John Dewey's The Child and the Curriculum: A Century Later Author(s): D. C.

Phillips Source: The Elementary School Journal, Vol. 98, No. 5, Special Issue: John Dewey: The Chicago Years, (May, 1998), pp. 403-414 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1002321 Accessed: 08/07/2008 11:56
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John Dewey's

Abstract
and containsan Dewey's TheChild theCurriculum influentialand remarkably clearaccountof how dualisms or false distinctionsarise,how they can be takenup by differentsects and so become the focus of opposing viewpoints, and how the dualism eventually can be dissolved and the dispute resolved; the account is illustratedby reference to the 2 schools of thought that oppose each otherabout the natureof the curriculum. In this articleI argue that Dewey's views on dualisms show clearsigns of the influenceof the German philosopher Hegel's work on "dialectic," and I examine whether Dewey's method of resolution is applicableto all types of dispute. But Dewey's essay is also noteworthy for his use of the analogy of an explorerand a map to illustrate the relation between the psychological and the logical orderingof subjectmatter,and this is analyzed. It is somewhat paradoxical that in order to celebrate the centenary of John Dewey's work at the University of Chicago we would think in terms of an artificial distinction: the work he did there, versus the work he did elsewhere. Dewey himself would have protested, for although of course he did not object to the making of distinctions per se, he stressed that they must be taken with a "grain of salt" and not treated as in any sense being "absolute" (as being what he called "dualisms"). He was the archenemy of attempts to force the variety, flux, continuities, interactions, and organic quality of the world into bifurcated and watertight categories (such as body vs. mind, thought vs. action, inner vs. outer, school vs. society, and interest vs. effort-one particularly important example of which is discussed in Bredo, 1998, in this issue). To make his case about how un-Dew-

The Child and the Curriculum:

A Century Later
D. C. Phillips
University Stanford

TheElementary School Journal

Volume 98, Number 5 ? 1998 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

0013-5984/98/9805-0002$02.00

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eyan such a biographical procedure was, Dewey might even have pointed to the very example of his own struggles with the issue of dualisms, which themselves constituted a continuum stretching back a decade or so before he moved to the Midwest and which extended long after he left. His antidualistic fervor reached a crescendo about 12 years after his Chicago period for, as is well

deemed worthy of comment; Dewey's analogy of the explorer and the map, and his discussion of the relation between the logical and the psychological aspects of teaching, also are classics. But before sampling these and other treasures in more depth, it will be best to start with an overview of the rhetorical structure of the essay. The Structure of the Essay

and known, in Democracy Education (1916/

1966) he attacked more than three dozen of them. A year or so later, in a short paper in the Journal of Philosophy (1917/1977), he made the philosophical point that his antidualistic stand was not to be interpreted as advocacy of some form of monism: neither is the world divided into a series of polar opposites, nor is it one; phenomenologically the world is diverse, marked by plurality and flux, but it is we who introduce watertight divisions when we attempt to construct knowledge. The point being acknowledged, then, that Dewey's work on dualisms must be seen as developing and gaining sophistication over the decades, there nevertheless is some justification for artificially freezing the clock and singling out for attention the marvelous pamphlet he produced in 1902 while at the University of Chicago, The Child and the Curriculum (1902/1956a). For here he gives an influential, and remarkably clear, account of how dualisms in general arise, and he goes on to give a "textbook" example of how such dualisms are to be dispatched. The dualism he picks on here is strenuously to be avoided, he argues (again in typical fashion), because of its dire educational consequences. As is usual with Dewey, the title of the essay succinctly expresses the particular dualism that he was attacking on this occasion. In sum, the essay stands as a fine encapsulation of much of Dewey's argumentative method and of many of his intellectual and educational interests. The essay is so rich, however, that it is done a considerable disservice if the attack on dualisms is the only feature that is

TheChildand the Curriculum written at was

a time when Dewey was reflecting deeply on social trends and ills and on the role of education (or, rather, of reformed education) in changing things for the better (see the article by Cohen, 1998, in this issue). In

had these social and educational concerns in mind, but he was also writing as a philosopher-in particular, one who was struggling to free himself from the undue influence of the Hegelian system. Dewey opens the essay with a discussion of how differing schools of thought arise when important and complex issues are under examination; crudely put, his view is that opposing viewpoints emerge because different aspects of a problem are taken to be of importance by groups of people with different interests or attitudes. He then introduces his educational exampleone that was at the center of what Westbrook calls a "fierce battle" at the time (Westbrook, 1991, p. 99)-the debate, over the content of elementary schooling, between (a) those, on one hand, who believe that what children learn in school should be determined by educated adults who are acquainted with the rich deposit of material in science, math, literature, history, and so forth, that has accumulated over the course of human history (this group believes that the needs of the "curriculum" should be paramount), and (b) those, on the other hand, who are on the side of "the child" and believe that the interests and capacities of children should determine what they devote their energies to in school. (I cannot resist an aside at this point: despite Dewey's
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efforts to resolve this debate, the dispute persists a century later. Thus, a contemporary of ours, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., recently strongly attacked "child-centered schooling," which he says offers a "mere caricature" and is "essentially anti-intellectual"; Hirsch supports "good subject-matter teaching"; see Hirsch, 1996, p. 245.)

ject for oneself). However, if one plans to travel, it is a waste of time and effort not to be guided by the map. (Recently I rediscovered these truths for myself during a trip to Norway; studying the map was invaluable, but it did not capture the riches I actually experienced during the journey. But my experiences would have been disconnected To returnto TheChild theCurriculum: and incoherent- and practically much and for some pages Dewey goes to and fro be- more difficult to come by-without the tween these two positions, spelling out their guidance of the geographical material emramifications and their shortcomings, and bodied in the map.) then he foreshadows his "resolution" of the At about this stage in the essay, then, dispute: "What, then, is the problem? It is Dewey returns to the resolution of the dujust to get rid of the prejudicial notion that alism that is his primary focus (the child vs. there is some gap in kind (as distinct from the curriculum), showing how its two degree) between the child's experience and "poles" are interrelated or form a continthe various forms of subject-matter that uum rather than being distinct and opposmake up the course of study ... we realize ing. Just as the logical ordering in the map that the child and the curriculum are simply grows out of an analysis of the psychologtwo limits which define a single process" ical interests and experiences of the ex(Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 11). plorer, the subjects incorporated into the There follows a philosophically interest- curriculum have developed from the intering and educationally significant couple of ests of children and adults over the ages. pages (discussed further below) in which The job of the educator working with young Dewey lays out why it is important to see students is to combine both poles of the duthe curriculum in this way as an "outcome" alism; the teacher needs to "reinstate" into and the interests of the child as a "begin- experience the subject matter of "the ning." Then he moves on to another impor- branches of learning"-or, as Dewey extant section of his argument, suggesting presses it using a somewhat inelegant term that the dualism of "child" versus "the cur- that recurs throughout the final third of the riculum" is closely related to another, that essay, the school subjects need to be "psyof the "psychological" ordering of subject chologized" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 22). matter versus the "logical" arrangement of Again in a fairly typical way, Dewey imit. Here he introduces the analogy of the ex- presses on his readers how important all plorer and the map (the map, after all, is a this is by pointing to three "evils" that relogical ordering of elements from the psy- sult from insisting on keeping these "poles" chological experiences of one or more ex- separate and embodied in a dualism. He plorers as they wander through unknown also discusses three stratagems that have ofterrain), and he considers the question of ten been used to give logically ordered subwhat use is the logically "formulated state- ject matter "psychological meaning" when ment of experience" (i.e., the map, or the the two poles of the dualism are treated as curriculum)? He argues that both the logical separate or discrete. The point here is that, and the psychological perspectives are vital. when the curriculum is treated as separate After all, looking at the features depicted in from the interests of students (i.e., when the a map (or a subject as laid out in a textbook) curriculum is not properly psychologized), does not substitute for taking a journey and educators have to try some artificial means experiencing the features of the countryside of making the uninteresting of interest. for oneself (or exploring the issues in a subThis argument rapidly leads Dewey to

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his poetically phrased denouement, which in effect is a Hegelian "synthesis" of the dialectical poles he has been playing off each other throughout the essay. He says, somewhat misleadingly, that "the case is of the Child," an expression that would suggest to an incautious reader that the "Child" is the winner or the most important pole of the dualism. His words in the final paragraph, however-and indeed the whole structure of his essay-clearly convey the message that both the child and the curriculum are "winners," for both are needed and indeed both are inseparably interrelated. The case really rests with the "Child and the Curriculum." It now remains to put some flesh on the bones of this skeletal structure, so I next turn to four features of the essay that, even after almost a century, retain their interest and importance. Four Important Features of the Essay 1. How Dualisms Arise and End: The Naturalization of Hegel It has often been noted that in the early stage of his career Dewey was steeped in German philosophy, and in particular in the work of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). Dewey remarked later that "I should never think of ignoring, much less denying, what an astute critic occasionally refers to as a novel discovery-that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking" (Dewey, 1930/1962, p. 21). This deposit was substantial, it lay quite deep, and it defies simple analysis. Thus, the following remarks are meant at best to be suggestive rather than comprehensive (see Phillips, 1971, for a lengthier analysis). There are at least two ways in which Hegelian philosophy influenced Dewey's attitude toward dualisms, toward the human tendency to conceptualize the world in terms of distinct and relatively ossified categories. First, Hegelian metaphysics stressed organicness and interrelatedness in a way that Dewey found immensely appealing, on both an intellectual and emotional level:

"There were, however, also 'subjective' reasons for the appeal that Hegel's thought made to me; it supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving.... The sense of divisions and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression.... Hegel's synthesis... was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation" (Dewey, 1930/1962, pp. 18-19). As a result, Dewey was led to regard the divisions or distinctions we make in the course of our thinking about the world as being intellectual instruments, temporarily useful perhaps in thinking about some issue but in the end quite misleading (and mischievous in practice) if we treated a particular division as in any sense existing in nature. In short, he strongly objected to the reification of our categories or distinctions. As he put it in his major work on metaphysics, Experienceand Nature (1929/1958), "Serious objection holds when the instrumental character of the elements [of intellectual analysis] is forgotten; and they are treated as independent, ultimate; when they are treated as metaphysical finalities, insoluble problems result" (Dewey, 1929/ 1958, p. 144). There is a second aspect of Hegel's thought-to laypeople it is perhaps the feature that is best known-that is so strikingly parallel to the way Dewey thought about dualisms that it is hard to believe that there was no connection. I refer, of course, to Hegel's use of the dialectical method. In Hegel's idealistic metaphysics, the "Absolute" develops (in the realm of ideas) by virtue of a process involving movement from a thesis, to an opposing antithesis, and eventually to a synthesis. The process then starts over again, with the synthesis acting as a new thesis generating another antithesis, and so on. During the decade of the 1890s, which
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he spent largely at the University of Chicago, Dewey gradually moved away from Hegel as he came to see (partly as a result of the influence of William James) that biological ideas-including the theory that humans are organisms that have evolved by the sorts of processes described by Darwin-were sufficient to underpin those positions and philosophical attitudes that had originally led Dewey to favor Hegel. (The stages in this movement away from Hegel are also well discussed in Westbrook, 1991, especially chap. 3.) For, of course, Darwinism accounts naturalistically rather than metaphysically for the flux and interrelatedness and development found in the living world. And evolutionary theory (especially in the hands of William James) gave an instrumental account of the human ability to think, in which it was depicted as an ability having survival value-a position that led to ideas being regarded as tools or instruments whose function is to help humans solve practical problems. As a result of these lines of thought, Dewey was led to naturalize what he had found valuable in Hegel (see Phillips, 1971; for a discussion of the various senses of the term "naturalism," see Phillips, 1992, chap. 3). The fruits of this change in the basis of Dewey's thinking, insofar as it affected his treatment of what he refers to as dualisms (arguably a naturalistic renaming of the Hegelian thesis and antithesis), can be found accounts for the origin of rival schools of thought with respect to important matters, not in terms of some metaphysical development of the "Absolute" via a struggle between thesis and antithesis, but naturalistically in terms of processes and forces that can be seen to operate in the natural world around us. In place of a "thesis" generating its "antithesis" and the tension between these leading to the emergence of a "synthesis," Dewey speaks of "dualisms" arising as groups of people become wedded to one or another way of interpreting a problem situation, thus generating rival "sects."

in TheChild theCurriculum. and Here Dewey

The dispute is not resolved by the emergence of a "synthesis" but by the disputants backing off and reconceptualizing the problem (during which process they will discover that there is some truth in both of the rival positions). Naturalized though this may be, the resemblance of the underlying pattern to the Hegelian dialectic is pretty clear. Thus, according to Dewey in 1902, "profound differences" arise in a problem area precisely because there is a problem-for a problem has a variety of seemingly conflicting elements, and the current way of formulating or describing these elements provides no easy route to a resolution. A group or sect will select a number of elements from this problem area as being of especial significance, and they will proffer their own "solution"; but of course a different sect will select other elements and arrive at a rival position. Both groups fail to see that the elements or conditions they are treating as "independent truths" are indeed factors that themselves might require "adjustment" (or negotiation or redescription). What results is "an unreal, and hence insoluble, theoretic problem" (Dewey, 1902/ 1956a, p. 4). Dewey states that "Solution comes only by getting away from the meaning of terms that is already fixed upon and coming to see the conditions from another point of view, and hence in a fresh light" (Dewey 1902/1956a, pp. 3-4). Dewey's account from 1902 has much going for it. All of us probably had the experience, during our own school days, of attempting to solve a word problem in math or in simple physics that proved intractable, even though we knew that it must be solvable because otherwise the teacher or textbook would not have presented it in the first place! In such cases we usually only made headway when we realized that we must be formulating the problem incorrectly or leaving out some important elements that ought to be included; only when we "backed off" and restated it, thus highlighting the elements in the problem differ-

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ently and describing them in different terms, did we find the solution. It is tempting to believe that intractable disagreements between different groups in important areas of real life ("pro-life" and "pro-choice" on the issue of abortion, for example) must be due to a similar cause, and it definitely is morale boosting to believe that a resolution can be found by a process of reconceptualization. Certainly Dewey's treatment of the dispute between the supporters of the interests of the child and those who favor the primacy of the established bodies of knowledge constituting the "curriculum" has great appeal. Several important issues arise, however. First, are all disputes between rival "sects" resolvable in the way that Dewey describes? How are we to recognize the dualisms that we need to move beyond? Here we are faced with an interpretive dilemma about what Dewey meant to suggest: it is difficult to credit that he was claiming that all disputes have arisen in the way he had described, or that he believed all disputes were resolvable in the manner he outlined. However, he does not discuss this issue explicitly, at least not in the sources reviewed here. Not only does his whole demeanor give the impression that dualisms are everywhere, but he also specifically claims that human thought is responsible for setting up these divisions (for nature, in itself, is organic rather than bifurcated). Probably what Dewey had in mind was this: all false distinctions-distinctions that arise when elements are abstracted from the situation in which they occur and that are reified into independent existents that become the different poles of a dualism-are likely to give rise to intractable disputes, but not all disputes are the result of the establishment of such dualisms. In short, the category of disputes is larger than the category of disputes resulting from dualisms. It should be clear by now that the viability of Dewey's mode of resolving disputes involving dualisms depends on these disputes being of the first rather than of the

second type-the disputes need to have arisen because each group or sect involved in the dispute has selected some of the elements in a situation and set these in "concrete." It is only in such cases that "backing off" and reconceptualizing the problem situation is likely to resolve the dispute. (It can resolve the dispute because it dissolves the artificial distinctions.) But, as I indicated previously, not every problem or difference of opinion arises in this manner, and Dewey is not particularly helpful in distinguishing these different types of disputes. Thus, for example, the dispute over whether there is life on Mars does not seem resolvable by the method of reconceptualization. Rather, this dispute illustrates the fact that in many areas of science, disputes sometimes arise in situations where no resolution is possible because crucial data are not currently available (and perhaps for technical reasons cannot conceivably be available for many years, if ever). In other words, a so-called critical experiment cannot yet be conducted. In such cases, then, the procedure that Dewey advocated will not bring resolution, whereas a breakthrough that uncovers new information might settle the matter. Not all disputes, then, are the result of the establishing of dualisms. But-to focus on dualisms for a moment-a second important issue that arises is whether all dualisms are artificial and likely to mislead us if we take them too seriously. Here I must return briefly to Dewey's debt to Hegel. It would be naive to assume that, because Dewey naturalized many aspects of Hegelian philosophy, his own position did not embody some metaphysical presuppositions. (All of us, including philosophical naturalists, hold views that are underwritten by metaphysics.) As I pointed out earlier, Dewey himself acknowledged that he remained attached to a set of assumptions also found in Hegel-namely, that the world is organic, interconnected, and is not divided into isolatable parts (or as he put it later in life, the natural realm is full of
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"transactions"; see the discussion in Phillips, 1976). This was the basis of his view that divisions or distinctions or dualismssuch as body and mind, inner and outer, thought and action, theory and practice-were distinctions that we make in a sense as intellectual instruments to help us think about problems. The error we make, according to Dewey, was that we reify or concretize these distinctions and treat them not as tools but as reflections of real divisions in the natural realm. I do not have much more to say about this, except to admit that although I do believe that many distinctions that we make are artificial and counterproductive (especially if we hold to them too rigidly), I hold a rival metaphysical view-namely, that some of our distinctions actually reflect real divisions in nature. According to this view, there are naturalkinds in nature (see Brown, 1994). That is, along with many contemporary philosophers, but probably contra to Dewey and Hegel, I hold that nature comes with some built-in disarticulations. Hence, I am led to believe that not all dualisms can be dispatched (or ought to be dispatched) in a Deweyan manner. A third important issue that arises is that seems generally to have been Dewey-who very optimistic about the resolution of social conflicts of all kinds-appears to underestimate the difficulties in getting rival parties in a dispute to agree that a resolution is required.After all, it often is only to the agnostic-to the person who does not adhere to one viewpoint or the other-that the existence of rival sects is itself a problem. When I hold firmly to a view that some others do not accept, I usually do not see both of our positions as being unsatisfactory merely because there is disagreement. My usual diagnosis is that I am right, and the others are wrong. The resolution of the conflict is not to be found by both sides "backing off" and reconceptualizing the situation in dispute; rather, what is required is that the others should capitulate and admit the error of their opinions! And this, of course,

might be a correct diagnosis. Consider the situation when some people held that the Earth was spherical whereas those of another school of thought believed it to be flat. This situation ought not to have been resolved by both parties agreeing to find an intermediate position that reconciled both views in a new "synthesis," for one group was holding an erroneous view. But even in a situation that calls for a "Deweyan" remedy, both sides have to agree to seek it, and this requires that the individuals involved have certain attitudes and dispositions. This is a matter that Dewey does not discuss in The Child and the Curriculum, but it was clearly very important to him. (After all, he strongly advocated that children should acquire the disposition to inquire and to adopt an "experimental attitude.") All this being said, however, it must be acknowledged that Dewey's habit of formulating his position on various issues by pointing to a seemingly irreconcilable dualism that he then resolves was a powerful-and often convincing-rhetorical or argumentative or organizing device in many of his writings. 2. Seeing the End in the Beginning Near the middle of Dewey's essay there begins a long, philosophically and educationally rich discussion that runs on for about six pages, or a little more than 20% of the whole. In this passage (which some readers no doubt find a little hard going) he builds on his earlier point that, rather than there being a dualism between the interests of the child and the logically formulated studies or disciplines that form the basis of the curriculum, there is a continuum with the young child and his or her interests at one pole and the logically formulated disciplines at the other. Dewey introduces the new phase of his discussion in these terms: "If such be the case, the problem of the relation of the child and the curriculum presents itself in this guise: Of what use, educationally speaking, is it to be able to see the

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end in the beginning? How does it assist us in dealing with the early stages of growth to be able to anticipate its later phases? The studies, as we have agreed, represent the possibilities of development inherent in the child's immediate crude experience. But, after all, they are not parts of that present and immediate life. Why, then, or how, make account of them?" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 12). Dewey's answer to this question falls into two parts, interpretation and guidance, and the points he makes are of great significance. First, he stresses that the child's emerging capacities and interests are simply that-current features of the child, having no deeper significance-unless they are interpreted as a "sign or index" of potentialities for further growth (Dewey, 1902/ 1956a, pp. 13-14). He adds: "It will do harm if child-study leave in the popular mind the impression that a child of a given age has a positive equipment of purposes and interests to be cultivated just as they stand. Interests in reality are but attitudes towards possible experiences; they are not achievements; their worth is in the leverage they afford, not in the accomplishment they represent" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 15). It is the end point-the discipline of physics, or the art of Raphael or Corot, for example-that serves as the "criterion" of interpretation, for it is these things that enable us to see where the potentialities of the child could end up if properly nurtured (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 16). Without the end point, we would not see that the potentialities actually were potentialities; they would merely be transitory features of the child, having no deeper significance. Furthermore, it is our knowledge of the end point that allows us to guide the growth of the child; "mathematical scholarship" is required both to understand the significance of a child's interest in counting and measuring and to provide the educational guidance necessary for this interest to come to "fulfillment" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 17). It hardly seems necessary, but, hav-

ing recently become a grandparent, I can offer this homely example: the gurglings of an infant are fascinating in themselves, but they become deeply significant only when we see them as an indication of a potentiality for full communication and the development of language. Over the next couple of years we adults use our knowledge of our native language to guide the development of the gurglings in the requisite direction. It seems clear that some of Dewey's followers did not read this section of his essay very carefully or did not appreciate its significance. Dewey was not arguing that the teacher should "cave in" to the interests of the child, nor of course was he suggesting that teachers should merely impose material on students. Rather, he was suggesting that the teacher had a more important and far more difficult and subtle role to play. Nevertheless, he was often blamed for the excesses of the progressive movement over the 3 or 4 decades following the publication of The Child and the Curriculum.One of these excesses was captured brilliantly in a famous cartoon that depicted a somewhat crestfallen youngster asking his teacher "Please, Miss, do we have to do whatever we want to do again today?" It should be apparent that the Dewey of the 1902 essay did not condone this excessively childcentered educational practice; on the contrary, a careful reading shows that he had decisively refuted it (see Westbrook, 1991, chap. 4; and the opening pages of Cohen's article, 1998, in this issue). 3. The Logical and the Psychological, and the Explorer and the Map Dewey's discussion of "seeing the end in the beginning" moves seamlessly into his discussion of a dualism he saw as being closely related to the one between the child and the curriculum, namely, the dualism between the logical and the psychological ordering of experience. As he put it, "A psychological statement of experience follows its actual growth; it is historic; it notes steps
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actually taken, the uncertain and tenuous, as well as the efficient and successful. The logical point of view, on the other hand, ... neglects the process and considers the outcome. It summarizes and arranges, and thus separates the achieved results from the actual steps by which they were forthcoming in the first place" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 19). Dewey then further clarifies this dualism by introducing the example of the explorer and the map. (I was about to call this an analogy, but it is not, for it is a particular instance of the dualism he is discussing.) The notes an explorer makes as he or she travels through new terrain are a record of the psychological ordering of experience. They record the events in the order in which they happened, they describe the things that were of interest at particular moments of the journey, they note the accidental links between the experiences on different occasions, and so on. After the journey, however, the explorer might analyze the notes and bring the things that were described into a logical (and in this example, a spatial or geographical) order-a particular stream is located to the north of a particular range of mountains, and so on (irrespective of the "historical" order in which these geographical features were discovered). Clearly, as Dewey stresses, "The two [the experiences on the journey, and the map] are mutually dependent." He continues: "Without the more or less accidental and devious paths traced by the explorer there would be no facts which could be utilized in the making of the complete and related chart" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 19). Dewey then turns to the crucial educational issue: "Of what use is this formulated statement of experience? Of what use is the map?" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 20). He might well have added: "Of what use is the textbook? How does it relate to classroom experience?" As I indicated in the opening pages of this article, Dewey stressed that the map does not take the place of the actual journey, just as the "logically formulated

material of a science or branch of learning ... does not take the place of personal contact" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 20). But the map or the textbook (the logical formulation) gives direction to future journeyings, it aids memory, and it "economizes the workings of the mind in every way"-that "which we call a science or study puts the net product of past experience in the form which makes it most available for the future" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 21). Once again, then, Dewey is arguing that the poles of a dualism-this time the logical versus the psychological--are both vital and are inextricably interrelated; one is no more important than the other. Given the brilliance of Dewey's example of the explorer, a further illustration is hardly necessary; but my own school days contained an incident that greatly puzzled me at the time but that became clear when I first read this portion of The Child and the Curriculum.In my final year of high school, in the company of about 30 other students who had survived in what was then a highly selective environment, I took a yearlong course in chemistry. Our teacher decided not to trouble us with doing all the required laboratory work but instead lectured us from the front of the room and performed the experiments for us as demonstrations. The syllabus was a demanding one, crammed with chemical equations and chemical tests and analytic techniques that we were supposed to master. Although almost all of us passed (some with various distinctions) the end-of-year external examinations in physics, calculus, and so on, only three of the 30 or so (if my memory is accurate) passed the chemistry exam. We all felt completely lost; the material overwhelmed us, we had difficulty committing it to memory, and we had absolutely no interest in the material. In Dewey's terms, we had been asked to memorize the logically ordered subject matter without having experienced the domain for ourselves. (Elsewhere Dewey pointed out that humans are able to adapt and that under the sort of con-

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The psychological point that Dewey ditions I have described some minds become capable of taking an interest in this makes while discussing the "logical/psy"cold storage knowledge," as he sometimes chological" dualism seems to me to be more called it. This may account for the fact that problematic. His point here is, in essence, three of my classmates actually acquired an empirical one, for the assessment of enough information to pass the chemistry which evidence is required: Dewey seems exam; unfortunately, I was not one of to have believed that for worthwhile learnthem.) The following year at the university ing to occur a student must have firsthand I summoned up enough bravado to take a experience of the "terrain" (whether it be a yearlong course in chemistry, one that had country, or a subject matter field). The loga large amount of laboratory work, and un- ical ordering can be a guide, but it is not a der that circumstance I found the textbooks replacement for direct experience. Alto be of great help; I did fairly well in the though this is an attractive position, one that can be supported by anecdotes such as course. It would not be wise, however, to allow the one I told about my disastrous high nostalgia for long-past school days to have school chemistry class, I think it goes too far the last word here. It may be strange to put and contains too many ambiguities. Of it this way, but, in attacking the logical/ course a basic stock of experience is redualism Dewey is himself quired by anyone who uses a natural or psychological running together a logical and a psycholog- even a technical language, for otherwise the ical point. His logical point seems to me to terms are just empty sounds having no unbe unassailable: it is possible to order a derstood referents. This is not quite the body of material logically, or historically or same, however, as saying that, to appreciate psychologically, or even by topic, or by the a map, one must have made a journey to alphabetical order of the chief concepts in- the country being depicted. It is true that volved. The results of these orderings are after studying the map one has not had the same experiences that one would have had different and serve different purposes-the explorer's notes serve one purpose or set of on visiting the country (my experience of purposes, the map of the same terrain Norway was of a different quality from that serves another. (My colleague Elliot Eisner which I had from studying the map), but and I have often discussed this issue in the the logical ordering found in the map or the context of the contributions of artistic or es- textbook can be meaningful to a person who thetic approaches to understanding class- has an interest or who has been coached rooms vs. the contributions of more scien- about the issues for which an answer can be tifically oriented approaches. Eisner often sought in that particular "rendering of exhas stressed, correctly, that a scientifically perience." (For example, I understood beoriented researcher's account of a classroom fore my visit there, from books and from the will ignore features or qualities that a prac- map, the importance of the warm Gulf titioner of educational connoisseurship will Stream in moderating what would othertake note of; I do not disagree but, rather, wise be an extremely cruel climate in Norregard this almost as a truism. In Dewey's way.) Dewey can probably handle this sort terms, the explorer's "psychological" notes of objection, but only at the cost of softening will of course contain many entries that are his strong claim. irrelevant for the "logical" mapmakerI can illustrate the point here by another for, as Dewey observed, different orderings exercise in nostalgia: at the time I was strugof experience serve different purposes. gling with high school chemistry, I was takThere are strong echoes of this aspect of ing a yearlong physics class. One incident Dewey in Eisner's position; see Eisner, is starkly engraved on my memory-it had 1988.) an enormous effect on me, yet it was a "textMAY 1998

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book," theoretical experience, involving no direct acquaintance on my part with the phenomena involved. We had been studying the kinetic theory of gases, according to which the particles (molecules) of a gas move randomly, and we had learned, I believe, the theoretical derivation of Boyle's Law from the premises of the theory. Now, according to the kinetic theory, the temperature of a gas is directly equated to the average velocity of the movements of its molecules (the hotter the gas, the faster the motion, the cooler the gas, the lower the average velocity). Then the teacher asked an apparently innocent question: "What could be expected, theoretically, to happen if the temperature was lowered further and further?" Why, the molecules would move more and more slowly. "And what will happen if we further lower the temperature?" Well ... the molecular motion would eventually stop! "Would it be possible, do you think, to lower the temperature even more?" After a great deal of reflection, we decided probably not; the gas would have reached what our teacher described as "absolute zero"! It turned out, of course, that this was not an astoundingly low temperature-nowadays I sometimes joke with my friends from the American Midwest that their wintertime temperature is close to absolute zero! At the time, I was amazed by this result; we can have ever and ever higher temperatures, but we can only ever get to about - 273 degrees Celcius. Thus I learned the impressive fruits of rigorous theoretical thinking. (I discuss this example further in Phillips, 1992, chap. 9.) But perhaps there is a Deweyan moral to this example after all-the prepared mind can learn by exposure to the "logical," but the key is how the preparation is carried out. Unfortunately, I cannot remember how my physics teacher accomplished that. Dewey wrote, in The Child and the Curriculum, that "every study or subject thus has two aspects: one for the scientist as a scientist; the other for the teacher as a teacher. These two aspects are in no sense opposing

or conflicting. But neither are they immediately identical" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, p. 22). of my Perhaps the accomplishment teacher was that he had led us, as a physics teacher, to the stage where we were starting to think like scientists, where the "logical" ordering of the material was meaningful in itself. 4. The "Evil Results" of Dualisms Near the end of his essay, Dewey enters into a discussion (that runs for nearly six pages) of the "evil results" that follow as a consequence of failing to relate the logical and the psychological poles of the dualism, from failing to "psychologize" the material the student is dealing with. This is typical of many of his writings; in Democracyand Education,for example, he constantly points to the disastrous consequences of setting up artificial dualisms. (See Dewey, 1916/1966, chap. 11, for a particularly good set of illustrations centering around the dualism of interest vs. thinking.) Thus, in 1902 Dewey points out that unpsychologized material becomes formal and that often the facts to be learned are reduced to meaningless "hieroglyphs" (my chemistry teacher comes to mind here). There is lack of motivation; the thoughtprovoking quality of the material "drops out"; and nonpsychologized material needs to be "sugar coated" or madeof interest (instead of having its inherent interest made teacher has to have "reapparent)-the course to adventitious leverage" (Dewey, 1902/1956a, pp. 24-26). The underlying philosophical point here-about which I am in full agreement with Dewey-is that the distinctions and conceptualizations we make in our thought are not just of theoretic interest; on the contrary, they have practical consequences, for our thought is inextricably related to our actions. If we misconceptualize a situation, or if we erect a false dichotomy, our practical efforts will bear the misshapen fruit. Dewey inherited this view from William James,

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who held that the biological function of thought was to direct our actions (see James, 1899/1958, esp. chap. 3). His debt to James was acknowledged in another important short work that Dewey produced during the time he was at the University of Chicago, a work that is now usually reprinted in the same volume along with The Child and the Curriculum;thus, in chapter 4 of The Schooland Society, Dewey writes that older philosophies discuss the origin of ideas, but "the possibility of their origin in and from the needs of action was ignored. Their influence upon conduct, upon behavior, was regarded as an external attachment" (Dewey, 1900/1956b, p. 101). For Dewey, our thoughts, and the dualisms that we set up, really matter, and their worth can be judged by the quality of the behavior to which they lead. And the dualism of child and curriculum leads to very poor educational practice!

Note Helpful comments on an earlier draft were and Nel provided by Martin Koning-Bastiaan Noddings.

References Bredo, E. (1998). Evolutionarypsychology and Dewey's critiqueof the reflexarcconcept.ElSchool 98, Journal, 447-466. ementary and How science Brown,J. (1994).Smoke mirrors: London:Routledge. reality. reflects

Cohen, D. (1998).Dewey's problem. Elementary School 98, Journal, 427-446. Dewey, J. (1956a). The childand the curriculum. and Joint edition with Theschool society.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books. (Originalwork published 1902) and JointediDewey, J. (1956b).Theschool society. tion with The childand the curriculum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books. (Originalwork published 1900) and nature. New Dewey, J. (1958). Experience York:Dover. (Originalwork published1929) Dewey, J. (1962).Fromabsolutismto experimentalism. In G. Adams & W. Montague (Eds.), Americanphilosophy Contemporary (pp. 1327). New York:Macmillan.(Originalwork published 1930) and New Dewey, J. (1966).Democracy education. York: Free Press. (Originalwork published 1916) Dewey, J. (1977). Duality and dualism. In S. Morgenbesser(Ed.), Deweyand his critics (pp. 117-119). New York:Journalof Philosophy, Inc. (Originalwork published 1917) Eisner,E. (1988).The primacyof experienceand the politics of method. Educational Researcher, 17(5), 15-20. Hirsch, E. D. (1996). The schoolswe need. New York:Doubleday. on James,W. (1958).Talksto teachers psychology; and to studentson someof life's ideals.New York: Norton. (Original work published 1899) Phillips, D. C. (1971). John Dewey and the organismic archetype.In E. French(Ed.),Melbournestudies in education,1971 (pp. 232271). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. in Phillips, D. C. (1976).Holisticthought socialscience. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Phillips,D. C. (1992).Thesocialscientist's bestiary. Oxford:Pergamon. Westbrook,R. (1991).JohnDeweyand American Ithaca, NY: Cornell University democracy. Press.

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