931, these testamentary proceedings have been pending settlement and distribution in court, due to incidents brought about by the only two heirs, daughters of the deceased testatrix. - Various projects of partition were presented but all of them were opposed by the co-heir Flora Castillo. In order to arrive at a definite solution, her sister Jovita, filed a petition offering to pay all the lawful obligations of the estate on condition that she be awarded the parcel of land in Talahiban and 2/3 of the land in Laiya, as provided in the probated will. The proposition was approved without opposition in an order, and the administrator presented a project of partition in accordance therewith. - In the amended project of December 29, 1933, approved by the court, it was stated that the assets of the inheritance, consisting of said two parcels of land, amount to P10,165.46. The liabilities, which include the indebtedness and other obligations of the estate, the redemption of 20 hectares of the land in Talahiban mortgaged to Lorenzo Sales and Gabino Tejada, and Jovita Castillo's betterments of one third 1/3 and another 1/5 under the seventh clause of the will, amount to P8,526.49, leaving a balance or difference of P1,638.97 which constitutes the net legitime to be prorated between the two heirs. In accordance therewith, each of them should receive properties worth P819.485. - To carry out the distribution provided in the will and give each heir her share of the estate, adjudication was made as follows: To Flora Castillo, 16 hectares, 38 ares and 97 centares of the land in Laiya, on the eastern part thereof, from north to south, the value of which, at P50 a hectare, is P819.485; and to Jovita Castillo, 23 hectares, 61 ares and 3 centares of the land in Laiya, on the western part thereof, from north to South, the value of which, at P50 a hectare, is P1,180.515, and the entire parcel of land in Talahiban with an area of 40 hectares, 82 centares, the value of which at P200 a hectare, is P8,165.46. ISSUES 1. WON the amended project of partition should have been approved. 2. WON the inclusion of the items of P3,104.92, P2,000, P3,388.48 and P2,033.09 among the liabilities of the project was erroneous.

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3. WON the true value of the distributable net assets is P9,357.33 as assessed by the appellant. HELD 1. YES - It is contended that the court should not have approved the amended project of partition because the debts and obligations of the estate have not yet been paid and because the court, in approving it, did not require Jovita Castillo to file a bond to secure the payment of said debts and obligations. - There is no doubt that under sections 734, 735, 739 and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the debts and expenses of administration should be paid by the executor or administrator, and the estate should not be distributed among the heirs until all such debts and expenses have been paid; however, there being no objection in this case, on the part of the creditors, and the solvency of the co-heir subrogated not having been questioned, there is no good reason to reverse the order appealed from for said cause alone. The appellant, not being one of the acknowledged creditors, is not entitled to oppose the proceedings on this ground. - With respect to the bond, neither is she the right party to interpose any objection, but, in all cases, the creditors who have not done so. At any rate, even after the amended project of partition is approved, and pending the delivery of the hereditary estate, the defect may be corrected if some of the acknowledged creditors appear and petition that said co-heir file some security in case she were not ready to settle immediately the debts and other obligations of the estate. 2. NO - With the exception of the second item, the amounts in question have been entered in said liabilities for the purpose of determining and finding the liquid assets or net legitime to be prorated between the two heirs. As to the amount of the debts and expenses of administration, there can be no difficulty whatsoever; their existence is acknowledged by the administrator and the appellant has not questioned them. - As to the item of P2,000, Jovita Castillo offered to pay the debts and other expenses of administration on the condition stated in the facts. Under the will and the Civil Code, the redemption of the mortgage should be defrayed by Jovita, but her proposition had been approved by the court and the order had become final

CASTILLO VS BOLAOS (Administrator) 62 PHIL 641 IMPERIAL; December 21, 1935

NATURE Appeal from the order of the court of March 26, 1934, approving the amended project of partition presented by the attorney for the administrator on December 29, 1933. FACTS - Flora Castillo, one of the heirs of the deceased Manuela Perez, brought this appeal.

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because the appellant had consented to it, so the estate should now make payment thereof. - The court, considering the transaction beneficial and that it would bring about a prompt settlement and distribution of the inheritance, approved the proposition and the appellant neither excepted to the order approving it nor appealed therefrom. Thus, the opposition now entered by her is out of time. 3. NO - This amount is erroneous. If the value stated in the project is correct and the amount of the liabilities is that appearing therein, as held by us in the preceding paragraphs, it necessarily follows that the net assets amount to only P1,638.97. Disposition: Order is affirmed reserving to the creditors of the estate appearing in the amended project of partition of December 29, 1933, their right to demand immediate payment of their credits of Jovita Castillo, or that she file a sufficient bond in the case she has to defer payment thereof.

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her heirs, and, in the second, she revoked the first and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. - Tirso Reyes (plaintiff), as guardian of the minor children of Salud, presented the first will of Maria. The lower court rejected it (and accepted the second will) and held that Salud was not the daughter of Maria by her husband Bibiano. The SC, on appeal, affirmed. (FIRST ACTION) - Having lost in the claim for a share in the estate of Maria, Reyes (representing the minor children of Salud) now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of Bibiano, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria. This action is to recover one-half portion of said usufruct. (SECOND ACTION) - This action afforded Milagros Barretto-Datu an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano. She argued that the Project of Partition is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of Milagros, who was then a minor. - The lower court declared the project of partition of the estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud, was not a daughter of Bibiano and Maria, on the basis of Article 10812 of the Civil Code of 1889. It further rejected the contention of Reyes that since Bibiano was free to dispose of 1/3 of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud to the extent, at least, of such free part. The lower court concluded that, as Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. The lower court dismissed Reyes complaint and ordered them to return the properties received under the project of partition, but denied Milagros claim for damages. ISSUE:
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WON the partition of the estate of Bibiano should be set aside. HELD: NO - Art 1081 of the old CC has been misapplied. Salud had been instituted heir in Bibiano's last will and testament together with Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and thus was not null and void under that article. Art 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her from being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros (as she was allotted a share less than her legitime), Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. - Milagros contends that the partition was void as a compromise on the civil status of Salud in violation of Art 1814 of the old CC. This is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Art 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of Bibiano, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. - At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia v Reyes), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal;

REYES v BARRETTO-DATU G.R. No. L-17818 REYES, JBL; Jan 25, 1967
FACTS: - The spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo, during their lifetime, acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. - When BIBIANO died on Feb 18, 1936 in Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto and Milagros Barretto(-Datu) and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa and Felisa and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond in San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, however, was reserved for his widow. Maria was appointed administratrix, and she prepared a project of partition, which she signed in her own behalf and as guardian of then minor Milagros. The CFI approved it, and distribution of the estate and delivery of shares followed. Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs and the issuance of new titles in her own name. - When MARIA died on Mar 5, 1948, it was discovered that she had executed two wills. In the first will, she instituted Salud and Milagros as

A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.

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but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Thus, where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and it has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. - Milagros argues that since the court's distribution was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud and Maria (who signed for herself and as guardian of Milagros), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada v Mata, which held that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise agreement or proceeding, was consummated", and here invoked by Milagros, cannot be applied as the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Moreover, Milagros argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano. In fact it was the court's duty to do so3. - That Milagros was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. In Ramos v Ortuzar: The proceeding for probate is
3

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one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice; and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them (citing Manolo v Paredes). A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees (citing Santos v Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres) A party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. As held in Reyes v Barretto Datu (First Action), Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of then minor Milagros. It is now incontestable that Milagros was not only made a party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian; she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the court which settled her father's estate. - Milagros further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria) could not have ignored that Salud was not her child, the act of Maria in agreeing to the partition and distribution was a fraud on Milagros rights and entitles her to relief. SC held that first, there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano was judicially settled and distributed, Salud knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it was Maria who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children can be held liable therefor. Second, granting that there was such fraud, relief can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and this period had lapsed long ago when she contested the partition in 1956 (whether counted from date she became of age in 1944, or when she became aware of the true facts in 1946). To evade this, Milagros contends that her delay in filing was due to Reyes verbal promise to reconvey the properties. However, there is no reliable evidence to support this. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made, it can not bind the minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in

PROF. LEO BATTAD

interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro). Disposition Decision reversed and set aside in so far as it orders Reyes to reconvey to Milagros the properties, and affirmed in so far as it denies any right of Milagros to accounting.

DAEL V IAC 171 SCRA 524 March 31, 1989; REGALADO

FACTS - Cesario Cabutihan was first married to Bienvenida Durana. When the latter died, Cesario married her sister, Victorina Durana. - Cesario died followed by Victorina Durana who died intestate . - The first marriage of Cesario produced legitimate children who are the intervenors in the case although Carmencita Cabutihan instituted the case as petitioner. - The second marriage of Cesario with Victorina did not produce any issue; however, the latter's heirs are the children of her two sisters and a brother including the petitioner and the intervenors who are all the children of Bienvenida. - It is claimed by all the oppositors that they are entitled to 2/3 portion of the estate of Victorina Durana considering that their predecessors-ininterest are the brother and sister of Victorina Durana; while the remaining 1/3 portion should devolve to the petitioner and the intervenors who represent their mother Bienvenida Durana and the other sister of Victorina Durana. - During the second marriage of Cesario and Victorina, they were engaged in a copra business and a public transportation business, with Victorina managing the former. After the demise of Cesario, Victorina and the private respondents entered into a extra-judicial settlement of his estate. - Part of the properties adjudicated to Victorina include the copra business as well as some of the vehicles used in the transportation business. Subsequently, however, the vehicles were

Act 190, SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. - When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

transferred to the private respondents by virtue of a "deed of sale". - Carmencita Cabutihan filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Victorina Durana, wherein she also prayed for her appointment as administratrix. Petitioners herein filed an opposition, asking that the letters of administration be issued instead to herein petitioner Lucilda Dael. The other private respondents, on their motion, intervened in the case. - Court below appointed Amado Zoleta as special administrator of the estate of the late Victorina Durana . Said special administrator, upon order of the probate court, submitted an inventory of the properties of the estate . - A "Supplementary Inventory" was filed by the special administrator covering other real properties of the estate of Victorina, consisting of the undivided shares in the inheritance of Cesario Cabutihan from his parents. - Respondents moved for the disapproval of said inventories claiming that the properties listed therein were either acquired during the first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan or were merely the products or fruits of the properties of said first union or otherwise acquired through the funds thereof. - TC: Victorina had no paraphernal properties brought or contributed to her marriage with Cesario; that the copra business was formed during the first marriage. All the properties listed in the inventories in her name or jointly with Cesario do not belong to her exclusively; these properties in are either the assets of Bienvenida as her paraphernal property or as the conjugal partnership assets of spouses Cesario or the latter's capital. - To determine, therefore, the extent of the estate of Victorina, the conjugal estate of Cesario Cabutihan and Bienvenida Durana must be settled or liquidated first; of the conjugal estate shall be inherited by Cesario Cabutihan and his 5 children; the inheritance of Cesario in the Estate of Bienvenida in addition to the other half shall constitute Cesario's estate which shall be inherited by his second wife and his legitimate children. - The probate court thereby disapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale. The latter two were annulled for being simulated or fictitious and for involving conjugal properties of the first

A2010
marriage, including properties of Bienvenida, to which Victorina is not an heir. - Petitioners appealed to the IAC. - Carmencita filed a "motion for authority to withdraw funds" from the estate, in the amount of P90,000.00 to be partitioned among the heirs in accordance with the proportion provided for in the aforesaid decision of the probate court. Motion was granted. - IAC: affirmed decision of lower court. ISSUES 1. WON the copra business, as well as the properties listed in the inventories as acquired during the second marriage, are assets of the conjugal partnership of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. 2. How will the properties involved between the two conjugal partnerships be apportioned. 3. WON the court erred in allowing the withdrawal of funds for distribution to the heirs as advance inheritance. HELD 1. NO. When Bienvenida died, the first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. It was also at this point in time that the inheritance was transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida. Thus, her heirs, acquired respective and definite rights over-onehalf of the conjugal partnership property which pertained to Bienvinida. Consequently, whatever fruits or income may thereafter be derived from the properties, including the copra business, would no longer be conjugal but would belong in part to the heirs in proportion to their respective shares. The fruits and income of the other half of the property of the conjugal partnership would exclusively belong to Cesario. - The marriage of Cesario and Victorina also produced the corresponding legal consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or income of the separate properties of the spouses would be conjugal, including those acquired through their industry. Hence, the fruits and income of Cesario's share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership properties of the second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired through these last-mentioned properties would likewise be conjugal in nature.

PROF. LEO BATTAD

- It would have been ideal had there been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. Unfortunately, the Court cannot determine from the records the amount of such properties at the time of Bienvenida's demise. What appears evident, however, is that, considering the continuity in the operation of the two businesses during the marital coverture between Cesario and Victorina which spanned a period of 14 years, and the fact that after Cesario's death Victorina still actively engaged in the same business until her own death 5 years later, the properties enumerated in the aforesaid inventories submitted to the probate court could not all have been properties of the first marriage. 2. Guidance should be sought from the provisions of the Civil Code to the effect that whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by the same person should be carried out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses. The first marriage existed for approximately 15 years while the second marriage lasted for about 14 years . Applying the aforestated rule, the first conjugal partnership will be prorated a share of 15/29 of the properties included in the inventory while the second conjugal partnership will get 14/29 thereof. Not to be included, however, are the real properties listed in the supplementary inventory because they definitely belong to the estate of Cesario as the latter's inheritance from his parents. - 1/2 of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited by him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida. The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided, 1/2 to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his heirs, namely, Victorina and his 5 children.

18

SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

- To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for distribution to her heirs shall consist of her 1/2 share in the conjugal properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth (1/6) share in the estate of Cesario as an heir. 3. NO. Said order is within the contemplation and authority of Rule 109, Section 2 whereof provides that notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules. Rule 90, on the other hand, provides in part that "no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs." - It is true that "partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious - courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance." The respondent court correctly held than "if oppositors would stand to share more in the inheritance than what was fixed for them in the appealed judgment, the estate has sufficient assets to ensure an equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and final judgment in the proceedings." Also, it does not appear that there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond required. It is clear that the provisions of the Rules of Court, as well as the jurisprudence thereon, were followed in this particular incident. Disposition. Decision MODIFIED.

A2010 PABLO RALLA vs. J. UNTALAN [Heirs of Pedro Ralla] 172 SCRA 858 SARMIENTO; April 27, 1989
FACTS -CFI Albay, Sp. Proc. 564: Rosendo Ralla, widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will, leaving his entire estate to his son Pablo and nothing to his other son, Pedro. In the course of the hearing, Pablo filed MTD on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the Rosendos will, for its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the CA and the SC. On the scheduled hearing, Pablo reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will. Consequently, Judge Quicho decreed equal division of Rosendos estate between his two sons, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. -Civil Case No. 2023: Pedro Ralla filed action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella. The brothers agreed to compromiseand entered into a project of partition whereby the 63 parcels of land were amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved by Judge Grageda. -Sp. Proc. 1106: Eleven years later, Joaquin Chancoco, Pablos brother-in-law filed petition for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him P5T. Pablo filed a manifestation stating that he had no objections to the probate. His "Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the Probate of the Will" and the petition for probate itself were granted despite the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro. -When special administrator Teodorico Almine (Pablos son-in-law) took possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo, he also took possession of the 63 parcels of land covered by the project of partition. The heirs of Pedro Ralla moved to exclude these parcels. Judge Untalan granted the motion. Judge Reyes denied Pedro Rallas MFR. -But in a subsequent Omnibus Order [August 3, 1979], Judge Untalan ruled, inter alia, that the 63 parcels should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla and

PROF. LEO BATTAD

that said the consolidated Sp Proc Nos. 564 and 1106 should proceed as probate proceedings. -About two years later, the heirs of Pedro Ralla filed another petition for the exclusion of the subject parcels of land, causing Judge Untalan [July 16, 1981] to reconsider his earlier Omnibus Order, thereby excluding the 63 parcels. Pablos MFRs were denied by succeeding Judge Reyes. Hence this special civil action for certiorari. ISSUES 1. WON the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels were void (having been allegedly made after the filing of the petition for the probate of the will and before said will was probated) 2. WON Judge Untalan committed GAD in flipflopping (reversing the Omnibus Order two years after issuance) as to the exclusion of the 63 parcels of land HELD inebriated 1. The argument is flawed and misleading. The partition was made in the civil case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will of Rosendo Ralla. -The rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. The rule is inapplicable where there are two separate cases (partition and probate), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla) comprising dissimilar properties. 2. NO. a. The Omnibus Order resolved ten divergent issues springing from four separate special proceedings pending in CFI Albay. There are at least nine specific directives contained therein. A distinction must be made between those directives that partake of final orders and the other directives that are in the nature of interlocutory orders. -In the case at bar, the part denying the motion for exclusion of the parcesl of land was interlocutory in character because it did not decide the action with finality and left substantial proceedings still to be had. The order of inclusion of the subject parcels of land was a mere incident that arose in the settlement of the estate of

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

Rosendo Ralla. It is elementary that interlocutory orders, prior to the rendition of the final judgment, are, at any time, subject to such corrections or amendments as the court may deem proper. b. It is worthy to note that the properties involved in the present petition were the subject of the project of partition signed by both Pablo and Pedro Ralla. Said project of partition was approved by the lower court and the brothers received their respective shares. Upon their motion Judge Grageda declared the partition case closed and terminated; no appeal was made from this decision; consequently, it attained finality. -Torres v Encarnacion, 89 Phil. 678: Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it. Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition . . .They cannot attack the partition collaterally. c. That part of the Omnibus Order setting aside the project of Partition was clearly erroneous. Realizing this and the fact that it was not yet too late for him to correct his mistake, Judge Untalan issued the questioned Order of July 16, 1981. This is perfectly valid. -The partition in CivCase2023 is valid and binding upon Pablo and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their mother Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition. -Pablo Ralla could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla. Could it be that the petitioner's keen interest in including these lands in the estate proceedings is directly related to the fact that his son-in-law is the administrator of the said estate of Rosendo Ralla?

A2010
Disposition Petition is dismissed.

PROF. LEO BATTAD

leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the said section and Chapter XXXIX, Part II, of the same Code. The proceeding, as provided by section 750, should be commenced by petition and not by complaint. - In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former. In view of these allegations it is erroneous to hold that the said parties are without right" either to appear in the case or to substantiate their respective alleged rights. This unfavorably resolves the petitioners' first assignment of error. Disposition: Affirmed

SANCHEZ V CA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO LAGUNA V. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC. IMPERIAL J; Feb. 25, 1938
FACTS - Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, claimed in a petition for escheat the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared and assailed the petition. -Municipal Council based their petition for escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed from then on to the Crown of Spain. Thus following the logic that the Phil. government particularly the municipality of San Pedro, succeeded the Crown of Spain. ISSUE WON the property may be subject to escheat HELD NO, it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heir or person who may legally claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a petition for escheat should not lie. - From the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Fathers, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition. If the municipality of San Pedro believes that it has some other right to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its petition which gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot avail itself successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure. - Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without

CITY OF MANILA V ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOPOF MANILA 36 PHIL 815 JOHNSON, J; August 30, 1917
FACTS - Action was commenced in CFI of Manila, its purpose was to have declared escheated to the city of Manila certain property situated in and around said city; that said property consists of 5 parcels of land located in the districts of Malate and Paco, city of Manila. The theory of the plaintiff, City of Manila, is that one Ana Sarmiento (ANA) was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "heir or person entitled to the same." - CFI ruled that the prayer of the plaintiff should be denied without any finding as to costs. From that conclusion the plaintiff appealed to this court and made a number of assignments of error. City of Manila appealed. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) intervened and opposed position of City of Manila.

20

SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

ISSUE WON CFI erred in denying the prayer of City of Manila to have declared escheated to the latter the property in question. HELD NO. - The following facts were proved by a large preponderance of the evidence: That ANA resided, with her husband, in the city of Manila sometime prior to Nov. 17, 1668; that on said date she made a will; that she added a codicil to said will; that on May 19, 1669, she made another will; that said will contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas;" that the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas" succeeding that of her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that such subsequent administration should continue perpetually; that ANA died in 1672; that for more than 200 years the intervenor, RCAM, through his various agencies, has administered said property; that RCAM has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession and administration of said property in accordance with the terms and provisions of ANAs will. - Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated: "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property, under the procedure provided for by Secs. 751 and 752, may be declared escheated. - The proof shows that ANA did not die intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was intended by the original owner

A2010
- So, the property in question CANNOT be declared escheated as of the property of ANA. If by any chance the property may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons subsequent to ANA died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same. Disposition Judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

PROF. LEO BATTAD

his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until Feb 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein, Pablo Lorenzo, was appointed in his stead. -During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty valued at P27,920 and personalty valued at P1,465, and allowing a deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment consisting of a 1% monthly interest from July 1, 1931 to the date of payment and a surcharge of 25% on the tax, amounted to P2,052.74. On March 15, 1932, the defendant filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings pending before CFI-Zamboanga (SP Proc No. 302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff herein, be ordered to pay to the govt the said sum of P2,052.74. The motion was granted. On Sep 15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said amount under protest, notifying the defendant at the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. The defendant overruled the plaintiff's protest and refused to refund the said amount. -Oct 4, 1932: plaintiff brought this action in CFIZamboanga for refund of the P2,052.74 and for collection of interest thereon at 6% per annum, computed from Sep 15, 1932. Defendant set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax in question and which was not included in the original assessment. CFIZamboanga dismissed both complaint and counterclaim. Both parties appealed to SC. ISSUES 1. When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied? 2. WON the inheritance tax should be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the testator's death 3. WON it is proper to deduct the compensation due to trustees in determining the net value of the estate subject to tax 4. WON Act No. 3606, favorable to the taxpayer, should be given retroactive effect 5. WON there has been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax HELD

LORENZO V POSADAS 64 PHIL 353 LAUREL; June 18, 1937

FACTS -May 27, 1922: one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On June 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in CFIZamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. Said will provides, among other things, as follows: 4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley. 5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or otherwise disposed of for a period of 10 years after my death, and that the same be handled and managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that he be directed that the same be used only for the education of my brother's children and their descendants. 6. I direct that 10 years after my death, my property be given to the above mentioned Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks most advantageous. xxx xxx xxx 8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley. -CFI-Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley 10 years after. The 2 executors named in the will was appointed trustee on March 8, 1924. Moore took

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

1. Accrues from death; but should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to P. J. M. Moore as trustee on March 10, 1924 Reasoning Accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death. Authentication and probate of a will as a necessary condition to effect transmission of property does not affect the general rule. The authentication of a will implies its due execution but once probated and allowed the transmission is effective as of the death of the testator. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date. From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the obligation to pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the payment on inheritance tax is clearly fixed by sec 1544(b) of the Revised Admin Code as amended by Act No. 3031, in relation to sec 1543 of the same Code. 2. YES. Reasoning Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that in 1932 the real properties in question had a reasonable value of only P5,787. This amount added to the value of the personal property left by the deceased, which the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would generate an inheritance tax which, excluding deductions, interest and surcharge, would amount only to about P169.52. If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value. "The right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at the moment of death, and hence is ordinarily measured as to any beneficiary by the value at that time of such property as passes to him. 3. NO.

A2010
Reasoning Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in arriving at the net value of the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be computed. In this case, defendant and CFI allowed a deduction of only P480.81. This sum represents expenses and disbursements of the executors until March 10, 1924, among which were their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. Plaintiff contends that the compensation and fees of the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28, should also be deducted under sec 1539 of the Revised Admin Code which provides, in part, as follows: "In order to determine the net sum which must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned, there shall be deducted, in case of a resident, the judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings." - A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. But from this it does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax. Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator intended that the duties of his executors and trustees should be separated. On the contrary, in par 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his real estate be handled and managed by his executors until the expiration of the period of 10 years therein provided. Judicial expenses are expenses of administration but, the compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but in the management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come properly within the class or reason for exempting administration expenses. Service rendered in that behalf have no reference to closing the estate for the purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and are not required or essential to the perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. Trusts of this character are created for the benefit of those to whom the property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the preservation of the estate. No sound reason is given to support the contention that such expenses should be considered in fixing the value of the estate for the purpose of this tax. 4. NO.

PROF. LEO BATTAD

Reasoning Defendant levied and assessed the inheritance tax due from the estate of Thomas Hanley under sec 1544 of the Revised Admin Code, as amended by Act No. 3606. But the latter went into effect on Jan 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not the law in force when the testator died on May 27, 1922. - It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the death of the decedent. The taxpayer cannot foresee and ought not to be required to guess the outcome of pending measures. Of course, a tax statute may be made retroactive in its operation. Liability for taxes under retroactive legislation has been "one of the incidents of social life." But legislative intent that a tax statute should operate retroactively should be perfectly clear. Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. 5. YES. Reasoning The liability to pay a tax may arise at a certain time and the tax may be paid within another given time. The mere failure to pay one's tax does not render one delinquent until and unless the entire period has lapsed within which the taxpayer is authorized by law to make such payment without being subjected to the payment of penalties for failure to pay his taxes within the prescribed period. It was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent's property to the trustee. Delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the TC in conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word "trust" is not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust. The words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. To create a trust by will the testator must indicate in the will his intention so to do by using language sufficient to separate the legal from the equitable estate, and with sufficient certainty designate the beneficiaries, their interest in the trust, the purpose or object of the trust, and the property or subject matter thereof. Stated otherwise, there must be a concurrence of 3 circumstances: 1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; 2) a definite subject; 3) a certain object;

22

SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing." There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointment a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will. - Moore became trustee on March 10, 1924. The mere fact that the estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid on or before March 10, 1924, to escape the penalties of the laws. A trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust. When Moore accepted the trust and took possession of the trust estate he thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui que trust. He did not acquire any beneficial interest in the estate. He took such legal estate only as the proper execution of the trust required and, this estate ceased upon the fulfillment of the testator's wishes. The estate then vested absolutely in the beneficiary. - The highest considerations of public policy also justify this conclusion. If payment of the tax could be postponed or delayed by the creation of a trust of the type at hand, the result would be plainly disastrous. Testators may provide, as Thomas Hanley has provided, that their estates be not delivered to their beneficiaries until after the lapse of a certain period of time. In the case at bar, the period is 10 years. In other cases, the trust may last for 50 years, or for a longer period which does not offend the rule against perpetuities. The collection of the tax would then be left to the will of a private individual. - The estate which plaintiff represents has been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and surcharge provided by law in such cases. Grand total of P3,634.43; plaintiff already paid P2,052.74; only P1,581.69 is legally due from the estate; this last sum is P390.42 more than the amount demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim; as defendant cannot be given more than what he claims, plaintiff is liable only in the sum of P1,191.27.

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Disposition The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff in both instances.

PROF. LEO BATTAD

Upon this assurance, the SC denied the motion of the Martinez heirs to dismiss the appeal. It will be seen therefore that the order of Judge Paredes nullifying and resolving the sale of the receivership property to Reyes, was never effectually appealed from, and has acquired the character of a final and irrepealable order. - Notwithstanding the declaration of nullity made by Judge Paredes and the observation of the SC that Reyes could no longer be treated in any other character than that of receiver, he has continuously pretended to be the owner of the property by virtue of the purchase and he has refused to submit any account of his receivership in the subsequent years. In view of this attitude, a number of motions were made by adverse parties seeking to bring him to account and to have him removed with the result that, in 1925, Judge Paredes revoked the appointment of Estanislao Reyes as receiver without prejudice to the rendering of an account within 15 days from the notification. - Reyes contended that he has made expenditures necessary to the care and conservation of the property over and above the proceeds obtained from the coconuts produced by the land and that the lower court had no power to turn him out at least as long as the expenditures made by him have not been reimbursed. ISSUES 1. WON the lower court has the power to remove a receiver. 2. WON Reyes is entitled to reimbursement. HELD 1. YES. Reasoning There cannot be the slightest doubt of the power of the lower court to remove a receiver and terminate a receivership under section 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and in view of the attitude of the appellant, the impropriety of his longer remaining in office is apparent. 2. YES. Reasoning If upon the prompt submission and examination of the receiver's accounts, it should be found that he has actually paid out for the conservation and protection of the property subject of the receivership more than he has received by way of income, or should have

MARTINEZ v. GRANO 42 PHIL 35 STREET; August 14, 1926

FACTS - Estanislao Reyes was appointed receiver and entered into possession of property consisting the estate of a certain Martinez in 1921. The property did not produce enough income to meet the expenses and pay the sums due the holder of first mortgage, El Hogar Filipino. So, he recommended to the court that the property be sold. Judge Paredes made an order authorizing the receiver to sell the land at an upset price of P38,000. In 1922, Judge Borbon renewed this authority twice, both with the upset price of P35,000. - Estanislao was unable to find a purchaser, and he himself came forward with an offer to take the property at P35,138.49, it being understood that he would assume all obligations encumbering the property, the amount of which was to be deducted from the amount of his bid. Judge Borbon authorized the clerk of the court to execute a deed transferring the property to Reyes. The Martinez heirs opposed the sale. Clemencia Grao also opposed because of the inclusion of 3 parcels of property which belonged to her, and she successfully prosecuted an appeal to the SC. The SC ruled for the exclusion of Graos land. There was no consideration of the validity of the sale there being no appeal by the Martinez heirs against the sale as a whole. - Judge Paredes, however, decreed a resolution of the sale for non-performance of the conditions of the sale (purchase price should have been deposited first with the clerk of court). Reyes' attorneys attempted to appeal the order as it affected both the Martinez heirs and Grao. No notice of the intention to appeal, however, was served upon the Martinez heirs, with the result that when the bill of exceptions came to the SC, a motion was made by the Martinez heirs to have the appeal dismissed. Upon this the attorneys for Reyes replied that the appeal involved only the 3 parcels of land which had in a previous decision been declared by this court to belong to Grao.

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received in the exercise of reasonable diligence, such balance in his favor should be recognized as a lawful claim constituting a lien on the property. - The order appealed from will therefore be affirmed with the modification that Reyes is given 40 days from the date of the return of this record to the lower court within which to submit his accounts as receiver, upon the filing of which the adverse parties will be notified in order that they may controvert the same if they see fit; and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Disposition Order modified.

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Gloriosa and his two brothers-in-law for a consideration of P3k each. - Lutero told the mayor that he was not selling the land and that he could not do so because the 5-year period had not yet elapsed but the mayor told him to just sign the affidavits because after 5 years his sisters will get the land and pay for them and that if they would not pay, the mayor will take steps to return the land personally to him. Lutero stated that he has not been paid for the land by his sisters. - Lutero claimed that as early as 1940-1941 he had already been in occupancy of the 12 hectares. Title to the property had been issued to him as early as April 26, 1967, after the homestead patent was issued in his favor on April 7, 1967. His 3 sisters occupied portions of the property only in 1969, after he was forced to sign the affidavits by Mayor Abragan. - RTC ruled for Lutero. CA affirmed ISSUE WON Lutero acquired the lot in trust for the benefit of the heirs of Eugenio HELD NO. - "A trust is the legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter." Trust relations between parties may be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as a matter of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into by operation of law. - Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby

PROF. LEO BATTAD

becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or hold the legal right to property, which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. - However, it has been held that a trust will not be created when, for the purpose of evading the law prohibiting one from taking or holding real property, he takes a conveyance thereof in the name of a third person. - Petitioners did not present any evidence to prove the existence of the trust. They merely alleged that LUTERO, through fraudulent means, had the title of the land issued in his name contrary to the alleged agreement between the family that LUTERO would merely hold the lot in trust for the benefit of EUGENIO's heirs. The alleged agreement was not proven and even assuming that the petitioners duly proved the existence of the trust, said trust would be of doubtful validity considering that it would promote a direct violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act as regards the acquisition of a homestead patent. A homestead applicant is required by law to occupy and cultivate the land for his own benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else. - Furthermore, under Sec 12 of The Public Land Act (CA 141), a person is allowed to enter a homestead not exceeding 24 hectares. In the present case, it is not disputed that EUGENIO already applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares of land and was disqualified from applying for an additional 12 hectares. If we uphold the theory of the petitioners and rule that a trust in fact existed, we would be abetting a circumvention of the statutory prohibitions stated under the Public Land Act. - As for the alleged sale of 3 portions of the lot, the three conveyances are void. CA 141 prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 5 years from the issuance of the patent and grant under Section 118. Dispositive Petition is hereby DENIED.

SALTIGA DE ROMERO v CA (ROMERO) 319 SCRA 180 GONZAGA-REYES; November 25, 1999
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the CA FACTS - Eugenio Romero bought from spouses Celedonio Jaug and Sofia Macan the latter's "rights, interest, participation, ownership and possession" of 12 hectares of public land. When Eugenio applied for a homestead patent for said land, the same was disapproved by the Bureau of Lands because Romero already had applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares and was disqualified from owning the additional 12 hectares. - Eugenio placed the application in the name of his eldest son, Eutiquio, allegedly in trust for all the children of Eugenio. When Eutiquio got married and had children, the application was transferred in the name of Lutero, the second son of Eugenio. When Lutero in turn got married, he relinquished the application in favor of his younger brother Ricardo. - Eugenio died. His widow Teodora caused the land in question to be subdivided among 6 (out of 9) of her children, including Lutero. The other 3 children received shares in other properties. - Lutero claims that a policeman picked him up and brought him to the office of Mayor Pablito Abragan where he found his mother and 3 sisters Gloriosa, Presentacion and Lucita and the respective husbands of the latter two. At the office, he was presented 3 affidavits for his signature, to the effect that he sold 3 hectares each out of the 12 hectares of land to his sister

HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP V. CA (RAMON & BENJAMIN YAP) 24

SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4 312 SCRA 603 Aug 17, 1999
FACTS - Chua Mia had 3 sons: Lorenzo, Benjamin and Ramon Yap. - Ramon purchased parcel of land fr Nery sps. Lot was registered in name of Ramon. He declared the prop for tax and pd real estate tax. - Ramon constructed apartment. 1/5 of the cost was defrayed by Ramon. The rest was shouldered by Chua Mia. The improvement was declared for real estate tax in the name of Lorenzo, as the old woman wanted. - Lorenzo died. His heirs resided permanently in Manila. Ramon allowed them to use 1 unit of the apartment bldg. - Ramon sold the land and his share in the apartment to Benjamin. - Petitioners advised Ramon and Benjamin of their claim of ownership over the prop. - Respondents filed action in RTC for quieting of title. - Petitioners: Nery sps offered to sell the land to Lorenzo but since Lorenzo and his wife were at that time Chinese citizens, they requested Ramon to allow them to use his name. It was agreed that Ramon will have the prop until Lorenzo acquires Phil citizenship. Should Lorenzo predecease, lot would be transferred to Lorenzos heirs. - TC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE WON the heirs of Lorenzo have any right over the apartment bldg & the lot HELD NO - Trust a. Express created by direct & positive acts of parties, by writing / deed, or will, or by words evincing an intent to create trust b. Implied deducible fr nature of transaction as matters of intent or independently of intent, as being superinduced on transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity; implied trust may be = resulting: arises by implication of law & presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the intent as to w/c can be found in the nature of transaction though not

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expressed in a deed / instrument; based on equitable doctrine that its the more valuable consideration than the legal title that determines equitable interest in the prop = constructive: not created by any word, expressly or impliedly, evincing intent to create a trust, but one that arises in order to satisfy demands of justice; doesnt come about by agreement or intent but by operation of law construed against one who by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains legal right w/c he ought not to hold - Implied trust may be established by parol evidence. Express trust cant. To establish implied trust by parol evidence, proof shld be as fully convincing as if acts are proven by authentic document. - Evidence submitted by petitioners is utterly wanting. (self-serving testimony of wife of Lorenzo). She admitted that their biz was razed by fire, and this put to doubt the claim that Lorenzo had the means to purchase the land. On the other hand, Ramon Yap was an accountant w/ means to buy the prop. - A trust or provision in the trust is invalid if enforcement is against the law even though its performance doesnt involve commission of a criminal / tortuous act. - The trust agreement between Ramon & Lorenzo wouldve been in contravention of the 1935 Consti. (re acquisition or holding lands of public domain in Phils)

PROF. LEO BATTAD

Angeles y Bombita of offense of selling shabu, punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. - Angeles has now lodged with us this petition for habeas corpus, invoking (a) RA 7659, which has reduced the penalties prescribed under the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and (b) the recent ruling of this Court in People vs. Martin Simon y Sunga, which has confirmed the retroactive application of the abovenumbered amendatory law. ISSUES 1. WON the penalties of Angeles should be reduced. 2. WON the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. HELD 1. YES. Conformably with the second paragraph of Section 20 of RA 6425, as amended by Section 17 of RA 7659 and as construed and applied in People v. Simon, the newly prescribed penalty for his offense would now only be prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of indeterminate penalty on petitioner, modified accordingly, should thereby be from six months of arresto mayor as minimum to six years of prision correccional as maximum. 2. NO BUT - Angeles has only served the minimum of his sentence; however, he may, if qualified, be released on parole pursuant to Section 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. - While the instant petition for habeas corpus should be DISMISSED for its prematurity, the Court, nonetheless, expresses its concern over the plight of persons convicted for drug-related offenses prior to the enactment and effectivity of RA 7659 who could be entitled to parole for having served their minimum sentences, or who, indeed, may be due for release from confinement after having served their maximum sentences conformably with the applicable penalties newly prescribed by RA 7659 and our decision, construing this law, in the Simon case. Aware of the need to have this matter attended to with great dispatch, the Court sees it fit to take the

VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN VELASCO V CA ILUSORIO V BILDNER TIJING V CA ANGELES v. DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISONS G.R. No. 117568 VITUG; January 4, 1995
FACTS - In People v. Angeles, SC affirmed the trial court's decision convicting accused Rolando

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opportunity, by way of extraordinary measures, to pronounce thusly: All courts of competent jurisdiction may entertain petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act who have served the maximum of the applicable penalties newly prescribed by RA. 7659. In this regard, the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-petition forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the petitions are filed may refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights or to the Public Attorney's Office for possible assistance to the prisoners concerned.

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the sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found by the trial were in accordance with the evidence discloses by the record, or in order to pass upon the correctness of the conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a commitment in due from based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal case is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of law or of fact, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law. Reasoning - Throughout the entire course of those proceedings in the trial court, that court had jurisdiction of both of the persons of the accused and of the crime with which they were charged, and it did not and could not lose that jurisdiction as a consequence of mistake or error committed by the trial judge in his finding of fact as to the age of the woman, or in his conclusions of law as to bearing of the woman's age upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused of the crime with which they were charged. However, both in the court below and in this court on appeal, the point passed sub silentio, and the attention of neither court was invited or directed to the question raised regarding the victims age. Disposition Application for the writ must be denied

PROF. LEO BATTAD

- On May 28, 1987, CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Van Ngias landlord Dionisio G. Cabrera, Jr., accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress." - Acting thereon, Liwag issued on June 1, 1987 a mission order to a team of seven (7) CID agents for them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report." - On June 2, 1987, the CID agents went to petitioner's residence him to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but petitioner locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. - The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of the Western Police District. With police help, he was subdued and immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office. - A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2, 1987 but there is nothing in the records to convince this Court that said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension. Said warrant was based on the following acts and circumstances: - but he made no investments but engaged in tutoring in French and practice of acupressure - he wilfully refused to recognize the authority of immigration agents who were sent to invite him to CID for verification of his status and physically resisted being taken in by the agents resulting in physical injuries to himself and the agents; - he has thereby made himself an undesirable alien subject to deportation. - Because of injuries he sustained he was transferred from his detention cell at the immigration office to the PGH for treatment - On June 10, 1987, petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the "threatened removal" of petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent Commissioner

FELIPE V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS 24 PHIL 121 CARSONL January 18, 1913

FACTS - Application for a writ of habeas corpus and for discharge from custody of the Director of Prisons, filed on behalf of Adriano Trono Felipe and Aniceto Trono Felipe, prisoners in Bilibid, by virtue of commitments in due dated March 10, 1911, issued by CFI Bulacan upon a sentence condemning them 2 years 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional. An alleged illegality of the detention of these prisoners is grounded upon the finding out that the victim in the abduction of a virgin with her consent (rapto de una doncella con su anuencia) is in truth over 18 years of age. ISSUE WON writ of habeas corpus should be granted given that there was an erroneous allegation as to the age of the victim HELD NO Ratio Writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy provided for the correction of factual errors. Courts cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings, review the record in a criminal case after judgment of conviction has been rendered, and the defendants have entered on the execution of

LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA V. LIWAG 175 SCRA 318 / G.R. No. 78596 FERNAN, C.J.: July 13, 1989
FACTS - Van Nghia is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana, Manila originally admitted here November 1, 1981 as a temporary visitor, but became an immigrant on November 16, 1984 based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines. However he has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure.

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

ISSUES 1 WON arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation proceedings was valid 2 WON Writ may be properly granted HELD 1 NO. - The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. Herein petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. - For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were monitored. - Precedent of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago does not apply - The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. - What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. 2 NO.

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- The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule. - Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. - Certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. - Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement and released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond on June 19,1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 during the pendency of the administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court. - Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly restrained, as in the case of Enrile v Moncupa where rights to travel and freedom of expression were restricted. The only condition in his bailbond is that ordinarily found in any other analogous undertaking, which is "to appear and answer the complaint x x x; will at all times hold himself ... amenable to the orders and processes of the Court; and after conviction, he will surrender himself ... in execution of such judgment ... ." - Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

PROF. LEO BATTAD

Disposition: The petition is DISMISSED.

ILAGAN V ENRILE GR 70748 MELENCIO-HERRERA; October 21, 1985

NATURE Appeal from order of CFI Bataan FACTS May 10, 1985 Atty. Laurente Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by PC-INP and detained in Camp Catitipan allegedly on basis of a Mission Order issued by the Ministry of Natl Defense. When he was visited by Atty. Antonio Arellano, he was also arrested. May 13 Atty. Marcos Risonar was also be arrested A petition for habeas corpus is filed in SC shortly after on the basis of illegality and violation of the Constitution, since arrests cant be made based on Mission Orders. May 16 SC issues writ, requires a return, and sets hearing on May 23. In their return, respondents contended that the detained attys were arrested based on a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by the Pres., that the Writ of HC is suspended as to them by Proc. 2045-A, and that pursuant to Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile, the Courts lack authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of prisoners held pursuant to the suspension. Also, they expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detainees played active roles in organizing mass actions of CPP and the Natl Democratic Front May 23 Detained attys recounted circumstances of their arrest and detention. Respondents presented evidence of subversive activities in Davao, but failed to link these to the attys. Thus, SC ordered the temporary release of detainees on the recognizance of the petitioners lead counsels (former SC CJ Concepcion and JBL Reyes). SC also gave petitioners 10 days to file a traverse to the return of the Writ and the respondents 10 days to reply thereto May 24 petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that the detainees had not been released yet and prayed their release May 27 respondents filed urgent MFR of the order of release, reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of HC has the effect of ousting the

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4

Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the detainees were arrested not on the basis of their lawyering but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage and their leadership in the CPP, even to the extent of using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP objectives; and that they were involved in the Welgang Bayan, which demands for the armed overthrow of the government. Also, while there is a Court Order directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the detainees until ordered released by the President, and that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a period not exceeding 1year. May 28 respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detainees before RTC-Davao; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them; and praying for dismissal of this Petition for having been rendered moot and academic. May 30 - petitioners filed an Opposition to the Urgent Motion/ Manifestation contending that since the detainees were not given the benefit of a prelim investigation, they were denied their right to due process; thus, the Information for Rebellion is void. Respondents reiterated prayer for dismissal based on mootness ISSUE 1. WON the Petition should be dismissed for mootness HELD 1. YES Ratio The petition has been rendered moot and academic by the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the RTC and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of HC is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the RTC, the remedy of HC no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose. Reasoning. Rule 102.4: When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.-If it appears the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order

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of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment - If the detainees question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no PI has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of HC but a Motion before the RTC to quash the Warrant of Arrest and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation of the case. - HC would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. Rule
102.14: If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge (rebellion is a

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Illegal Possession of Subversive documents (punishable by prision correccional), and TC had granted bail; whereas in this case, petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and RTC has not allowed bail. Disposition Petition for HC dismissed for having become moot and academic. SEPARATE OPINIONS (not really related to the topic) MELENCIO-HERRERA, concurring -it must be noted that in the Warrant of Arrest, no bail has been indicated. Neither was bail recommended by the City Fiscal. Also, pursuant to PD1834, even as amended by PD1974, the crime of Rebellion is still punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. - Considering, therefore, that the detained attys are not entitled to bail as a matter of right before the prosecution is heard on its evidence, and observing fealty to the Constitutional mandate that all persons, except those charged with capital offenses, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties (Sec18, Art.IV, 1973 Consti), the RTC, should be directed to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the detained attys is strong - Individuals against whom PDA's have been issued should be furnished with the original, or duplicate original, or certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the IRR of PD1877, the PDA's should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside Metro Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such date of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attys were arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985. The 4-month gap can give room for doubt as to its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attys posed any appreciable danger to national security and public order. - paramount consideration should be that the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated (Sec3, Art.IV, 1973 Consti). Until the issue of the validity of the PDA is finally resolved, PDA's applied for on the basis of militancy alone in national security cases, of

capital offense) -petitioners argue that the absence of a PI renders the Information for Rebellion filed against them void and the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over them, and thus, they are entitled to release. Respondents on the other hand contend that a valid warrantless arrest makes a PI unnecessary (Rule112.7: When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the RTC the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person xxx)

-The right to a PI, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. -The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke, wherein SC ordered the release of 2 of the accused, is not on all fours with this case as, in that case, the accused were charged only with

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insufficient surveillance, or unsupported deductions and inferences, contravene the Constitutional mandate that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Adherence to Constitutional mandates could ease the current discontent and growing insurgency gripping the nation today. The objective should be to fight for the hearts and minds of the people by observing the rule of law. TEEHANKEE, dissenting - After this Court issued its near-unanimous Resolution of May 23, 1985, ordering the immediate release of the 3 detainees on the recognizance of their principal counsel, retired CJ Concepcion, and retired Justice JBL Reyes, which release it had expressly ordered to be "immediately executory", this Court has now refused to enforce its own release order. Repeated motions for enforcement of this Court's immediately executory order of release as against respondents' brazen disrespect and contemptous disregard thereof were filed in vain. It has instead dismissed the petition for HC for having become moot and academic, because of the arbitrary filing of precipitate, vindictive and oppressive charges against them for the capital crime of rebellion without hearing or PI and in gross violation of their right and rudimentary requirements of due process and fair play. - The camp commander at Camp Bagong Diwa did not honor the Court's release order, saying that "it had to be verified from higher authorities." Without awaiting this Court's action on their MFR, respondents somehow got the Fiscal of Davao to precipitately file on May 27, 1985, without any PI, an information against the 3 detainees for the capital crime of rebellion with RTC-Davao. The said trial court grossly disregarding the deference that all inferior courts should accord this Court as the highest court of the land (since the military's equally gross disregard of this Court's May 23rd order for the release of detainees was a matter of public notice, having been prominently reported in all national newspapers) just as precipitately issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against the detainees. Respondents then filed on May 28 their Urgent Manifestation/Motion, with copies of

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the information and warrant of arrest, praying for dismissal of the HC petition at bar on the ground that it has become moot and academic. - the sacred constitutional rights [and] the right to due process which is fundamental fairness have been grossly denied the detainees. This Court's "immediately executory" release order of May 23rd should be forthwith honored and complied with. Far from having rendered the petition as moot and academic, all the railroaded proceedings and orders charging the detainees with instant rebellion in gross disregard of the pendency of this case and of the assurance given in open court that the petitioners-lawyers would be entitled to a hearing and a PI in obedience to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, should be declared null and void. They were patently void, having been issued without jurisdiction under the well-settled rule that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment [or order] is null and void and confers no rights. At the very least, all proceedings in the instant rebellion case before the RTC should be suspended and enjoined until the detainees are granted their right to a PI and opportunity to confront their accusers and disprove the charges; meanwhile, it is but part of due process that they be set free as ordered by the Court and be enabled to prepare their defense. The petition for a writ of HC to set them at liberty should accordingly be granted for the ff reasons and considerations: 1. Basic Right to Due Process. This plainly means that generally no person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without a PI. The right to a PI is statutorily granted for serious offenses and to deny it violates the right to due process guaranteed by the Constitution. 2. Petitioners-lawyers denied due process. The blitzkrieg filing of precipitate, vindictive and oppressive charges against detainees for the capital crime of rebellion without hearing and PI deprived them their right to due process and the rudimentary requirements of fair play. As emphasized in Galman vs. Pamaran, due process ... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

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3. Right to PI. May 23rd hearing brought out the importance of PI to prevent hasty and baseless prosecution, since respondents could not cite concrete evidence of specific criminal acts committed by detainees. The whole point is that petitioners' lawyers have squarely shown that they have been denied their right to PI and to show the utter falsity of the charge of instant rebellion against them. It is this Court which must grant petitioners this right, and uphold their right to due process. 4. Professional witnesses of military not checked out. As admitted by the State attys, there are so many professional witnesses presented by the military in such cases, whose statements should not be swallowed hook, line and sinker. The exparte affidavits of the alleged surrendered NPAs could be checked out as against their background and an independent investigation only in a PI. Such affidavits and statements have been found to be completely worthless in other cases. 5. Protective mantle of this Court. The unlawful arrest and detention of the petitioners-lawyers has completely uprooted their lives. This Court must extend them its protective mantle as officers of the courts, because of the strong indications of ominous trends for lawyers "who are engaged in pro bono publico work who have incurred the ire of the military, such as in the case of Abra, where there are no more lawyers handling subversion cases because the only two human rights lawyers handling such cases have been charged with subversion and locked up in the stockade. 6. People's right of assembly and petition the government for redress of grievances. Mass demonstrations popularly termed as welgang bayan constitute a legitimate exercise of these basic constitutional rights. The military must overcome their allergy if not aversion to such welgas. 7. Preservation of liberties and motives. Good faith must be presumed as well on the part of respondents as of petitioners-lawyers. The good motive but misplaced overzealousness of the military, may be noted, obsessed as they are with keeping peace and order. The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided

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zeal is constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. The record of the May 23rd hearing highlights the imperative importance of the injunction that no matter how worthy the motive may be, the authorities, civilian or military, should not suppress the people's liberties, and push the aggrieved citizen in despair towards the NPA or the communists; and respect their constitutional rights as otherwise there would be no difference as against the outlaws or rebels. The record underscores the utter lack of evidence to support the unlawful arrest and detention of the three petitioners-lawyers. 8. Basic concepts and principles of freedom. (1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be 'protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person. (2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the Ideals of liberty, equality and security against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles. (3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people (4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. (5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious

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shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful and of oligarchs political economic or otherwise. 9. The express teaching of the Salonga case. The express teaching on freedom of expression, based on numerous precedents, of this Court's unanimous decision (11 members with 3 abstentions) in the case of Salonga vs. Pao should dispel the apparent misconception on the part of the military, as well as certain government prosecutors, that militant protests and demonstrations are seditious and subversive of the government. Freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties, that this must be so because freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments 10. Peaceful and violent welgas. Had the military and the police adhered to the basic democratic concepts and principles and recognized the people's constitutional right of assembly, protest and petition for redress of grievances and accordingly exercise forbearance and understanding, then the welgas will not and cannot erupt in violence. 11. The Stale PDA. Iwill not deal here with the serious question raised by petitioners as to the validity of the PDA issued by the President under date of January 25, 1985 for the arrest and detention of the three petitioners-lawyers for having "committed subversion and/or acts inimical to public safety, national security and public order." This question is better resolved in the separate case. Suffice it to state that the PDA against petitioners was already inoperative and stale. It was issued on January 25, 1985. As respondent general himself states in the return, the military did not see any need to enforce it until after almost 4months later on May 10 to 13 of this year. What is incomprehensible is that no copy certified or plain of the PDA could be shown to petitioners upon their arrest, contrary to existing rules and instructions. Be that as it may, the PDA should be held to be inoperative and ineffectual. The facts show that the President was misled into precipitately issuing the same:

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A. By the President's own statement, he had declared that "he would issue the controversial PDA orders only when natl security would require it and that there is no present need for him to do it." Respondent 's own admission that there was no need to serve it until after almost 4months later shows that there was no necessity for the peremptory issuance of the PDA last January 25th. B. The issuance of the PDA against the detainees clearly do not fall within the 2 exceptions to the general rule provided in PD1877, that all cases involving national security offenses "shall be referred to the provincial or city fiscal or to the proper court for PI in accordance with existing laws. 12. Civilian Supremacy. Art II, sec.8 of our Consti states that "Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military. But the military here dragged its feet and refused to honor this Court's "immediately executory" release order of May 23rd. This Court's decisions and orders form part of the law of the land It is a sad day for civilian supremacy when the military do not feel bound by the verdict of the courts and would place themselves above the courts and require as a condition for executing its judgment that they be morally convinced by the judgment rendered. To allow such usurpation and denigration of the Court's judicial review power is to subvert, if not destroy, the Constitution and Rule of Law. The survival of a democratic society rests on Rule of Law, which depends on the existence of an independent judiciary. 13. The Supreme Court as guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution. The judiciary is entrusted by the Constitution with the awesome power and task of determining disputes between litigants involving life, liberty and fortune and protecting the citizen against arbitrary or oppressive action of the State. The Courts are called upon "to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary [assisted by the bar] stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive as also transgression of its constitutional limitations by the legislature." The Constitution is basically a charter of limitations of govl power and ordains the weakest department, the Supreme Court, as the guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution.

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14. Erroneous premises of the majority decision. A. The majority decision holds that the writ of HC has served its purpose because of the warrant of arrest issued by the RTC. This is based on an erroneous premise that the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest, and that the denial of a PI of detainees was a mere informality or defect. The trial court was totally devoid of jurisdiction to issue a warrant of arrest because of the gross denial of their right to due process. B. The majority holds that filing of the information without PI falls within the exceptions of the Rules. Again, this is erroneous. The petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant. The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of Jan. 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. C. The majority decision's rationale that the Nolasco case invoked by petitioners is not applicable here since the RTC had granted bail to Nolasco for non-capital offenses, whereas in this case petitioners are charged with the capital offense of rebellion and the RTC has not allowed bail. This is erroneous. The instant information for rebellion is null and void for denial of due process. What remains is the PDA, just like in the Nolasco case. There, the trial court granted bail. Here, it is this Court that has granted bail in the form of its May 23rd immediately executory release order. It certainly would be judicial anathema that this Court ordered compliance with the bail order of the RTC in the Nolasco case and yet feel impotent to enforce its own "immediately executory" release order of the detainees upon their counsel's recognizance. D. To require the citizen at every step to assert his rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. Here, the flaunting and disregard of the Court's immediately executory May 23rd release order by not releasing the petitionerslawyers would render illusory petitioners' right to due process and PI. 15. Same standard in Galman case of not jeopardizing accused's constitutional rights should be applied. In the case of Galman vs. Pamaran, the majority held that "the only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in 'fact been offered [by the prosecution]. The same

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standard and concern of not placing the accused in jeopardy of their constitutional rights through denial of due process and their right to PI should be applied here. 16. The preservation of freedom, like its perfection is a never-ending struggle. But when free men shirk from their duties to society, as well as to themselves, they imperil their own liberty. When the citizens of a democracy allow themselves to be lulled into indifference, they seal their own doom. 17. There has never been a case as transcendental as this one. We have tried and bolstered to be a democratic society which is based and predicated upon freedom of speech. But to bolster up the freedom of speech, we've established the right of every person accused and even detained to counsel. Now, any (act) tending to impair the disposition of lawyers to represent the accused, is derogatory to the democratic system, and therefore, derogatory to human rights. 18. Petitioners'appeal for liberty should be heeded. If a person is unlawfully deprived of his liberty, he can avail himself of the great writ of liberty, the privilege of the writ of HC for the purpose of regaining freedom in the shortest time possible. In its early years of practice, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a puny and unavailing remedy as against the king. For judges were under the influence of the crown and refused to issue the writ for people who were detained on suspicion of disloyalty to the former but against whom there was no concrete evidence, and the people continued to languish in extended detention. Since then, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has become the fundamental instrument against arbitrary and lawless state action. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries with it the derogation of the people's freedoms and liberties. Therefore, the provisions must be strictly construed and cannot be allowed to extend to situations not explicitly allowed by the Constitution. I vote to grant the petition for habeas corpus and to set the petitioners immediately at liberty. Petitioners must be granted their constitutional right to due process and the right to PI. The railroaded ex-parte proceedings and orders in the instant rebellion case should be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction in having deprived

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petitioners of their sacred constitutional right to due process. CONCEPCION, JR., J., dissenting: - I dissent. The petition is not moot and academic. - Petitioners should be set free immediately because they were arrested unlawfully, and the information filed against them dismissed for being null and void. However, the authorities may, if they choose to do so, file a case against petitioners. The fiscal should conduct a PI as required by law. If he finds the existence of a prima facie case, then he should file the necessary information. After the court issues a warrant of arrest against petitioners, only then may they be placed in custody. They have a right to a PI, and infringement of this is a denial of due process. - Petitioners arrest does not fall under any of the instances enumerated for a valid warrantless arrest. Their arrest without a warrant is therefore patently and undeniably illegal. The unlawful arrest of petitioners cannot give rise to a valid information. The Information is and must remain null and void. - It is the responsibility of the judiciary to define and maintain the delicate balance between individual freedom and the security of the State. In the fulfillment of this mission, active participation and assistance of dedicated human rights lawyers are indispensable. At a time when the AFP has to play a salient role in our affairs of government in view of a rebellion in our midst, there is all the more a greater need for lawyers to defend the rights of individuals against actual or possible abuses of agents of the State. - We must strengthen and solidify the Rule of Law. It is the only way to the survival of democracy in our land. Patajo J., concur (to Concepcion) ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting : - The majority opinion appeals to the mind for it appears to be logically constructed. It leans heavily on the letter of the law. Upon the other hand the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee which is his article of faith appeals both to the mind and the heart for it is based not only on law but on equity also. Teehankee's opinion better serves the ends of justice and I gladly subscribe to it. I also subscribe to Concepcion's separate opinion

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SPECPRO DIGESTS RDS. 3 & 4 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL ET AL. vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990 187 SCRA 311 PER CURIAM
NATURE Petitions for habeas corpus COMMON FACTUAL DROP This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the warrantless arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest were charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples Army and rebellion for acts purportedly done in pursuit of subversive objectives. (Note: There are unique facts for each of the 8 cases, please refer to the originals. This is merely a digest after all) ISSUE WON the writ of habeas corpus may be issued for these cases HELD Ratio Habeas corpus shall not issue where the persons concerned are legally detained. - It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules

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of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that: Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied) - At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been filed. - We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, reexamination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our

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Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition. Reasoning as applied to each specific case 1. Umil vs. Ramos - As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. - However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case: - From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. 2. Roque vs. De Villa - In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra,

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without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess. - When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following: (1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988; (2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988; (3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988. 3. Anonuevo vs. Ramos - In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive materials,

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and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry. 4. Ocaya vs. Aguirre - In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. 5. Espiritu vs. Lim - Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8 - Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 1 - The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for

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questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11 6. Nazareno vs. Station Commander - In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

VELASCO V CA SUPRA ANGELES v. DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISONS SUPRA MONCUPA V ENRILE

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