POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH

Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova

issued by IDIS VIITORUL

Focus

Domestic Policy Sector:

Crisis Situations Reveal the Government’s
Inability to React Rapidly

Foreign Policy Sector:

What Holds Back Moldovan European
Development: “Democratic” Achievements and
“Communist” Drawbacks?

Security Policy Sector:

No. 2 (9), February 2008

From KGB to ISS: What Changed?

The Institute for Development and Social

Initiatives (IDS) Viitorul is a research, education
and outreach organization which activates in the
field of economic analysis, governance, law, political
sciences, strategic and organizational science. It
was set up in June 1993 in Moldova as a non-
governmental, not-for-profit organization, non-
political entity.

www.viitorul.org
Political and Security Statewatch
Crisis Situations Reveal the
Government’s Inability to React
Rapidly
Overview
The independence of the judiciary became
again a top issue after the ECHR rejected the
first list of Moldovan judges and after Moldova
lost a case requiring it to pay the record sum of
2.5 million euros to an economic agent. New
parties accuse the Ministry of Justice of abuses,
while the parliamentary parties adopted the
Law on Political Parties stipulating that, from
2009 on, major parties will benefit from state
financing. The Moldovan government was not
prepared to cope with the epidemic of mumps
and only after mass protests of the holders
of commercial licenses agreed to discuss
implementation of Law 208.
ECHR questions independence of
Moldovan judiciary
Last year, the Republic of Moldova
submitted to the Council of Europe a list
of judges as candidates for the European
Court of Human Rights. The names on
that list represented persons close to the
Communists Party, hence the list was rejected
and Moldova had to send a second list.
The second list included new names and
subsequently Mihai Poalelungi was elected as
the Moldovan judge replacing Gleb Pavlovici,
who was the last Moldovan judge at ECHR
and previously expressed critical opinions
on the independence of the judiciary in the
Republic of Moldova. Cases against Moldova
increased and the country currently ranks high
among countries charged by their citizens
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2 (9), February 2008
Domestic Policy Sector
by Ion Marandici
ionmarandici@gmail.com
at the ECHR. The most notable case lost
by Moldova in February was Oferta Plus vs.
Republic of Moldova. In that case the state
lost and was consequently required to pay
the record sum of 2.5 million euros to the
Moldovan company Oferta Plus. Moreover,
the Oferta Plus case revealed that high ranking
officials were responsible for violating the law.
Plaintiff ’s lawyer Vitalie Nagacevschi read a
list comprised of the names of the Minister of
Justice, First Vice-Premier, Prosecutor, etc.
Especially when the case involves politics,
the judiciary is subject to political pressures.
The department from the Ministry of
Justice responsible for the registration of
political parties is often seen as a tool of the
governing party used to control the political
competition. Patria-Moldova, the European
Action Movement, the Popular Action
Movement and the Liberal Democratic Party
of Moldova (PLDM) are four new parties
that had difficulties during the registration
procedure. The Ministry of Justice mentioned
the existence of false signatures in their
applications without any evidence to support
this claim. However, some of the above-
mentioned parties produced the persons whose
signatures the authorities claimed were fake
and accused the Ministry of Justice of abuse
of power and respecting political orders. The
Ministry of Justice has already lost a case to
the European Action Movement that claimed
the ministry’s refusal to register the party was
illegal.
2
Political and Security Statewatch
It seems the Ministry of Justice became a
gatekeeper for political party participation.
A party needs a lot of patience to overcome
this obstacle. PLDM representatives declared
they have talked to vice-ministers of Justice
demanding evidence that some of the
signatures were faked, but the officials could
not come up with any plausible explanations.
Another abuse reported by the political parties
is the fact that the Ministry of Justice did
not hand back the membership applications
that are party property. The leaders of the
political parties argue that through unfounded
accusations the authorities damage the image
of the new political parties. In the same line,
lawsuits against major opposition politicians
continue: Mihai Ghimpu (Liberal Party),
Dorin Chirtoaca (mayor of Chisinau), Nicolae
Andronic (Popular Republican Party), and
Serafim Urechean (AMN) face legal actions.
Some obervers believe that these lawsuits are
intended to harass the Opposition and are
another proof of the political control over the
judiciary.
The Law on political parties: a hidden deal
of the parliamentary parties?
The newly adopted Law on Political Parties
sets rather restrictive criteria for founding
new political parties and is a result of the
negotiations of the parliamentary parties which
tried to restrict the access to the political arena
for the extra-parliamentary parties. Drafters
of the law discussed some rather normative
arguments, stating the need for political
stability as more important than the right to
found a party. However, the activity of the
extra-parliamentary Opposition parties was
significant: the Liberal Party won the electoral
contest for the mayor’s office in Chisinau; the
PLDM plans to initiate a referendum in order
to modify the Constitution, and the European
Action Movement organized numerous street
demonstrations. The law on political parties
was co-drafted by the Council of Europe
and its major positive innovation is that the
political parties will be partially financed by
the state budget. While the Democratic Party
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2 (9),
no. February
3, August 2008
2007
and the Alianta Moldova Noastra party insisted
on having state budget financing for parties
beginning January 1, 2008, the majority
decided that the provisions of the law will be
applied only after the parliamentary elections
begining July 1, 2009. The most radical was the
Democratic Party that left the plenary session
of the Parliament as a result of the discussions
on the Law on Political Parties accusing the
Christian-Democrats and the Communists of
restricting the activity of political parties. Two
independent deputies, Vitalia Pavlicenco and
Vladimir Filat, disagreed with the manner in
which the law was drafted.
The new law provides that 0.05 % of the
state budget revenues will be directed towards
political party financing. The criteria for
obtaining state financing are simple, but rather
strict and bound to the success of the party
in the elections. Thus, half of the sum will
be divided according to the number of seats
a party wins in the Parliament and the second
half will be distributed to parties that win at
least 50 representatives in the 33 districts.
The amount of donations was limited
to 0.1% of the revenues of the state budget
(approximately $1.2 – $1.3 million USD).
Some deputies argued that limitation of the
amount of donations for political parties is
unjust. While in the draft the figure was 0.2%,
the Communist deputies voted for lowering the
amount of donations for parties as a percentage
of the budget from 0.2% to 0.1%. The Court
of Auditors will be responsible for controlling
the spending of the financial resources coming
from the state budget and the political parties
will be obliged to present financial reports
annually until March 31 to the Court of
Auditors, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Justice.
Even if the main goal of financing parties
from the state budget is to make the political
class more responsible, it is doubtful that state
financing will help parties be more efficient.
The parties can use the state finances
to improve their facilities, for personnel
spending, to cover costs related to advertising
materials, trips abroad and in the country,

Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch
telecommunication costs, costs related to
the organization of political activities, fees
related to the membership in an international
organization, investments in various types
of goods, electoral campaigning, protocol or
offices.
Actually, the innovation of this law is that it
stipulates that the parties can be financed also
by the state (but not state enterprises) and not
only from donations or personal contributions.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, France,
Romania and others have developed laws that
ensure political party financing. Financing
from abroad of political parties is forbidden
and the new regulation states that any donation
will have to be registered. Other goals of
this law include diminishing absenteeism at
elections and developing political pluralism.
In addition to that, the parties are obliged
to update their member lists and submit them
to the Ministry of Justice before December
31 of the pre-electoral year. This means they
must submit lists with at least 5,000 members
with at least 150 members registered in any
of the 33 districts. The law does not stipulate
whether independent candidates can obtain
state financing.
The Government is not ready to cope with
crisis situations
The governmental activity was marked
by the competition between the local and
central authorities. While central authorities
accuse district leadership controlled by the
Opposition of promoting “destructive politics”
as opposed to the “real politics” promoted
by the Government, the local authorities
accuse the central authorities of financial
strangulation. At least in two cases the reaction
of the Government was delayed: the mumps
epidemic and the Law 208.
The mumps epidemic started in December
2007, but the Government was not able
to tackle the issue and did not inform the
public opnion about the scale of the disease.
The Government did not have the necessary
financial means to buy the necessary
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2 no.
(9), 3,
February
August 2007
2008
vaccinations and consequently ordered them
only two months later. Cases of disease were
registered in all the districts of the republic,
but the most affected regions are Chisinau,
Balti, districts of Comrat, Orhei, Anenii
Noi, Hancesti and Ialoveni. 80% of the
patients were between the ages 18-25. The
authorities forecast the peak of the epidemic
in the March-April period; at the same time
the Ministry of Public Health requested from
the Government almost 700,000 euro in order
to buy approx. 600,000 vaccinations from an
Indian manufacturer. The authorities managed
to pay only for 310,000 vaccinations that will
be used at the beginning of March. According
to certain sources, from November 2007 until
February 2008 more than 10,000 persons were
infected with mumps, while for February the
data indicate an upward trend.
The second case refers to the holders of
commercial licenses. After many protests,
government authorities agreed to discuss and
negotiate with commercial license holders.
This happened only after significant protests
took place in Balti and Chisinau. It seems the
government will postpone the implementation
of the Law 208, obliging the traders to register
an individual firm, to have an accountant
and to issue a bill after each transaction. The
whole history of the implementation of the
Law 208 reveals that the Government reacted
and accepted dialogue only after protests
threatened to become more intense.
Government activity will probably
be marked by recent changes to the Code
of Conduct for Civil Servants adopted by
Parliament. While there are certain positive
aspects like limiting the value of presents that
bureaucrats can accept, it also stipulates that
public information will be distributed only by
the person responsible for that in each ministry
or institution. Critics claim that that would
restrict the freedom of expression, but also the
free access to information of public interest.
In the course of parliamentary debates, the
representatives of the Opposition parties
demanded that President Voronin’s portrait not

Political and
Political and Security
Security Statewatch
Statewatch no.February
no. 2 (9), 3, August2008
2007

to be hung on the walls in the offices of high accusing him of xenophobia. Subsequently the
ranking officials saying this is actually political Prosecutor’s Office of Moldova reacted in the
campaigning on public money since the function same manner, but the journalist repeated his
of the head of state is not depoliticized and the statements explaining he meant rather Russian
President has in a parliamentary republic a influence and not an ethnicity. Public debates
rather symbolic competences as compared with in the square revealed another problem of
the Parliament and the Government. Moldovan society: minority integration and
Further regarding public administration the ambigous status of the Russian language.
reform, the Government announced that the
Ministry for Industry and Infrastructure will Prognosis
be dissolved. Another change in Government March will be the month of Gagauzian
was the dismissal of Constantin Mihailescu, elections for the local parliament. High
the Director of the Ministry for Ecology and ranking officials already started their visits in
Natural Resources for unknown reasons by the region in order to support the Communist
the head of state. At the end of February, the candidates. On the other hand, the initiatives
authorities announced their plans to reduce launched by the Liberal Democratic Party of
costs of the governmental spending to 10% Moldova are likely to stir discussions about
from the state budget by dismissing approx. 10 the efficiency of the institutional design of
000 persons from the budgetary sector. More Moldovan democracy. Liberal Democrats
than a half of these persons are employed by propose the direct election of the President and
the Ministry of Education. a mixed electoral system for the parliamentary
Surprisingly, but the law regarding elections. However, critics suggest that the
prohibiting public servants from holding initiative to organize a referendum on the
double citizenship was not promulgated best way to elect the President and the most
by the President and was returned to the appropriate type of electoral system are just
Parliament for further examination. Probably methods of pre-electoral campaigning, even if
the President realized that the promulgation of the PLDM assured the public that the party
such a law would make the reintegration of the will also promote these initiatives after the
country impossible because many persons on 2009 elections.
the Nistru’s left bank hold double citizenship.
The local public administration will see its role
diminished in matters concerning the freedom
of assembly. If until recently the organizers of a
public meeting needed the approval of the local
authorities, the new law on public meetings
stipulates that the organizers of such events
have only to inform the authorities, but do
not need their authorization. If the meeting is
expected to exceed 100 persons, the organizers
must notify authorities. Many consider the
new law more liberal than the previous one.
Still, Moldovan authorities did not welcome
meetings organized by the Union of Journalists
from Moldova. The February 3 meeting
triggered reactions from news portals in the
Russian Federation which extracted certain
statements from the speech given by the Director
of “Timpul” newspaper, Constantin Tanase,

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul” 

Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch
What Holds Back Moldovan
European Development: “Democratic”
Achievements and “Communist”
Drawbacks?
Overview
Moldova finds itself in a rhetorical
entrapment in relation to the European Union
which makes the future of an enhanced EU-
Moldova contractual agreement highly
uncertain. That is how one would assess the
state of affairs between the two entities after
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for
External Relations and Neighborhood Policy,
visited Chisinau. Moldovan authorities had to
face the reality that any further evolution of
this relationship is conditional upon a strong
commitment of the Moldovan government
to the rule of law and continuing reforms.
The 2009 parliamentary elections will be a
benchmark for measuring progress. At that
time, the EU will either endorse or further
postpone Moldovan claims for European
integration.
There have been positive signs that
Moldovan-Romanian relations could resume
normality. This comes as a result of the
meeting between the foreign ministers of both
countries in Kiev where new talks regarding
the Basic Treaty and border recognition took
place. In their statements, both Mr. Stratan and
his counterpart Mr. Cioroianu confirmed that
the text of the treaty is in its final stages and
that there is strong support for a concluding
agreement. In the same vein, the Speaker
of the Moldovan Parliament, Mr. Lupu,
addressed the press emphasizing the need
for an amiable and beneficial relation with
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2no.
(9),3,February 2008
August 2007
Foreign Policy Sector
by Sergiu Panainte
sergiu.panainte@gmail.com
Romania assuring that the institution he is
leading will be more involved on this issue.
On the international scene, the international
community witnessed Kosovo declare its
independence from Serbia. After the major
powers recognized that independence, among
them the United States, Great Britain and
France, observers perceived a dangerous
precedent. This event precipitated new
declarations in Tiraspol about its special status
and that a similar solution has to be applied for
the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.
A History of Failure: Reversed
Metamorphosis
Among the members of the
Commonwealth of the Independent States
(CIS), Moldova was considered a frontrunner
on the path to EU membership. It was the
first CIS country to negotiate the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994.
In 1999 the government at that time even
asked for a Free Trade Area with the EU
which was not endorsed for the simple reason
that Moldova was not yet a member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). That was,
however, accomplished in the summer of 2001
when Moldova became a full WTO member.
Furthermore, Moldova was engaged in
regional development projects with EU
sponsorship as part of the Euroregions Lower
Danube and Upper Prut, which included
regions from Moldova, Romania and

Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch
Ukraine, following an administrative reform
financially supported by the same EU. These
are the mere facts from the history of EU-
Moldova relations during the governance of
the “Democrats.”
Beginning in 2001, when the “Communists”
took power, one noticed a regression of this
relationship. First, Communist leadership
declared membership in the Russia-Belarus
Union a priority. Administrative reform was
reversed too. In accordance with the alleged
reason of power decentralization Moldova
reverted to the rayon system, bringing the
efforts of the EU to nothing. Moreover, the
desire for stronger ties with Moscow has
governed Moldovan foreign policy since
2001. As a result, the EU lost faith in the
belief that Moldova would follow a European
path.
However, the Kozak Memorandum
changed the rule of the game resulting in
Voronin’s realignment of the foreign policy
agenda. European integration was given
top priority, but facts speak for themselves.
Nothing has been done to strengthen
European ties in reality policies have
rendered opposite results: delayed reforms,
economic growth that rests on remittances
from abroad, democratic degeneration, and
worsening living standards, to name but a
few.
Now, why this retrospective? Were the
“Democrats” good and the “Communists”
are bad and why are these terms bracketed?
First, this retrospective clearly shows that
EU-Moldova relations declined after the
Communist party came to power. One should
mention though that the European Union
Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)
and Visa Facilitation Agreement are
Communist party successes, with strong
recommendations from the EU. Second, the
then “Democrats” were former Communists
who had to adjust to the new realities and the
present “Communists” are actually socialists,
who govern according to the rules of “wild
capitalism,” massive accumulation of material
wealth by those in power.
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2no.
(9),
3,February
August 2007
2008
After Ferrero-Waldner visited Chisinau,
she concluded that “the door of the EU
is neither closed nor open to Moldova.
There is a need for further reforms and
law implementation in order to fulfill the
provisions of the Action Plan. The chances for
an enhanced contractual agreement depend
fully on Moldovan authorities and the
benchmark, the parliamentary elections from
2009, should be carried out in line with all
the international requirements with all parties
subject to the same conditions.”
This statement indicates that the PCA,
together with the Action Plan, will be
extended for another year until Moldova
can fully perform its commitments under
that agreement. The EU does not want
to proceed to a higher level just because
Moldova asks for it. However, in order
to make the pill sweeter, Ferrero-Waldner
acknowledged the progress Moldova made
in Action Plan implementation by rewarding
it with Autonomous Trade Preferences, the
Visa Facilitation Agreement and Common
Visa Center in Chisinau. As a bonus, the high
official introduced a Mobility Partnership
meant to enhance the cooperation on migration
issues and to create better conditions for the
Moldovans working in EU member states.
She also pointed to the fact that if progress
is achieved, Moldova could benefit from a
similar contractual agreement that Ukraine
will enjoy in the foreseeable future. What is
this agreement providing for?
Ukraine began discussing a New Enhanced
Agreement (NEA) to be implemented
following the expiration of its PCA. EU-
Ukrainian relations have achieved notable
progress and now the EU wants to reward this
by creating a Free Trade Area (FTA) as part of
that NEA. The only condition was that Ukraine
joins the WTO. Ukraine accomplished this on
February 5, 2008, beginning FTA negotiations
13 days later. That is where Ukraine stands
now, a position comparable to that of Moldova
in 2001. As previously said, Moldova has
become an outsider after having once been a
leader among CIS countries in strengthening

Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch
EU ties. What would explain such a failure or
such a reversed metamorphosis?
Ukraine is geostrategicaly more important
for Europe than Moldova. However, the
objective facts are that Ukraine keeps
the pro-Western course of its policies, a
strategy reinforced by the September 2007
parliamentary elections. Ukraine truly wants
to join EU and NATO and so it complies with
European norms and values. The trade between
the two entities has steadily increased in recent
years, Ukraine being the 25th largest export
market for EU and EU being the first trading
partner of Ukraine.
Moldova lacks the size and resources of
Ukraine. Nonetheless, Moldova could start
to truly comply with its commitments: rule
of law, market economy, and respect for
human rights and liberties. The EU does not
expect the Communist government to honor
these commitments as it has failed to do so
during seven years in power. That is why the
parliamentary elections of 2009 are seen as a
turning point where Moldovan citizens will
either endorse a mandate for the Communist
party or place Moldova’s fate in the hands of
the opposition. Hence, these elections have
to be democratic and any attempt by current
leaders to corrupt them will be the death
sentence for Moldova in its relation with the
EU. The only alternative for the party in power
to survive is to sacrifice the party interests for
the interests of the people, even if that will
mean losing power.
Pragmatic Approach to a Sensitive Issue
Despite a strained relationship with
Romania in 2007, Moldovan authorities
exhibited more willingness to come to terms
with the western neighbor in the beginning
of 2008. While President Voronin is unlikely
to relax his attitude toward Romania, other
high officials called for setting up a friendly
dialogue with Romanian authorities. In this
regard, Parliamentary Speaker Lupu disagreed
publicly with Voronin defending his view that
Moldova must build a mutually beneficial
relationship with Romania based on pragmatic
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2 (9),
no.February
3, August2008
2007
approaches to the problems existing between
the two states.
The major problem that must now be
solved is the Basic Treaty, still non-existent
after 17 years of Moldova’s independence.
The meeting in Kiev between Mr. Stratan and
Mr. Cioroianu during the reunion of foreign
ministers from the EU and Black Sea regions
signaled progress on the issue. The officials
stated to the press that the basic documents
which will govern Moldovan-Romanian
relations are to be finalized soon. Indeed, a
pragmatic approach that excluded emotions,
mutual fears and distrust.
The EU requires that Romania have these
documents to secure the external borders of
the EU by settling all border disputes with
the direct neighbor Moldova. Moldova also
needs this agreement to ensure its territorial
integrity. Furthermore, the Basic Treaty will
outline priorities for joint cooperation and aid
the development of amicable relations. Now,
as there is political will, both in Chisinau and
Bucharest to make it happen, one shall witness
improvements in the dialogue between the
two neighbors.
Kosovo: Right to Self-determination or
Catalyst for World Separatism?
The world had to acknowledge a “fait
accomplis” when on February 17, 2008 the
parliament in Pristina declared independence
from Serbia. While the situation did not
escalate to an armed conflict between the
Kosovar Albanians and ethnic Serbs, massive
demonstrations and clashes between police
and demonstrators have been registered. In
violation of the UN Charter and disregarding
the Security Council vote, major powers like
the US, Great Britain and France recognized
Kosovo’s independence. Serbia severely
opposed this independence and will likely
never recognize it. Other opposed countries
include Orthodox Russia, Romania, and
Greece, as well as Spain. All except Romania
and Greece are confronted with separatist
movements.
However, with the support of the key

Political and Security Statewatch
international players, Kosovo’s independence
is already a fact, despite the opposition posed
by the rightful Serbian claims and other states
supporting Serbia’s position. Therefore,
an outrageous precedent has been created
for the stability in zones torn by conflict
and separatism movements including
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
and even within the Russian Federation.
Following Kosovo’s declaration for
independence there has been a “flood”
of scenarios describing how the situation
may evolve in the region. With regard to
Transnistria the most creative ones provided
for Moldova unification with Romania or
for creation of a Pridnestrovskaya Rossyia,
etc.
So far, Tiraspol authorities claimed
the recognition of its special status and
following the September referendum on
unification with Russia, it asked again for
this unification. There is a widely held opinion
that Moscow will not rush to recognize
either Transnistria’s independence or its
unification with Russia given the alleged
fear of losing Moldova to Romania. While
not impossible, this scenario seems unlikely
to happen due to many reasons: identity
crisis of Moldovan population, the Russian
willingness to keep the status quo in the
region, a still precarious relation between
Romanian and Moldovan leadership. As
a consequence, for the short term it is
improbable that the Kosovo precedent will
cause any immediate or irremediable effects.
However, in the long run, one could notice
alterations in the position of negotiating
parties participating in the “5+2” format,
mainly Russia. In its capacity as observer,
the EU pledged support for the resolution of
the conflict that would respect the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of
Moldova.
Prognosis
As the result of the visit by the
Commissar for External Relations and
Neighborhood Policy of the European
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2 (9), February 2008
Commission to Chisinau it has became
clear that the EU’s opinions of Moldova
will depend on the outcome of the 2009
parliamentary elections. This is the result
of the poor implementation of the Action
Plan and slow pace of reforms. Therefore,
from the frontrunner to European integration
from the CIS states (who expressed that will
explicitly), Moldova was outrun by Ukraine,
which awaits a decision that will engage it
in a New Enhanced Agreement with the EU
that provides for a Free Trade Area between
the EU and the subscriber state. Even
without further prognosis one could predict
no changes in the EU’s attitude toward
Moldova as long as Moldovan authorities
continue their course of actions.
Relations with Romania seemed to have
resumed a state of normalcy where both
partners could solve existing problems and
enhance cooperation on various levels. The
Basic Political Treaty is expected to be signed
soon which should settle all the problems
pertaining to border recognition. Since there
are important politicians backing a friendly
approach to neighboring Romania, one
could witness a “rapprochement” or at least
reconciliation on basic issues requiring
Moldovan-Romanian cooperation.
Kosovo’s independence created a state of
wariness within the international community
giving birth to an unprecedented situation
that feeds separatist tendencies elsewhere in
the world. This applies to Transnistria as
well, but for the time being no rash decisions
have been made either by Tiraspol and
Chisinau or Moscow. Since Russia fiercely
opposes Kosovo’s independence it might not
recognize Transnistrian independence for the
fear of losing control over Moldova. Hence,
the situation will not change dramatically
in the foreseeable future. The task remains
as it was – to bring the parties back to the
negotiation table and try to find a peaceful
and lasting solution to the conflict.

Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch
From KGB to ISS: What Changed?
Overview
On February 26 one could easily see that
the Information and Security Service (ISS) re-
cently updated its website. According to the
same source, the update is part of the strategy
for ISS modernization. However, the recent
update shows that despite the ISS’s claims to
be democratic and apolitical, it has not shed
its Soviet past.
The site states that “An evaluation of secret
services in this period proves that they com-
ply with the necessary objectives due to the
proper implementation of experience gained
over many decades. As a matter of fact, they
were created and still represent the rational
continuity of structures that existed before the
declaration of independence.”
In addition, the ISS website section „His-
torical files” traces the beginning of the secu-
rity services in Moldova to the year 1924 when
the Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist
Republic was established within the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic. In other words, con-
trary to development expectations connected
to the process of European integration and to
the modernisation of the security services in
accordance with the Individual Partnership
Action Plan, the Moldovan security establish-
ment stresses its Soviet legacy.
Since August 27, 1991, when its „Declara-
tion of Independence” was drafted, the Re-
public of Moldova made several attempts to
reform its security services. Immediately af-
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. 2no.
(9),3,February
August 2007
2008
Security Policy Sector
by Alex Leşanu
leshanu@gmail.com
ter gaining independence, The State Security
Committee of Republic of Moldova was reor-
ganised into The Ministry of National Secu-
rity. This Ministry existed until 1999, when a
new structure, renamed the Information and
Security Service, replaced it.
The change in nomenclature seemed
to signal a transition from a bureaucratic,
old-sfashioned „Ministry” to a more flexible,
mobile, Western-style „Service”. It implied a
change in attitude and was a first step in the
creation of viable security services in accor-
dance with the Republic of Moldova’s interna-
tional commitments. Along with „The Law on
the Information and Security Service” promul-
gated in July 2007, the Moldovan Parliament
drafted „The Law on the Status of the Informa-
tion and Security Officer”.
These two basic laws seem to provide all the
necessary support for security service reform.
However, there are several developments that
point to the ISS’s increasing power and to its
placement beyond any legal framework. In this
sense, one of the main security threats to con-
stitutional order and to the Republic of Mol-
dova’s fragile democratic achievements is the
lack of mechanisms to monitor ISS activity.
The return of „the f ifth column”
At the beginning of 2008, the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Mol-
dova will be one of the main beneficiaries of
the Romanian government’s financial support.
10
 Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch
This declaration was issued despite the frozen
state of Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations
exacerbated by the unilateral actions of Moldo-
van authorities. These actions include the expul-
sion of several Romanian officials and clerics and
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin’s accusa-
tions that Romania is the main security threat
to Moldovan statehood because its citizenship
policy threatens Moldova’s existence.
At the same time, previous anti-Romanian ac-
cusations and declarations have tended to be
disregarded, partly because of their frequency
but also because of evidence that from 2002 to
2007 Bulgaria granted 11,000 citizenships while
Romania only granted 2,500. In this sense, the
attitude of Moldovan authorities shifted from
personal attacks on Romanian officials to Roma-
nia’s activities, calling into question the legal as-
pect of Romania’s financial assistance to several
Moldovan NGOs and media organizations.
These developments were widely reported
in 2007 when the former government newspa-
per, “Moldova Suverana”, published a series of
articles, later claimed to have been written by a
former Romanian security agent. These articles
claimed that Romanian secret services, along
with the Romanian embassy in Chisinau, spon-
sored newspapers and activities directed against
the statehood of Republic of Moldova.
In line with previous developments, during
the ISS’s annual meeting to discuss its 2007 ac-
tivity and 2008 objectives, the Moldovan presi-
dent highlighted foreign financial assistance to
parties and mass media. According to Vladimir
Voronin, special attention should be paid to il-
legal financing from abroad.
Despite Voronin’s professed commitment
to European values, this statement more close-
ly resembles the attitude of Russian President
Vladimir Putin towards the British government’s
alleged attempts to subvert Russian national se-
curity with the aid of regional British Council
offices. Another example would be the accusa-
tions against Natalia Morari, a Moldovan jour-
nalist, who was denied access to the Russian Fed-
eration because she is perceived as a threat to the
national security of the Russian Federation.
Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”
no. no.
2 (9),
3, August
February
2007
2008
At the same meeting, Voronin stated that the
financial resources of political parties and mass
media should be monitored in order to annihi-
late all attempts to subvert the Republic of Mol-
dova’s “statehood” and constitutional order.
From freedom to security of speech
When Moldovan officials declare that only the
Communist Party is really interested in the exis-
tence of Republic of Moldova, then all members
of the media and opposition parties who hold
distinct opinions on foreign or domestic policy
issues, such as the resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict or the neutrality of Moldova, could be
declared as “threats to the security of Republic of
Moldova.” A series of events this month show that
security reform is far from being accomplished.
President Vladimir Voronin’s former advisor,
Artur Resetnicov, was appointed ISS Director in
November 2007. At the same time a new “Law on
the Status of the Security and Information Offi-
cer” was drafted. Artur Resetnicov replaced Ion
Ursu, who was appointed as Moldovan Ambas-
sador to Greece. This appointment of a former
top security official as ambassador reveals the ar-
bitrariness of Moldovan authorities and the arti-
ficial character of ISS, which merely serves as a
political instrument against the Voronin Admin-
istration’s opponents.
Considering the appointment of a former
presidential advisor to the position of ISS Direc-
tor, along with new laws that determine the civil
status of secret service while granting the ISS ex-
clusive rights to intercept phone calls, there are
concerns that the ISS will heavily influence the
2009 parliamentary elections.
In an interview, Artur Resetnicov stated his
confidence in Vladimir Voronin’s legal mandate,
as the guarantor of Moldovan statehood, to direct
ISS activity. Marian Lupu, Speaker of Moldovan
Parliament, does not share this opinion. He was
visibly confused by Voronin’s declaration, stating
that the purpose of this declaration was unclear.
In addition, Lupu expressed his concern about
the public character of President’s assumptions.
In the same interview, the ISS Director called
11
Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch no. 2 (9),
no.February
3, August2008
2007

the media and opposition party reaction to ment.

Voronin’s statement “hysteria” among people
who feel that it is their part, which President
Voronin has in his mind when mentioning
some illegal activities. In addition, Artur Re-
setnicov said he was confident that the Infor-
mation and Security Service would increase
its efforts to preserve “the constitutional order
in the Republic of Moldova.” Not much time
has passed and the first results of this declara-
tion have already started to appear.
Already this month, two criminal cases
were reported involving mass media organiza-
tions that developed projects with Romanian
financial assistance. In one case, Constantin
Tanase, Director of the daily newspaper “Tim-
pul”, is charged with “instigating ethnic dis-
crimination,” while the second refers to radio
station “Vocea Basarabiei,” which is charged
with “calling for the removal of the constitu-
tional order.”
In the case of Constantin Tanase, the Pros-
ecutor General misinterpreted Tanase’s state-
ment during a public manifestation at the
National Opera Square. In the other case, the
acusations of the Prosecutor General and of the
Center for Prevention of Corruption and Eco-
nomic Crimes, which monitor the radio sta-
tion’s implementation of Romanian financed
projects, are not in line with charges initially
brought to the attention of radio manage-
In addition, Alexandru Lipcan and Vladi-
mir Filat, two opposition party deputies, re-
signed from the ISS monitoring sub-com-
mission on the grounds that a parliamentary
majority was reluctant to call for an audit of
the 2007 ISS activity report, in the framework
of the Parliamentary Commission on National
Security and Public Order. They said that the
ISS increasingly resembles the former KGB
and Soviet security services. Although this res-
ignation enhances the image of these deputies
and their parties, opposition parties have lost
another means of monitoring ISS activity.
Prognosis
Until Parliament organizes an audit of ISS
activity and the Supreme Security Council is
regarded as a formal institution, Moldovan se-
curity services will be the means of achieving
political goals instead of discovering real secu-
rity threats. Such threats include the Russian
Federation’s attempt to ignore the constitu-
tional order of Republic of Moldova by inau-
gurating 23 voting stations on the Nistru’s left
bank during the presidential elections, which
are due on March 2nd. Until the Moldovan
government initiates real reform, Moldovan se-
curity services will continue to remember their
Soviet legacy.

The Bulletin is a bilingual monthly publication aiming to provide analysis on various elements of
domestic and foreign policy, as well as on some issues of special interest for Moldova.

Political and Security Statewatch authors: Ion Marandici, Sergiu Panainte, Alex Leşanu.

In order to subscribe to the distribution list of Political and Security Statewatch bulletin, please
contact us by e-mail: ghenadie.mocanu@viitorul.org.
Coordination and distribution of the bulletin: Ghenadie Mocanu.

Contacts:
Chisinau, 10/1, Iacob Hincu Str., 2009 MD, Republic of Moldova
Tel/fax: (+ 373/22) 21 09 32; 21.36.32; 22.71.30
E-mail: idis_viitorul@mdl.net
Web: www.viitorul.org

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul” 12

Political
Politicaland
andSecurity
SecurityStatewatch
Statewatch no. 2no.
(9),3,February
August 2007
2008

The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”

is a research, education and outreach organization which activates in the
field of economic analysis, governance, law, political sciences, strategic and
organizational science. It was set up in June 1993 in Moldova as a non-
governmental, not-for-profit organization, non-political entity.

The IDSI’s mission is to contribute to the growth of independent thinking

environment in Moldova and in other emerging democracies; to contribute
to the strengthening of the local and regional governments; to assist the
expansion of the civil society in which the citizens act together to express
their own interests, to exchange information and to strive for mutual goals and
influence government.

IDSI is also a common platform that brings together young intellectuals who
are concerned with the models of transition towards the free market and the
open society. IDSI helps them to contribute with their energies, values and
virtues, providing its logistic, moral and intellectual support and advices them
regarding their future projects and initiatives. Consistent with this mission,
IDSI has forged several linkages between the academic and policy-making
environments, generating policy analysis and recommendations for various
areas of public interest, creating and disseminating of the best practices, good
governance and economic analysis.

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul” 13