Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No.

8620 January 12, 2011

JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010, concerns respondent attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened. Antecedents On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent, respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600 square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No. 4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.1 De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The respondents sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.2 De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as follows: xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding (the making and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they were already dead as of that time, which is punishable under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the judicial proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN; Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by representing dead persons therein who, he falsely made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the adverse parties.

12. That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts, complainant respectfully submits that respondent likewise violated: (a) His Lawyers Oath: xxx (b) The Code of Professional Responsibility:3 xxx On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to comment on De Leons administrative complaint.4 In due course, or on August 2, 2010,5 the respondent rendered the following explanations in his comment, to wit: 1. The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; 2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries relevant to the material allegations of the Governments complaint in Civil Case No. 4674MN, William Lim, the representative of the Lim Family, informed him: a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from Georgina Flores; b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively managing the family business, and now co-owned the properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their parents, Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, had executed in their favor; and c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute sale, William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly assumed that their parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their names. 3. Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves were the ones who had engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo) consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an extension to file responsive pleading dated February 3, 2006 the fact that it was "the family of the defendants" that had engaged him, and that he had then advised "the children of the defendants" to seek the assistance as well of a licensed geodetic surveyor and engineer; 4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the information and would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for that reason; 5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death certificates of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to apprise the trial court of that fact; and 6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification brought against him (Atty. Castelo) through the resolution dated February 11, 2010. The same office denied the complainants motion for reconsideration on May 17, 2010.

On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply,6 whereby he asserted that the respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration. The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits. Ruling We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint. I Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent, have sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,7 viz: I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers Oath, providing:8 CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.9 The least they can do in that regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly

includes any act or omission contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to include such element).10 To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:11 A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences. With the cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for damages.12 Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they play in the administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals or offices only during good behavior.13 II Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN.14 He alleged therein that: 2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover, it is hereby made known that defendants spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had already sold the two (2) parcels of land, together with the building and improvements thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (148805) 139876 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, of Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo Lim and William Lim are their successors-in-interest and are the present lawful owners thereof. In order to properly and fully protect their rights, ownership and interests, Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall hereby represent the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as substitute/representative parties in this action. In this manner, a complete and expeditious resolution of the issues raised in this case can be reached without undue delay. A photo copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, executed by herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as Annex "1" hereof.

xxx 21. There is improper joinder of parties in the complaint. Consequently, answering defendants are thus unduly compelled to litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as to which they have no knowledge of nor any involvement or participation in. 22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was the one who, by its governmental authority, issued the titles to the subject property. This action is barred by the principles of prescription and laches for plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this suit, particularly against defendant Flores, from whom herein answering defendants acquired the subject property in good faith and for value. If truly plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of action on the subject property, it should not have waited thirty (30) years to bring suit. Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.15 He expressly named therein as defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons whom the respondent had already alleged in the answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of land.16 The following portions of De Leons complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz: 2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, are Filipino citizens with addresses at 504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46 C. Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where they may be served with summons and other court processes; 3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age and with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila, alleged purchasers of the property in question from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; 4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City holds office in Malabon City, where he may be served with summons and other court processes. He is charged with the duty, among others, of registering decrees of Land Registration in Malabon City under the Land Registration Act; xxx 7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Malabon City described in TCT no. M-15183 of the Register of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which is attached to this Complaint as Annex "G", and copy of the location plan of the aforementioned property is attached to this complaint as Annex "H" and is made an integral part hereof; 8. That there are now more or less at least 40 squatters on intervenors property, most of them employees of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who had gained access to intervenors property and built their houses without benefit of any building permits from the government who had made their access to intervenors property thru a two panel metal gate more or less 10 meters wide and with an armed guard by the gate and with permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and/or and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee illegally entered intervenors property thru a wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall now separating intervenors property from the former esquinita which is now

part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chus and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoos and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lees property and this illegally allowed his employees as well as their relatives and friends thereof to illegally enter intervenors property through the ladders defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu installed in their wall and also allowed said employees and relatives as well as friends to build houses and shacks without the benefit of any building permit as well as permit to occupy said illegal buildings; 9. That the enlargement of the properties of spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had resulted in the closure of street lot no. 3 as described in TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu having titled the street lot no. 3 and placed a wall at its opening on C. Arellano street, thus closing any exit or egress or entrance to intervenors property as could be seen from Annex "H" hereof and thus preventing intervenor from entering into his property resulted in preventing intervenor from fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits from his property; 10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and later on defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are the only people who could give permission to allow third parties to enter intervenors property and their control over intervenors property is enforced through his armed guard thus exercising illegal beneficial rights over intervenors property at intervenors loss and expense, thus depriving intervenor of legitimate income from rents as well as legitimate access to intervenors property and the worst is preventing the Filipino people from enjoying the Malabon Navotas River and enjoying the right of access to the natural fruits and products of the Malabon Navotas River and instead it is defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee using the public property exclusively to enrich their pockets; xxx 13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee were confederating, working and helping one another in their actions to inhibit intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain access and beneficial benefit from his property; On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the defendants named in De Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim,17 stating that "spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx are now both deceased," to wit: xxx 2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint are ADMITTED, with the qualification that defendants-spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the registered and lawful owners of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-35929, issued by the Register of Deeds for Malabon City, having long ago acquired the same from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, who are now both deceased. Copy of the TCT No. M-35929 is attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "1-A". The same title has already been previously submitted to this Honorable Court on December 13, 2006. xxx The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-called clarification and submission,18 in which he again adverted to the deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:

1. On March 19, 2009, herein movants-defendants Lim filed before this Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR; 2. The Motion for Substitution is grounded on the fact that the two (2) parcels of land, with the improvements thereon, which are the subject matter of the instant case, had long been sold and transferred by the principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-intervention defendants Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to said Motion as Annex "1" thereof. 3. Quite plainly, the original principal defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject property, have totally lost any title, claim or legal interest on the property. It is on this factual ground that this Motion for Substitution is based and certainly not on the wrong position of Intervenor de Leon that the same is based on the death of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu. 4. Under the foregoing circumstances and facts, the demise of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no longer has any significant relevance to the instant Motion. To, however, show the fact of their death, photo copy of their respective death certificates are attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "2" hereof. 5. The Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is the clear, legal and imperative need to now substitute herein movants-defendants Lim for defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the said principal complaint. 6. Simply put, movants-defendants Lim have become the indispensable defendants in the principal complaint of plaintiff DENR, being now the registered and lawful owners of the subject property and the real parties-in-interest in this case. Without them, no final determination can be had in the Principal complaint. 7. Significantly, the property of intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the subject of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically, if not similarly, situated as that of herein movants-defendants Lim, and likewise, may as well be a proper subject of the Principal Complaint of plaintiff DENR. 8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself, concedes the fact that herein movants-defendants Lim should be substituted as defendants in the principal complaint as contained in their Manifestation dated June 3, 2009, which has been filed in this case. WHEREFORE, herein movants-defendants Lim most respectfully submit their Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint and pray that the same be granted. xxx Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants? A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondents pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was

acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other party. III Good faith must always motivate any complaint against a Member of the Bar According to Justice Cardozo,19 "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored." A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.1avvphil The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action, or to accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint sooner than later. WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 5834 February 22, 2011 (formerly CBD-01-861) TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: The case originated from an administrative complaint1 filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. In an En Banc Decision2 dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for, among others, abandoning her clients cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed. Respondent moved to reconsider3 the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution4 dated February 24, 2004. Subsequently, while respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report5 dated November 12, 2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases. Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent orders from her court confirming the report. Acting on Judge Amog-Bocars letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution6 dated April 9, 2008, required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise the case would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on file with the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution7 on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance.8 A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondents address of record at "26B Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka, Marikina City" by registered mail. The same was delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Lota Cadete on October 29, 2009, per certification9 dated February 3, 2011 by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina Central Post Office. Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The said certification reads: This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of payment made by one ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.10 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.11 Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution. We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment.12 Sebastian v. Bajar13 teaches Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not "only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."141avvphi1 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose

of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.) In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 8253 March 15, 2011 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067) ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil action to recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution he was handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death. Antecedents In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to see Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who was a brother of Atty. Miralles.1 They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University where their son was then studying. Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to him. 2 He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they informed him that they had only P60,000.00, he required them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti).3 To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in the name of Arnulfo.4 On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. On that representation, Arnulfo handed the check to Atty. Ricafort.5 After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands. The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the memorandum.6

When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning the P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum.7 Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort. In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not mention anything about any consignation;8 and that Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him. Findings of the IBP Commissioner Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation dated October 7, 2004,9 in which he concluded that: It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible than the testimony of Atty. Ricafort, observing: Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating witness, we find their statements to be credible. Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee, attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that he did not have any retainer agreement nor any memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove that the amount of P65,000.00 was received as an acceptance fee for the handling of the case. Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued only receipt because the late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that thing that will happen in the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you received that P65,000.00 did you not put anything there that you will describe the nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that you have considered this P65,000.00 as your attorneys fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not know why they were not showing the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me the receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with that P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that P65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did not answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the proof of service of the said letter was presented by the complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it was received by their helper who did not forward the letter to him. He

also adopted the position that the complainant was demanding the P65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the allegation that he received the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog, Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any reason why this case was filed against him. In his answer the respondent stated that we have been very good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said that in fact he was surprised when the complaint was filed against him and they even attached the decision of the Supreme Court for his suspension and maybe they are using this case to be able to collect from him. The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that the total amount to redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked whether he consigned the money to the court to redeem the property he answered in the negative. The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it was stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7, 1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given him the sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing redemption money of the Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case for annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court that the bank needed P240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing on the actuation of the complainant who has been required to deposit P65,000.00 by his lawyer. The Undersigned Commission has no alternative but to believe in the credibility and truthfulness of complainants narration that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles.10 Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them. On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVI-2004-473, 11 resolving to return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses. On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report and Recommendation, 12 in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had been part of his attorneys fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation. Action of IBP Board of Governors Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569,13 therefore, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent has taken advantage of his client [sic] vulnerability and has been dishonest with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED and Ordered to Return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration,14 maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial because he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt;"15 that considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfos affidavit; and that he did not receive Arnulfos demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote (the name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not at all know. Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension,16 thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of the Board of Governors dated 18 November 2006, that in lieu of the Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law and Ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration,17 assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based. Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution. Ruling We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence. However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension, considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned against committing a similar offense. A. Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for purposes of their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees under a "package deal" arrangement. Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs version more credible.

We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts was correct and in accord with human experience. Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited in court for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for them to consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural implications of such requirement being ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts representations about the requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely understandable in view of their awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal community of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their property. Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos demand letter was incredible. He already initially admitted receiving the letter through a househelp. 18 His denial came only subsequently and for the first time through his motion for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006,19 in which he completely turned about to declare that the Gemma Agnote who had received the letter was unknown to him.20 Expectedly, Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial, because not only was the denial an apparently belated afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier admission of receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty. Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible under the established circumstances. Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt." 21 But such explanation does not persuade us. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with the legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received from or held by him for them.22 And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was not intended for deposit in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in the civil action of any mention of consignation. However, the complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs contradicted his insistence, specifically in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs) readiness and willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption price and interest) in court, thus: 16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 as redemption price plus reasonable accrued interests, if there are any;
23

Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The consignation was a notion that could have emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows:

Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the form of check, how did you come to know this fact? Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng P65,000.00 tapos may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya dagdagan niyo ng konti. Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo? Witness: Nandoon po ako. Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was given? Witness: Yes. Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong P65,000.00 na tseke? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit? Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit niya sa court. Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala idiniposit sa court? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman? Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi naming salamat.24 B. Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.25 In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came into his possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.27 Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand.281avvphi1 Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit: Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.

Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended.29 He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in him.30 He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients.31 Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16,32 particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17,33 all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.34 Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include: xxx 3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; xxx That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort aggravated his liability. In Nuez v. Ricafort,35 decided in 2002, the Court found him to have violated Rules 1.0136 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.0337 and Rule 12.0438 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the complainant to commence in the RTC a civil action to recover the proceeds against him and his wife. The Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the commission of similar acts, stating: We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty. There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued

pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation. All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates. By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra). Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.39 Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty for violation of Canon 16 ranges from suspension for six months,40 to suspension for one year,41 to suspension for two years,42 depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyers misconduct, we rule that disbarment is the commensurate punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of trust funds for his clients. WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice. This decision is effective immediately. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197 April 13, 2011 [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ] ANTONINO MONTICALBO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, Respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24, 2008 filed by complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave abuse of authority thru false representation.1 Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC).2 The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute the case.3 The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of complainant Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court.4 Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89.5 He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal, which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008.6 In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. He stated that: Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern the proceedings of this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since the appealed Order was received by counsel for the defendants-appellants on February 13, 2008, the notice of appeal, not a motion for reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of 15 days which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and the appealed Order has become final and executory. The lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347).7 Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff

of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the Board and President of the said cooperative.8 Complainant further avers that he personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6, 2008 and September 10, 2008.9 In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent judge refutes all the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that he decided to dismiss complainants appeal because it was filed out of time under the Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion.10 Secondly, he argues that complainants accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless and that the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the appeal in the case.11 Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any drinking spree with his staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from drinking alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because he has to refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons.12 The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation.13 On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the charge of grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.14 The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice. Grave Misconduct and Bribery In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 In the absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent judge.16 This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,17 where the Court explained: The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.181avvphi1 In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant.19 What constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of Sampiano v. Judge Indar:20 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind

affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.21 Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved party.22 Well-established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests on the complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial evidence his accusations against respondent.23 Substantial evidence, the quantum of proof required in administrative cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.24 Failure of the complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed his duties will prevail.25 In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to buttress his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in drinking sprees with court employees during office hours. Contrary to complainants statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was attending to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking sessions. Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.26 Complainant miserably failed to substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit. Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court employee against any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has no basis in fact or law.27 As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case of Francisco v. Leyva,28 This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however, neither will we hesitate to shield the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.29 Gross Ignorance of the Law Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith.30 In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.31 Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his counterclaim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and will not toll the running of the period to appeal. To support his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on Summary Procedure. Complainant is mistaken. A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly shows that complainants claim is covered by the said rule which reads:

Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil Cases xxx (2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of interest and costs. Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed the ceiling at P100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in charging that respondents "knowledge of law fell so short" and that he was remiss in his obligation to be familiar with the law which "even law students these days know such x x x."32 For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words carefully and refrain from hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in this instance, he is obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of insulting language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer to accord due respect to the courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that "a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith.33 A judge is not required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.34 As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations.35 The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions.36 With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis37 is instructive: As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be. Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.38

Citation of non-existent case The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-existent case Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 in his questioned Order. A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, "CA G.R." And, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the "Court of Appeals." This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying respondents judicial position. A judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence."39 The Code of Judicial Conduct also demands that he "be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."40 While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official duties.41 As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards of competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his position.42 The case of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: "A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity."43 It is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the incorrect citation of the said case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He should be admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially as it pertains to the proper execution of his office. Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency. WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his functions and duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 6683 June 21, 2011

RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA, Respondent. DECISION PEREZ, J.: The present administrative case is based on the following facts: Prelude Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated with nine (9) other petitions1 voicing a similar concern. On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the consolidated petitions, effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883.2 On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo3 of G.R. No. 72954 was entrusted to the Courts Judicial Records Office (JRO) for safekeeping.4 The Present Case On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter 5 to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished several documents6 relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions to the said fund by way of the docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.7 On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed8 Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent and Mr. Biraogo. On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised9 Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card10 of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since returned. 11 The tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo.12

The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by directing 13 Atty. Dimaisip to supply information about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo. Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide a Memorandum14 on 13 August 2003. In substance, the Memorandum relates that: 1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential employment that the respondent was able to gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.15 2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the possible return of the subject rollo.16 Atty. Dimaisip said that the respondent acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty. Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of Justice Gancayco.17 On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.18 On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed19 the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make a study, report and recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the OCAT submitted a Memorandum20 to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The OCAT made the following significant observations: 1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20 August 1991.21 However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco were given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to remain as employees of the court for the limited purpose of winding up their remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.22 2. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties as a legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but merely to fulfill a personal agenda.23 By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his confidential position for which he may be administratively sanctioned.24 3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently no longer in the employ of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be sanctioned as such employee. 25 Nevertheless, an administrative action against the respondent as a lawyer and officer of the court remains feasible.26 Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a Resolution 27 on 9 December 2003 directing the respondent to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to return the same for a period of almost twelve (12) years. The respondent conformed to this Courts directive by submitting his Respectful Explanation (Explanation)28 on 21 January 2004. In the said explanation, the respondent gave the following defenses: 1. The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.29 Instead, the respondent shifts the blame on the person whose signature actually appears on the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without authority, took the subject rollo in his name.30 Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as

the author of such signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the same might have belonged to Atty. Banzon.31 2. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in his box of personal papers and effects, which he brought home following the retirement of Justice Gancayco.32 The respondent can only speculate that the one who actually borrowed the rollo might have been a colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco and that through inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his personal box.33 3. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the rollo, professing that he had never exerted effort to examine his box of personal papers and effects up until that time when he was contacted by Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the missing rollo. 34 The respondent claimed that after finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his personal box, he immediately extended his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no time in arranging for its return.35 On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondents Explanation to the OCAT for initial study. In its Report36 dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found the respondents Explanation to be unsatisfactory. On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped37 the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to prepare a final report and recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held by the OBC wherein the testimonies of the respondent, 38 Atty. Banzon,39 Atty. Dimaisip40 and one Atty. Pablo Gancayco41 were taken. On 6 August 2007, the respondent submitted his Memorandum42 to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation. On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation 43 to this Court. Like the OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be fully accountable for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it timely. 44 The OBC, thus, recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.45 Our Ruling We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case, we find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty. The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible for taking out the subject rollo. The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information: 1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the rollo,46 and 2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, actually received the rollo from the JRO.47 The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he never authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.48 We are, however, not convinced. First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.

Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff of Justice Gancayco.49 However, the respondents convenient surmise remained just thata speculation incapable of being verified definitively. Third. If anything, the respondents exceptional stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004: x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently or accidentally" found its way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance of a Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including seeing to it that only his personal belongings were in that box for taking home after his term of office in this Court has expired.50 Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent responsible for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. Respondents Administrative Liability Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability. We begin by laying the premises: 1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and as such, can no longer be held administratively sanctioned as an employee.51 However, the respondent, as a lawyer and a member of the bar, remains under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this Court.52 2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.53 We must recall that Justice Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever reason the respondent borrowed the subject rollo, it was not for any official reason related to the adjudication of pending cases.54 3. The respondents unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a considerable length of time all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing the same. It must be pointed out that the subject rollo had been in the clandestine possession of the respondent for almost twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered and recovered by the JRO. Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without the courts consent, is an administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon, 55 this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus: Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should be meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking the records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records, papers or documents outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not to take the records of the case outside of the court and to subsequently forget about them.56 (Emphasis supplied)

Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the bar.1awphi1 It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes. As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied). Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year as too harsh for the present case. We consider the following circumstances in favor of the respondent: 1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September 1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned. 2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which remained confidential despite the finality of the resolution in G.R. No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent. 3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the respondent cooperated with the JRO for the return of the rollo. We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736 July 25, 2011 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2034-MTJ] ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZA, JR., Complainant, vs. JUDGE MARIA CLARITA C. TABIN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City. Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before us is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainant Atty. Conrado B. Gandeza, Jr. against Judge Maria Clarita C. Tabin, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City, for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge. The antecedent facts are as follows: Complainant alleged that on November 20, 2007, around 9 o'clock in the evening, a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number UJB 799 driven along Marcos Highway, Baguio City by Guimba Digermo (Digermo), collided head on with a Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up with plate number XMW 135 driven by Marion Derez. The Mitsubishi Galant is owned by complainant and his wife, Atty. April B. Gandeza, while the Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up is owned by respondent Judge's nephew, Paul N. Casuga. Complainant recalled that when he arrived at the accident site, he saw respondent Judge conferring with the police investigator. He claimed that respondent Judge approached him and in a harsh tone accused his driver to be the one at fault and was under the influence of liquor. Respondent also kept on reminding the police investigator to put in his report the alleged drunken condition of his driver despite complainant's request to respondent judge not to prejudge the situation. Complainant claimed that at the hospital, while both drivers were being subjected to physical examination, respondent Judge, instead of accompanying her nephew's driver, opted to stand closely beside complainant's driver and kept on suggesting to the examining doctor that his driver was under the influence of liquor. He added that when respondent Judge came to know the "negative" result of the alcoholic breath examination of his driver, she protested and demanded another examination on his driver. Despite his protests and his driver's refusal to undergo a reexamination, respondent Judge's request prevailed. Later on, complainant alleged that a new medical certificate showing his driver was under the influence of liquor was issued upon respondent's insistence. Complainant argued that respondent Judge has no personality to interfere with the police investigation and only the police investigator has the right to request for re-examination. Complainant likewise suspected that respondent Judge may have also facilitated the filing of the criminal complaint in court against his driver, since the complaint was filed in court barely a week after the collision. The investigating prosecutor even recommended an exorbitant sum of P30,000.00 for complainant's driver's liberty. Complainant believed that the processes have been railroaded to accommodate respondent Judge.

Moreover, complainant averred that his wife, a practicing lawyer in Baguio City, at one time saw an employee of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 2, carrying outside of the court premises, the folder of the criminal case filed against their driver. When asked as to why said staff was carrying the case record outside the court's premises, said employee informed her that she will bring it to the sala of respondent Judge as the latter requested for it. In another incident, complainant added that when his wife went to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC), Baguio City, to move for the postponement of the scheduled mediation of the subject criminal case, she was informed by the clerk that respondent Judge went there and inquired about the supposed mediation. Complainant insisted that respondent's actions showed her interest in the criminal case without regard to proper decorum. She, in effect, abused her judicial position. On July 11, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Tabin to submit her comment on the complaint against him.2 In her Comment3 dated September 9, 2008, Judge Tabin denied that she exerted undue influence in the conduct of the investigation. While she admitted that she did request the police officer that complainant's driver should be subjected to an alcoholic breath test as done earlier to her nephew, she, however, insisted that she did not influence PO3 Jackson U. Pabillo and the doctor of the Baguio General Hospital into doing the same. 4 Judge Tabin also pointed out that she never made public the fact that she is a judge, albeit, she admitted that complainant and PO3 Pabillo knew her as such.5 Respondent Judge also disputed that she used her position in borrowing the records of the criminal case against Digermo. She explained that at that time, her sister did not have a lawyer, thus, she asked one of her staff to borrow the records of the criminal case as there may be developments in the case that her sister might not be aware of. Respondent added that she opted to borrow the case records instead, since she did not want to create the wrong impression that she was exerting her influence on the conduct of the criminal proceeding. Likewise, she explained her presence at the PMC by claiming that she merely accompanied her sister there as the latter did not know PMC's location. Likewise, Judge Tabin denied that she had a hand in the filing of the case against Digermo. She disputed that she recommended the amount of P30,000.00 as bond for his provisional liberty, considering that the Prosecutor's Office is an independent office. In a Memorandum6 dated February 5, 2009, due to conflicting statements of the parties, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City for investigation, report and recommendation. On March 11, 2009, the Court directed the redocketing of the instant complaint as a regular administrative matter and referred the case to Executive Judge Edilberto T. Claravall of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, for investigation, report and recommendation.7 During the investigation conducted by the Investigating Judge, complainant failed to appear.8 Later on, it appeared that the criminal case against complainant's driver was dismissed after the complainant settled his differences with respondent Judge. On November 3, 2009, in his Report,9 Judge Claravall recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Tabin due to insufficient evidence to prove her guilty of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge. Judge Claravall pointed out that the charges of Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge are penal in nature; thus, the same must be proven by convincing proof. The Investigating Judge observed that the act of Judge Tabin in borrowing the records of the criminal case was an

exercise of her right to information. He is convinced that the actions of Judge Tabin were just normal reactions of any person who comes in defense and aide of a relative. On March 26, 2010, the OCA, however, found Judge Tabin guilty of violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA reasoned that there was sufficient evidence showing that respondent Judge is liable for impropriety. Records show that Judge Tabin did not merely look after the safety of her nephew after the vehicular accident, but she likewise ascertained that the conduct of the investigation was in her nephew's favor.10 RULING While we agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent Judge cannot be held liable for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge due to lack of evidence of malice on the part of respondent Judge, we, however, agree with the findings of the OCA that Judge Tabin is guilty of impropriety. As found by the OCA, it was inappropriate for respondent judge to direct that a second test be conducted on complainant's driver when the first test resulted in a "negative." Respondent judge cannot interfere in the conduct of the investigation. Inevitably, as a result of her interference, complainant suspected that she was influencing the outcome of the investigation as evidenced by complainant's alleged statement: "Itong ospital na ito, pwede palang impluwensyahan ng huwes." Even assuming that respondent Judge did not make public her position as a judge to the examining doctor or the investigating policeman, the fact that she knew that said police officer and the complainant had knowledge of her being a judge should have refrained her from further interfering in the investigation. She cannot act oblivious as to how and what the public will view her actions. She should have kept herself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance herself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum. Likewise, respondents act of borrowing court records and accompanying her sister at the PMC under the guise of extending assistance to her sister manifested not only lack of maturity as a judge, but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious motive but sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical examination as well as the investigation in their favor. Indeed, while respondent Judge's concern over the safety of her nephew and the outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court. Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.11 To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation.121avvphi1 In a number of cases,13 following the case of Rosauro v. Kallos,14 we ruled that impropriety constitutes a light charge. Section 11 (C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides the following sanctions if the respondent is found guilty of a light charge:

C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: 1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or; 2. Censure; 3. Reprimand; 4. Admonition with warning. We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the Judiciary is to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, as in the case at bar.15 WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Clarita C. Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City, GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 6689 August 24, 2011

RIZALINA L. GEMINA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ISIDRO S. MADAMBA, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing the complaint filed by Rizalina L. Gemina (complainant). The complaint charged Atty. Isidro S. Madamba (respondent) with deceit, malpractice and gross negligence, and prayed for his suspension/disbarment.1 The complainant alleged that she is an heir of the registered owner of several parcels of land located in Laoag City.2 These parcels of land were unlawfully sold by Francisco Eugenio in connivance with the respondent. The documents pertaining to the transactions over these lands were notarized by the respondent either without the presence of the affiants or with their forged signatures. The documents the complainant referred to were: 1. Waiver of Rights & Interest 2. Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee 3. Deed of Adjudication3 & Sale 4. Affidavit of Non-Tenancy 5. Deed of Absolute Sale The complainant alleged that the Waiver of Rights and Interests was submitted by Eugenio to the Department of Agrarian Reform. This document shows that it was entered in the respondents Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, when she went to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court, Isabela, to request for a copy, she found out that Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 was an Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee allegedly executed by the Spouses Efren Alonzo and Imelda Alonzo on September 29, 2003. In the column "REMARKS" of Document No. 2283, the word cancelled was written, but no reason was given for the cancellation, nor was a copy of the alleged cancelled document in the records. The same Affidavit of Buyer/Transferee was also entered in the respondents Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2285, Page No. 253, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. The complainant submitted a Certification dated May 3, 2004 issued by Clerk of Court Artemio H. Quidilla, Jr., that a certified true copy of Doc. No. 2283, Page No. 252, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003 cannot be issued because the respondent did not submit notarial reports for the years 2003 and 2004, although he was commissioned as a Notary Public for these years.4 The complainant also asked for a certified true copy of a Deed of Adjudication and Sale allegedly executed by Eugenio and the other heirs, and notarized by the respondent on July 22, 2003. The instrument shows that this document was entered in the respondents Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2263, Page No. 248, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003, but no copy was submitted to the OCC. In the column "REMARKS," the words "without copy" appeared, without stating the

reason for the absence of a copy. Clerk of Court Quidilla issued a Certification dated June 21, 2004 that indeed, no copy was submitted.5 In another unlawful sale of a parcel of land, an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy was notarized by the respondent. It was entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2448, Page No. 276, Book No. VIII, Series of 2004. The affidavit referred to a Deed of Sale involving a 2,500-square meter property. The Deed of Sale was notarized by the respondent on November 14, 2002 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 2212, Page No. 239, Book No. VIII, Series of 2002. To verify the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, the complainant tried to secure a copy but she discovered that no such Deed of Sale existed. In fact, a different document corresponds to Doc. No. 2212, Page No. 239, Book No. VIII, Series of 2002. It refers to an Affidavit of Discrepancy, instead of a Deed of Sale. On the column "REMARKS," the word "cancelled" appeared without indicating the reason for the cancellation. This was confirmed by Clerk of Court Quidilla in his 1st Indorsement dated July 16, 2004, stating that "Doc. No. 2212, Series of 2002 pertains to an Affidavit of Discrepancy executed by Joseph Lim Clemente on November 15, 2002."6 In his Comments and Compliance dated August 29, 2006,7 the respondent admitted the complainants allegations on the notarization of the subject documents, but denied any participation in the sale and transfer of the lands covered by the documents. He claimed that it was his secretary who prepared and drafted the documents. He claimed that his only participation was to affix his signature on the documents; he was already 82 years old and insulin dependent, so he had no more time to prepare documents and enter documents in his notarial register. He begged for leniency and consideration from the Court, and asked for forgiveness for his inadvertent acts. He apologized and committed himself not to repeat these misdeeds. In a resolution dated November 29, 2006, we referred the complaint to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.8 In the position paper she submitted to the IBP, the complainant reiterated her charges against the respondent, further stating that as a member of the Philippine Bar, the respondent allowed himself to be used as a Notary Public to illegally enable third parties to claim rights over properties to which the complainant has hereditary rights. By notarizing documents through false representations, without the signatories personally present before him as required under the Notarial Law, the respondent should be held guilty of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.9 The respondent likewise reiterated in his position paper10 his explanations contained in his comment submitted to this Court Respondent does not deny having affix[ed] his signatures in the subject documents but he was never a participant in the alleged unlawful sale. His participation is limited to the affixing [of] his signature in the subject documents. The alleged manipulation was committed by her [sic] clerk[-]secretary who enjoyed his trust and confidence having been in said position for almost two decades. Said clerk-secretary is responsible for the preparation and entry of the documents in the Notarial Book. As such, he has all the chance to do [the] things he wanted to do, which of course respondent has no least suspicion to suspect him to do illegal and unlawful acts to his Notarial Register. When respondent was still strong, he personally prepare [sic] document and personally do [sic] the entry of his Notarial Documents in his Notarial Book, but in the early [year] of 1999, his sickness was aggravated and he became insulin dependent. This necessarily weakens his body and eyesight. And so he has no choice except to trust said secretary-clerk for the preparation and entry of notarial documents in his notarial register. On February 12, 2008, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted to the IBP Board of Governors her Report and Recommendation,11 recommending the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, finding that:

In her Complaint, complainant alleged that she is an heir of a registered owner of some parcels of land in Laoag City. However, no documentary evidence was presented to support the same. She insisted that respondent notarized documents without the appearance before him of the persons who executed the same, but no clear and sufficient evidence was also presented. Rule 130, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that "Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In the herein case, although complainant made it appear that she has evidence to prove that there was anomaly in the notarization of the subject documents, she failed to present the same. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved and that as an officer of the court he has performed his duties in accordance with his oath (Acosta v. Serrano, 75 SCRA 254; Atienza v. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338). The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence (Baldoman v. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 139). The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 adopted and approved Commissioner Maalas Report and Recommendation, and dismissed the complaint against the respondent for lack of merit.12 We totally disagree with the findings of Commissioner Maala for the following reasons: First, the IBP cannot inquire into whether the complainant is an heir of the registered owner of the land. It is not within its authority to determine whether the complainant has a legal right to the properties involved in the transactions and to require her to submit proof to that effect. Its function is limited to disciplining lawyers, and it cannot determine issues of law and facts regarding the parties legal rights to a dispute. Second, from the respondents own admissions, it cannot be doubted that he is guilty of the charges against him. His admissions show that he had notarized documents without reading them and without ascertaining what the documents purported to be. He had completely entrusted to his secretary the keeping and the maintenance of his Notarial Register. This eventually resulted in inaccuracies in the entry of the notarial acts in his Notarial Register. The excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing held on November 12, 2007, presided by IBP Commissioner Oliver L. Pantaleon,13 show: MR. GEMINA: Your Honor, itong Affidavit of Discrepancy is not an Affidavit of Discrepancy. Minamanipulate niya yong ano This is a Deed of Sale. Pinalitan niya yong ano, eh, document number. This is a Deed of Sale pertaining to the property Noong sinita na namin siya pinalitan naniya, the same number pero iba na ang pangalan. Affidavit of Discrepancy na ang pinalabas. The same document number, page 3, number 8. And we were able to get a copy of these documents. COMM. PANTALEON: You can submit that also. ATTY. MADAMBA: That is really true, Your Honor, because I have said I am not the one anymore preparing my reports on notarial. I relied on my secretary. So everything there will present to me and I sign it believing that all are clear. COMM. PANTALEON:

So you admit that particular allegation. ATTY. MADAMBA: Yes, that I have notarized that two documents. MR. GEMINA: Not only that, Your Honor, there are several documents we can prove. ATTY. MADAMBA: Well, I have already submitted. The Court is likewise convinced that the respondent notarized the Waiver of Rights and Interests executed by one Juanito Peniera without asking for proof of identity, relying merely on assurances and his belief that the person before him was a "wise man."14 It was shown during the hearing on November 12, 2007 that the document was a forgery. The transcript of stenographic notes of what transpired during the hearing on November 12, 200715 shows: COMM. PANTALEON: Right now, what is your evidence to show that this person did not personally appear before the respondent? MR. GEMINA: Can I talk, your Honor? COMM. PANTALEON: What is your name? MR. GEMINA: I am Candido Gemina, Jr., husband of the complainant. The signature of Juanito Peniera was a forgery. In fact, we also filed a case against Francisco Eugenio and he was sentenced to jail on that matter. COMM. PANTALEON: On this document? MR. GEMINA: Yes, on that document. COMM. PANTALEON: Why do you say that the signature of Juanito Peniera in this case was forged? MR. GEMINA: He testified in court in Laoag City that he did not sign. COMM. PANTALEON:

Juanito Peniera testified in court? MR. GEMINA: Yes, sir. The IBP resolution, based wholly on Commissioner Maalas Report and Recommendation, totally missed and disregarded the submitted evidence and the respondents testimony during the hearing of the complaint. The IBP apparently had treated the respondent with exceptional leniency. In our view, the respondents age and sickness cannot be cited as reasons to disregard the serious lapses he committed in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as a notary public. The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entries and his failure to enter the documents that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held accountable for these misdeeds.16 A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.17 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.18 Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondents failure to make the proper entry or entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyers commission as a notary public.19 WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Isidro S. Madamba GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and hereby orders the REVOCATION of his notarial commission, if still existing. He is further SUSPENDED indefinitely from reappointment as a Notary Public. Considering the seriousness of his violations, he deserves disbarment from the practice of law but taking into account his old age and sickness, the Court, for humanitarian reasons, hereby orders his SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.1avvphi1 Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be appended to Atty. Isidro S. Madambas personal record as a member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 4955 September 12, 2011

ANTONIO CONLU, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR., Respondent. RESOLUTION VELASCO, JR., J.: Before the Court is a complaint1 for disbarment with a prayer for damages instituted by Antonio Conlu (Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and dereliction of sworn duty. Antonio was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1048, a suit for Quieting of Title and Recovery of a Parcel of Land commenced before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Silay City, Negros Occidental.2 He engaged the services of Atty. Ireneo to represent him in the case. On March 16, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment3 adverse to Antonio. Therefrom, Atty. Ireneo, for Antonio, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat the recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. The CA, per its Resolution of February 10, 1997, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellants brief within the reglementary period. Antonio got wind of the dismissal from his wife who verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila. When confronted about the dismissal action, Atty. Ireneo promised to seek reconsideration, which he did, but which the appellate court later denied for belated filing of the motion. In that motion4 he prepared and filed, Atty. Ireneo averred receiving the adverted February 10, 1997 CA Resolution5 only on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who initially received a copy of said resolution was not so authorized. However, the CA denied the motion for having been filed out of time. As the CA would declare in a subsequent resolution dated December 3, 1997, there was a valid receipt by Atty. Ireneo, as shown by the registry return card with his signature, of a copy of the CAs February 10, 1997 Resolution. Accordingly, as the CA wrote, the motion for reconsideration of the February resolution which bore the mailing date May 8, 1997 cannot but be considered as filed way out of time. In light of these successive setbacks, a disgusted Antonio got the case records back from Atty. Ireneo and personally filed on October 13, 1997 another motion for reconsideration. By Resolution of December 3, 1997, the CA again denied6 this motion for the reason that the prejudicial impact of the belated filing by his former counsel of the first motion for reconsideration binds Antonio. Forthwith, Antonio elevated his case to the Court on a petition for certiorari but the Court would later dismiss the petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the denial. Such was the state of things when Antonio lodged this instant administrative case for disbarment with a prayer for damages. To support his claim for damages, Antonio asserts having suffered sleepless nights, mental torture and anguish as a result of Atty. Ireneos erring ways, besides which Antonio also lost a valuable real property subject of Civil Case No. 1048.

Following Atty. Ireneos repeated failure to submit, as ordered, his comment, a number of extensions of time given notwithstanding,7 the Court referred the instant case, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4955, to its Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Acting on OBCs Report and Recommendation8 dated November 23, 2000, the Court, by Resolution of January 31, 2001, directed Atty. Ireneo to show cause within ten (10) days from noticelater successively extended via Resolutions dated July 16 and 29, 2002why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment and to comply with the filing of it. In separate resolutions, the Court (a) imposed on Atty. Ireneo a fine of PhP 2,000; 9 (b) ordered his arrest but which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) cannot effect for the reason: "whereabouts unknown";10 (c) considered him as having waived his right to file comment; and (d) referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report, investigation and recommendation.11 At the IBP, Atty. Ireneo desisted from addressing his administrative case, his desistance expressed by not attending the mandatory conference or filing the required position paper. On the basis of the pleadings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Ireneo liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with warning. The salient portions of the investigating commissioners Report and Recommendation12 read as follows: Uncontroverted and uncontested are respondents inability to file appellants Brief, his futile attempts to mislead the Court of Appeals that he did not personally received [sic] the resolution of dismissal. His filing of the Motion for Reconsideration five (5) months late. [sic] Aggravated by his failure to file his comment in the instant administrative complaint despite his numerous motions for extension to file the same. [sic] He is even adamant to comply with the show cause order of the bar confidant. The series of snobbish actuations in several resolution of the Supreme Court enjoining him to make the necessary pleading. [sic] By Resolution No. XVIII-2008-523, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and recommendation of the CBD.13 We agree with the inculpatory findings of the IBP but not as to the level of the penalty it recommended. Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the performance of his duty as Antonios counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellants brief before the CA. He failed, in short, to exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonios right. Antonio, by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonios interest, if not to secure a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause of a client, lawyers, regardless of the importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them.14 And to add insult to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to know about the outcome of his appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost.

It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty.15 The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence.16 This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively providing: CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxxx Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Antonio was not abhorrent enough, Atty. Ireneo tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997 Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such copy, but the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the process of comparing Atty. Ireneos signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the registry return card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to stress, Atty. Ireneo had under the premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01, which provide: CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxxx CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphasis supplied.) We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Ireneos defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension. But the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him, he just left his last known address and could not be located. The Courts patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyers impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts

of justice respect, courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial and speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to the Court by now is that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the process, delay the resolution of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one, but without the intention to so submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Courts processes, if not its liberality. This cannot be tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo can neither defeat this Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. 17 Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. xxxx Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphil A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license.18 Considering, however, the serious consequences of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon a clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,19 the Court penalized a lawyer who failed to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings, such as position papers, leading to the dismissal of the case with six months suspension. In Soriano v. Reyes,20 We meted a one-year suspension on a lawyer for inexcusable negligence, the latter having failed to file a pre-trial brief leading to the dismissal of the case and failure to prosecute in another case, and omitting to apprise complainant of the status of the two cases with assurance of his diligent attention to them. In this case, Atty. Ireneo should be called to task for the interplay of the following: his inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of Antonios appeal, coupled by his lack of candor in not apprising Antonio of the status of his appealed case; his attempt to mislead the CA in a vain bid to evade the consequence of the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration; and, last but not least, his cavalier disregard of the Courts directives primarily issued to resolve the charges brought against him by Antonio. We deem it fitting that Atty. Ireneo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, up from the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This should serve as a constant reminder of his duty to respect courts of justice and to observe that degree of diligence required by the practice of the legal profession. His being a first offender dictates to large degree this leniency. The prayer for damages cannot be granted. Let alone the fact that Antonio chose not to file his position paper before the IBP-CBD and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily prove his claim for damages, a proceeding for disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil action; it is undertaken and prosecuted for public welfare. It does not involve private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.21 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is declared GUILTY of inexcusable negligence, attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to lawful orders of the Court. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC A.C. No. 6655 PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint1 of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified documents. Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed2 was for a consideration of P250,000 and appears to have been executed and signed by Lopes surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The second deed3was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the notarial portion. Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs signatures were falsified. She contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a certification 4from said hospital. The certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of "Substance Induced Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type." Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and they came to know of their existence only recently. She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates 5 (CTCs) in her name and in the names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them. Complainant submits the affidavit6 executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8, Claveria, Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the instance of Shirley and were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen with the naked eyes that the signatures are similar in all three CTCs. Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to annul a previously simulated deed of sale7 dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still single. In his comment,8 respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution. He claims that the preparation and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the following circumstances: In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley Mipanga went to his house and requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the parties that the agreed purchase price is P1,000,000 and was presented the certificate of title to the property. Upon finding that the registered owner

is "Lope Caalim, married to Caridad Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was given, the names and personal circumstances of Lopes surviving children. He asked where Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she was not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia after the deed of conveyance is prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria. An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia, complainant and Marivinia. After he finished typing the deed and the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to Claveria for her daughters to sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet them all in one place for them to acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all meet at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that same day. Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw Shirley, Caridad, complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental witnesses to the execution of the document. Upon being informed that the parties have already affixed their signatures on the deed, he examined the document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures appearing therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the property for P1,000,000. The heirs answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and its contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the original and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession. Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect registration of the deed and transfer of the title in her and her husbands name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid including the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which will then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes are payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added that the estate taxes due, with interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since the consideration for the sale is P1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous. Shirley asked him who between the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is the obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it still depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an agreement on the matter, but the parties replied in the negative. Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad and her covendors, however, refused and said that a big portion of the P1,000,000 paid to them was already used by them to pay and settle their other obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only P250,000 so that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway already willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed. This resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which was, however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed, however, irritated respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent went home. Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the second deed with the reduced selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to the parties plea. In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent prepared and notarized the second deed providing for the lower consideration of only P250,000. He used the same document number, page number and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the second deed was intended by the parties to supplant the first.

Respondent denies complainants assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsified, averring that as stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan. As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under confinement at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical certificate9stating that Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the appointment of a guardian for her. By Resolution10 dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a Report and Recommendation11 dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick F. Fernando found respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable participation in an act designed to defraud the government. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that his notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years. According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to justify his actions. As a notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a document that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the act by likewise notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document. On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Fernandos report and recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a transaction that effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of his Notarial Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a similar violation in the future will be dealt with severely.12 The above resolution is well taken. By respondents own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary public. Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true consideration for the transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as well as the notarization thereof. He then claimed to have been "moved by his humane and compassionate disposition" when he

acceded to the parties plea that he prepare and notarize the second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and hence contrary to respondents contention that the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended to supersede the first deed. As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the present complaint are insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated. We have previously ruled that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and their successors in interest.13 Complainant, however, firmly maintains that she and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of the subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in the pending suit filed by the complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-S). With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads: CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Xxxx Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose. In Gonzales v. Ramos,14 we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial act is: By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.15 Moreover, while respondents duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its consummation.16Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes

notaries public from performing any notarial act for transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit: SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if: (a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral; xxxx In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its illegal purpose. His purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not absolve respondent who, as a member of the legal profession, should have stood his ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent should have been more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor consent to the doing of any. 17 As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.18 Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice when he gavethe second document the same document number, page number and book number as the first: SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. x x x xxxx (e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries. Xxxx Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page number and book number as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He therefore knowingly violated the above rule, in furtherance of his clients intention of concealing the actual purchase price so as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government. Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement of the parties and hence superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall be given a number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not concerned with the validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but merely to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.19 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds _herefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral

conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Xxxx In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. Said penalty was in accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,20Serzo v. Flores,21Zaballero v. Montalvan22 and Tabas v. Mangibin.23 The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.24 In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order. With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-year suspension imposed in Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he prepared and notarized the second deed for the purpose of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity aimed at defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate to the infraction committed by respondent. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent. SO ORDERED.

epublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 7649 December 14, 2011

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and BENJAMIN DANDA, Complainants, vs. ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO "PEEWEE" TRINIDAD, and ANDRESITO FORNIER, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and Benjamin Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants claim that respondents instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City Prosecutors Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon respondents.2 Attached to complainants letter-complaint is the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint3 allegedly submitted by complainants in the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints. The Facts Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City.4 De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in exchange for money.5 De Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group, composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were untouchable.6 In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign and file.7 The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and supporting documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De Guzman.8 During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office, complainants allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all of them continuously telling complainants to pursue the case. 9 When complainants asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued, De Guzman allegedly replied, "Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila."10 Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C31.11 Complainants were allegedly offered by respondents P 200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they refused.12 Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents One Million Pesos (P 1,000,000.00) to pursue the case until the end, but they refused again.13 For this reason, respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal

recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City.14 On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text message from De Guzman, saying, "Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo."15 In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy,18 De Guzmans Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006C-31,19 and other relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,20 and prayed that the complaint be pursued against De Guzman. Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court21 and Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,22 denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad vehemently declared that he has never communicated with any of the complainants and has never been to Cotabato.23 He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not contain ultimate facts because it does not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of the meetings and conversations with him.24 Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge, spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros (Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidads reputation as a lawyer and city mayor.25 Trinidad claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City.26 Trinidad also claims that he, his family members and close friends have been victims of fabricated criminal charges committed by the syndicate headed by Montesclaros.27 Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses of defendants.28 Since the defendants addresses are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with the court.29 Consequently, a warrant of arrest is issued by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is served upon the defendant will the latter know of the criminal complaint. 30 At this point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the defendant in order for the complainants to drop the criminal complaint.31 To prove the existence of this syndicate, Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion racket.32 Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend, Emmanuel Cinco, which charge was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by complainants themselves.33 Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of their members as respondents to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a victim of this fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment filed in Marawi City.35 Fortunately, when the warrant of arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidads wife was not there. 36 Lastly, Trinidad declared that Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in remote and dangerous places to harass his victims.37 Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court 38 and Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar, he has conducted himself professionally in accordance with the exacting standards of the legal profession.40 Fornier denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having any dealings or communication with any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for himself or on behalf of a client, any case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against complainants. 41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this case for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment.42 Fornier claimed that the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.43 For coming to the legal aid of

the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of the group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his clients.44 Fornier claimed that the filing of the complaint is apparently an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may have exposed and thwarted their criminal designs at extortion.45 Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey to the scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made and continues to make a mockery of the justice system by utilizing the courts, the Prosecutors Offices, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in carrying out their criminal activities. 46 Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to establish the charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as complainants affidavits are replete with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and convincing evidence.47 De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint48 on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of this administrative complaint, are spurious.49 According to the Certification issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which charge was subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor, did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.50 In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,51 De Guzman stated he is an 81-year old retired Regional Trial Court judge.52 He pointed out that there are no details regarding the allegations of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of documents, violation of lawyers oath and other administrative infractions.53 De Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved in this case which was masterminded by Montesclaros.54 In his Affidavit of Clarification,55 De Guzman claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the preparation of the complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his and his clients names in the counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make the Affidavit of Clarification.57 Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has "no familiarity with the complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in the complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business."58 During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 200859 and 13 March 2009,60 none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their complaint despite due notice.61 Report and of the Commission on Bar Discipline Recommendation

The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline reads: In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are deemed to be without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the charges against them. As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to hold him administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is hereby recommended.62

The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint as well as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against respondents Trinidad and Fornier.63 Other than bare allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of Trinidad and Forniers supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts constituting the complaint.64 In addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the non-participation and non-involvement of Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.65 For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges against Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit. On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the allegations in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same. 66 Moreover, De Guzman failed to controvert the "truly vicious evidence" against him: But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to Orlando D. Badoy, City Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel to Cotabato City to file charges against persons he did not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of those who executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis Lauban which was filed before the Supreme Court.67 The Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against Fornier and Trinidad.68 In De Guzmans case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty from a suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases to extort money: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with modification, and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case against Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases in order to extort money.69 The Issue The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint. The Ruling of this Court We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier. We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzmans liability, and likewise dismiss the charges against De Guzman. Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.70 Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.711avvphi1 Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.72 Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.73 Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.74 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. 75 It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.77 To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. De Guzmans Liability The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzmans liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion. The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating

Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this document by complainants: This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office. This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint CounterAffidavit in connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.78 (Emphasis supplied) To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court. Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a syndicate headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents submitted by complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct against respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor. Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are these complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the allegations of De Guzmans misconduct are really doubtful. Lastly, the supposedly "vicious" evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states: Dear Orly, Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about the South and the way of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man, Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest. Thank you and best regards.79 The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting documents. The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this purported letter: Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the letter or explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it conveys.80 Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication of evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioners observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of complainants criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman stated: 5. Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does not have any "Daryll"); 6. Undersigned counsels name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor G. Alcarez (Montesclaros lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor; xxx 4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.81 For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De Guzman. De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing. Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden because the documents they

submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly dismisses the charges against De Guzman. Trinidads and Forniers Liabilities The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to Trinidads and Forniers liabilities: A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges against Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondents supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of communication. The supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office to the Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly militates against the reliabiity of Complainants charges against Respondents. xxx But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable Respondents non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission, however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In particular, they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same as a piece of evidence.82 At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with this Court within 15 days from notice: c. If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the charges against Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit. SO ORDERED.