Neil Randolph C.

Mijares

Constitutional Law 1

Estrada vs Desierto De Jure vs De Facto President Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president. HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

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Randolf David et al vs Gloria Arroyo Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power & Ni ez Cacho-Olivares vs Exec Sec Ermita -Freedom of Speech Overbreadth In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The SolGen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power. ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
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Neil Randolph C. Mijares

Constitutional Law 1

actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: 1 There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
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Neil Randolph C. Mijares David vs. Arroyo G.R. no.171396

Constitutional Law 1

Facts: In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. Issue: in times of national emergency, may the president exercise powers under section 17, article xii without congressional authority? Ruling: the President may exercise such powers under Section 17, Article XII only under the grant of congressional approval. Certainly, the notion that congressional authority is required under Section 17, Article XII is not evident from the provision. Even Fr. Bernas notes that Section 17 does not require, as does Article VI, Section 23(2), that the authorization be "by law", thus leaving the impression that the authorization can come from the President Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. The said provision is not self-executing as to be validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization. The provision merely declares a state economic policy during times of national emergency. As such, it cannot be taken to mean as authorizing the President to exercise "takeover" powers pursuant to a declaration of a state of national emergency.

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Neil Randolph C. Mijares

Constitutional Law 1

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy National Patrimony Qualified Filipinos Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that: 1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing); 2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony. ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares. HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former. **Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
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Neil Randolph C. Mijares

Constitutional Law 1

Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Disierto

G.R. No. 146710-15 FACTS: After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the Presidents administration started resigning one by one. In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate. The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President submitted two letters one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether the petitioner resigned as President; and Whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning 02 March 2001

RULING: 1. For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country. This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign. 2. Petitioners contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned.

Presidential Immunity From Suit In the 1973 Constitution, Sec 17, Art 7 thereof provides: The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure. The above provision has been omitted in the 1987 Constitution. The logic behind is that there is no need to constitutionally provide such because it is inherent in the presidents position. Note however that there are restrictions and limitations. In US jurisprudence, the president is immune from suit only in so far as the involved case is civil in nature which is done under the performance of his official functions. In the case of Estrada vs Desierto, the SC ruled that Estrada cannot cloak himself with presidential immunity to protect himself from criminal liability after his tenure especially so when the acts he committed include the heinous crime of plunder. The SC will not allow such to be used as a license by a president to commit unlawful acts and unlawful omissions.
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Neil Randolph C. Mijares AASJS vs Datumanong G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

Constitutional Law 1

Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens ISSUE: is By inimical to the & national allowing interest dual and allegiance, shall is be RA dealt 9225 with by law."

recognizing

unconstitutional?

HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

FACTS: This is an action for prohibition against the Secretary of Justice, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. According to petitioner, RA 9225 condones dual allegiance which is contrary to the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 allows dual allegiance HELD: It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the provision in the CA 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What RA 9225 allows is dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.

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Neil Randolph C. Mijares Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. G.R. No. 101083 En Banc PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J FACTS:

Constitutional Law 1

July 30, 1993

The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case 2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgment in accordance to the prayer of the complaints 3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution HELD: 1. The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. 2. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially. 3. Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

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Neil Randolph C. Mijares

Constitutional Law 1

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993, (En Banc) J. Campos Facts: This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and the heirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting and no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.) Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages. President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizens Mendiola Commission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for damages by the petitioners. February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Issue: Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit. Ruling: Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reason of public policy that public policy would be hindered and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government. Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claims. Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was merely a preliminary venue and it was not an end in itself. The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby dismissed. Department of Agriculture v. The National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 104269, Nov. 11, 1993, J. Vitug Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the agency to the DA. After certain arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.

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After several months, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by DA with the NLRC claiming that the writ issued wa effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the DA making its decision null and void & all actions should be deemed invalid and of no legal effect. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case. Ruling: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The petition is granted and the resolution reversed and set aside.

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Neil Randolph C. Mijares Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Constitutional Law 1

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Issues: 1. Can

the

Court

make

determination

of

what

constitutes

an

impeachable

offense?

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional. 3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. Held: 1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust elude a precise definition. 2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." 3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

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Constitutional Law 1

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the EVAT Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the HoR as required by Sec 24, Art 6 of the CONST. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the SW&M Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as SB 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a HB and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and copetitioner Roco even signed the said SB. Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon." The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

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Constitutional Law 1

Atitiw V. Zamora G.R. No. 143374 En Banc, J. Tinga Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. The court declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328. The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA 2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees. Issue: 1. Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional. 2. Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220. 3. Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220 Ruling: In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. The title of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title that embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of the RA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriations. On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is no such thing as an irrepealably law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or repealing the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law. The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect. Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.

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Constitutional Law 1

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC. FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5D registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Enterprises. The squatters refused to vacate the lots sold to private respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters occurred. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Private respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana. ISSUE: WON the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit. HELD: YES. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

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Constitutional Law 1

G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, vs. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC. FACTS: Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines. Then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27 outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products. A.O. No. 27 was later amended by providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner. Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. Only two companies participated, the respondent being the lower bidder. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to the other company. Hence, respondent filed a complaint injunction, mandamus and damages against DOH. ISSUE: WON DOH can invoke immunity from suit. HELD: NO. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus.

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Constitutional Law 1

G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO. FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondents capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity. HELD: NO. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise there from, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

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Neil Randolph C. Mijares So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007 Q what is naturalization? Give the modes of becoming a citizen by naturalization.

Constitutional Law 1

ANS: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.(So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007). Q In a petition for naturalization, it was contended that the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization should possess those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473. Is the contention correct? Why? ANS: No. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007). Q State the rationale for the enactment of RA 9139 otherwise known as Administrative Naturalization Law. ANS: R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting brain drain for the Philippines. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007). Q Are the qualifications prescribed under Act No. 473 applicable to RA 9139? Explain. ANS: No. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. Second, if the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here. Third, applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified

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Neil Randolph C. Mijares under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under

Constitutional Law 1 C.A. No. 473.

Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007). Q State the basic requirement of witnesses in a naturalization proceeding. Explain. ANS: The witnesses presented should be competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. The character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007, citing Rep. v. Hong, G.R. No. 168877, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 405). Q State the duty of an applicant for naturalization before he can be naturalized. Explain. ANS: In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within the purview of the naturalization law, a credible person is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not credible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value; as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007). Q In naturalization proceedings, may the State appeal the decision even if it did not oppose the petition? Explain. ANS: Yes. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court. (So v. Rep., G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007). Note: It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law. Q Who has the burden to show that a person is entitled to be naturalized? Explain. ANS: It is well-settled rule that it is the bounded and inescapable duty of anyone applying for naturalization to carry at all times the burden of proving his right thereto, not only by complying with all the substantive and procedural requirements and submitting proof thereof at the trial. (Tiu v. Rep., 158 Phil. 1137 (1974); In Re: Petition for Admission as Citizen of the Phils., Shewak A. Keswani, et al. v. Rep., G.R. No. 153986, June 8, 2007).

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Constitutional Law 1

Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua et al G.R. No. L-45081 In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; and Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

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