Political Law 1.

Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011. Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. Prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be known as Maguindanao massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and additional charges of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities and members of the academe filed a petition before this court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre should be allowed. HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to certain guidelines as enumerated. The present petition which asserts the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precept into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights involved, within the guidelines.

2. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al. G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011 Local governments; principle of local autonomy. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. FACTS: Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, along with Ansarudidn Adiong, Regie, Sahali-Generale, protested the pronouncement that held the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotobato under state of emergency and the delegations of supervision of ARMM to the DILG. This action was prompted by the gruesome massacre of 57 in the said area. The petitioners, however, sought the prohibition and declaration of unconstitutionality of such delegation (AO 273 and 273-A) for it violated the principle of local autonomy. They pointed out that the delegation gave the DILG secretary, Ronaldo Puno, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Philippine National Police, the power to take over and seize the operations and governmental powers. Furthermore, they contested that the President did not have any factual basis for declaring the state under emergency status. ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violated the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act HELD: NEGATIVE. The President did not declare and put the province under the authority of the DILG. The action was merely done so that after the massacre, the citizens will have confidence upon the government. The Supreme Court observed that after law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-

Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

3. League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056. April 12, 2011. Cityhood Laws; Just share in national taxes. The share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the Local Government Code (LGC), not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). FACTS: This petition involves the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis--vis the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011. The Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 constitutional. Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause. ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws are violative of the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes HELD: NEGATIVE. The share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC. As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.

Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.

4. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011. Local Government; Requisites for creation of province. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC, if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme Court found no reason why this exemption should not apply also to provinces. Facts: On the time that the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed as a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 constituents based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO). The said number is therefore insufficient because the law requires 250,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the land area failed to comply with the required 2,000 sq. km. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers. Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Inevitably, on December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. Hence, on February 10, 2010, Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating that "The land

area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOID. Respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that "the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Issue: Whether or not the R. A. No. 9355 is constitutional. Held: AFFIRMATIVE. The SC ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land

area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass. What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. 5. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011. Administrative cases; due process. Administrative cases; due process. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due process of law. Facts: Dr. Jose Deleste bought a parcel of land in Tambo, Iligan City from the heirs of Gregorio Nanaman. When Nanamans wife died, an action was filed against Deleste alleging that the subject property was a conjugal property of the deceased spouses and that the wife could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1995 and it was held that Deleste and Nanaman were co-owners of the subject land. When the aforementioned civil case was still pending before the Court of First Instance, PD 27 was issued which mandated that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the Department of Agrarian Reform notified only the heirs of Nanaman regarding the procedures of the program. Certificates of Land Transfer, as well as Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Titles, were issued in favor of private respondents who were tenants and cultivators of the property. The heirs of Deleste filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board seeking to nullify the Emancipation Patents. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator declared the Emancipation Patents null and void. Private respondents filed their Notice of Appeal immediately. DARAB, however, nullified the Order which granted the writ of execution prayed

for by the petitioners. DARAB further claimed that the Emancipation Patents were valid since it was the petitioners who should have informed the DAR of the pending Civil Case which involved the subject property. Petitioners filed petition for review with the Court of Appeals and eventually with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not The Department of Agriculture violated the rights of the petitioners to procedural due process. Held: Affirmative. The case of De Chavez vs. Zobel held that the enactment of PD 27 is in itself a statutory notification to landowners of the agrarian reform program. The actual notice, however, is an essential requirement of administrative due process. Failure to notify the proper party, as well as conducting as ocular inspection, deprives involved parties of their right to property through the denial of due process. Also, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt Corp vs. DAR, the court held that in the implementation of agrarian reform, notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowners of the intention of the state to acquire the land for the program and also provides opportunity for the landowner to prove that such land is excused from the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Furthermore, the deed of sale executed between Deleste and the wife of Nanaman in 1954 serves as constructive notice that such property is owned by Deleste. By failing to notify the petitioners of the fact that the subject land is being covered by the agrarian reform program, DAR violated the right of the former to due process of the law.