2.

OMAHA BEACH : American Troops

D-Day at Omaha The Pointe du Hoc Order of battle 1st Order of battle 29th Landing diagram 16th Landing diagram 116th Engineer Task Force Operation Order 1-44 Operation Order BB44 German positions Maps G-3 Report, 1st Div.

D-Day at Omaha

1st Infantry Division " Big red one "

29th Infantry Division " Blue and gray "

The stretch of coast coded Omaha is a sandy beach located between Vierville sur Mer to the west and Colleville sur Mer to the east. This 6 km-long beach is flanked on each extremities by cliffs up to 60 meters high and plunging directly into the sea. The beach itself is dominated by a 40 meters high, steep-sloped grassy ridge. Bracketed between high cliffs, the beach only has five draws of varying suitability. 5 kilometers to the west is the Pointe du Hoc, a 30 meters-high rocky cliff. The 352.ID and 716.ID are in charge of the defense of this coastal sector. The main line of resistance is made of a serie of WNs bordering the beach and interdicting the access to the draws; no concrete work has been built inland. Backing the beach defenders are several artillery battalions of the Omaha Beach Sector 352.ID in position a few miles behind, between La Cambe and Formigny, and equiped with twenty-four 105mm and 150mm howitzers that are able to fire on all of the 6 kilometers of coast. The passive defence is made of several antitank ditches and walls along the beach and numerous beach obstacles: stakes, tetrahedrons, "C" elements and Begian Gates.

The Objectives :
The goal of the landings in this sector is to establish a beachhead between Port en Bessin and

the Vire river and then push south towards Caumont and Saint-L alongside the Second British Army. Once the beaches have been cleared, the troops will head inland and reach a line going from Isigny to Tour en Bessin and link up with the Rangers at the Pointe du Hoc to the west and the british 47th Royal Marine Commando at Port en Bessin to the east.

The invasion :
The bad weather, the strong tide currents and low visibility will completely disorganize the landing schedules of the first waves assault companies . The preliminary bombardement by the Air Force miss the WNs due to zero visibility, the bombers dropping their loads too far inland. Those are intact defenses that the eight companies of the first wave will face. The tanks scheduled to support the first assault troops are also missing. The DDs of the 741st Tank Battalion launched off shore nearly all sank due to the strong sea, only two tanks out of 29 of B and C Companies will hit the beach. At 0630 hrs the first LCAs and LCVPs are approaching the beach and the german open fire furiously, all hell breaking loose the moment the ramps are being lowered. The GIs find Elements of the 1/16 Inf Rgt a completely flat beach with no cover and raked by german ( Robert F. Sargent - USASC ) machineguns, AT guns and mortars. On top of that, most of the landing crafts have drifted to the east because of the strong tide currents and men are not landing on their assigned sector and find themselves intermingled with other squads and companies. Company A/116 loses almost all it's officers in the first 15 minutes, the men being pinned down at water's edge, or hiding behind the beach obstacles and refusing to advance, paralysed with fear. Except for a few sectors, it's the same situation all over the beach: men pinned down behind the shingle, behind destroyed vehicles, beach obstacles or lying down at water's edge and advancing only with the rising tide. The second wave of reinforcements begin to land at 0700 hrs and meet the same fate and men and materiel losses are mounting by the minute. Nonetheless, begining around 0800, some officers start to organize small groups of men and lead them to assault the first strong points. Despite high casualties, equipment losses and disorganisation, a large portion of the assault troops did not remain pinned down, encouraged and inspired by a handfull of valorous officers and non-comissioned officers who take their lead. These early penetration were to LCI 553 land troop on Fox influence the rest of the day's action on Omaha Beach. Green The most important condition to improve the situation on the ( USA Signal Corps ) beach was to push the vehicles inland. This was made possible after the destroyers and the 18th Infantry Regiment had reduced the german resistance at the E-1 draw. By early afternoon, vehicles were able to advance through the Ruquet valley. For the other draws, the efforts to open them to traffic only succeeded late in the afternoon.

The End of the Day :

The assault on Omaha had succeeded but had been much more harder than what was envisioned. Generally speaking, clearing and organizing the beach had just begun by nightfall. The penetrations made in the morning by relatively small groups lacked the power to thrust deep inland and a fierce german resistance had confined the advance to a narrow beachhead no larger than one and a half mile in the Colleville area. Behind the US lines, german pockets still refused to cease fighting. Needless to say, none of the D-Day objectives assigned to the 1st Infantry Division had been reached, neither the penetration towards route 13 nor the junction with the british at Port en bessin or the Rangers at the Pointe du Hoc. As the end of the day a first assesment can be made: it was close call and a disaster had been narrowly avoided. Only 100 tons of materiel had be landed out of the 2,400 planned but more than that, the human losses have been staggering, on the 34,000 men landed, the americans had lost around 4,720 killed, wounded or missing on the beach which would be forever known as 'Bloody Omaha'.

The Pointe du Hoc

The Rangers at the Pointe du Hoc

While the main assault was taking place on Omaha Beach, Companies D, E and F of the 2nd Ranger Battalion were engaged in a solitary action, 5 kms to the west. Under Lt.Col. James E. Rudder, the 225 Rangers had a very special mission to accomplish at the Pointe du Hoc: capture that fortified postion and neutralize the 6-guns 155mm battery that was capable of firing on all the approaches to Omaha and Utah. The layout of the terrain was making this mission particularly difficult: a 25m-wide strip of beach overlooked by a 30m high cliff that would have to be climbed. It was around 0430 hrs that the ten LCAs and four DUKWs carrying the troops had been lowered from the transport ships about 20 kilometres off the coast. Each LCA was equipped with rocket-propelled knotted climbing ropes and rope ladders that would be used to climb the cliff. Each landing craft was also carrying extending ladders made of several sections that could be easily assembled to each others while each DUKW were carrying 110-foot long firemen' ladders. The attack plan was that, at H-Hour, D Company would land to the west of the Pointe while E and F Companies would land to the east of it, and then they would neutralize the battery emplaced on top. Due to strong tide currents and low visibility, the british control boat mistook to Pointe de La Pere for the objective, 2km to the east. This forced the Rangers to navigate along the coast under the german fire which sank one of the DUKWs. Previously, one of the LCA had already

Climbing the Pointe du Hoc ( USA Signal Corps )

sunk in the rough sea near the start line. This navigation error caused a 40 minutes delay on the planned schedule and the follow-up Rangers companies, without any news from Rudder, would be redirected to Omaha Beach. At 0710 hrs, the 9 remaining LCAs reached the eastern side on the cliff on a 400m-wide front and the Rangers landed on the narrow strip of beach. In less than 5 minutes, the first men were already on top of the cliff and, after regrouping into small squads, they moved towards their assigned objectives. They reached the battery emplacements but found no guns inside them. Without stopping, they carried on with their mission and pushed inland to cut the coastal road, establish a defensive perimeter and await for the reinforcments coming from Omaha Beach. The patrols started around 0900 hours. Following a path beyond the coastal road, two Rangers found the guns in a field as well as a large amount of ammunitions but with no german soldiers around. They destroyed two of the guns with hand grenades and then retraced their steps to fetch some more. Another patrol finished up the job and blew up the ammos. After a while, the enemy began to recover from the early confusion and mounted several counter-attacks during the day. The small group of Rangers back at the battery was besieged and only with sporadic contact with advanced group near the road and the Command Post couldn't establish communication with the main attacking forces on the beaches. Rangers at the Pointe du Hoc During the afternoon, only a single message could be sent to ( USA Signal Corps) V Corps from the Pointe du Hoc: "Here is the Pointe du Hoc - missions accomplished - need ammos and reinforcements casualties heavy". This situation lingered on June 6th and 7th, the Rangers dug in and awaiting the reinforcements from Omaha. It's only around noon on June 8 that the relief forces, made of the 5th Ranger Battalion, the 116th Infantry Regiment and tanks from the 743rd Tank Battalion forced the germans to withdraw toward Grandcamp and the Rangers were able to take a short rest. During this assault, the 2nd Ranger Battalion suffered 135 losses out of the 225 men that landed. On June 8 at 1200 hrs, only 90 men remained fit for duty.

Order of battle 1st

1st Infantry Division - Order of battle Commanding General : Major General Clarence R. Huebner Assistant Commanding Brigadier General Willard G. Wyman : Chief of Staff : Colonel Stanhope B. Mason

Clarence R. Huebner

G 1. G 2. G 3. G 4. G 5.

Lt. Colonel Charles S. Ware Lt. Colonel Robert F. Evans Lt. Colonel Frederick W. Gibb Lt. Colonel Clarence M. Eymer Lt. Colonel John M. Rogers, Jr.

Adjutant General : Lt. Colonel Leonidas Gavalas 16th Infantry Regiment : Colonel George A. Taylor Medical det. : Major Charles Tegtmeyer 1 / 16th : Lt. Colonel Edmund F. Driscoll A Co : Captain James Pence B Co : Captain Thomas Merendino C Co : Captain Victor Briggs D Co : Captain Polydore Dion 2 / 16th : Lt. Colonel Herbert C. Hicks, Jr E Co : Captain Edward F. Wozenski F Co : Captain John Finke G Co : Captain Joseph Dawson H Co : Captain Robert Irvine 3 / 16th : Lt. Colonel Charles T. Homer, Jr I Co : Captain Kimball Richmond K Co : Captain Anthony Prucnal L Co : Captain John Armellino (WIA 6 June) M Co : Captain Emil Edmonds 18th Infantry Regiment : Colonel George A. Smith, Jr. 1 / 18th : Lt. Colonel Henry G. Learnard, Jr. 2 / 18th : Lt. Colonel John Williamson F Co : Captain Orin W. Rosenberg G Co : Captain Gordon Jeffrey H Co : Captain Robert E. Murphy 3 / 18th : Lt. Colonel Courtney P. Brown 26th Infantry Regiment : Colonel John F. R. Seitz 1 / 26th : Lt. Colonel Francis J. Murdock, Jr D Co : Captain Robert Bridges 2 / 26th : Lt. Colonel Derrill M. Daniel 3 / 26th : Lt. Colonel John T. Corley I Co : Captain Semanchyk K Co : Captain Kendall Moultrop (WIA 6 June) L Co : Captain Billings M Co : Captain Uffner

1st Engineer Combat Bn : Lt. Colonel William B. Gara C Co : Captain Dave E. Stokley (WIA 9 June) 299th Engineer Combat Bn : Lt. Colonel Milton Jewett 1st Division Artillery : Brigadier General Clift Andrus 5th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Robert N. Tyson 7th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel George W. Gibbs 32nd FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Edward S. Bechtold 33rd FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Walter J. Bryde C Battery : Captain Pelletier 81st Chemical Mortar Bn : Colonel Thomas H. James (WIA 6 June) A Co : Captain Moundres (KIA 6 June) 1st/Lt. James P. Panas D Co : Captain Gaffney (KIA 6 June) Lt. Marshall 56th Signal Bn : Major Ernest L. Smith Hq Co : Captain Robert H. Berg A Co : Captain Howard E. Porter C Co : Captain William D. Lyon 1st Cavalry Reconnaissance Captain William L. Blake Troop : 1st Signal Co : 701st Ord. Light Maintenance Captain Raymond C. Huntoon Co : 1st Quatermaster Co : Captain John J. King 1st Military police Platoon : Major Thomas F. Lancer 1st Medical Bn : Lt. Colonel Samuel Blechfeld ATTACHMENTS 741st Tk Bn : Lt. Colonel Robert N. Skaggs Svc Co : Lt. Frank A. Klotz Med Co : Captain Alex Hochman A Co : Captain Cecil D. Thomas B Co : Captain James G. Thornton C Co : Captain Charles R. Young D Co : Captain John F. Sicks 745th Tk Bn : Lt.. Colonel Wallace Nichols 635th Tk Destroyer Bn : Lt. Colonel Wint Smith

111th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Thornton L. Mullins 197th AAA AW Bn : Med Det. : A Battery : B Battery : Lt. Colonel Charles T. McEniry Captain Irving S. Roth Captain William S. Heitz Captain Everett V. Peterson (KIA 6 June) 1st Lt. Knox W. Livingston C Battery : Captain William R. Olcott D Battery : Captain Thomas A. Chappelle

115th Regimental Combat Colonel Eugene N. Slappey Team : 116th Regimental Combat Colonel Charles D.W. Canham Team : 1 det, 29th Reconnaissance Troop : 1 det, 121st Engr Combat Bn :

Order of battle 29th

29th Infantry Division - Order of battle Commanding General : Major General Charles H. Gerhardt Assistant Commanding : Brigadier General Norman D. Cota Chief of Staff : Colonel Godwin Ordway, Jr G 1. G 2. G 3. G 4. G 5. Lt. Colonel Cooper B. Rhodes Major Paul W. Krznarich Lt. Colonel William J. Witte Lt. Colonel Louis M. Gosorn Captain Asa B. Gardiner

Charles H. Gerhardt

Adjutant General : Lt. Colonel Robert H. Archer, Jr 115th Infantry Regiment : Colonel Eugene N. Slappey Hq Co : 1st Lt. Frank D. Bergstein 1 / 115th : Lt. Colonel Richard C. Blatt Hq Co : Captain David F. Mentzer, Jr A Co : Captain John M. Ryan B Co : Captain LeRoy Weddle C Co : Captain Frank Bowen D Co : Captain George B. Nabb, Jr

2 / 115th : Lt. Colonel William E. Warfield Hq Co : Captain Richard P. Scott E Co : Captain Waldo E. Schmitt F Co : Captain Robert J. Kaiser G Co : 1st Lt. Livingston Eaddy H Co : Captain Angelo W. Onder 3 / 115th : Major Victor P. Gillespie Hq Co : Captain Jacobs L. Jones I Co : Captain William L. Spry K Co : Captain Louis I. Hille L Co : Captain Arthur D. Lawson M Co : Captain George B. Fowler 116th Infantry Regiment : Colonel Charles D.W. Canham Hq Co : Captain Joseph A. Rice 1 / 116th : Lt. Colonel John A. Metcalfe Hq Co : Captain Thomas J. Callahan A Co : Captain Taylor N. Fellers (KIA 6 June) B Co : Captain Ettore V. Zappacosta (KIA 6 June) C Co : Captain Berthier B. Hawks D Co : Captain Walter O. Schilling 2 / 116th : Major Sidney V. Bingham, Jr Hq Co : Captain Charles R. Cawthon E Co : Captain Lawrence A. Madill (KIA 6 June) F Co : Captain William Callahan G Co : Captain Eccles Scott H Co : Captain George Boyd 3 / 116th : Lt. Colonel Lawrence E. Meeks Hq Co : Captain Archibald A. Sproul I Co : Captain Mifflin Clowe K Co : Captain William G. Pingley, Jr L Co : Captain Charles W. East M Co : Captain Charles Kidd 175th Infantry Regiment : Colonel Paul R. Goode Hq Co : Captain Henry J. Reed 1 / 175th : Lt. Colonel Roger S. Whiteford Hq Co : Captain Guy G. Griffin, Jr A Co : Captain Joseph E. Mueller B Co : Captain Jack Brashears C Co : Captain Alexander Pouska, Jr D Co : Captain Miles C. Shorey, Jr 2 / 175th : Lt. Colonel Millar G. Bowen Hq Co : Captain Louis J. Curl, Jr E Co : Captain Lawrence E. Maddox

F Co : Captain Robert M. Miller G Co : Captain Kearney Slingluff H Co : Captain Edward Wolff 3 / 175th : Lt. Colonel Edward A. Gill Hq Co : Captain Paul T. Freund I Co : Captain Frank J. McKenna K Co : Captain John T. King III L Co : Captain Alvin W. Hobbs M Co : 1st Lt. Thomas C. Emlo 121st Engineer Combat Bn : Lt. Colonel Robert P. Ploger Hq Co : Captain Henry E. Lewis A Co : Captain Christian L. Martin B Co : Captain Edward L. Humphrey C Co : Captain Svend A. Holmstrup (KIA 6 June) 29th Division Artillery : Brigadier General William H. Sands 110th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel John Purley Cooper Hq Co : Captain James R. McCarthy Battery A : Captain William H. Beehler Battery B : Captain Charles C. Cole Battery C : Captain Arthur L. Flinner 111th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Thornton L. Mullins (KIA 6 June) Hq Co : Captain William L. Decamps Battery A : Captain Jack R. Wilson Battery B : Captain John Hodges Battery C : Captain Louis A. Shuford 224th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Clinton E. Thruston, Jr Hq Co : Captain Harry J. Mathews, Jr Battery A : Captain Arnold J. Young, Jr Battery B : 1st Lt. Delos H. Mathiesen Battery C : Captain Harry R. Ostler 227th FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Neal W. Harper Hq Co : Captain Robert M. Godber Battery A : Captain Doyle E. Conrad Battery B : Captain George F. Weidl Battery C : Captain Walter J. Rakow 29th Signal Co : Captain Arba G. Williamson 29th Reconnaissance Troop : Captain William H. Puntenney 729th Ord. Light Maintenance Captain Harold S. Price Co : 29th Quatermaster Co : Captain Frank B. Hines 29th Military police Platoon : Major Vern E. Johnson

104th Medical Bn : Lt. Colonel Arthur N. Ericksen A Co : Captain Raymond F. Conway B Co : Captain Lester L. Kolman C Co : Captain John S. Williams ATTACHMENTS 743rd Tk Bn : Lt. Colonel John S. Upham, Jr A Co : Captain Vodra Philips B Co : Captain Charles Ehmka (KIA 6 June) C Co : Captain Ned Elder 747th Tk Bn : Lt. Colonel Stuart G. Fries 635th Tk Destroyer Bn : 1 det, Hq & Hq Btry, 49th AAA General Edward W. Timberlake Bde : Hq & Hq Btry, 18th AAA Grp : Colonel T. W. Munford 110th AAA Gun Bn : Lt. Colonel William F. Curren, Jr. 457th AAA AW Bn : Lt. Colonel C. G. Remmington 1 det, 413th AAA Gun Bn : 320th AAA Bln Bn VLA - [C Btry] : 102nd Cavalry Rcn Squadron : 5th Engineer Special Bde : Colonel William D. Bridges 6th Engineer Special Bde : Colonel Paul W. Thompson (WIA 6 June) Colonel Chase 992nd Engineer Treadway Br Co : 1 det, 996th Engineer Treadway Br Co : 502nd Engineer Light Pon Co : 503rd Engineer Light Pon Co : 1st Engineer Combat Bn, C Co : 234th Engineer Combat Bn : 254th Engineer Combat Bn : Hq & Hq Co, 1121st Engineer C Grp : 37th Engineer Combat Bn : Lt. Colonel Lionel F. Smith (KIA 6 June) A Co : Captain Louis J. Drnovich

147th Engineer Combat Bn : 336th Engineer Combat Bn : Hq & Hq Co, 1171st Engineer C Grp : 112th Engineer Combat Bn : Major William A. Richards (KIA 6 June) 146th Engineer Combat Bn : Lt. Colonel Carl J. Isley Hq Co : Captain Arthur Hill A Co : Captain Sam H. Ball, Jr B Co : Captain John K. Howard (WIA 6 June) C Co : Captain Vincent L. Wall 149th Engineer Combat Bn : 1340th Engineer Combat Bn : 610th Engineer Light Equip Co : Hq & Hq Btry, V Corps Arty : 1 det, 17th FA Obsn Bn : 33rd FA Bn : Hq & Hq Btry, 190th FA Grp : 186th FA Bn : 187th FA Bn : Colonel Raymond B. Beach 190th FA Bn : 200th FA Bn : 58th Armored FA Bn : Lt. Colonel Mc Quade (KIA 6 June) Major Walter J. Paton (From 6 June) 26th Regimental Combat Team Colonel John F. R. Seitz : 2nd Ranger Bn : Lt. Colonel James E. Rudder Hq Co : Captain James W. Wikner A Co : Captain Joseph A. Rafferty (KIA 6 June) B Co : Captain Edgar L. Arnold C Co : Captain Ralph E. Goranson D Co : Captain Morton L. McBride E Co : 1st Lt. Gilbert C. Baugh F Co : Captain Otto Masny 5th Ranger Bn : Lt. Colonel Max F. Schneider Hq Co : Captain John C. Raaen Jr. A Co : Captain Charles H. Parker B Co : Captain George P. Whittington, Jr. C Co : Captain Wilmer K. Wise D Co : Lt. George R. Miller E Co : Captain Edward S. Luther

F Co : Captain William M. Runge

Landing diagram 16th

16th Regimental Combat Team - Landing Diagram Land Wave H -10 H H +01 H +03 H +08 H +25 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c Fox Green Easy Red Wave 16 DD 16 DD 1 Co 'C' 741 Tk Bn Co 'B' 741 Tk Bn 4 LCT 4 LCT 2 Co 'A' 741 Tk Bn Co 'A' 741 Tk Bn 12 LCA 12 LCVP 3 Co 'L' & 'I' 16th Inf. Co 'E' & 'F' 16th Inf. 2 LCM 6 LCM 4a Engr Spec Task Force Engr Spec Task Force 1 LCM 3 LCM 4b Engr Spec Task Force Engr Spec Task Force 2 LCM 4 LCM 4c Engr Spec Task Force Engr Spec Task Force 6 LCA - 7 LCVP 13 LCVP Co 'K' 16th Inf. - Hq & Hq Co 3rd Co 'G' 16th Inf. - Hq & Hq Co 2nd 5 Bn Bn Prov 397 AAA(AW) Btry Prov 397 AAA(AW) Btry 6 LCVP - 1 LCM 6 LCVP - 1 LCM Co 'H' 16th Inf. - Hq & Hq Co 2nd 6 Co 'M' 16th Inf. Bn 8 LCVP - 1 LCM 8 LCVP Co 'A' 81 Cml Wpons Bn - Hq & 7 Co 'C' 81 Cml Wpons Bn Hq Co 2nd Bn 3 LCT 5 LCT Det. 5th ESB - Misc tractors and Det. 5th ESB - 15 Half tracks 8 vehicles other misc. vehicles 6 DUKW - 1 LCI 1 LCVP - 8 DUKW - 1 LCI 9 457 Amph. Trk Bn 459 Amph. Trk Bn - Det. V Corps 12 LCVP 10 Co 'A' & 'C' 16th Inf. 12 LCVP Co 'B' 16th Inf. - Hq & Hq Co 1st 11 Bn 16th Inf. Engr misc. pers. 5 LCT 9 LCVP 12 Brty A,B,C 62nd FA Bn SP Co 'D' 16th Inf.; Other misc. 1 LCVP - 1 LCM Hq & Hq Co 16th Inf. Serv. Co and 13 other misc. 3 DUKW 1 LCVP - 18 DUKW 14 Hq & Hq Co 3rd Bn Brty A,B,C 7th FA Bn - Hq & Hq

H +30

H +40

H +50

H +60 H +65 H +70

8 9

H +80

H +90 H +95

10

H +105 11

H +110 1 LCI - 4 LCT 20th ECB - 197 AAA Bn Det.

H +120 12 H +130 H +135 13 H +180 14 H +185 15 H +195 H +210

Co 62nd FA Bn 8 DUKW - 1 LCVP - 2 LCM Det. Hq Co 1st Div - Can Co 16th Inf. 7 LCT - 2 LCI - 2 LCVP 1st Engr. Bn - AT Co 16th Inf. 197 AAA Bn 7 LCT 5th ESB Det.

15

16 17

4 LCVP Co 'C' 20th Engr. Det. 2 RF 5th ESB - 62nd FA Bn 1 LCM Salvage

2 LCVP - 1 RF 2 LCM Salvage 2 LCM - 1 LCI - 18 LCVP 2nd Bn 18th Inf. 9 LCI 1st + 3rd Bn 18th Inf. 5 LCT A.T Co 18th Inf - 348th Engr (C) Bn Co 'B' 1st Engr. Bn

18 19 20 21

H +220 16

10 LCT 20th Engr. Bn

22

Landing diagram 116th

116th Regimental Combat Team - Landing Diagram Touch Down H-5 H H+1 H+3

Easy Green

Dog Red

Dog White 16 DD C Co 743 Tk Bn 2 LCT A Co 743 Tk Bn 6 LCVP G Co 116 Inf

Dog Green

H + 30

H + 40

16 DD B Co 743 Tk Bn 2 LCT 2 LCT 2 LCT A Co 743 Tk Bn A Co 743 Tk Bn A Co 743 Tk Bn 6 LCVP 6 LCVP 6 LCA E Co 116 Inf F Co 116 Inf A Co 116 Inf 3 LCM - 2 LCA 3 LCM 3 LCM 3 LCM 146 Engr CT 146 Engr CT 146 Engr CT 146 Engr CT C Co 2d Ranger Bn 5 LCVP 8 LCVP 5 LCVP 8 LCA - 1 LCVP H Co 116 Inf Hq Co 2d Bn Hq Co 116 Inf B Co 116 Inf AAAW Btry AAAW Btry AAAW Btry AAAW Btry 1 LCM - 4 LCVP 1 LCM - 4 LCA 1 LCM - 1 LCA 1 LCM D Co 81 Cml Wpns 6 LCVP 149 Engr Beach Bn 112 Engr Bn Bn Hq 1st Bn 116 Inf 121 Engr Bn 112 Engr Bn 149 Engr Beach Bn

149 Engr Beach Bn H + 50 7 LCVP L Co 116 Inf 7 LCVP I Co 116 Inf 9 LCVP Hq Co 3d Bn M Co 116 Inf 1 LCT 1 LCVP - 4 LCT 112 Engr Bn

H + 57

H + 60

H + 65 1 LCI 149 Engr Beach Bn 1 LCI 112 Engr Bn

H + 70

H + 90 H + 100 13 DUKW 111 FA Bn

D Co 116 Inf 1 LCM - 7 LCVP 6 LCVP 121 Engr Bn K Co 116 Inf C Co 116 Inf 4 LCVP B Co 81 Cml Wpns Bn 3 LCT - 5 LCA 1 LCVP 121 Engr Bn Hq & Hq Co 116 A & B Co 2d Inf Ranger 7 LCA 5th Ranger Bn 1 LCM - 2 LCT 8 LCA 1 LCI 121 Engr Bn Hq Co 116 Inf 5th Ranger Bn 5 LCT 58 Armd FA Bn 1 LCI 6th Engr Sp Brig 10 DUKW AT Plat 1st Bn Cm Co 116 Inf 2 LCT 467 AAA AW Bn

H + 110

H + 120

H + 150 H + 180 H + 225

7 DUKW AT Plat 2d Bn AT Plat 3d Bn 29 Sig Bn 5 LCT 3 LCT AT Co 116 Inf 2 LCT AT Co 116 Inf 467 AAA AW Bn 467 AAA AW Bn 467 AAA AW Bn 149 Engr Beach Bn 1 LCI Hq Co 116 Inf 104 Med Bn 12 DUKW 2 LCT 3 LCM - 3 LCT 461 Amph Trk Co 18 DUKW 1 LCT 2 LCT 461 Amph Trk Co

5 LCT

Engineer Task Force

Special Engineer Task Force The mission of the Special Engineer Task Force on June 6 on Omaha is the destruction of the beach obstacles and the clearing of 16 gaps, 45 meters-wide each, to allow the landing crafts to hit the beach, and this before the tide rises again. This ad hoc Task Force is made of units belonging to the Navy or the Engineers and attached to the 1st Infantry Division. Each Gap Assault Team is made of a detachement of 27 men from an Engineer Combat Battalion and 14 others from an NCDU (Naval Combat Demolition Unit). The Gap Assault

Teams are commanded by an officer from the engineers and are reinforced for the heavy work by a Tank Dozer. The are scheduled to land at H+03, right behind the first infantry wave. The Gap Support Teams have the same table of organisation and will be supporting two Gap Assault Teams each, landing at H+08. The Special Engineer Task Force on Omaha SETF troops are crossing the Channel aboard LCTs and transfer to LCMs their equipment and explosives-ladden moments only before the assault. The SETF meets the same difficulties during the beach approach as the other assault units and at least half the Gap Assault Teams hit the sand 15 minutes behind schedule. This delay prevents the men from blowing gaps through the obstacles because infantry troops are already using them as covers. On top of that, the Gap Assault Teams are taken under a heavy fire as the germans are particularly targeting the rubber dinghies loaded with 225Kgs of explosives each. The SETF is only able to open a few of the planned gaps during the morning and they will have to wait for the afternoon and the low tide again to work in better conditions but still without explosives, as the beach is crowded with men and materiel. On June 6, The Gap Assault Teams will suffer casualty rates between 34% and 41% and even 53% for the NCDUs. GAP ASSAULT TEAMS N Engineer Combat Battalion Unit Officer TOUCH DOWN : H + 03 NCDU Officer C.G.M Freeman Lt(jg) Culver Lt(jg) Holtman Lt(jg) Nichols W.O. Thompson Lt(jg) William M. Jenkins Dog Red Dog Green Dog White Sector

Unit #11 #24 #27 #41 #42 #43

1 A/146th Lt. Willam J. Kehaly Lt. William A. 2 A/146th Anderson 3 A/146th Lt. John S. Schill 4 A/146th Lt. Kenneth J. Shively Lt. Howard O. 5 B/146th Caldwell 6 C/146th Lt. Eskell F. Roberts Lt. Ben G. Bartholomew 8 B/146th Lt. Wesley R. Ross Lt. Raymond E. 9 C/146th Lanterman 7 B/146th 10 C/146th Lt. Joseph Gregory 11 12 13 14 299th 299th 299th 299th Captain Manniko Lt. J. Wood Lt. Batchelor Lt. Phil Wood

#140 W.O. J. G. Hill #137 Ens. Harold P. Blean #44 #45 W.O. Raynor

Easy Green

Ens. Lawrence S. Karnowski #46 Ens. J. E. Bussell #22 Lt. Walter Cooper #23 Lt(jg) A. E. Vetter #141 Ens. G. L. Gouinlock

Easy Red

15 16

299th Lt. McGuire 299th Lt. Hobson

#138 Ens. J. C. Allen #142 Ens. H. G. Stocking TOUCH DOWN : H + 08 NCDU Officer

Fox Green

GAP SUPPORT TEAMS N Engineer Combat Battalion Unit Officer

Unit

Sector Dog Green Dog White Dog Red Easy Green Easy Red Fox Green

A C/146th Lt. Meier Lt. Charles F. Rollins, B C/146th Jr Lt. Donald P. C C/146th Latendresse D B/146th Lt. William Trescher E F G H 299th 299th 299th 299th Lt. Donahoo Captain Perry S/Sgt. Luehrs Captain Bunting

#133 Ens. Mitchell #130 Ens. A. B. Cheney no NCDU Ens. Herbert E. Duquette no NCDU #131 Ens. S. F. Inman no NCDU #129 Ens. W. C. Peterson #128

Operation Order 1-44

NCDG/A4-3 Serial: 001 TOP SECRET -- NEPTUNE GROUP No. 1 - 44 TASK ORGANIZATION (a) Naval Combat Demolition Section No. ONE - Lt.(jg) Heideman, USNR, (LCM 25) NCDU No. 11 - LCM 1 NCDU No. 24 - LCM 2 NCDU No. 27 - LCM 3 NCDU No. 41 - LCM 4 NCDU No. 42 - LCM 5 NCDU No. 43 - LCM 6 NCDU No. 140 - LCM 7 NCDU No. 137 - LCM 8 NCDU No. 133 - LCM 17 NCDU No. 130 - LCM 18 NCDU No. 128 - LCM 20 LCMs 25, 28, 29 30, 31 (b) Naval Combat Demolition Section No. TWO NCDU NCDU NCDU NCDU No. No. No. No. 44. 45 46 22 LCM LCM LCM LCM 9 10 11 12 Lt.(jg) V. Cooper, USNR, (LCM 26) WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE "O" (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) NAVAL COMBAT DEMOLITION 31 May 1944; 1200

NCDU NCDU NCDU NCDU NCDU NCDU

No. No. No. No. No. No.

231 141 138 142 131 129

LCM LCM LCM LCM LCM LCM

13 14 15 16 21 24

LCMs 26, 32, 33, 34, 36 1. Information as in Naval Commander Western Task Force NEPTUNE MONOGRAPH, and Commander Assault Force 'O' Operation Order No. BB-44. The Naval Combat Demolition Group is associated and working with an Army demolition group consisting of two battalions of Combat Engineers attached to the V Corps. One NCDU together with one Army combat demolition unit forms a Gap Assault Team. Tankdozers embarked in LCT(')s will land at H hour and proceed against obstacles as directed by the Army combat demolition unit officers. All paths cleared through minefields will be marked by personnel of the Army demolition units with a standard minefield gap marker, five feet high. Individual mines which have not been removed will be marked by an eighteen inch probing wire with a six inch by six inch piece of rod muslin attached to the top. NCD Sections TWO and ONE will form part of Group O-1 and O-2, respectively, of Force 'O' and will function under the commanders of those assault groups. 2. Beaches; two on FOX GREEN, six on EASY RED, two on EASY GREEN, two on DOG RED, two on DOG WHITE and two on DOG GREEN. (2) Widen the gaps in the seaward band of obstacles until the entire band is cleared. (3) Assist the special Army Engineer Demolition Group in clearing gaps through other bands of obstacles and removing all obstacles from the OMAHA Beaches. 3. (a) NCD Section No. ONE land Assault Group O-2, and clear band of obstacles on Beaches and EASY GREEN in accordance below. as directed by Commander eight gaps through the seaward DOG GREEN, DOG WHITE, DOG RED, with the table set forth This Group will: (1) Clear and mark sixteen gaps, fifty yards wide, through the seaward band. of obstacles on the OMAHA

I - Assault Units __________________________________________________________________ Serial No. of Gap & Coordinates Beach Team Craft No. NCDU (Eastings only) No. (LCM) No. __________________________________________________________________ 1. (6522 - 6526) DOG GREEN 1 1 11 2. (6545 - 6549) DOG GREEN 2 2 24 3. (6568 - 6572) DOG WHITE 3 3 27 4. (6588 - 6592) DOG WHITE 4 4 41 5. (6615 - 6619) DOG RED 5 5 42

6. (6635 - 6639) 7. (6655 - 6659) 8. (6675 - 6679)

DOG RED EASY GREEN EASY GREEN

6 7 8

6 7 8

43 140 137

II - Support Units DOG GREEN DOG WHITE DOG RED EASY GREEN A B C D 17 18 19 20 133 130 Army 128

III - Reserve Craft DOG GREEN 28 DOG WHITE 29 DOG RED 30 EASY GREEN 31 __________________________________________________________________ (b) NCDU Section No. TWO land as directed by Commander Assault Group O-1, and clear eight gaps through the seaward band of obstacles on Beaches EASY RED and FOX GREEN in accordance with the table set forth below. I - Assault Units __________________________________________________________________ Serial No. of Gap & Coordinates Beach Team Craft No. NCDU (Easting only) No. (LCM) No. __________________________________________________________________ 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. (6740 (6760 (6790 (6811 (6830 (6851 (6872 (6893 6743) 6764) 6794) 6815) 6835) 6856) 6876) 6898) EASY RED EASY RED EASY RED EASY RED EASY RED EASY RED FOX GREEN FOX GREEN 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 44 45 46 22 23 141 138 142

II - Support Units EASY RED EASY RED EASY RED FOX GREEN E F G H 21 22 23 24 Army 131 Army 129

III - Reserve Craft EASY RED 32 EASY RED 33 EASY RED 34 FOX GREEN 35 FOX GREEN 36 __________________________________________________________________ (x) (1) Land at H plus three minutes, each unit clearing a gap fifty yards or more in width through the seaward band of obstacles. Upon completion of clearing the initial gap, each unit widen and extend the gap as time permits until the entire seaward band of obstacles is removed. If the seaward band of obstacles is Element "C", ten men from the

Army section of the Gap Team will reinforce the NCDU to assist in removal of the obstacle. The two powder men of each NCDU launch the rubber boat with reserve explosives from the LCM at the time of debarking and tow it ashore. One man remain with the boat while the other proceeds inshore to the highwater mark with a white, triangular range marker, two feet wide at the base, and eight feet high. The man proceeding inshore with the marker, place it on the beach above the highwater mark on the center line of the gap cleared by the combined Army and Navy team. (2) When the depth of water prevents further clearance of the seaward band of obstacles, mark the extremities of the cleared gaps by green flags mounted on buoys, then assist the Army team clearing obstacles in the inshore bands. (3) Support NCDUs land as directed by NCD Section Commanders to assist, or augment the assault NCDUs. Unload reserve explosives from the support craft. Retract and remain on call, to be unloaded as directed by NCD Section Commanders. (4) Reserve craft remain afloat on call, to be unloaded as directed by NCD Section Commander. (5) Indicate intention to explode charges by a violet smoke grenade lighted when the fuze to the charge is ignited. (6) Unless otherwise directed use a two minute delay fuze for all charges. 4. Logistics (a) Rations. Each individual will land with one type "K" and one type "D" rations. (b) Water. All individuals land with one full canteen. Canteens will be refilled only from supplies of Allied troops. (c) Arms and equipment. Each man will carry arms and ammunition and equipment as separately indicated. (d) Life belts. Life belts will be worn high up under the arms. (e) Additional equipment of NCDUs will be brought forward in LCMs of Convoy O-5, arriving in the Assault Area D plus 1 day. Communications as outlined in Communication Plan, Annex H, to Commander Assault Force "O" Operation Order No. BB-44. Use Zone minus Two Time. All units synchronize watches with ships time prior to embarking in LCMs. Commander Naval Combat Demolition Group initially in LCT(R) 464. During the assault he will be embarked in LCM 27. JOSEPH H. GIBBONS, Lieutenant Commander, Commander Naval Combat Demolition Force "O" B. Deployment and Landing Plan. DISTRIBUTION Commander Assault Force O-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) Commander Assault Force O-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3)

5.

ANNEXES U.S.N.R. A. LCM Movement and Approach Plan Group

Commander Assault Force O-3 . . . . . . Commander Assault Force O-4 . . . . . . Comdr. LST Flotilla TWELVE . . . . . . Comdr. LCI(L) Flotilla TEN . . . . . . Comdr. LCT Flotilla TWELVE . . . . . . Comdr. LCT Flotilla EIGHTEEN . . . . . Comdr. LCT Flotilla NINETEEN . . . . . Comdr. Gunfire Support Craft . . . . . Demolition Units & LCMs . . . . . . . . Princess Maud . . . . . . . . . . . . . CG V. Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CG 1st Inf. Div . . . . . . . . . . . . Col. Comdg. 16th R.C.T. . . . . . . . . Col. Comdg. 18th R.C.T. . . . . . . . . Col. Comdg. 115th R.C.T. . . . . . . . Col. Comdg. 116th R.C.T. . . . . . . . Prov. Eng. Spec. Brig. Grp. . . . . . . 5th Eng. Spec. Brig. . . . . . . . . . 6th Eng. Spec. Brig. . . . . . . . . . CO 6th Beach Battalion . . . . . . . . CO 7th Beach battalion . . . . . . . . Comdr. Far Shore Service Group (OMAHA). Col. Comdg. Army Eng. Demolition Group N.C.W.T.F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ComLanCrab 11th Phib . . . . . . . . . COUSNAAB POOLE . . . . . . . . . . . . COUSNAAB PORTLAND . . . . . . . . . . . File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (45) (40) (1) (5) (5) (3) (3) (3) (3) (5) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (30) (5) (5) (3) (3) (1)

NCDG/A4-3 Serial: 001 TOP SECRET -- NEPTUNE GROUP OPERATION ORDER No. 1-44

WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE "O" (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) NAVAL COMBAT DEMOLITION PORTLAND DORSET 31 May 1944: 1200 ANNEX A MOVEMENT, APPROACH, DEPLOYMENT, & LANDING PLAN

TASK ORGANIZATION (a) Assault and Command Craft - Lt(jg) Orr, USNR. (LCM 27). LCMs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, 27. Support Craft - Ens. Williams, USNR. (LCM 17). LCMs 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. Reserve Craft - Ens. Edelfelt, USNR. (LCM 30). LCMs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.

19 LCMs

(b) (c)

8 LCMs 9 LCMs

1. (a) This plan provides for orderly departure of the LCMs of the Naval Combat Demolition Group from assembly ports, for their movement to the Assault Area; their approach, deployment, and landing, and for replacement of LCMs which become casualties during the

movement. (b) Detailed information concerning the convoy in which the LCMs proceed, is to be found in Annex C to Commander Assault Force 'O' Operation Order No. BB-44. (c) Appendix 3 to this Annex shows the location of the Transport Area and the vessels therein relative to the landing beaches and the courses and destinations thereto. 2. LCMs proceed in Convoy Group TWO, arriving off the OMAHA Beaches in time to perform the tasks assigned in the Operation Order and in the Field Order of Army Engineer Demolition Group 3. (a) Assault and Command Craft - LCMs 1 - 16, and 25 - 27 inclusive, proceed from PORTLAND or POOLE as appropriate to the Assault Area in tow of LCT(A)s and LCT(HE)s in Convoy Group TWO as set forth in Appendix 1 to this Annex. When towing craft lie to about 1,000 yards inshore from Point KING LCMs go alongside the LCTs and embark Demolition teams. Then Demolition Teams are loaded, LCM's of each section assemble on the section commander and proceed to line of departure via the route prescribed by the Commanders, Assault Groups O-1 and O-2 respectively. Upon arrival at the line of departure, deploy as indicated in Appendix 2 to this Annex. Leave line of departure when despatched by control vessels, about H - 10 minutes, and land on assigned beaches at H + 3 minutes. After arrival at the line of departure, LCMs 25 and 26 proceed as directed by NCD Section commanders. (b) Support Craft.- LCMs 17 - 24 inclusive, proceed from POOLE to the Assault Area in tow of Gunfire Support Craft in Convoy Group TWO in accordance with Appendix 1 to this Annex. Upon arrival of the towing craft at Point KING, LCMs cast off lines, assemble by sections on the senior boat division officer of their section, and proceed to LSI(S) Princess Maude to embark support demolition teams. When demolition teams are embarked, Support Craft of each section proceed via route prescribed by the Commanders of Assault Groups O-1 and O-2 respectively, to the line of departure, and deploy as indicated in Appendix 2 to this Annex. Leave line of departure when despatched by control vessels about H - 5 minutes and land on assigned beaches at H + 8. (c) Reserve Craft - LCMs 28 - 36 inclusive, proceed from POOLE to the Assault Area in tow of Gunfire Support Craft as set forth in Appendix 2 of this Annex. Upon arrival of towing craft at point KING, LCM cast off tow line. Assemble by sections on the senior boat division commander of each section and proceed to the point about 1,000 yards inshore from Point KING where assault demolition teams are embarking in assault craft. Replace any missing assault craft with LCMs from the Reserve Group. From this point, proceed to LSI(S), Princess Maud, and embark any Support demolition teams whose LCMs did not arrive. From Princess Maud, remaining Reserve Craft proceed toward line of departure via route prescribed by their

respective Assault Group commanders and deploy as indicated in Appendix 2 to this Annex. Leave line of departure when despatched by control vessels in time to arrive approximately 1,000 yards off their assigned beaches at H + 20 minutes. Lie to in these positions on call. 3. (x)(1) LCMs berth alongside their respective towing craft when directed by the Commander Convoy Group TWO. (2) LCMs nominally in tow enroute to the Assault Area will run engines at sufficient speed to preserve a slack tow line. See that the tow line is tended carefully, however, in order to prevent it fouling the screws of the towing vessel. (3) In the event of engine failure or other casualty while on passage during daylight, adjacent LCM take necessary action to take the casualty in two and place it in tow of an LCT of low priority at the rear of the convoy. In the event of casualties during darkness, LCM crews embark on towing craft and set the LCM adrift to leeward, if necessary to maintain convoy speed. 4. Use reserve fuel to replenish tanks prior to arrival at the Assault Area. 5. LCMs when released by Naval Combat Demolition Group Commanders, report for duty to Ferry Control Subordinate Command Number ONE in LCI(L) __, one mile off Beach CHARLIE, displaying International flag hoist FOX EASY ROGER, Numeral ONE. JOSEPH E. GIBBONS Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.R. Commander Naval Combat Demolition Group Force "O" APPENDICES 1. Loading and Towing assignments. 2. Deployment Diagram. 3. Assault Area Diagram. NCDG/A4-3 FORCE Serial: 001 TOP SECRET - NEPTUNE GROUP _____________________________ APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A TO OPERATION ORDER 1-44 LOADING AND TOWING ASSIGNMENTS ASSAULT AND COMMAND CRAFT - DEPART PORTLAND AND POOLE WESTERN NAVAL TASK ASSAULT FORCE "0" TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR NAVAL COMBAT DEMOLITION PORTLAND, D0RSET

LCM No.:TEAM No.:NCDU No.: No. of :Asslt.

C.0. NCDU

: Towed By

:Beach

: : :Personnel: : : :Grp. ___________________________________________________________________________ ___ : : : : : : : 1 : 1 : 11 : 40 : Freeman C.G.M. : 2124(A) :Dog G : O-2 2 : 2 : 24 : 40 : Culver Lt(jg) : 2227(A) :Dog G : O-2 3 : 3 : 27 : 40 : Holtman Lt(jg) : 2273(A) :Dog W : O-2 4 : 4 : 41 : 40 : Nichols Lt(jg) : 2275( ) :Dog : O-2 5 : 5 : 42 : 40 : Thompson Carp. : 2050(HE):Dog R : O-2 6 : 6 : 43 : 40 : Jenkins Lt(jg) : 2075(HE):Dog R : O-2 7 : 7 : 140 : 40 : Hill Carp. : 2229(HE):Easy G : O-2 8 : 8 : 137 : 40 : Blein Ens. : 2307(HE):Easy G : O-2 9 : 9 : 44 : 40 : Reymer Carp. : 2339(HE):Easy R : O-1 10 : 10 : 45 : 40 : Karnowski Ens. : 2425(HE):Easy R : O-1 11 : 11 : 46 : 40 : Bassell Ens. : 2049(HE):Easy R : O-1 12 : 12 : 22 : 40 : Barbour AC0M : 2287(HE):Easy R : O-1 13 : 13 : 23 : 40 : Vetter Lt(jg) : 2037(A) :Easy R : O-1 14 : 14 : 141 : 40 : Guinlock Ens : 2228(A) :Easy R : O-1 15 : 15 : 138 : 40 : Allen Ens. : 2043(A) :Fox G : O-1 16 : 16 : 142 : 40 : Stocking Ens. : 2008(A) :Fox G : O-1 ___________________________________________________________________________ ___

DEPART POOLE ___________________________________________________________________________ ___ : : : : : : : 25 :Command : : : Heideman,Lt(jg): : : :Section1: : 27 : Isaly, Major : LCT(R) 450: : O-2 26 :Command : : : Cooper, Lt(jg) : . : : :Section2: : 27 : Jewett, Major : LCT(R) 452: : O-1 27 :Command : : : Gibbons, Lt Cdr: : : :Group : : 28 : O'Neill, Lt Col: LCT(R) 464: : O-1-2 ___________________________________________________________________________ ___

SUPPORT CRAFT - DEPART POOLE

___________________________________________________________________________ ___ : : : : : : : 17 : A : 133 : 40 : Mitchell, Ens. : LCG(L) 424:Dog G : O-2 18 : B : 130 : 40 : Cheney, Ens. : LCG(L) 426:Dog W : O-2 19 : C : Army : 35 : : LCG(L) 449:Dog R : O-2 20 : D : 128 : 40 : Duquette, Ens : LCT(L) 687:Easy G : O-2 21 : E : Army : 37 : : LCT(L) 811:Easy R : O-1 22 : F : 131 : 40 : Inman, Ens. : LCT(R) 366:Easy R : O-1 23 : G : Army : 37 : : LCT(R) 423:Easy R : O-1 24 : H : 129 : 40 : Peterson, Ens : LCT(R) 447:Fox G : O-1 ___________________________________________________________________________ ___

RESERVE CRAFT - DEPART POOLE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LCM No. 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Towed by LCT(R) 473 LCT(R) 482 LCF 3 LCF 5 LCP 6 LCF 7 LCF 9 LCF 11 LCF 12 Assault Group O-2 O-2 O-2 O-2 O-1 O-1 O-1 O-1 O-1 Beach DOG GREEN DOG WHITE DOG RED EASY GREEN EASY RED EASY RED EASY RED FOX GREEN FOX GREEN

Operation Order BB44

11thPHIB/A4-3(1)(a) Serial : 00681 TOP SECRET - NEPTUNE OPERATION ORDER No. BB-44 TASK ORGANISATION

WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE "O" (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) U.S.S. ANCON, Flagship, PORTLAND, DORSET, 20 MAY 1944; 1200.

(a) Landing Force - Major General Huebner, USA. (124.1) 1st U.S. Infantry Division (less 26th R.C.T., plus 115th & 116th R.C.T.s of the 29th Infantry Division, plus 2nd & 5th Ranger Battalions), Reinforced. (b) Shore Party - Brigadier General Hoge, USA. (124.2) 2/3ds 5th Engineer Special Brigade. 2/3ds 6th U.S. Naval Beach Battalion. 1/3d 6th Engineer Special Brigade. 1/3d 7th U.S. Naval Beach Battalion. (c) Assault Group - Captain Fritzsche, USCG. (124.3) O-1 - Captain Imlay, USCG, Deputy. APAs LCH LSI (L) LSTs LCI (L)s LCTs CHASE (F), HENRICO. LCI (L)-87 (RF). EMPIRE ANVIL. 309, 314, 357, 373, 374, 376. 83, 85, 88, 89, 493. 2 APAs 1 LCH 1 LSI (L) 6 LSTs 5 LCI (L)s

18, 20, 25, 195, 199, 200, 201, 206, 209, 213, 53 LCTs 271, 276, 293, 305, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 623, 624, 625, 626, 637, 638, 769, 814, 815, 856, 2008, 2037, 2043, 2049, 2228, 2287, 2339, 2425, 2487. as assigned. 552, 553. 1291, 1307. 118, 187. 10, 20. 18 LCM (3)s 2 PCs 2 SCs 2 MLs 2 LCCs

LCM (3)s PCs SCs MLs LCCs

(d) Assault Group - Captain Bailey, USN. (124.4) O-2 - Captain Wright, USN, Deputy. APAs LCH LSI (L) LSTs LCI (L)s CARROLL (F), JEFFERSON. LCI (L)-86 (RF). EMPIRE JAVELIN. 310, 315, 316, 317, 332, 372. 84, 90, 91, 92, 94, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 2 APAs 1 LCH 1 LSI (L) 6 LSTs 17 LCI (L)s

540, 541, 553, 554, 555, 557. LCTs 27, 29, 30, 80, 147, 149, 153, 197, 207, 214, 244, 54 LCTs 294, 332, 364, 535, 536, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 622, 665, 666, 703, 704, 705, 713, 714, 767, 775, 776, 813, 2050, 2075, 2124, 2227, 2229, 2273, 2275, 2297, 2307. as assigned. 565, 568, 618, 1225. 1332, 1353, 1354, 1360. 153, 189. 30, 40, 50. 18 LCM (3)s 4 PCs 4 SCs 2 MLs 3 LCCs

LCM (3)s PCs SCs MLs LCCs

(e) Assault Group - Captain Schulten, USN. (124.5) O-3 - Commander Unger, USCG, Deputy. XAPs LCH LSTs LCI (L)s ARUNDEL (F), DIX, THURSTON. LCI (L)-492 (RF). 3 XAPs 1 LCH

6, 51, 75, 133, 134, 157, 285, 286, 347, 350, 375, 12 LSTs 502. 93, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498. 11 LCI (L)s

LCTs

7, 22, 202, 415, 431, 434, 460, 562, 618, 619, 628, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 39 LCTs 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 657, 658, 659, 667, 706, 707, 708, 711, 712, 715, 768, 857. OCEANWAY. 564, 565, 617. 193, 304. 1 LSD 3 PCs 2 MLs

LSD PCs MLs

(f) Assault Group O-4 - Commander Dennis, RN. (124.6) LSI (S)s PRINCE CHARLES (F), PRINCE LEOPOLD, PRINCE BAUDOUIN. LSI (H)s LCT (5) MLs BEN MY CHREE, AMSTERDAM, PRINCESS MAUD. 413. 193, 304.

3 LSI (S)s 3 LSI (H)s 1 LCT (5) 2 MLs

(g) Escorts - Captain Sanders, USN (124.7) US DDs FRANKFORD, McCOOK, CARMICK, DOYLE, 12 US DDs ENDICOTT*, EMMONS, MURPHY, BALDWIN, HARDING, SATTERLEE, THOMPSON , PLUNKETT. Hunt DDs US DE ODDs Frigates A/S Trawlers PCs SCs TANATSIDE, TALYBONT, MELBREAK. BORUM, AMESBURY, BLESSMAN. VESPER, VIDETTE. L'ADVENTURE, L'ESCARMOUCHE BRESSAY, COLL, SKYE. 552, 553, 564, 565, 567, 568, 617, 618, 1225. 1291, 1307, 1332, 1353, 1354, 1360. 3 Hunt DDs 3 US DE 2 ODDs 2 Frigates 3 A/S Trawlers 9 PCs 6 SCs 5 MLs (970) 7 MLs 2 HDMLs 6 SGBs

MLs (970) 118, 153, 163, 304, 448. MLs HDMLs SGBs 187, 189, 193, 194, 214, 230, 907. 1383, 1387. HMS GREY FOX, GREY SHARK, GREY OWL, GREY WOLF, GREY GOOSE, GREY SEAL. 696, 701, 704, 714, 721, 730, 752.

MTBs

7 MTBs

(h) Gunfire Support Craft - Captain Sabin, USN. (124.8) LCH LCI (L) 520 (F). LCFs LCG (L)s LCT (R)s LCP (L)s LCT (A)s 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12. 424, 426, 449, 687, 811. 366, 423, 447, 450, 452, 464, 473, 482, 485. as assigned.

1 LCH 7 LCFs 5 LCG (L)s 9 LCT (R)s 28 LCP (L)s

2008, 2037, 2043, 2124, 2227, 2228, 2273, 2275. 8 LCT (A)s

LCT (HE)s 2049, 2050, 2055, 2229, 2287, 2297, 2307, 2339, 10 LCT (HE)s 2425, 2487. (i) Bombardment Group - Rear Admiral Bryant, USN. (124.9) BBs TEXAS, ARKANSAS. CLs GLASGOW, MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES.

2 BBs 3 CLs

US DDs

FRANKFORD, McCOOK, CARMICK, DOYLE, 9 US DDs ENDICOTT*, BALDWIN, HARDING, SATTERLEE, THOMPSON. TANATSIDE, TALYBONT, MELBREAK. 3 Hunt DDs

Hunt DDs

(j) Sweeper Group - Commander Cochrane, RN. (124.10) (1) 4th MS Flotilla - Commander Cochrane, RN. (124.10.1) MSs KELLETT (S.O.), PANGBOURNE, ALBURY, SULTON, LYDD, SELKIRK, ROSS, SALTASH, THUNDER. FUDAY, RIGHTO, NEILL SMITH. 140, 142, 143, 255. 9 MSs

Danlayers MLs

3 Danlayers 4 MLs

(2) 31st MS Flotilla - Commander Storrs, RCNR. (124.10.2) MSs CARAQUET (S.O.), BLAIRMORE, COWICHAN, FORT WILLIAM, MALPEQUE, VEGREVILLE, MINAS, WASAGA, MULGROVE. BAYFIELD, GREEN HOWARD, GUNNER. 345, 454, 465, 473. 9 MSs

Danlayers MLs

3 Danlayers 4 MLs

(3) 167th BYMS Flotilla - Lieutenant Heath, RNR. (124.10.3) BYMSs 2155 (S.O.), 2069, 2156, 2210, 2047, 2051, 2061, 2182. 8 BYMSs

(4) 104th MS Flotilla (124.10.4) MMs 31, 37, 74, 75 (S.O.), 84, 86, 279, 305, 307. 9 MMs

(k) Far Shore Service Group OMAHA - Captain Camp, USN. (124.11) Accomodation Ship SS ELEAZAR WHEELOCK. ARL LCM (CRU)s Ferry Craft : ADONIS.

1 Accom Ship 1 ARL 12 LCMs

LCI (L) LCI (L) LCI (L) LCT (5) & (6)s RHFs LCM (3)s LBV (2)s LCVPs Service Craft : Fueling Trawlers LBEs LBOs LBWs LBKs

83, 84, 85, 88. 89, 90, 91, 92 (Temporarily until relieved by four LCHs). 86, 414, 492, 520 (when assigned).

4 LCI (L)s 4 LCI (L)s 4 LCH 72 LCT (5) & (6)s 20 RHFs 139 LCM (3)s 72 LBV (2)s

(lifted in LSTs)

172 LCVPs

9 Fuel Trawlers. 16 LBEs 26 LBOs 5 LBWs 2 LBKs

CB Group OMAHA : Pontoon Drydock (l) Dispatch Boats (124.12) US PT PT-72. HM Seaplane Tenders 210, 269, 270, 271, 283, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1586. 1 Pont. Drydock

1 US PT 9 Disp. Boats

(m) Rescue Vessels (124.13) USCG Cutters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.

15 USCG Cutters

* USS Endicott was damaged in a collision on 24 May 1944. She didn't take part in Normandy landings The beach obstacles The first defences the allies will have to face are beach obstacles. Their construction had been sped up since Rommel inspection tour in January 1944.

The first line of obtructions is made of "C" Elements, also knows as "Belgian Gates. It is built out of girders and the three vertical ones are meant to tear open a ship's hull while it's structure is strong enough to resist tides and boats trying to knock them over. The second line consist of stakes or posts. The wooden or metalic stakes are facing the sea and are aimed at riping the hull of the landing crafts. Some of them are topped with mines ready to detonate at impact. The posts, heads facing the coast and inclined at about 40 are meant to capsize boats that would happen to pass over and some of them are even equiped with metalic teeth to rip hulls open. The last line of obstacles is made of hedgehogs (sometimes called Czech hedgehogs). It is build with three riveted girders put together with metalic plates. Notches in the upper part are supposed to tear the hulls and hold back the crafts in the fields of fire of the defenders. Their bases are driven into concrete to stabilize them. Lots of these obstacles that could not be removed in time before the landing of the first wave would be used as covers by the GIs pinned down under the german machineguns fire. The Resistance Nests (Widerstandnest or WN) The 7km-long beach sector, flanked by cliffs, is defended by light resistance nests numbered Wn60 to Wn 74. There is no heavy strongpoints (Sttzpunkt) in this area nor any artillery batteries in concrete casements, the nearest are at Longues sur Mer to the east and at the Pointe du Hoc to the west. At dawn on D-Day, the construction of the defenses is far from being complete, some pillboxes haven't received their guns yet but are nonetheless formidable.

WN 60 1 75mm gun 3 tobruks with mortars

WN 61 1 88mm Pak in pillbox 1 50mm Pak in concrete

WN 62 2 75mm guns in pillboxes 2 50mm Pak guns

1 mortar position 1 Flak 38 20mm gun flamethrowers

emplacement 1 tobruk with an R35 tank turret 2 tobruks with MGs flamethrowers

3 MG positions 1 tobruk with MG 2 tobruks with mortars 1 twin-AA MG in concrete emplacement 1 artillery observation post flamethrowers WN 65 1 50mm Pak in pillbox 1 50mm Pak in concrete emplacement 1 75mm gun 2 tobruks with mortars WN 68 1 50mm Pak in concrete emplacement 1 AT gun 2 tobruks with tank turrets 1 double-embrasure pillbox

WN 63 Company HQ Radio station

WN 64 1 76,2mm gun 1 20mm Flak gun 2 tobruks with mortars

WN 66 1 50mm Pak in concrete emplacement 1 AT gun 2 tobruks with tank turrets 2 heavy mortars in concrete emplacements 1 double-embrasure pillbox WN 69 1 Flak gun MG positions

WN 67 320mm rocket-launcher position

WN 70 1 75mm gun in pillbox 1 75mm gun 4 tobruks with MGs 2 mortars in concrete emplacements 1 20mm Flak gun WN 73 1 75mm gun in pillbox 3 tobruks with mortars MG positions 1 observation post

WN 71 1 observation post MG positions 1 tobruks with MG 1 mortar in concrete emplacement 1 double-embrasure pillbox WN 74 2 75mm guns

WN 72 1 88mm Pak in pillbox 1 50mm Pak doubleembrasure pillbox MG positions 1 tobruk with MG 1 double-embrasure pillbox

Assault Map - April 1944 Sheet 1

Assault Map - April 1944 Sheet 2

Assault Map - April 1944 Sheet 3

Assault Map - April 1944 Sheet 4

Assault Map - April 1944 Sheet 5

Assault Map - April 1944 Sheet 6

First Wave

Later Assault Landings

D-Day Objectives V Corps

Plan for Assault at Pointe du Hoc 6 June 1944

Vierville - St Laurent Area To Noon 6 June

Colleville Area To Noon 6 June

Evening of D-Day

Pointe du Hoc - German Night Attack 6 / 7 June 1944

V Corps 7 - 8 June 1944

1st Infantry Division 7 - 8 June 1944

29th Infantry Division 7 - 8 June 1944

V Corps Advance 9 - 13 June 1944

Action at Grandcamp 8 June 1944

V Corps Advance 14 - 18 June 1944

Omaha Beach West Bigot Map - Front

Omaha Beach West Bigot Map - Back

Omaha Beach East Bigot Map - Front

Omaha Beach West Bigot Map - Back

V Corps D-Day Operations G-3 Report, 1st Div.

Headquarters 1st US Inf. Div. APO #1, U. S. Army G-3-Ops. 1st. Inf. Div. a. 6 June 1944 First wave was landed at 0635B 6 June and the second wave at 0636B. The 16th Infantry and 116th Infantry were landed at 0635B. Word was received by the USS CHASE at 0655B that the entire first wave had floundered. The advance Division command post with the Assistant Division Commander landed on Beach Easy Red at 0839B and opened a temporary command post above the high water line below the top of a shelf of coarse gravel extending along that part of the beach and some casualties were suffered by the command post group and the Military Police Platoon. The remainder of the advance Division command post established a temporary command post aboard the control craft PC 533 which was off Easy Red Beach. The following message was received by the Naval Commander Western Task Force, "First wave landed Dog Green 0635B, second wave 0636B, first wave assault group O-1 landed

0635B, one LCA capsized, one LCT (A) sinking with engine room flooded. Success signal for capture of PONTE DU HOE was reported by V Corps". A report was received at 0807B that "Returning boats reported floating mines near the beach endangering landing; many boats swamped and many personnel in the water". The control vessel off Easy Red Beach reported at 0807B, "First wave landed at 0635B, the seventh wave at 0735B, unable to determine on waves between them, but believe they are evenly spaced and on time". An Army intercept at 0811B from 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, stated that battalion had not landed yet and was moving to the right. The 50th Division (British) notified the 1st US Infantry Division that the 69th Infantry Brigade and 231st Infantry Brigade first landed at 0725B. By 0827B, the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry reported they were moving forward and one and two sections had not landed yet. Division Headquarters was informed by control vessel Dog Red that obstacles were mined and there was no chance yet to destroy mines by demolition. At 0928B, the Division was informed by the Ranger Commanding Officer that the enemy gun fire on exit D-G and an enemy battery behind Dog Green were hindering the landing. The Division Commander notified Commanding General, 50th Division that progress was slow, with fighting on the beaches. Word was received at 0930B that the Rangers had landed safely with heavy opposition; the beach was not clear of obstacles and dangerous for LCA's. At this time, the Division was told that one Allied squadron armed with 2000 pound bombs was attacking MAISY battery, which was reported by 0945B as being completely destroyed. The Division notified the Navy that enemy fire on beach Easy Red was keeping LCI's from landing. At 0950B, the Assistant Division Commander notified the Division Commander aboard the USS ANCON, "There are too many vehicles on the beach; send combat troops". Special Situation Report 1 to the Naval Commander, WTF, stated, "The first wave landed Easy Red at 0635, Dog Green 0635 second wave Dog Green 0636 and second through seventh wave landed Easy Red by 0735. 3d Battalion 16th Infantry Regimental CP exit E-3 Easy Red and moved to the right. Unconfirmed reports from V Corps report capture of POINTE DU HOE. Landing boat from USS JEFFERSON reported mines and heavy seas. No enemy activity over convoy last night. E boats expected north of CAPE LEVY". Combat Team 116 reported that they by-passed opposition on beach and were moving forward slowly. An Army information radio message was received which stated "At 0900B several companies 16th Infantry were seen on Easy Red and Fox Red Beach; enemy artillery and machine gun fire was still effective; about 30 LCT's were standing by to land; obstacles seemed thicker than in photos; Btry A 7th Field Artillery in DUKWS just arrived. LCI 85 was hit after unloading and is smoking; 2 LCT's are burned. 10 tanks are on Fox and landing resuming on Dog". Division Headquarters intercepted a radio message from CVER to the USS CHASE stating that boats and vehicles were piling on beaches; troops were dug in on beach; enemy held fire until craft beached. Fifteenth wave landed 0840B; there were many LCT's and LCI's off

beach, but few LCVP's were available. It was reported by control vessels that many wounded on Dog Red Beach needed immediate evacuation and many LCT's were standing by, but could not be landed because of heavy enemy shell fire on beach. The Division command post ashore sent the Division Commander the following radio message: "Reinforce 2d Battalion 16th at once". At 1031B, the Division notified the advance command post ashore "The 18th Infantry is landing as planned; use where needed". The 18th Infantry was ordered to reinforce 2d Battalion 16th Infantry at once. At 0915B, Navy reported to the Division Commander that they could find no targets of opportunity without endangering own landing and asked for any information on right target for LCG. Later the Navy said they believed the LCG(L) could lay down close barrage over heads of troops on Fox Green Beach, if own troops had made no progress in landing. Division Headquarters told the Navy not to fire the LCG(L). The Division Commander was notified at 0959B by PC 522, "First wave of DD tanks floundered on Fox Green Beach, second wave incomplete and 22 minutes late and fourth wave dispatched by primary red; 5th wave did not appear; 6th wave dispatched 15 minutes late; 7th no information; 8th dispatched and all landed; 9th sent late; only half of the 10th wave reported and those were late; 11th wave dispatched on time; 12th wave only LCT's were on time when dispatched". By 1105B, the 16th Infantry reported no beach exits were open in the regimental sector. At 1110B, the 2d Battalion 18th Infantry landed and rest of regiment was on the way in; 2d Battalion 16th Infantry was in COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER. It was reported at 1105B bt PC 564 that the 20th wave had just landed. The 16th Infantry reported that exits would be opened shortly. At 1026B, the Division requested the USS ARKANSAS to endeavor to locate and destroy batteries impeeding the landing on beach Dog Red bye heavy shell fire. Control vessel Easy Red radioed to the Division Commander that the Chief of Staff Advance command post says, "Condition of Beach D-3, E-1, E-3, F-1 still critical and beach between exits are drawing mortar and artillery fire". At 1125B, beachmaster Easy Red notified USS ANCON "Information is still incomplete; enemy holding vigorously; combat troops needed; H/195 needed Easy Red Beach". The 115th Infantry was ordered to clear high ground south-west past Easy Red in 16th infantry sector, to coordinate with Commanding Officer, Combat Team 16 Commanding Officer, Combat Team 18 and Assistant Division Commander. At 1134B, the Division Commander instructed the Beachmaster Easy Red and Easy Green to expedite calling in 115th and 18th Infantry Regiments. Just prior to noon, the Division received information, "The fire support on Easy Green Beach is reported as excellent and Germans are reported leaving position and surrendering to American soldiers". The 50th Division was informed that fighting continues on the beaches and reinforcements were being employed. The Divison Commander ordered control vessels to rush all infantry elements to beach. Shortly after noon, the Division was informed that Fox Green Beach was not securely established yet. The Division Commander notified the Navy to instruct beachmaster to request fire through Shore Fire Control Parties, if possible. The Division Commander was

informed that there was a "jam-up" on Easy Green Beach; new outcropping of enemy fire on right end of Dog Green Beach was slowing up progress. At 1213B, the Division was informed that troops previously pinned down on beach were advancing up heights behind Easy Red, Easy Green, Fox Red and Fox Green Beaches. The USS ANCON informed the Division that Rhino Ferries were on the line of departure; the beach was temporarily closed due to congestion and advice was requested. At 1257B, USS ANCON was told by Beachmaster Dog Green that a large number of 116th Infantry was still on Easy Green exit and Dog 3 was progressing. At 1230B, Division Commander was informed by Commander LCT Flotilla 19, "LCT 623 reported Easy Red Beach closed by enemy fire". The Commander asked, "Do you intend to shell or shall we continue to beach LCT's?". The Division intercepted a radio message to V Corps which stated that enemy artillery was registering on Easy Red Beach and firing when craft arrived there; believed craft could be seen from church spire at VIERVILLE. At 1256B, the Division instructed PC 552 to give priority to ships carrying infantry. At 1300B, the Division Commander was informed by the Assistant Division Commander that 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, had taken town at 1233B. At 1318B, the Commanding General received a message from Beachmaster Dog Green stating "Beachmaster, 7th Beach Battalion, suggests 116th move inland; DG exit still blocked". The Division Headquarters received information from an intercept that there was a general advance up the slop of Easy Red, and the advance continued on Fox Red with some men moving on ridge toward PORT EN BESSIN. At 1256B, The Assistant Division Commander reported to the USS ANCON that no identification of the beach defenses was known; spasmodic artillery fire was falling in the area; advance elements Combat Team 115 had cleared beach 1135B, 50th Division (British) was notified that 16th Infantry was in COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER (687882); other units were progressing slowly and beaches were not yet cleared of fire. Commanding General instructed the LCG to fire on church steeple in VIERVILLE. At 1341B, the Navy informed the Division Commander, "Beach Dog Green, White, and Red are entirely clear of opposition and ready to land troops; no opposition on beach. Easy Green and Red troops are ashore apparently waiting infantry reinforcements. All fire support ships are waiting for target assignment on shore". At 1429B, the Assistant Division Commander informed the Commanding General that he had arrived on the beach 0830B; the situation was difficult; information was limited; progress slow; liaison with combat units only; radio out and wire going in at present. The USS ANCON notified advance headquarters, 9th Air Force, that the Commanding General, V Corps, requested fighter-bomber squadrons attack batteries suspected south of L'AURE River, firing on beaches; batteries could not be located from ground; gave L'AURE river as bomb line. Division Commander notified the Navy that both Dog Red and Easy Green Beaches were again being shelled. Division Headquarters was informed that an enemy battery was infilading Easy Red Beach; seemed to be heavy caliber from an undetermined direction,

probably west. At 1507B, 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry, reported that they had about 30 casualties and men were pinned down on Dog Green Beach by sniper fire; Navy fire was also a hindrance. Remainder of Advance Division command post arrived on Easy Red Beach at 1530B. The Commanding General notified the Assistant Division Commander that tanks from the Landing Ship Dock enroute to Fox Green were attached to the 16th Infantry. Division Headquarters was informed that the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, had passed through COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER (684877). At 1635B, two Ranger Battalions reported that there was no opposition in their sector and other battalions were "OK". The Division command post group aboard the USS ANCON departed at 1700B for Easy Red Beach. The Assistant Division Commander notified the Commanding General that the Advance command post location was 676999 with contact by phone with Division Artillery and 116th Infantry and by radio with 18th Infantry. Division Commander was requested to land 26th Infantry as soon as possible. The USS ANCON group arrived Beach Easy Red at 1900B. By 1604B, five guns of the 7th Field Artillery Battalion were in position plus some Cannon Company of the 29th Division and by 1655B it was reported to the Advance Division command post that four guns of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion were ashore on the beach. At 1700B, the 115th Infantry reported the 1st Battalion had been sent to 116th phase line and 116th was not there; the 2d Battalion was on the D-day phase line and the 3d Battalion was on a strong point on D-3 exit. The 18th Infantry was told to continue the mission of pushing forward to extend 16th right flank and report when contact with 16th and 116th was made. The 26th Infantry landed at E-3 at 1930B. At 2010B, the 26th Infantry was given the mission to move 1st Battalion behind the 16th Infantry with 2d and 3d Battalions "to clear out" ST LAURENT on the right flank of the 18th Infantry. At 1935B, the 1st Engineer Battalion was informed that if they were any DD tanks located, the battalion was to give them to anyone needing them. At 2035B, the 16th Infantry reported the regimental command post was located on the reverse slope of hill, inland drom LCI(L) 457487 and the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was in COLLEVILLE. The Division received a report that the Ranger Force had captured pillbox 588939 and had 15 men wounded. The 18th Infantry Situation Report as of 2400 hours stated that the 1st and 3d Battalions landed at 1200 hours with forward regimental command post and moved to assembly area at 680895; The 2d Battalion took over the mission of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry; 3d Battalion was committed to the right of the 2d Battalion to take high ground in the vicinity of 666875; the 1st Battalion was in reserve and at 2345B hours was committed to take over mission of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. (1) The situation at the close of 6 June 1944 is shown on Appendices A (1) - Map: GSGS 4250, 1/50,000, FRANCE, Sheets 6F/2, 7F/1, 6F/4, 7F/5 and A (2) Overlay showing

Progressive Movement Commencing D-Day.