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Pages : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 [28] 29 Macaca 12-15-2011, 09:32 PM A victory, and little else (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/A-victoryand-little-else/Article1-782921.aspx) By Maroof Raza | Hindustan Times Forty years ago on December 17, India witnessed its finest military hour (and consequently Pakistans darkest hour), with the liberation of Bangladesh and the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers in East Pakistan. The fall of Dacca, as the city was known then, surprised many because of two reasons: first, a nuclear-armed US 7th fleet was ready, waiting to intervene and second, Pakistans eastern army had enough men to delay the Indian offensive, until a United Nations (UN) ceasefire would send Indian troops back to the original borders. While the common perception is that the war started on December 4, 1971, even the Central Intelligence Agency was unable to determine to any certainty as to which side had initiated hostilities on 3rd December. While there were fierce battles on Indias western borders, the campaign in the east, was spectacular. Initially, Indias politico-military leaders in Delhi fearing a UN ceasefire were in a hurry to establish a free Bangladeshi government in the port towns of Khulna and Chittagong, after Soviet Russia informed Delhi that it couldnt keep vetoing resolutions at the UN for a ceasefire. With limited time, the Indian Army was rushed bypassing Opposition to swiftly liberate Dacca. Later, a study of Indias campaign by Pakistans National Defence College concluded that: the credit really goes to General Jacobs meticulous preparations in the Indian eastern command and to the implementation by his Corps commanders for Indias blitzkrieg in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Dacca fell, despite the fact that there were 26,400 Pakistani soldiers in the city and only 3,000 Indian soldiers surrounded Dacca. On December 16, during a lull in the battle, Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff, Eastern Army Command during the 1971 war, sought permission to meet Lieutenant General AAK Niazi to seek his surrender. When in Dacca, Lieutenant General Jacob said to Lieutenant General Niazi that hed ask him thrice to surrender. If the latter didnt respond, hed go back to Calcutta and order the annihilation of Pakistani troops by ruthless bombing. India had complete air superiority, and Lt Gen Niazi was aware of that. In fact, a warning by Indias Army chief General Sam Manekshaw had already been aired. Lt Gen Niazi knew he was cornered and when he was asked the third time, he simply broke down. The next morning at 9, the world witnessed the largest military surrender since World War 2, and the parade was commanded by Lt Gen Niazis ADC, at Lt Gen Jacobs insistence. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission, which was set up by Zulfikar Bhutto to probe their military disaster, concluded that India had achieved its victory because Lt Gen Niazi lost his nerve. Lt Gen Niazi later admitted that Lt Gen Jacob had blackmailed him into surrendering. Declassified records show that the main aim of the US was to protect General Yahya Khan and Pakistan from dismemberment. Within Pakistan, there was a belief that China would come to its assistance in the event of a war. General Khan kept telling his commanders to wait for Yellow (China) in the North and White (the US) in the South but Beijing (then Peking) did not care to interfere. This was in keeping with Indias assessment. After the war, Bhutto even lamented, that China had not fulfilled its obligations to Pakistan as promised. However, despite our military gains, Indias policymakers failed to put in place a favourable political arrangement which was the ultimate aim of the war with a new Bangladeshi government in place. India could have sought guarantees from Bangladesh on three essential issues: first, rationalisation of border enclaves; second, transit rights for rail and through Bangladeshi waterways and third, guarantees for its Hindus. But DP Dhar, a close associate of Indira Gandhi, and then head of ministry of external affairs policy planning division, apparently assured our generals that these problems are political and can be sorted out later. They never were. And we returned those 93,000 prisoners for nothing!

Maroof Raza is the author of Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan Macaca 12-15-2011, 09:37 PM Dhaka calling (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dhaka-calling/888456/) By C. Raja Mohan | Indian Express The liberation of Bangladesh 40 years ago will long remain the most memorable moment for Indian statecraft. It saw then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decisively support liberal and progressive forces in East Bengal who sought to overthrow the brutal oppression by the Pakistan army. Mrs Gandhi demonstrated great skill in coping with a hostile international environment, outmanoeuvring Pakistans allies, the United States and China, by mobilising the Soviet Union, and leading an effective military campaign. Indias contribution to the liberation of Bangladesh was not only a definitive moment for the subcontinent but also a major landmark in the evolution of international politics after World War II. In todays jargon, it would be called a humanitarian intervention. Those who talk loudly today about the responsibility to protect people against genocide by their own government, however, were all opposed to Indias military intervention. It was not just the West and China that opposed Indias intervention. Very few from the non-aligned movement that India claims to lead supported India on Bangladesh at the United Nations. Bangladeshs war of liberation produced three distinct strategic outcomes for the region. One was a change in the regional balance of power in Indias favour. The second was an ideological blow against the two-nation theory that saw the bloody Partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The third, the vivisection of Pakistan, reconfigured Indias eastern flank. As it celebrates the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Bangladesh, India would do well to remember its dismal failure to consolidate the strategic gains from 1971. A self-absorbed India in the 1970s was unable to anticipate the regional reaction to the liberation of Bangladesh and frittered away a historic opportunity to transform the subcontinents geopolitics. Despite its many good intentions, New Delhi was unable to convert the division of Pakistan into a lasting peace with the surviving western half, or build a sustainable partnership with the newly created Bangladesh. The promise of a durable peace that India thought it negotiated with Pakistan in the Simla Agreement of 1972 has remained elusive. Worse still, within a decade-and-a-half, Pakistan would go on the offensive, leaving Delhi scrambling to cope with new security challenges from the west. In India, many critics of the Shimla pact have argued that Pakistans Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto got the better of Mrs Gandhi. Whatever might be the merits of that argument, the reality is that, while India won the war in 1971, it could not win an effective peace settlement. In Pakistan, the army saw the Simla Agreement as an imposed peace by the victor of 1971. If India thought it had a settled framework for the resolution of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir in the Simla Agreement, a revisionist Pakistan has successfully made the 1972 pact largely irrelevant to bilateral relations over the last three decades. Central to Pakistans revisionism was the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent. The first decision by Bhutto after the 1971 war was to launch a clandestine nuclear weapon programme. From Islamabads perspective, the nuclear move was indeed logical, but India failed to assess it properly despite Bhuttos talk in the 1960s about making the bomb even if Pakistan had to eat grass. China, which clearly understood the strategic implications of the 1971 war, rendered massive assistance to Pakistans nuclear and missile programmes in a bid to reverse what it called Indias hegemony in the subcontinent. If the South Asian balance tilted in Indias favour at the end of 1971, a nuclear Pakistan reversed it

by the end of the 1980s. Armed with a nuclear deterrent, Pakistan found that it could support insurgencies in India first in Punjab, then in Kashmir, and eventually the extremist forces all across India. With its margin of conventional military superiority made irrelevant by Pakistans nuclear weapons, Delhi has struggled for more than two decades in dealing with Rawalpindis low-intensity proxy war against India that was defined in terms of a retribution for 1971. Delhis own half-cocked move of conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 but refusing to exercise the military nuclear option engineered the worst of all possible atomic outcomes for Delhi. India inadvertently lent a strategic legitimacy to Pakistans nuclear weapons programme. Deluding itself with the disarmament rhetoric, Delhi let a nuclear gap with Pakistan emerge. Indias gains in the east too evaporated rapidly after a bloody coup in August 1975 that killed the founder of Bangladesh, Mujibur Rahman. If India seemed a helpless bystander, the coup helped restore the influence of many ideological and political forces internal and external that opposed the liberation war in 1971. The deep internal divisions in Bangladesh and Indias own ineffective regional policy put Delhis relations with Dhaka in a deep freeze and undermined the gains of 1971. If the liberation of Bangladesh was a great triumph, Delhis failures after 1971 were monumental. They were rooted in the refusal to think strategically about the implications of the liberation war and prepare adequately for its consequences. Forty years after 1971, India is in danger of losing a second opportunity at hand to transform relations with Bangladesh. In her visit to Delhi in January 2010, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina took bold risks to make a fresh beginning with India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs return visit to Dhaka last September did much to advance the bilateral relationship. But the failure to sign the agreement on the Teesta waters, thanks to the tantrums of West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, has helped revive the trust deficit between Delhi and Dhaka. The inability of India, once again burdened with inchoate leadership, to quickly correct the course with Bangladesh could turn out to be as disastrous as the post-1971 policy failures. The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research Macaca 12-15-2011, 09:44 PM What the envoy said (http://tribune.com.pk/story/306543/what-the-envoy-said/) By Khurram Husain | The Express Tribune What exactly happened at the envoys conference held in Islamabad on December 12th and 13th? We have confusing reports emerging from the whole affair and a final set of recommendations that doesnt tally up with the initial reports of what the envoys were actually saying. A report in this newspaper headlined the first day of the conference with these words: Envoys want less emotion, more strategy in policies. Some of the contents of that report, sourced to a single anonymous participant, were striking. For instance, the participant told the reporter that the envoys urged the government to immediately reopen supply routes for Nato forces and that foreign policy should be based on strategy, not sentiment. The report goes on to say that the views of the countrys top diplomats were in stark contrast to the tough stance taken by the government as well as the military establishment in the aftermath of the Nato attacks. Fair enough. This is exactly what one would expect foreign envoys to say if you think about it. For

many decades now, the foreign office establishment has taken a dim view of the countrys foreign policy, over which they have had very little control. I recall, as a vivid example, a visit by the late Agha Shahi to LUMS in the aftermath of the nuclear tests in 1998, when Pakistan was completely isolated in the world community and bottled up behind a wall of sanctions. I had a brief opportunity to speak to him directly and sensing the fleeting nature of the moment, I kept my question brief and open-ended. How long will Pakistan remain isolated, Agha sahib? I asked. For as long as we patronise militant groups, for as long as we try to use terrorism as a tool in foreign policy, his reply began. And then he continued, and Im paraphrasing from memory here: We have done this to ourselves, we have followed very misguided policies to pursue our interests and the result is this, this isolation. If we dont stop patronising extremist groups, we will never escape this isolation. I know enough about the foreign policy of our country to know that the foreign office and its envoys and ministers and secretaries and spokespeople have always, privately, chaffed at the role they have to play in the execution of our foreign policy: the role of public relations damage control. Remember the silent outcry of the envoys in the wake of the Kargil disaster? All our ambassadors and high commissioners around the world woke up one day to discover that their country was in the middle of a major conflagration, that their host countries had serious and indignant questions to ask about the whole affair about which none of them had been briefed. They read about it in the newspapers. I got a glimpse of how this works at a wedding dinner that I was attending in Rawalpindi, in the first week of July 1999. The Kargil war was the backdrop and on every table it was the foremost topic of conversation. I had the misfortune to be seated next to a retired general who asked me what I did and when I told him I was a teacher at LUMS, he went off on how important it was for me to explain to my students what was happening in Kargil, how much it matters to the country and that they should all support the venture. I argued back that I would do no such thing, in fact, I was doing the exact opposite by holding seminars and inviting speakers to come and talk about how deeply misguided the entire venture was. An argument ensued during which I made a reference to the growing isolation that had become Pakistans destiny ever since we embarked on a policy of using deniable militancy as a tool of foreign policy. Isolation? growled the visibly irritated general. That is the job of the foreign service, what do we have them for? You tell me general, I said. What do we have them for? To explain our point of view to the world! he shouted. You think that is a tough job? He went on, We in the army have to do far tougher jobs than that all the time and we dont complain, why does everyone else always complain? This snippet from the conversation has stuck in my mind because it is extraordinarily illustrative of how captive our foreign policy really is to the mercurial impulses of generals and their deluded pursuit of national honour. Let them do whatever they please and let the envoys clean up the mess. That is their job! On the second day of the conference, a set of recommendations were issued, which are the diametrical opposite of the concerns reportedly aired by the envoys on the first day. What happened? Was this a case of misreporting, or were the envoys made aware of some ground realities of their home country? Perhaps our envoys should take whatever views they brought with them to the conference and wrap them with fresh flowers into a bright and beautiful wreath to lay on the grave of Agha Shahi, who could probably have told them before they even departed their host stations that they were being summoned to Pakistan to be told what to think, not to be consulted. The flowers will eventually wilt, but Agha sahibs insights will not. And, on their way out, they should buy themselves a broom each and prepare to get on with their jobs back in their host stations. After all, securing our national honour is hard work, dont they

know that?

Finally, the review! (http://tribune.com.pk/story/306560/finally-the-review/) By Ejaz Haider | The Express Tribune Foreign policy revision (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/15/foreign-policy-revision.html) Dawn Editorial Death wish of the Pakistani political class (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=82488&Cat=9) By Ayaz Amir | The News Pakistans narrative of progress (http://tribune.com.pk/story/306541/pakistans-narrative-ofprogress/) By Arsalan Ali Faheem | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-15-2011, 09:49 PM US-Pakistan jousting (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/uspakistan-jousting/887894/) By C. Raja Mohan | Indian Express The decision by a US Congressional panel to freeze $700 million of assistance to Pakistan highlights the current troubled bilateral relationship but should not be over-interpreted. As a spokeswoman of the State Department clarified, the cut wont take effect until both houses of the Congress approve and President Obama signs it into law. During the last few months, the US has delayed the disbursement of its aid flows to Pakistan that amounted to nearly $20 billion in the previous decade. The Pakistan army has, in turn, been bold in asserting that it can do without US assistance. As a series of incidents in 2011 the Raymond Davis affair, the killing of Osama bin Laden, and the US cross border attacks on Pakistani posts on the Durand Line have brought into sharp relief the growing contradiction between the US and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. Washington, which has known all along the Pakistan armys double-dealing on terror, is no longer in a position to gloss over the problems with Rawalpindi. There is much resentment in the US against aiding Pakistan, which is actively helping those killing American soldiers in Afghanistan. The Obama administration would like to leverage the anger in the US Congress to compel the Pakistan army to change its behaviour and cooperate in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. The threats to cut off US aid are part of this effort. The Pakistan army, on the other hand, senses a rare opportunity to dominate Afghan affairs as US troops prepare to end their combat role there by 2014. In a bid to extract the maximum concessions from the US, Rawalpindi is whipping up anti-American sentiments in the nation. It has blocked overland supplies to US and NATO troops in Afghanistan, ordered the US out of a military base in Pakistan, and threatened to shoot down any American aircraft or American drone violating its air space. Beyond the public posturing in both Washington and Rawalpindi, efforts are on to patch up. Towards a reset The US defence secretary, Leon Panetta, who has been one of the more strident critics of Pakistans destabilisation in Afghanistan, has sounded more conciliatory this week during a visit to Kabul. Panetta insisted that the US cant win in Afghanistan without winning in Pakistan. Its going to be important, as we continue to move and progress in our efforts in Afghanistan, that we continue to outreach to Pakistan. This has been a difficult and complicated relationship but it is an important relationship, Panetta said. The Pentagon has put on hold drone attacks after its cross-border air raids that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on November 26. There are reports that the Pakistan army has resumed institutional contacts with the NATO headquarters in Kabul and the military coordination units on the border.

Senior officials from Pakistan have said that the blockade against the US troops in Afghanistan will not be lifted until there is an apology from Washington. President Obama has offered condolences but not an apology. Washington and Rawalpindi might find a way to finesse the issue, if the US inquiry into the November raids can show some contrition. Meanwhile, a conference of Pakistans envoys to major capitals this week has come up with a formal agenda for a US-Pakistan reset. It called for a comprehensive reworking of the bilateral arrangements for security cooperation in 2002 between the Bush administration and the military government led by General Pervez Musharraf. The envoys felt Musharraf had offered much too lenient terms to the United States military and the CIA to operate in Pakistan and they must now be renegotiated. The envoys appear to be endorsing what the Pakistan army leadership has been saying for a while. Since they cant do without each other, Washington and Rawalpindi have every reason to kiss and make up. Yet, unexpected events on the ground might continue to complicate the patch-up effort. Afghan local police With the US troops set to end their combat role in Afghanistan by 2014 and move steadily towards an advisory role, the Obama administration is considering the expansion of a controversial programme to build slocal militias. Since last year, US special forces have trained and lightly armed nearly 10,000 Afghans to police their villages against the Taliban. These Afghan Local Police (ALP) units currently operate in about 55 districts. The US military wants to triple the ALP to 30,000, who can fan out into nearly 100 districts. While the Pentagon is pleased with the functioning of the ALP units, Western NGOs have criticised the militias of local extortion and human rights violations. Originally conceived as a limited duration programme, the ALP could eventually emerge as an important force in the Afghan security landscape. The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research Pakistan decides to REVISE ties with United States (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slideshow-1-pakistan-decides-to-revise-ties-with-united-states/20111215.htm) By Amir Mir | Rediff Restructuring a relationship (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=82490&Cat=9) By Ikram Sehgal | The News U.S. move to hold aid strains ties with Pakistan (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/uspakistan-usa-idUSTRE7BD01H20111214) By Qasim Nauman and Augustine Anthony | Reuters Punishment model (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82383&Cat=8) The News Editorial US-Pakistan relationship (http://tribune.com.pk/story/306542/us-pakistan-relationship/) The Express Tribune Editorial A nation that lies (http://tribune.com.pk/story/306557/a-nation-that-lies/) By Atika Rehman | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-16-2011, 07:25 PM Growing isolation (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/16/growing-isolation.html) By Cyril Almeida | Dawn NOW that weve taught the Americans a lesson and they know we mean business, a question: what next? Our security mavens think they know the answer: to engineer a face-saving exit from Afghanistan the US needs Pakistan, and while the US is still loath to accept that reality, domestic political and fiscal imperatives in the US will force that realisation sooner than later. Its like Tom Cruise in that silly movie Knight and Day using hand gestures to explain to a blonde Cameron Diaz her chances of survival. With us, the chances of a face-saving exit from Afghanistan for the US are shoulder-high; without us, they are knee-high.

The Pakistani security apparatuss calculation could well be right. But it could also be wrong. The US isnt exactly known for doing what others think it will do or want it to do. The problem for Pakistan is that the national-security folks have bet the house that they are right. Conditioning its support for the US project in Afghanistan on an acceptance of Pakistans view of what needs to be done in Afghanistan is a high-stakes bet: what if the US chooses otherwise? Imagine an alternative scenario in which the US decides to do things its own way in Afghanistan and determines that Pakistan is the problem, not just in Afghanistan but generally when it comes to dealing with the terrorism threat regionally and globally. You dont even have to try very hard to imagine this alternative scenario: tune in to the commentary on Pakistan emanating from the US and youd think weve already been declared the enemy. Bill Kellers piece in The New York Times this week is extraordinary precisely because his relatively sympathetic view of Pakistan is so unusual; patience and tolerance for Pakistan in world capitals is otherwise perilously low. Scarier than the increasing international isolation of Pakistan, though, is the nonchalance and dismissiveness with which it is being treated out here. Policymakers here appear so sure the US doesnt have any choice but to work with Pakistan that they have been blinded to signs that various power centres in the US are increasingly opposed to working with Pakistan. Maybe some American generals get that they need to work with Pakistan but many influential senators and congressmen do not. And maybe many in the State Department and the White House understand the indispensability of Pakistan but there are powerful voices which believe otherwise. More often that not, what emerges as policy from the US is a compromise between its various power centres. When, according to the national-security folks here, the US hasnt done the right thing in 10 years, why are we so sure the same US policymaking apparatus will now converge on the outcome that we desire? And its not just the US which is tiring of us. The whispers from Europe too are increasingly worrying. Before we could rely on the Europeans privately acknowledging that the US had made many mistakes in Afghanistan and that Pakistan was protecting some legitimate national interests.But patience with Pakistan in Europe is increasingly thin. Its not just a recalcitrant army that is the problem: the perception that Pakistan is being run on the civilian side by a ruinous kleptocracy, to use Bill Kellers phrase, that doesnt have the capacity or interest to govern a state teetering on the edge has exasperated anyone who does want to help Pakistan. Even Canada Canada! is tiring of us. This from a Dec 1 op-ed titled Why is CIDA sending aid to a de facto enemy? in the National Post, a conservative newspaper: This week, in response to a deadly border incident that involved Nato troops, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani declared that there will be no more business as usual with the United States. Canada should make precisely the same declaration in regard to its own bilateral relationship with Pakistan. Every dollar that we spend on civil projects in Pakistan is another dollar that the countrys security establishment has available to it for providing material support to the Taliban and the Haqqani network in the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands. In replacing Pakistan on its country-of-focus list, [the Canadian International Development Agency] can pick from plenty of other poor countries that arent supporting the terrorists who are planting the roadside bombs that kill our troops. Pakistan may fulminate against the outside worlds unfair attitude towards and betrayal of us but the outside world is just as tired of Pakistan. Right or wrong as the outside worlds thinking may be can Pakistan afford to ignore it?

A state on the verge of bankruptcy, blamed by the worlds military superpower for nudging it towards defeat in its longest war, viewed by the world at large as a hub of terrorism, and critically dependent on exports to and remittances from the very countries that are tiring of it what about that configuration suggests Pakistan is on a path to anywhere good internationally? And yet policymakers here are clutching at straws. Hope is seen in the Arab Spring, the situation with Iran and fresh US-Russia tensions. The thinking is that the Arab Spring has deprived the US of a major ally in Egypt while relations with Turkey are complicated. Meanwhile, with the West and Iran on a collision course, a second massive crisis in the region will be avoided. And with Putin coming back to power and US-Russia relations slipping backwards, Pakistans position on Afghanistan may be listened to more sympathetically. Because of these other international exigencies, Pakistan will not face serious international punishment, the thinking here goes. Of such fallacies are great defeats made.

Learning from experience (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\17\story_17-122011_pg3_4) By Ijaz Khan | Daily Times What does Pakistan want in Afghanistan? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/307077/what-does-pakistanwant-in-afghanistan-2/) By Najmuddin A Shaikh | The Express Tribune Atmospherics around the Bonn Conference (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111216&page=9.2) By Palvasha von Hassell | The Friday Times Aid 'freeze' to Pakistan can be waived: US (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Aid-freezeto-Pakistan-can-be-waived-US/articleshow/11129170.cms) IANS Macaca 12-16-2011, 07:32 PM Free fall (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111216&page=9.1) Whether the knife falls on the melon or the melon on the knife, the melon suffers By Aparna Pande | The Friday Times US-Pakistan ties have been in a downward spiral since the beginning of this year, but now they seem to be in free fall. The Pakistani state insists on playing the injured victim and betrayed ally card, both for domestic consumption and as an oft-overused bargaining tool. And the US administration appears to have become impatient with an always-complaining ally who is reluctant to face reality. US-Pakistan relations have always had a see-saw nature. So at one level the current frictions in the relationship are not surprising. As I show in my book ("Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India") Pakistan has always looked to the US as a country who would bolster Pakistan's meager resources - both economic and military - in order to help Pakistan achieve parity with India. Pakistan also hoped for American assistance in any conflict with India. From the US perspective, however, Pakistan was one of the cogs in the wheel in the 'northern tier of containment' against the Soviet Union during the Cold War and a frontline ally against terrorism after 9/11. While the US provided immense amounts of economic and military aid, American administrations did not support Pakistan during any of its conflicts with India. Also, during the last two decades ties between India and the US have grown in many areas. The bedrock of Pakistan's ties with the US has always been the security relationship, the military-tomilitary ties and the intelligence relationship between the two countries. Through the 1960s, 70s and especially during the 1980s, there were very close ties. Top American military officials like former chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, and former CENTCOM commander and current CIA chief General David Petraeus, have tried to build ties with Pakistan because of their own positive experiences in the past. However, starting in the 1990s, the ties began to weaken.

When they were rebuilt after 9/11, the American military-intelligence establishment saw what they perceived as duplicitous behavior. Pakistan was an ally in the war on terror and had provided its territory and troops for assistance to the American-led international forces in Afghanistan. And yet, the Pakistani state's allowing of 'safe havens' within its border and use of jihadi groups as proxies like the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and their allies - hurt American interests and American lives. The mistrust in the American security establishment is deepening. The raid that killed Osama Bin Laden and repeated instances of cross-border violations by both American Special Operations Forces and NATO helicopters has to be seen in this context. When we read the statement by now retired Admiral Mullen, that the Haqqani network was "a veritable arm of the ISI", we would do well to remember that Admiral Mullen made over 27 trips to Pakistan to meet with General Kayani and other Pakistani officials. The mistrust is also visible in the response to the latest NATO attack on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Both sides have their own versions of the incident. Pakistan has closed its land borders to NATO supplies and there is no sign yet on when they will re-open. According to Pakistan Premier Yousaf Raza Gilani, "business as usual" would not be possible and "the democratic government would not allow similar attack on the country's sovereignty, and any (such) attempt in future will definitely meet the detrimental response". Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has reportedly ordered his troops to respond to any violations of the border without waiting for orders from above. Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Major General Ashfaq Nadeem referred to the incident as a "pre-planned conspiracy" by "supposed allies". NATO insists that the incident was "not a deliberate" violation. Instead of trying to go further in order to placate Pakistan, the American military establishment has tried to demonstrate that they are not as dependent on Pakistan's logistical support as is made out to be. Further, while Pakistan has closed the land borders to NATO supplies, its air space is still open for use by NATO and the Americans. If Pakistan closed its air space as well, that would increase the problems for the US. But US ties with Russia and the Central Asian states are not like they were during the 1960s, 70s or 80s. While there are areas in which they disagree, Russia has allowed the US to operate the northern route to supply its troops in Afghanistan. The longer, and more often, Pakistan closes its borders, the less leverage it will have, as the US will turn more and more to the northern route and even try other routes. Ties between the civilian elements of both countries leave much to be desired. The Obama administration has repeatedly tried to bolster the civilian side of the Pakistani state both through the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill as well as by assistance in bolstering Pakistan's weak economy. During every crisis, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton calls or visits Pakistan to calm things down. President Obama too called his Pakistani counterpart President Asif Ali Zardari to condole on the deaths of the Pakistani soldiers killed in the NATO strike. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the American administration to ask for more assistance for Pakistan at a time when the mood in the Congress is becoming more and more antiPakistan. Soon after the NATO strikes, two leading Republican senators, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, called for a "full review" of ties with Pakistan stating that "US policy toward Pakistan must proceed from the realistic understanding that certain actions of Pakistan's military are contributing to the death and injury of our men and women in the military and jeopardizing our national security interests." Pakistan and aid to Pakistan has been a key topic of discussion at all Republican presidential debates. In this context, it is unfortunate that Pakistan has lost one of their best interlocutors with the Americans, the former Pakistani ambassador to US Husain Haqqani. The Pakistani state has often played the game of brinkmanship - or as an American analyst recently said, "Russian roulette" - with its neighbor India. Attempting to play this game with the Americans may prove problematic, or disastrous. Pakistan's security establishment, especially its army, has been attempting to regain what it lost during the Musharraf years. While the government is civilian, the army still has a say in foreign policy, defence and security policy, economic policy and even in domestic politics. Pakistan's army has always portrayed itself as the champion or protector of Pakistan's "ideological and territorial frontiers". While the army still remains "India-centric" - as

General Kayani has often stated - it is much easier to gain public approval by "standing up to the US" these days than by standing up to India. It is in this context that we need to read the army becoming more turf conscious domestically (not allowing ISI to be under civilian control, for instance) as well as internationally (resisting the American attempt to boost civilian supremacy over the military, and championing of the 'sovereignty' issue). Today we face problems in all aspects of the US-Pakistan relationship. On the American side there is, as always, a lack of a unified consistent policy by all segments of the American administration. In previous decades, the security establishment was the bedrock. Today, those ties still remain but there are deepening cracks in the edifice. With growing mistrust, there is increasing reliance on and likelihood of more drone strikes, Special Forces operations across the border in 'hot pursuit' of jihadis, and covert operations within Pakistan. While the State Department and White House are still committed to the Pakistani relationship and would like to see a 'stable, democratic Pakistan', there are signs of growing American impatience with the civilian leadership. On the Pakistani side, the civilians are not strong enough and often use the 'American card' to play to a domestic audience which is 83% anti-American, according to the latest polls. The Pakistani military-intelligence establishment - increasingly comprised of the Zia generation and the 'lost generation' (more ideologically Islamist and anti-American) - sees the issues of 'ghairat' (honour) and 'sovereignty' as critical, if it has to maintain its legitimacy and status at home. What Pakistan's civilian and military establishments fail to understand is that this is not the 1960s or 1970s or the 1980s. During those decades, Pakistan was the only American ally in the subcontinent and the US often viewed the region from the Pakistani prism. That is no longer the case. There are American troops in Afghanistan and the US has a stake in Afghanistan's future. America's ties with India have deepened in the last two decades and the US also has a stake in India's stability and future. Pakistan's insistence on brinkmanship instead of a negotiated resolution of differences may result in the worst nightmare of its establishment: the US viewing Pakistan from the Indian and Afghan prisms. Macaca 12-16-2011, 07:35 PM Close and friendly ties between the US and Pakistan benefit not only these two countries but the entire region and beyond. For the US, good ties with Pakistan are important not only because it has troops in Afghanistan, but also because stability in the region depends on stability in Pakistan. While walking away from Pakistan and the region is an option, it would not help the US in the long term. And neither would it help other countries in the region - India, Afghanistan and China. While the Obama administration has tried to change the policy followed by the previous administrations and attempted to boost the civilian side of the Pakistani state, there is more that can be done. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill and other American assistance to Pakistan has the potential to boost the civil society, rebuild the broken education system, provide energy assistance and eventually build a civilian democratic Pakistan. Pakistan is much more than just its civilian and security establishments and there is a need for genuine people-to-people interaction and partnerships. It is Pakistan that will suffer from any further breakdown of ties with the US. It is dependent upon external assistance not just for its economy but also for energy and education, and American assistance and support is critical in this respect. Any more conflict with US, especially over Afghanistan, will only hurt Pakistan. Brinkmanship with a country that has the capability but not yet the desire or goal to cause harm is not pragmatic. As the Urdu proverb goes: whether the knife falls on the melon or the melon on the knife, the melon suffers. A parna Pande is Research fellow and Director, Hudson Institute's Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia. Her book, "Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India" was published by Routledge in April 2011 Macaca 12-16-2011, 07:49 PM Border wars and brinkmanship (http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/border_wars_and_brinkmanship) By Rodney W. Jones | Foreign Policy

Pakistan's immediate reaction to the tragic November 26 air attacks on two check posts located barely 400 meters from the Afghan border in Mohmand tribal agency, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, was to declare that the attacks were "unprovoked aggression" and convey impressions to the local media that the attack was a premeditated assault by U.S and NATO forces in Afghanistan. This aroused a nationwide furor, further roiling an already tense relationship and leading to immediate retribution against American military and political interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Soon after the incident, Pakistani army officials reportedly changed the rules of engagement for forward-based units on the country's western border, authorizing them to fire on any such air intrusions without having to seek permission from senior commanders or headquarters, and indicated that air defenses would be beefed up in that sector. But amid the hue and cry within Pakistan, some also questioned why Pakistan's large and expensive military forces had not responded with air defenses to protect the posts, especially since the army claimed the supposedly "unprovoked" NATO aircraft attacks had lasted up to 2 hours. Why were Pakistani Air Force (PAF) fighter aircraft not scrambled and dispatched to the scene? Did the PAF prudently stay out of an army screw-up (if, as U.S. officials insist, Pakistani forces fired first), or did they just not get the word? It would have been an acute irony if Pakistan had sent up its American-built F-16 fighters against American helicopters or slow-flying AC-130 gunships being used against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. In fact, the furor masks the fact that Pakistan's close-in air defenses along the border with Afghanistan are thin, and long-range radars facing Afghanistan are not always on , as they were hardly needed in the past, except against Soviet air forces during the Afghan occupation of the 1980s. Ground-based radars' line-of-sight detection provides virtually no early warning against lowflying aircraft coming through gaps in the mountains, either, although triangulation of their beams coupled with GPS coordinates of mapped border locations may allow them to judge whether an aircraft has crossed into Pakistani air space. Whether they did on November 26 is not yet clear, since the firing on the posts could easily have been at standoff range, behind the Afghan side of the Durand Line. The bulk of Pakistan's fixed site and other long-range ground radar constituting the national air defense system (ADGES) are oriented primarily to detecting threats from India, along the Line of Control dividing Kashmir to the north, or coming across the main Indian border along the east, and provide, from southern locations surveillance of potential threats from the Arabian Sea. They also provide general surveillance of high-altitude traffic from Afghanistan but are not oriented to close-in mountain border surveillance. Most of Pakistan's large numbers of low-altitude radar, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers travel with armored and mechanized divisions and independent brigades deployed to counter a possible Indian invasion. Pakistan has a large inventory (about 1,900 as of 2010) of transportable anti-aircraft guns of various types and calibers, and also has concentrations of such AA guns and SAM defenses around air bases and sensitive facilities in the interior. The PAF operates the national air defense system from a command center in Chaklala (on the outskirts of Rawalpindi) through a network that contains high- and low-level ground radars. Recent PAF acquisitions also include three Swedish (Saab 2000 Erieye) and two Chinese-made ZDK03 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, which have 360-degree vision and lookdown radars that can detect aircraft at any altitude, as long as they are not hidden in ground clutter. Their primary missions are regarded as strategic, i.e., early warning, air defense and closein, ground-based missile surveillance. And the PAF also deploys Pakistan's mainstay air defense weapons, namely fighter aircraft with air-to-air interceptor missiles. The vast majority of Pakistan's estimated 3,150 ground-based air defense missile systems in 2010 were in the low-altitude MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems) category, though some heatseeking, low altitude types (such as the Crotale) are mounted on vehicles. The shoulder-fired missiles are in the same general category as the American-made Stinger missiles that the Afghan mujahideen used to bring down Soviet aircraft in the 1980s. The Pakistani army deploys a contemporary assortment of these types of infra-red, or heat-seeking, short-range missile systems, including some 2,500 Chinese Mk1/Mk2 (an adaptation of the Russian SA-7) and HN-5A, 230 French Mistral, 200 Swedish RBS-70, as well as 60 up-to-date Stingers (Raytheon FIM-92A). It would be very easy for Pakistan to shift additional anti-aircraft machine guns and to introduce

these shoulder-fired missiles to its western region, and reports suggest that the army is actually doing that now. However, if Pakistani front line border posts are equipped with these systems and expected to use them against any air intrusion -- accidental, pre-notified, or otherwise -- there are almost certain to be further accidental collisions and disruptions of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. If U.S. aircraft accidentally stray into Pakistani territory and take ground fire from anti-aircraft guns or missiles, they will almost certainly retaliate as a standard operational procedure. Second, Pakistan would face the threat that some of these advanced missiles could get into militant hands, which would put not only U.S./NATO aircraft, but also Pakistani aircraft, at serious risk, and also broaden suspicions in the West of Pakistani complicity with militants. Stinger proliferation to militants might further deter the Pakistani military from establishing control over its tribal territory, and would, in effect, provide insurgents with yet additional cover in safe havens in Pakistan. Third, Pakistani firing of Stinger-type missiles against U.S. aircraft operating in Afghanistan may be seen as acts of war against the United States. While the Pakistani public increasingly views America's war on terror operations in Afghanistan as "not Pakistan's war," they may be locked by escalation into owning "Pakistan's war on American forces." It should take little imagination to grasp where that would lead. The westward deployment of these MANPADS or low-altitude anti-aircraft guns would probably not be able to threaten U.S. drones, because bilateral protocols for U.S. drone activity along the Afghan-Pakistan border already exist and are followed. Normally drones fly at altitudes above the ceiling of shoulder-fired missiles, and their infra-red signatures, even at low altitude, are much more difficult for infra-red sensors to detect than those of manned aircraft. Drones may not even be readily detectable by Pakistan's existing ground radars in the region. By diverting AEW&C aircraft with advanced radar to that region, however, Pakistan probably could detect and shoot down drones with fighter aircraft and, possibly, in the unlikely event they were relocated to the tribal region, target them with its small number of high altitude SA-2 missiles. But these contingencies, which would disturb Pakistan's preferred strategies and air defense deployments against India, seem far less likely than the prospect of further (accidental or not) air-to-ground or ground-to-ground clashes between NATO and Pakistani troops. Risking the loss of Pakistan's scarce 4th generation fighter aircraft and pilots in cross-border shoot-outs with U.S. forces would be a recipe for further disaster. Macaca 12-16-2011, 07:51 PM Although the U.S. Central Command's assessment of the Mohmand incident is still a week away, the findings will likely blame communications breakdowns and fog of war confusion, exploited by deceptive firing from militants close by Pakistan's border posts, for the tragic case of friendly-fire. This was after all the most lethal, but not the first, cross-border incident of its kind. This may turn out to be one case where the extremist tail did wag the dog. Lessons will be gleaned from this incident, but the crucial ones concern the vital importance of transparent military-to-military communication and information-sharing on the activities of militants, and dedicated measures of mutual support for efforts to run them to ground. Neither side can afford to be responsible by inconsistent strategy for taking the lives of the other. Technical measures for avoiding collisions that have not yet been exploited include the use of reprogrammable, identification-friend-or foe (IFF) transponders. When placed with personnel at Pakistan's forward check posts and support installations, these should serve to ward off inadvertent fire by US forces, supplementing existing communications protocols. Frequently updating codes should protect these instruments from theft and successful spoofing use by militants. Beyond that, both sides must get back to basics on harmonizing policies on the future of Afghanistan. This would include pursuing as far as they prove viable the so-called "reconciliation" negotiations with those insurgents who might be induced to withdraw from combat in favor of participation in the Afghan political process. Secretary Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Islamabad warmly invited Pakistan to be a central player at the front end of this process, a process and role which Pakistan itself has long urged. Moving forward with relevant bilateral working groups developing road maps and strategies could help calm ruffled feathers while, importantly, working together for peaceful, internationally-supported outcomes in Afghanistan that will also satisfy Pakistan's legitimate long-term interests. Dr. Rodney W. Jones is President of Policy Architects International in Reston, VA, and an expert on security in South Asia

The Afghan concentration camp (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=82652&Cat=9) By Muzaffar Iqbal Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:00 PM The Pakistanis Have a Point (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/magazine/bill-kellerpakistan.html) By BILL KELLER | New York Times As an American visitor in the power precincts of Pakistan, from the gated enclaves of Islamabad to the manicured lawns of the military garrison in Peshawar, from the luxury fortress of the Serena Hotel to the exclusive apartments of the parliamentary housing blocks, you can expect three timehonored traditions: black tea with milk, obsequious servants and a profound sense of grievance. Talk to Pakistani politicians, scholars, generals, businessmen, spies and journalists as I did in October and before long, you are beyond the realm of politics and diplomacy and into the realm of hurt feelings. Words like ditch and jilt and betray recur. With Americans, they complain, its never a commitment, its always a transaction. This theme is played to the hilt, for effect, but it is also heartfelt. The thing about us, a Pakistani official told me, is that we are half emotional and half irrational. For a relationship that has oscillated for decades between collaboration and breakdown, this has been an extraordinarily bad year, at an especially inconvenient time. As America settles onto the long path toward withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan has considerable power to determine whether the end of our longest war is seen as a plausible success or a calamitous failure. There are, of course, other reasons that Pakistan deserves our attention. It has a fast-growing population approaching 190 million, and it hosts a loose conglomerate of terrorist franchises that offer young Pakistanis employment and purpose unavailable in the suffering feudal economy. It has 100-plus nuclear weapons (Americans who monitor the program dont know the exact number or the exact location) and a tense, heavily armed border with nuclear India. And its president, Asif Ali Zardari, oversees a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis. But it is the scramble to disengage from Afghanistan that has focused minds in Washington. Pakistans rough western frontier with Afghanistan is a sanctuary for militant extremists and criminal ventures, including the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, the notorious Haqqani clan and important remnants of the original horror story, Al Qaeda. The mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul is deep, nasty Afghanistan was the only country to vote against letting Pakistan into the United Nations and tribal. And to complicate matters further, Pakistan is the main military supply route for the American-led international forces and the Afghan National Army. On Thanksgiving weekend, a month after I returned from Pakistan, the relationship veered precipitously typically off course again. NATO aircraft covering an operation by Afghan soldiers and American Special Forces pounded two border posts, inadvertently killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, including two officers. The Americans said that they were fired on first and that Pakistan approved the airstrikes; the Pakistanis say the Americans did not wait for clearance to fire and then bombed the wrong targets. The fallout was painfully familiar: outrage, suspicion and recrimination, petulance and political posturing. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the chief of the army and by all accounts the most powerful man in Pakistan, retaliated by shutting (for now and not for the first time) the NATO supply corridor through his country. The Pakistanis abruptly dropped out of a Bonn conference on the future of Afghanistan and announced they would not cooperate with an American investigation of the airstrikes. President Obama sent condolences but balked at the suggestion of an apology; possibly the president did not want to set off another chorus of Mitt Romneys refrain that Obama is always apologizing for America. At this writing, American officials were trying to gauge whether the errant airstrike would have, as one worried official put it, a long half-life. If you survey informed Americans, you will hear Pakistanis described as duplicitous, paranoid, selfpitying and generally infuriating. In turn, Pakistanis describe us as fickle, arrogant, shortsighted and chronically unreliable. Neither countrys caricature of the other is entirely wrong, and it makes for a relationship that is

less in need of diplomacy than couples therapy, which customarily starts by trying to see things from the other point of view. While the Pakistanis have hardly been innocent, they have a point when they say America has not been the easiest of partners. One good place to mark the beginning of this very, very bad year in U.S.-Pakistani relations is Dec. 13, 2010, when Richard C. Holbrooke died of a torn aorta. Holbrooke, the veteran of the Balkan peace, had for two years held the thankless, newly invented role of the administrations special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The antithesis of mellow, Holbrooke did not hit it off with our no-drama president, and his bluster didnt always play well in Kabul or Islamabad either. But Holbrooke paid aggressive attention to Pakistan. While he was characteristically blunt about the divergent U.S. and Pakistani views, he understood that they were a result of different, calculated national interests, not malevolence or mere orneriness. He was convinced that the outlooks could be, if not exactly synchronized, made more compatible. He made a concentrated effort to persuade the Pakistanis that this time the United States would not be a fair-weather friend. You need a Holbrooke, says Maleeha Lodhi, a well-connected former ambassador to Washington. Not necessarily the person but the role. In the absence of full-on engagement, she says, its become a very accident-prone relationship. On Jan. 27, a trigger-happy C.I.A. contractor named Raymond Davis was stuck in Lahore traffic and shot dead two motorcyclists who approached him. A backup vehicle he summoned ran over and killed a bystander. The U.S. spent heavily from its meager stock of good will to persuade the Pakistanis to set Davis free pleading with a straight face that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. On May 2, a U.S. Navy Seals team caught Osama bin Laden in the military town Abbottabad and killed him. Before long, American officials were quoted questioning whether their Pakistani allies were just incompetent or actually complicit. (The Americans who deal with Pakistan believe that General Kayani and the director of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, were genuinely surprised and embarrassed that Bin Laden was so close by, though the Americans fault the Pakistanis for not looking very hard.) In Pakistan, Kayani faced rumbles of insurrection for letting Americans violate Pakistani sovereignty; a defining victory for President Obama was a humiliation for Kayani and Pasha. In September, members of the Haqqani clan (a criminal syndicate and jihadi cult thats avowedly subservient to the Taliban leader Mullah Omar) marked the 10th anniversary of 9/11 with two theatrical attacks in Afghanistan. First a truck bomb injured 77 American soldiers in Wardak Province. Then militants rained rocket-propelled grenades on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, forcing our ambassador to spend 20 hours locked down in a bunker. A few days later the former Afghan president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, spread his arms to welcome an emissary from the Taliban to discuss the possibility of peace talks. As they embraced, the visitor detonated a bomb in his turban, killing himself, Rabbani and the talks. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, without any evidence that American officials are aware of, accused Pakistan of masterminding the grotesque killing in order to scuttle peace talks it couldnt control. And two days after that, Adm. Mike Mullen, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took to Capitol Hill to suggest that Pakistani intelligence had blessed the truck bomb and embassy attack. His testimony came as a particular shock, because if the turbulent affair between the United States and Pakistan had a solid center in recent years, it was the rapport between Mullen and his Pakistani counterpart, General Kayani. Over the four years from Kayanis promotion as chief of the army staff until Mullens retirement in September, scarcely a month went by when the two didnt meet. Mullen would often drop by Kayanis home at the military enclave in Rawalpindi, arriving for dinner and staying into the early morning, discussing the pressures of command while the sullen-visaged general chain-smoked Dunhills. One time, Kayani took his American friend to the Himalayas for a flyby of the worlds second-highest peak, K2. On another occasion, Mullen hosted Kayani on the golf course at the Naval Academy. The two men seemed to have developed a genuine trust and respect for each other.

But Mullens faith in an underlying common purpose was rattled by the truck bombing and the embassy attack, both of which opened Mullen to the charge that his courtship of Kayani had been a failure. So over the objection of the State Department the admiral set out to demonstrate that he had no illusions. The Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence agency, he declared. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck-bomb attack as well as the assault on our embassy. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:06 PM Several officials with access to the intelligence told me that while the Haqqanis were implicated in both attacks, there was no evidence of direct ISI involvement. A Mullen aide said later that the admiral was referring to ISIs ongoing sponsorship of the Haqqanis and did not mean to say Pakistan authorized those specific attacks. No matter. In Pakistan, Mullens denunciation led to a ripple of alarm that U.S. military hardliners were contemplating an invasion. The press had hysterics. Kayani made a show of putting the Pakistani Army on alert. The Pakistani rupee fell in value. In Washington, Mullens remarks captured and fed a vengeful mood and a rising sense of fatalism about Pakistan. Bruce O. Riedel, an influential former C.I.A. officer who led a 2009 policy review for President Obama on Pakistan and Afghanistan, captured the prevailing sentiment in an Op-Ed in The Times, in which he called for a new policy of containment, meaning a more hostile relationship toward the army and intelligence services. I can see how this gets worse, Riedel told me. And I can see how this gets catastrophically worse. . . . I dont see how it gets a whole lot better. When Gen. David H. Petraeus took over the U.S. militarys Central Command in 2008, he commissioned expert briefing papers on his new domain, which sprawled from Egypt, across the Persian Gulf, to Central Asia. The paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan began, according to an American who has read it, roughly this way: The United States has no vital national interests in Afghanistan. Our vital national interests are in Pakistan, notably the security of those nuclear weapons and the infiltration by Al Qaeda. The paper then went on for the remaining pages to discuss Afghanistan. Pakistan hardly got a mention. Thats typical, my source said. Pakistan tends to be an afterthought. The Pakistani version of modern history is one of American betrayal, going back at least to the Kennedy administrations arming of Pakistans archrival, India, in the wake of its 1962 border war with China. The most consequential feat of American opportunism came when we enlisted Pakistan to bedevil the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The intelligence agencies of the U.S. and Pakistan with help from Saudi Arabia created the perfect thorn in the Soviet underbelly: young Muslim freedom fighters, schooled in jihad at Pakistani madrassas, laden with American surface-to-air missiles and led by charismatic warriors who set aside tribal rivalries to war against foreign occupation. After the Soviets admitted defeat in 1989, the U.S. mission accomplished! pulled out, leaving Pakistan holding the bag: several million refugees, an Afghanistan torn by civil war and a population of jihadists who would find new targets for their American-supplied arms. In the ensuing struggle for control of Afghanistan, Pakistan eventually sided with the Taliban, who were dominated by the Pashtun tribe that populates the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. The rival Northern Alliance was run by Tajiks and Uzbeks and backed by India; and the one thing you can never underestimate is Pakistans obsession with bigger, richer, better-armed India. As long as Pakistan was our partner in tormenting the Soviet Union, the U.S. winked at Pakistans nuclear-weapons program. After all, India was developing a nuclear arsenal, and it was inevitable that Pakistan would follow suit. But after the Soviets retreated, Pakistan was ostracized under a Congressional antiproliferation measure called the Pressler Amendment, stripped of military aid (some of it budgeted to bring Pakistani officers to the U.S. for exposure to American military values

and discipline) and civilian assistance (most of it used to promote civil society and buy good will). Our relationship with Pakistan sometimes seems like a case study in unintended consequences. The spawning of the mujahadeen is, of course, Exhibit A. The Pressler Amendment is Exhibit B. And Exhibit C might be Americas protectionist tariffs on Pakistans most important export, textiles. For years, experts, including a series of American ambassadors in Islamabad, have said that the single best thing the U.S. could do to pull Pakistan into the modern world is to ease trade barriers, as it has done with many other countries. Instead of sending foreign aid and hoping it trickles down, we could make it easier for Americans to buy Pakistani shirts, towels and denims, thus lifting an industry that is an incubator of the middle class and employs many women. Congress, answerable to domestic textile interests, has had none of it. Pakistan the afterthought was the theme very late one night when I visited the home of Pakistans finance minister, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh. After showing me his impressive art collection, Shaikh flopped on a sofa and ran through the roll call of American infidelity. He worked his way, decade by decade, to the war on terror. Now, he said, Pakistan is tasked by the Americans with simultaneously helping to kill terrorists and the newest twist using its influence to bring them to the bargaining table. Congress, meanwhile, angry about terrorist sanctuaries, is squeezing off much of the financial aid that is supposed to be the lubricant in our alliance. Pakistan was the cold-war friend, the Soviet-Afghan-war friend, the terror-war friend, the minister said. As soon as the wars ended, so did the assistance. The sense of being discarded is so recent. A Boston University-educated economist who made his money in private equity investing in other words, a cosmopolitan man Shaikh seemed slightly abashed by his own bitterness. Im not saying that this style of Pakistani thinking is analytically correct, he said. Im just telling you how people feel. He waved an arm toward his dining room, where he hung a Warhol of Muhammad Ali. Were just supposed to be like Ali take the beating for seven rounds from Foreman, he said. But this time the Pakistanis have wised up. We are playing the game, but we know you cant take these people at their word. With a timetable that has the United States out of Afghanistan, or mostly out, by the end of 2014, Pakistan has leverage it did not have when the war began. One day after 9/11, Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, summoned the head of Pakistani intelligence for a talking to. We are asking all of our friends: Do they stand with us or against us? he said. The following day, Armitage handed over a list of seven demands, which included stopping Al Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, giving American invaders access to Pakistani bases and airspace and breaking all ties with the Taliban regime. The Pakistanis believed from the beginning that Afghanistan had American quagmire written all over it. Moreover, what America had in mind for Afghanistan was antithetical to Pakistans selfinterest. The only time period between 1947 and the American invasion of Afghanistan that Pakistanis have felt secure about Afghanistan is during the Taliban period, from 1996 to 2001, says Vali Nasr, an American scholar of the region who is listened to in both academia and government. Now the Bush administration would attempt to supplant the Taliban with a strong independent government in Kabul and a muscular military. Everything about this vision is dangerous to Pakistan, Nasr says. Pakistans military ruler at the time, Pervez Musharraf, saw the folly of defying an American ultimatum. He quickly agreed to the American demands and delivered on many of them. In practice, though, the accommodation with the Taliban was never fully curtailed. Pakistan knew Americas mission in Afghanistan would end, and it spread its bets. The Bush-Musharraf relationship, Vali Nasr says, was sort of a Hollywood suspension of disbelief. Musharraf was a convenient person who created a myth that we subscribed to basically that Pakistan was on the same page with us, it was an ally in the war on terror and it subscribed to our

agenda for Afghanistan. But the longer the war in Afghanistan dragged on, the harder it was to sustain the illusion. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:10 PM In October, I took the highway west from Islamabad to Peshawar, headquarters of the Pakistan Army corps responsible for the frontier with Afghanistan. Over tea and cookies, Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik, the three-star who commanded the frontier (he retired this month) talked about how the Afghan war looked from his side of the border. The official American version of the current situation in Afghanistan goes like this: By applying the counterinsurgency strategy that worked in Iraq and relying on a surge of troops and the increasingly sophisticated use of drones, the United States has been beating the insurgency into submission, while at the same time standing up an indigenous Afghan Army that could take over the mission. If only Pakistan would police its side of the border where the bad guys find safe haven, fresh recruits and financing wed be on track for an exit in 2014. The Pakistanis have a different narrative. First, a central government has never successfully ruled Afghanistan. Second, Karzai is an unreliable neighbor a reputation that has not been dispelled by his recent, manic declarations of brotherhood. And third, they believe that despite substantial investment by the United States, the Afghan Army and the police are a long way from being ready to hold the country. In other words, America is preparing to leave behind an Afghanistan that looks like incipient chaos to Pakistan. In Peshawar, General Malik talked with polite disdain about his neighbor to the west. His biggest fear one Im told Kayani stresses in every meeting with his American counterparts is the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces, an army of 170,000 and another 135,000 police, responsible for preventing Afghanistan from disintegrating back into failed-state status. If the U.S. succeeds in creating such a potent fighting force, that makes Pakistanis nervous, because they see it (rightly) as potentially unfriendly and (probably wrongly) as a potential agent of Indian influence. The more likely and equally unsettling outcome, Pakistanis believe, is that the Afghan military immature, fractious and dependent on the U.S. Treasury will disintegrate into heavily armed tribal claques and bandit syndicates. And America, as always, will be gone when hell breaks loose. General Malik studied on an exchange at Fort McNair, in Washington, D.C., and has visited 23 American states. He likes to think he is not clueless about how things work in our country. Come 2015, which senator would be ready to vote $9 billion, or $7 billion, to be spent on this army? he asked. Even $5 billion a year. O.K., maybe one year, maybe two years. But with the economy going downhill, how does the future afford this? Very challenging. American officials will tell you, not for attribution, that Maliks concerns are quite reasonable. So I asked the general if that was why his forces have not been more aggressive about mopping up terrorist sanctuaries along the border. Still hedging their bets? His answer was elaborate and not entirely facile. First of all, the general pointed out that Pakistan has done some serious fighting in terrorist strongholds and shed a lot of blood. Over the past two years, Maliks forces have been enlarged to 147,000 soldiers, mainly by relocating more than 50,000 from the Indian border. They have largely controlled militant activities in the Swat Valley, for example, which entailed two hard offensives with major casualties. But they have steadfastly declined to mount a major assault against North Waziristan a mountainous region of terrorist Deadwoods populated by battle-toughened outlaws. Yes, Malik said, North Waziristan is a terrible situation, but his forces are responsible for roughly 1,500 miles of border, they police an archipelago of rough towns in the so-called Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, and by the way, they had a devastating flood to handle last year. If you are not able to close the Mexican border, when you have the technology at your call, when there is no war, he said, how can you expect us to close our border, especially if you are not locking the doors on your side?

Americans who know the area well concede that, for all our complaints, Pakistan doesnt push harder in large part because it cant. The Pakistan Army has been trained to patrol the Indian border, not to battle hardened insurgents. They have comparatively crude weaponry. When they go up against a ruthless outfit like the Haqqanis, they tend to get killed. Roughly 4,000 Pakistani troops have died in these border wars more than the number of all the allied soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Theyre obviously reluctant to go against the Haqqanis, but reluctant for a couple of reasons, an American official told me. Not just the reason that they see them as a potential proxy force if Afghanistan doesnt go well, but also because they just literally lack the capability to take them on. Theyve got enough wars on their hands. Theyve not been able to consolidate their gains up in the northern part of the FATA, they have continued problems in other areas and they just cant deal with another campaign, which is what North Waziristan would be. And there is another, fundamental problem, Malik said. There is simply no popular support for stepping up the fight in what is seen as Americas war. Ordinary Pakistanis feel they have paid a high price in collateral damage, between the civilian casualties from unmanned drone attacks and the blowback from terror groups within Pakistan. When you go into North Waziristan and carry out some major operation, there is going to be a terrorist backlash in the rest of the country, Malik told me. The political mood, or the public mood, is no more operations. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:14 PM In late October, Hillary Clinton arrived in Islamabad, leading a delegation that included Petraeus, recently confirmed as C.I.A. director, and Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, Mullens successor as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Petraeus used to refer to Holbrooke as my diplomatic wingman, a bit of condescension he apparently intended as a tribute. This time, the security contingent served as diplomacys wingmen. The trip was intended as a show of unity and resolve by an administration that has spoken with conflicting voices when it has focused on Pakistan at all. For more than four hours, the Americans and a potent lineup of Pakistani counterparts talked over a dinner table. Perhaps the most revealing thing about the dinner was the guest list. The nine participants included Kayani and Pasha, but not President Zardari or Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who provided the dining room at his own residence and made himself scarce. The only representative of the civilian government was Clintons counterpart, the new foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, a 34-year-old rising star with the dark-haired beauty of a Bollywood leading lady, a degree in hospitality management from the University of Massachusetts and, most important, close ties to the Pakistani military. For a country that cherishes civilian democracy, we have a surprising affinity for strong men in uniform. Based on my conversations with American officials across the government, the U.S. has developed a grudging respect for Kayani, whom they regard as astute, straightforward, respectful of the idea of democratic government but genuinely disgusted by the current regimes thievery and ineptitude. (We know from the secret diplomatic cables disclosed by WikiLeaks that Kayani has confided to American officials his utter contempt for his president and hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign.) Zardari, whose principal claim to office is that he is the widower of the assassinated and virtually canonized Benazir Bhutto, has been mainly preoccupied with building up his patronage machine for elections in 2013. The Americans expect little from him and dont see a likely savior among his would-be political challengers. (As this article goes to press, Zardari is recovering from chest pains in a hospital in Dubai; there are rumors he wont return.) So, Kayani it is. The official American consensus is less enamored of Kayanis loyal intelligence underling, General Pasha, whose agency consorts with terrorists and is suspected of torturing and killing troublemakers, including journalists, but Pasha is too powerful to ignore. The day after the marathon dinner, Clintons entourage took over the Serena Hotel for a festival of public diplomacy a press conference with the foreign minister, followed by a town meeting with young Pakistanis and then a hardball round-table interview with a circle of top editors and anchors.

Clintons visit was generally portrayed, not least in the Pakistani press, as a familiar ritual of America talking tough to Pakistan. In the town meeting, a woman asked why America always played the role of bossy mother-in-law, and that theme delighted editorial cartoonists for days. But the private message to the Pakistanis and a more careful reading of Clintons public performance reflected a serious effort to reboot a troubled relationship. Clinton took care to pay tribute to Pakistani losses in the war against terror in the past decade in addition to the military, an estimated 30,000 civilian dead, the equivalent of a 9/11 every year. She ruled out sending American ground troops into Pakistani territory. She endorsed a Pakistani plea that U.S. forces in Afghanistan do a better job of cleaning up militant sanctuaries on their own side of the border. Questioned by a prominent television anchor, she repudiated Mullens testimony, not only disavowing any evidence of ISI complicity in the attack on Americas embassy in Kabul but also soft-peddling the spy agencys coziness with terrorists. Now, every intelligence agency has contacts with unsavory characters, she said. I dont think you would get any denial from either the ISI or the C.I.A. that people in their respective organizations have contacts with members of groups that have different agendas than the governments. But that doesnt mean that they are being directed or being approved or otherwise given a seal of approval. That particular riff may have caused jaws to clench at the C.I.A. compound in Langley, Va. The truth is, according to half a dozen senior officials with access to the intelligence, the evidence of Pakistans affinity for terrorists is often circumstantial and ambiguous, a matter of intercepted conversations in coded language, and their dealings are thought to be more pragmatic than ideological, more a matter of tolerating than directing, but the relationship goes way beyond contacts with unsavory characters. Theyre facilitating, one official told me. They provide information to the Haqqanis, they let them cross back and forth across the border, they let this L.E.T. guy (the leader of the dangerous Lashkar-e-Taiba faction of Kashmiri terrorists) be in prison and not be in prison at the same time. And yet the Pakistanis have been helpful Abbottabad aside against Al Qaeda, which is Americas first priority and which the Pakistanis recognize as a menace to everyone. They have shared intelligence, provided access to interrogations and coordinated operations. Before the fatal border mishap Thanksgiving weekend, one U.S. official told me, anti-terror cooperation between the C.I.A. and Pakistani intelligence had been very much on the upswing. The most striking aspect of Clintons trip, however, was her enthusiastic embrace of what is now called reconciliation which is the polite word for negotiating with the Taliban. Pakistan has long argued that the way to keep Afghanistan from coming to grief is to cut a deal with at least some of the Taliban. That would also mean Afghanistan could get by with a smaller, cheaper army. The notion has been anathema to the Americans tasked with killing Taliban; a principled stand against negotiating with terrorists is also a political meme that acquires particular potency in election seasons, as viewers of the Republican debates can attest. Almost unnoticed, though, reconciliation has moved to a central place in Americas strategy and has become the principal assignment for U.S. officials in the region. Clinton first signaled this in a speech to the Asia Society last February, when she refocused Afghanistan strategy on its original purpose, isolating the terrorists at war with America, meaning Al Qaeda. The speech was buried beneath other news at the time, but in early October, Tom Donilon, Obamas national security adviser, met Kayani in Abu Dhabi to stress to skeptical Pakistani leaders that she was serious. Clintons visit to Islamabad with her generals in tow was designed to put the full weight of the U.S. behind it. Clinton publicly acknowledged that the ISI (in fact, it was General Pasha in person) had already brokered a preliminary meeting between a top American diplomat and a member of the Haqqani clan. Nothing much came of the meeting, news of which promptly leaked, but Clinton said America was willing to sit down with the Taliban. She said that what had once been preconditions for

negotiations renouncing violence, shunning Al Qaeda and accepting Afghanistans constitution, including freedoms for women were now goals. In diplomacy, no process is fully initiated until it has been named. A meeting of Pakistani political parties in Islamabad had adopted a rubric for peace talks with the Taliban, a slogan the Pakistanis repeated at every opportunity: Give peace a chance. If having this project boiled down to a John Lennon lyric diminished the gravitas of the occasion, Clinton didnt let on. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:17 PM Within the American policy conglomerate, not everyone is terribly upbeat about the prospect of reconciling with the Taliban. The Taliban have so far publicly rejected talks, and the turban-bomb killing of Rabbani was a serious reversal. There is still some suspicion encouraged by Afghanistan and India about Pakistans real agenda. One theory is that Pakistan secretly wants the Taliban restored to power in Afghanistan, believing the Pashtun Islamists would be more susceptible to Pakistani influence. A more cynical theory, which I heard quite a bit in New Delhi, is that the Pakistani Army actually wants chaos on its various borders to justify its large payroll. Most Americans I met who are immersed in this problem put little stock in either of those notions. The Pakistanis may not be the most trustworthy partners in Asia, but they arent idiots. They know, at least at the senior levels, that a resurgent Taliban means not just perpetual mayhem on the border but also an emboldening of indigenous jihadists whose aim is nothing less than a takeover of nuclear Pakistan. But agreeing on the principle of a stable Afghanistan is easier than defining it, or getting there. After Clinton left Islamabad, a senior Pakistani intelligence official I wanted to meet arrived for breakfast with me and a colleague at Islamabads finest hotel. With a genial air of command, he ordered eggs Benedict for the table, declined my request to turn on a tape recorder, (Just keep my name out of it, he instructed later) and settled into an hour of polished spin. The Taliban learned its lesson in the madrassas and applied them ruthlessly, he said, as the Hollandaise congealed. Now the older ones have seen 10 years of war, and reconciliation is possible. Their outlook has been tempered by reason and contact with the modern world. They have relatives and friends in Kabul. They have money from the opium trade. They watch satellite TV. They are on the Internet. On the other hand, he continued, if you kill off the midtier Taliban, the ones who are going to replace them and there are many waiting in line, sadly are younger, more aggressive and eager to prove themselves. So what would it take to bring the Taliban into a settlement? First, he said, stop killing them. Second, an end to foreign military presence, the one thing that always mobilizes the occupied in that part of the world. Third, an Afghan constitution framed to give more local autonomy, so that Pashtun regions could be run by Pashtuns. On the face of it, as my breakfast companion surely knows, those sound like three nonstarters, and taken together they sound rather like surrender. Even Clinton is not calling for a break in hostilities, which the Americans see as the way to drive the Taliban to the bargaining table. As for foreign presence, both the Americans and the Afghans expect some long-term residual force to stay in Afghanistan, to backstop the Afghan Army and carry out drone attacks against Al Qaeda. And while it is not hard to imagine a decentralized Afghanistan in which Islamic traditionalists hold sway in the rural areas but cede the urban areas, where modern notions like educating girls have already made considerable headway that would be hard for Americans to swallow. Clinton herself sounded pretty categorical on that last point when she told Pakistani interviewers: I cannot in good faith participate in any process that I think would lead the women of Afghanistan back to the dark ages. I will not participate in that. To questions of how these seemingly insurmountable differences might be surmounted, Marc Grossman, who replaced Holbrooke as Clintons special representative, replies simply: I dont know whether these people are reconcilable or not. But the job weve been given is to find out. If you look at reconciliation as a route to peace, it requires a huge leap of faith. Surely the Taliban

have marked our withdrawal date on their calendars. The idea that they are so deeply weary of war let alone watching YouTube and yearning to join the world they see on their laptops feels like wishful thinking. But if you look at reconciliation as a step in couples therapy a shared project in managing a highly problematic, ultimately critical relationship it makes more sense. It gives Pakistan something it craves: a seat at the table where the future of Afghanistan is plotted. It gets Pakistan and Afghanistan talking to each other. It offers a supporting role to other players in the region notably Turkey, which has taken on a more active part as an Islamic peace broker. It could drain some of the acrimony and paranoia from the U.S.-Pakistan rhetoric. It might not save Afghanistan, but it could be a helpful start to saving Pakistan. What Clinton and company are seeking is a course of patient commitment that America, frankly, is not usually so good at. The relationship has given off some glimmers of hope with U.S. encouragement, Pakistan and India have agreed to normalize trade relations; the ISI has given American interrogators access to Osama bin Ladens wives but the funerals of those Pakistani troops last month remind us that the country is still a graveyard of optimism. At least the U.S. seems, for now, to be paying attention to the right problem. If you stand back, said one American who is in the thick of the American strategy-making, and say, by the year 2020, youve got two countries 30 million people in this country, 200 million people with nuclear weapons in this country, American troops in neither. Which matters? Its not Afghanistan. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:22 PM Jim Jones: Amb. Haqqani was not involved in memogate (http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/exclusive_jim_jones_amb_haqqani_was_not_i nvolved_i n_memogate) By Josh Rogin | Foreign Policy Former National Security Advisor Jim Jones has submitted a confidential affidavit, obtained by The Cable, in which he swears that he has no reason to believe that former Pakistani Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani had any role in the scandal known as "memogate." Jones was the go-between in the transmission of a secret memo from Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz to then Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen in the days following the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad. The memo, purportedly from the Pakistani civilian leadership, asked for U.S. government help to avoid a pending military coup in Pakistan and pledged, in return, to reorient Pakistan's foreign and national security policy to be more in line with U.S. interests. Ijaz has claimed over and over that the memo and the scheme it contained was derived and driven by Haqqani, who has since resigned over the scandal and is now in Islamabad without permission to leave the country. Ijaz also claims that that Haqqani discussed the scheme with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, who faces increasing domestic political pressure from opponents and is in Dubai due to what is being described as a recent "mini-stroke." Haqqani has always claimed that he had no role in the writing or delivery of the memo. Earlier this week, Jones broke his silence on the issue by signing a confidential affidavit about his role in "memogate," which he sent to Haqqani's lawyers as part of their planned libel suit against Ijaz. In the affidavit, Jones states that Ijaz never mentioned to him that the memo came from Haqqani. "A few days before May 9, 2011, I received a phone call from Mr. Mansoor ljaz. I have known Mr. ljaz in a personal capacity since 2006. During the call Mr. Ijaz mentioned that he had a message from the highest authority' in the Pakistan government which he asked me to relay to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen," Jones wrote in the confidential affidavit. "At no time during the call do I remember Mr. Ijaz mentioning Ambassador Haqqani, and he gave me no reason to believe that he was acting at the direction of Ambassador Haqqani, with his participation, or that Ambassador Haqqani had knowledge of the call or the contents of the

message." Jones told Ijaz he would only forward the message to Mullen if it was in writing. On May 9, Ijaz sent the unsigned memo to Jones's personal e-mail account and Jones passed it on to Mullen. Mullen has acknowledged that he received the memo but claims he gave it no credence and took no action on it whatsoever. "It was my assumption that the memo was written by Mr. Ijaz, since the memo essentially put into writing the language he had used in our telephone conversation earlier," Jones wrote in his affidavit. "I do not recall whether Mr. Ijaz claimed that Ambassador Haqqani had anything to do with the creation of the memo. I have no reason to believe that Ambassador Haqqani had any role in the creation of the memo, nor that he had any prior knowledge of the memo." The Jones affidavit will be used by Haqqani's legal team to bolster Haqqani's claims that Ijaz was the author's memo, not him. Ijaz's main evidence of Haqqani's involvement is a series of Blackberry Messenger communications that Ijaz claims he had with Haqqani to discuss the memo during its formation. Ijaz has said his Blackberry is being examined by Pakistani forensic experts as part of the ongoing investigation. Ijaz's activity throughout the scandal has raised several questions about his motives. For example, he publicly disclosed the existence of the memo in an Oct. 10 op-ed in the Financial Times, purportedly to defend Mullen from attacks and slanders in Pakistan. Then, on Oct. 22, he met in London with Pakistan's Gen. Shuja Pasha, the leader of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which Ijaz's memo promised would be replaced with new, U.S.-friendly national security leaders in Pakistan. Last week, Ijaz claimed in a Newsweek article that Haqqani and Zardari knew of the raid to kill bin Laden in advance and may have given the U.S. military tacit permission to violate Pakistani airspace. Haqqani has initiated legal action against Ijaz over those claims and the Jones affidavit is part of that litigation. In the most interesting part of the affidavit, Jones states his personal opinion that the memo probably did not come from the Pakistani government at all. "Upon my reading of the memo that I was asked to forward to Admiral Mullen, it struck me as highly unusual that the highest authority' in the Pakistan government would use Mr. ljaz, a private citizen and part-time journalist living in Europe, as a conduit for this communication," Jones wrote. "My personal opinion was that the memo was probably not credible." Asked for comment on Friday by The Cable, Jones declined to elaborate. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:24 PM Ijaz responded to Jones' affidavit with a lengthy comment to The Cable. Here are some excerpts, after the jump: On December 12, 2011, Gen. James L. Jones issued an Affidavit to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in which he, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, tried to recall the events of May 9, 10 and 11 of this year, which are the dates on which Amb. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's former ambassador to the United States, asked me to assist him in delivering a message that he dictated to me and whose content originated entirely from him to Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen. Jones was the individual who I asked to deliver Haqqani's message to the admiral. Gen. Jones and I have known each other since 2006. I consider him a friend and have learned many valuable lessons from him during the five years we've known each other. He has been a guest speaker at my charity events and I have been an overnight guest at his official home when he was NATO commander. We have published an op-ed together, ironically, in the Financial Times on the subject of Pakistan. Our families know each other, as do our spouses. He is a man of the highest possible integrity who has served the United States with unparalleled dignity and honor. But in the case of his recollections with regard to this matter, I have a friendly disagreement with him on a number of the points he raises in his affidavit...

First, Gen. Jones states in Point 3 of his affidavit, "A few days before May 9,2011, I received a phone call from Mr. Mansoor ljaz..." This is factually incorrect for a number of reasons. The only telephone number I had for Jim at that time was his home number after he left the National Security Council. A thorough review this evening of my telephone records for the only two telephone numbers I maintain (a US cell and a UK cell) shows that on neither billing statement for that time period is there a single call to Jim's home telephone number other than the one made on the morning of May 9th after Amb. Haqqani and I spoke -- in fact just after we spoke. There are no calls at all to any number I have ever had for Jim in any single day in May prior to May 9th, and indeed, not on any date for that billing cycle going back to April 21, 2011... Secondly, Jim states in Point 4 of his affidavit, "At no time during the call do I remember Mr. Ijaz mentioning Ambassador Haqqani, and he gave me no reason to believe that he was acting at the direction of Ambassador Haqqani, with his participation, or that Ambassador Haqqani had knowledge of the call or the contents of the message. I informed Mr.ljazthat I would not forward an oral message of this type to Admiral Mullen and that if he wanted anl.thing forwarded it would have to be in writing." This statement is partially correct, and can be simply corrected by looking more closely at the timeline of discussion during that call. To the best of my recollection, at the outset of the call and for much of the call, I did not mention Haqqani's name because I felt it was necessary to gauge Jim's reaction to the message content first. As his skepticism of the message grew, he asked me who this was coming from and I said, exactly as Jim has stated in Point 6 of his affidavit, that it was from the highest authority in Pakistan. His skepticism persisted, and so to avoid any view from Jim about sourcing, near the end of the call I made it clear to him that the message was originating from Haqqani. He asked me, as I have stated in my Supreme Court testimony, about my relationship with Haqqani and I gave him a very short overview. He indicated his views of Haqqani, which he repeated to me in more strongly worded terms in a recent call after the controversy erupted, and the call ended. It is important to note that I never mentioned Gen. Jones' name to Haqqani in any conversation or correspondence we had. Haqqani knew I was talking to more than one person, although it is my belief that he probably knew I would rely on Jim in the end. He certainly knew of my strong personal feelings for Jim, which I had conveyed in no uncertain terms when Haqqani took me to see President Zardari in Washington on May 5, 2009. President Zardari knew as well... Third, Jim erroneously notes that we had spoken a "day or two earlier" in Point 6. It was on that day for the first time in a very long time. Fourth, Jim notes that he assumed I wrote the memo since our conversation was reflected in it. Of course it was. But that doesn't mean the content of the Memorandum arose from that conversation. I say again, the content of the Memorandum to Adm. Mike Mullen originated entirely from Amb. Husain Haqqani. He dictated it to me and was responsible for all key edits.

Saviours indignant again (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82654&Cat=9) By Babar Sattar Memogate and immunity (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82650&Cat=9) By Huzaima Bukhari and Dr Ikramul Haq Curse of interesting times (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111216&page=1) By Najam Sethi | The Friday Times Pakistan's 'memogate' bodes ill for Zardari (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16217679) By Haroon Rashid | BBC The return of the prodigal conspirator (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\17\story_17-12-2011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Army, ISI want govt to continue, Ijaz was told (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/16/army-isi-wantgovt-to-continue-ijaz-was-told.html) Dawn Memogate unfolding (http://tribune.com.pk/story/307579/memogate-unfolding/) The Express Tribune Editorial Macaca

12-16-2011, 08:30 PM In mountain camps, Pakistani Taliban train for death (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-pakistan-taliban-idUSTRE7BD22T20111214) Saud Mehsud | Reuters Pakistan's Taliban say they have started peace talks, but in a mountain camp young recruits learn how to mount ambushes, raid military facilities and undertake the most coveted missions -- suicide bombings. "America, NATO and other countries could do nothing to us despite having nuclear weapons," said Shamim Mehsud, a senior Taliban commander training the fighters who hold AK-47 assault rifles and cover their faces with white cloth. "Our suicide bombers turn their bones into bullets, flesh into explosives and blood into petrol and bravely fight them, and they have no answer to that." On Saturday the deputy commander of the Tehrik-e-Taliban, or Taliban Movement of Pakistan, said exploratory peace talks with the U.S.-backed government were underway. Pakistan's prime minister denied this and said Pakistan would negotiate only if the group, which has been waging a four-year insurgency, laid down its arms. There are no signs they intend to do that in the camp in South Waziristan near the Afghan border. It is in unruly tribal areas like this where the umbrella group is entrenched. Taliban commanders escorted a small group of journalists, including a Reuters reporter, to the remote camp. To get there without running into army checkpoints, they drove to North Waziristan, where the army has limited control, and then walked uphill for 15 hours over rugged terrain. On the way they came across fighters from Turkmenistan, a reminder that parts of Pakistan are a global hub for militants. What they discovered at the training ground is that the Taliban are highly disciplined and determined. They rise at dawn for prayers and then have a simple breakfast of tea and flatbread before the training starts. The militants jog in the high-altitude valley, and do push-ups, somersaults and jumping to hone the skills necessary for fighting in the harsh conditions on the border. In close-quarters combat training, fighters slam each other on to the rocky ground and then spring back up and chant "God is greatest." In another drill, one of the fighters wears a uniform taken from a dead Pakistani soldier. Others sneak up, take him down and snatch his weapon. FIRED UP BY RELIGIOUS ZEAL Men such as these will face the Pakistani army, one of the biggest in the world, and are potential targets for U.S. drone aircraft missile strikes. Their rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles are no match for the firepower and technology of their enemies. But they seem unfazed by the tough odds and say they welcome death. "It is my good fortune that I have been chosen for this holy task," said a 22-year-old fighter who goes by the codename Commando. "I am eagerly awaiting my chance to wage war and sacrifice myself against the infidels." The TTP, which is allied with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, pledged to overthrow the Pakistani

government after the military started operations against militant groups in 2007. It is blamed for many of the suicide bombings across Pakistan and has carried out audacious attacks, including one on military headquarters near the capital Islamabad in 2009. The United States has labeled the TTP a terrorist group. When they are not training or praying, the fighters help carry supplies and ammunition to frontlines by mule and travel long distances to cities to buy food and other goods. To relax, they play volleyball on a makeshift court and have wrestling matches where the contestants are cheered and taunted. One wrestler was asked how he would wage war when he could not wrestle. At night they tune in to the Pashtu services of Western radio outlets and usually don't like what they hear. "Why do they call us terrorists? America is the terrorist because it drops bombs on Muslims," said a 17-year-old called Malang, or free spirit. A DVD player that is connected to a car battery offers fighters the chance to watch TTP videos of successful operations against the military. Sometimes the militants' communications radios cross signals with nearby army radios. One night the reporters overheard a conversation between the enemies. "If you are so brave come out and fight us," said one fighter. "Don't worry," a soldier replied. "We are coming."

The power of narrative (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/16/the-power-of-narrative.html) By Khalid Aziz | Dawn Still at risk (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/16/still-at-risk.html) Dawn Editorial Crimes of `honour` (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/15/crimes-of-honour.html) Dawn Editorial Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:36 PM Reporter's journey with Taliban through Pakistani tribal region shows militants' resilience (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_PAKISTAN_WALK_WITH_THE_TALIBAN? SITE=KFWB&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) By ISHTIAQ MAHSUD | Associated Press For 15 hours, we walked with Taliban fighters through territory supposedly controlled by the Pakistani army and frequently pounded by U.S. drone strikes. Avoiding roads and towns, we easily evaded soldiers and were shown recruits drilling with weapons, militant positions and - from a distance - a compound used by foreign fighters. The rare trip to South Waziristan revealed the resilience of militants in the northwestern tribal areas, some of whom are also battling American soldiers across the frontier in Afghanistan. It also demonstrated that the insurgents, who once ruled much of South Waziristan from permanent bases with many hundreds of fighters, are now largely a guerrilla force there. The Pakistani Taliban had invited three Pakistani journalists to meet its leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, at a time when splits have appeared in the movement. But Mehsud canceled, with his aides saying he was called into urgent meetings with a delegation of Afghan Taliban elders who had arrived from across the border. The trip began in the capital of North Waziristan, Miran Shah, where the Pakistan army has yet to launch an offensive despite requests from Washington. Militants, including al-Qaida and Afghan Taliban factions, are in firmer control in this region than in South Waziristan. Extremists from other countries and other areas of Pakistan were visible on the streets of the town. We then drove to the boundary with the south, and began our journey on foot, accompanied by four

fighters. South Waziristan was once home to about 500,000 people but its towns and villages are now mostly empty. The population was told to flee ahead of a major Pakistani army offensive in 2009. The army has declared victory, but most locals haven't returned. They do not believe official statements that their homeland is safe. In one abandoned village, three men were living in a single room in a ruined house. They said they couldn't leave because they had no money and two of them were blind from birth. Their sole possessions were a dirty mat and some blackened cooking pots. One, 30-year-old Mafiq, said the Taliban gave them monthly rations and sometimes cooked food. At night, we slept in empty houses. Once, we feasted on goat with about 40 fighters in a forest encampment. The Pakistani military remains in South Waziristan in force but its men are often targeted in ambushes. On the main roads there were army posts, vital for supplying the roughly 30,000 soldiers in the region. But it was easy to travel without being spotted or pursued so long as our group stayed off them. "The army is confined to the roads," said Shameem Mehsud, the operational commander of the Pakistani Taliban. "All the surrounding areas are in Taliban control." After 15 hours hiking, our group came to a semi-permanent forward position used to attack troops traveling on a main road below. About 30 fighters were armed with rocket launchers, sniper rifles and artillery. Through binoculars, Mehsud pointed out what appeared to be an anti-aircraft gun on a nearby ridge he said belonged to the Taliban. As we chatted, the army fired mortars at the position, one round landing about 50 meters (yards) away. On the return journey to the north, again on foot but using a different route, one of the fighters pointed to a collection of buildings that he said was used by fighters from Turkmenistan. He said fighters from other countries stayed at different places in the region. The tribal regions, particularly North Waziristan, have become a magnet for Muslims wanting to fight jihad or "holy war." The area is also used by Afghan militants to stage attacks inside their homeland, knowing that U.S. and NATO troops cannot enter Pakistani territory. The Pakistani army, which has several times flown reporters to South Waziristan and other Afghan border areas to show off its achievements against militants, was not available for comment on what we observed on our trip. The army offensive in South Waziristan was launched after heavy American pressure, and was followed by operations in six of the seven tribal regions along the border. But as U.S.-led forces have found in Afghanistan, holding exposed and remote territory against insurgents who know the area and can count on local support is fiendishly difficult. Eager to wipe out a safe haven for al-Qaida and protect American troops in Afghanistan, the United States has supplied Pakistan with money, weapons and expert assistance for its campaign against the militants. That cooperation has faltered badly this year amid a series of crises between the two nations, whose divergent interests in Afghanistan have proven hard to reconcile. There is no love lost between the Pakistani military and the Pakistani Taliban, which is allied to alQaida and has carried out scores of suicide bombings around the country since 2007. Some insurgent commanders in the northwest have said recently they were in peace negotiations with the Pakistani government. Militant attacks in major cities outside the northwest have been down sharply this year, a drop some have attributed to the success of army operations and the drone strikes.

The commanders in South Waziristan rejected any talk of peace. They said they would negotiate with the government only if Islamic law were implemented throughout the country, the army withdraws from the region and all Taliban prisoners are released. "Despite all their resources and atomic power, America, NATO and Pakistan cannot defeat the Taliban as our suicide bombers will use their bones as bullets, their flesh as gunpowder and their blood as fuel," Mehsud said. "They have no way to counter to this spirit." Pakistan's spy agency has been accused of aiding other militants, such as the Haqqanis and other factions in the Afghan Taliban who carry out attacks on U.S. troops across the border. CIA drones, in turn, have targeted militants with missile strikes in the Pakistani tribal regions. Although Mehsud said the militants often changed their training grounds because of fear of attack by American drones, he and his fighters didn't appear overly concerned about the missiles. There have been more than 60 such attacks this year, the vast majority in the Waziristans. At one point on the trip, the militants showed us young recruits - they called them trainee suicide bombers - exercising on a flat piece of land in a deserted village surrounded by mountains. Wearing masks, they staged the mock capture of a man wearing the uniform of a Pakistani soldier. "We will jump in the fire without any hesitation on the orders of our commander," they shouted in unison at the end.

Raw Video: Taliban training in Pakistan (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/video/raw-videotaliban-training-in-pakistan/article2271863/) Associated Press Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:46 PM Pakistan: bombs, spies and wild parties After seven tumultuous years reporting from Pakistan, Guardian correspondent Declan Walsh reflects on the inspiring figures, the jaw-dropping landscapes, the deep corruption and the day the Taliban came to town (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/15/pakistan-bombs-spies-wildparties) By Declan Walsh | The Guardian Even before you reach Pakistan there's reason to fret. "Ladies and gentlemen, we will be landing shortly, inshallah," says the Pakistan International Airlines pilot, 10 minutes outside Islamabad. To the western ear this ancient invocation literally "God willing" can be disconcerting: you pray the crew are relying on more than divine providence to set down safety. But these days it's about right Pakistan, a country buffeted by mysterious if not entirely holy forces, seems to have surrendered to its fate. Viewed from the outside, Pakistan looms as the Fukushima of fundamentalism: a volatile, treacherous place filled with frothing Islamists and double-dealing generals, leaking plutoniumgrade terrorist trouble. Forget the "world's most dangerous country" moniker, by now old hat. Look to recent coverage: "Hornet's Nest" declares this week's Economist; "The Ally from Hell" proclaims the Atlantic. Western condemnation has a moral quality, the tinge of wounded betrayal. Much of it is rooted in Afghanistan, where many blame Pakistan for the Taliban resurgence. Some years ago a senior UN official in Kabul warned me the US could launch unilateral airstrikes if Pakistan didn't get into line. Surely it would be unwise to destabilise a nuclear-armed country of 170m people, I said. "Well," he shot back grimly. "Maybe they deserve it." Yet for all the stone-throwing, hard facts are elusive. Did the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency really shelter Bin Laden? Does it control the notorious Haqqani network? Did it play a role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks? If smoking guns abound, the Pakistanis are remarkably good at wiping their fingerprints from the trigger. Instead, we are left with a murky stew of allegations, coincidences and the steamy whispers of western spies.

Perhaps the embodiment of this conundrum is Pervez Musharraf, the former military ruler once beloved of the west. In a recent interview the BBC's Stephen Sackur harangued him about Pakistani perfidy. What of the Taliban safe havens? Sackur demanded. Or the Quetta Shura? Or reports that the monocular Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, resides happily in Pakistani suburbia? Musharraf sat through the mauling, visibly bristling, then shot back. "You say it is true. I say it is all nonsense," he said, wearing his trademark wounded-puppy face. "This is a mirage. This is what people say. This is what you think." [My italics]. But what should we think conspiracy, cockup or thinly veiled chaos? Puzzling out the answers to that question has been central to my seven years reporting from Pakistan for the Guardian. Much of it was dominated by the banner dramas: bombs and political heaves, spy scandals and shootings. But there were also, I discovered, truths to be gleaned from the smaller things such as the way people drive. Pakistanis swerve into heavy traffic without looking, don't stick to their lane or indicate, which makes it hard to predict where they are coming from or going to. Social graces are rare horns honk, headlights are impatiently flashed but social hierarchy is observed: hulking four-wheel drives (increasingly armour-plated) barge through the swarms of matchbox cars. Off to the side, the police are taking bribes. But pull off the road and everything changes. Pakistanis are welcoming, generous and voluble. They insist you stay for tea, or the night. They love to gab, often with glorious indiscretion national politics and local tattle, cricket scandals, movie stars and conspiracy theories. This is fun, and good for the business of journalism. While Islam is technically the glue of society, you learn, the real bonds are forged around clans, tribes, personal contacts. To get anything done, the official route is often pointless the key is sifarish, the reference of an influential friend. Journalists use sifarish a lot; occasionally they are called on to dispense it too. Late one night, shortly after the last election, I got a surprise phone call from a ruling party official. Previously chatty and relaxed, he spoke in a loud and oddly deliberate voice. "Do you remember that place you mentioned last night the 'Cat House'?" he said. I remembered no such thing. "Well, the police have turned up," he continued. "And I was hoping you might have a word with them." Seconds later the line dropped; I didn't call back. Two days later the papers carried reports of a police raid on a speakeasy-cum-brothel in a smart part of Islamabad, called the Cathouse. They arrested Russian and Chinese women, dozens of bottles of liquor and a number of punters including a newly elected ruling party MP and his entourage, including my friend. But they were released without charge, the reports noted, after a phone call from a "higher-up" in government. I thought that was the end of the matter until a police video of the raid surfaced on the internet some months later. It showed officers storming into the Cathouse, arguing with Russian women and at, at one point, a middle-aged man in a crowded corridor, shouting into his phone. "Do you remember that place you mentioned last night?" says my friend "The Cathouse?" Such laughs have been regrettably rare. When I arrived in 2004, Islamabad was a somnolent, reliably dull city. By night, the sons of the rich drag-raced their daddies' cars along deserted streets, swerving to avoid wild boar ambling from the bushes. Foreigners mocked the capital for its provincial feel. "Islamabad half the size of a New York graveyard but twice as dead" went the diplomats' tired gag as white-gloved waiters served gin and tonic on manicured lawns. Then the Taliban came to town. It started with the bloody siege of the Red mosque complex in July 2007, just before Pakistan's 60th birthday. Bullets zipped through the leafy streets; I dusted off my flak jacket. Then came the bombs: at markets, checkposts, the Naval headquarters, UN offices, the five-star Marriott hotel. Up the street from my house, Benazir Bhutto gave speeches from behind barbed wire, during a brief-lived house arrest. Weeks later she drove out to Rawalpindi, where she was assassinated.

Today the blasts have stopped, mostly, but the city is cloistered in concrete. Fortified walls rise over the streets, vehicles slalom through elaborate checkposts, hotel entrances resemble prisons with gold-buttoned guards. Embassies are retreating into a sandbagged, Green Zone-style enclave; the presidency and even ISI headquarters are similarly isolated. That, however, is just the cosseted capital the real pain has been felt elsewhere. Pakistan has paid a high blood price for what my guardian colleague Jason Burke calls the "9/11 wars". Since 2001, up to 5,000 Pakistanis have died in more that 300 suicide attacks; the victims range from toddlers to three-star generals. Another 13,000 have been wounded. This is partly the legacy from the military's decades-old dabbling in Islamist extremism, but for most Pakistanis the culprit is America. Television shows fizz with anti-American anger; many say the "Ally from Hell" epithet applies to the US, not them. Things have never been worse: outrage at the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a murky border incident triggered a blockade on Nato supplies, the closure of a CIA drone base and the boycott of a conference on the future of Afghanistan and that's just in the last week. Washington, meanwhile, is moving to restrict $700m (450m) in aid. The relationship is beset by frustrations and misunderstandings on both sides, but the net effect is that Pakistanis are more profoundly isolated from the outside world than they have been in decades. This cannot be good. Many Pakistanis educated, ambitious, modern resent being lumped in with the terrorists. "Why don't you write about the other Pakistan?" is a frequent refrain "other" being the country of software companies, pizza dinners, effervescent art shows and quality literature. When I could, I did, with a tendency towards the counter-intuitive: the booming brewery across the street from military headquarters; the transvestite civil rights movement, the punk rock bands and oxygen bars and rambunctious polo tournaments in the heights of the Hindu Kush. But perhaps the most memorable experiences were rooted in the rich cultural and religious heritage. One of my best trips was in Sehwan Sharif in Sindh, a glorious Sufi festival on the banks of the Indus with a mesmeric mix of party and prayer a spectacle to make the head spin and the heart sing. Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:49 PM Still, there's no getting around it: Pakistan is beset with problems that no amount of jolly beer stories or whirling dervishes can remedy. It is, as a psychologist might say, a country with serious issues. Most are decades old the overweening army, the confused place of Islam, the covert support for jihad, deep-rooted corruption, the poisoned bond with America. Resolving them has never been so urgent. One reason is Afghanistan. As western troops draw down by 2014, Pakistan can help construct a stable future for the war-ravaged country or spoil a deal it dislikes. But beyond that, it is the internal stability of Pakistan that is more worrying. The country is riven by ethnic, tribal and political faultlines, which, in turn, are being exacerbated by galloping population growth and deepening poverty. Turmoil in a country with at least 120 nuclear warheads and a projected population of 300m people by 2030 could make Afghanistan look like a walk in the park. Talk of a "nuclear Somalia" is overstated, but you get the point. Yet there is little sign of revolution. As the Arab spring swept the Middle East, Pakistan was quiet because, in a sense, it already has what others are demanding: elections. The problem is that few like the results. Asif Ali Zardari, the accidental president, suffers a crippling legitimacy deficit driven by perceptions of corruption and a more fundamental struggle for supremacy. Just a few years ago the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, mused to the US ambassador about the possibility of a coup. Last week, Zardari suddenly flew to Dubai, triggering fresh speculation that such an upset was about to happen. The hype seems unfounded, and Zardari says he will soon return. But few doubt Kayani is the real power. Will ordinary Pakistanis tire of this power game? While there is no sign of a spring tide, millions of tiny waves are lapping the shores of despair. In October, Raja Khan, an unemployed man from Sindh province, travelled hundreds of miles to Islamabad. Standing outside parliament he doused himself in kerosene then struck a match. Hours later, racked with pain, the 23-year-old died. Poverty had ground him down, Khan said in a farewell note. As his coffin was nailed shut, his wife gave birth to their third son. His elderly father cried out: "Oh, Zardari, where are you?" It's not just Pakistan over the seven years foreign correspondence changed drastically, too. In

2004, the Guardian focused on UK readers; today, through the internet, our audience is at once global and intensely local. Pakistanis leap on every story, scrutinising and commenting, particularly on Twitter, a medium many have embraced with gusto. It helps to project less obvious stories, such as a feature on the appalling wave of alleged state-sponsored killings in Balochistan earlier this year. But the intriguing feedback I received came in the form of an old-fashioned letter. Charles Burman was 92 years old, a former British army signals sergeant who had fought a long forgotten colonial campaign in the tribal belt in the 1930s and 40s. In wobbly handwriting he sent a fascinating account of his experiences; Waziristan was pretty dangerous back then, too, it turns out. Not everyone liked the coverage. Fatima Bhutto, niece of the assassinated Benazir, once suggested I was "on the PPP payroll", referring to the government party; pro-government blogs suggested I was peddling the ISI line; the ISI monitored my phone calls and occasionally rang to voice its own displeasure. The US military in Afghanistan blacklisted me briefly; the Taliban called with a ransom demand for a kidnapped hostage; Pervez Musharraf threatened to sue. That was all fine multidirectional criticism is a compliment but sometimes the story came a little too close. In 2008 a Guardian fixer was abducted and tortured while investigating a story on intelligence agency abduction and torture. Last year, for a few nail-biting hours, a close friend's father was caught up in a brutal gun-attack on a mosque belonging to the minority Ahmadi community in Lahore. He survived but more than 100 others died. The bombings took a toll. A few minutes after the 2008 suicide bombing of the Marriott, a hotel where I got my hair cut and had coffee with contacts, I found myself standing in the rubble, dazed by the enormity of the atrocity. A giant crater occupied the park, staff in bloodstained uniforms stumbled through the lobby, hunting for survivors, orange flames licked the ash-laden sky. Blood squelched underfoot. Retreating outside I found a preppy looking young man sitting on the verge, staring numbly into the inferno. His name was Ehsan Peerzada and he was 19 years old, articulate and educated, the son of a senior civil servant. In other circumstances, I might have interviewed him for a story on savvy, westernised Pakistanis. Now he railed in a stream of invective against everyone Islamist extremists, Americans, drone strikes struggling to make sense of it all. "It's not fair," he mumbled. "It's not fair." It's not all darkness; away from the bang-bang, life in Pakistan can be richly rewarding. I've been humbled by inspiring figures, traversed jaw-dropping landscapes and attended some wild parties, on one occasion with a roomful of transvestites. Where else can you find yourself with a bearded, joint-rolling characters, as I once did in Peshawar, nicknamed "Mullah Omar"? Even the news can be fun. Some years ago the cricket board issued a press release detailing "genital warts" of its errant star, Shoaib Akhtar. These days, bomb stories vie for space with Veena Malik, a daring actress who appeared topless wearing nothing but a tattoo that read "ISI". Malik has denounced the pictures, claiming but of course that they are the product of conspiracy. I hoped that my reporting portrayed the rich complexity of a society that, below the surface, defies its stereotypes. But on some occasions there was just nothing to be said. A few months ago I visited a house in Rawalpindi with a giant poster over the windows, depicting a heroic warrior on a gallant white steed. The warrior was Mumtaz Qadri, the police bodyguard who gunned down the Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, last January, and this was his house. Outside, young children shouted slogans for Qadri, a curly-bearded extremist who killed Taseer because he championed the case of a poor Christian woman who had been prosecuted under the country's notorious blasphemy laws. Others joined them, protesting against Qadri's prosecution for murder. The air was thick with talk of persecution. "Qadri is a great martyr," said one man. "What he did is permitted by Islam." Then the crowd poured through the streets and on to the highway leading to Islamabad. The police closed the road and watched. The celebration of Qadri, a deluded fanatic, was deeply depressing. So was the fact that nobody dared raise their voice against his supporters, not even the government. Instead, the judge who sentenced Qadri has fled Pakistan. Aasia Bibi, the Christian at the heart of the furore, remains in jail. And Taseer's son, Shahbaz, has been kidnapped probably by Qadri sympathisers. An ugly spectacle, it betrays questions about something deeply unhealthy at the core of Pakistani society. Still, many Pakistanis have similar doubts. There is a striking amount of national introspection in a hearteningly vibrant press. But which way out of the quagmire? Imran Khan, the cricket star turned

political sensation, says he has answers. He exudes the confidence of a man who believes his time has come.But his ideas are controversial and, critics say, naive. His stance against "politics" echoes that of Musharraf a decade ago a perception he will have to work hard to dispel. People often ask the most basic question about Pakistan: will it survive? The question has been going round for decades; the naysayers inevitably silenced. Is the current situation any more precarious? The country has deep stores of resilience, but is more vulnerable to external shocks than ever before. One thing, however, is clear: inshallah may have worked until now, but it is no longer enough. Declan Walsh's book Insh'Allah Nation is out next year The jihad will be YouTubed (http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/15/the_jihad_will_be_youtubed) By Raffaello Pantucc | Foreign Policy Macaca 12-16-2011, 08:59 PM BOOK REVIEW: The Unraveling (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML17Df01.html) Reviewed by Erico Yu | Asia Times In mid-September, bomb blasts and gunfire hit the United States Embassy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in the Afghan capital, Kabul, killing seven people. According to subsequent intelligence reports, the perpetrators were from the Haqqani network, which has been funded and supported by the Pakistan government's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The Pakistani government denied the US accusations, but the tough reactions of both sides reveal the mutual mistrust and widening cleavage between the two counter-terrorism allies. It seems to be a policy contradiction for Pakistan to support US military actions in Afghanistan while maintaining its connection with radical Islamic groups in the region. Yet, according to John R Schmidt, a senior US diplomat and analyst of Pakistani politics, Pakistan's dual policy is understandable and the US must face up to the problem. In his latest book, The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad, Schmidt traces the history of Pakistani politicians who have advanced foreign policy goals by using Islamic radicals, especially in Kashmir and in Afghanistan's civil war. He tells readers of how Pakistan has become a center of regional radical Islamism not only because of its selfish leadership and poor judgment, but also because of the mistakes and miscalculations of India and the United States. This is, he cautions, "a story without heroes". Those who study Pakistan must have a comprehensive understanding of the country's feudal class structure, military affairs and Islamism. The first three chapters of the book reveal the country's unique social patronage network and traditions, exposing the complicated relationships among these three primary actors. Many civilian politicians have been locked in "a perpetual struggle" for access to national resources to serve feudal landlords. The army, on the other hand, has a more national and public interest perspective, though it lacks democratic legitimacy and the trust of the public. Although once a low-profile actor in the political arena, Islamism, especially the more fundamentalist Deobandi Sunni sect popular among the Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly North Western Frontier province) and lower-class Punjabis, has become a fertile soil for radical jihadis. Schmidt squarely blames Pakistani politicians for preparing the ground for the current ascendancy of radical Islamism, from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto sending irregular forces to help the Kashmiri Muslim uprising in the early 1960s and Zia ul-Haq's support of anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan to the deliberate institutionalization of pro-Pakistan and Pashtun majority jihadist groups - such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and later the Lashkar-e-Taiba - to serve Pakistani interests in Kashimir and in Afghanistan since the late 1980s.

Such a foreign policy reached its apex when the Taliban took over Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, which created an illusion that the strategy was effective. President George W Bush's "you're either with us or against us" stance gave Islamabad no choice but to stand on the US side, which put then-president Pervez Musharraf and his successors in a difficult situation. Given the bitter memories of the territorial dispute with Afghanistan before the 1980s and the pro-India tendencies of a politician like Hamid Karzai in office in Kabul, Pakistan hopes that the Taliban can keep their neighbor preoccupied and, therefore, less of a threat to Pakistan. As such, Pakistan's cooperation with the United States has always been limited and intermittent. The government even reached several peace agreements with radical Islamic groups and local extremists in the tribal areas while conducting military operations against them. After 2007, when Islamabad realized that jihadi groups, which provided refuge for former al-Qaeda and Taliban members fleeing from Afghanistan, became a primary threat to its own stability, it found itself outmaneuvered in the ensuing garrison warfare because of inadequate military capacities and resources. Schmidt understands these difficulties and accepts some of Pakistan's explanations. But he insists that the Pakistani leadership is largely responsible for this dire situation. The situation in Pakistan also poses a policy dilemma for the United States. On one hand, the White House has failed to press Pakistan to do more to either eradicate its domestic radical Islamism or to rein in nuclear proliferation. On the other, as indicated in Schmidt's conversations with Pakistani army officers, governmental officials, and Islamic sect leaders, there is a chronic distrust of Americans among Pakistanis. If a leader pushes too hard on the issue or gets too close to the United States, it fuels domestic anti-Americanism that undercuts his governance, as happened in the case of Musharraf. It also helps expand the influence of radical Islamism into urban areas, which encourages more US drone attacks that kill innocent Pakistanis, thereby creating a vicious circle that impedes the bilateral relationship. At a broader level, Schmidt believes that both American and Indian policies exacerbate Pakistan's sense of insecurity and contribute to its reluctance to fight jihadist groups. Although the United States played an important role in the re-launch of peace negotiations, its commitment to Pakistan's security is limited to its multi-billion dollar assistance. The United States, after all, is rapidly expanding its military and strategic relationship with India, in part to contain China. India, meanwhile, shows little willingness to withdraw militarily from Kashmir and provide autonomy status to the region under a Pakistan-India-Kashmir trilateral mechanism. Schmidt's book is rather gloomy in its forecast of Pakistan's future. Despite his pessimism and the bias provided by his years as a US diplomat, Schmidt does a credible job of analyzing the internal dynamics within Pakistan and its implications for US foreign policy. Macaca 12-16-2011, 09:05 PM Children Describe Torture Dungeon At Pakistani Madrasah (http://www.rferl.org/content/children_describe_torture_dungeon_at_pakistan_madr asah/24422014.html) By Zafar Karimi, Ron Synovitz | Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Impoverished families who sent their children to a madrasah in northern Karachi thought they were paying for drug-rehabilitation treatment and Islamic education. But children as young as 7 who lived through the ordeal say the school was a center of torture where they spent more time shackled and being beaten than receiving religious instruction. Harron, a 12-year-old boy from Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, tells RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal that the muftis at the Zakariya madrasah "brought locks and chains and put them on my legs. Only once a week would they let us out of this prison, but only for a few minutes. And that

was also in order to take a shower." Harron adds that the children were beaten, "and if we cried they would beat us more. One person used to hold down our arms, another would hold down our legs while another would flog us. They also would pour cold water on us and they would use a metal rod from a gas pipe to beat us. We used to call out, 'please, Sir Mufti, forgive us.' But he would just beat us more and more." Zainullah, a 22-year-old student from Quetta, says the basement was a dungeon-like maze of rooms with shackles and hooks mounted on the walls, and that students were kept there. "There were four people working there. Whenever our parents would come to meet us, we would come out," he adds. "But we would not tell them that they were beating us because [we were afraid that] if we would tell our parents they were beating us, they would beat us more. On the day I arrived at this madrasah, they put the chains on my legs and I remained in those chains from then on." Chained And Beaten It was complaints by children as young as 7 to their mothers that resulted in a raid by Karachi police on December 12. Police station chief Ehsanullah Marwat says his officers were shocked when they encountered the stench from the basement and found children being treated like animals. "There were 54 students in chains and 14 without chains. We arrested one mullah and four others ran away" during the raid, he says. Sher Ali is a young boy from Afghanistan who was sent by his family to the madrasah for religious instruction. The fact that his mother's brother is the owner of the madrasah did not prevent the muftis from pouring oil and water on his skin so that the beatings would hurt more. "First they were tying us down with chains and then they would put a mixture of oil and water on us. Then they would beat us," he says. "I have been here for three months and they were beating me more often than they were teaching me lessons [from the Koran]." Some Parents Condoned Beating Parents made an initial payment of about $150 to register their children, as well as a monthly payment of 6,000 Pakistani rupees (about $70). Some of the students' parents were aware of the brutal treatment and even condoned it. Niaz Muhammad, father of madrasah student Said Mohammad from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, says he hoped the mullahs at the madrasah would help wean his disobedient son off cigarettes and chewing tobacco. "My son was routinely disappearing from our home for six months at a time. I would have to send someone out to find him and bring him home," Muhammad says. "He would stay in the house for a few days, but then he would go out again and disappear." Other parents say they were aware of the way teenagers were being treated, and that they condoned it. "We brought them to the madrasah because they were not following the right path. They were not accepting God nor the Prophet [Muhammad]," says Mir Talam from Waziristan, who brought several of his boys there. "So, finally, we admitted them here and we were paying 5,000 rupees [per month] to the madrasah administrator. We gave them the chains ourselves to tie them down and to put them on the right path." Mufti Dawood Sought

Qari Usman, the one teacher detained so far by police, says a teacher named Mufti Dawood was responsible for the beatings. "You have seen that they were tied in chains by Mufti Dawood. These boys were using hashish and drinking alcohol," he says. He says the pupils were given a religious education, including Janaza funeral prayers, the Hadith collection of the sayings of the Prophet, and Fazaile Aamal, a preacher's book that teaches religious behavior. But Mufti Dawood Sahib ordered them to be chained up "because he thought that if they were not chained, they would be fighting among themselves. " Qari Usman says there were six other adult instructors at the madrasah and all who were there during the raid fled, leaving him alone to face the authorities. Zainullah says he and others who were shackled in the basement want Mufti Dawood to be hanged for subjecting them to such cruelty. Police say they do not think there is any connection between the Karachi madrasah and any Islamic militant group. They say children from the madrasah are in custody but will be released to any parents who want to take them back.

Chained children in Pakistan: Not an uncommon treatment for addicts (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2011/1214/Chained-children-in-Pakistan-Not-anuncommon-treatment-for-addicts) By Ben Arnoldy | The Christian Science Monitor Macaca 12-16-2011, 09:15 PM Bangladesh war: The article that changed history (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia16207201) By Mark Dummett | BBC On 13 June 1971, an article in the UK's Sunday Times exposed the brutality of Pakistan's suppression of the Bangladeshi uprising. It forced the reporter's family into hiding and changed history. Abdul Bari had run out of luck. Like thousands of other people in East Bengal, he had made the mistake - the fatal mistake - of running within sight of a Pakistani patrol. He was 24 years old, a slight man surrounded by soldiers. He was trembling because he was about to be shot. So starts one of the most influential pieces of South Asian journalism of the past half century. Written by Anthony Mascarenhas, a Pakistani reporter, and printed in the UK's Sunday Times, it exposed for the first time the scale of the Pakistan army's brutal campaign to suppress its breakaway eastern province in 1971. Nobody knows exactly how many people were killed, but certainly a huge number of people lost their lives. Independent researchers think that between 300,000 and 500,000 died. The Bangladesh government puts the figure at three million. The strategy failed, and Bangladeshis are now celebrating the 40th anniversary of the birth of their country. Meanwhile, the first trial of those accused of committing war crimes has recently begun in Dhaka. There is little doubt that Mascarenhas' reportage played its part in ending the war. It helped turn world opinion against Pakistan and encouraged India to play a decisive role. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the then editor of the Sunday Times, Harold Evans, that the article had shocked her so deeply it had set her "on a campaign of personal diplomacy in the European capitals and Moscow to prepare the ground for India's armed intervention," he recalled. Not that this was ever Mascarenhas' intention. He was, Evans wrote in his memoirs, "just a very good reporter doing an honest job". He was also very brave. Pakistan, at the time, was run by the military, and he knew that he would

have to get himself and his family out of the country before the story could be published - not an easy task in those days. "His mother always told him to stand up and speak the truth and be counted," Mascarenhas's widow, Yvonne, recalled (he died in 1986). "He used to tell me, put a mountain before me and I'll climb it. He was never daunted." When the war in what was then East Pakistan broke out in March 1971, Mascarenhas was a respected journalist in Karachi, the main city in the country's dominant western wing, on good terms with the country's ruling elite. He was a member of the city's small community of Goan Christians, and he and Yvonne had five children. The conflict was sparked by elections, which were won by an East Pakistani party, the Awami League, which wanted greater autonomy for the region. While the political parties and the military argued over the formation of a new government, many Bengalis became convinced that West Pakistan was deliberately blocking their ambitions. The situation started to become violent. The Awami League launched a campaign of civil disobedience, its supporters attacked many non-Bengali civilians, and the army flew in thousands of reinforcements. On the evening of 25 March it launched a pre-emptive strike against the Awami League, and other perceived opponents, including members of the intelligentsia and the Hindu community, who at that time made up about 20% of the province's 75 million people. In the first of many notorious war crimes, soldiers attacked Dhaka University, lining up and executing students and professors. Their campaign of terror then moved into the countryside, where they battled local troops who had mutinied. Initially, the plan seemed to work, and the army decided it would be a good idea to invite some Pakistani reporters to the region to show them how they had successfully dealt with the "freedom fighters". Foreign journalists had already been expelled, and Pakistan was also keen to publicise atrocities committed by the other side. Awami League supporters had massacred tens of thousands of civilians whose loyalty they suspected, a war crime that is still denied by many today in Bangladesh. Eight journalists, including Mascarenhas, were given a 10-day tour of the province. When they returned home, seven of them duly wrote what they were told to. But one of them refused. Yvonne Mascarenhas remembers him coming back distraught: "I'd never seen my husband looking in such a state. He was absolutely shocked, stressed, upset and terribly emotional," she says, speaking from her home in west London. "He told me that if he couldn't write the story of what he'd seen he'd never be able to write another word again." Clearly it would not be possible to do so in Pakistan. All newspaper articles were checked by the military censor, and Mascarenhas told his wife he was certain he would be shot if he tried. Pretending he was visiting his sick sister, Mascarenhas then travelled to London, where he headed straight to the Sunday Times and the editor's office. Evans remembers him in that meeting as having "the bearing of a military man, square-set and moustached, but appealing, almost soulful eyes and an air of profound melancholy". "He'd been shocked by the Bengali outrages in March, but he maintained that what the army was

doing was altogether worse and on a grander scale," Evans wrote. Mascarenhas told him he had been an eyewitness to a huge, systematic killing spree, and had heard army officers describe the killings as a "final solution". Evans promised to run the story, but first Yvonne and the children had to escape Karachi. They had agreed that the signal for them to start preparing for this was a telegram from Mascarenhas saying that "Ann's operation was successful". Yvonne remembers receiving the message at three the next morning. "I heard the telegram man bang at my window and I woke up my sons and I was: 'Oh my gosh, we have to go to London.' It was terrifying. I had to leave everything behind. "We could only take one suitcase each. We were crying so much it was like a funeral," she says. To avoid suspicion, Mascarenhas had to return to Pakistan before his family could leave. But as Pakistanis were only allowed one foreign flight a year, he then had to sneak out of the country by himself, crossing by land into Afghanistan. The day after the family was reunited in their new home in London, the Sunday Times published his article, under the headline "Genocide". 'Betrayal' It is such a powerful piece of reporting because Mascarenhas was clearly so well trusted by the Pakistani officers he spent time with. I have witnessed the brutality of 'kill and burn missions' as the army units, after clearing out the rebels, pursued the pogrom in the towns and villages. I have seen whole villages devastated by 'punitive action'. And in the officer's mess at night I have listened incredulously as otherwise brave and honourable men proudly chewed over the day's kill. 'How many did you get?' The answers are seared in my memory. His article was - from Pakistan's point of view - a huge betrayal and he was accused of being an enemy agent. It still denies its forces were behind such atrocities as those described by Mascarenhas, and blames Indian propaganda. However, he still maintained excellent contacts there, and in 1979 became the first journalist to reveal that Pakistan had developed nuclear weapons. In Bangladesh, of course, he is remembered more fondly, and his article is still displayed in the country's Liberation War Museum. "This was one of the most significant articles written on the war. It came out when our country was cut off, and helped inform the world of what was going on here," says Mofidul Huq, a trustee of the museum. His family, meanwhile, settled into life in a new and colder country. "People were so serious in London and nobody ever talked to us," Yvonne Mascarenhas remembers. "We were used to happy, smiley faces, it was all a bit of a change for us after Karachi. But we never regretted it." Macaca 12-16-2011, 09:20 PM Bangladeshs second chance at justice (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/oped/article2718033.ece) By David Bergman | The Hindu

Bangladeshis will come together this year to mark the nation's 40th anniversary of independence. The celebration comes at a time when the Bangladesh government, now under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, is making its second attempt to bring to account Bengalis alleged to have collaborated with the Pakistan military during the 1971 war of independence. The struggle against the Pakistan military, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, had widespread national support. However, there remained some Bengalis particularly members of Islamist parties, like the Jamaat-e-Islami who during the independence war collaborated with the Pakistan military and continued to support a unified Pakistan. Soon after the creation of Bangladesh, the new Awami League government under the leadership of Hasina's father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman passed a law which allowed for the prosecution of collaborators' both those who committed violent crimes and those who simply gave the Pakistan military their political support. The 1972 ordinance led to the arrest of more than 30,000 people (all Bangladeshis), and trials took place across the country. ALLEGATIONS, AMNESTY However, within two years, following a spate of acquittals, allegations that the trials were turning into witch-hunts and difficulties in pursuing the cases given the lack of administrative capacity, Mujib announced an amnesty for those convicted of political' crimes. Though, technically, this meant only political collaborators' were exempted, the amnesty effectively resulted in the end of all trials including those involving violent offences. Significantly absent from this first process of accountability were many of the leaders of the Jamaate-Islami and its student wing who are alleged during the war to have been the most ideologically committed collaborators and to have established their own militia called the Al Badr to assist the Pakistan military In the dying days of the war many key Jamaati leaders fled the new state of Bangladesh. Indeed, there would be little need for the second current round of trials had many of these men, including Ghulam Azam, the Jamaat's head in 1971, not returned to Bangladesh following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in August 1975 and restarted their political activities. During the subsequent 15 years of military/autocratic rule, involving severe restrictions on freedoms of expression and association, civil society groups had little opportunity to raise the issue of these men's alleged involvement in war crimes. FALL OF ERSHAD But following the fall of General Ershad's regime in 1990, and the return of political democracy, the demands were re-articulated by citizens' organisations and the families of those who had been murdered or disappeared. These demands were further spurred in response to the Jamaat's success in winning 18 parliamentary seats in the 1991 general elections. Now finally, twenty years later (during which the Jamaat completed five years in a governing coalition), Bangladesh has initiated a new process of trials for the atrocities committed during the 1971 independence war. As of today, five top leaders of the Jamaat-e-islami are detained. The trial of one of them, Delwar Hossain Sayedee, has now started. Two other leaders of the main opposition party Bangladesh Nationalist Party have also been detained, though one has obtained bail. All of them deny any involvement in war crimes. A SECOND ATTEMPT

Though far from perfect, this second attempt at seeking accountability looks like it may well be more successful than the first. Instead of attempting to prosecute thousands of people, the investigators currently have in their sights less than twenty men. The trials are taking place in a specially designated court room in front of three judges, two being from the Supreme Court. The process is relatively well organised with the local defence lawyers (advised by three British barristers who are though not allowed into the country), provided with opportunities to present their case. The Tribunal has also given a number of protections to the accused men which are not usually provided by ordinary Bangladesh courts including short periods of remand for questioning, allowing a lawyer as well as a doctor to be present in an adjacent room during interrogations, and improved medical facilities whilst in jail. In another small but significant procedural improvement, the evidence is also being transcribed contemporaneously by a stenographer. However, the Tribunal does not provide all the rights available to an accused in an ordinary Bangladesh court. Most significantly, the first amendment of the constitution precludes fundamental rights from applying to these men. Whilst the tribunal's rules of procedure incorporate many of the rights required to ensure a fair trial, it remains the case that during the pre-trial and trail process, the accused still cannot seek any remedy from the High Court or indeed any other court. Only against conviction can an appeal be made. Domestic standards aside, the tribunal is far from meeting many international standards and practices. The judges have themselves stated that they are a national tribunal prosecuting international offences.' This formulation has meant that defence arguments that invoke standards from U.N. sponsored international tribunals have had little traction so far. A CONCERN One major concern raised not only by the defence but some international observers is that the tribunal's governing law defines the offence of crimes against humanity' without a number of basic elements that are required in international law. In recent weeks Sayedee's lawyers have also criticised the lack of preparation time they have been given for the trial and questioned the legislation that requires them to provide to the prosecution all the witness statements in support of their client right at the beginning of the trial. Last week, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party issued a statement calling the tribunal a rubber-stamping body' and accusing it of being an illegal and unconstitutional process for extrajudicial persecution of political opponents.' Whilst legitimate concerns about the tribunal exist, there would appear to be nothing in the tribunal's governing law or current practice that justifies such trenchant criticism. Indeed as stated above it is an improvement in many ways from most domestic trials. Strategically, the BNP's decision also appears myopic since there is significant national support for the tribunal. However, the fact that all seven accused are prominent leaders of the opposition has raised questions about whether there is an element of political opportunism to the entire process. The government certainly has a lot to gain politically from the trials, and repeated comments from ministers about their likely outcome have exacerbated concerns about the tribunal's independence. The optics certainly do not look good. The best response to this is clear. The trial process must ensure not only that justice is done but

seen to be done. If convictions take place following an objectively fair assessment of the evidence, with all the appropriate protections and opportunities for the accused to defend themselves, objections regarding the political affiliation of the accused will have limited impact. Whether this happens of course is yet to be seen. As the trials begin, national and international observers will watch the process closely. As, of course, will the thousands of victims of war crimes, who have already waited a long time for justice.

Bangladesh days (http://tribune.com.pk/story/307578/bangladesh-days/) By Pervez Tahir | The Express Tribune Indian Army recalls 1971 victory (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indian-Army-recalls1971-victory/articleshow/11134560.cms) IANS Macaca 12-16-2011, 09:28 PM Forty Years After Its Bloody Independence, Bangladesh Looks to Its Past to Redeem Its Future (http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/12/16/forty-years-after-its-bloody-independencebangladesh-looks-to-its-past-to-redeem-its-future/) By ISHAAN THAROOR | Time Forty years ago on Dec. 16, in front of massed throngs in Dhaka, the commander of the eastern wing of the Pakistani army tendered his countrys unconditional surrender to an Indian counterpart. That act signaled the end of a brief war between the bitter foes and the liberation of East Pakistan, a territory ruled from Islamabad but separated by 1,000 miles of India, and its transformation into the independent state of Bangladesh. But while triumphant cries of Jai Bangla echoed across the new capital, they were shouted by a shell-shocked, war-ravaged people. An official in the then nascent countrys government told a TIME reporter: It is a dream come true, but you must also remember that we went through a nightmare. That nightmare more than half a year of brutal, arguably genocidal repression by the West Pakistani military against a Bengali populace seeking self-determination claimed anywhere between one and three million lives, led to some half a million rapes and roughly ten million refugees fleeing across the western border with India. By any metric, the events that birthed Bangladesh in 1971 are among the bloodiest in the post-World War Two era. Given the trauma of its founding, forty years on, Bangladesh has done fairly well for itself. Derided initially as a basket case state that spends half the year submerged under floodwaters, Bangladesh boasts development indicators superior to Pakistan, the country to which it was once unnaturally conjoined. Its economy grows at a healthy clip, boosted by one of the worlds most prominent textiles industry. Its women are among the most empowered in any Muslim-majority country. Its democracy, though at times dysfunctional, is still robust. (I last visited Dhaka when the military was the de facto ruling power, the main force behind a caretaker administration of technocrats that ostensibly were seeking to reform Bangladeshs corruption-prone political parties. They bowed out following free and fair elections and, unlike in Pakistan, the army casts a far smaller shadow over politics in Dhaka.) Yet the skeleton in Bangladeshs closet has always been the violence of 1971. As Ive written here, here and here, the country failed for decades to reckon with its traumatic past, a legacy of both domestic divisions and the exigencies of the Cold War former President George H.W. Bush, the Nixon administrations ambassador to the U.N. in 1971, denounced the Indian intervention that ended the massacres and won Bangladesh its freedom as aggression. (India was closer to the Soviet Union; neighboring Pakistan and China had warmer ties with Washington.) Many of Islamabads top military officials behind Operation Searchlight the spectral name for West Pakistans campaign of slaughter slipped away back west, exonerated by governments in Dhaka, Islamabad and New Delhi that hoped to move beyond the horrors of 1971. Others, including some of the leading Bangladeshi collaborators with West Pakistans military junta, remained and even managed to enter mainstream political life in Dhaka. One of them, Ali Ahsan Mojaheed, a leading

member of the Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party, told me in an interview in 2008 that the issue of war crimes was dead and could not be raised. But this was a past that could not be buried, at least not in a country where virtually every household can offer tales of parents lost or disappeared, sisters raped and children murdered. Its a black mark on the nation that only in the past year, with the return to power of the secularist Awami League the same party that led Bangladeshs freedom struggle in 1971 has the country made significant progress in prosecuting four decade-old atrocities. The government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina set up a tribunal and had Mojaheed and six others arrested; most have been charged with war crimes. The international community has cautiously applauded the move, though rights groups and observers have expressed concerns about Dhakas reticence to allow international mediation of the proceedings. Critics within Bangladesh say the tribunal is really a platform for Hasina to target key political opponents the Jamaat has long been allies with the Bangladesh National Party, the main opposition and a sworn Hasina foe. Haroon Habib, a Dhaka-based journalist who has contributed to TIME in the past, shrugged off these concerns on the eve of the fortieth anniversary in an op-ed in the Indian daily The Hindu: Whatever challenges the Hasina government faces today and whatever its failures and shortcomings are in delivering good governance, the trial of the perpetrators of the worst crimes against humanity is fundamental for Bangladesh. It is the answer to an aggrieved nation of countless bereaved families, widows and orphans, wounded and immobilised. It is an unfinished task which needs to be completed to remove a national stigma. Still, a tribunal is no panacea for all of Bangladeshs ills. A long history of violence and extrajudicial killings, in keeping with the brutal episodes of 1971, remains, irrespective of which government is in power. Rights groups report at least 40 people, including dissidents and opposition activists, have been disappeared since January 2010. Fingers point to the long arm and heavy hand of the governments ominously named Rapid Action Battalion, an elite police unit. To be sure, Bangladesh is hardly the only country in the region whose security forces and political elites behave with impunity. And the politics of South Asia is still tinged with a legacy of partitions, zero-sum games, existential divides and bitter conflict that simmers both within the countries there and the relations between capitals. More the shame then that the government in Islamabad has for many years attempted to wipe its hands clean off its militarys actions in 1971. A number of heartfelt, thoughtful articles written by Pakistanis recently lament their national amnesia over the Bangladesh genocide. 1971 is something of a taboo in classrooms and features little in the often conspiratorial, overheated conversation of Pakistans national media. In Bangladesh, too, knowledge of the massacres is clouded. Researchers have precious little physical, forensic evidence of the 40 year-old killings. To this day, investigators and historians struggle to come up with a clear number for those killed: Bangladesh is situated on an alluvial floodplain; its genocide victims werent interred in killing fields, but flushed away via streams and rivers into the ocean. In August 1971, as Bengali rebels resisted the West Pakistani crackdown, a TIME correspondent sent in this dispatch: The evidence of the bloodbath is all over East Pakistan. Whole sections of cities lie in ruins from shelling and aerial attacks. In Khalishpur, the northern suburb of Khulna, naked children and haggard women scavenge the rubble where their homes and shops once stood. Stretches of Chittagongs Hizari Lane and Maulana Sowkat Ali Road have been wiped out. The central bazaar in Jessore is reduced to twisted masses of corrugated tin and shattered walls. Kushtia, a city of 40,000, now looks, as a World Bank team reported, like the morning after a nuclear attack. In Dhaka, where soldiers set sections of the Old City ablaze with flamethrowers and then machinegunned thousands as they tried to escape the cordon of fire, nearly 25 blocks have been bulldozed clear, leaving open areas set incongruously amid jam-packed slums. For the benefit of foreign visitors, the army has patched up many shell holes in the walls of Dhaka University, where hundreds of students were killed. The article goes on: Commented one high U.S. official last week: It is the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in Poland.

Bangladesh must travel a long road before it can reconcile with the ghosts of its creation, but at least, four decades on, it is finally, imperfectly, taking those first steps. Macaca 12-16-2011, 09:33 PM Was there an Indian plot to break up Pakistan in 1971? (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/oped/article2721165.ece) By CHANDRASHEKHAR DASGUPTA | The Hindu The sweeping victory of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman's Awami League in the 1970 Pakistani elections was warmly received in India. The Bengalis of East Pakistan had always favoured a more cooperative approach in relations with India. New Delhi hoped for a progressive improvement in bilateral relations with a new democratic Pakistan, in which the eastern wing had its rightful representation. However, some observers questioned the possibility of bridging the vast political divide between the two wings of Pakistan. They felt that the eastern wing was likely to secede. SECESSION, OBJECTIVES In December, High Commissioner B.K. Acharya expressed a view that was widely accepted in New Delhi. He recognised the possibility of secession but argued that majority control of the Central Pakistan Government by the East Pakistanis offered the only hope of achieving India's policy objectives towards Pakistan and overcoming the stonewall resistance of West Pakistan against better ties. Moreover, a secessionist East Bengal might demand integration with West Bengal and a United Bengal and might pass under the control of pro-Chinese Marxists. Such developments would further complicate India's defence and strategic problems. Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul agreed that India should do nothing to encourage the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan but he added that it did not lie in India's hands to stop it. Much would depend on the rulers of Pakistan and the realisation by West Pakistan of the need to come to an equitable arrangement with East Pakistan. Indian officials reviewed the situation in early January. MEA Secretary S.K. Banerjee and Acharya observed that the question of a secessionist movement would arise only if the eastern wing failed to secure its six-point autonomy demand through constitutional means. Acharya observed that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples' Party, might accept the autonomy demand if he himself could be all-powerful in the western wing, or if each wing was allowed to go its own way. However, a basic point of disagreement was in regard to powers of taxation. The army would not accept an arrangement under which it would have to depend upon subventions from the provinces for its funding. R.N. Kao, the head of India's Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), said that he had received information that Mujib himself considered secession to be a definite possibility and was preparing for such an eventuality. Kao's assessment was that Mujib's hands were tied. He would either have to adopt an unyielding stand on the six-point demand or be swept aside by popular opinion. He would go through the motions of seeking implementation of the demand through constitutional means but a secessionist movement was a definite possibility. In this case, India could expect appeals for assistance in a variety of fields, including arms, money and military training. He urged that India should position itself to offer the assistance that might be requested. WHAT THE RECORDS SHOW The records show that New Delhi had no prior intention of dismembering Pakistan. However, events moved rapidly in East Pakistan. At the end of January 1971, RAW confirmed that the Awami League leadership was not very optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations on a new constitution and was preparing to launch a mass movement for an independent Bangladesh if the talks proved abortive. In early March, Tajuddin Ahmad met secretly with Deputy High Commissioner K.C. Sen Gupta, on Mujib's instructions, to explore whether India would provide political asylum and other assistance in the event of a liberation war. After consulting Delhi, Sen Gupta gave a response that was insufficiently specific to satisfy Sheikh Mujib. In mid-March, the latter repeated his appeal for assistance at this critical hour for his country, which was left with no alternative but to fight for independence. India was not taken by surprise by the Pakistani crackdown on the Bengalis on March 25. She was not prepared, however, for the savagery of the onslaught. This drew impassioned condemnation from all sections of the Indian public. It also resulted in a refugee influx on a totally unexpected and

unprecedented scale. Though border inhabitants offered unstinting hospitality to the victims of the barbaric crackdown, it became evident that economic and political stability in the border provinces would be in danger unless conditions were created for the return of the millions of refugees to their homeland. THE PLAN By the beginning of April, India's political aims had crystallised. New Delhi entertained deep apprehensions concerning a long-drawn guerrilla war in East Pakistan. It feared that a freedom struggle initially led by the moderate Awami League might eventually be taken over by pro-Chinese extremists if it dragged on for years. Thus the freedom fighters had to be assisted to bring the hostilities to the earliest possible conclusion and open military intervention might be required in the final stage. Second, conditions had to be created to enable the return of the refugees to their homes as early as possible. In the absence of a political settlement between the Awami League leadership and Islamabad, the refugees would return only to an independent Bangladesh. These cerebral reasons were powerfully reinforced by the moral outrage caused by Pakistan army atrocities and the strong public support for intervention on behalf of the victims. After March 25, Indian public opinion was unanimous in demanding that the government should extend full assistance to the Bangladesh freedom struggle. At the beginning of the year, India had hoped for a united Pakistan in which the eastern wing exercised a degree of influence proportionate to its population. The prospect of secession was viewed with some misgiving. It soon became evident, however, that secession was a very real possibility as the dominant forces in Pakistan were not prepared to accept the six-point programme. The brutal crackdown of March 25 sealed the fate of a united Pakistan. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh was inevitable after the massacre. Public sympathy for the people of Bangladesh and India's national interests demanded that full cooperation be extended to the freedom struggle in order to ensure its speedy success. The writer is a retired diplomat and author of War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48

V for Vendetta (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111216&page=13) By Fayes T Kantawala | The Friday Times Memomania to Veenamania: honour is skin deep? (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\17\story_17-12-2011_pg3_2) By Haider Shah | Daily Times Macaca 12-16-2011, 09:37 PM Bangladesh towards political stability? (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\17\story_17-12-2011_pg3_3) By Syed Kamran Hashmi | Daily Times After 40 years of its independence, Bangladesh is recognised internationally as a peaceful developing country that is wracked by constant natural disasters, including tropical cyclones and devastating floods. Unlike its parent state, Bangladesh is not identified as a nation associated with militant Islam, international terrorism, religious fundamentalism and guerrilla warfare. It is rather admired by the global community for its strict anti-terrorism stance and its support for UN peacekeeping missions. Like in Pakistan, Sunni Muslims are a clear majority in Bangladesh and comprise more than 85 percent of its population. Yet, sectarian violence among Shiites and Sunnis is uncommon, and further fragmentation of Sunnis into Wahabi, Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought is unpopular. Religious freedom of minorities, including Hindus and Christians, is also generally well preserved in Bangladesh, as opposed to Pakistan where religious freedoms are curtailed. Bangladesh too has territorial disputes with India and continues to wrangle with its giant neighbour over its northeast border districts. Nevertheless, it is determined to solve all its differences through diplomatic means and negotiations only a policy that is widely considered as appeasement in

Pakistan. Accordingly, in 2001, Bangladesh voluntarily pulled its forces back from the disputed district of Padua in Sylhet that the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) had captured from the Indian forces. Similar to the geostrategic location of Pakistan, Bangladesh is ideally placed for a proxy war with India. It is situated on the western border of Assam the far eastern state of India that has been struggling for decades for its own independence. In spite of that, Bangladesh has eschewed an aggressive military strategy and has never been involved with, or been accused of training and supporting, the local Assamese militia. In the immediate aftermath of its independence in 1971, Bangladesh desperately needed urgent financial assistance. Its losses were huge. It had not yet recovered from the devastating floods of 1970 that had killed almost 250,000 people, when that was immediately followed by the loss of millions of lives in the war of independence. Its hope of any financial independence had also dwindled when demand for jute (the golden fibre) the largest cash crop and major export of Bangladesh plummeted internationally and was replaced by demand for polyethylene internationally. At the time, India had provided Bangladesh $ 232 million in foreign aid. To add to other woes, Bangladesh was also one of the most densely populated countries of the world. It had a population of 71 million to impede its developing economy that was growing at 7 percent annually. The population of Pakistan in 1971 was 68 million. Through decades of focused struggle to educate and empower Bengali women, the country managed to control the population explosion, and population growth rate has dropped to 1.29 percent with a current population level of 156 million. In comparison, Pakistan has a growth rate of 1.6 percent and a total population of 187 million in 2011. The literacy rate in Bangladesh is also comparable to Pakistan close to 60 percent. But the difference is in gender disparity in literacy rates. Bangladeshs literacy disparity between males and females is 10 percent, whilst Pakistans is 30 percent. The economy of Bangladesh is expected to grow at 6.5 percent for the next five years according to a World Bank report. It is directly associated with the growth in its garments industry that is averaging 20 percent per year. Even though it does not produce cotton, Bangladesh has become the third largest exporter of readymade garments in the world, just behind China and Turkey. Its $ 15 billion garment sector accounts for 80 percent of total exports and employs 3.5 million people. However, military dictatorships and extra-constitutional administrative measures have blemished the political stability of Bangladesh. The latest blow was the declaration of emergency in 2007. The emergency delayed elections by two years in order to launch a major crackdown operation against corruption. But once the bureaucratic martial law was lifted, the people of Bangladesh voted once again for the same political parties. They elected the Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, with more than two-thirds majority in parliament. This time, the political administration has taken some courageous steps to strengthen the democratic process and has tried and executed five ex-army officers for the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The country has also established a tribunal with international assistance (in the interests of transparency) to prosecute the seven people who are charged with war crimes in Bangladesh during its war of independence in 1971. If these trials are conducted independently and bring a just verdict, then it is very likely that Bangladesh will turn the page towards political stability and depart permanently from the era of political turmoil. Macaca 12-17-2011, 07:14 PM Hazy Trail To Dacca Some basic, erroneous ideas about the 71 Indo-Pak war need to be deflated (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279341) By SRINATH RAGHAVAN | Outlook India Indias war with Pakistan in 1971 was the most important strategic event in South Asia since the subcontinents Partition. Few wars in contemporary history have had such ramified and lasting consequences. In a very real sense, South Asia is still coming to terms with the tectonic shifts of that crucial, crisis-ridden year. Unsurprisingly, popular understandings of the war remain mired in

myths and contested claims on all sides. Four decades on, with the benefit of hindsight and greater access to key sources, we can tell more nuanced accounts of the events of 1971 and Indias role therein. Indeed, an entire herd of sacred cows can be driven to the abattoir. For starters, consider the popular assumption that India prevailed because it pursued a clear and well thought out strategy. The evidence now available shows that there was no such strategy. The Indian leadership, essentially, felt its way through the crisis. Many of their strategic assumptions turned out to be wrong, forcing them to improvise as the crisis wore on. A short-list of the more crucial mistakes would need to include the assessment in February-March 1971 that the Pakistan army would not use force to resolve the political impasse; the assumption thereafter that the Bengali fighters could by themselves tie down the Pakistani forces; the notion that the provisional government of Bangladesh would be a unified and pliable ally; the anticipation of political support from major non-aligned countries; the expectation that the Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council would provide adequate cover for India to accomplish its military objectives. This is not to draw up an indictment of Indias handling of the crisis. It would have been somewhat astonishing if the Indian leadership had avoided such missteps while making decisions under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty and pressure of time. But we now know that Indira Gandhi and her advisors did not possess the strategic omniscience that has been attributed to them. A corollary to this is the fixation in public memory with Indira Gandhi, P.N. Haksar and General Sam Manekshaw. They undoubtedly deserve much credit. But the record also highlights the important role of other individuals. Foreign minister Swaran Singh was indefatigable in his diplomatic efforts to canvass support for India. When war broke, he also played a crucial role at the UN Security Council to ensure that Indias standing was not adversely affected. Defence minister Jagjivan Ram provided steady political direction for the war effort and showed considerable acumen and tact in keeping the friction amongst the three services to a minimum. Several military commanders down the chain most notably, Lieutenant General Sagat Singhbrilliantly seized fleeting opportunities on the battlefield to enable the capture of Dhaka. Self-congratulatory Indian accounts routinely claim that the war began on December 3, 1971, with Pakistani air-strikes in the west. It is time we dropped this morally comforting but spurious story. From November 21 onwards, Indian forces were making strong forays into East Pakistan, designed to capture and hold territory. New Delhi had decided on December 4 as the D-Day for launching an all-out war in the east. The Indian leadership was hugely relieved when Pakistan launched its airstrikes a day earlier. For New Delhi could now argue that war had been triggered by Pakistan. Misconceptions about Indias handling of the crisis have been compounded by erroneous assumptions about the role of external powers. The Nixon administration was loath to turn the screws on Yahya Khan and believed that India was aggravating the situation. But the extent of Nixon and Kissingers antipathy to India tends to be overstated. After his famous visit to Beijing in July 1971, Kissinger told the Indian envoy, L.K. Jha, that if India started a war against Pakistan which would lead to Chinese involvement, the US would not come to its assistance. But Kissinger also clarified that if either China or Pakistan launched an unprovoked attack, India could expect American support. Once war began, Nixon and Kissinger feared that India would also attack and dismember West Pakistan. This led them initially to urge the Chinese to make some military moves on their borders with India and then to dispatch an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal. It is now clear that India had no designs in the west beyond securing small readjustments to the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Nixons moves were, however, based on a wrong intelligence input about Indias plans in the western sector. Such misperceptions are all too common in international crises. By contrast, Indian assessment of the Soviet Unions role tends to border on the sentimental. In many quarters, 1971 continues to be seen as the apogee of Indo-Soviet cooperation, symbolised by the treaty of August 1971. But the treaty was not the product of a strategic consensus between India and the Soviet Union on the crisis. The Russians were averse to the fracturing of Pakistan. They believed that a break-away East Pakistan would be vulnerable to the influence of China. If the crisis turned into an India-Pakistan conflict, the resulting instability would redound to Chinas advantage. Moscow sought to adopt a careful equipoise between India and Pakistan, urging restraint on the former while prodding the latter towards a political settlement in East Pakistan.

Indian officials were deeply concerned about the Soviet stance. In order to secure Moscows support, they suggested dusting off an old draft treaty and concluding an accord with the USSR. The treaty had originally been proposed by Moscow following the Sino-Soviet military clashes in early 1969. Indira Gandhi had refrained from signing it owing to concerns about the domestic fallout and implications for Indias policy of non-alignment. The idea was revived in May 1971 by the Indian ambassador in Moscow, D.P. Dhar. But Mrs Gandhi came around to it only after Kissingers meeting with Jha, which underscored the need to secure a strong deterrent against China in the event of war. To Mrs Gandhis consternation, the Soviet stance on the crisis did not shift even after the treaty was inked. Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko told her that it would be very good if your government continues the restraint and regards the situation in a cold-blooded way. During her visit to Moscow at the end of October 1971, Mrs Gandhi did some plain talking to her hosts. Only thereafter did the Soviet position gradually and reluctantly begin to change. Then too, it was because of their assessment that president Yahya Khan was making no serious moves towards a political settlement. Chinas role is perhaps the most misunderstood. Beijing was vociferous in its criticism of India throughout the crisis. But contrary to conventional wisdom, it did not extend unequivocal support to Pakistan. As early as April 1971, Beijing urged Yahya Khan to moderate the armys campaign in East Pakistan, improve relations with the Bengalis, and work towards a political settlement. Prolonged instability in East Pakistan would set the stage for an Indian intervention. However, the Chinese were careful to avoid any suggestion that they might come to Pakistans aid in a war with India. Beijings caution stemmed from their concern about the strong Soviet military presence along their borders. Besides, following the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong was keen to trim the Peoples Republican Armys role and institutional importance. A military crisis was undesirable from this perspective too. When a Pakistani delegation led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Beijing in early November 1971, the Chinese were not much more forthcoming. Premier Zhou Enlai made some sensible suggestions on how Pakistan ought to react if India attacked, but did not volunteer any direct military help. China would only offer political and economic support as well as some defence equipment. On returning to Pakistan, Bhutto gave a public statement asserting that China had assured Pakistan of its support in the event of an attack by India. But the Indian charge daffaires in Beijing, Brajesh Mishra, sent an astute message that the Chinese had no intention of embroiling themselves in an India-Pakistan war. The decks were cleared for the Indian military intervention. Much of the received wisdom on 1971, then, can be challenged and revised. But the subject will continue to excite full-throated controversy, not least because we are still living with its consequences. Major wars in history invariably become major wars of history. And for historians, the war of 1971 has barely begun. Srinath Raghavan is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. His book on the 1971 crisis will be published next year.

1971: East Bengal revisited (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\18\story_18-122011_pg3_4) By Lal Khan | Daily Times Red steps to reminiscences (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/red-steps-toreminiscences/889026/) By Shombit Sengupta | Indian Express The liberation of East Pakistan: A reporter's diary (http://www.rediff.com/news/special/theliberation-of-east-pakistan-a-reporters-diary/20111216.htm) By Prem Prakash | Rediff The more things change (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/17/the-more-things-change.html) By Abbas Nasir | Dawn Macaca 12-17-2011, 07:20 PM Personal accounts of 1971 (http://tribune.com.pk/story/307590/personal-accounts-of-1971-3/) By Ajmal Kamal | The Express Tribune Mohammad Siddiq Bilwani, the author of the book with the twin title Bilwani ka Andaz-e Bayan and Main ne Dekha Suqoot-e Dhaka was born in Bantva, a small town of the princely state of

Manavadar, located in Kathiawar, Gujarat. He was running a family business in the South Indian city of Mysore when the Partition of 1947 happened. He played an active role in bringing his family and valuables to the safety of Karachi and then went back to his native town to dispose of the immoveable assets and transfer the familys capital to the capital city of the new state. His family, like other business clans of Gujarat Khoja, Bohra, Memon, Kutchi and Ithna Ashri quickly resumed their businesses in various places in Pakistan. He went on to expand his business to East Pakistan as early as the 1950s and his business involvement continued till the last days of united Pakistan. Trying to discover Bilwanis personality and thinking is useful as his experiences in an active practical life have informed his view of the long series of events that led to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state. For example, it is hardly surprising that he often looks at the traumatic days of the civil war in the eastern part in comparison with the similar days of 1947-48, during which communal riots, tension, a two-way transfer of population, division of assets between the two states and transfer of private capital took place. He is of the firm opinion that the 1971 civil war was much bloodier and more destructive than the events around the Partition. He observes that while some specific areas Punjab, Bengal and Bihar were vastly and tragically hit by killings, rape and looting, other parts of the subcontinent such as Sindh, Gujarat, large parts of UP and CP and almost the entire southern subcontinent remained relatively calm although passions were high and so was communal tension. He recalls the experience of his biradari and other biradaris from Kathiawar and other parts of Gujarat that were able to not only safely bring their member families to the new state but also to transfer their capital to start their life again in the new state. (It should not be forgotten here that many such business clans were already settled in the areas that came to become Pakistan from the colonial days, mostly the late 19th and early 20th centuries.) Bilwani notes that in 1947, the two states had been able to facilitate transfer of cash, assets and private capital. He mentions the name of a fellow Gujarati, HM Patel, who represented Pakistan on the committee overseeing the division of office equipment and furniture on a 80:20 ratio between the newly-born states of India and Pakistan. On the other hand, the level of mutual hatred and hostility between the parties involved in the civil war of East Pakistan in 1971, was much higher and engulfed the entire area now forming Bangadesh. A very large number of people were killed and maimed at the hands of the Pakistani armed forces, militias and police; the rebel Bengali members of these forces, state-supported razakar outfits (such as alBadr and alShams having a Bengali and Bihari membership), indigenous and India-trained bahinis (the most famous being the Mukti Bahini) and sundry lawless elements working on their own. The industrialists and tea-planters, who had their business base in West Pakistan, had to leave all their immoveable assets without any compensation (except the large amounts of cash that they were able to withdraw from banks and smuggle to West Pakistan before withdrawals were banned by the Awami League). Bilwani describes how the Gujarati business clans Adamjee, Dadabhoy and many less known ones from West Pakistan had invested in the eastern wing in jute, paper and other industries and tea plantations, which they lost in 1971 (Kutchi Memons had large businesses in Calcutta and Burma, which they were able to shift to East Pakistan after 1947, but they, too, lost everything. Since they had little business presence in West Pakistan, they were hit harder than other business communities). All these industrial and business interests were officially taken over by the Bangladesh government, because of the widely-held and realistic view that these export-oriented industries and businesses had resulted in gross economic exploitation of East Bengal, as almost the entire foreign exchange earned through them was routinely allocated to West Pakistan and this practice had continued throughout the life of the two wings together. Bilwani, too, notes in passing that the miserable condition of the infrastructure in East Pakistan showed how little was invested there. Any protests on the continuation of the practice of economic, political and cultural exploitation were suppressed by exercising brutal force. The heartless and greedy policies devised and cruelly imposed by the ruling classes of West Pakistan with the support of the civil and khaki bureaucracy resulted in a huge human misery on all levels. Bilwani mentions how he made several trips to East Pakistan during the war. One such visit he undertook on March 23, 1971 when East Pakistan was on the verge of being hit hard by Operation Searchlight when, on his arrival in Dhaka on his way to Chittagong, he saw Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (separately) who were preparing to leave for home. He describes

his 130-mile-long road journey through Sitakund, Koni, Daudhundi, Comilla to Chittagong, which was taken over by the Mukti Bahini a couple of days later. A little more than 300 men of the Baloch Regiment of the Pakistan Army got besieged in the cantonment; they were rescued by their colleagues from Comilla cantonment after about a week and the town came back under the nominal control of the Pakistani forces. The Bihari settlements of Wireless Colony, Sholaset and Pahartali were besieged from all sides and supply of food and other essential items was cut off. The Biharis were all but abandoned by those who they had supported. Dilip Kumar, Raj Kapoor's ancestral homes in Pakistan to get heritage status (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Dilip-Kumar-Raj-Kapoors-ancestral-homes-inPakistan-to-get-heritage-status/articleshow/11147643.cms) Press Trust Of India Pak Hindus ask for refugee status or citizenship from India (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pak-hindus-ask-for-refugee-status-or-citizenship-fromindia/20111216.htm) Press Trust Of India Hackistan: Indo-Pak rivalry takes on new frontiers (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/17/hackistanindo-pak-rivalry-takes-on-new-frontiers.html) Spider Magazine Macaca 12-17-2011, 07:33 PM Revisiting 1971 (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82489&Cat=9) By Javed Jabbar | The News Beginning with 1971, on every Dec 16 a wound reopens in the psyche of Pakistan and causes piercing pain. Forty years ago on this day, a unique vision for a nation-state became a traumatic vivisection. East Pakistan seceded with decisive Indian help to become Bangladesh. Even as remembrance brings grief and the conditions in todays Pakistan demand renewal rather than regression, the need to revisit some aspects of 1971 remains critical. Some elements which comprise the catastrophic failures of both the political and military leaderships after the polls of December 1970 in West and in East Pakistan are established truths that require no revision One of the major facets that deserves reappraisal is the charge of genocide allegedly conducted by the armed forces of Pakistan, by Biharis and West Pakistanis seeking to exterminate the Bengali people of Bangladesh, particularly the Hindu population and supporters of the Awami League. Over the past 40 years this accusation has been repeated so often in Bangladesh and India and in Western discourse that it has come to be accepted as truth. Specifically, it is claimed that in the period between March 16 and Dec 16, 1971, about three million people were killed and between 200,000 and 300,000 women were raped. No evidence has ever been offered as to how a mere 45,000 Pakistani troops scattered in small formations across the province, dealing with a domestic insurgency, facing the prospect of an Indian invasion, short of supplies, without using any poison gas or weapons of mass destruction could achieve this incredibly high number of casualties. (The 90,000 Pakistani prisoners-of-war included over 50,000 civilians.) According to this fabricated story, in only about 262 days, on every single day, over 11,000 people were killed and over 1,000 women were raped. This bizarre fantasy has become a calumny which maligns both the people and the state of Pakistan, as well as the countrys armed forces and the Bihari Pakistanis, tens of thousands of whom still languish in Dhaka as Pakistanis abandoned by their own country. The falsehood is part of the history of the liberation of Bangladesh fed into the minds of millions of young children in that country, who grow up with the conviction that massive, merciless evil was perpetrated by Pakistanis. Leading journals, newspapers and favourably reviewed books around the world repeat the charge of genocide ad nauseam. In some instances, in those nine months, some sections of Pakistans armed forces did commit atrocities. These include the attack on Jagannath Hall in Dhaka University on March 25, and subsequently in the villages and areas of Shankaripura, Jinjira, Tangail, Thanapara, Chuknagar and Boriotola. There was also the inexplicable murder of intellectuals on Dec 15 in Dhaka, apparently by pro-Pakistani militias. In cruel counterpoint, mass killings of West Pakistanis and Biharis took place in Joydevpur/Gazipur, twice (1971 and 1972) in Khulna Jute Mills, Mymensingh, Santahar and Kushtia. Hundreds of West

Pakistani army officers, soldiers and families were killed by their Bengali colleagues during the mutinies. If the factually supported versions are noted, which estimate that the total number of persons of all categories and from all sides killed in the conflict were between 100,000 and 200,000, then it is likely that as many West Pakistanis and non-Bengalis perished in 1971 as did Bengalis. If apologies are to be tendered, as they certainly should be, there are strong grounds for mutual apologies, if not simultaneously then consecutively. Though Pakistan was fighting both a civil war and an external war, it should take the first step, with the understanding that the gesture will be reciprocated. To revisit this facet is not to morbidly dig up graves and play a perverse blame game of numbers. There is profound sacredness to every human life and to the dignity of every human body. To raise this is not to diminish our affection and respect for the people of Bangladesh, our very own brothers and sisters, although alas now separated. It is to reiterate our shared reverence and search for truth and justice. Of all the studies this writer has read about this element of 1971, the book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War by Indian Hindu Bengali writer Sarmila Bose, a senior research fellow at Oxford University, represents the most carefully researched, unusually balanced and searingly evocative analysis of this tragedy. (Oxford University Press, 2011.) Here are just two excerpts. There are reports that having publicly stated that three million Bengalis had been killed on the basis of what he had apparently been told after his release from imprisonment Sheikh Mujib tried to establish the necessary evidence for it by setting up a committee of inquiry in January 1972. No further information appears to be available on the work of the inquiry committee or its findings. None of the popular assertions of three million Bengalis allegedly killed by the army cites any official report. In a report published in The Guardian entitled The missing millions on 6 June, 1972, William Drummond wrote: This figure of three million deaths, which the Sheikh has repeated several times since he returned to Bangladesh in early January, has been carried uncritically in sections of the world press. Through repetition such a claim gains a validity of its own and gradually evolves from assertion to fact needing no attribution. My judgement, based on numerous trips around Bangladesh and extensive discussions with many people at the village level as well as in the government, is that the three million deaths figure is an exaggeration so gross as to be absurd. (Page 176) Yet, many Hindus were also left unharmed by the Pakistan army during 1971. As the witness accounts in Chapter 6 show, many Hindu refugees were leaving their villages and fleeing to India not because of any action of the army, but because they could no longer bear the persecution by their Bengali Muslim neighbours. Much of the harassment of Hindus by their fellow-Bengalis appears to have been non-political, motivated by material greed. The intimidations, killing and hounding out of Hindus whether by the army or by Bengali Muslims amounted to what has later come to be termed ethnic cleansing. (Page 182) To reach the ideal of a jointly-written history of 1971 some day, sustained new efforts are required to build a closer, more constructive, rational and evidence-based dialogue between Bangladesh and Pakistan. The writer is a former minister and senator Pakistan and Bangladesh: estranged siblings I (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\16\story_16-12-2011_pg3_6) By Javed Jabbar | Daily Times Pakistan and Bangladesh: estranged siblings II (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\17\story_17-12-2011_pg3_5) By Javed Jabbar | Daily Times Macaca 12-17-2011, 07:50 PM Truth be told (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82933&Cat=9) By Sana Bucha | The News

Theres been a startling moment in Pakistans foreign policy a moment that not only crystallizes what this country is about but demonstrates the pitfalls of irregular combat in the age of terror. The moment was tragic and deliberate a Nato air strike that left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead on a Pakistani base called Salala. Our time with the US has since been reset. Americas just beginning to see Pakistans newer tougher face but is it because we have understood the value of life? Not so. Ten years and 45,000 deaths after it began, the war on terror still commands support at home and backing from abroad mainly from the Obama administration. However, with rising scepticism on a national level and Pakistans questionable policy on drones, its sovereignty and aid, we find ourselves in the middle of a vigorous debate about where our country is headed. About time Id say. The US war in Afghanistan has deeply affected Pakistan. Mere centimetres away from becoming a failed state itself, Pakistan is trying to disentangle itself from a failed war by raising a new slogan: Give Peace A Chance. In other words, the Pakistan government will talk to the Taliban those who wage jihad against their own people because theyre miffed at the US. I wonder what that means. Will we engage with them on an ideological level? Explaining why killing innocent Pakistanis in mosques, shops and schools is immoral or will we plead with them to spare us? I dont quite remember how we got it into our heads that jihad was inextricably linked to violence. Might it have something to do with the actual history and practices of the Taliban? Lets face it: until and unless we abandon the false narrative of jihad as the necessary defence of a desperate land beleaguered by bad guys, we will be in serious danger. Think the only danger for Pakistan is along its border with Afghanistan? Wrong. Theres a longstanding calamity that is waiting to erupt. If it does, the resulting conflict stands to be more devastating than Pakistan has ever known. The clock for this crisis started ticking in 1970. Balochistan: Pakistans aggrieved province. Pakistans forty percent where often dead, seldom alive; predominantly mutilated and bullet-riddled bodies of Baloch citizens resurface so frequently that its considered quite usual. What isnt normal however is that no one wants to talk about it. There are no in-camera briefings within parliament to curb the crisis. DG ISI doesnt offer his resignation on not being able to detect outside influence that leaves so many of his own people dead. The president doesnt issue a statement on how he will tackle the extensive and lengthening grievances of the province. Senior journalists dont burn the midnight oil investigating the reasons behind such atrocities. No man, known for his publicity stunts abroad, writes in the Financial Times to unveil the conspiracy whether hatched in the presidency or elsewhere. Moreover, ambassadors are not summoned to Pakistans foreign office and asked for their opinion on how to view Balochistan. Instead, over a few cups of tea and an elaborate lunch, Pakistans future in another country is discussed. How to view Afghanistan is the question. Balochistan. Who cares? Hows that for priority? Speaking of priorities, it seems that Pakistans myriad problems ranging from inflation, to lack of law and order have suddenly taken a back seat. There is only one problem that has Pakistans democracy and autocracy at loggerheads Memogate. Bless Mansoor Ijaz for being the one to distract this nation from real concerns. It started off with Husain Haqqani dictating a memorandum that was delivered to the US government through Mansoor Ijaz, to save the democratic government from a potential army coup. It was later discovered that the military establishment was already rounding up Saudi support for a potential regime change. The debate instead of focusing on Pakistans fledgling democracy and the risk it faces from its own military has shifted to whether Mr Mansoors word will hold true against the new revelations made by General James Jones. No one is really concerned why Nawaz Sharif moved the Supreme Court on the issue, or whether ordering Husain Haqqani to be put on the ECL before even hearing him out was fair or not. Clearly, even when faced with the most important of issues, we usually keep ourselves occupied with the stupidest ones. Whether this will set the stage for the ouster of this government remains to be seen, but no one is addressing who could want the government out. If the memorandum was indeed penned to woo the admiral for the sake of democracy, why is there no word of support from the democratists in the government? Was the military planning on overthrowing the government or not? If the boys in uniform decide to remain mum as is expected why is the government silent?

If indeed there was fear that this government was going to be sent off packing, why not say it. Its now or never. But even Memogate had its moment of rest. Pakistani actress Veena Malik posed on the cover of an Indian magazine in all her glory, sporting an ISI tattoo on her left arm. The Pakistani media was on the story pronto. From the proverbial mullah to the interior minister it seemed everyone wanted to comment on this obscenity. Before we knew it, Veenas act was pronounced un-Islamic 100 lashes was one proscribed punishment while other respectable nationals filed a petition in court to revoke Veenas nationality. If a woman who wilfully sheds her clothes needs an Islamic awakening, then what do women and young girls throughout Pakistan who are forced into doing the same deserve? In Fata, women IDPs were forced to have sex in return for a handful of rice. Meanwhile, in Sindh more than 300 women fell prey to karo-kari last year. Not a word from the religious or the ghairatmand of Pakistan. Women all over Pakistan are subjected to sexual abuse and our national integrity remains in place. Moreover, an active and thriving blue cinema industry in the country and regular visits to porn sites makes us a proud nation. I dont know whether to laugh or cry when Pakistanis defend honour by burying it six feet under. We want our sovereignty to be respected but dont mind harbouring foreign terrorists. We want rule of law but we dont hold accountable the people charged with upholding it. We want democracy but we cut dictators more slack. We want honesty but will pick and choose our own truth. Maybe then, we deserve what we get.

Who wrote it? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82934&Cat=9) By Farrukh Saleem | The News Claims and counter-claims (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\18\story_18-122011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Dial M for Memo (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308044/dial-m-for-memo/) By Fahd Husain | The Express Tribune Memogate unfolding (http://tribune.com.pk/story/307579/memogate-unfolding/) The Express Tribune Editorial Memogate: the game changes? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308027/memogate-the-gamechanges/) The Express Tribune Editorial Pakistans memo scandal pits military against Zardari government (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistans-memo-scandal-pits-military-againstzardari-government/2011/12/16/gIQAgDdFyO_story.html) By Simon Denyer | The Washington Post The venom of false beliefs (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82936&Cat=9) By S Iftikhar Murshed | The News Iraq, a War Obama Didnt Want, Shaped His Foreign Policy (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/us/politics/iraq-war-shaped-obamas-foreign-policy-whitehouse-memo.html) By MARK LANDLER | The New York Times PAKISTAN ARMY: US TOP-MOST MILITARY COMMANDER EXPRESSES DISILLUSIONMENT (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4817.html) By Subhash Kapila | South Asia Analysis Group No respite (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\18\story_18-12-2011_pg3_2) By Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur | Daily Times Macaca 12-17-2011, 07:59 PM Children of the Taliban (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/17/children-of-the-taliban.html) By Irfan Husain | Dawn ACCORDING to a recent report, the Afghan Taliban have reached an agreement with the Karzai government that will end their attacks on schools and teachers. In return, the education department will have the curriculum vetted and approved by the extremist group that will also have a say in the selection of teachers. The Pakistani Taliban have a much simpler education policy: they just blow up school buildings,

paying especial attention to girls schools and colleges. To further discourage parents from trying to educate their kids, these zealots kill and kidnap them at every opportunity. These are the people we are supposed to negotiate with, according to large sections of our political class and right-wing media. But whenever reports of talks between the Taliban and the government do the rounds, they are firmly repudiated by the terrorists who repeat their mantra of no talks until their interpretation of Sharia law is imposed across the whole country. So basically, they are demanding that we surrender before any negotiations can take place. According to their calculus, by constantly slaughtering unarmed civilians and attacking state institutions, they will weaken the will of the government as well as the population to resist. Thus far, their estimation of the establishments stomach for the struggle has not been far wrong: witness the abject position our politicians and administration took when they handed over Swat to the terrorist group headed by Maulana Fazlullah. Had not these criminals overreached, they might still have been terrorising Swat. The reason for the Talibans rejection of all modern education is that they want to drag us down to their level of ignorance. The violent Nigerian group Boku Haram stands for a similar degree of backwardness. They shroud their demands for a retreat to the distant past by claiming that they want to restore the golden era of early Islam. But the real reason is that these holy warriors have been brainwashed into believing that everything modern and scientific is un-Islamic. In reality, they feel bypassed and inadequate in the globalised world of the 21st century. We must never lose sight of the fact that religion has nothing to do with the ongoing struggle: the fight is, and always has been, about power. It is also true that most Muslim countries have failed to put forward a consistent counter-narrative by their generally shambolic performance. This absence of good governance has given the extremists greater appeal than they deserve. Having said this, let us not forget what a disaster the Taliban were when they were in power in Afghanistan. They not only isolated their country by their stone-age approach to government, they gave religion a bad name by their brutal treatment of women and the non-Pashtun minorities. In Pakistan, we have the example of the alliance of the Islamic parties who governed the then NWFP province under Musharrafs regime, having come to power with his help. Widely seen as corrupt and ineffective, they opened the doors to further extremism. More than anything else, we should deplore the Talibans benighted attitude towards education. By banning girls from going to school, and imposing their barbaric worldview on learning, they wish to consign future generations to the same ignorance they revel in. Politicians like Imran Khan should ask themselves if they would like their children to grow up and be educated under a Taliban dispensation. Despite their ignorance, they understand that to exercise total control over a subject population, you have to control what the younger generation absorb. In the mediaeval era, the Church recognised this truth and staffed schools with priests. Only the arrival of the Enlightenment wrested control of learning from the papacy. Among so much else, children educated in madressahs are denied any knowledge about the wonders of the universe. Who, for instance, will teach them about the implications of the possible discovery of the Higgs boson, recently announced by the director of the Large Hadron Collider at Cern? To convey the excitement the increasing probability of a breakthrough has generated in the scientific community, here is Lawrence M Krauss, cosmologist at the Arizona State University, quoted in the New York Times: If the Higgs is discovered, it will represent perhaps one of the greatest triumphs of the human

intellect in recent memory, vindicating 50 years of the building of one of the greatest theoretical edifices in all of science, and requiring the building of the most complicated machine that has ever been built. One of those who contributed significantly to the building of this theoretical edifice was Prof Abdus Salam, the Pakistani physicist who was honoured for his work with a Nobel Prize. In Pakistan, he was largely ignored by a reactionary establishment that was rabidly hostile towards his Ahmadi belief. How could one discuss the discovery of the Earth-like planet 600 light-years away with a graduate of a madressah? Kepler-22b is the most likely candidate for a world that might sustain life found so far. This has been a fruitful year for scientists searching the skies for extra-terrestrial planets, and over 1,000 have now been identified. But for me, the most exciting scientific possibility of the year has been the report that certain particles might have travelled faster than light. The controversial experiment has been repeated with similar results, and should it be confirmed, it will have enormous implications for the tested theory of relativity and our view of how the universe is constructed. One of the fundamentals of the theory postulates that nothing can travel faster than light. And thus far, all research and experience seemed to confirm this law of physics. But researchers who reported their findings recently might force a re-valuation of what has been taken as gospel for decades. One possible explanation for this aberration is that these neutrinos might have jumped into another dimension through which the path to the point of observation is shorter giving the illusion of supralight travel. Sadly, all these wonders will be denied to children brought up and educated under the Taliban and their ilk. Those who want us to share power with them need to think again.

Deconstructing Imran Khans Taliban narrative I (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011%5C11%5C12%5Cstory_12-11-2011_pg3_4) By Farhat Taj | Daily Times Deconstructing Imran Khans Taliban narrative II (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011%5C11%5C19%5Cstory_19-11-2011_pg3_4) By Farhat Taj | Daily Times Deconstructing Imran Khans Taliban narrative III (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\11\26\story_26-11-2011_pg3_4) By Farhat Taj | Daily Times Graveyard Of Empires, Crucible Of Coalitions The second Bonn meet on Afghanistan built on the first. Will inertia hit? (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279342) By SATINDER KUMAR LAMBAH | Outlook India Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan: India as Catalyst (http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SpecialReport111.pdf) By Ali Ahmed | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Macaca 12-17-2011, 08:06 PM For Delhi families, justice is suspended (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML17Df02.html) By Neeta Lal | Asia Times It has been 10 years since a deadly terror strike - touted as the biggest attack on the highest legislative body of the world's largest democracy - shook the sandstone-hued parliament complex in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. [1] Five terrorists, armed with guns and hand grenades, burst into the building after breaking through tight security and began indiscriminate firing. A gun battle raged for an hour between police personnel and the fatigue-wearing attackers resulting in 12 fatalities. Those killed included six

security men, four Delhi cops and one each from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the parliament watch-and-ward staff. Though Pakistan condemned the attack at the time, denying any involvement of militant groups based on its soil, a trail of evidence pointed to the handiwork of two Pakistan-based terror outfits Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Three men, suspected Kashmiri militants Mohammed Afzal and Shaukat Hussain Guru and a Delhi University professor S A R Geelani, were convicted in the case and sentenced to death in December 2002 "for supporting and helping to plan the attack". One of the lead conspirators of the attack - Afzal Guru - is currently on death row. Guru has had his execution stayed and is seeking a mercy pardon. His cousin, Shaukat Hussain Guru, on the other hand, was freed after completing his 10-year term in December 2010. Shaukat's wife, Afsan Guru, has also been acquitted along with Geelani. Two other conspirators - Maulana Masood Azhar and Tariq Ahmed - are believed to be still at large in Pakistan. However, despite the passage of time, the overwhelming feeling in India - especially among the victims' families - is that they have not received decent closure on the gruesome episode. This feeling got amplified further on December 13 this year, when amidst routine tributes paid to the martyrs by politicians, their families registered their protest by boycotting the memorial ceremony. In 2006, on the attack's fifth anniversary, the family members had returned the gallantry medals awarded to their dead kin to protest the delay in Guru's hanging. "Till the time Afzal Guru is hanged, there will be no honor for the martyrs in the Parliament attack. When the Supreme Court of India has given a death penalty to Afzal Guru, why has he not been brought to book?" asked Bipin Adana, 23, the son of Delhi Police head constable Vijendra Singh, who was killed in the terror attack. "Don't humiliate us ... take back the petrol pumps that were given to us, but hang Afzal," said the daughter of Kamlesh Kumari, a woman constable with the CRPF, who was gunned down during the attack. Meanwhile, senior leaders of right-wing opposition party the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) - Sushma Swaraj and Ravi Shankar Prasad - have slammed the government for being "soft" on terrorism. They advocated that Guru's execution will be the "biggest homage" to the victims. Guru's mercy plea is currently "under consideration" with President Pratibha Patil. The home ministry had about a year ago recommended to the President that the plea be rejected. But sources suggest that Patil may well leave the contentious decision of the attack convict's pardon for her successor as she is completing her term in July 2012. And as there is no mandated time limit for the Presidential pardon, the decision on Guru's petition, say sources, may well come later rather than sooner. Organizer - the monthly journal of the Hindu fundamentalist group, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) - argues that it would indeed be in the national interest to impose a ''time-bound frame'' on mercy petition decisions. The article in the journal's latest issue maintains that the continuing delay in Guru's execution will only embolden those plotting such attacks. Moreover, the burden on the exchequer, in the upkeep and welfare of the likes of Guru and Ajmal Kasab (the lone surviving terrorist of the Mumbai 2008 attacks) is unfair to the taxpayer. Drawing an analogy with the United States, Organizer states that Washington acted swiftly following the 9/11 attack with a new law - the Patriot Act - for intelligence and security agencies to deal with terror, with the result that there has not been a single attack there since. Every year, states the feature, the December 13 martyrs are remembered in a ritualistic manner. "Is it enough? No, as we have miserably failed to punish the guilty even several years after the Supreme Court verdict" it says. And concludes that the "time has come to have a relook at this power so as to protect the human rights of over a billion people". Political analysts iterate that though the December 13 episode helped New Delhi turn international opinion against Pakistan by labeling its western neighbor as a state sponsor of terrorism, there has been no other tangible gain.

As erstwhile director of Intelligence Bureau Ajit Doval told the Press Trust of India news agency, "We did leverage our position diplomatically. Pakistan accused now of state sponsored terror but little else has changed domestically." In fact India continues to be the target of repeated terror strikes from terrorists based on foreign soil. In the country's worst terror attack, Pakistan-backed militants killed 166 Indians and foreigners in Mumbai between November 26-29 in 2008. In fact, Mumbai has been hit by terror attacks at least half a dozen times between early the 1990s and last year, resulting in over 600 deaths. Despite repeated assurances on safety from the government, on July 13 this year again, 21 people were killed and more than 100 injured by three bomb blasts that ripped through the city. The blasts were a series of coordinated rush-hour explosions at different locations in the city. The capital city of New Delhi, too, has borne the brunt of many a lethal attack, including a recent one on September 7 this year when a bomb outside the High Court killed 14 people and injured 74 others. Ironically, it came in the wake of rumors that Guru could be hanged. Political scientist and former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice writes in her memoir No Higher Honor about the backroom drama that ensued between India and Pakistan following the December 13 attack. The two nuclear-armed countries - who have fought three wars since their Independence in 1947 - were virtually on the brink of a war, writes Rice. The explosive situation, she says, was averted by diplomacy between the national security adviser to George W Bush, Rice and her Indian counterpart at the time, Brajesh Mishra. Apart from such political theater, there is little evidence to suggest that India is any wiser after the attack on parliament. Has the country learnt to fob off terror attacks on its soil since then? Has it managed to give the families of the security forces who died during the attack a sense that justice has been done? The answer to both these questions is an emphatic no. Note 1. The deadly significance of 13: India has suffered its deadliest terror attacks on the date 13 or its multiples: March 12, 1993: 13 explosions rocked Mum killing 257 people. May 13, 2008: nine blasts in 15 minutes killed at least 68 people in Jaipur, Rajasthan. July 26, 2008: A series of 21 blasts rocked Ahmedabad (Gujarat) and left 56 dead. September 13, 2008: Five synchronized blasts left 30 dead in Mumbai. November 26, 2008: Mumbai blasts left 166 (total 13) dead.

Karnataka to initiate probe into 'love jihad' (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/karnataka-toinitiate-probe-into-love-jihad/20111216.htm) Press Trust Of India Ten cases of terror money reaching stock market detected in last 3 years (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ten-cases-of-terror-money-reaching-stock-marketdetected-in-last-3-years/articleshow/11139723.cms) TNN Bomb threat to Chennai IT complex, 1000 employees evacuated (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/Bomb-threat-to-Chennai-IT-complex-1000employees-evacuated/articleshow/11131275.cms) By Mahalingam Ponnusamy | TNN The strange case of Mohammad Niaz: Al Qaeda agent? Or innocent? (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/the-strange-case-ofmohammad-niaz/20111215.htm) By A Ganesh Nadar | Rediff The growing lure of barbarism (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/15/the-growing-lure-ofbarbarism.html) By Jawed Naqvi | Dawn Macaca 12-17-2011, 08:11 PM Wen and why (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/wen-and-why/888644/) By Yubaraj Ghimire | Indian Express

Nepals Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai is in the centre of a controversy after the cancellation of the much-awaited visit of Wen Jiabao this month. It would have been the first by a Chinese premier in over a decade. Chinas ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, has told Deputy Prime Minister Narayan Kaji Shrestha that Wens visit, scheduled from December 20, has been postponed. China has not yet announced if and when Wen will be visiting Nepal, but speculation is rife in Kathmandu over the reasons for and consequences of the decision. Nepals government seems to suggest that it is due to Chinas internal problems. Wen Jiabao has postponed his visit to Myanmar as well; Nepals is not an isolated case, says Shrestha. But what has embarrassed Nepal further was the official announcement from Beijing the same day that Wen would be participating in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region summit in Naypyidaw. At home, Bhattarai has come under fire from opposition parties like the Nepali Congress that call this a diplomatic fiasco. They say China cancelled the visit as Bhattarai unilaterally made public the information on November 15, flouting diplomatic norms. It was inappropriate and immature on the part of Bhattarai. Nepal will be seen as a country incapable of handling a high-level foreign visit, said Ram Sharan Mahat, leader of the Nepali Congress. Rajeshwar Acharya, Nepals former ambassador to China, called it a diplomatic misconduct on the part of the prime minister. There were, of course, fears that Wen may face protests by Tibetans and supporters of the Free Tibet movement. In anticipation of this, the government, which is firm in its One China policy and recognises Tibet as Chinas integral part, had made elaborate security arrangements around the Hotel Soaltee where he was scheduled to stay there were plans to airlift him from the Tribhuvan International Airport to the hotel, and then to Godavari where he was to plant a sapling. Altogether, 10 ministers and the chairman of the China Exim Bank, which had agreed to advance a soft loan for the 760 MW West Seti hydro project, were supposed to be part of the 182-member team from Beijing, the biggest contingent so far. While China was tightlipped all through, Nepalese authorities, including some ministers, stated that China was going to offer at least four billion Nepali rupees as soft loan, increase its annual grant to Nepal substantially, upgrade an existing airport in the tourist city of Pokhara, build four major roads along the Nepal-Tibet border and four dry ports for Nepals bilateral as well as diversified trade with the world outside. This suggested that China would play a role as important as India in its development and that Nepals relation with the northern neighbour will be as special as with the southern. A high-level team of the Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation, which has Maoist chief Prachanda as a vice-chairman and is interested in Lumbinis all-round development, was also in the capital, a week prior to the scheduled visit. Beijing apparently was clear that Nepal needs to be given a firm message on the Tibetan issue, and therefore, the fear of Tibetan protest may not have been the most important reason for the cancellation of the visit. It could well have been Nepals internal problems. On December 11, a group of ministers belonging to the United Democratic Madhesi Front, including Bijay Gachhadar and Jaya Prakash Gupta, met the prime minister with a warning that they would withdraw their support something that would cost Bhattarai his chair if he did not follow through with the four-point deal agreed on August 27, which included, among others, the entry of 10,000 youngsters from Nepals Terai area in the army. No ultimatum was served, but such a threat which endangered the survival of the government just 10 days before the much-awaited visit could have been a reason for Beijing to have second thoughts. As China visibly increases its presence and interest in Nepal, almost on par with Indias, activities of the Madhes parties and the deliberate or innocuous leakage of dates by a prime minister who is perceived as pro-India, would not have gone unnoticed. The cancellation of the visit does not necessarily mean Chinas interest has diminished. The way it has happened, however, gives rise to concerns whether the incident would in anyway dent relations with China, which is keen to sign treaties on security.

Constitution Assembly Gives itself Another Six months of Extension (http://southasiaanalysis.org/notes7/note640.html) By S.Chandrasekharan | South Asia Analysis

Group Ensuring Rapid Rate of Economic Growth of Terai (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4810.html) By Hari Bansh Jha | South Asia Analysis Group A hundred days later (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-hundred-days-later/885116/) By Yubaraj Ghimire | Indian Express Macaca 12-17-2011, 08:49 PM SRI LANKA AND THE PEACE MAKERS: A STORY OF NORWAY AND INDIA (http://www.ipcs.org/issuebrief/south-asia/sri-lanka-and-the-peace-makers-a-story-of-norway-178.html) By MR Narayan Swamy | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies More than two years after Sri Lanka militarily vanquished the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in a manner few had anticipated, a Norwegian government-led investigation into the collapse of the 2002 peace process has resulted in a comprehensive and revealing report that is bound to reopen some old wounds as well as renew attention on the widely alleged human rights violations during the last stages of the military operation, besides Colombos delay in finding a political formula to address Tamil grievances and aspirations. I PAWNS OF PEACE Titled Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka 1997-2009, the 202page report contains cautionary tales for international conflict resolutionists dealing with newlyconfident non-Western nations that have well defined ideas of national sovereignty and the limits of outside intervention. Besides highlighting in a forthright way Norways mistakes and its positive contributions, the report, released in Oslo in November, sheds light on the dissonance between New Delhis ambiguous position on the military operation and its humanitarian toll designed to suit all audiences at home and abroad and its avowedly anti-LTTE policy that ensured there would be no Indian pressure on the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to stop the operations. Oslos decision to investigate and introspect on its failure in Sri Lanka, where its ambitious moves to bring about a negotiated settlement to a quarter century of conflict failed, followed domestic criticism of its peacemaking efforts. Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka spanned 12 long years from 1997 to 2009. Although Norway was (and is) involved in several peace-making efforts around the world, Sri Lanka was the only place where it was the sole facilitator. Norway invested heavily in Sri Lanka, both monetarily and in human resources, aspiring to end a conflict that since 1983 had left tens of thousands dead, thousands more wounded or maimed and a once tranquil island nation battered. And the war, in a critical part of South Asia, showed no signs of ending. What emerges from the study is an informed and, in some ways, disturbing story. First, Oslo was invited by Colombo and the LTTE to help usher in peace but which, like in the case of New Delhi earlier, later found itself at the receiving end of both parties. Second, the international community was also deeply engaged in the peace process but whose members did not always see eye to eye on the details. Third, India was undoubtedly a key factor in Sri Lanka but which, while seemingly took a middle path and seeking an end to the war and tilted heavily towards a militarily aggressive Colombo. Lastly, the Sri Lankan regime that decided to crush the LTTE, and in the process has became a mirror image of the Tamil Tigers; and LTTE which remained inflexibly wedded to its cause of Tamil Eelam, ultimately losing everything it had, leaving the Tamils it claimed to represent on bent knees. II THE TALE OF INDIA The report has numerous references to India. As Norway took cautious steps towards peace in Sri Lanka, holding confidential discussions with both Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran, Norwegian diplomats began visiting New Delhi and holding meetings with the Indian Foreign Secretary, the National Security Advisor and the intelligence agency (RAW). All of this was away from the media glare. It was the start of the process that ultimately led to the drafting of the February 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA). After these meetings it became clear (to Norwegians) that India will keep an arms length approach and will not take an active role in the

process. Based on wide-ranging interviews and archives made available by the Norwegian government, it reveals Indias predicament as Sri Lanka took on the LTTE. Publicly, India unceasingly urged successive Sri Lankan governments to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil community, giving the impression that it was supportive of negotiations with the LTTE. But as the peace process began to unravel, more particularly after the LTTE suffered a crippling and unprecedented split in March-April 2004 (a month before the Congress rode to power in New Delhi), Indias position against the Tigers hardened. India criticizes Norway in private meetings for being too LTTE friendly and underlines the need to put the LTTE in its place, says the report. Once Rajapaksa took charge in November 2005 after being elected President, India did not oppose Sri Lanka giving precedence to the military operation, in the process letting it to overwhelm the chances of a negotiated settlement. India quietly began providing critical radar and intelligence information to the Sri Lankan armed forces a role also played by the US. And while maintaining that it cannot provide offensive military asses, New Delhi did not object to Sri Lankan purchasing weaponry elsewhere. Most importantly, Indian opposition to the LTTE starts to translate into firmer backing for the Sri Lankan government. The report makes the startling claim that even as New Delhi made some pleas for limiting civilian casualties (towards the end of 2008), the Indian government makes it clear that it supported a continuation of the (military) offensive and the defeat of the LTTE. The Congress-led government refused to apply pressure on Sri Lanka to call off the ceasefire even though the regime counted as members seemingly pro-LTTE parties from Tamil Nadu. But almost till the time the LTTE was crushed and its leadership wiped out in May 2009, India never came out in such undisguised manner in support of Colombo. In public, however, the Indian government refrains from voicing these views. The study details the Rajapaksa regimes worry about a possible defeat of the Congress party in the April-May 2009 Lok Sabha election. Colombo feared that if the Congress was voted out, someone will come to the insurgents aid. It alleges that Indias Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, a Lok Sabha member from Tamil Nadu, contacted Prabhakaran towards the end of the conflict it does not say how the contact was made and suggested that the LTTE agrees to a pre-drafted statement that they will lay down their weapons. The move (coinciding with other efforts globally to try rescue the LTTE leadership) apparently leaked to pro-LTTE Tamil Nadu politician Vaiko, who rejects it as a Congress truck and assures the LTTE that the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) will win the elections and come to the Tigers cause. This analysis proved to be a horrible blunder. It is indeed true that LTTE supporters, like most people even in India, did feel that the Congress would not be able to retain power in 2009. And realizing that the Sri Lankan government was intensifying the military offensive because it too shared the fear, the LTTE attempted till the very last minute to rally the Tamil Diaspora around the world so as to put pressure on the West to try halting the war. But Colombo was in no mood to compromise. By then, the Rajapaksa regime had come to choking the Tigers for good and it saw no benefit in loosening its grip, come what may. Colombo had also formed an international arc that included, besides immediate neighbour India, countries as wide ranging as China, Pakistan and Iran to help it withstand intense Western pressures to go slow. In hindsight, says the report, the Norwegian team underestimates the Sri Lankan governments strength, both militarily and politically. It may be a coincidence, but LTTE chief Prabhakaran lay dead in northern Sri Lankan precisely when the Lok Sabha results were declared in India, with the Congress proving pundits wrong by dramatically retaining power for another five years. And when the LTTE was crushed, DMK leaders in Delhi (and Chennai) were not discussing the fate of Prabhakaran and his family but jockeying for the most coveted ministries in the Manmohan Singh cabinet!. A news story published by the author in February 2008 for IANS revealed for the first time that New Delhi had played a key but covert role in the events which culminated in the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). While I did provide some fascinating and (until then) unknown details, at the specific request of sources who spoke to me, I refrained from saying that it was the RAW which was at the heart of Indias covert involvement. My revelation produced disbelief not just in New Delhi, Chennai and Colombo but elsewhere too. Even some Norwegians were surprised. Austin Fernando, who was Sri

Lankas Defence Secretary when the CFA was signed in 2002, expressed surprise that there had been Indian covert involvement in the peace process. Macaca 12-17-2011, 08:53 PM III CONFESSIONS OF ERIC SOLHEIM The Norwegian report, for the first time ever, makes a reference to RAW. But at the event where the report was released, and later while speaking to me also in Oslo, Norwegian minister and the former Special Envoy to Sri Lanka, Erik Solheim, came out with some startling details over the involvement of the Indian intelligence, acting (as I had reported much earlier) with the full backing of the Indian government. Solheim revealed that when Norway decided to get involved in Sri Lanka, India counselled patience. If you cannot be patient, then please go away, he quoted a senior Indian official as saying. Otherwise, you will only complicate the situation. My own sources have told me that the draft of the CFA repeatedly travelled to New Delhi for comments while it was being quietly discussed by the leadership of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. Solheim confirmed this, saying he frequently met RAW officials, at times at the Delhi airport, and that India was kept aware of each and every detail. In a confession that is bound to surprise many, he said that it was India which came out with a list of countries which could be members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the Nordic body that was formed to oversee the peace process in the countrys north and east. Solheim said that India was consulted and involved in the Sri Lanka peace process at every step but none of this was made public. He also claimed that Indian government officials and LTTE representatives had a secret meeting ahead of the CFA but refused to say where this happened. (This may have been the reason why Prabhakaran, at his April 2002 press conference in Kilinochchi, claimed with an air of confidence that he was sure India would soon lift the ban on the LTTE. India did not.). Solheim told me that India was very clear right from the start that it would never accept any break up of Sri Lanka and it desired a peaceful end to the conflict. He said the Indian government accepted Norways role but made it clear that they did not want any major (Western) player to get sucked into Sri Lanka. Indian inputs over the nascent peace process, he said, were sound and constantly good although Indian officials were often sceptical too about the prospects of Colombo and the LTTE embracing one another for good. Solheim also came out with revelations about Anton Balasingham, the LTTE theoretician and the one man who wielded a lot of influence on Prabhakaran. Balasingham, he said, always understood that nothing will work if it went against Indian interests. Balasingham, however, told Solheim that Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief Pottu Amman had for months insisted that they were not involved in Rajiv Gandhis assassination. Balasingham told the Norwegian minister: I did not believe their story, and they stopped lying to me once they realized I was not buying the story. A leftwing politician, Solheim who met Prabhakaran about ten times (in northern Sri Lanka) and Balasingham perhaps hundred times, mostly in London -- used the occasion to make some scathing criticism of the LTTE chief. The Tigers, he said, made very major mistakes, one of which was the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Another was the killing of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Both killings fetched no dividends to the LTTE; on the contrary, the first destroyed whatever goodwill the Tigers had in India, the one country that mattered most in Sri Lanka. The second assassination turned much of the West against the LTTE. In free and frank discussions with Solheim, Balasingham once described Prabhakaran as an isolated warlord whose grasp of international politics was dismal. Solheim defended himself against criticism that he did not anticipate the final war which finished off the LTTE. He pointed out that the Indian administration, which followed the conflict very closely, also did not think that the Sri Lankan government would be able to achieve a military victory until 2008. It was only from that year that Indian intelligence officials began sharing their assessment with Solheim that Sri Lanka might militarily overwhelm the Tamil Tigers. In any case, Mahinda Rajapaksa would never have come to power if Prabhakaran had not ordered Tamils in Sri Lankas north and east to boycott the 2005 presidential election. The decision deprived his opponent Ranil Wickremesinghe of crucial Tamil votes from the region, leading to Rajapaksas narrow victory.

Solheims argument was that while there could be legitimate criticism directed at Norway (some of which he accepted), too many things happened in that complex theatre called Sri Lanka that no one had anticipated. These included (apart from the LTTE asking Tamils to boycott the presidential vote), the split in the LTTE in 2004 and the death of Balasingham in December 2006. After his death, there was not one meaningful political or militarily initiative by the LTTE. IV CONCLUSIONS & LESSONS TO LEARN For Norway, involved in varying degrees in several peace processes around the world, there are plenty of lessons, as they emerge in this document. Norway had many positives to its credit in Sri Lanka. One was the CFA it helped bring about in 2002, which ushered in peace or at least, an absence of war after many years. In the process, without doubt, thousands of lives were saved. Norway was also able to keep Colombo and the LTTE talking even in adverse circumstances, leading, at one point, to the two sides agreeing to work for a conflict resolution based on federal principles. But the peace process failed because it could not persuade Colombo or the LTTE to make any significant shift in their entrenched positions. The peace moves were also constrained by the structural features of the Sri Lankan state and its ethno-centric politics. The reports makes the candid admission that soft power mediator Norway could not counter or transform many of the dynamics that ripped apart the peace process. It suggests different courses of action might have mitigated some problems. One such suggestion is that Oslo should not disengage itself from Sri Lanka when it became clear that a full-scale war had resumed again between the LTTE and Colombo. For the future, the report suggests that Norway should avoid situations where it is a weak and isolated mediator, with limited and inconsistent international backing. Mediators should attach firm conditions to their involvement. Western thinking that aid can be a substitute for politics turned out to be misplaced. And even-handedness between a state and non-state actor was not the desired option in the age of war on terror. In the case of Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa governments decision to cock a snook at the West and count on the support of Asian countries to take on the LTTE while disregarding the terrible consequences that followed, when tens of thousands of innocents were caught up in the slowly shrinking Tiger zone make apparent the difficulties for traditional mediation efforts by Western countries. The Sri Lankan peace process reflects broader global changes, the report says. It began as an experiment in liberal peace building and ended as a result of a very different Asian model of conflict resolution."Building on Westphalian notions of sovereignty and non-interference, a strong developmental state, the military crushing of the terrorism, and the prevalence of order over dissent or political change, this model may serve as an inspiration for other countries in the region, the report says, cautioning that this global eastward shift may have far-reaching consequences for the possibilities of Norwegian-style mediation in the future.

NORWAY IN SRI LANKA: A TALE OF THE FAILED PEACE-PROCESS (http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/norway-in-sri-lanka-a-tale-of-the-failed-peace-3502.html) By J Jeganaathan | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Seeking U.S. Moral Leadership on Human Rights in Sri Lanka (http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/12/14/seeking-u-s-moral-leadership-on-human-rightsin-sri-lanka/) By Donald Wright Patterson | Foreign Policy Journal Sri Lanka: A Regime facing International Isolation (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4802.html) By Kumar David | South Asia Analysis Group Sri Lanka: Unfinished Business (http://www.eurasiareview.com/05122011-sri-lanka-unfinishedbusiness-analysis/) South Asia Terrorism Portal Mother Teresa Sri Lanka order rocked by baby charges (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia16160938) BBC Tamil rebels recruited children for last stand against Sri Lankan army (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tamil-rebels-recruited-children-for-last-standagainst-sri-lankan-army-6275874.html) By ANDREW BUNCOMBE | The Independent Macaca

12-17-2011, 09:07 PM Asia Society on Kashmir: Now Serving Foreign Policy Junk (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/suhaga-shukla-esq/asia-society-on-kashmir-n_b_1139076.html) By Suhag A. Shukla | Huffington Post America is addicted to junk food and we're getting fat. Still, we just can't resist sweet, fatty, prettypackaged edibles that are not only tasty, but convenient too. Unfortunately, this love affair with "quick and easy" isn't just infecting our food choices. Take for example the latest serving of foreign policy-lite by the Asia Society (http://www.hafsite.org/HAF_Responds_to_Asia_Society_biased_panel_on_Kashm ir). On Nov. 11, the New York based educational institution hosted a panel entitled Kashmir: The Case for Freedom. Purportedly aimed at shedding light on the long and complicated history of the region, the program with novelists Arundhati Roy and Pankaj Mishra, and a Kashmiri graduate student Mohamad Junaid is emblematic of the manner in which many of America's intellectual elite institutions, including the Asia Society and the New York Times, prefer pretty prose over substance and ideology over actuality when exploring the complexities that rile Southeast Asia. For those not well versed in the political spectrum of India, for comparison, having Arundhati Roy and Pankaj Mishra speak on Kashmir is akin to having a panel on church reform that includes Christopher Hitchens and no clergy; or a panel on American imperialism where Noam Chomsky is the featured speaker. Not only would such programs provide little in the way of a diversity of views or robust conversation on very complex topics, but they would likely draw only the choir to whom the panelist wanted to preach. Renowned economist Jagdish Bhagwati from Columbia University said it best last summer in a critique of the New York Times and its op-eds on the Indian economy: "Perhaps the most articulate critics are the 'progressive' novelists of India, chief among them Pankaj Mishra whom the op-ed page editors of the New York Times regularly and almost exclusively invite to write about the Indian economy, a privilege they do not seem to extend symmetrically to American novelists to give us their profound thoughts on the US economy! While economic analysis can often produce a yawning indifference, and Mishra's narrative is by contrast eloquent and captivating, the latter is really fiction masquerading as non-fiction. Whether its exploring the economy or foreign policy, one thing is clear. Asia Society chose this same intellectual diet of platitudes -- one in which the perspective of a Kashmiri Pandit (Hindu) didn't fit its flavor du jour. Between 1989 and 1991, nearly 99 percent of the Kashmir Valley's Hindus (400,000 Kashmiri Pandits) were systematically and brutally driven from their homes through an orchestrated campaign of massacres, intimidation, pillage, rape and murder. Countless eyewitness accounts recall the sheer terror and loss experienced when they came face to face with de facto eviction notices slapped on their homes, businesses, and temples, and firing guns accompanied by loudspeakers and the slogan, "Raliv, galiv ya chaliv! (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/kashmirhindus-forsaken-forgotten-for-21-years/20110119.htm)" (Convert, die, or escape), echoing through the once peaceful Valley. But it wasn't until 54 minutes into the 75 minute panel that even a mention of Kashmiri Hindus was made. The Government of India, the CIA, members of the U.S. Congress (see H.Res. 387 (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hr112-387)), USCIRF, and nearly every reputable human rights organization have volumes documenting the Pakistani ISI backed insurgency and atrocities committed during the 1990 religio-ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Hindus. But according to Roy, "... perhaps the most contentious issue of the Kashmiri Pandits in Kashmir... there was an exodus from the Valley in 1989, at the time of the uprising, and the reasons for that exodus are seriously contentious." Adding insult to injury, she also suggested that the 70,000 to 80,000 Pandits who are stuck in squalid refugee camps, somehow remain there by choice. After two decades, these poverty-stricken refugee camps remain overcrowded and lack basic necessities such as drinking water and medicine, education and employment. They do not have adequate facilities for sanitation, and thus have a high incidence of disease, high death rates and low birth rates. There are widespread depression and stress-related problems. Does it seem likely that anyone would really "choose" to stay? Bare mention was made of the 1,300 or so Hindu families remaining in the Valley (http://www.iakf.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43:those-who-remainthe-survival-and-continued-struggle-of-the-kashmiri-pandit-non-migrants-&catid=3:iakfarticles&Itemid=16), who live with some of the same socio-economic pressures as those in the

camps, but also in constant fear of terror and violence. While Pankaj Mishra doubled as a bench warmer, the most questionable claims came from graduate student, Mohamad Junaid (whom the Asia Society has marketed as an anthropologist). According to Junaid, Kashmiris (presumably Kashmiri Muslims) had faced 400 years of foreign, ie. Indian, rule and 1990 was thus "a year of idealism, of resolve, that we will finally throw India out." He held that Kashmir was not a part of South Asia, but more a part of Central Asia through "cultural influences." Indeed Central Asians, namely the Turks, did invade Kashmir, and violently at that, but not until the 1300s. Prior to that, Kashmir was very much an integral part of 3rd century CE Mauryan Empire, which ushered in a politically united continent which looks an awful lot like modern India (and Pakistan). But according to Junaid, "... the borders of India, as a nation-state were first marked out by the British and Kashmir was never a part of India." As for cultural influences, none of the panelists mentioned that Kashmiri Hindus can trace back their history nearly five millenia. None of them brought up the fact that despite its geographic isolation from the rest of the then Hindu continent, Kashmir "proved outstandingly creative in the domain of religion during most of the centuries in which the dominant faiths of the inhabitants were Buddhism and Hinduism [early centuries of the Common Era through the 14th century]."* There was no discussion of scriptural commentaries, such as the 13th century CE Sarvadarshanasamgraha by Madhavacharya Vidyaranya (as refererenced to me by lay historian Vishal Agarwal) in which the influential saint hailing from what we know now as the southern state of Karnataka included Kashmiri Saivism amongst the 15 significant Hindu schools of thought. Indeed there are many opinions on an issue as complex as Kashmir, and the Asia Society, as an institution seeking "to increase knowledge and enhance dialogue, encourage creative expression, and generate new ideas across the fields of arts and culture, policy and business, and education," really shouldn't have picked sides. But it did.** It chose to promote a jaundiced, anti-India, ultraleft wing view -- the same view, in fact, of recently convicted Pakistani spy agency lobbyist Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/06/syed-ghulam-nabi-faiplea_n_1132923.html). I hope the next time the Asia Society decides to serve up Kashmir, that it comes with some sides called balance, new ideas, and dialogue. For a fact-check on many of the statements made on the Asia Society panel, see "Kashmir Fiction and the Facts (http://www.hafsite.org/media/pr/kashmir-fiction-and-the-facts)." * Jacobsen, Knut A., Helene Basu, Angelika Malinar, and Vasudha Narayanan. Brill's Encyclopedia of Hinduism. Vol. 1. Boston: Brill Leiden, 2009. Print. ** In the description of the program itself, Asia Society demonstrates its lack of neutrality: "The Indo-Pakistani conflict over the former princely states of Jammu and Kashmir has led to three wars and the loss of thousands of lives over almost 65 years. Since 1989 an armed insurgency in Indian-administered areas has contested Indian rule with some groups demanding independence and others union with Pakistan. Under Indian and Pakistani military rule, allegations of severe human rights abuses have been leveled against both sides. The 2008 bombings in Mumbai further postponed hopes of discussion toward resolving the conflict, with the possibility of an independent Kashmir hanging in the balance."

Bhagavad Gita faces 'extremist' branding, ban in Russia (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/Bhagavad-Gita-faces-extremist-branding-ban-inRussia/articleshow/11143014.cms) IANS Jiten Marandi And Three Others Acquitted (http://www.countercurrents.org/pudr151211.htm) By PUDR Should Milli Gazette be allowed to die? (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/should-milli-gazettebe-allowed-to-die/888226/) By Irena Akbar | Indian Express 'Why CM's fund not used for compensating wrongly held Muslims' (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-mecca-masjid-blast-why-cms-fund-not-usedfor-compensation/20111215.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Indias Muslim dilemma (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82386&Cat=9) By Aijaz Zaka Syed

Include madrassas to empower Muslims (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/editpage/Include-madrassas-to-empower-Muslims/articleshow/11085417.cms) By Prabhat Banerje | Times of India Permit diversity in the system (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Permitdiversity-in-the-system/articleshow/11085423.cms) By Macaca 12-17-2011, 09:12 PM Indian hospital fire uncovers shocking truths about first world care (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/indian-hospital-fire-uncovers-shockingtruths-about-first-world-care/article2272270/) By STEPHANIE NOLEN | The Globe and Mail The ongoing investigation into a hospital fire that killed 96 people in Kolkata last week is unearthing a litany of shocking errors and peeling back the curtain on the shiny faade of wealthy India. The fire took place at the AMRI Hospital, one of the elite private medical institutions that dot Indias big urban centres. These hospitals provide the latest in diagnostic and surgical procedures, offer wealthy patients multi-room in-patient suites, platinum waiting lounges and charge as much as $1,000 a day as a basic bed rate not much, compared to private medical care in the West, but fees accessible only to a tiny Indian elite. But as details released in the past few days from the investigation of the fire make clear, the first world care offered by the hospital was only skin deep. The hospital had no working sprinkler system, and no functioning smoke alarms. Staff had no fire training and many members fled when the blaze began in the early hours of the morning. Hospital management was storing diesel and other highly flammable materials in the basement as fuel for generators, to cover for frequent power outages as well as trash, much of which was also highly combustible, including boxes, gas cylinders, electric cable and old mattresses that released dense smoke when they went up in flames. Many mobile patients suffocated in their rooms, where the windows were sealed shut, and from which there was no fire escape route. The detail that has most appalled Indians is that the hospitals private security guards turned away both residents of the local slum who rushed up to help when they saw the blaze (because fire departments respond so slowly here, neighbours are often the first respondents), locking them out at the gate and also fire fighters when the first of 25 trucks arrived, two hours after the blaze began. This response seemed inexplicable until an investigation by the Times of India revealed that in October, when a private security guard in the hospital found a small fire and called the fire department, hospital management suspended him without pay in punishment. When the Kolkata fire department launched an inspection of other private city hospitals in the wake of the AMRI fire, it found that most lacked working fire alarms, and many were storing waste onsite. Several had approach lanes too narrow for fire-tending vehicles to reach them, and dysfunctional hose systems. Probhir Rose, director of Woodland, one of the citys oldest and most prestigious hospitals, reacted angrily to suggestions his hospital was unsafe, telling the Indian Express that his facility had a fire alarm system, they just werent using it. Nine owners and administrators of the AMRI Hospital have so far been arrested in connection with their responsibility for the blaze. The fatalities in the AMRI fire are a reminder that while Indias better-off citizens look to the private sector to provide what the weak state doesnt good schools, street cleaning, policing, clean water, and of course medical care there are no guarantees to be had from this sector either. Building codes and safety procedures are routinely violated and the government agencies tasked with oversight are toothless regulators with no capacity for enforcement. Investigators in the AMRI fire have suggested that the hospitals administrators were paying bribes to inspectors in lieu of spending money on fire safety equipment. What the government records as accidental deaths grew by 50 per cent over the past decade. Every time I see incidents like AMRI I'm convinced we really are a third world nation with delusions

of greatness, Omar Abdullah, the outspoken chief minister of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, said in the wake of the fire.

Buildings and the block (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sunanda-k-datta-raybuildingsthe-block/458768/) By Sunanda K Datta-Ray | Business Standard Flaming Disregard (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279339) By DEBARSHI DASGUPTA | Outlook India Who Else But The Aam Aadmi (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279340) By DOLA MITRA | Outlook India Who, What, Why: Why are Indians dying from alcohol poisoning? (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16197280) BBC Bootleg liquor deaths stir prohibition debate in India (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/bootleg-liquor-deaths-stir-prohibitiondebate-in-india/article2273431/) By STEPHANIE NOLEN | The Globe and Mail What cannot be their poison (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Editorials/What-cannotbe-their-poison/Article1-783433.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Barefoot: Remembering Kandhamal (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Harsh_Mander/article2723257.ece) By HARSH MANDER | The Hindu Media Matters: A lot of virtual noise (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Sevanti_Ninan/article2723261.ece) By SEVANTI NINAN | The Hindu Macaca 12-17-2011, 09:16 PM Indias Dirty Picture (http://the-diplomat.com/indian-decade/2011/12/16/indias-dirty-picture/) By Sanjay Kumar | The Diplomat Recently released Hindi movie Dirty Picture is a celebration of womens independence, individuality and sexuality, capturing the life of Silk Smitha, who lives by her own rules, using her sexuality to free herself from the hypocrisy of a male dominated society. But such portrayals are a far cry from the reality of life for many Indian women. In one of a string of recent cases of violence against women, a 17-year-old student was allegedly stabbed by a youth in North 24 Parganas district, West Bengal, because she refused to marry him. Reports suggest that although several people were present, no one spoke up for the girl. Just a couple of days earlier, in a high-profile incident, a New Delhi woman was gang raped in a pick-up truck after she had been dropped off near her home after working a late shift at a call center. In response, police in the city have introduced new measures obliging call centers, corporations and media organizations to drop female workers at their front door after work. The pick-up attack was far from an isolated incident. Indeed, New Delhi has the unfortunate nickname of the rape capital of India, with The Times of India reporting that the city had the highest number of reported rape cases last year, with 414, followed by Mumbai at 194. In a country where theres still a strong stigma attached to admitting to having been raped, the true figures could be much higher. And things may actually be getting worse in some cases. One recent study by leading researchers found that violence against women had jumped 44 percent between 1993 and 2011. The working paper, The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India, and penned by Harvard Prof. Lakshmi Iyer, Anandi Mani of the University of Warwick, and the IMFs Prachi Mishra and Petia Topalova, also found that kidnappings rose by 13 percent and rapes per capita increased by 23 percent over the same period. The propensity for violence toward women goes further than attacks on adult women Indias skewed gender ratio reflects a culture in many states whereby mothers will go to great lengths to

ensure they give birth to a boy, not a girl. As Shreyasi Singh has noted in The Diplomat: Sons are viewed as bankable assets, while girls are more often associated with anxiety, expense and subjugation. Having a daughter get married is hugely costly for parents, and there is little these women can do in return. Boys are also seen as a better investment as they dont need crippling dowries. And in Hinduism, only a male heir can light the parents funeral pyre. Such social pressures have prompted many women to abort female fetuses, dramatically skewing the sex ratio in parts of the country. According to the 2011 census, there were 940 females per 1,000 people in India. But in the state of Haryana, for example, there were only 877 females per 1,000 males. As I travelled around villages in the Rohtak district of the state recently, I talked to many young men who said they were forced to look outside the state for a bride because there were too few women. In some respects, of course, attitudes have improved. A 1993 constitutional amendment, for example, called for the establishment of directly elected local councils at the district, intermediate, and village levels, and also mandated one-third of all council seats should be filled by women.Yet even today, a womans sexuality is seen as tied to a familys honor, and while parents might send their daughters to a good school or university, many still wont allow them to choose their own partners or select their own path in life. In the novel In Afghanistan, Where God Only Comes to Weep, Siba Shakib writes of a woman who struggles day in and day out to preserve her family, her honor and her sexuality, but finds the male-dominated society crushes her individuality. India is not Afghanistan, and women here are still generally more independent minded. But such determination is not being matched by a change in the mindset of men, who too frequently believe they need to impose their will on women often violently.

Dehli, That Town Which Was (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279337) By PAVAN K. VARMA | Outlook India Should Delhi go vertical? Experts divided (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Should-Delhi-go-vertical-Experts-divided/Article1-783456.aspx) By Sidhartha Roy | Hindustan Times Watch these spaces (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/Watch-thesespaces/Article1-783436.aspx) By Gopal Krishna Gandhi | Hindustan Times Goa Uses Anniversary to Reimagine Itself (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/goa-usesanniversary-to-reimagine-itself/) By NARESH FERNANDES | India Ink Delhis Air as Dirty as Ever Despite Some Reforms (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/delhis-air-as-dirty-as-ever-despite-some-reforms/) India Ink Taj Mahal Diamond Sets Auction Record for Indian Jewel (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/taj-mahal-diamond-sets-auction-record-for-indianjewel/) By SHIVANI VORA | India Ink English-Hinglish, Angrezi-Fangrezi (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/16/english-hinglishangrezi-fangrezi/) By Tripti Lahiri | IndiaRealTime English, owning up a language (http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/mediumterm/2011/12/16/english-owning-up-a-language/) By VIR SANGHVI | Hindustan Times Fighting to Save Our Precious Forest (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/16/mumbaijournal-fighting-to-save-our-precious-forest/) By Nayantara Kilachand | IndiaRealTime Mission: Impossible Ghost Protocol (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/16/reviewround-up-mission-impossible-ghost-protocol/) By Preetika Rana | IndiaRealTime Tintin Translates Into Box-Office Success (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/tintintranslates-into-box-office-success/) By RANJANI IYER MOHANTY | India Ink World's shortest women is 2ft tall

(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/8960487/Worlds-shortest-women-is-2fttall.html) Daily Telegraph Macaca 12-17-2011, 09:21 PM Hardly 'Incredible India' (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/hardly-incredible-indiaidINDEE7BF03W20111216) By Alistair Scrutton and Manoj Kumar Frustrated executives while away time in five-star hotels waiting for deals that never come, and civil servants play video games in their offices - growing signs of the reform limbo and crisis of confidence behind India's economic malaise. Policy paralysis, corruption scandals and a government fearful of political backlash to any bold moves have combined with the global slowdown and worsening domestic finances in the last few months to derail Asia's third-largest economy. India now faces the worst-case scenario that was touted earlier this year - stubbornly high inflation, slowing growth, a mounting fiscal deficit, a rupee that risks freefall -- and both policymakers and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) have few levers to fix it. For years, Indian entrepreneurs have boasted they can do business despite the government adeptly working around potholed roads, clogged ports and reams of regulatory hurdles. But government inertia - what many politicians see as "playing safe" - is taking its toll on corporate confidence. Entrepreneurs once feted in Bollywood movies as national heroes, whose million-dollar homes and jetset lifestyles were a beacon for millions of India's aspiring middle classes, no longer seem capable of driving the $1.6 trillion economy. "We may have seen phases of economic growth slower than this in the two post-reform decades, but never has the entrepreneurial mood been so low," wrote Shekhar Gupta, editor-in-chief of the Indian Express. It's echoed across offices of business leaders from Mumbai to Delhi. One foreign executive described increasingly strained telephone conversations over the past year with his U.S.-based CEO as deals became mired in red tape and ministerial inertia. "They always understood that India was difficult to do business in. But not this difficult," said the executive, who asked not to be named as he was not authorised to speak for his company. The banking sector is now under strain from bad loans. Economic reforms that may bring in much-needed foreign investment, such as opening up the supermarket sector to the likes of Wal-Mart Stores Inc (WMT.N), have been put on hold as political parties eye important state polls next year. Even reforms seen as no-brainers politically, such as the introduction of a digitalised national ID card or food subsidies for the poor, have faced delays as opposition parties and coalition partners smell blood ahead of a 2014 general election. FROM COCKY TO FEARFUL India used to be full of brash business leaders. When Tata Steel (TISC.NS) bought an Anglo-Dutch rival in 2007 for $12 billion, the newspaper headline "Empire Strikes Back" epitomised the supreme confidence of India's aggressive capitalist kingpins then on a global buying spree. Jaguar, Land Rover and other foreign brands soon followed into Indian hands. The economy may grow at under 7 percent this fiscal year, down from initial forecasts of 9 percent. That's still a far cry from the around 3.5 percent "Hindu" rate of growth that plagued the decades after India's independence from Britain in 1947.

But these last few heady years have changed expectations. These days, growth below 7 percent is enough for investors to delay projects, for banks to put off loans and for voters to get angry: 7 percent is the new 2-3 percent. It was corruption scams surfacing over a year ago that may have started it - a potentially $39 billion scam involving selling telecoms licenses at rock-bottom prices effectively saw distracted politicians asleep at the economic wheel. Suddenly politicians were jailed and billionaires questioned by police. It sent shudders through the political class. The invincibility of the political "untouchables" disappeared. Inside India's famously bureaucratic ministries, middle-level civil servants passed the buck to toplevel officials who in turn passed the buck to their reluctant political masters. One defence contractor, who asked to not be named due to the sensitivity of the issue, recounted spending weeks at a top hotel, sipping drinks every evening with fellow frustrated arms dealers waiting for "imminent" defence ministry decisions that never came. An Indian executive likened the country's economic malaise and government's reform limbo to an old village adage - a bullock knows that if it goes to work in the field it could get whipped, while the animal that lazes around far away does not. "Once the spotlight is on, even minor mistakes become noticeable," said the vice-president of an infrastructure firm about a slowdown in decision making ever since corruption scandals broke last year. "That's why nobody wants to take decisions." Many civil servants have been seen playing computer games during official hours when parliament sessions are adjourned or their minister goes on trips for G20 or World Bank meetings, according to one government official. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh may be reform-minded. But with real power lying with the populistinclined Sonia Gandhi, he has been unable or unwilling to press for new steps to modernise and open up the economy. With Gandhi ill, reportedly with cancer, there are signs the family dynasty that has run India for decades has lost its bearings, increasingly unable to keep its coalition partners in line as parties jostle for power before the 2014 election. The cabinet's one sudden announcement of major reform - allowing foreign firms to hold 51 percent stakes in the supermarket sector - may have been partly driven by economic panic as the rupee plummeted, with Asia's worst-performing currency suffering from capital flight to safe havens like U.S. Treasuries. But Singh's about-turn only 10 days later in the face of a political backlash underscored that, even at a time of alarm over the economy, politics and the concern about forthcoming elections took precedence. FLOWS SLOW, CONFIDENCE EBBS India's annual financing requirement of $119 billion is the highest in Asia, according to a Nomura report. The trade gap for the fiscal year to March 2012 is expected to widen sharply to $155-$160 billion from $104.4 billion a year ago. Foreign funds are net sellers of about $300 million of Indian shares this year in sharp contrast to record investment of more than $29 billion in 2010, and the 30-share BSE Sensex is down more than 23 percent, making it the worst-performing major global market this year. "Industry is geared up to deliver infrastructure in line with the strong growth pattern and the government's forecasts," said Russell Waugh, managing director of Leighton Welspun Contractors, part of Australia's Leighton Holdings (LEI.AX).

"But the flow (of new projects) at the moment, the real flow, is not aligned with that gearing. So we're seeing most companies struggling." Infrastructure assets, including telecoms, construction and power, which account for about 25 percent of total corporate credit, are now a key concern for banks. Worries about rising bad loans prompted Moody's Investors Service earlier this month to cut its outlook on India's banking sector to "negative" from "stable", saying monetary tightening and a slowdown in the economy would cut bank loan growth. The car industry - a symbol of the aspirations of millions of India's middle classes - is now an example of how slipping growth and high interest rates have hit consumer demand and investment decisions. Car sales in India, which jumped 30 percent in the last fiscal year, have slumped due to high interest rates and rising input costs. Sales may just break even this fiscal year. Maruti Suzuki (MRTI.NS), India's biggest automaker, is deferring an investment of $560-740 million in plants in the western state of Gujarat due to the economic gloom. "When we will start work in Gujarat will depend on how the market improves in the future ... at the moment the general economic situation is too negative to justify it," Maruti Chairman R. C. Bhargava told Reuters. "There's no point creating excess capacity if the demand is not there." Macaca 12-17-2011, 09:23 PM NO QUICK FIX There is no quick fix for the government, with the fiscal deficit set to beat its target of 4.6 percent of GDP. But there is little sign of efforts to help investment, including speeding up approvals of projects hit by red tape and environmental approvals. One official, monitoring government infrastructure projects, said that of 558 government projects, 241 were delayed as of end-July, resulting in a cost overrun of some 20 percent, or more than $31 billion. The projects, which include setting up airports, new railway lines, shipping ports, roads and power plants, have been delayed by more than two years on average due to issues of land acquisition, environmental clearance and rising costs. Senior government officials, who declined to be named, described a finance ministry dominated by 76-year-old Pranab Mukherjee, who is more adept at bringing together unruly coalition allies than doing anything bold about the economy. "Mukherjee is a politician first with little time for his own ministry as he is also the chief trouble shooter for the Congress party. Many bureaucrats don't even get to see him for days and have no access to him," said one. "His style is very old world and some say not very responsive to financial markets. It's not surprising that in a crisis like what's confronting us currently, lack of imaginative leadership in the treasury department is also reflecting in the economic woes facing the country." Mukherjee first became finance minister in 1982, way before India had begun to rethink its postindependence socialist, state-driven economic model. For many, India will remain in limbo only until a real crisis prompts it to act - similar to the 1991 balance of payments crisis that ushered in the country's first economic reforms under Singh, who was then finance minister. "At the end of the day, I feel you need crisis to get going again," said V Ravichander, who advises multinationals on doing business. "And even though our growth rates have fallen from 8 to 6.9 percent on the last estimate, I guess people feel 6.9 is not still low enough for us to do something

about it." But that inertia could means India faces some turbulent years ahead, exacerbated by the 2014 election that may just polarise the country further. "The new Hindu Rate of Growth is 6 percent and on all evidence, from macroeconomic data to the empty billboards of Mumbai, we're headed there next year," wrote Gupta. "Returning to economic stagnation like that is bad enough by itself. But this is not the forgiving India of the past. This India has tasted growth, progress, optimism and aspiration."

BRICs buffeted by euro storm but stay on course (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/15/economy-brics-idINDEE7BE0EY20111215) By Alan Wheatley That Singhing Feeling All round bad news shakes the economy, but a few still see a light (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279357) By ARINDAM MUKHERJEE | Outlook India Companies Bill for Corporate Funding of Political Parties And NGOs Introduced (http://www.countercurrents.org/krishna161211.htm) By Gopal Krishna | Countercurrents Rightly cautious (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/rightly-cautious/888647/) Indian Express Editorial Behind the curve (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2721025.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Heading for grain drain (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Heading-forgrain-drain/articleshow/11135598.cms) Times of India Editorial Tax exemptions for rich costs govt Rs 4.6L cr (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Taxexemptions-for-rich-costs-govt-Rs-4-6L-cr/articleshow/11149543.cms) TNN Credit Policy: A welcome pause (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2721012.ece) By M. NARENDRA | The Hindu BusinessLine Credit Policy: Focus on liquidity (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2721011.ece) By AJAY SRINIVASAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Monetary policy: pause and effect (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/madan-sabnavismonetary-policy-pauseeffect/458767/) By Madan Sabnavis | Business Standard A tricky balance (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2721184.ece) The Hindu Editorial Indian Shares Near 28-Month Low Despite Interest Rate Pause (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204553904577102070037080092.html) By KHUSHITA VASANT | Wall Street Journal The Indian Rupee Is an Abandoned Child (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204466004577101943261966930.html) By HARSH JOSHI | Wall Street Journal India, China in Economic Warnings: Eurofail Damages World (http://blogs.the-americaninterest.com/wrm/2011/12/15/india-china-in-economic-warnings-eurofail-damages-world/) By Walter Russell Mead | The American Interest RBI shifts focus to growth, rates on hold (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/india-economyrbi-rates-idINDEE7BF05020111216) By Tony Munroe The crash of rupee is crash of confidence (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Swaminomics/entry/the-crash-of-rupee-is-crash-ofconfidence) By SA Aiyar | Times of India Macaca 12-17-2011, 09:27 PM Root problem: labour laws (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/t-n-ninan-root-problemlabour-laws/458762/) By T N Ninan | Business Standard Delivering the third Business Standard lecture on Thursday night, Raghuram Rajan provided an

interesting insight into the reason for high inflation in India. The professor of finance at Chicago, who is also an adviser to the Prime Minister, argued that productivity growth in Indian agriculture had been poor, so rural incomes were not growing fast enough. In its effort to deal with this, the government was pumping subsidies and income transfers into the countrywide, to put money in peoples pockets which the recipients were spending. Since this expenditure was not matched by productivity growth, it was causing inflation. The argument brought to mind the subtle insight that Dr Rajan offered into one of the causes of the financial crisis in the US in 2007-08. Inequality had been growing in the US, he said in his award-winning book Fault Lines, published last year. With incomes in the lower deciles virtually stagnant, politicians responded by trying to meet one of the basic needs of the poor, namely housing. They allowed financial innovations that made it possible to give housing loans to those who would not ordinarily qualify. Thus was born the sub-prime housing market which, with the help of Wall Street types, ballooned and then morphed into the megafinancial crisis that brought economies on both sides of the Atlantic to a standstill. Both arguments by Dr Rajan trace a financial problem to non-financial causes rooted in the real economy. It is a line of thought that is worth staying with. If you look for the root cause of the power sectors problems (high losses, disincentive for investors), it boils down to the virtually free electricity provided to farmers. That cant be corrected because farmers dont earn enough to be able to pay a higher electricity tariff. And there is a limit beyond which it becomes impossible for other users to cross-subsidise power to farmers; high electricity tariffs are already a burden for exporters who compete against rivals in countries that enjoy lower power tariffs. So you cant fix the power sectors problems without fixing agriculture. That argument can be taken a step further: Land revenue has virtually disappeared as a source of money for state governments farmers cant be taxed because they dont earn enough. Irrigation charges cannot be levied at any reasonable level, for the same reason. Fertiliser prices cannot be raised, diesel prices have to be kept down because farmers use it for their pump-sets, and so on. The bald truth is that half of Indias workforce toils in the fields to generate one-sixth of GDP. Since the other half produces the remaining five-sixths, non-agricultural incomes are typically five times agricultural incomes. The way to even out the imbalance is to get people off the land, and into nonagricultural occupations. But urbanisation and the growth of non-agricultural employment have been slow in India, an important reason being the stifling of industries that can provide entry-level, low-value work. China showed the way by promoting Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), and encouraging through them the manufacture and export of simple products like toys and shoes. Rajiv Gandhi, on his path-breaking visit to China in 1988, visited one such TVE outside Shanghai which was making and exporting tricycles of a basic kind. India missed the bus that China caught, but it can still catch some others like travel and tourism. The answer to the problems of high inflation and slowing growth, and low farm incomes, would lie in addressing the basic reforms that India is still to attempt like labour laws. Instead, we have a food security Bill that will create irrational incentives which end up threatening agriculture itself. Talk of committing hara-kiri

Has education lost its heart? (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/article2724064.ece) By B. M. HEGDE | The Hindu Picking up the Bill (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/Picking-up-theBill/Article1-783844.aspx) By Chanakya | Hindustan Times Team Anna says Lokpal has to have everything. You will have a parallel government then (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/team-anna-says-lokpal-has-to-have-everything.-you-willhave-a-parallel-government-then/889025/) By D K Singh | Indian Express Sliding towards participation (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/deepak-lal-slidingtowards-participation/458763/) By Deepak Lal | Business Standard Move ahead on Lokpal (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2721187.ece) The Hindu Editorial Now Kiran Bedi misinforms the public..on Lokpals judicial powers (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/now-kiran-bedi-misinforms-thepublic-on-lokpal-s-judicial-powers) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Macaca 12-18-2011, 07:33 PM

India on highway to prosperity (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/india-on-highway-toprosperity/story-e6frg6ux-1226224350776) By GREG SHERIDAN | The Australian WHEN you drive down the highway from Delhi to Jaipur you begin to feel the sheer scale of India's economic development. It's an enormous highway. It might be six lanes wide or eight - it's impossible to tell, as :DIndians don't drive in lanes and the lanes aren't marked:D. Even on a Sunday the highway throbs with trucks, hundreds of them, giant beasts of the road. Highways are a key to India's economic growth: farm to market, factory to port, call centre to dormitory suburb. When you leave Delhi and enter Haryana state, you pass through the satellite city of Gurgaon. Apart from the richest circles of central Delhi, near the embassies and government offices, Gurgaon is the place most people in the city want to live. It is a vision, flawed but splendid, of the new India struggling to emerge. It's an IT hub, with many call centres, numerous corporate headquarters, kilometres of shopping malls, swanky high-rise apartments, manicured and sometimes gated suburbs, and international brand-name hotels. It's a couple of years since I've been to Gurgaon and it seems to have exploded in the meantime. As you leave town on the Jaipur highway, Gurgaon doesn't leave you. The high-rise apartment buildings don't stop for a long time, only gradually do they give way to acres of factories. But lately the elephant of the Indian economy has stumbled. Economic growth has taken a dip, and this week saw the first monthly decline of industrial production since the global financial crisis. But the secular growth story seems to be on track, and it's important to keep the scale in sight. India is now nearly a $2 trillion economy. On the (admittedly contestable) purchasing power parity measure, India may already be the third largest economy in the world, after the US and China. If it's not there yet, it will be soon. Indian economic growth has slowed from the supercharged 9-10 per cent a year range to the still express 7-8 per cent bracket. If everything goes badly it could be as low as 6 per cent next year. But China apart, no other economy of comparable size will grow anything like as fast. For Australia, the implications are enormous. Already our two-way trade is $23 billion a year. Like China, India is seeking resources and investing in the Australian resources sector. Shrewd judges suggest that within five years India could have a total of $30bn investment in Australia, about the same as China has now. Australia has a huge stake in India's success, not only an economic stake but a geo-strategic stake as well. There is passionate debate in India about whether the growth slowdown is caused by global travails - the euro crisis, US stagnation, Middle East instability - or by an Indian combination of fiscal laxity, high interest rates and reform paralysis in the country's coalition government. India needs strong, orthodox economic policy. It desperately needs a new round of economic reform. But Indians are applying some non-conventional remedies to their situation. The whole story of India's explosive economic growth defies all textbook theory and is the most distinctive economic model the world has seen. While China followed the well-established East Asian pattern of low-wage manufactures for export, India leapt straight from dreadful poverty to turbocharged IT dominance. Conventional economic development - manufacturing and infrastructure, like the Delhi-Jaipur highway - has flowed from there. Some Indians believe IT can again make an outsize contribution to reigniting economic growth, as well as eradicating poverty. One is Sachin Pilot, the Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology, an up-and-comer in Indian politics whom you might think of as India's emerging Bill Shorten. "If you look at the numbers in the last decade," he says, "despite the slowdown in the Western world, India has done a good job in growing the size and scale and depth of our economy. There's still tremendous growth potential because there is tremendous untapped demand.

"We have two tasks: to maintain the robust growth in manufacturing, agriculture and IT, and then to make sure some of that growth gets to the poor. A lot of jobs growth will come from manufacturing. The global slowdown led to last month's decline in industrial output. But I wouldn't be too focused on one month's figures. Today the electronics industry in India is worth $45bn. In less than four years it will be worth $400bn. We don't want to be importing most of this, it will be bigger than our oil imports." Pilot believes IT can contribute to reigniting Indian economic growth and to poverty reduction. He also thinks it can be used to tackle corruption. He reels off a list of dizzying figures. At more than 100 million, India has the third highest number of internet users, behind only the US and China. There are 900 million mobile phones in India. But there is one figure Pilot is not happy with: there are only 12 million broadband connections. So the government has a multi-billion-dollar program to hook up connectivity across the nation. Every 10 per cent increase in broadband penetration brings nearly 1.5 per cent increase in the overall size of the economy, he says. Pilot believes IT can tackle production. His government is going to force the state governments to make records and services available digitally. This will reduce the scope for what Indians call "speed money": bribes paid to avoid the Indian disease of bureaucracy, "death by delay". He also believes IT can tackle poverty and development. More than 40 per cent of Indians don't have bank accounts and only 5 per cent of villages have a physical bank. Hand-held devices that are digitally connected can revolutionise villagers' ability to connect with the world and carry out commerce that can transform them from subsistence to trading. The Indian IT sector will grow by 19 per cent this year, Pilot says, a figure most countries would find impressive, but it's down from 30 per cent the year before. More than 60 per cent of India's software exports go to the US, and Pilot wants to diversify that. Parthasarathi Shome, of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, tells me the two greatest reforms India needs are a simpler set of labour laws and more effective anticorruption laws. These are part of what discourages foreign investment. But there's a lot else Pilot would like to see, including a GST. For the moment, the government has retreated on its attempt to open up multi-brand retailing to foreign ownership and competition. Yet the country desperately needs a bigger and more efficient retail sector. Naveen Jindal, the chief executive of Jindal Steel and Power, greets me at his plush New Delhi home and recounts the pleasure of doing business in Queensland and NSW. Government bureaucrats do what they say they are going to do, and don't want any special considerations in return. Julia Gillard's decision to lift the ban on Australian uranium exports to India has removed a roadblock in the relationship, and Indian investment in Australian resources will accelerate. Manish Tewari, an MP and spokesman for the Congress Party, is lavish in his praise for Gillard and her decision. "Prime Minister Gillard has shown the sagacity and vision to take a hard decision," he says. "We are aware of the sensitivity of this issue in Labor Party policy. You have sent an important signal to India that you have levelled the playing field between India and China. This may be the most important single step in the past three decades in furthering India-Australia relations." After two weeks in India, it is impossible to mistake the positive reception to the uranium decision. It is also impossible to miss the absolutely ubiquitous debate on how the country can reignite higher economic growth rates. And perhaps that is the most encouraging out-take from India today: the overwhelming consensus that the country wants to keep pursuing high economic growth. Only economic growth, after all, can lift tens, even hundreds, of millions of Indians out of poverty.

Stop controlling (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/stop-controlling/889331/) By Ila Patnaik |

Indian Express Where are the skilled? (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/where-are-the-skilled/889325/) Indian Express Editorial Seek growth spur from talent pool (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/seekgrowth-spur-talent-pool-779) Deccan Chronicle Editorial A ruling that takes corporates to task (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/cgopinath/article2726640.ece) By C. GOPINATH | The Hindu BusinessLine Gathering speed (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2726500.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial India's own emissions trading scheme (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2726531.ece) By SAURABH KUMAR | The Hindu BusinessLine Govt plans new urban hubs around big cities (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-plansnew-urban-hubs-around-big-cities/articleshow/11161776.cms) By Mahendra Kumar Singh | TNN Bizarre India, 2011 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204466004577101683573703036.html) Wall Street Journal Crunch time for firms as debts come due (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/17/indiacompanies-debt-idINDEE7BG07H20111217) By Sumeet Chatterjee | Reuters Macaca 12-18-2011, 07:38 PM After diagnosis, the difficult part (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/18/after-diagnosis-the-difficultpart.html) By M.J. Akbar YOU can create a Lokpal, but how do you change India? Anna Hazare`s movement has been among the most important developments since Jayaprakash Narayan`s stirring leadership in the 1970s marked the second phase of that long historic process known as minting a nation out of a country. Anna`s breathtaking contribution is that he has forced us to recognise that there is cancer in the body politic and that it is entering the terminal stage. He has withstood threat, pressure and inducement, including temptations aimed towards both ego and bank balance. He has insisted with courage and conviction that we find a doctor and fund a hospital that will begin to address this national disease. Both are essential, since there can be no forward movement until we identify and institutionalise those who can heal the patient. But diagnosis, however brilliant, is not a cure; it is only the beginning of a process. The next step, if anything, is harder. Cosmetic change will disguise the virulent symptoms, but it will not eradicate the crisis. Now that draft legislation has reached parliament`s drawing board, it is perhaps time to consider what precisely it might deliver. We need a Lokpal because the present inter-relation between crime and punishment has collapsed. Crime has been delinked from punishment with grease. There must therefore be a Lokpal bureau of investigation since a general without a force will only chase butterflies, not criminals. That is obvious. Then comes the difficult part. Where will this new police force emerge from? As presently envisaged, it can only come from the existing guardians of law and order. No one expects Anna Hazare to raise a new contingent of Indians who will, when they graduate from St Divine School of Honesty, be awarded angelic wings under their armpits instead of hair. Question: why should the chaps who created the problem in the first place become any better as caretakers of the solution? The merit of the LBI concept is that it will be dedicated to fighting graft. What if, within five years, it merely raises the price of grease, and the cost of corruption becomes a higher quotient in the algebra of business balance sheets? I am not a sceptic. I do not subscribe to the pessimist position that since nothing will happen, it is safer to do nothing. Anna Hazare, in any case, has eliminated `nothing` from the options before the

Indian state, and for this he deserves our adulation and admiration. There were muscular segments of this government, and their cohorts in the other estates, including media, who thought they could leak some acid on the Anna parade, and it would scatter. Wiser counsel prevailed; a sage or two currently ranked higher than the muscle party, recognised that any more acid would only inflame crowds and incite conflagration across the country. But as we attempt to change course and steer back towards sanity, it is necessary to lift curtains from the grey areas, recognise doubt and try to shift it towards clarity. Such a process cannot ignore contradictions on the street. Urban India, the first stronghold of the Anna movement, has collaborated in an alibi narrative of corruption which soothes the growing middle class need for blame without the pain of accountability. Corruption, in this comforting scenario, is the exclusive fief of the powerful: police, politician, businessman, bureaucrat. The alibi works because it is a substantial part of the truth, but it is not the whole truth. There are men and women in government who are honest; and their numbers are not insignificant. The debate about 2G pricing became a debate only because there were officers in the finance ministry who refused to be coerced, and left an imprint of integrity on the files. At the other end of the spectrum lies a different reality. The urban street, which considers itself a victim, and is proud of a vanguard role in any protest, leaps to take advantage of the culture of corruption whenever it gets a chance to make a personal side deal. It will not, for instance, pay a fine when it breaks the law; it will bargain with a constable for a corruption rate of escape. There is a story going around in Delhi, which is funny without being a joke. Traffic police are now demanding Rs200 as bribe for a violation instead of Rs50, and calling it the Anna Hazare rate. Such cynicism would not survive a day if the holier-than-thou driver of the car decided to pay the fine of Rs500 instead. It takes two sides to complete a transaction. Do not dismiss this as petty crime. Culture is the aggregation of moral snowflakes. They might seem individually insubstantial, but when they congeal into ice a nation can become snowbound.

The Inarticulate Age (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Citycitybangbang/entry/theinarticulate-age) By Santosh Desai | Times of India Banana republic? Not yet (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2726524.ece) By K. R. Srivats, G. Naga Sridhar, P. V. Sivakumar, Aditi Nigam | The Hindu BusinessLine Churlish Congress (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2726528.ece) By SHISHIR SINHA | The Hindu BusinessLine Foul odour from Home Ministry (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/b-sraghavan/article2726499.ece) By B. S. RAGHAVAN | The Hindu BusinessLine The opposition must step back (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Editorials/Theopposition-must-step-back/Article1-784143.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Lokpal, Lok Sabha (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/lokpal-lok-sabha/889324/) Indian Express Editorial Help Wanted (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/friedman-help-wanted.html) By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN | The New York Times Macaca 12-18-2011, 07:45 PM Maharani's durbar and a blinkered view of history (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/rightand-wrong/entry/maharani-s-durbar-and-a-blinkered-view-of-history) By Swapan Dasgupta | Times of India Apart from newspapers that commemorated the event and an agreeable party on the lawns of Ambassador Hotel where the cultural elite drank to the occasion, the centenary of the transfer of the Capital and the foundation of New Delhi was largely unobserved. Official India, which otherwise

loves to organise tacky commemorations by producing unappealing postage stamps, gave this event a wide berth. And, while no one was forthcoming about the reason, the rationale was inescapable: the 1911 Durbar was a colonial event and, therefore, only worthy of sneer. The Hindu sense of history has at the best of times been rather feeble. However, when it comes to the 190 years of British rule, the disdain for a recorded past is coupled with a spurious political correctness and hypocrisy. Even after six decades of Independence and flamboyant assertions of national sovereignty, India has yet to develop the necessary self-confidence to view history as history. Instead, the past has been sought to be tailor-made to view the prevailing political fashions of the present. It is not that the ignominy of being ruled by a foreigner has weighed heavily on the national consciousness. In the past thousand years or so, predators from the west have repeatedly overwhelmed indigenous kingdoms, particularly in northern and eastern India, and combined ruthless vandalism with innovations. Turks, Mongols, Persians and Afghans made India their happy hunting ground, and ruled with a mixture of raw coercion and cultural co-option. The conquerors always took care to maintain a discreet distance from the conquered peoples without creating a closed system based on ethnicity and religion. Of course, post-Akbar many of these barriers broke down but never sufficiently for the hapless Dara Shukoh to become a trendsetter. Not enough of the conquerors went native although enough of the conquered peoples appropriated facets of the Persian and Turkish ways of life. Many of these changes stemming from conquest and subordination were also dutifully played out in the two centuries of colonial rule. The British steadfastly maintained their social distance from the natives, particularly after the uprising of 1857 and the influx of the memsahibs into the Civil Lines and cantonments. The Indians were socially wary of the British but there were enough collaborators (as in Moghul times) who sought to bridge the cultural and emotional gulf between the West and the East. More to the point, there were enough Indians who genuinely believed (particularly after the demise of the East India Company in 1858) that British rule constituted a significant advance on anything the country had hitherto experienced. At one level the 1911 Durbar was a spectacular show of imperial mightas evident from the grovelling genuflection of the Indian princes (barring Baroda and Udaipur) to the King-Emperor. But it would be imprudent to forget that until Mahatma Gandhi captivated the nation with his simple message of swaraj, the common Indian was genuinely enamoured of the Queens peace. The choreography of the 1911 Durbar was thrown out of gear when the Indian crowds broke the cordon to kiss the ground on which the King and Queen had walked. Were they victims of false consciousness? Maharani Victoria wasnt Indian and nor did she ever visit India. Yet, this diminutive frump became as much a part of India as any distant Moghul. In 1911, when the New Delhi project was inaugurated by George V on December 15, the British Empire was the most worlds most decisive power; by 1931, when New Delhi was finally ready to function as the seat of government, the imperial sunset was approaching. This is not revisionist history. It is the history that was itself cynically revised as part of the nationbuilding project of Indias post-imperial rulers. But history isnt rewritten by removing the George V statue from its canopied pedestal opposite India Gate or by renaming Connaught Place as Rajiv Chowk. Unless India is overcome by perversity, there will be a Lutyens Delhi distinct from a DDA Delhi, a Kingsway called Rajpath, the North and South Blocks and a Parliament House built for an India where democracy was conceived of as the future. The British Raj wasnt quite the dark ages the sloganeers make it out to be.

Liberation and its discontents (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/liberation-and-itsdiscontents/889318/) By Frederick Noronha | Indian Express Delhi needs more space, but how? (http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Delhineeds-more-space-but-how/Article1-784172.aspx) By Sidhartha Roy | Hindustan Times

Caste it away (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Caste-itaway/articleshow/11157231.cms) Times of India Editorial Killer hooch (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Killerhooch/articleshow/11157257.cms) Times of India Editorial Toxic liquor leaves village of widows (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/18/toxic-liquor-leaves-villageof-widows.html) Agence France-Presse Beyond the old barriers (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2726833.ece) By MRINAL PANDE | The Hindu What Kapil Sibal does not understand: the internet (http://kafila.org/2011/12/07/what-kapil-sibaldoes-not-understand-the-internet/) By Shivam Vij | Kafila Macaca 12-18-2011, 07:51 PM Only Reacting, Not Acting (http://www.countercurrents.org/dube171211.htm) By Mukul Dube | Countercurrents This piece of writing is inspired by a long telephone conversation with Harsh Kapoor (South Asia Citizens Wire, Communalism Watch, etc.) which followed a public meeting of Champa the Amiya and B.G. Rao Foundation at which the speakers were Manisha Sethi and Kumar Ketkar. I shall focus on the implications of what I see as the main issues discussed. Sethi, who is perhaps best known for her work related to the Batla House encounter of 2008, spoke of what has become the established pattern in dealing with terror: Muslims, mostly young males, are arrested and imprisoned with the foul treatment that imprisonment has come to imply and the business is given wide and completely uncritical publicity by the mass media. These unfortunates are often released, years later, after their lives and those of their families have been destroyed. There is an assumption that every explosion and every discharge of a gun must be the act of a Muslim, because dont we know that all Muslims belong to SIMI or IM or another of the terror outfits that might just as well have been created by police and press, so convenient are they. We know now that many encounters have been imaginary, dreamt up by a few people in uniform. The corpses, though, are real and as they cannot speak, the police have the last word. Ketkar spoke chiefly of the quite rapid growth of Hindutva as a force in Parliament, and in the countrys politics generally, and of how Hindutva has managed to infiltrate every institution in the country, from the staffs of daily newspapers to the sarkari bureaucracy and even the State machinery of the police and the armed forces. He said a good many other things, but in this piece of writing I shall ignore them. Kapoor said that Hindutva has become the done thing, while in the past it was at least subterranean if not actually despised. This is manifested in the symbols seen everywhere the marks on the forehead, the thread tied around wrists. I pointed out that it is religiosity in general which has become a way of life: if the Hindus have their symbols, the Muslims have their skull caps which I, a product of the 1950s and 1960s, associate with namaz and not with constant, public visibility. There is a common thread here. The monetary compensation that is given to those unjustly imprisoned is not justice. Justice demands that the functionaries of the State the police and others who perpetrated the injustice be punished according to the rules under which they are employed and under the laws of the land. If the forces of Hindutva have infiltrated the countrys governmental institutions, they have done that against the rules which govern the functioning of those institutions. If Hindutva, as expressed in hatred towards other religions, has come to permeate the very thinking of the bulk of Indian society, that must be called at once the victory of unreason and the defeat of our humanity. The media, by and large, look to the saleability of what they produce and not to the principles of journalism or to the role of the mass media in society. Kapoor also pressed home something which both speakers had touched upon, something which has been brought up repeatedly, in the years since 2002, by far more people than I can list here. This is that the agenda is set by the actions of Hindutva and the terms of discourse are defined by Hindutva, so that the rest of us can only react and are kept so busy putting out fires, metaphorically, that we have no time to do those positive, productive and creative things that should be done. I belong to the old tradition, seen all over the world, which might be called the Phir Subah Hogi Tradition. The older among us speak constantly of the dawn

that is around the corner, certainly to inspire the young and perhaps to give ourselves courage. But the problem, in the words of a friend whom I shall not name, is that those who are kept busy dousing innumerable large and small fires and trying to tackle the termites and worms and locusts that are all over, cannot take any of the steps that are needed to bring that dawn closer. Do we live in hope or in despair? Usually we engage in just the sort of mechanical activity that serves as a substitute for accomplishment. Again in the words of Kapoor, people who see themselves as progressive and secular find themselves sharing the stage with essentially obscurantist individuals from both main religions. This must be called a victory of practicality over principles: and because it is fundamentally flawed, it leads to nothing beyond small items tucked away in some newspapers and a few posts on obscure web sites. We only think that we have done something.

A third of India's Muslims say they are suffering (http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/southasia/a-third-of-indias-muslims-say-they-are-suffering) By Suryatapa Bhattacharya | The National Weapons of mass instruction? (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Weapons-of-massinstruction/articleshow/11161715.cms) By Srijana Mitra Das | TNN Macaca 12-18-2011, 07:57 PM GHULAM NABI FAI AND THE ISI (http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/ghulam-nabi-fai-and-the-isi3523.html) By Radha Vinod Raju | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies No one in India was surprised when Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai was arrested by US authorities in July this year on the grounds of colluding with the ISI to influence American opinion on the Kashmir issue. In fact, according to informed views in India, the US government was aware of Fais connections with the Pakistan government much earlier, and the timing of the arrest of Fai only confirmed the downward spiral of US-Pakistan relations. The FBI arrested Ghulam Nabi Fai on 19 July 2011 for allegedly working secretly for Pakistan's ISI to lobby and influence the US government on the Kashmir conflict, in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Fai was born in Badgam district of Kashmir, and was an early sympathizer of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Kashmir. He did his graduation from Srinagars Sri Pratap College and his Masters from the Aligarh Muslim University. After a stint in Saudi Arabia, he moved to the US in 1977 and got his PhD in mass communications from Temple University, Pennsylvania. He became a US citizen in 1990. There are reports that he was a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami during his college days and knew Muhammad Yusuf Shah aka Syed Salahudin, Chief of the Hizbul Mujahideen. His arrest and conviction has been condemned by Syed Ali Shah Gilani, leader of the hard line Hurriyat faction, which would confirm the above background. It may be recalled that the Pakistani Army and the ISI had initially supported the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, which was spear-heading the movement for independence. The attacks on the Kashmiri Pandits, and other selected targets in Kashmir in 1989-90 by the militants of the JKLF were the brainwork of the ISI. When they could not influence the aim of the JKLF, which was independence for Kashmir, the ISI stopped funding, training and arming their cadres. The ISI thereafter focused on training and arming the Hizbul Mujahideen, which was the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and whose aim was to merge Kashmir with Pakistan. The attack on the JKLF cadres by the Hizbul Mujahideen in the early 1990s was to eliminate them from the scene completely on account of the ideological differences. The funding of Ghulam Nabi Fai, a Kashmiri from Budgam and a US citizen, needs to be seen in this background. If the ISI has been funding him all this while, it can only be because he was playing their game, and not because he was pursuing the so-called cause of Kashmirs independence. Fai was charged along with a Pakistani American associate named Zaheer Ahmad for getting illegal funding for the Kashmir American Council from Pakistan. Neil MacBride, the attorney handling Fais case, said that Fai is accused of a decades-long scheme with one purpose - to hide Pakistans involvement behind his efforts to influence the US governments position on Kashmir, his handlers in Pakistan allegedly funneled millions through the Kashmir Center to contribute to U.S. elected officials, fund high-profile conferences, and pay for other efforts that promoted the Kashmiri cause to decision makers in Washington. For the last 20 years, Mr. Fai secretly took millions of dollars from Pakistani intelligence and lied about it to the U.S. government, MacBride said. As a paid

operative of ISI, he did the bidding of his handlers in Pakistan while he met with US elected officials, funded high-profile conferences, and promoted the Kashmiri cause to decision-makers in Washington. He was reportedly directed by the ISI and was in touch with them 4000 times in the last 3 years. The prosecutors also alleged that Kashmiri American Council was run by elements of Pakistani government including the ISI and that Fai had received at least US$4 million from the government of Pakistan. In a plea bargaining agreement, Fai admitted that he routinely submitted his strategy plans and budgets to ISI, specifically to a contact named Javeed Aziz Khan, also known as Brigadier Abdullah. As per reports, Khan used to chastise Fai for making decisions without the ISIs approval. Reports also indicate that Fai admitted that in December 2008, he had submitted a plan to the ISI outlining his strategy to secure congressional support for pressuring the White House to support Kashmiri independence. As he planned the agenda for his 2009 Peace Conference, Khan sent Fai a list of 18 suggested topics. Of the 10 sessions eventually included in the conference agenda, six were taken directly from Khans suggestions. No further proof is needed of Ghulam Nabi Fais close working relationship with the ISI. He took US citizenship in 1990, at the height of the anti-India movement in Kashmir. What needs investigation is whether he took the US citizenship on the ISIs bidding to strengthen their case through an Indian-born Kashmiri. Dawood Gilani had changed his name in 2006 to David Headley similarly on the ISIs bidding to enable him to work for them under cover in India.

Our AFSPA friendlier than that of Pakistan: Army (http://www.tehelka.com/story_main51.asp? filename=Ws161211AFSPA.asp) By Riyaz Wani | Tehelka Is infiltration in J-K on rise after AFSPA move? (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/is-infiltrationin-jk-on-rise-after-afspa-move/889234/) Agencies Macaca 12-18-2011, 08:05 PM Waiting to explode (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/Waiting-toexplode/Article1-784139.aspx) By Shishir Gupta | Hindustan Times After the September 7, 2011, bomb blast outside Delhi high court, two incidents merit serious consideration: the seizure of five kilogrammes of high intensity explosives from a car outside Ambala railway station on October 12, and the busting of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) terror module with the arrest of Pakistani national Mohammed Adil aka Ajmal in Madhubani, Bihar, on November 25. Investigations into the Ambala case have revealed that the RDX consignment was pushed into India by the Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF). The KTF is reportedly funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the explosives were delivered through couriers affiliated to the Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT). The KTF's founder, Jagtar Singh Tara, a former Babbar Khalsa International terrorist, an accused in the assassination case of former Punjab chief minister Beant Singh, had escaped from Burail Jail in Punjab and is now based in Pakistan. The unravelling of the IM module showed that northern Bihar districts bordering Nepal are the 'new Azamgarh' for this indigenous terror group. The police claimed that the 14 identified group members, of whom seven were caught, were responsible for the German Bakery bombing in Pune in February 2010, the RK Chinnaswamy stadium bombing in Bengaluru in April 2010, and the shootout at Jama Masjid in Delhi on September 18, 2010. These two seemingly disparate incidents point to certain developments. One, there is evidence of serious attempts to revive militancy in Punjab by Pakistan-based elements. Two, the fig leaf of deniability in the name of 'indigenous terrorism' no longer holds. We may see more Pakistan-based 'jihadists' getting directly involved in terror strikes in India in the future. Three, the IM's leadership, which survived the 2008 Batla House encounter and evaded the country-wide police dragnet thereafter, is not only getting fresh recruits but is also preparing for new terror strikes. Four, Islamic radicalisation continues unabated within India, with new pockets such as Basopatti in the Madhubani district in Bihar, Tumkur in Karnataka, and Tambaram near Chennai coming up on the radar. Also, the interrogation of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)-trained Ajmal revealed that after years of

being choked by the ISI for conducting assassination attempts on then president Pervez Musharraf, the group has been unshackled in Pakistan and is apparently preparing to target India. That India is back in JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar's cross-hairs has also been corroborated by intercepts of communications among the group's key handlers in Pakistan and Nepal. Given the fact that IM co-founders Riyaz and Iqbal Bhatkal managed to hide in Delhi for two months after the Batla House encounter, and that Yasin Bhatkal was trying to settle down in the same city this year, India's internal security set-up has much on its hands. Yasin, who managed to give Indian agencies the slip, is the current pivot of IM operations in India with Riyaz and Iqbal now safe in Karachi. The radicalisation of IM recruits in Salafi mosques in north Bihar require an urgent counterterror response. As the UPA is committed to improving relations with Pakistan, New Delhi should insist that Islamabad take visible action against anti-India groups, freelance jihadists and rogue agents. There is an urgent need to regulate human and material traffic along the Bihar-Nepal border. This means that the ongoing construction work of four integrated check-posts along the 1,751 km border should be conducted on a war footing and be completed by end-2012. With Bangladesh and Myanmar on board on mutual security issues, India should put pressure on Nepal to weed out radicals from its Terai region. Within India, human intelligence capacities should be built in ghettos and gated communities to ensure that terrorists and radicals do not get shelter. The ability of the Indian State to neutralise terror modules has to move up a notch or two. There is no other option.

Dawood's ex-aide heads rebel outfit in Arunachal (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/Guwahati/Dawood-s-ex-aide-heads-rebel-outfit-in-Arunachal/Article1-784192.aspx) Hindustan Times Coping with GenNext journalists (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/coping-with-gennextjournalists/20111218.htm) By B Raman | Rediff Macaca 12-18-2011, 08:12 PM Four decades on and where are we? (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/18/four-decades-on-andwhere-are-we.html) By Ardeshir Cowasjee | Dawn TWO days ago the nation commemorated or it should have even though to the majority it may have little significance the 40th anniversary of the signing of the instrument of surrender by the commander of the Pakistan forces in East Pakistan and the commander of the Indian forces of Eastern Command at Ramna race course at one minute past five in the afternoon of Dec 16, 1971. Thus died the Pakistan founded and made by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a mere 24 years previously. It had had a brief painful life with acrimony never absent between the two wings of the country separated by enemy territory. Writing elsewhere, a columnist last week suggested that the first order of national business should be on the teaching of history. For this is a country with no use for history. No, history plays no part in the national psyche nor in the thinking process (if there be one) of those who have over the years been put into or taken over the leadership of this nation divided unto itself. It has been forgotten amidst the present-day hysteria of anti-Americanism that has overtaken both rulers and the ruled, fuelled by what is known coyly as the establishment that in 1971 the breakaway of East Pakistan was the most traumatic event in the countrys short life. The population of what was left of Pakistan was reduced by more than half (and, boy, have we now made up for that with an unwieldy population of 180 million that cannot be supported in far too many ways). Territory was lost as was the geopolitical role in Southeast Asia, plus a significant portion of the economy. Arrogance battling with ignorance and a false sense of superiority led the west wing, whilst the east wing fretted and fumed. When things came to a head after atrocities committed by both sides during the fraught year of 1971, and hostilities broke out war with our large neighbour it was the state-controlled media

that covered up any and all truth just as the free media, subject now to self-censorship, sensationalism and hysteria is fuelling a crush USA campaign rather than as it was then a crush India mode. This country never seems to have had an awareness of its own weight and strength. Lest we all forget, and for those that just do not know, reproduced here is the instrument of surrender signed on that sad day long ago when perhaps, at a rough guess, two-thirds of our population were not even born. The people, plus the leadership, need to either remember or know: The Pakistan Eastern Command agree to surrender all Pakistan Armed Forces in Bangla Desh to Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and Bangla Desh forces in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes all Pakistan land, air and naval forces as also all para-military forces and civil armed forces. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora. The Pakistan Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora as soon as the instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms and will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of LieutenantGeneral Jagjit Singh Aurora will be final, should any doubt arise as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender terms. Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender shall be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with provisions of the Geneva Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all Pakistan military and para-military forces who surrender. Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of West Pakistan origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora. Signed by J.S. Aurora and A.A.K. Niazi on Dec 16, 1971. So, 79,700 regular Pakistani soldiers and paramilitary troops were prisoners of war in Indian hands, together with 12,500 civilians. Thirteen hundred men were lost in battle as opposed to how many thousands lost in todays battle fighting the scourge of terrorism, mainly homegrown. The army had told the nation it would fight to the last man. It failed in its promise. Military and civilian governments over 24 years, in their arrogance and incompetence, which had seeped down into the masses, had played their part in the loss of half a country. Horrible things happen in war that is what war is all about, killing. We are up in arms about the Salala tragedy quite forgetting about the thousands of other soldiers who have lost their lives battling with terrorism inflicted by our own people through circumstances of our own making. Pakistan does not stand tall and proud, despite what the establishment-geared government might tell us. And it cannot afford to stand alone for too long. America is no pushover. The prime minister has made noises about soon reverting to what was normal, cooperation in an attempt to sort out the dangers posed by the Afghan situation. It will have to happen. Pique over what may well have been an accident and dreams of strategic depth are not going to get us far. The pity is that in the US we are now left sadly short on the diplomatic front. Voices of sanity are few, and to them no one listens. Skill is needed to ward off the isolation now faced and any further humiliation.

Map phobia (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/17/map-phobia.html) By A.G. Noorani | Dawn Monkey business (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/18/monkey-business.html) Dawn Editorial Macaca 12-18-2011, 08:19 PM Pakistans patrons (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/18/pakistans-patrons.html) By Michael Krepon | Dawn INDIA remains thoroughly non-aligned, even after its civil nuclear deal with Washington. Pakistan,

in contrast, needs patrons, and has succeeded in having two powerful ones Washington and Beijing to counterbalance India, a significant diplomatic accomplishment. No other country has managed to draw significant, concurrent support from both Washington and Beijing, both before and after these powerhouses started speaking to each other. Afghanistan is a trivial pursuit in geopolitical terms. This poor, unfortunate state matters most in geopolitical terms as the locus of follies conducted by others within its borders. Afghanistan matters far less than the demise of the US-Pakistan partnership. A complete split would constitute a loss for both parties, but Pakistan, the weaker party, will suffer far more for losing a patron. The United States and Pakistan have been partners since the 1950s. Pakistan`s perceived utility to the United States extended long after John Foster Dulles` regional alliances to contain the Soviet Union Cento and Seato dissolved. Paradoxically, the rise and revitalisation of the Taliban, with Rawalpindi`s support, created conditions whereby Pakistan could initially renew and then jeopardise its partnership with the United States. In June 2004, Washington declared Pakistan to be a major non-Nato ally. It`s been a downhill ride ever since. Reversing this slide will take a good long while, especially if the Taliban retake Kabul with Rawalpindi`s help. China, Pakistan`s other powerful patron, is an `all weather` friend, providing significant support for Pakistan`s ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programmes in the past. After the Bush administration gifted New Delhi with a qualified exemption to the rules of nuclear commerce, Beijing consented to repeated Pakistani requests for nuclear power plants at concessionary rates reactors that may no longer be built on Chinese soil. Islamabad is increasingly looking to Beijing for investment and infrastructure development, but big steps forward are hindered by Pakistan`s internal security problems. In a stunning blow to Pakistani economic development plans, the China Kingho Group pulled out of a $19bn deal to build coal mines, power and chemical plants in Sindh because Beijing feels that Karachi is not safe to invest or reside in. Beijing has also called out Pakistan a very unusual move because of unrest in China`s western border areas stoked allegedly by militants trained in Pakistan. Islamabad has pledged to deal with the issues causing Chinese discontent, and seeks to get investment back on track. During crises with India in 1990, 1999 and 2001-02, Pakistani civilian and military leaders made beelines to Beijing seeking backup. They received polite but unmistakable advice to resolve their difficulties with New Delhi without major new weapon shipments or shrill public warnings against Indian military adventurism. Beijing helped the United States, South Asia`s essential crisis manager, more than it helped Pakistan during these three crises. During the millennial flood of 2010, the United States provided $550m to help Pakistanis in great distress, including $62m in seeds and agricultural implements so that farmers could produce a bumper wheat crop after the waters receded. After prodding by US officials, China reportedly added $200m in flood-related assistance to its initial offering of $47m. Pakistani government leaders have tried to strengthen their partnership with China in tangible ways as ties with the United States fray. One method of dealing with Washington`s growing disaffection is by characterising security assurances purportedly made in private by Chinese officials in ways that Beijing has notably refrained from reaffirming. For example, during Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar`s trip to China in May 2011, he spoke appreciatively of Chinese construction of the Gwadar port, while expressing an interest in Chinese construction of a naval base there. When asked about this request, a senior Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson replied, I have not heard about it. This odd exchange took place around the same time as a meeting in Beijing between Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Pakistani media outlets dutifully reported a

Pakistani foreign ministry press release that, China has warned in unequivocal terms that any attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China. Beijing has advised Washington to respect Pakistan`s sovereignty and solidarity The Chinese leadership was extremely forthcoming in assuring unprecedented support to Pakistan for its national cause and security. Chinese media outlets did not report this assurance. Similarly, after Adm Mike Mullen vocalised his assessment about Rawalpindi`s ties with the Haqqani network before leaving his post as chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, Prime Minister Gilani asserted the following week, during a visit by Vice Premier Meng Jianzhu, China`s minister of public safety, that China categorically supports Pakistan`s efforts to uphold its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Again, Chinese media reports did not use this formulation. Pakistan`s military will increasingly rely on Chinese equipment. But the track record of ChinaPakistan relations especially during natural disasters and crises with India suggests a relationship in which Pakistan asks for much and Beijing is circumspect about giving. The writer is co-founder of the Stimson Centre in Washington, DC

Resetting Pak-US ties (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=82967&Cat=9) By Asif Ezdi Single issue foreign policy (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308425/single-issue-foreign-policy/) By Tanvir Ahmad Khan | The Express Tribune A psychological warfare operation (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308427/a-psychological-warfareoperation/) By Shaukat Qadir | The Express Tribune Road map for Afghanistan as contested as ever (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20111219a1.html) By HARSH V. PANT | The Japan Times India In Afghanistan: Light Amid Gloom (http://www.eurasiareview.com/18122011-india-inafghanistan-light-amid-gloom-analysis/) By Bibhu Prasad Routray | Eurasia Review Macaca 12-18-2011, 08:28 PM Grand unifying conspiracy theory (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\19\story_19-12-2011_pg3_3) By Syed Mansoor Hussain | Daily Times Frankly I do not give an athletes foot about Memogate, my only quibble with the darn thing is that it should not be pronounced Meemogate. But I am entirely perturbed about the news that close to 150 goats were stolen in one night in the Faisalabad area. One hundred and fifty goats! Just imagine the logistics of it. At maybe around 20 or 30 kilos per goat, that is a lot of goat to haul away without serious planning and much help. Just imagine dear readers: having to walk away with one goat, bleating endlessly and possibly struggling valiantly and multiply that by 150. There is of course the possibility that it was not really theft but a conspiracy hatched by the ubiquitous establishment. Why the establishment, you ask? Well, there is nobody else in Pakistan that is sufficiently organised and has enough well trained people in its employ to pull off a major operation of this nature. But then who exactly is the establishment? Anybody as far as I am concerned who can do whatever it wants and gets away with it. Quite possibly the actual perpetrators were the so-called proxies of the establishment aka the jihadists. I suppose the USs decision to cut off aid to the establishment just might be having a downstream effect leading people who once benefitted from the largesse of the establishment now being forced to forage for themselves. After all, what self-respecting jihadi would ever consume anything except for genuine goat curry? Desperate times, desperate measures. There is, however, one other possibility that must be considered. Perhaps the goats finally had enough of servitude and decided to make a dash for it; how they managed to tie up their owners is of course a matter of some concern. Could this be the beginning of the revolution that everybody and his/her aunt are talking about these days? Well, the revolution has to start some place and by somebody and why not goats destined to be slaughtered to provide culinary enjoyment for the rich and the powerful? But all that sounded a bit too fantastical to believe so I kept wondering about the real story behind it. One thing I am however convinced of is that the establishment is definitely

involved. And then came enlightenment or at least a plausible reason. Soon after reading about the missing goats, I ran into a news report about a statement made by our new revolutionary leader, Mr Imran Khan about sheep and goats sitting in parliament. As we all know Mr Khan is never wrong and of course would not indulge in metaphorical statements that might be misconstrued, especially by the throngs of educated Pakistanis who follow his every word and accept every statement he makes as gospel truth. I am sure you are wondering what Khan sahibs statement has to do with the missing goats in Faisalabad but bear with me, I am getting there and I promise you it is a doozy, far deeper in conspiratorial imagination than almost anything else around. Now, Khan sahib stated that sheep and goats are sitting in parliament so his truly believing supporters expect that soon when they see a picture of our parliament in session, they will actually see sheep and goats in there. Here comes in the role of the establishment. We all know that Khan sahib is the The Man as far as the establishment is concerned and clearly the establishment wants to prove him right in almost all things, especially when it comes to their joint opinion about the present elected representatives of the people and parliament they inhabit. So, my interpretation of the missing goats combined with Khan sahibs statement about sheep and goats sitting in parliament is that at an appropriate time the people of Pakistan will wake up to the sight of goats actually sitting in parliament, most likely during a joint session addressed by the president. Enquiring minds will of course wonder why the goats were procured at this time when the presidents address to a joint session is still a while away. The answer is obvious. The goats have to be trained, properly groomed and brainwashed into acting like the parliamentarians. Frankly, the establishment has accomplished similar feats in the past. But this can take time, which is obviously the real reason why President Zardari is being forced by the establishment to delay his return to Pakistan. Also, the establishment has to make sure that enough of the humanoid members of parliament are made to boycott the aforementioned joint session and allow their seats to be occupied by goats made up to look like them. Once all these preparations are complete, I am sure that the president will be allowed to return to Pakistan and address a joint session of parliament. Here, as my ever conspiratorial mind wandered further afield, I realised that the Memogate conspiracy could indeed also really be about replacing the present political dispensation with a goatacracy. After all, considering the present state of governance, most independent and objective analysts of the Pakistani scene are convinced that if goats ruled Pakistan instead of the present lot, Pakistan will definitely not be worse off but indeed might do a lot better. Goats, as we all know, have no interest in living in big houses, driving bulletproof sedans worth millions of rupees and having Swiss bank accounts running into billions of rupees. And goats have absolutely no interest in setting up rental power plants either. All that I need to do now is to try and square all this with the nude shoot of Veena Malik with ISI painted on her arm and her subsequent disappearance and rumours that she has returned to Pakistan hiding in a shuttlecock burqa. It is all connected; of that I am convinced, but how and that I promise you dear readers I will soon figure out.

Memogate: public interest or political interest? (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\19\story_19-12-2011_pg3_4) By Marvi Sirmed Political stability (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\19\story_19-122011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial A way out of the memogate mess (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308412/a-way-out-of-thememogate-mess/) By Shahzad Chaudhry | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:06 PM A case of showcase sovereignty! (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308819/a-case-of-showcasesovereignty/) By Mohammad Aasim Saleem | The Express Tribune As much as I appreciate the nations enthusiasm at the very idea of a confrontation with the US, I really see no case for the advertised sovereignty. Following the November 26 incident which claimed the lives of Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan boycotted the Bonn conference as its sovereignty was violated and it had to react. Wikipedia defines sovereignty as, the quality of having supreme,

independent authority over a geographic area, such as a territory. Now, it may all be a matter of perception, but name a province in Pakistan where this joke of a government can attribute the word sovereign to itself; terrorism in the name of religion, crime in the name of poverty, mafias in the name of rights and corruption in the name of the states infancy. What sovereignty are we talking about? The fact is, as things stand right now, we have no sovereignty. The Bonn conference boycotted, the Shamsi airbase will probably be vacated and Nato supplies remain suspended to date all in the name of defiance.. What does it actually take for a nation and its representatives to wake-up to the idea of sovereignty or national pride; the death of over two dozen soldiers or the thousands who have already died as a result of Americas war on terror, a decade of deceit by our governments who publicly disapproved and condemnded drone attacks while agreeing to them in private or twotiming the nation and the intelligence? For Gods sake Mr president and prime minister! We are a nation still plunged in the worst scenarios of secularism and sectarianism. We are an Islamic Republic that has no clue of Islam. It is the 21st century and we still practice evils like karo kari and legitimise them. We have jagirdars and landlords who chain hundreds as bonded labour. We rape our own, loot ATMs and banks, charge double in holy months and we exploit every single weakness in others to make ourselves stronger. For every single failure, nationally and internationally, we cling on to conspiracy theories to salvage self-respect. As things stand, we do not have control over our own lives, let alone the nation and its boundaries; so wheres the question of sovereignty or national pride? Now, however, far-fetched, unrealistic and rather dramatic my solutions may sound, I do believe they will restore the pride and feeling that we had in, for say, 1961. To me, the solution lies in change that must occur within the 180 million who make up the nation. By Gods grace and by Gods grace only, it will happen when we cast votes based on political agendas and not on ethnic grounds. When this happens, the US will not dare to send a drone this way because as soon as it violates Pakistans airspace (after necessary protocol), it will be shot down! We will have a foreign policy not determined by scenarios and dictated by the US, but by choices based on peoples sentiments. This will be the day when there will be governance of the people, by the people, for the people. Then, when one fine day, a random incident occurs on our borders, perhaps we can claim that our sovereignty has been violated, our trust harmed, our dignity challenged and our pride shaken.

Balochistan will not remain with Pakistan: Top Baloch leader (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Balochistan-will-not-remain-with-Pakistan-TopBaloch-leader/articleshow/11170510.cms) Press Trust Of India Parents knew brutal truth of Pakistani madrassah dungeon (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8964205/Parents-knew-brutal-truthof-Pakistani-madrassah-dungeon.html) By Rob Crilly | Daily Telegraph Hear no evil (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308422/hear-no-evil/) The Express Tribune Editorial Looking to the Future of Pakistan (http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/1205_pakistan.aspx) The Brookings Institution Pakistan: No Friend and a Fading Ally (http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1205_pakistan_cohen.aspx) By Stephen P. Cohen | The Brookings Institution Give diplomacy a chance (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83092&Cat=9) By Shamshad Ahmad | The News The Bonn II Conference on Afghanistan: A Step Forward Amidst Uncertainty (http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheBonnIIConferenceonAfghanistan_vchandra_191211) By Vishal Chandra | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses US now less dependent on Pak for Afghan supply route: Report

(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/US-now-less-dependent-on-Pak-for-Afghan-supplyroute-Report/articleshow/11171464.cms) Press Trust Of India Secret U.S., Taliban talks reach turning point (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/19/us-usaafghanistan-idUSTRE7BI03I20111219) By Missy Ryan, Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball | Reuters Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:12 PM The emancipation of minorities (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/19/religious-emancipation-ofminorities.html) By FAIZA MIRZA | Dawn March 2, 2011 was one of the most unfortunate days in the history of Pakistan, when the minister for religious minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated on his way to work, by unidentified gunmen, in Islamabad. He complained of receiving death threats from various religious lobbies for criticising the blasphemy law. The irony is that the culprits responsible for his untimely demise are still at large. In a country where law and order situation deteriorates by the day and accountability measures are almost nonexistent, minorities live in fear of losing their lives and families for absurd reasons. Religious minorities are unable to practice their religion with full zeal and fervor due to various security reasons and threats. The vigils and religious festivities that remained the main components of Pakistani culture and signs of coexistence have vanished and what is left behind is only pessimism and a dreary outlook for the future. There were times when Muslims and minorities, representing different faiths, lived congenially respecting each others differences and religions. In fact, many of us have studied in non-Muslim institutions, which are still considered the epitome of prestige and dignity in Pakistan, known for educating topnotch business executives, entrepreneurs, politicians and social activists. Our leading healthcare facilities, including the only leprosy center working for the rehabilitation of lepers, are owned by non-Muslim social workers. However, things have changed drastically over a period of time and bigotry/intolerance towards different faiths reign the country. Many non- Muslims have filed written complaints against the reprehensible state of affairs and claim that they have been forced to convert to Islam, which has resulted in their migration to the neighbouring countries. Pakistan was created on the principle of empowering people and giving them an opportunity to profess their faith and beliefs. Clause 25 of Pakistans constitution gives all minorities significant rights to practice their faith, in accordance with their respective holy doctrine. Simultaneously, the founder of Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was known to emphasise on the importance of freedom of speech and religion. Ms. Nuzhat, National President of Pakistan, For Young Women Christian Association (YWCA) said, Time after time we have requested the government of Pakistan to stop calling us minorities. We are equal citizens of Pakistan and would appreciate if we are called people of other faiths rather than this hideous term which does not represent non-Muslims of Pakistan at all. She said that YWCA works for the betterment of women at large and 88 per cent of its beneficiaries are Muslim women, whereas only 10 per cent of the women are from various Christian communities. YWCAs work primarily revolves around empowering women through education, by encouraging them to enroll in adult literacy programmes and raising awareness about their rights as humans. We advocate and represent women regardless of their caste, colour, creed and religion, considering them our responsibility, Nuzhat said. She added: it is not that we have not received positive response from the Muslim political and social factions. In fact, they have assisted and collaborated with us on various projects including flood and earthquake relief campaigns and we deeply appreciate their efforts. If a handful of organisations are actively assisting people from different religious orientations then why cant we be more accommodating and reciprocate their sentiments positively? Shouldnt this serve as a cue to change the way we think and indeed build better relationships with people from other religions? Isnt it time to put our differences aside and think as one nation? Hasnt enough damage been already done to waylay the foundations of our homeland?

A selected few prevailing in our society have stigmatised our religious ideologies to an extent that many of us hesitate to even discuss the most apparent problems constraining our development and growth as a nation. It is time to give back what we genuinely owe to the people belonging to different faiths, it is indeed time to restore their religious liberty, sense of freedom and security and time to correct our wrongs before its too late for Pakistan.

Partition and Minority Rights in Punjabi Hindu Debates, 1920-47 (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16915.pdf) By Neeti Nair | Economic & Political Weekly The PM's 'foreign hand' (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/a-k-bhattacharyapmsforeign-hand/459027/) By A K Bhattacharya | Business Standard Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:18 PM The shadow of 1971 (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308817/the-shadow-of-1971/) By Akmal Hussain | The Express Tribune When the military government of 1971 committed atrocities against the people of East Pakistan, it undermined the legitimacy of the very state it purported to defend. In West Pakistan, the states propaganda machine was deployed in the familiar whipping up of public opinion into a frenzy that was fuelled by a combination of misguided notions of religious purity and ethnic prejudice. The Bengalis, who at the time constituted the majority of Pakistanis, were demonised as a seditious ethnic group soiled by Hindu influence. The consequent failure of the people of West Pakistan to rise up in mass protest ruptured the fabric of humanity that gives cohesion to society and ennobles national consciousness. The people in post-1971 Pakistan did not come to terms with the crimes against humanity that had been committed and this cast a shadow on the national psyche. The displacement of human values from the practice of governance, gradually, eroded the institutional structure of society and state, since democratic institutions are underpinned by the norms and values of civilisation. The essential factor in the debacle of 1971 was the fact that a military government was in power. It chose to use military force as a response to what were essentially political demands of the majority, following the electoral success of the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The mode of use of military force, unconstrained by considerations of professional discipline, law or morality was due to of a gradual degeneration of the military cause by its involvement in politics, following the Ayub Khan coup dtat of 1958. This fact is clearly articulated in the published version of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (as declassified by the government): one of the major causes of our disgrace was the moral degeneration which had set in among senior military commanders as a result of their continued involvement in martial law duties right from 1958. The commission identified the main allegations of excesses committed by the Pakistan Army, some of which are: excessive use of force and firepower in Dhaka during the night of March 25 and 26, 1971; senseless and wanton arson and killings in the countryside during the course of sweep operation; killing of intellectuals and professionals like doctors and engineers; killing of East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists .; raping of a large number of East Pakistani women The Hamoodur Rahman Commission compiles evidence on the allegations through statements by senior military officers. For example, General Niazi, in referring to the period prior to the posting, testifies: Military action was based on the use of force, primarily, and at many places indiscriminate use of force was resorted to . Brigadier Shah Abdul Qasim states: Excessive force was used on that night. Army personnel acted under the influence of revenge and anger during the military operation. Major General Rao Farman Ali, adviser to the Government of East Pakistan testifies: Harrowing tales of rape, loot, arson, harassment and of insulting and degrading behaviour were narrated in general terms. That a professional army could descend to such depths shows what happens when an organisation is divorced from its moral moorings. Since 1971, the Pakistan Army has been reconstructed as one of the finest fighting forces within its technological constraints, in the world. The basis of its fighting

capability is the discipline, strength of character and moral integrity that are inculcated during the training process of soldiers and officers alike. The lesson of 1971 is that the military must neither govern nor should it be used against its own people. The operations in Balochistan over the years, as indeed repeated military interventions in the political sphere since 1971, make one wonder whether the lessons of East Pakistan have been learnt. In the civilian sphere, the lesson of the 1971 tragedy is to give importance to establishing rationality and universal human values in institutional structures and in political behaviour. The first step in rectifying the degeneration of politics in Pakistan would be to offer an apology to the people of Bangladesh. As a citizen of Pakistan, I humbly do so now.

The birth of Bangladesh (http://tribune.com.pk/story/308780/the-birth-of-bangladesh/) By Kuldip Nayar | The Express Tribune West Pakistanis who stood for Bangladeshis rights (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\20\story_20-12-2011_pg3_2) By Babar Ayaz | Daily Times 1971 War, Memories of Another Day (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-1971war-memories-of-another-day/20111219.htm) By John Taylor | Rediff Arab spring, Pakistani winter (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83090&Cat=9) By Safeer Awan | The News Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:23 PM For India, a year of talking to Gilani, but with eyes on Kayani (http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/uday-abhyankar-for-indiayeartalking-to-gilani-buteyeskayani/458821/) By Uday Abhyankar | Business Standard Our prime minister recently described Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani as a man of peace. The prime minister may be justified in his assessment; after all he has met Mr Gilani rather more often than you or I. But it is not Mr Gilanis pacific nature that is important but rather his will and capacity to deliver peace. The fact is that Pakistans security and foreign policy, especially towards India and Afghanistan, is determined not by the civilian government but by the military, and in particular by the Pakistan army and Chief of Staff General Kayani. President Asif Ali Zardaris reported heart trouble will lead to further questions about his governments authority. Indeed, the subservience of Pakistans civilian leadership to the military was again highlighted a couple of weeks ago by the swift dismissal of its ambassador in Washington, who had displeased the military in the so-called Memogate affair. And the Pakistani army chief, by either function or nature, is not presumably a man of peace. The Pakistani militarys pre-eminent position in the countrys political life, its pre-emption of a disproportionate amount of public money, and the economic empire it has carved out for itself in the last six decades largely depends on its claim to act as the bulwark against an allegedly hostile India. A good relationship with India would threaten all this. So it is hard to see why the army would welcome or allow it. Still, a dialogue with Pakistans civilian leadership may bring some low-level results on matters in which the military has little interest: Better atmospherics, easing of visa restrictions and maybe MFN treatment. But on the core issue of controlling terrorist groups that the Pakistani military has nurtured as its proxy tools, or bringing those responsible for the attack on Mumbai to justice, we should have low expectations. Unfortunately, in the dialogue with Pakistan, those who are willing Gilani and company are not able; and those who are able General Kayani and the army are not willing. We have long and stridently complained about terrorism emanating from Pakistan. For reasons of their own, the US, major European countries and others have ignored our complaints. However since discovering Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani garrison town of Abbottabad, the assassination of former Afghan President Rabbani and the attack on the US Embassy in Kabul, American opinion has shifted. Senior US figures such as the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as well as Democratic and Republican leaders in

Congress have been explicit about the Pakistani Army/ISIs role in nurturing terrorist groups. Secretary Clintons warning about keeping snakes in the back garden could hardly be clearer. The United States will continue its pressure using all the carrots and sticks it has, to persuade the Pakistani military to combat terrorist groups operating on its soil, the Haqqani network in particular. Its Nato allies are likely to do likewise. Whether such pressure is successful is uncertain and the recent bombing of the Pakistani border post, killing 24 soldiers, will complicate its efforts. Yet the US does have strong levers, including an estimated $2 billion annual military aid, and Pakistans dependence for spare parts and technical support for US-supplied weapons systems. The US pressure will make it more difficult for the Pakistani military to address the unenviable if self-inflicted challenges it faces: To hunt with the (American) cops while running with the terrorists; managing the civilian leadership while dealing with India, Afghanistan and China; and simultaneously trying to ensure that Pakistani society doesnt disintegrate completely under the onslaught of the terrorist and fundamentalist forces unleashed since the regime of General Zia. Quite an agenda. The Pakistani military is on an unsustainable path, likely to lead to a messy and possibly violent dead-end. Whether the military sees it coming in time to avert it remains to be seen. In the meantime, we have to protect our own security and interests. Hopefully, since the Mumbai attacks, our security agencies have become more effective and better coordinated. The time is right for further intensification of cooperation on intelligence matters with the US and others, so that we get actionable intelligence that could be used to prevent new attacks. There is also considerable concern about Pakistans nuclear assets and the possibility that al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated terrorist organisations might get hold of them. That would pose a danger not only to India but to all of Pakistans neighbours, including Iran and the Arab countries in the Gulf. Our cooperation with friendly intelligence agencies should start giving greater attention to this issue, which could pose a grave threat in the coming years. We also have to keep some lines of communication open. This provides a rationale for maintaining the dialogue with the civilian leadership. As our prime minister has said, you cant choose your neighbours. But let us do this with our eyes wide open. Dont expect substantial results on core issues any time soon. Not, in any case, soon enough to bring the Nobel Peace Prize to any of the present actors.

'Many people in Pakistan feel that religion is under threat from West' (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/many-people-in-pakistan-feel-that-religion-is-under-threatfrom-west/20111219.htm) By Pamela Constable | Rediff 'Establishment of Pak's fifth military dictatorship underway' (http://www.rediff.com/news/slideshow/slide-show-1-establishment-of-paks-fifth-military-dictatorship-underwayreidel/20111219.htm) By Bruce Reidel | Rediff A fragile experiment (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/19/a-fragile-experiment.html) By Huma Yusuf | Dawn Pakistan Army Looks to a New Leader (http://www.diplomaticourier.com/central-asia/671-pakistanarmy-looks-for-to-a-new-leader) By RAJEEV SHARMA | Diplomatic Courier Zardari snubs Kayani's call, ready to fight till the last bullet (http://www.rediff.com/news/slideshow/slide-show-1-zardari-snubs-kayani-s-call-ready-to-fight-till-the-last-bullet/20111219.htm) By Amir Mir | Rediff Memogate Scandal Escalates In Pakistan (http://www.countercurrents.org/ghazali191211.htm) By Abdus Sattar Ghazali | Countercurrents Democracy or memo-cracy? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83088&Cat=9) By Ameer Bhutto | The News Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:30 PM North Indian 'Apni Beti' Program Strikes a Blow Against Child Marriage (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/19/north-indian-apni-beti-program-strikes-a-blowagainst-child-marriage.html) By Gayle Tzemach Lemmon | The Daily Beast

In a cement-walled room at the end of a rutted road in the rural Indian district of Bhiwani, a teenage girl named Lado sits in a shaft of sunlight and talks confidently about her future. I want to be a math teacher, says the 17-year-old, her printed green scarf falling on to her lap. I tell my parents, Do whatever you want, but educate me. Let me go to school. Welcome to the front lines of the fight to stop child marriage in a country where nearly half of all girls wed before age 18. The weapon of choice: cash. Lado is part of an innovative program called Apni Beti Apni Dhan, or Our Daughters, Our Wealth. Launched in 1994 by the northern state of Haryana, the program gives poor families 500 rupees ($11, the equivalent of less than half a weeks pay) when a daughter is born, and also deposits money into a savings account. If the girl turns 18 unwed, she is eligible to redeem the bond, worth 25,000 rupees (roughly $500, or one third of an average yearly income). The earliest of the programs approximately 150,000 enrollees turn 18 next year, offering a rare chance to study whether the program offers a solution other statesand countriescan use. Whether it can be tied directly to Apni Beti or not, child marriage is on the decline in Haryana, which saw an 18 percent drop in the practice between 1992 and 2006. Haryana community workers say that thus far none of the programs beneficiaries have been married off by their parents, who know of the programs promised payout. The girls must sign for the bond, but it is likely their parents will have control of it because of social norms, and most of the girls say they want their parents to use it for their education anyway. The stakes are high for the development of the booming Indian economy, home to both enviably strong 8 percent GDP growth (in a slow year) and the greatest proportion of the worlds child marriage cases. Young brides become young mothers with fatal consequences: pregnancy and childbirth complications top the causes of death among teenage girls, and babies born to mothers younger than 18 face a 60 percent greater risk of dying in their first year than babies born to older mothers. Girls who marry are forced to leave school, a costly loss: World Bank data show that for each year of secondary education, a girls future wages climb 10 percent to 20 percent. It is urgent, because we are talking about a whole generation of girls, 100 million girls in the world, who are going to be married as children if we dont do something about it, and India is the largest contributor to that number, says Dr. Anju Malhotra of the International Center for Research on Women, a Washington, D.C.-based global research institute that is now studying the impact of Apni Beti and whether it is a model that can be scaled. The $500 payment is hardly a game-changing sum in the rich and fertile farming state of Haryana, where per capita GDP has tripled to $1,778, well above the national average, since 1999. But the programs designers say the state is sending a message about the worth of girls, traditionally seen as burdens to be fed until they move to their husbands home, where in-laws benefit from their work. They are considered to be owned, like a piece of property or an animal, says Firoza Merhotra, a former Haryana government official who served as Apni Betis original architect. We thought we should try and get women to be more valued. And this was one way. Merhotra notes that an updated version of the program is open to more families and pays much more at age 18, when girls receive 85,000 rupees, or $1,635. For Lado, the Apni Beti money offers leverage in her struggle for upward mobility. Her parents married off her sister, born before the start of the program, at 15, but with the help of a supportive brother and Apni Betis promised payment, Lado is now in 10th grade at schooland she doesnt plan to stop there. This program does matter to girls, because with it, they can do better in their lives, Lado says, holding the brown-bordered Apni Beti enrollment certificate her mother received from the government 17 years ago. I am happy about the help from this project, because I need the money to study more. This makes a difference. The Apni Beti program is maturing at a time when Indian women sit center stage in their countrys

economic ascent. Women account for 15 percent of the countrys leading CEOs, compared to 3 percent in the U.S., and for nearly 40 percent of Indians enrolled in higher education. The better women do, the better the country does: If you want to have the real development, it has to be development of the whole, not development of the part, says Dr. Pam Rajput, founder of the Center for Womens Studies and Development at Indias Punjab University. If there is balance in the society, then there will be more security for the girl, and parents will be more comfortable and then she will be able to go out of the house. In addition to encouraging families to see their daughters as assets, not liabilities, the program aims to correct the demographic imbalance and stop families from aborting or killing their female babies after birth. Haryana has one of Indias most skewed sex ratios: the state counts 877 females to every 1,000 males, up from 861 a decade ago, but well below the national ratio of 940 females for every 1,000 males. While economic theory says scarcity increases value, Haryanas low number of girls is endangering girlsand leading some families to seek earlier marriage for their daughters protection. Parents never feel secure; if there is balance in the society, then there will be more security for the girl, and parents will be more comfortable and then she will be able to go out of the house, says Rajwati Dangi, a Bhiwani official charged with overseeing the program, whose office sits just above a billboard of a baby girl with the words Dont Hurt Me across the top. This is all due to imbalance of the sex ratio. If we disturb nature, we have to pay for it. Attitudes, not just savings bonds, are critical to improving the lot of girls and, in turn, society, says Dangi, who credits Apni Beti with helping to change mind-sets about early marriage among some families. There is, however, a long way to go in the larger battle. The family gives a revered position to the boy child; he is a special child, he is given better food, better education, pampered a lot, says Dheera Khandelwal, finance commissioner for Haryanas Department of Women and Child Development. This is a transition phase where ultimately the girls are suffering. At Apni Betis launch in 1994, government officials hosted events to congratulate parents on the birth of their girls, an occasion usually ignored or celebrated only quietly out of shame that the child produced was not a boy. The high-profile attention showed that the government welcomed the girls and wanted their parents to as well. Merhotra, the programs original designer, says she knew that they were on to something when parents began passing out sweets to their neighbors at the arrival of a daughtera treat usually reserved for sons. Still, one program alone will not change a long-established tradition of undervaluing girls. Local officials tell of well-worn jokes in which a man crying she has died weeps not for his wife, but for his buffalo, which is harder to replace. And billboards in the 1990s advertised, Pay 500 Now or Pay 5 Laks Lateror pay for an abortion now if youre carrying a girl or pay the steep cost of a dowry when she marries. Such advertisements are now outlawed by the Indian government, which has banned sex-selective abortions and any kind of gender selection, though rumors point to their continued popularity among parents. Dowries also are prohibited, but that has not stopped the practice, which undoubtedly plays a role in pushing daughters out the door: for many rural families, a daughters wedding is the most expensive event of their lives. Programs like Apni Beti and more recent schemes supported by governments across India aim to upend that economic ecosystem. Educated girls are said to require lower dowries; plus the girls bring money into the household when they go off to work. India is not alone in employing economic incentives: a program in Ethiopia offered parents a goat if their daughters remained unmarried during the course of two yearswith notable success. Some squirm at the idea of trading a girls opportunity for rupees or a goat. But those fighting child marriage, a practice Archbishop Desmond Tutu has likened to slavery, say dialogue and education alone arent enough. You cant put a price on a human being, but economics are one of the major

drivers of the tradition in the first place, says Malhotra. Economics are fundamental to changing the culture. Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:33 PM In essence, say child marriage experts, you must fight fire with fire. You have to reprice girls; you have to give them a shadow value, says Dr. Judith Bruce of the Population Council, a New Yorkbased nonprofit focused on reproductive health. Until you analyze the social contract and change the cost variables, you will not get change. Girls like Lado and her fellow Apni Beti participants are leading that change. Educated people are respected in society, says 17-year-old Bimla, who is now in the 11th grade and says she wants to study accounting and work in a bank. It is good to go outside the home and earn something. Bimlas mother is one of many women interviewed who never had the chance to study because their families made them wives when they were only girlsan injustice they vow to fight. I will use the money for her education, says Bimlas mother, Baby, whose parents arranged her engagement before she had turned 14. I fought with my parents to stay in school. I dont want her to have to do the same thing; I want her to have a better life.

Women can fight back with smartphones (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Womencan-fight-back-with-smartphones/articleshow/11173218.cms) By Shreya Roy Chowdhury | TNN Seven-year-old raped in Delhi (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Seven-year-old-rapedin-Delhi/articleshow/11169376.cms) Press Trust Of India Liberation and its discontents (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/liberation-and-itsdiscontents/889318/) By Frederick Noronha | Indian Express You've come a long way, Dilli (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/jugglebandhi/entry/you-vecome-a-long-way-dilli) By Jug Suraiya | Times of India Need to do a reality check (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Need-to-doa-reality-check/articleshow/11170576.cms) By Ajay Vaishnav | Times of India Look skywards (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Lookskywards/articleshow/11170538.cms) Times of India Coming to Amritsar, the Pod Car (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/coming-to-amritsarthe-pod-car/) India Ink India's Most Googled, 2011 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204879004577107760482573728.html) IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:39 PM Why no McDosa? (http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2011/12/19/why-no-mcdosa/) By Wally Olins | Reuters The whole world now knows that India has arrived. It isnt just Infosys and TCS. Tata is the largest manufacturer in Britain with Jaguar Land Rover and Corus not to speak of Tetley. Bajaj exports a significant proportion of its motorcycle output to Africa and so on. Indian companies are finally starting to make a significant impact on the global scene. So what about the global High Street? Theres a McDonalds but why is there no McDosa? I know Ive raised this before in this column but I simply dont understand it. The whole world loves Indian food. Theres nowhere you can go in Europe and very few places in the United States where you cant find a restaurant which purports to be Indian even if in reality its Bangladeshi. I was in Rheims the other day a medium-sized French city with a wonderful market and a beautiful cathedral where the French kings were traditionally crowned. Rheims is in the heart of the champagne country; so in every restaurant and cafe the thing is to have a coupe de champagne.

Naturally, right in the middle of all this is a very busy restaurant indien, complete even with champagne bar, and the locals love it champagne and tikka kebab wonderful. So, if Indian food is so popular and Indian entrepreneurs are so courageous and successful, why is there no Indian worldwide restaurant chain? It isnt that Indians dont understand hospitality. Indian hotel chains like Taj and Oberoi are amongst the worlds best and they are busy expanding internationally too. It just seems to me theres a real gap in the market for an Indian worldwide restaurant chain. India has the food, it has the knowledge, it has the experience, it has the finance. Now Indian entrepreneurs get on with it. We want McDosas.

An Urbanizing India Faces Natural Disaster Risk (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/anurbanizing-india-faces-natural-disaster-risk/) By NIKHILA GILL | India Ink 'We need to build, reform municipal cadres in all states' (http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/manmohan-singh-we-need-to-build-reform-municipal-cadres-in-allstates/458863/) By Manmohan Singh | Business Standard Infrastructure rating: time for reform (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/vinayakchatterjee-infrastructure-rating-time-for-reform/458891/) By Vinayak Chatterjee | Business Standard Inadequate Basis for Safety of the PFBR (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16918.pdf) By M V Ramana , Ashwin Kumar | Economic & Political Weekly Mullaperiyar dam issue: Ad war between Tamil Nadu and Kerala (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Mullaperiyar-dam-issue-Ad-war-between-Tamil-Naduand-Kerala/articleshow/11165100.cms) IANS Severe Accident Assessment for PFBR: A Designers Perspective (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16917.pdf) By S C Chetal , P Chellapandi | Economic & Political Weekly In Search of Common Ground (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16910.pdf) By Kalpana Sharma | Economic & Political Weekly Floods in Orissa: No Lessons Learnt (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16908.pdf) By Kishor C Samal | Economic & Political Weekly Fear Of Police Killed Many In Hooch Tragedy (http://www.countercurrents.org/khurana191211.htm) By Sukant Khurana & Brooks Robinson | Countercurrents Whos to Blame for Indias Illicit Liquor? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/19/economics-journal-who-is-to-blame-for-indiasillicit-liquor/) By Rupa Subramanya | IndiaRealTime Five Ways to Improve Indian Health Care (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/19/fiveways-to-improve-indian-health-care/) By Tripti Lahiri | IndiaRealTime India Urged to Up Drug Spending by $4.5 Billion (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/19/india-urged-to-up-drug-spending-by-4-5-billion/) By Tripti Lahiri | IndiaRealTime Baby dies in hospital, drunk man blamed (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/Kolkata/Drunk-hospital-staff-removes-oxygen-mask-baby-dies/Article1-784377.aspx) Hindustan Times Impact of Deregulated Savings Bank Interest Rates (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16906.pdf) By M K Datar | Economic & Political Weekly Decentralised Procurement and Universalised PDS (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16905.pdf) By Kaustav Banerjee

The frightening fisc (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-frightening-fisc/889755/) By P. Vaidyanathan Iyer | Indian Express Sensex: Key takeaways from 2011 (http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2011/12/12/sensexkey-takeaways-from-2011/) By Nipun Mehta | Reuters Stance of silence (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/stancesilence/458886/) Business Standard Editorial Not a buyers' market (http://www.hindustantimes.com/ViewsSectionPage/ColumnsOthers/Not-abuyers-market/Article1-784140.aspx) By Pushpa Girimaji | Hindustan Times Business as unusual (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/business-as-unusual/889320/) By Harish S Wankhede | Indian Express Bullish on all that glitters (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/n-chandra-mohanbullishall-that-glitters/458890/) By N Chandra Mohan | Business Standard Food Security Bill: Simpler the Better (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16898.pdf) Economic & Political Weekly Editorial Food Security Bill: Good for Politics, Terrible for Economy (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/19/food-security-bill-good-for-politics-terrible-foreconomy/) By Vibhuti Agarwal and Shefali Anand | IndiaRealTime Are we ready? (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Are-weready/articleshow/11170700.cms) Times of India Editorial The Food Security Bill is a necessity..but will be inadequate by itself (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/the-food-security-bill-is-a-necessitybut-will-be-inadequate-by-itself) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Making food security work (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2729311.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial How to digest this welfare (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/How-to-digestthis-welfare/Article1-784634.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Not a grain of sense (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/notgrainsense/459022/) Business Standard Editorial Land struggles in contemporary Kerala (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2729300.ece) By SANAL MOHAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Get ready for the network slugfest (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/vanita-kohlikhandekar-get-ready-fornetwork-slugfest/459025/) By Vanita Kohli-Khandekar | Business Standard Tenth-standard adulthood (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2729302.ece) By SHYAM G MENON | The Hindu BusinessLine Macaca 12-19-2011, 07:51 PM 2011, a year of Gandhian struggle (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/19/breakingviews-2011a-year-of-gandhian-st-idINDEE7BI09K20111219) By Hugo Dixon | Reuters The most electrifying event of the year, for me, was the Egyptian revolution. I'd long had an interest in Gandhian-style struggles. Here was a nonviolent struggle unfolding in real-time against Hosni Mubarak's repressive regime. Tens of millions of people were gaining their freedom. The media coverage of the events in Tahrir Square focused on the Facebook revolution. But when I went to Cairo shortly after, I discovered that the use of social media was only part of the reason why the dictator had been toppled. Behind the protests was a cadre of activists who had been trained in the techniques of nonviolent struggle. This realisation was a eureka moment. If it was possible to overthrow dictators with comparatively little bloodshed - less than a thousand died in Egypt's revolution - many millions more elsewhere might be able to gain their freedom given proper planning and training. 2011 was a banner year for nonviolent struggle. Not only did it witness the successful Arab Spring revolutions against dictators in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen; it also saw three Arab kings - in Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait - liberalize their political systems to head off similar protests. And the brave people of Syria went out on the streets again and again, despite being arrested, tortured and killed in their thousands.

Further afield, the Burmese regime started to reach an accommodation with pro-democracy activist, Aung San Suu Kyi, after two decades of nonviolent opposition; China experienced increasing stirrings of protest, for example when citizens posted nude photos of themselves on the internet after the authorities ruled that a photo of Ai Weiwei, the dissident artist, was pornographic; and even Vladimir Putin had to face demonstrations after seemingly widespread vote-rigging in Russia's parliamentary elections. The techniques of nonviolent struggle have also been used for purposes other than bringing down dictatorships. A man called Anna Hazare led a successful campaign against corruption in India. Meanwhile, the West had to contend with the Indignant anti-austerity movements in Spain, Greece and Italy as well as the anti-banker Occupy movements in the United States and Britain. And don't forget Leymah Gbowee, one of the winners of this year's Nobel Peace Prize. She helped end Liberia's civil war in 2003 by getting women from Christian and Muslim communities to go on a sex strike until their men stopped fighting. The technique has a long pedigree, at least in literature. Aristophanes' Lysistrata, first performed in 411 BC, is a comedy about how women used sexual abstinence to force peace talks between Athens and Sparta in the long-running Peloponnesian War. 2011 was the most successful year for nonviolent struggle since 1989 when peaceful revolutions led by the likes of Poland's Lech Walesa and Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel, who died at the weekend, swept away the old communist regimes of Eastern Europe. But nonviolent struggle hasn't mown down everything in its path this year. The Occupy movements haven't achieved much apart from raising consciousness. The transition to democracy in Egypt is still uncertain. Pro-democracy protests in Bahrain were snuffed out with the help of Saudi tanks. Bashar Assad is still in power in Damascus. And Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was brought down by a bloody civil war and foreign military intervention, not by unarmed protesters. THE GANDHI NETWORK Over the past year, whenever I could tear myself away from the unfolding drama in the euro zone, I turned my attention to nonviolent struggle. How were these movements organised? Did they draw inspiration from common sources? And what were the ingredients of success? The trail began in early January, several weeks before the Tahrir Square demonstrations. I was in Delhi meeting Kiran Bedi, a key member of Hazare's anti-corruption campaign. I wanted to know whether Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of India's independence struggle against the British in the first half of the 20th Century, was still relevant today. Of course, she replied, explaining that they had chosen January 30, the anniversary of Gandhi's assassination, to hold their anti-corruption demonstration. It wasn't until August, though, that the campaign gathered momentum. The decisive moment came when Hazare announced he would go on a public hunger strike, a classic Gandhian technique, until the government agreed to create a tough anti-corruption watchdog. This posed a dilemma for the authorities. Either they would let the 74-year-old man go on strike and they would look weak; or they wouldn't and they would look brutal. The police chose the latter option, arresting Hazare and over a thousand of his supporters on the grounds that they were holding an illegal demonstration. Indians came out in their millions in protest. Some kids in an orphanage even staged a hunger strike in sympathy. The so-called dilemma action was perfected by Gandhi in his salt march in 1930. At the time, saltmaking was a British government monopoly. Gandhi declared he was going to march to the sea and make his own salt, daring the authorities either to arrest him or display their impotence. After weeks of dithering, the British arrested Gandhi - triggering a massive civil disobedience campaign which led to over 80,000 people being put behind bars and paved the way for the end of British rule. Today's Indian authorities made the same mistake as their British predecessors. But this is moving too fast. Long before Hazare's victory, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had fled Tunisia and Mubarak had resigned in Egypt. When I went to Cairo a month later, I met Saad Bahaar, a former engineer who had been training activists in the techniques of nonviolent struggle for six years. I was stunned. How had he learned what to do? He pointed, among other things, to the work of Gene Sharp, a frail 83-year-old Boston-based academic who has been studying and proselytising

this type of warfare for about 60 years. I'd never heard of Sharp, who runs a small think-tank called the Albert Einstein Institution. But I sought him out and devoured a clutch of his books, including his classic treatise, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Sharp had analyzed how the pillars on which dictators' power rests could be undermined systematically by nonviolent struggle. He also listed 198 tactics that could be used. Sharp had taken the insights of Gandhi and others and developed them into a quasi-science. One of Sharp's concepts - political jujitsu - is particularly powerful. This is the idea that violence inflicted by a dictatorship on peaceful protesters could boomerang on the regime and destroy it. Bystanders would abandon their neutrality; the regime's pillars of support would become shaky; if the activists had the courage to maintain their struggle, the tyrant would ultimately collapse. But and this was a crucial "but" - the revolutionaries had to maintain their nonviolent discipline, according to Sharp. Otherwise, they would lose the active support of the masses and, in a trial of strength, the regime would overwhelm them. Boston is one node in a loose network of activists involved in nonviolent struggle. Another is Belgrade, home of Srdja Popovic, a 38-year-old Serb who was a founder of the resistance movement which helped bring down Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. Popovic now runs Canvas, a group that trains activists around the world in nonviolent struggle. The tall angular Serb has simplified and popularised Sharp's work, adding a huge dose of energy and humor as well as real-life experience. Then there are academics who have helped refine the techniques of nonviolent warfare by studying past campaigns. For example, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan studied 323 liberation struggles between 1900 and 2006 in their new book Why Civil Resistance Works. They discovered that 53 percent of the nonviolent campaigns succeeded in bringing about regime change, roughly double the 26 percent success rate for violent ones. The nonviolent struggles were also faster - taking on average three years to reach their goal rather than nine. And such campaigns had a good chance of ushering in democracies whereas regime changes brought about through violence tended to lead to new dictatorships. Macaca 12-19-2011, 08:48 PM INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESS The overall message of these activists and academics can be boiled down to several simple points. Success comes from having a clear and powerful goal, unity among the opposition, good strategic planning, tactical innovation and nonviolent discipline. The first point can be illustrated by comparing Hazare's anti-corruption campaign to the less successful Occupy movements. Hazare had a precise goal that resonated with a huge swathe of Indian society. The Occupy movements and their close relations, the Indignant movements, haven't yet articulated clear goals nor have they yet achieved anything concrete. The perils of abandoning nonviolent discipline are also shown by Italy's Indignati and Greece's Aganaktismenoi. In the former case, protests were hijacked by a group of anarchists called the Black Bloc; in the latter by demonstrators throwing Molotov cocktails. Almost all the media coverage focused on the fringe violent elements rather than the peaceful masses. Colonel Gaddafi's bloody overthrow is, of course, the supposed counter-example from 2011 to the merits of pursuing a nonviolent struggle. It seems to suggest that violence pays. As such, some members of the Syrian opposition are advocating it as a model they should follow - although the main umbrella body, the Syrian National Council, is still pushing the nonviolent approach. But the lessons from the Libyan revolution aren't clear-cut. For a start, it's unknowable what would have happened if the people had pursued a nonviolent campaign: they might eventually have got their way with less bloodshed. Although estimates of the Libyan death toll vary widely, the Transitional National Council has used a number of 25,000. If the same proportion of Syria's larger population was killed in a conflict, its death toll would be 89,000 - much higher than the 5,000 so far estimated by the United Nations. The Libyan campaign also relied on France, Britain, America and other countries attacking Gaddafi's forces from the air. That can't easily be repeated in Syria. Foreign powers aren't always willing to

play the role of global policeman - and, when they are, they typically want something in return such as control of a country's natural resources. How the Syrian conflict plays out will determine many people's perceptions of the value of nonviolent struggle. At the moment, it looks like there is a significant risk of it descending into civil war. But even if such a tragedy unfolds this won't prove that Gandhian-style campaigns are worthless. 2011 has already shown the power of the technique in other countries. As more people learn the strategy and tactics of nonviolent struggle, it will become more powerful still.

A 2011 timeline of protest, revolution and uprising. (http://blogs.reuters.com/anthonyderosa/2011/12/15/a-2011-timeline-of-protest-revolution-and-uprising/) Reuters The flash mobs of class warfare Political upheavals across the globe indicate people are no longer willing to tolerate hierarchicallyorganised governments (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/nitin-paiflash-mobsclasswarfare/458889/) By Nitin Pai | Business Standard You cant build consensus by being an introvert or if your leaders are sulking or if there is arrogance. You must talk (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/you-cant-build-consensus-bybeing-an-introvert-or-if-your-leaders-are-sulking-or-if-there-is-arrogance.-you-must-talk/889748/) By Arun Jaitley | Indian Express Indias politicians must lead, not follow (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\20\story_20-12-2011_pg3_5) By Sonali Ranade | Daily Times How much does your Lutyens MP cost you? (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/how-much-does-your-lutyens-mp-costyou) By Minhaz Merchant | Times of India The wisdom of the mob (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sreelathamenonwisdomthe-mob/458865/) By Sreelatha Menon | Business Standard Fake notes: Cant bank on banks (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Fake-notes-Cantbank-on-banks/articleshow/11162394.cms) By Saurabh Sharma | TNN Macaca 12-20-2011, 08:13 PM How much is too much democracy? (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/editpage/How-much-is-too-much-democracy/articleshow/11184893.cms) By Ashok Kapur | Times of India Mahathir Mohammed, the respected former Prime Minister of Malaysia and now an elder Asian statesman diagnosed some of the ills that seemingly afflict democracy in India. He recently addressed a gathering of national leaders, leading citizens, intellectuals and media personalities in the capital at a Leadership Summit organized by a leading national daily. The deliberations at the summit were broadcast live throughout the country. He has ascribed most of the current "problems" facing us to the reason that we have "too much democracy". He added that we need a "strong" Central leadership to overcome the present difficulties and restore some "order" so that unhindered progress can take place. The overdose of democracy holds back India from emerging as one of the leading players on the world stage. Mahathir's diagnosis is negated by recent experience of the modern nation states the world over and the lessons of history. One does not have to delve deep into history to draw the appropriate lessons from it. The last century itself is replete with examples of nations that broke up and disintegrated because they limited the practice of democracy in order to enforce "discipline" and attempted to bring about rapid economic growth. India is a federal republic with one of the most liberal forms of democracy. The Constitution was aptly described by Pt. Nehru, one of its main architects as a strong federation during normal times but with provision for converting it into a unitary structure in times of emergency. The Founding Fathers were visionaries with great foresight. They realized that for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual society, a federal structure was the only viable form of government.

A liberal democracy is the bedrock of federalism. The history of twentieth century world that we live in brings home this stark lesson to all of us. Nation upon nation, all federal republics that limited democracy in favour of "strong" central leadership broke apart and could not survive as unified states. Ethnic and linguistic minorities and regions seceded, often violently and at great human cost. Paradoxically, a "strong" central leadership invariably proved counter-productive. The example of former Soviet Union is a well-known. Also falling in the category of failed states are former Republic of Yugoslavia, Indonesia and nearer home, former East and West Pakistan. All these were federal republics that experimented with variants of democracy. They convinced themselves that somehow too much democracy is not good for their people and it must be limited for people's own sake. The leader knows best what is good for his "subjects". Thus, both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia practised 'socialist democracy' or 'democratic centralism'. Admittedly, the ideology was suffused with idealism, all in the name of "the people" and their beloved fatherland. Full guarantees were extended to all minorities and regions-but only on paper. Believe it or not, the Constitution of the former Soviet Union had conceded even the right of "secession" to the various ethnic regions. Indonesia similarly experimented with "guided democracy". The central leadership imposed their will on far-flung islands comprising several dozen major linguistic and tribal groups, with deadpan uniformity. They had virtually no voice, not to talk of role in governance. They were completely alienated from the central leadership. One cannot say with certainty if the final act in the Indonesian tragedy has played itself out. It may yet break up further. Pakistan's case is all too well known to merit detailed analysis. The Army Generals who overthrew a civilian government experimented with "basic democracy" as they felt that universal adult franchise was a luxury that Pakistan could ill-afford. Democracy was limited to selected individuals who were supposed to be literate in the 3Rs. The federal unit of East Pakistan was reduced to the status of a poor cousin. Like Indonesia, Pakistan's tragedy may be still unfolding, looking to the situation in the federal unit of Baluchistan and other federal provinces. A "strong" central leadership is the soul mate of limited democracy. And such leadership almost invariably passes on to the armed forces of the modern nation state. The generals and the air marshals assume charge in the name of "order and discipline". They have an in-built disdain for the "bureaucratic state" and the "bumbling democracy". They buy themselves a one-way ticket to power till such time as the state collapses under their heavy boots. The aforesaid are but some of the few examples of large federal states that experimented with limited democracy and failed. The malady does not discriminate, and seems to afflict smaller states as well. It appears to be endemic to the region. Sri Lanka has just survived a brutal civil war and is barely intact. Afghanistan is a house divided against itself between the Pashtuns and the Uzbecks, held together for the time being against the common threat from Taliban. Burma is apparently a paper entity and a geographical fiction as a nation. Some of the longest civil wars of the last century, largely forgotten by the outside world have spilled over to the present century. The state is fighting its own minorities who have, de facto, carved out for themselves their own sub states-the Kachins, the Karens and the Shans. Their respective territories are 'no go' zones save for the Burmese military in large numbers. Among these disintegrated and disintegrating states one can witness the solitary splendour of a standing and functioning federation with a liberal democracy. There are no prizes for guessing the right name. And this has been possible as the basic democratic structure of the state has not been disturbed, whatever the provocation. Not that we have not been afflicted with our own set of centrifugal forces. But we have contained them through dialogue and discussion. A liberal democracy is the most resilient form of government. Unity in Diversity is the lofty principle of the Indian society and a federal democracy is its actual form. A limited democracy and its counterpart of "strong" leadership is the antidote. The latter tries to impose a certain Uniformity in Diversity which has proved to be a recipe for disaster. This is the abiding lesson of the history of the last century. Much is made of the fact that Indian democracy is much too "noisy" for orderly progress and a

marketable brand. But the argument overlooks the fact that debate and discussion are the essence of good governance, as conflicting ideas and varying opinions get churned and what emerges is often the optimum solution. As someone rightly said, what may sound noise today is the music of democracy in the long run. Solzhenitsyn was right-the only alternative to debate and discussion is the Gulag. Mahatir Mohammed's prescription for India, with respect may, paradoxically enough, turn out to be a remedy worse than the disease. Indeed, it may prove fatal for the health of our federal democracy. The author is a retired IAS officer Four Reasons Why Shashi Tharoor is Wrong (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/fourreasons-why-shashi-tharoor-is-wrong/) By VIVEK DEHEJIA | India Ink Indian money gone global (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/indian-money-goneglobal/459153/) Business Standard Editorial When Centre cannot hold (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/when-centre-cannot-hold/890184/) By Manish Tewari | Indian Express Will our politicians swing the other way on Lokpal? (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/thereal-truth/entry/will-our-politicians-swing-the-other-way-on-lokpal) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Is it fine to extenuate? (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/it-fine-extenuate-485) By Paranjoy Guha Thakurta | Asian Age Political chaos named Lokpal (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-a-politicalchaos-named-lokpal/20111220.htm) By Sheela Bhatt | Rediff 233 mentally ill patients subjected to drug trials (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/indore/233-mentally-ill-patients-subjected-to-drugtrials/articleshow/11175169.cms) By Ashish Gaur | TNN Macaca 12-20-2011, 08:19 PM Stability or Democracy? (http://idsa.in/bookreview/StabilityorDemocracy) By Arvind Gupta | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Indias Foreign Policy: the Democracy Dimension (With Special Reference to Neighbours) SD Muni | Foundation Books, 2009 India is the worlds largest democracy. There is a huge pro-democracy public sentiment in India for the democratic struggles of people in other countries. Yet, India, unlike the West, has refrained from promoting democracy as an ideology in other countries in an aggressive way. In the past Indian governments have not hesitated to deal with non-democratic regimes monarchies, dictatorships, authoritarian rulers in other countries. At the same time, depending upon the circumstances, they have unambiguously supported democratic movements in other countries. In deciding on whether to support or not support democratic movements, India has invariably been guided by its strategic and security interests rather than democratic sentiments. It has supported democratic struggles when such support coincided with Indias national interests. What role does democracy as an ideology play in Indias foreign policy? Professor S.D. Muni has explored this question at length in his book. He has taken examples from Indias neighbourhood and examined several historical episodes to draw nuanced conclusions about the salience of the democratic dimension in Indias foreign policy. His main conclusion is this: the fact that India is a democracy does not necessarily imply that it will support democratic movements in neighbouring countries automatically. Democracy promotion is not an ideology for Indian policy makers; instead, they have followed a pragmatic policy. India supported democratic movements when it reckoned that doing so would be in its national interest. And it refused to do so when it perceived that support for democratic movements would cause instability in the region and undermine India security and strategic interests. In other words, India has sought to place a premium on stability rather than on democracy. Prof. Muni points out that in the event of a clash between democracy promotion and security, security interests have prevailed (p. 137).

The author takes several examples from Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sikkim to make his case. Thus, in Nepal, India helped the country to get rid of the autocratic Rana rule but refrained from giving full support to the Nepali Congress which was fighting the monarchy. As a result, the hands of King Mahendra were strengthened and an undemocratic Panchayati raj system was perpetrated until the 1990s when the multiple party system was eventually established as a result of a Jan Andolan. Analysing India security factors operating at that time communist Chinas rising influence and the instability in Nepal Prof. Muni concludes: Thus, for the sake of preserving its security interests, India had to compromise on the democracy objective in Nepal (p. 43). More recently, India supported the King until the Jan Andolan II in 2006 unseated him. Nepal is too sensitive to India for security reasons. The irony, however is that despite Indias preference for Nepals monarchs, most of them did not hesitate to play the China card to keep India unsettled. Like Nepal, Bhutan is also very sensitive for Indias security. In Bhutan, India fully supported the monarch and now supports the constitutional monarchy. In Sikkim, before it merged with India in 1975, the government was supporting the Chogyal and the feudal interests. But, once the new king and his American wife started undermining Indias security interests in the sixties and seventies, the government began to support the democratic forces. This ultimately resulted in the merger of Sikkim with India. In Pakistan, India has been sympathetic of democracy and democratic forces but it has not hesitated to deal with military rulers and dictators. The situation is made more complicated by the fact that democratically elected governments in Pakistan have also followed anti-India policies. Thus India has remained suspicious of democracy in Pakistan. India played a crucial role in the emergence of Bangladesh where the Pakistani army carried out a genocide in 1971. Indias support for Mujibs muktibahini and the Awami League was natural, but again, Prof. Muni argues, the calculations behind supporting the democratic forces were strategic. The massive influx of refugees into India as a result of the Pakistani pogrom and the opportunity of the century to weaken Pakistan played a role in Indias support for Bangladeshs democratic forces. India has also been wary of some democratically elected governments in Bangladesh that have followed an anti-India line and undermined Indias interests. Myanmar is critical for stability in Indias security. While during Nehrus time India fully supported the democratic forces represented by U Nu, the conditions changed after U Nu was overthrown in a military coup and Gen. Ne Win took over. India-Myanmar relations went into a freeze. India fully supported the pro-democratic forces in Myanmar and continued to do so even when the NLD was denied its right to rule after the 1990 elections. However, supporting democracy and ASSK proved costly for India as China made deep inroads into Myanmar by fully supporting the military rulers. India had to change its policy and mended fences with the military junta because of serious security and strategic considerations. The exploration of Indias democracy dimension in Indias foreign policy over the last sixty years leads Prof. Muni to believe that even Nehru, a committed democrat, had to compromise on supporting democracy in the neighbourhood due to the prevailing security environment. Nehru was concerned about Chinas forays into Indias neighbourhood and also of US interests in the region. Nehrus successors were more realistic and hard headed on the democracy question. Their passion for supporting democracy radically declined (p. 127). Going beyond the neighbourhood, the book also explores the larger question of the role of democracy in Indias foreign policy. India joined the US-inspired Community of Democracy initiative launched in Warsaw in 2000 and has contributed to the UN Democracy Fund. Indias joining the initiative was announced during President Clintons visit of 2000. How sustainable is Indias membership in the community of democracies which has a visible US imprint? Several critics of the Indian decision have argued that this step is an endorsement of US global strategic interests. However, Indias participation in the initiative has not been smooth given that it objected to the community of democracys anti-Zimbabwean, anti-Belarusian formulations. India is aware of the fact that its position on democracy promotion may not coincide with those of the West. Mindful of the likely divergence in Indias and US strategic interests, Prof. Muni cautions that in its neighbourhood India should not give in to pressures and temptations from the US or any other source (p. 137).

Surprisingly, the author does not explore the democracy dimension in Indias relations with Sri Lanka and Maldives. Further, Tibet and China are mentioned only briefly. In the authors view India has been tentative on Tibet and China because it does not have the wherewithal of promoting democracy there. Prof. Muni is a well known expert on South Asian affairs. In writing this book, he relies on a wealth of primary and secondary sources. He has interviewed many persons in different countries who had a role in the affairs of their respective countries. He brings to bear his considerable expertise and knowledge to explore Indias neighbourhood policy through the prism of democracy. Few books explore the democracy dimension of Indias foreign policy; this book fills that gap.

Populism hinders globalization (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20111221sf.html) By SHINJI FUKUKAWA | The Japan Times Macaca 12-20-2011, 08:25 PM Who should get the Bharat Ratna? (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2732614.ece) By MARKANDEY KATJU | The Hindu These days, the issue of awarding the Bharat Ratna on Republic Day is in the news. When I appealed for the Bharat Ratna to Mirza Ghalib and Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyaya, some people objected, saying that such awards should not be given to people who are no more. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong in giving awards posthumously, provided they are given to the right persons. The Bharat Ratna has been conferred posthumously in the past. Two examples are Sardar Patel and Dr. Ambedkar. Mirza Ghalib is a modern figure, not a legendary one like Lord Rama, or an ancient one like Gautam Buddha. Though he was brought up in the feudal tradition, he often broke through that tradition on perceiving the advantages of modern civilisation. Thus, in one sher (couplet), Ghalib writes: Imaan mujhe roke hai, jo khenche he mujhe kufr Kaaba merey peechey hai, kaleesa merey aage The word kaleesa' literally means church, but here it means modern civilisation. Similarly, kaaba' literally refers to the holy place in Mecca, but here it means feudalism. So the sher really means: Religious faith is holding me back, but scepticism is pulling me forward; feudalism is behind me, modern civilisation is in front. Ghalib is hence rejecting feudalism and approving of modern civilisation. And this in the mid-19th century when India was steeped in feudalism. Urdu poetry is a shining gem in the treasury of Indian culture (see my article, What is Urdu,' on (www.kgfindia.com)). Great injustice has been done to this great language. Before 1947, Urdu was the common language of the educated class in large parts of India whether the person was Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian. However, after 1947 some vested interests created the false propaganda that Urdu was a foreign language and a language of Muslims alone. Mirza Ghalib is the foremost figure in Urdu, and the best representative of our composite culture. Though a Muslim, he was thoroughly secular, and had many Hindu friends. He no doubt died over a century ago, but our culture, of which Urdu is a vital part, is still alive. I first appealed for the award of the Bharat Ratna to Ghalib at the Jashn-e-bahaar Mushaira in Delhi in April 2011. My appeal was supported by many prominent persons in the audience. They included Meira Kumar, Speaker of the Lok Sabha; Salman Khurshid, Union Law Minister; and S.Y. Quraishi, the Chief Election Commissioner. However, soon thereafter a leading journal described my appeal as sentimentalism gone berserk.'

As for Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyaya, at a recent function in Kolkata I appealed for the award of the Bharat Ratna to him. Sarat Chandra in his stories launched a full-blooded attack on the caste system, against women's oppression, and superstitions (see Shrikant, Shesh Prashna, Charitraheen, Devdas, Brahman ki beti, Gramin Samaj, etc.), evils that plague India even today. In his acceptance speech at a meeting organised in the Calcutta Town Hall in 1933 to honour him, Sarat Chandra said: My literary debt is not limited to my predecessors only. I am forever indebted to the deprived, ordinary people who give this world everything they have and yet receive nothing in return, to the weak and oppressed people whose tears nobody bothers to notice. They inspired me to take up their cause and plead for them. I have witnessed endless injustices to these people, unfair, intolerable injustices. It is true that springs do come to this world for some full of beauty and wealth with its sweet smelling breeze perfumed with newly bloomed flowers and spiced with cuckoo's songs, but such good things remained well outside the sphere where my sight remained imprisoned. This speech should inspire writers in India even today when 80 per cent of our people live in horrible poverty, when on an average 47 farmers have been committing suicide every day for the last 15 years, when there are massive problems of unemployment, and problems in the areas of health care, housing, education, and so on. I also appeal for the Bharat Ratna to the great Tamil poet Subramania Bharati, who a hundred years ago wrote against women's oppression and was a thorough nationalist and social reformer. Here is a verse from Bharati, who wrote powerfully in favour of women's emancipation. This was cited in a March 14, 2008 judgment of the Supreme Court of India, written by Justice Markandey Katju, in Hinsa Virodhak Sangh vs Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat & Ors: Muppadhu kodi mugamudayal Enil maipuram ondrudayal Ival Seppumozhi padhinetudayal Enil Sindhanai ondrudayal (This Bharatmaata has thirty crores of faces! But her body is one. She speaks eighteen languages! But her thought is one.) Here is another verse from Bharati: Gummiyadi! Tamizh Nadumuzhudum Kulungida kaikotti gummiyadi! Nammai pidiththa pisasugal poyina Nanmai kandomendru gummiyadi! Yettaiyum pengal thoduvathu theemai Endrenni irundhavar maaindhu vittaar; Veettukkulle pennai pootti vaippom endra Vindhai manithar thalai kavizhndhaar. (Dance and celebrate, so/the whole Tamil Nadu reverberates/that all evil forces which/surrounded us are driven away for ever. Those who declared it was evil/for women to get educated are dead and gone;/The strange men who were for sequestering women/have left the scene in disgrace) How many people in India have read Ghalib, Sarat Chandra and Subramania Bharati? There are demands to give the Bharat Ratna to cricketers and film stars. This is the low cultural level to which

we have sunk. We ignore our real heroes, and hail superficial ones. I regret to say that the present generation of Indians has been almost entirely deculturised. All that they care for is money, film stars, cricket, and the superficial. Today India stands at a crossroads. We need persons who can give direction to the country and take it forward. It is such people who should be given the Bharat Ratna, even if they are no more. Giving it to people who have no social relevance, such as cricketers and film stars, amounts to making a mockery of the award. Justice Markandey Katju is Chairman of the Press Council of India India wages inefficient war on malnutrition (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/19/breakingviews-india-idINDEE7BI0AJ20111219) By Jeff Glekin | Reuters India Moves on Food Security (http://the-diplomat.com/indian-decade/2011/12/20/india-moves-onfood-security/) By Sanjay Kumar | The Diplomat Should the Food Security Bill be scrapped? (http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/shouldfood-security-bill-be-scrapped/459159/) Business Standard Sell the idea (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sell-the-idea/890179/) Indian Express Editorial Take broadband to the masses (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2732363.ece) By NARESH WADHWA | The Hindu BusinessLine The right PSU glue for fiscal holes (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2732367.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Supporting the rupee (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2732612.ece) The Hindu Editorial India's Slowdown Tarnishes Gold (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733304577102483409760716.html) By LIAM DENNING | Wall Street Journal An area of darkness (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shyam-saran-anareadarkness/459155/) By Shyam Saran | Business Standard How sick is our private healthcare? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/subir-roy-howsick-is-our-private-healthcare/459156/) By Subir Roy | Business Standard Down to the last detail (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/m-j-antony-down-tolastdetail/459158/) By M J Antony | Business Standard Rising coal costs to hit India power projects - Fitch (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/risingcoal-costs-to-hit-india-power-pro-idINDEE7BJ08Y20111220) Reuters How Does Government Justify Aadhaar When Its Foundation Has Crashed? (http://www.countercurrents.org/thomas201211.htm) By Mathew Thomas | Deccan Herald Macaca 12-20-2011, 08:30 PM Looking for a Hero Down Under What to Expect When India's Cricket Team Visits Australia: Two Vulnerable Sides With a Lot to Offer (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204026804577099912070827078.html) By RICHARD LORD | Wall Street Journal Given that Australia, ranked fourth in the world, has just drawn a test cricket series at home with New Zealand, ranked eighth, you'd expect India to be strong favorites for their upcoming series. But, given India's form on the road, it might not be that simple. After a duo of dismal showingsbeing wiped out for 136 runs in the second test against New Zealand at Hobart, and their capitulation for 47 in the first test against South Africa at Cape Town last monthAustralia is sending its batsmen off on a pre-Christmas boot camp where they will focus on improving their technique against the moving ball. Michael Hussey had his worst series ever, managing just 23 runs in three innings, but his form over the past few years has been so sublime that it would be foolish to write him off. More worrying is former captain Ricky Ponting, at 36 years old the same age as Hussey but suffering from a slide in performance that's plagued him for longer, despite his fighting 78 in the first test against New Zealand at Brisbane. But on the plus side, David Warner nearly won the series with a superb undefeated 123 out of his team's 233 total in the second test, and captain Michael Clarke has never

had a better run with the bat. It's become a clich that India don't travel well, and they did very little to dispel the idea in the last overseas test series they played: a 4-0 drubbing at the hands of England. Since then they've bounced back with some impressive performances at home, beating West Indies 2-0 in a threematch series, but Australia will be a stern test. India's batsmen also struggled against the moving ball when they played England, and they'll face that in Australia too. But they'll also face steep bounce, in particular on pitches in Perth and Brisbane, and if anything that can be ever more disconcerting. With the low, slow pitches at home, Indian batsmen are naturals at going forward to play the ball off the front foot, hitting confidently through the line, even if they're not particularly over-pitched, with the hands characteristically low down. Down Under, they'll need to master playing late and off the back foot, and be ready to get their gloves out of the way of the rising ballall skills they can learn from one of their teammates, Rahul Dravid, who is in sublime form at the age of 38. Some of India's young batsmenthose weaned on Twenty20, such as Virat Kohli and Suresh Rainaare vulnerable against the short ball and candidates to get out trying to hook. If any batting lineup can overcome vulnerabilities like that, however, it's India's talent-saturated top sevenand of course vulnerabilities only matter if the opposition's bowlers can exploit them. And here we come to the relative unknown quantities of the series: the bowling attacks. The most interesting aspect of this series is how two seam attacks line up against each other that are full of promise but raw in the extreme. Australia will be missing injured 18-year-old fast bowler Patrick Cummins, who destroyed South Africa on his debut in Johannesburg a few weeks ago. But they will have their latest discovery, fellow quick James Pattinson, who took 14 wickets at an average of 14 against New Zealand, including two five-wicket hauls, plus the consistent Peter Siddle and the promising off-spinner Nathan Lyon. Potentially more interesting, however, is to see how India's young pace bowlers fare in new conditions that should suit them just fine. With the fitness of spearhead Zaheer Khan still doubtful and the canny Praveen Kumar also out, a lot falls on the young and relatively experienced shoulders of Ishant Sharma. His height gives him an advantage, but still tends to drift in and out of games. For once, India will line up with three genuinely quick bowlers who should be able to exploit the extra bounce on offer. Australia's batting is vulnerable, both technically and psychologically, and whether a talented but essentially untested bowling lineup can exploit that will be as crucial to the result of this series as how India's batsmen adjust to Australian conditions. India do look stronger on paper, but on grassAustralian grassit's too close to call. Another drawn series in Australia could beckon.

Surprising Sources of Delhis Air Pollution (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/surprisingsources-of-delhis-air-pollution/) By HEATHER TIMMONS | India Ink How Elephants Unwind (http://blogs.wsj.com/scene/2011/12/20/how-elephants-unwind/) By Amrit Dhillon | IndiaRealTime Internet is calling. Where are you? (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/internet-calling-whereare-you-486) By Patralekha Chatterjee | Asian Age Macaca 12-20-2011, 08:35 PM Why force first' will not work (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2732615.ece) By D. N. SAHAYA | The Hindu Union Minister for Rural Development Jairam Ramesh, in an article on left-wing extremism (From Tirupati to Pashupati? The Hindu, October 14, 2011), observed candidly: It is not the naxals who have created the ground conditions ripe for their ideology it is the singular failure of successive governments both in the States and the Centre.

There lay the main cause of the festering sore of naxalism, often characterised as left-wing extremism. It is no longer a fringe phenomenon it has marched forward to become an expansive armed movement since the spring thunder' in Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967. The Maoists have since carved out what they call a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), or Red Corridor, stretching from Tirupati in Andhra Pradesh to Pashupati in Nepal, encompassing parts of seven States: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Odisha, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar. They have their footprint in Madhya Pradesh as well. In all, the area comprises 200 districts, 60 of them labelled hyper-sensitive. This is a large swathe. They are also reported to be networking with insurgent outfits in the northeastern region. Strong base, ideology The development of the Maoist movement may be one of the most striking political developments in India's socio-economic ambit. An expert group set up by the Planning Commission in 2008 on Development Challenge in Extremist Areas' observed: Naxalite movement has to be recognised as a political movement with a strong base among the poor peasantry and adivasis and though it professed long-term ideology of capturing State power, in its day to day manifestation it was to be looked upon basically as a fight for justice, equity, protection, security and local development. Their selection of the theatre of war,' centre of gravity and catchment included geographically backward, isolated, inaccessible, inhospitable and hilly terrain, areas with poor or light or dysfunctional governance, social, economic and infrastructural deficits and deprived, alienated segments of society. No wonder, the Maoists have found a ready-made space to strike an emotional chord with the deprived lot and wear the mantle of Robinhood and benefactor. Left-wing extremism did not break in out of the blue in the 1960s. The process of social transformation was already on, marked by a disconnect from developmental currents, deficit of basic services and governance, disjunction between policies, programmes and delivery. A political vacuum provided stimulus. Left-wing extremists have followed the path, ideology and strategies that Mao Zedong enunciated in his Red Book,' Peasants Uprising in 1927' and Principle of Operation' all practised during the Chinese Revolution against Chiang Kai-shek. Those doctrines called upon cadres to fight against tyranny, social and economic injustices, poverty, corruption, lack of development, land-related issues and other public issues, and bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area to fight a wrong, and foment hatred against the establishment and the elites. Taking a leaf out of Mao's dicta the Maoists in India, in their exposition on Strategy and Tactic of Indian Revolution,' seek the seizure of power by armed force (through the barrel of the gun) and the settlement of issues by war. Causing damage to state infrastructure was the central aim and highest form of revolution. The Maoists have sought to push their agenda through armed struggle, killing, extortion, ransom, arson, sabotage, and attacks on police forces and posts. They have stockpiled arms and ammunition and built up money power and strike power. The game plan was to capture power ultimately, by overthrowing the democratic government. To give teeth to their struggle, a military formation called the People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) was formed. It has become a proficient striking force. The PLGA has army-line command, control, communication, sophisticated weaponry, explosives, skills and guerilla-warfare tactics, combined with motivated, passionate-to-the-cause cadres. They have intimate knowledge of the terrain and territory, and rapport with the local populace, which helps them elude the security forces. The state security forces have yet to achieve a high degree of motivation, involvement and intelligencebacked operations and capture the nuances and dynamics of guerrilla warfare, to be able to match the PLGA. Macaca 12-20-2011, 08:37 PM State action State-sponsored combat action against the Maoists was inevitable as militant, violent and unconstitutional means were the antithesis of democracy and the grammar of anarchy. The Supreme Court, on a writ petition filed by social anthropologist Professor Nandini Sundar and others, ruled: Notwithstanding the fact that there may be social and economic circumstances and certain policies followed by the state itself, leading to emergence of extremist violence, we cannot

condone it. The state necessarily has the obligations, moral and constitutional to combat such extremism and provide security to the people of the country. The state has launched many offensives against left-wing extremists. However, these have centred on the mechanics of one-dimensional, hawkish, knee-jerk, militaristic armed offensives, often attracting allegations of excesses and human rights violations. Undeterred by state-sponsored offensives, the Maoists have unleashed a reign of terror, bloodshed and militancy. Far from being contained, they have risen again and again. Counter-offensives against Maoists need to be based on a spirit of conflict resolution, distinguished from conflict management. Also needed are swift developmental thrusts, psychological operations to obliterate negative and warped perceptions about the establishment and the security forces, zero tolerance to the violation of human rights and excesses, confidence-building measures, and healing touches. Also needed are attractive rehabilitation packages for those who surrender, and service-oriented civic action programmes by security forces. Such a framework could bring about an abiding end to the conflict situation as was tried with tremendous success in Tripura to overcome a three-decade-long insurgency. Just declaring a war,' bluntspeak, provocative challenges, and ruthless, indiscriminate offensives would not be an appropriate or creative response. These tend to be counterproductive and alienate the masses. An obsession with crackdown first and development later will not work. Counter-offensive actions must walk on two legs, go hand in hand with rapid, accelerated developmental interventions and security instrumentalities in a synergetic and symbiotic manner. Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar put it perceptively in an interview to Frontline: Maoists can't be finished off through force alone. When governments fail to deliver, all kind of forces spring up. His government did concretise it in a mechanism of aapki sarkar aapke dwar (your government at your doorstep) that helped check the upsurge of Maoists in Bihar to a considerable extent. The Maoist movement is yet to leave an imprint as a mass uprising, let alone as a revolution. All that it has done is to spin-off terrorism by fomenting local issues and opportunistically and slyly attacking or ambushing security forces. Once the forces swoop down and strike, the Maoists retreat and cede the area, only to resurface off and on. Of late, lumpen elements and criminals have jumped on to the Maoist bandwagon, donning the robes of political recognition and respectability but really to indulge in gory criminal acts. The Maoists were initially inspired and fired by ideology. But over the years they deviated from the ideological currents to take to adventurism and terrorism. This has been reflected in the killing of innocent citizens, small and marginal farmers, women and adolescents, in contrast with the drive for the annihilation of class enemies.' The critical core of the policy to counter the Maoists should dwell essentially on a pro-poor-centric credo, inclusive growth, a trinity of security interventions, even socio-economic infrastructure dispensation in left out rain shadow' areas. Capturing the hearts and minds of the alienated and disempowered segments is critical. Of crucial significance are well-crafted, integrated and multidimensional strategies. A positive mindset, sagacity and clarity of vision and perception of the powers-that-be are essential. There should be active political processes. Political vacuums should not exist. There should be operational coordination among the affected States. Creative responses to challenges, vibrant micro-level governing modules such as gram panchayats and local bodies in Maoist-bound areas are needed. There should be community involvement in the combat against extremism, modulated and humane offensives of State security forces, and zero tolerance to human rights violations and excesses. These should be blended with brainstorming psychological operations to bring about changes in the psyche of turbulent and anguished minds. The author is a former Governor of Tripura and Chhattisgarh Walking with the Comrades, by Arundhati Roy (http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/walking-with-the-comrades-by-arundhatiroy/2011/11/07/gIQAIPR2yO_story.html) Book Review By Chandrahas Choudhury | The Washington Post Meeting Irom Sharmila (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-the-tragedy-of-beingirom-sharmila/20111215.htm) By Sumit Bhattacharya | Rediff Maoists in Golden Corridor Area (http://idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistsinGoldenCorridorArea_pvramana_191211) By P. V. Ramana | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Macaca

12-20-2011, 09:12 PM Same differences (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/same-differences/890133/) By Murtaza Razvi | Indian Express December 16 is a day of remorse in Pakistans calendar on that day, 40 winters ago, Pakistani forces surrendered before their Indian counterparts at Dhaka, and Bangladesh was proclaimed by Bengali nationalists in the former East Pakistan, then the countrys majority province. Bangladeshi historians have since termed their struggle against the Pakistan army as the struggle for independence. For all practical purposes, it was so, as the largely non-Bengali, West Pakistansourced army stationed in the eastern wing acted virtually as an occupation force, especially after the Awami League swept the 1970 election and the army refused to transfer power. The composition of the higher bureaucracy there was not very different; for years, cash crops jute being the foremost were exported and the revenue generated was almost entirely eaten up by West Pakistan, leaving the east in abject poverty. Soon after Partition, East Bengal had begun to be seen as an unwanted twin by the West Pakistan leadership. The cultural differences were enormous, and Islam being part of the state ideology failed to bridge the gap. While the leadership in the western wing was largely feudal and hand in glove with the armed forces, preserving colonial-era power relations, East Bengal boasted of a rising middle class with aspirations befitting a nation that had just gained independence. That the Bengalis had to wait for 24 long years, and a decade under martial law at that, before they could truly claim independence, was indeed tragic. The promise of Bangladesh and its people is now visible for all to see. As the country progresses, many of its social and economic indicators surpass those of Pakistan, which has been rudely shaken by Islamist terrorism. Because of its middle-class character and the lack of a feudal stranglehold, the Bengali genius was very different from its Pakistani counterpart; feudals with any landholdings in East Bengal were philanthropists who ran charitable projects instead of subjugating their landless peasants. In Pakistan, even today in certain parts of rural Sindh and Balochistan, big feudal lords continue to bring untold misery to their own people, holding many down under the burden of compounding debt, thus keeping many in virtual bonded labour, even confining some to their private, albeit illegal, prisons. Another important aspect of East Bengals society was the marked difference it displayed from Pakistans in terms of interaction with religion. The Bengalis never wore their faith on their sleeves, while Pakistans dominant Urdu ethos banks largely on Islam as the basis of the state. While a nonfeudal Mujibur Rahman found pride in his Bengali culture and language, in Pakistan, Sindhi, Balochi, Pashtun and Punjabi cultures and languages were made secondary to Urdu, a language that is not even native to any areas that comprised Pakistan! Why? Because Urdu is ostensibly the language of Muslims and contains religious and secular literature that harks back to Muslim supremacy in a long-lost India of the distant past. When the British annexed Punjab in 1949, overthrowing the Sikh rule, they abolished Punjabi as the medium of instruction in schools and imported teachers from Awadh and Delhi to teach Urdu to the natives. Since then, Urdu has remained the prevalent language of instruction. While Khalsa and Arya Samaj institutions secured the right to impart education in Punjabi (Gurmukhi script) and Hindi (Devnagri script) respectively, Punjabi Muslims wholeheartedly embraced Urdu. It is only in recent years that a masters programme in Punjabi was allowed to be instituted at the Punjab University, Lahore. So when hundreds of thousands of Urdu-speaking Muslims crossed over into Pakistan at Partition, they found ready allies in Punjabis with a common cause for declaring Urdu as Pakistans national language. They even prevailed on Jinnah in 1948, who could not speak Urdu, to declare Urdu the only national language, much to the anger of the Bengali majority whose proficiency in Urdu was non-existent. That was the beginning in East Pakistan of the Bangla Language Movement, which culminated in violence and the killing of many protesters in Dhaka by the security forces in 1952, which is now a milestone in the Bangladesh liberation movement. Finally, Bangla was granted a status on par with Urdu as Pakistans second national language that year, but with the trade-off that East Pakistan give up its majority status in parliamentary representation and settle for 50-50 parity with the minority West Pakistan. Thus, the sins of omission and commission were many on the part of the Pakistani civil-military elite

against the Bengalis. The only tragic, unfinished business of the 1971 breakup that still remains is some three million Urdu-speaking Biharis, who still claim Pakistani citizenship and await repatriation to Pakistan from the refugee camps of Dhaka. The writer is an editor with Dawn, Karachi

Hunt on for mystery ISI man in Delhi (http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Hunton-for-mystery-ISI-man-in-Delhi/Article1-785030.aspx) By Jatin Anand | Hindustan Times 26/11 case: Will Pak judicial panel's visit to India be of any use? (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/will-pak-judicial-panel-s-visit-to-india-be-of-anyuse/20111220.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff India's heated death penalty debate (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16160920) By Sanjoy Majumder | BBC Not a Very Intelligent Attempt at Intelligence Reform (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16904.pdf) Economic & Political Weekly Editorial MEDIA& POLICE: COPING WITH GENERATION BARKHA (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4819.html) By B.Raman | South Asia Analysis Group Macaca 12-20-2011, 09:18 PM Fall of Dhaka and a fall guy (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\21\story_21-122011_pg3_6) By D Asghar | Daily Times If hypocrisy was a sport, undoubtedly we Pakistanis would be the world champions. True to the core, till this day we are unmoved by the atrocities we unleashed on our eastern wing and dub it all as a conspiracy. Heck, we do not even want to accept our own mistakes and apologise to the millions of Bangladeshis because how could we possibly be wrong. Every time December comes, the wounds of a shameful and utterly disgraceful defeat are renewed. The images of helpless Bengalis and their massacre by our valiant soldiers comes to mind. There are certain people who want to put the blame on a so-called controversial individual, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (ZAB). Till this day, these individuals blast a false narrative and consider ZAB responsible for the breakup of united Pakistan. There is no denying that East Pakistan was feeling isolated for a long time. Again, as a totally lay person, I would like to raise a few points here. Even prior to Ayub Khans martial law, there was discontent in that area. Yes, Bhutto served in Ayubs regime, but his rise was attributed to being a young and bold foreign minister. He was not an Interior Minister and had little to do with East Pakistan. ZAB may have been controversial, passionate and extremely zestful, but in no shape or form can he be held responsible for this ugly episode. Back in 1967, when he formed the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), he had already distanced himself from Ayubs regime totally. The grievances of the people of East Pakistan were ignored by the mighty military establishment. By the time General Ayub handed the baton over to General Yahya, ZABs political career had taken off. He was no longer a government minister but a true political leader with a solid backing of the people. It was shocking for the military establishment to witness the mandate of the people from both wings in the elections of 1970. It has been proved time and again that when the people of Pakistan have been given their right to vote, they have always chosen the progressives. The Awami Leagues victory in the then East Pakistan and the PPPs dominance in West Pakistan was well expected. Needless to say, even at that point, the establishment was unwilling to accept that mandate. Was it not ZAB who offered Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his Awami League to form a government with him? He did offer Mujib to become prime minister of a united Pakistan. The discontent among the Bengalis was overwhelming and they were able to read the writing on the wall. Was it ZAB who was holding power in Islamabad and unwilling to transfer it to the elected leaders? For that matter, who unleashed the full-fledged military operation in East Pakistan, in order

to crush a so-called Indian-supported conspiracy? Can anyone in their right mind come up with any logical explanation who gave those orders and why? Was it ZAB who cajoled the military to do so? Why would have the military followed the commands of a civilian leader? Who raised the squads of Al-Shams and Al-Badr (militias) in the troubled eastern wing? Who was responsible for rape, murder and mayhem in that area? Who left thousands of illegitimate children behind? Who gave the nation a false narrative that all was well and our valiant soldiers were going to crush this evil conspiracy? Who surrendered on December 16, 1971 was it ZAB or A K Niazi? The biggest issue with our nation is that we never want to reflect on our mistakes with honesty. We never want to offer an honest introspection. Back then when ZAB became the first civilian Martial Law Administrator, he was ridiculed. Till this day, some misguided people use that as an epithet against him. The question to ask very honestly is why he did that. He was wary of his predecessors and their antics. Given the major debacle that the nation had gone through, was it not wise of him to do so? If he had any evil intentions, then why did he not cling on to that dictatorial power? If anything, our establishment is indebted to ZAB for negotiating the safe return of 90,000 prisoners of war. It was ZAB who went to Simla and made that impossible thing happen. If he had any vendetta against the Bengalis, why would have ZAB accepted Bangladesh as a separate nation? Why would he go to Dhaka and lay wreaths on their monument of the fallen? Why would he meet Mujib again and embrace him at the historic Islamic Summit in 1974 in Lahore? As always, shying away from our history is very easy and laying the blame on ZAB is even easier. We invent our own history to suit our own egos. We have high regard for a term called conspiracy. Any time we are unable to face the truth, we give it a facade of conspiracy and try to create an enemy or invent a fall guy. ZAB may have done a lot of things as an elected prime minister of Pakistan that the people may vehemently disagree with but to blame him as the culprit behind the breakup of Pakistan is downright dishonest and inaccurate. The irony is that till this day we are in the same mode and unwilling to face and accept the reality. History can never be fabricated. Someone, somewhere, accounts for the truth. Accepting and learning from that bitter truth can perhaps make us understand ourselves better.

Ten Pointers for Transformation (http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TenPointersforTransformation_vchadha_201211) By Vivek Chadha | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Water Sharing between India and Bangladesh: Old Confusion and New Realities (http://idsa.in/idsacomments/WaterSharingbetweenIndiaandBangladesh_ppandey_2012 11) By Punam Pandey | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Macaca 12-20-2011, 09:24 PM Correcting the civil-military imbalance (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309307/correcting-the-civilmilitary-imbalance/) The Express Tribune Editorial In her capacity as the lawyer of former ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani, Asma Jahangir appears to be employing a public defence in the memogate case that has the virtue of being true: that her client, as a member of the civilian government, is being held to a higher standard than the military. On December 19, she said that ISI chief Shuja Pasha should have resigned after the May 2 Abbottabad raid, much as Haqqani did soon after the US confirmed the existence of Mansoor Ijazs infamous memo. This line of attack may not be enough to spare Haqqani should his role in the controversy ultimately be confirmed, but by bringing the matter to public attention, Jahangir is fighting the worthy cause of civilian supremacy. If indeed it turns out that everything Mansoor Ijaz has said is true, then, along with Haqqani, Pasha, too, should be forced out of his job. According to Ijaz, Haqqani only began plotting against the military after the military first considered removing the government from power. In Ijazs leaked BBM exchanges, allegedly with Haqqani, he says that the ISI chief had sought permission from Arab leaders to force President Asif Zardari from office in the days after the May 2 raid. In theory at least, the military is supposed to be subservient to the elected government and so to seek foreign

help to bring down that government is a gross violation of the Constitution. While hearing the case against Haqqani, the Supreme Court may want to expand its remit and look into these far more serious allegations too. But as history has painfully taught us, the military does not tolerate outside accountability. For the government to have even a chance of fighting back, it needs the support of both the Supreme Court and the opposition parties. This is where the changing rhetoric of PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif has been such a disappointment. He has used the memogate controversy to fan the flames of public anger against Haqqani in particular and the government in general. What makes this even more disappointing is that Nawaz had been one of the more clear-eyed critics of the military. After May 2, he was one of the few politicians courageous enough to call for accountability for those in uniform. And indeed, as recently as December 19, Nawaz met with veteran Baloch nationalist leader Ataullah Mengal and agreed with Mengals accusations at a press conference, where he blamed the military for killing and suppressing the Baloch. It is noteworthy how the problems in Balochistan are being pinned almost entirely on the shoulders of the army, with nary a word against the civilian set-up. This is because the Baloch know, as does the rest of the country, that, elections aside, true power rests with the generals. The Supreme Court, which has dogged the government as it does every time, seems less worried about the power of the military. Even though it has publicly disavowed the doctrine of necessity, which has been used to justify every coup in the country, the court has not pursued the military with the same verve it has shown in holding the government accountable. The same is true of the Abbottabad commission, which in its questioning of Haqqani and ambassador to the UK, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, seems likely to pin much of the blame for that fiasco on the government. General Kayani was fully on board when the NRO was first agreed upon by Musharraf and Benazir; it would now be ironic if that is what leads to further ruptures in civil-military relations. It is also important not to get caught up in the minutiae of everyday politics to such an extent that we lose sight of the bigger picture. The military always escapes accountability but brings down all its force on civilians who have displeased it. This imbalance in power needs to be rectified immediately in the greater national and public interest since all state institutions need to be subservient to parliament and the executive led by an elected prime minister.

Fire in the desert (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83420&Cat=8) The News Editorial Mengals no-nonsense message (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\21\story_2112-2011_pg3_1) By Recruiting the right man for the job (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83423&Cat=9) By Zafar Hilaly | The News Our security dilemma (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83424&Cat=9) By Sajjad Malik | The News The endgame strategy (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83426&Cat=9) By M Zeb Khan | The News The year of living dangerously (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83427&Cat=9) By Maleeha Lodhi | The News 10 things about memogate (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309357/10-things-about-memogate/) By Aakar Patel | The Express Tribune Haqqani Says U.S. Job Was Thankless Assignment (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/20/haqqani-says-u-s-job-was-thankless-assignment/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime Pakistans Army Muddies Waters (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/20/pakistans-armymuddies-waters/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime USs al Qaeda strategy in a mess (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\21\story_21-12-2011_pg3_3) By Jan Assakzai | Daily Times

DEADLY EMBRACE: RECENT BOOKS ON PAKISTAN (http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/BookDiscussionpdf.pdf) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies How Can the Presidential Campaign Work for U.S. in Pakistan? (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-p-farwell/how-can-the-presidential-_b_1158992.html) By James P. Farwell and Marvin G. Weinbaum | Huffington Post Macaca 12-20-2011, 09:31 PM Cost of self-censorship (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/cost-of-self-censorship.html) By Syed Irfan Ashraf | Dawn JOURNALISTS in Pakistan are familiar with `pre-censorship`. However, few focus on self-censorship and the harm that does to the ideal of the public`s right to know. This has become more of a problem in the post 9/11 situation, which has led to war-like conditions in Pakistan. Reporters working in the region along the Pak-Afghan border sometimes either kill sensitive information, or twist it. These practices are, of course, a direct outcome of rigid information regimes experienced in the past, which have affected several generations of journalists and led them to believe that their work must support the country`s `security interests`. Whatever this may mean, at the back of many journalists` minds is the idea that the official version must prevail over the rest of the story. In the words of one journalist, reporters believe that any sensitive news related to the war on terror is a national secret, so journalists are required to ensure official approval by painting over the rest of the facts. Thus, they do not act as independent reporters and wait instead for the official nod or press release to baptise available information. And the official account included, whether verbal or non-verbal, is usually so compelling that it overshadows the rest of the story. While the fear factor does much damage too, in some cases conversely there is a discernible overconfidence among underpaid and under-trained reporters working in conflict areas, so that they fail to realistically measure the negative consequences of their reports. Few in Pakistan, though, are that determined. Mostly, they toe the line whether willingly or unwillingly. In the words of journalist Riffat Orakzai, we have lost war reporting to various stakeholders, who know how to threaten some of us and compel the rest. This sort of self-censorship was discernible at a recent gathering at a press club in Chitral. A group of 13 journalists deliberated whether to report on heavy military deployment in the area along the Pak-Afghan border. Some discussed the possibility of a backlash, particularly if the news did not go down well with the military. Others thought along patriotic lines: information should not be leaked through them to the Taliban or other militants. Such considerations led to a unanimous decision to kill the story. Justifying this, a senior local journalist commented: People want to know why their areas are becoming littered with military boots and how much freedom they are going to lose in the days to come. But breaking this story may help the Taliban become aware of the military`s movement. Attachment to one side or the other has always, the world over, played a role in tempting journalists into being partisan. Yet such a subjective approach has never been held to meet the standards of quality journalism. The dominant section of the journalistic fraternity has proudly raised slogans such as `we believe in no ism but journalism`, but in the post-9/11 world this is just not true anymore. The thin line that separates the myth of objectivity from subjectivity has been blurred. The globalisation of terror has turned traditions of neutrality upside down and ended idealism in war reporting. In the context of Pakistan, the entire framework of the journalistic profession is undergoing conceptual changes, and reporters in troubled areas cannot bring about any vital change.

Nevertheless, many journalists want the debate to continue, not because their lives are at risk, or because the security forces have taken over conflict reporting, but because the issue is much bigger. After 9/11, the ragtag band of Al Qaeda operatives escaping the US blitz on the Tora Bora mountains took refuge in Pakistan`s tribal belt. Had reporters not indulged in self-censorship, their work may have helped the international community nip the evil in the bud. Networking by Al Qaeda operatives went underreported mainly because, to quote BBC reporter Dilawar Wazir, who is from Waziristan: Senior journalists in Waziristan thought that reports about jihadis would invite the wrath of the global community, which would ultimately lead to the destabilisation of their area. In Kurram Agency, where sectarian tension has permeated every walk of life, this concept has taken another form. Occasionally, at the press club level, journalists decide what ought to go to the presses and what not; it is believed that journalism cannot help in conflict mitigation, but that it usually complicates sensitivities between the Shia and Sunni. This consensual blockage of information has assumed the shape of a tradition under which journalists censor themselves on the assumption that this is in the larger interest of their communities. Such practices have turned journalists into something of a moral brigade which interprets the world to the public, and their public to the world, in a tainted manner. Many journalists believe, however, that reporters in conflict zones must not alone shoulder the blame for imbalanced or biased reporting. They argue that their bosses in Karachi or Islamabad are equally culpable for having turned journalism into a largely urban profession. These employers do not invest in the capacity-building of marginalised reporters, neither do they provide them with protection where needed. In a similar vein, less time for more complicated issues leads to a lack of attention towards the bruised public caught in conflict zones. Pakistani and Nato security forces have been carrying out huge operations targeting Al Qaeda/Taliban networks in their terrain, but local journalists and the urbanised media houses to which they are attached have yet to make global news outlets aware of the death and destruction that has become routine. Unfortunately, the lack of focus on the citizenry`s issues is a trend in Pakistan`s troubled areas. There is no justification for this, particularly since it de-links information from its proper context. Journalists, and journalism, cannot continue to tamper with reality. The writer teaches at Peshawar University Pakistan deadliest country for journalists for 2nd year in a row (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_JOURNALIST_DEATHS? SITE=PAREA&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) Associated Press The annual anchor awards (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\21\story_21-122011_pg3_5) By Elf Habib | Daily Times Troubled Pakistanis turn to exorcism for help (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/uspakistan-exorcism-idUSTRE7BJ0GZ20111220) By Rebecca Conway | Reuters Lahore rally (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/lahore-rally-2.html) Dawn Editorial Disturbing confessions (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/disturbing-confessions.html) Dawn Editorial Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:07 PM

Little mosque on the prairie (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/21/little-mosque-on-the-prairie.html) By MURTAZA HAIDER | Dawn While Pakistan is known for the diversity of beliefs, cultures and languages, the Pakistani TV, however, has portrayed an artificially homogenous picture of the social order. And even when the digital media acknowledges diversity by presenting religious and cultural minorities, it resorts to portraying them in a negative light where TV dramas and talk shows are laden with pejorative terms to describe Hindus, Christians, Jews, Ahmadis and others. I remember the heydays of Pakistan TV that once produced Haseena Moins hit plays such as Ankahi and Uncle Urfi, and Amjad Islam Amjads Waris. While these TV plays set new standards for performance and production excellence, and were instant hits across Pakistan, they were also very selective in the types of characters they portrayed. Haseena Moins characters depicted the UP nastaleeq types from Karachi, and Amjad Islam Amjads characters depicted Punjabis settled in and around Lahore. Missing from these plays were many others characters one usually sees on the streets of Lahore and Karachi. Haseenas plays didnt show Sindhis, Pathans, or Zoroastrians in Karachi and Amjad Islam Amjad didnt write a single Shia character in his plays. How is it possible that in decades of telecasting, not a single Pakistani TV play has ever shown a shot of a neighbourhood in which the Shias ceremonial flag is visible? If you were to walk through Bhati, Mochi, and Lohari in old Lahore, you cannot help but notice the Shia properties adorned with the distinguishing black ceremonial flags (alum). While much is being celebrated about the newly liberated media in Pakistan, it appears that selfcensorship is still the name of the game when it comes to depicting minorities. In Pakistan, TV channels are reluctant to invite Ahmadis even to those talk shows that focus on violence against Ahmadis. At the same time, some religious communities continue to be portrayed in pejorative terms where talk show hosts and guests routinely speak of the proverbial Hindu Bunya and Christian crusader while being oblivious to the fact that a very large number of Hindus and Christians are proud citizens of Pakistan. The publically-owned as well as private TV channels in Pakistan usually air unsubstantiated allegations against various communities. Politicians and religious leaders of all stripes are routinely found blaming the Jewish lobby for all things wrong with Pakistan. Earlier this week, a Punjabbased member of the provincial assembly, Samina Khawar Hayat, professed on a talk show that the Internet is a conspiracy by the Jewish lobby to corrupt the morals of the Pakistani youth! Since 9/11, Pakistani media continues to repeat the false story (originally broadcasted by Hizbullahs AlMinar TV) about Jewish workers being absent from work in Manhattan on 9/11. Never did any anchor or the so-called intellectuals tried to trace the origins of this baseless falsehood. While the media in Pakistan, and in most other Muslim majority countries, continues to either ignore religious minorities or depict them in a pejorative way, Muslims in North America have enjoyed mostly balanced coverage in the media. Despite the controversy about a retail chain pulling its ads from a show about Muslim families in the United States, All American Muslim continues to run on The Learning Channel. The controversy has even inspired a parody of the commercial that was supposed to be pulled from the show. In Canada, despite their small numbers, Muslims have emerged as the second largest religious community. Muslim commentators are routinely invited to speak on national TV. Leading newspapers publish articles authored by Muslim writers on issues that concern Muslims. This is not to say that at times mainstream Canadian media is less than generous in its criticism of Muslims. The controversy about closing the cafeteria for Friday prayers at a school in Toronto is one such example where the Canadian media has made a mountain out of a molehill. However, serious concerns expressed in the media about the honour killing of three young daughters by an Afghan family has been welcomed by the Canadian Muslims as well. It is only in Canada where a sitcom about the trials and tribulations of a small Muslim community in a prairie town has been a success on primetime TV. Little Mosque on the Prairie runs on Canadas CBC Network and is already in its fifth successful season. The show depicts Muslim families living in a small town trying to adjust to the Canadian way of life. While being amusing, the show is able to break several stereotypes, while maintaining a few. Consider that the local Imam in the show is a

clean-shaven young man who speaks English without an accent while the antagonist in the show is a Punjabi-accented middle-aged man who is always trying to be more religious than the rest of the community. Muslims are slowly becoming part of the mainstream Canadian fabric. Their presence in Canada is being celebrated as part of the diversity that touches every community. From public transit unions to public sector universities, Muslims are visible not only as part of the community, but they are seen in leadership roles as well. The Faculty of Business at Brock University near Niagara Falls in Ontario chose to put the picture of a young Muslim student wearing Hijab on the cover of its brochures for the Master of Science in Management. Brock University is not alone in celebrating the diversity of it students. Several universities in Canada and the United States boast about the religious and cultural diversity thriving at their campuses. While Canada is far from being perfect, it has matured enough as a society where a Hijab clad Muslim women is now the face of the Faculty of Business at a large university. I wonder how long it will take Pakistan to mature as a society where Dr. Abdus Salaams photograph could be proudly displayed on the prospectus of Punjab University, where he once taught. Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:17 PM Hurtling down the abyss (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309882/hurtling-down-the-abyss/) The Express Tribune Editorial The recent Pakistan Defence Council (PDC) rally in Lahore was mammoth, orchestrated as it was by some of the most organised religious parties in the country. The idea was to cross the benchmark established by Imran Khans Tehreek-e-Insaf earlier and it was probably crossed. The reigning presence was that of the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD), as its followers outnumbered the Jamaate-Islami ones, the next big cadre party in the country. In all, 30 religious outfits were present, including the single-leader party, the JUI of Maulana Samiul Haq. Imran Khans party was present in the person of a senior representative, who read out his party chiefs speech to the people gathered. There was Sipah-e-Sahaba too, its status made unclear more or less like Jamaatud Dawas through litigation after it was banned by the UN Security Council. There were the expected appendices from the non-religious world: Hamid Gul, Sheikh Rashid, Ijazul Haq, etc, who once represented the supremacy of the army in the country. This is what the leaders led on the occasion by Hafiz Saeed of the JuD said: The rulers should immediately dissociate themselves from the US war on terror, permanently cut off the Nato supply line and prepare the nation for jihad in case the US dares invade the country. The mammoth show of force, seen after a long time since the disbandment of the MMA alliance, underlined yet another policy directive: dont give the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India and decide against allowing a trade route to India through Pakistan, because there are disputes to be resolved with India and revenge to be taken from it for the crimes it had committed against the Kashmiri Muslims and because it had tried to destroy Pakistan through a water war. The issue of Babri Mosque was added to the list of battle cries against it and the solvent of all the challenges faced by Pakistan was jihad fought by the proxy warriors organised by the religious parties. Both the US and India were the targets of this pledged Armageddon. It was the biggest Wahhabi-Deobandi gathering seen in a long while. The Barelvis were not there but Allama Tahirul Qadri of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), speaking elsewhere in the country, asked the Supreme Court to get rid of the PPP government by forcing a midterm election held under a neutral caretaker government prescribed by the honourable court. The message to the military was: if the Nato supply routes are reopened, the jihadis will attack the trucks. Maulana Samiul Haq raised the rather grandiose slogan: We will attack Indian, US, Russian and Nato forces if they try to violate Pakistans sovereignty. JuD leader Hafiz Abdur Rehman Makki was more specific: Our men are trained to use rifles and Kalashnikovs. When they head towards India with weapons, no one can resist them. Sipah-e-Sahabas chief, Maulana Ahmad Ludhianvi, boasted that 4,000 young people he had sent for jihad had died. This is the consequence of a number of vectors aligning themselves: the break between the US and Pakistan Army after the Salala attack; the consensus built by the PPP government in parliament in favour of the Pakistan Army against the US; the public mind as moulded by the media in favour of an isolationist policy under which jihad becomes possible; the memogate affair and the case related

to it at the Supreme Court asking it to decide whether the PPP leadership was guilty of treason against the state by endangering its national security as represented by the Pakistan Army. Jihad, which has demonised Pakistan in the eyes of the world and given rise to proxy warriors gone haywire inside Pakistan after affiliating themselves with al Qaeda, is once again seen as the prescription. The power of the clerics who organised the mammoth rally is beyond question. It is supplemented by militants fighting the military in Fata and by the synergy provided by a consensus for the demand that there be Sharia in Pakistan. When such rallies take place, there is cause for worry because an implication of their success is that the state is becoming dysfunctional, approaching the prototype of failed states like Somalia, where only jihad prospers.

TALKING TO TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN: FAILURES AND LESSONS (http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/talking-to-tehrik-i-taliban-failures-and-lessons-3526.html) By Aryaman Bhatnagar | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Mustached Pakistani Man Emerges From Hiding, 'Handlebars' And All (http://www.rferl.org/content/mustached_man_emerges_from_hiding_handlebars_and_a ll/24428252.html) By Farhad Shinwari | Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Pakistan Most-Deadly Nation for Journalists (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/pakistan-most-deadly-nation-for-journalists/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:23 PM Rally in Lahore sends alarm bells ringing (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/21/rally-in-lahore-sendsalarm-bells-ringing.html) By Cyril Almeida | Dawn IT was an extraordinary spectacle in Minto Park at the foot of the Minar-i-Pakistan on Sunday: jihadists, sectarian warriors, orthodox mullahs, Islamic revivalists, all banding together under the banner of the Difaa-i-Pakistan Council (Pakistan Defence Council) and vowing to defend Pakistan against external aggression. Headlined by Hafiz Saeed, leader of the Jamaatud Dawa, widely perceived as a front for the banned Lashkar-i-Taiba, Sundays event was a massive show of right-wing strength and has come in the wake of a heightened public profile by the JuD in recent months. Was the PDC rally, then, meant to signify the entry of Hafiz Saeed into national politics, though perhaps not of the electoral variety? More broadly, does the PDC event suggest that the security establishment is once again lashing together reactionary and millenarian forces in pursuit of narrow institutional interests without heed to the dangers to state and society of such a move? The Difaa-i-Pakistan (PDC), an umbrella group of 44 right-wing entities and personalities, has been reactivated in the wake of the Mohmand killings, suggesting an external agenda. But critics also see a thinly veiled domestic political agenda behind the creation of the PDC, an attempt to create a right-wing grouping from which an MMA-style or perhaps even an IJI-style political front will emerge ahead of the next general election. Were seeing a replay of 10 years ago. After 9/11, we saw the creation of the Pak-Afghan Defence Council. From there, the politicians in the group created the MMA while the hardcore jihadis went their own way, said Nusrat Javeed, a veteran journalist. According to Tahir Ashrafi, chairman of the Pakistan Ulema Council and a moderate cleric, the main focus of the PDC is the defence of Pakistan. All of this stuff thats going on with the US, their meddling and interference, we want that to end. We have no interest in doing politics. But Ashrafi, who is perceived as close to the security establishment, added that the efforts to create the PDC had been going on for the last couple of years: Ever since the break-up of the MMA, we have been trying to put together a new alliance. The external dimension

While suspicions about the PDCs reactivation have centred around the security establishments evolving domestic electoral and political strategy, deteriorating ties between the army and the US also appear to have played a significant role. The thrust of the PDCs demands at the Sunday rally was ostensibly external: withdrawing Pakistan from the so-called war on terror; revamping ties with the US to satisfy a muscular and Islamic Pakistani nationalism; and an anti-India campaign that emphasised the centrality of Kashmir and water disputes and rejected the granting of MFN trading status to India. Its about showing to the outside world that the army is under a great deal of pressure at home, that the religious parties are active and agitating and so the space for Pakistan to do what the US wants has been reduced, said Suhail Waraich, a senior journalist. A time-worn tactic it may be, but analysts warn about the dangers of stirring anti-US, anti-India sentiments. Theres a conflict between goals and strategy, said Imtiaz Alam, secretary general of Safma. They build up this jingoism but then become hostage to it because they dont know how to control it. Arif Nizami, editor of Pakistan Today, said, The problem is that the army cant sustain this radical anti-American policy. If it has to compromise eventually, then these measures (like the PDC) actually make it more difficult to compromise. Playing politics Beyond the immediate purpose of cultivating the PDC as a buffer against American demands, analysts believe the right-wing alliance has a deeper political purpose. What do they need the PDC for? The army, the government, the Foreign Office, everyone is on the same page about taking a tough line with the Americans. There has to be something more to it, said Rana Jawad, an Islamabad-based journalist. Like you have many windows open on the computer, the establishment has many windows open too, Arif Nizami said. So they have Imran Khan to collect all the establishment political types and now you have the PDC to gather together all the ultra-right types. The ISI has unleashed its jihadis, said Amir Mir, an expert on Islamic militancy in the region, adding, Before Sundays rally, there had already been five rallies in November alone on the Mall (Lahore). The link between the PDC and the security establishment, according to Mir and other analysts, was as clear as anything can be in the otherwise murky nexus between the establishment and jihadi groups. Samiul Haq (of JUI-S), Hafiz Saeed, Ijazul Haq, Sheikh Rashid, all these people come from the agency circles, Mir argued. And look at their views on foreign policy, theyre nothing more than mouthpieces of the intelligence establishment. See who is involved (in the PDC) and look at their past: theyve never gone against the ISI and some of them are quite frank about it, Suhail Waraich said. Their platform is anti-US, anti-India, anti-present government, who does that suit? According to Amir Rana, director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, however, the move may be less about cobbling together a winning electoral alliance than to put pressure on the mainstream parties: These guys dont have much of a vote bank but they can act as a break on the policies of the mainstream parties. Theres 40 of them on one side with media coverage to boot, thats something the national political parties will have to keep in mind while taking public positions on certain policies. Other analysts conjectured that the blocks of an electoral strategy to shut out from power the two major parties, the PPP and the PML-N, were being laid by the shadowy but powerful army-run intelligence apparatus.

The revival of the military-mullah alliance could be to squeeze the space for Zardari and the PPP, the N-League and the other nationalist parties in the provinces, said Imtiaz Alam. Instead of putting all their eggs in the Imran Khan basket, theyre activating various fronts in preparation for a hung parliament, where they will have choices then. The next stage For its part, the PDC is determined to press ahead with its rallies and formalise its leadership structure in the days ahead. In a few days there will be a leadership meeting to determine how to proceed with membership and organisational issues. Then on Jan 13, we will hold a rally at Liaqat Bagh in Rawalpindi and another one on Feb 5 in Karachi. We are here to stay, said Tahir Ashrafi, one of the PDCs leaders. Inevitably for such an unwieldy group, rifts and other complications also lie ahead. The Jamaat-iIslami and the JUI-F in particular have not evinced much interest in the PDC. The JI wants to deal directly with the PTI or the PML-N rather than carry political lightweights in the PDC along, Suhail Waraich said. He added: Fazlur Rehman believes he has been attacked by the Taliban, who are close to Samiul Haq (a key PDC leader). Fazlur Rehman at some level also believes in constitutional and electoral politics, but most of these PDC guys believe in nothing, theyre just close to the Taliban and the ISI. Meanwhile, a PDC insider said that Hamid Gul, Sheikh Rashid and Ijazul Haq would be welcome as guests but not as members of the leadership council, hinting at disagreements within the PDC. Still, with the PDC expected to plod ahead, some political analysts wonder if regime change is really whats in the offing. What if another My dear countrymen speech becomes necessary in the months ahead? asked Rana Qaisar, an Islamabad-based journalist. At that point, it would be useful to have PDC-types ready to swing into action to defend the army. Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:32 PM The real shame in Pakistan (http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/21/the_real_shame_in_pakistan) By Asra Q. Nomani | Foreign Policy In this month's issue of FHM India, an international men's magazine, Pakistani actress Veena Malik made worldwide headlines with a risqu nude photo shoot. While much of the attention has been on what Malik wasn't wearing, one of the most powerful elements of her photo shoot was what she was sporting: a big, bold tattoo on her left arm, stating very simply, "ISI," for Pakistani's secretive Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. The cover headline: "Pakistani W.M.D. Veena Malik Shows You How to Throw a Grenade!" Indeed, the cover has been explosive; PakAlertPress.com, for instance splashed a headline on its blog: "India and Pakistan Are Going Nuclear Over Provocative Political Tattoo." And the photo has elicited a furious reaction in Pakistan's media and in its living rooms. In one fell swoop, the enormous tattoo on a bare woman's body managed to demystify, emasculate and parody the ISI -- something most people have been afraid to do in public since the inception of the agency a year after the birth of the nation in 1947. Founded with a mission of coordinating intelligence in the country after Pakistan's loss to India in the 1947 war in Kashmir, the agency has become a feared, though privately mocked, enterprise, its hands allegedly in every back-room Pakistani deal; rigging elections, training militants for battle in India and Afghanistan, and monitoring its own citizens. The tattoo's location on Malik's body takes on special meaning in light of retired Adm. Mike Mullen's statement in September that the militant Haqqani Network, considered by most Western analysts and experts to be based in the tribal areas of Pakistan, is a "veritable arm" of the ISI.

All the while, the ISI works in the cloak of darkness. In 2002, when I was trying to find my kidnapped Wall Street Journal colleague Daniel Pearl, I met an ISI officer in my living room in Karachi who acknowledged his employer, but introduced himself as "Major." "Major what?" I asked. "Major Major," he said. Nice. Really helpful. *** To scholars on Pakistan, the ISI tattoo is emblematic of an important new civil discourse occurring in Pakistan over issues that were formerly taboo, such as the role of the ISI in society. Hassan Abbas, the author of Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, about growing militancy in Pakistan, said new media freedoms are eliciting rich debate in the country on deep, contested issues "such as the role of religion in society and the interference of the military in political arena." He adds, "These issues are being openly debated in Pakistan, and that is, overall, a healthy development." Kabeer Sharma, editor of FHM India, says the ISI tattoo was meant to be a sardonic reflection of India's own conspiracy theories about the intelligence agency. "In India, you say, 'The milk has gone bad. The ISI did it,' They blame all of their problems on ISI," says Sharma. Sharma, the son of an Indian satirist and New Delhi bookstore owner, says that a dilemma on the subcontinent is that folks don't laugh enough over the absurdities of politics. "The problem," he says, "is that we all blame our problems on this imaginary force. Who is this ISI?" Meanwhile, on the Pakistan side, everything is blamed on RAW. "We collectively have no sense of humor. We have no sense of irony," he says. As a media image, the Malik photo was a genius expression of a real counterculture movement taking root in Pakistan, taking a dig at the secretive "Major Major" culture of the ISI, by literally exposing the agency -- and by extension, the government -- to the light of day, if just in a simple tattoo. (Malik says that the photo was altered, and both Malik and FHM are engaged in a legal battle over the issue.) While a Pakistani newspaper said the country "yawns"at the Malik photo, it chronicled columns, commentaries and jokes circulating in the nation, including one that goes like this: "Her arm says ISI but the picture is RAW," a reference to India's intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing. But this isn't just a conspiracy hatched in India (though the magazine was produced there), feeding the siege mentality behind so much of the rhetoric in Pakistan. In a country where the "ghairat brigade," or honor squad, of talking heads takes regularly to the airwaves to defend Pakistan's honor against enemies -- perceived and imagined -- the photo shoot was a victory for a new movement that is emerging in Pakistan: the beghairat brigade, or the squad "without honor," or more aptly the "shameless brigade." To many, the beghairat brigade offers a counter to the conspiracy theories that so permeate debates in Pakistan. Josh White, a scholar on Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, says, "I think the significance of the small but interesting beghairat movement is that it is trying to forge a way of being genuinely nationalistic without accepting the narrative that all of Pakistan's problems are the result of someone else's meddling." Malik and her generation in Pakistani society illustrate a deeper battle that is playing out in Pakistan and Muslim communities on issues of honor, or ghairat, and shame, called sharam. Flagging this evolution, the acerbic Pakistani columnist Nadeem Paracha wrote earlier this year, "Goodbye ghairat." With a sense of wit, irony and humor, the beghairat brigade offers the nation an opportunity to expunge itself of the corrosive relationship with traditional honor-shame culture, by challenging the warped sense of honor and dishonor that has defined much of the country's ethos on issues from corruption to nuclear non-proliferation, "honor killings" of women and men, homegrown militant networks, and the ISI. And the beghairat's work is rooted in Pakistani tradition with sardonic 20th century writers such as Saadat Hasan Manto, the author of the must-read book, Letters to Uncle Sam, and a favorite of Malik's.

The Pakistani military's public relations office reportedly sent a text message to local journalists from the Pakistani grousing that the photo was "the height of humiliation for Pakistan, done by a Pakistani on Indian soil." In a Pakistani socialists' listserv, one Pakistani writer, giving the ISI acronym new meaning, wrote, tongue-in-cheek,"Is this part of a grand conspiracy to implicate the great International Soldiers of Islam (ISI) in a controversy by the enemies of Islam...." If so, he joked, "every soldier of Islam would be eyeing to be part of the investigation team." What is ironic is that while there have been calls to revoke Malik's Pakistani citizenship (rejected, fortunately, by the courts), there are some less-than-exemplary characters who have been lauded in the country by the "ghairat brigade." For instance, Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber, is considered a victim by many in Pakistan, despite having confessed to the crime for which he has been imprisoned, the attempted murder of a number of innocents. Then there is A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who signed a confession in 2004 that he gave nuclear secrets to the North Koreans, Iran and Libya, in violation of international nonproliferation agreements; he was pardoned, and today he is a hero in the country. Years ago, Pakistanis took to the streets when American agents caught and extradited Mir Amal Kansi, a Pakistani who shot and killed CIA employees in 1993 as they sat in their cars at a traffic light in Langley, Va. And, then, lest we forget, there is the serious homegrown militancy problem of a Punjabi Taliban and a Pakistani Taliban that includes tens of thousands of militant soldiers, based on many estimates, freely living in the country without much harassment. Finally, there is Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani MIT graduate known as "Lady al-Qaeda." She was convicted last year in a U.S. court for attempting to shoot a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan, but, in a country where the average income is about $450 a year, the government of Pakistan allocated some $2 million for her defense, and Pakistanis in the "Free Aafia" movement march regularly on the streets. Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:35 PM Deborah Scroggins, a journalist and author of the provocative forthcoming book, Wanted Women: Faith, Lies and the War on Terror: The Lives of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Aafia Siddiqui, says, "If Aafia Siddiqui is Pakistan's 'daughter of the nation,' Veena Malik is her perfect alter ego. The 'ghairat brigade' holds up Aafia as the symbol of Pakistan victimized by the West. Veena mocks their pretentions to purity and challenges their obsession with sex." Scroggins lays out the contrast that is symbolic of the divide that has engulfed Pakistan: Born in 1972, Siddiqui comes from the rigid, puritantical, Deobandi interpretation of Islam, and came of age during the 1980s, when jihad was celebrated in Pakistan as the source of the great defeat over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. "She's revered by the 'ghairat brigade' because although she went to the U.S. to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Brandeis University, she never 'went over to the other side,' so to speak" Scroggins adds. "She never stopped raising money for jihad. She continued to view the U.S. as the enemy of Pakistan and of Muslims. When she was captured in Afghanistan, Pakistan's right-wing pundits and politicians rushed to accuse the country's democratically elected government of selling her to the U.S. in exchange for money, even though there was no evidence that the government had anything to do with it." Born in 1984, "Veena is a symbol of another Pakistan, one that has existed since the founding of the state, but that we've seen less and less of with the rise of Islamization," says Scroggins. "It's an irreverrant, mocking, creative, secular Pakistan -- the voice of writers and poets like Ahmed Faiz," a biting 20th century intellectual. "Unfortunately it tends to be confined to the upper classes and is very much under threat these days," she says. Both Malik and Siddiqui "broke the rules about the way Pakistani women are supposed to behave," Scroggins says. Siddiqui was divorced from her doctor husband and remarried a younger man, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, another 9/11 facilitator. Her activities endangered her children; she was caught shooting at a U.S. soldier. "But she is forgiven for all of that because Pakistanis believe she did it for Pakistan and Islam," says Scroggins. "It's assumed that Veena, on the other hand, is only having her nude picture taken for money. And that's the way the ghairat brigade' always portrays the motives of Pakistan's secularists." Aisha Chowdhry, a 24-year-old Pakistani-American journalist who produced a documentary, "Inside the Tinder Box," about Pakistan, says the Malik cover, whether nude as it appeared or topless, as

Malik insists the photo was originally, "should not come as a surprise" to those watching the counterculture movement in Pakistan. "Art always has been a way for Pakistanis to showcase how they feel," she says. "Today, there are songs criticizing the government, paintings depicting terrorism in Pakistan, and now a racy photo of one of the country's most famous models with an ISI tattoo." Chowdhry says, "In a country where journalists get killed if they dare to investigate sensitive issues, music videos and plays are one of the few ways to connect the young generation with what is going on in their country, and maybe even make a positive change someday." In a piece on al-Jazeera before the Malik controversy, Syed Ali Abbas Zaida, founder of the Pakistan Youth Alliance, asked, "Can the youth of Pakistan inspire change and turn into pro-active citizens who agree to disagree peacefully?" The next month, the aptly-named band "Beghairat Brigade," uploaded its catchy new tune, "Aalu Anday" (or "Eggs and Potatoes"), calling out the politicians and military for their ineptitude in running the country. Pakistani singer Ali Azmat just put out a new song, "Bomb Phata," ("Bomb Exploded"), that chronicles the major actors that play a part in Pakistan's instability, from President Asif Ali Zardari to army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. It speaks to the daily worries about electricity and food shortages that vex Pakistanis while bombs explode in Lahore, Karachi, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). And people regularly slam the government's inability to contain the domestic terrorism that is striking the country. This year, Pakistani artist Imran Qureshi won a prestigious award for his art installation, "Blessings upon the land of my love," describing his work as showing "the bloody aftermath of a bombing." Malik's photo is a little more subtle, but in its nuance, it's likely to become an iconic symbol of a moment when one Pakistani decided to, quite literally and shamelessly, strip bare the truth of how institutions in Pakistan, are focused on the wrong priorities. "My dear patriots, there are far graver issues than this which need your serious consideration," wrote Pakistani economist and writer Raza Habib Raja, after the photo spread earned the rancor of the honor brigade. "The biggest issue is perhaps your screwed up mind set which gets riled up on these trivialities while completely ignoring much serious problems like rising extremism, sectarian killings and massive inequality." Raja concluded: "...I loved that ISI tattoo. Now that was really liberating and bold!!!" Asra Q. Nomani, a former reporter at the Wall Street Journal, is the author of Standing Alone: An American Woman's Struggle for the Soul of Islam. She teaches journalism at Georgetown University Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:40 PM Mengals timely warning (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309884/mengals-timely-warning/) By Imtiaz Gul | The Express Tribune The Veteran Baloch nationalist, Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengals warning that atrocities against the Baloch have pushed the situation to a point of no return is timely. After his meeting with Nawaz Sharif in Karachi on December 19, Mengal came down hard on the Pakistani security establishment, holding the Punjabi army responsible for inhuman acts against the Baloch people. The Baloch youth dont want a Pakistan in which they receive mutilated bodies of their compatriots they are being systematically eliminated and forced to seek refuge in the mountains, said the former chief minister of Balochistan and the founding chief of the Balochistan National Party. Mengal also accused Interior Minister Rehman Malik of hurling threats at the Baloch in the same way former president General Musharraf did. While many in Pakistan might dismiss part of Mengals loaded criticism of the centre and the army, the multiple crises in Balochistan do merit serious and urgent consideration. There is little doubt that Balochistan is most probably as much a microcosm of Pakistans security and political crisis as is Fata. Almost 450 murders since January so far; dozens of abductions and hundreds of attacks on key security and utility installations suggest that the province is currently going through one of the worst political, economic and security crises in its history.

The growing influence of religious extremists in the province is noticeable from the fact that the highest number of attacks on Nato supplies were carried out in Balochistan during the last four years, apparently by Taliban or pro-Taliban elements. The unusual number of target killings of Hazaras also bears testimony to the increased involvement in sectarian terrorism of outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Most Pakistani security agencies, officials and people at large, usually suspect external forces such as Afghanistan, the US and India of stoking and supporting nationalist violence to allegedly force Pakistan to accept their demands, which include serious tackling of organisations such as the so-called Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, and the Lashkar-eJhangvi. Based on the trends the Centre for Research and Security Studies observed since January this year, one could probably narrow down the current wave of violence in Balochistan to four key categories i.e. Baloch separatists, sectarian, external and internal forces (security agencies). All of them are so intricately intertwined that no easy deduction is possible to pinpoint the culprits behind most violent incidences. Sectarian violence, the data suggests, claimed the second highest number of deaths after those caused by the nationalist militancy during the period starting from 2003 to December 2011. Shia were the primary victims of sectarian attacks and a majority of these attacks occurred in Quetta (237) and Jhal Magsi (36). Hindus were also affected by this violence, which forced them to migrate to other parts of the province or the country. Suicide attacks were the major cause of death (150) followed by non-suicide fatal attacks (114) and bombings (10). Officially banned organisations, mainly the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, were the ones that often claimed responsibility for such attacks and the minority Hazara community living in the region was the major victim of this violence. Dr Malik Baloch, a balanced nationalist leader, also draws attention to the alarming circumstances that currently prevail in Balochistan. He, too, dismisses the Balochistan package, scorns the predominance of the security forces in governance and security matters and considers them to be a major source of discontent among the Baloch people in particular. Despite all these misgivings, Dr Baloch still pretends to be optimistic. Speaking at a seminar in Islamabad recently, he said that the dominant majority of the Baloch people are probably still pro-federation if their bruised egos are assuaged. The present provincial parliament, he said, had lost its relevance and only a fresh mandate could probably help restore the trust of the Baloch in the political system, which is leaking and creaking under misgovernance, violence and apathy of rulers.

Old Balochs advice (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/21/old-balochs-advice.html) Dawn Editorial Honour killings (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/21/honour-killings-3.html) Dawn Editorial HRCPs report on honour killing (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309875/hrcps-report-on-honourkilling/) The Express Tribune Editorial Pakistan honour killings reach 675 this year (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8968120/Pakistan-honour-killingsreach-675-this-year.html) By Rob Crilly | Daily Telegraph Chains not needed (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/21/chains-not-needed.html) By Zubeida Mustafa | Dawn Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:46 PM Solve the Pakistan problem by redrawing the map (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/solve-the-pakistan-problem-byredrawing-the-map/article2278388/) By M. CHRIS MASON | The Globe and Mail Relations between the United States and Pakistan have reached an all-time low. The Khyber Pass is closed to NATO cargo, U.S. personnel were evicted from Shamsi airbase and Pakistani observers have been recalled from joint co-operation centres.

Much more importantly, senior officials in Washington now know that Pakistan has been playing them false since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and understand that Pakistan was sheltering Osama bin Laden a few hundred yards from its version of West Point. The recent shelling of Afghan troops inside Afghanistan by the Pakistani army, and the NATO counterstrike, cleared in error by Pakistan, has further embarrassed the Pakistani military. It should be obvious by now that Pakistan has no intention of doing what the United States has wanted for the past decade. The combination of wishful thinking, admiration for the emperors new clothes and $10-billion in payments to the Pakistani military have accomplished nothing. Admiral Michael Mullen was not wrong when he testified recently that the terrorist Haqqani network is operating as an arm of the Pakistani army. He might have added that the Taliban is the Pakistani armys expeditionary force in Afghanistan. Pakistan shelters, funds, trains, supplies and advises the Taliban. The simple fact is that Pakistan is the worlds No. 1 state supporter of terrorism. In Afghanistan, Pakistan will never be happy unless it has a puppet regime in Kabul and can run the country like a colony. Islamabad does not intend to allow the current Afghan constitution to remain in effect, and as soon as NATO pulls out, it will push the Taliban into an all-out civil war in Afghanistan designed to return it to power. All of which has led to a lot of hand-wringing in Washington, accompanied by a revolving-door procession of senior U.S. officials going to Islamabad to read a toothless riot act the Pakistanis can now recite by heart. The permanent solution to the Pakistan problem is not more of this chest-beating appeasement. The answer lies in 20th-century history. In 1947, when India gained independence, a British Empire in full retreat left behind an unworkable mess on both sides of India called Pakistan whose elements had nothing in common except the religion of Islam. In 1971, this postcolonial Frankenstein came a step closer to rectification when Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, became an independent state. The answer to the current Pakistani train wreck is to continue this natural process by recognizing Baluchistans legitimate claim to independence. Baluchistan was an independent nation for more than 1,000 years when Great Britain notionally annexed it in the mid-19th century. The Baluchis were never consulted about becoming a part of Pakistan, and since then, they have been the victims of alternating persecution and neglect by the Pakistani state, abuse which escalated to genocide when it was discovered in the 1970s that most of the regions natural resources lie underneath their soil. Since then, tens of thousands of Baluchis have been slaughtered by the Pakistani army, which has used napalm and tanks indiscriminately against an unarmed population. Changing maps is difficult only because it is initially unimaginable to diplomats and politicians. Although redrawing maps is the definition of failure for the United Nations and the U.S. State Department, it has, in fact, been by such a wide margin the most effective solution to regional violence over the past 50 years that there is really nothing in second place. Among the most obvious recent examples (apart from the former Soviet Union) are North and South Sudan, Kosovo, Eritrea, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Timor and Bangladesh. An independent Baluchistan would, in fact, solve many of the regions most intractable problems overnight. It would create a territorial buffer between rogue states Iran and Pakistan. It would provide a transportation and pipeline corridor for Afghanistan and Central Asia to the impressive but underutilized new port at Gwadar. It would solve all of NATOs logistical problems in Afghanistan, allow us to root the Taliban out of the former province and provide greater access to Waziristan, to subdue our enemies there. And it would contain the rogue nuclear state of Pakistan and its A.Q. Khan network of nuclear proliferation-for-profit on three landward sides. The way to put the Pakistani genie back in the bottle and cork it is to help the Baluchis go the way of the Bangladeshis in achieving their dream of freedom from tyranny, corruption and murder at the hands of the diseased Pakistani military state. M. Chris Mason is a retired diplomat with long service in South Asia and a senior fellow at the Center for Advanced Defence Studies in Washington What enemy? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83580&Cat=8) The News Editorial

Mission not accomplished! (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\22\story_22-122011_pg3_5) By Harlan Ullman | Daily Times Pakistan Mulls Terms Of Future NATO Cooperation (http://www.rferl.org/content/pakistan_mulls_terms_of_future_cooperation/24426976.html) By Abubakar Siddique | Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Deadly NATO Attack: Future Of Pakistan-US Relationship (http://www.eurasiareview.com/21122011-deadly-nato-attack-future-of-pakistan-us-relationshipoped/) By Murad Khan | Eurasia Review Marriage on the rocks (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83585&Cat=9) By Aasim Zafar Khan | The News Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:52 PM For ex-Pakistan ambassador to U.S., an abrupt fall from grace (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-ex-pakistan-ambassador-to-us-an-abruptfall-from-grace/2011/12/20/gIQA7WhK7O_story.html) By Simon Denyer | The Washington Post Anyone who is asked to represent Pakistan in the United States faces a tough and thankless assignment, former ambassador Husain Haqqani told an inquiry here Tuesday, such is the gulf of mistrust between the two nations. For Haqqani who is caught up, as he sees it, in a serious deterioration in U.S.-Pakistani relations and a battle for supremacy between Pakistans civilian government and the countrys powerful army that description is something of an understatement. He was forced to step down as ambassador and return to Pakistan last month after being implicated in a controversy over a secret memo soliciting Washingtons help to prevent a possible military coup. For the former senior government official, author, journalist and scholar, it has been a stunning fall from grace, transporting him from the salons of Washington to virtual isolation in Islamabad and a possible treason charge. Upon his return, commentators rushed to condemn him on Pakistans influential television talk shows. Then, before the Supreme Court had even heard his side of the story, it barred him from leaving the country, a move that prompted his attorney, Asma Jehangir, to describe the case as pre-judged. The court hearing, which opened Monday, was adjourned until Thursday. Haqqani denies involvement in the frivolous and absurd memo, but the talk of treason has disturbed and upset the former ambassador and his family. There are some people who disagree with my husbands views, but that doesnt give them the right to question his service to Pakistan or his patriotism, Farahnaz Ispahani, Haqqanis wife and a spokeswoman for President Asif Ali Zardari, said in a phone interview Tuesday. Youd expect the courts to follow the law and give due process, and not allow this media frenzy to decide the matter, she said. I am appalled by the media trial that is going on in this country. Haqqanis delicate balancing act as ambassador began to unravel after the U.S. raid in Pakistan in May that killed Osama bin Laden. Testifying Tuesday before a Pakistani inquiry relating to the raid, he said that after the attack, U.S. officials were not only unapologetic about having violated Pakistani sovereignty, they were also intransigent and even threatening in their tone, demanding that Pakistan provide access to data and people found in the house in Abbottabad where bin Laden was killed. Meanwhile, he told the inquiry, so intense is the anti-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan that any attempt to win friends and influence people favorably in the U.S. plays into the hands of those agitating against the U.S. in Pakistan. The Pakistani representative is then cast as going against the wishes and sentiments of the

Pakistani people, he said. In November, Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani American businessman, revealed that in early May he had sent an unsigned memo to Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, via former national security adviser James L. Jones, asking for U.S. help in preventing a possible military coup. In return for such aid, the memo promised, Pakistan would bring its nuclear arsenal under a verifiable, transparent regime of control, sever links between the military spy service and the Afghan Taliban, and bring to justice militants accused of attacking the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. Ijaz said the memo was dictated to him by Haqqani, on Zardaris instructions, and he has since released a series of purported BlackBerry Messenger exchanges that he says support his version of events. The military was outraged and, just as important, apparently saw a chance to dispose of a man it had long been gunning for, analysts say. Mistrust had been especially acute since Haqqani accused the army in a 2005 book of a long-standing symbiotic relationship with radical Islam. The incident offered the military an opportunity to attack Zardari, Haqqanis boss and most important backer and an equally bitter foe of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief. Asked to give evidence on the memo affair, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of the InterServices Intelligence agency (ISI), said he had met with Ijaz, reviewed the evidence and concluded that it indicated Haqqanis involvement. Last week, Kayani demanded a full investigation of a controversy that he said had harmed national security, calling it an unsuccessful attempt to lower the armys morale. On Friday, however, the former ambassador was thrown a lifeline from the United States in the form of an affidavit from Jones, a copy of which The Washington Post obtained. Jones undermined Ijazs story by testifying that the businessman had contacted him about the proposal a few days before May 9, the date on which Ijaz has said Haqqani had first telephoned him with the idea. Pakistani newspapers have begun to ask why the intelligence agency is not being investigated, along with government officials. In the BlackBerry exchanges, Ijaz said that Pasha, the ISI chief, had traveled to Arab countries in May, where he received permission from their leaders to oust Zardari. Many are likely to consider Ijazs second charge as serious as the one against Haqqani and Zardari and would expect that the Supreme Court gives the statement equal importance as it proceeds with the memo case, Pakistan Today wrote in an editorial last Thursday. So far, that expectation has not been met.

Pakistan memo crisis adds pressure to U.S. ties (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/ususa-pakistan-idUSTRE7BK27020111221) By Missy Ryan | Reuters Memogate and surrogates (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\22\story_22-122011_pg3_2) By Mohammad Taqi | Daily Times Is Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan's president, about to resign? Pakistan's president, Asif Ali Zardari, is under mounting pressure from all sides. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/pakistan/111216/zardariresignation-pakistan) By Suzanna Koster | GlobalPost Notes on a scandal (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/21/notes-on-a-scandal.html) By SALMAN HAQQI | Dawn The webmaster (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83582&Cat=9) By Ikram Sehgal | The News

A Janus-faced alliance (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\22\story_22-122011_pg3_3) By Saad Hafiz | Daily Times The dangers of 2012 (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309888/the-dangers-of-2012/) By Tariq Rahman | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-21-2011, 08:56 PM Sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83583&Cat=9) By Aziz Ali Dad | The News For the last one decade Pakistan has been facing the worst kind of law and order. From Fata to Karachi, Pakistan has been constantly embroiled in conflicts that have created quasi civil warlike situations. Although, the region of Gilgit-Baltistan has remained immune from Islamists militancy, ethnic violence and nationalist insurgency, it has suffered from sectarian violence for last two decades. Recently, Gilgit city and its suburbs have seen a new element of violence in the shape of target killings. Given the scale of violence and terrorism at the national level, it is difficult for Gilgit to be in the limelight of print and electronic media. And though in terms of the number of causalities it seems less in intensity, its repercussions on the overall social fabric are deeper. Gilgit city is situated in a very important geo-strategic location as it connects different valleys and functions as a gateway to China. Because of its geo-strategic location Gilgit has historically remained vulnerable to various invasions and geo-political changes in surrounding polities. The sectarian violence in Gilgit is a result of a long historical process wherein the society gradually lost its traditional base of kinship and exposed to new mode of governance and social arrangements through modern institutions in colonial and post-colonial periods. Disintegration of the traditional social order resulted in an identity crisis at the collective level. In the absence of a traditional set up of society and empowered institutions, people resorted to religion to establish a collective identity. While doing so the people severed connections with those elements of culture that do not fit within the mould of modern religious identities at the collective level. The rupture with traditional governance, social arrangements, kinship base and culture appears in the shape of enmity within people from same linguistic, racial and tribal groups during sectarian strife. While Gilgiti society was experiencing social disintegration, the rulers of the country subjected Gilgit-Baltistan to various experiments of governance. With every new experiment the scourge of sectarian violence only got stronger because modern institutions were not empowered. It was a kinship based relationship that had enabled people to live together despite sectarian clashes since 1988. But the pluralist nature of society became the first casualty after January 2005 when violent events forced people to migrate from their ancestral abodes to the areas which are dominated by their sect. The situation has further aggravated with the increase in target killings in Gilgit, which have virtually turned Gilgit into a no go area. Every week several people fall prey to the spate of target killings. Because of this the residential, commercial areas, hotels, offices and educational institutions have been divided along sectarian lines. The very term target killing is employed in legal jargon because it is different from other kinds of murder in nature. This term is a new entry into the repertoire of violent vocabulary employed by the local people. Target killing is a convenient term to brush every kind of murder under the rubric sectarian strife. In Gilgit this term is used to refer to assassination on sectarian basis. In order to stem sectarian violence, it is indispensible to decouple the term target killing from other kinds of murder. Vocabulary with sectarian and violent connotation paves the way for violent mentality. Tacit acceptance of violent nomenclature by the society contributes to sectarian mentality and violence. Ironically, the local police has also found target killing a useful term to shirk from its duty of ascertaining the nature of every murder and tends to dub every murder as a target killing. Our nation has an uncanny talent to cast the state of the art technology within its idiosyncratic mould.

Recently, the local police has proudly announced the instalment of CCTV cameras in Gilgit city. The people of Gilgit hardly get three hours of electricity during the harsh winter season. One wonders how the police will manage to get information about murderers during the long hours of loadshedding. It is obvious that it will be impossible to provide 24 hour surveillance and the perpetrators will have a field day right under these expensive cameras. When the minds and eyes of law fail to comprehend the nature of crime and apprehend the culprits, then it is difficult to believe that the CCTV cameras will be successful. The above-mentioned facts show a pattern of the lame excuses presented by the local administration to cover up its failure to control the deteriorating law and order situation in Gilgit. To make the local administration and police force more effective it is imperative to revisit tried and tested strategies and train police with modern techniques of investigation to ably deal with the changing nature of violence. Tragically, in our country those who perpetrate violence update themselves with modern mechanics of violence as compared to the police that still relies upon outdated methods and approaches. The anachronistic approach at the structural level contributes to emboldening of violent elements in society and the failure of law enforcing agencies in the region.

Looking out on the Pir Panjal (http://tribune.com.pk/story/309886/looking-out-on-the-pir-panjal/) By Zahrah Nasir | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-21-2011, 09:00 PM Army Officer Said to be Caught in ISI Sex Trap (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/indian-army-officer-caught-in-isi-sex-trap/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence allegedly attempted to blackmail an Indian army officer to spy for them by setting him up with a woman and taking videos of them together, according to an Indian defense official. The lieutenant colonel, who was training at staff college in Bangladesh, allegedly declined to spy for Pakistan and instead went to the Indian High Commission in October to explain the situation and was immediately sent back to India. A military enquiry in to the incident is ongoing, the Indian defense official said. The official declined to name the man involved or to give details about the nature of exactly what the videos showed or whether the officer was married. Attempts to reach an ISI spokesman were not successful. The episode illustrates that Pakistans relations with India , while making slow progress on the level of trade and other technical issues, are still mired in distrust at times bordering on slapstick comedy at the level of the countrys militaries and spy agencies. Pakistans spy agency continues to view India, and especially New Delhis growing ties with Afghanistan, as a major security threat. Indian and the U.S. officials have tried to persuade Pakistan to change its strategic calculation and focus more resources on beating Taliban militants that shelter on the countrys border with Afghanistan. Its not the first time an Indian military officer has been caught in a compromising position. In 2009, Commodore Sukhjinder Singh, a married naval officer who was posted in Moscow, was photographed with a Russian woman. The photographs made it in to the public domain but there was no suggestion they were related to a blackmail attempt. The Navy fired him earlier this year for the affair.

Motto of Indian Mujahideen V2.0: Scale down, build up (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/mottoof-indian-mujahideen-20-scale-down-build-up/20111221.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff

Will a counter-terror apex body add more confusion? (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/will-acounter-terror-apex-body-add-more-confusion/20111221.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff The ifs and buts of community policing (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/killercomedies/entry/the-ifs-and-buts-of-community-policing) By Soumittra S Bose | Times of India Macaca 12-21-2011, 09:07 PM A Portuguese Relic's Place in the Indian Imagination (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1220/a-portuguese-relic-s-place-in-the-indian-imagination-choudhury.html) By Chandrahas Choudhury | Bloomberg The word "India" is a kind of unicolored canopy thrown over an extraordinarily dense, diverse and tangled set of political histories, a behemoth threatening to drown out "the small voice of history" -to borrow a phrase from the historian Ranajit Guha -- unless the little traditions find a way to assert themselves. Many Indians, especially those of my generation, were reminded of the necessity of disaggregating the threads of history this week when the state of Goa celebrated the 50th anniversary of its annexation by India. A small, sylvan territory on the west coast, now India's most popular tourist destination, Goa had an experience of colonial rule that was longer and very different from much of the rest of India. From the early 16th century onward, it came under the control of the Portuguese, who converted much of the local population to Catholicism and ruled much of the region for more than four and a half centuries as Estado Portugus da ndia, or the Portuguese state of India. The encounter between the Portuguese and the indigenous population of Goa, while unmistakably marked by coercion and repression, also produced a distinctive culture, cuisine, architecture, and worldview that still makes Goa a standout out in modern India. As Vivek Menezes, the scholar of Goa, wrote in an essay in the magazine The Caravan earlier this month: y the 16th century, Goa had exploded into the richest trading port the world had ever known, the centre piece of a truly global empire that extended from Brazil to Timor to Aden and back to Lisbon; Goans were profoundly globalised centuries before the first British merchant showed up in the subcontinent. (In fact, the British East India Company was formed in response to a series of letters by Thomas Stephens, an English Jesuit who marvelled at the riches of Portuguese Goa.) [B]Although India's anti-colonial movement in the first half of the 20th century had a ripple effect in Goa, the end of the British Raj in 1947 had no effect on the Portuguese dictator Antnio de Oliveira Salazar, who continued to deploy a governor to rule the territory, leaving it, after 1954 -- when the French withdrew from their Indian territories -- as the last colony on the subcontinent. Finally, in a controversial move, the government of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, took Goa by force in a short, swift operation in December 1961. Two years later, in 1963, Goans voted in elections for the first time, and entered the narrative of Indian democracy by becoming the country's smallest state. But assimilation into India brought with it a fresh set of quandaries about identity, such as a movement within the state in the 1960s to have it incorporated into Maharashtra, the much bigger state to its north, which also includes the metropolis of Mumbai, itself once a Portuguese holding subsequently handed over to the British. The core of the dispute revolved around language: Was Konkani, the tongue widely spoken on the west coast of India and particularly in Goa, merely a dialect of Marathi, the language of Maharashtra, or was it an independent language? In an India that was being organized into new states based on linguistic boundaries -- a very full account of this reorganization can be found in the historian Ramachandra Guha's book "India After Gandhi" -- this was a vital question. The matter was finally decided, unusually, by a referendum in 1967. More than 54 percent of the people voted against merging with Maharastra. Fifty years after decolonization, it might be said that Goa is still coming to terms with its complex past and sometimes too-thin present, as interpreted through the sunglasses of Indian and foreign tourists. As the journalist Rajdeep Sardesai wrote recently, "Brand Goa for the tourist is defined by

plenty of sun, many beaches, all night bars, loud music, and the occasional rave party: basically, a chance to rid oneself of the inhibitions of middle class India without the neighbour complaining." Goans are seen by outsiders as pleasure-loving, laidback people who are fond of a tipple and a siesta and a jangle on the guitar. Sometimes this is too reductive and unlayered a narrative. (Only the need to share a laugh compels me to tell you a story about my friend Merwyn, a Goan baker who now lives in the suburb of Borivali in Mumbai. Last year, he embarked on his summer vacation to Goa leaving on the door of his shop the sign: "Closed For Summer Holidays: May 10-June???") Meanwhile, Portuguese, which was spoken by many Goans 50 years ago, has almost died out; the imperatives of an economy dependent on tourism mean that most people in the state have had to embrace Hindi, the closest thing to a national Indian language. The ambiguities of this situation were brought out in an essay by the Goan writer Frederick Noronha called "Liberation and its Discontents": Goas significance to South Asia, not just to India, is often lost in the story. Here was a place that was a meeting point nay, a clashing point of cultures. It was among the earliest European colonies in Asia, and stayed the longest. It was ruled by the Portuguese (who were themselves ruled by the Spanish for part of their term here), blockaded by the Dutch, and protected by British troops stationed here. Goas colonial cousins at one time stretched from the coast of Africa till Macau and Japan. Portuguese rule here was bigoted in parts, and tolerant in others. Yet, out of it emerged an ethos where communal amity largely prevails. A land that saw drastic changes with every new set of rulers has been able to look ahead, adapt, and even gain from the upheaval. Its sons and daughters have excelled in music (both Western and Indian), food, sport, the languages, brokering between cultures, and so many other fields. [...] Five decades is long enough time to re-evaluate the past and overcome hurt. Maybe it is time to reevaluate the long, not-always-pleasant and not-always-unpleasant relationship with the former colonisers. Should not great Portuguese individuals like the pioneering 16th century Jewish-origin botanist, Garcia da Orta, and the writer of global epics, Luis de Camoes, be seen as belonging to Goa (or India and Asia too) having spent a considerable part of their lives here? If only every Indian could attend at least a single session of a major conference being held this week at Goa University called "Goa: 1961 and beyond." The event celebrates Goa's place in the history and imagination of at least three continents, including Africa, and features, among others, contributions by the writer Damodar Mauzo ("How Liberated Is Goan Literature?"), the literary critic Rukmini Bhaya Nair, the historian R. Benedito Ferrao ("The Many Africas of Goa"), and the urbanstudies scholars Rahul Srivastava and Matias Echanove ("The Portuguese Past in Contemporary Mumbai Villages..."). For the story of India to be kept alive in the greatest depth and density, so must the story of Goa.

New Delhi Turns 100 (http://the-diplomat.com/sport-culture/2011/12/21/new-delhi-turns-100/) By Sanjay Kumar | The Diplomat Wengers: New Delhis Oldest Bakery (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/wengersnew-delhis-oldest-bakery/) By Preetika Rana | IndiaRealTime Whats Behind Delhis Fogged In Flights? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/whatsbehind-delhis-fogged-in-flights/) By SRUTHI GOTTIPATI | India Ink Bollywood may sing, but Bangalore rocks (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/bangalorerockmusic-idINDEE7BK04L20111221) By Arjun Kashyap | Reuters Macaca 12-21-2011, 09:12 PM India Revisits the '70s The central bank risks stagflation by loosening to stimulate growth. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204552304577112013336442028.html) Wall Street Journal Editorial The Indian economy hit choppy waters this year and investors fear it is about to get worse. Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh's government has abandoned reforms, most spectacularly on foreign investment in retail this month. Some reassurance came from the central bank, which steadied the economy this year by fighting double-digit inflation. But that bit of stability is threatened after the Reserve Bank of India signaled Friday that it's about to give up the fight, too. India faces the worst bout of inflation in major Asian economies, a dilemma the RBI earlier seemed to acknowledge. Prices have been rising at an annual clip of above 8% for nearly 24 months and it was encouraging to see RBI Governor Duvvuri Subbarao push up the short-term interest rate by 2.25 percentage points this year. Mr. Subbarao is now losing his nerve. On Friday, he refused to hike interest rates for the first time this year and strongly suggested he would loosen credit next year. That's incredible given that the policy rate is still negative in real terms and growth in the broad money supply is running higher than expected. Headline numbers did fall two months in a row, but prices still rose 9.1% year-onyear in November. The decline has much to do with base effects from the end of 2010. The central bank surely understands that Indians' inflation expectations have hardened after witnessing the most persistent rise in the prices of goods in the last two decades. These expectations are not going to be altered by two months' data, especially now that goods inflation has spread to wagesand, thanks to the economy's rigidities, become sticky. The real reason for the RBI's change of heart is the pleading of various interest groups to bring down the cost of credit. GDP growth slowed to 6.9% in the latest quarter, while industrial output last month has deteriorated. Easy money is an easy response to flagging growth, but it's the wrong prescription. Mr. Subbarao seems to think he can trade off inflation in favor of growth, but the last 30 years of experience with priming the monetary pumpor even the last threeshould have taught him that there is no such correlation in the long run. The RBI is now recapitulating this experience. After it kept credit too cheap in 2008-09, India is now stuck with inflation and slowing growth. If Mr. Subbarao doubles down in coming months, he risks even more monetary instability this time around, probably without helping the cause of growth. He would also then fritter away the gains made by tightening in the past year. Meanwhile, as the RBI's credibility dissipates, the rupee is being hammered against the dollar. In desperation, Mr. Subbarao has dug into his toolkit, liberalizing foreign inflows into government bonds and some banking deposits, which is good though not sufficient at the moment. More worryingly, he's tried to curb speculation by imposing new rules last week on currency derivatives. What the central bank needs to restore stability to the rupee is a mandate for price stability, ideally achieved by targeting the exchange rate. Instead Mr. Subbarao juggles multiple mandates, including promoting growth. Except growth at this point is being held back more by regulation, than by the cost of credit. India's policy makers may not admit it, but they are stumbling into stagflation. The right way out of this mess is for Mr. Singh to drive growth through reforms and for Mr. Subbarao to maintain stable prices. It's bad enough that India's prime minister appears to have abdicated his responsibility, but its central banker will make things worse if he tries to compensate for Mr. Singh's failings.

Facts about RBI, govt moves to shore up rupee (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/factsabout-rbi-govt-moves-to-shore-up-r-idINDEE7BK07M20111221) Reuters Sensex jumps 510 points, ends 5-day losing streak (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/indiasensex-nifty-close-idINDEE7BK08Q20111221) By Nandita Bose | Reuters Pain on Dalal Street as Markets Sink (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/pain-on-dalalstreet-as-markets-sink/) By NEHA THIRANI | India Ink Why textiles has failed to perform (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2735637.ece) By MANIKAM RAMASWAMI | The Hindu BusinessLine

India story is about manufacturing (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2735544.ece) By R. SRINIVASAN | The Hindu BusinessLine A false responsibility (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2735547.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Slowdown fears? Not for Gujarats taxmen (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/Slowdown-fears-Not-for-Gujaratstaxmen/articleshow/11188146.cms) By Ankur Jain | TNN Less tension over pension (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/Less-tensionover-pension/Article1-785403.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Hunger must go (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/Hunger-mustgo/Article1-785409.aspx) By Jean Dreze | Hindustan Times Securing food delivery (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/securing-food-delivery/890475/) MK VENU | Indian Express Indias needy reject fair-price food shops (http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/southasia/india-s-needy-reject-fair-price-food-shops) By Suryatapa Bhattacharya | The National Cutthroat Market Drives Network18, Ambani Talks (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204879004577109513639432808.html) By MEGHA BAHREE And AMOL SHARMA | Wall Street Journal India Unveils Strategic Oil Stockpile Plans (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577111893998225190.html) By RAKESH SHARMA | Wall Street Journal The race to better learning (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/educable/entry/the-race-tobetter-learning) By Meeta Sengupta | Times of India Light Hand, Please (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Light-HandPlease/articleshow/11196998.cms) Times of India Editorial Hard lessons in education (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/indicus-analytics-hardlessons-in-education/459317/) By Indicus Analytics | Business Standard Go back to the labs (http://www.hindustantimes.com/ViewsSectionPage/ColumnsOthers/Go-backto-the-labs/Article1-785410.aspx) By Ashok Parthasarathi | Hindustan Times Hacking the sarkar (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/hacking%3Ci%3Esarkar%3Ci %3E/459313/) Business Standard Editorial Bharat Ratna, Katju paradox, et cetera (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/bharat-ratna-katjuparadox-et-cetera-487) By Ashok Malik | Asian Age Macaca 12-21-2011, 09:17 PM Gasping for breath Short of authority and direction, Indias rulers flail in the face of growing problems (http://www.economist.com/node/21541879) The Economist A LESSER man might have quit by now. Even Manmohan Singhs fabled ability to endure humiliation is being tested. That the prime minister defers to his political boss and head of the ruling Congress party, Sonia Gandhi, is widely accepted. That he is undercut by colleagues, including Mrs Gandhi, who are still sceptical about his liberalising reforms, looks increasingly hard for him to swallow. Tougher yet for a man of personal integrity is that he is presiding over such widespread and outrageous corruption. Nor can it be easy for him to accept that, despite an emphatic re-election in 2009, his government has passed no substantial laws. The price is being paid by India itself. Investors and others lament policy paralysis. Ministers shy away from big decisions, fearing accusations of graftthough Mr Singh this week urged them at least to get on with infrastructure spending. Meanwhile an obstructive opposition, the Bharatiya

Janata Party (BJP), has caused gridlock in parliament for much of the year, hoping to tap public fury over corruption. As a result, the current parliament has done the least work of any in a quarter of a century. A prominent Congress figure, Shashi Tharoor, is so glum he suggested this week scrapping parliament altogether in favour of a presidential system. That will not happen, but nor will much get done. On December 13th the finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee, had almost to beg MPs to collaborate on economic reform. Well he might. An overdue, but poorly sold, official decision to let foreigners invest in (and so improve) the retail sector in India was put on hold just two weeks after it was announced. Mr Mukherjee admitted that the government would have fallen if the matter had gone to a vote. Promoting a reform expressly to reassure investors, then promptly backing away, was dismally bad politics. It may mark the moment this government lost its way. The weakness looks unforgivable given that Congress holds 207 of the 545 seats in the lower house, or Lok Sabha. On the surface, the blunder was failing to square the retail deal with a coalition ally, the Trinamul Congress, led by Mamata Banerjee, a notoriously unreliable ally. She sabotaged Mr Singhs trip to Bangladesh in September over a river-sharing deal; in November she threatened to topple the government over a small petrol-price rise. But in opposing retail reform she was emboldened by others. Congress leaders opposed the policy in cabinet, which suggests a deeper problem of factions inside the prime ministers party. Mrs Gandhis dismal silence spoke of her broader detachment, after being diagnosed with a serious illness in the summer. Her son, Rahul Gandhi, a timid would-be prime minister, was as ever absent, pottering around in the politics of Uttar Pradesh. Mr Singh and his coterie were feebly exposed. Such failures are inviting opponents of other policies to prowl. A plan to let the private sector provide more pensions may be the next victim. A long-touted proposal to confer a right to food will be delayed. And on December 13th parliaments finance committee attacked the governments prized scheme for rolling out biometric identity cards, warning it had no clarity of purpose and could be a security risk. That looks like an opening salvo for bigger attacks on the scheme next year. These problems are compounded by slackening economic growth. Local and foreign investors are already unnerved by a global slowdown. Political intransigence, continuing corruption, high inflation and the possibility that India will miss its fiscal targets all add to the governments woes. Mr Mukherjee has cut his growth forecast for the year, from 9% to 7.5%. Even that may be optimistic, after figures on December 12th showed industrial output (spread across mining, capital goods and other sectors) slumped by 5.1% in October compared with a year earlier. The rupee promptly reached historic lows against the dollar. Inflation fell slightly, to 9.1% in November, but is still much too high. So the central bank will not rush to reverse its long run of rate rises that have left investors squealing. The response from Mr Singh should be a push to explain to Congress and the country how reforms to land ownership or government efficiency or the retail sector would help to improve the mood and hence Indias economic fortunes. Instead he looks set to be embroiled, for the third time this year, in another bitter struggle. A populist anti-graft campaigner, Anna Hazare, is back on the national stage with demands for an ombudsman, a lokpal, to oversee politicians, including the prime minister. Mr Hazare is increasingly political and explicitly anti-Congresshe sat with leaders from the opposition BJP and the Communist Party at a one-day fast in Delhi on December 11th and has told voters to boycott the ruling party. That move might limit the numbers who actually rally round him, but it still looks likely to pile more pressure on the ageing Mr Singh.

Mumbai Next for Anna Hazare? (http://the-diplomat.com/indian-decade/2011/12/21/mumbai-nextfor-anna-hazare/) By Rajeev Sharma | The Diplomat Anti-corruption legislation for debate in India's parliament (http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/anti-corruption-legislation-for-debate-inindias-parliament) By Suryatapa Bhattacharya | The National

And now to the House (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/and-now-tohouse/459312/) Business Standard Editorial Then as farce (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/then-as-farce/890472/) Indian Express Editorial We want a lean, mean Lokpal (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/article2732624.ece) By Abhishek Singhvi | The Hindu Bumpy Road Awaits Government on Anti-Graft Bill (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/bumpy-road-awaits-government-on-anti-graftbill/) By Vibhuti Agarwal | IndiaRealTime The Lokpal Bill: What They Wanted Vs. What They Got (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/the-lokpal-bill-what-they-wanted-vs-what-theygot/) By Margherita Stancati | IndiaRealTime Think it through (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Think-itthrough/articleshow/11197017.cms) Times of India Editorial Thanks for showing some spine on the Lokpal.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-realtruth/entry/thanks-for-showing-some-spine-on-the-lokpal) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Ministers' foreign trips: Rs 435 crore due towards Air India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Ministers-foreign-trips-Rs-435-croredue-towards-Air-India/articleshow/11193986.cms) Press Trust Of India Macaca 12-22-2011, 08:47 PM How India's Bureaucracy Stays Unaccountable The country's freedom of information laws, only a few years old, are already proving weak. They need be to be strengthened. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204552304577111950879387664.html) By ANIT MUKHERJEE | Wall Street Journal Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh boosted transparency in 2005 when he passed the Right to Information Act, or RTI, designed to give citizens better access to government records. But for the past couple of months, Mr. Singh has been talking about revisiting the actfor the worse. Mr. Singh's says he wants to protect the "deliberative processes" of officials who now claim to be bogged down by RTI petitions seeking documents. More likely, those officials are scared of writing memos that reflect what they really think, lest that memo should suddenly become a liability when released under the act. The government wants to dilute the RTI by creating lots of exceptions for what information a citizen can access. Instead the act needs to be strengthened. The passage of the act has improved accountability to some extent and enhanced ordinary citizens' understanding of government and politics. Hence, for instance, government bureaucracies that deliver services, like passports or driving licenses, are increasingly responsive to citizens who can drop the threat of an RTI to get work done faster. This is introducing an element of transparency in decision making. But this hasn't been enough. The big problem is that the government's implementation of RTI is weak. Caveats for justifiable national-security cases are built into the law. Yet even for matters that don't need opaqueness, bureaucrats have stonewalled information gatherers or ignored diktats from the Chief Information Commission (CIC), the judicial office that oversees RTI. Consider my own experience. Researchers of defense policy like me need access to government data, but the Indian military does not adhere to declassification procedures. Frustrated by the lack of primary material related to the defense ministry's organizational structure from the 1940s to 1980s, I filed an RTI request in 2009 against the Ministry of Defence and the three armed services, seeking six documents. A torturous year shuttling between different offices later I finally appealed to the CIC in August last year. But I heard from the CIC only eight months later. This exposed the first loophole in the implementation of the RTIthe CIC can take as long as it wants to call for the first hearing. The course of my hearings threw up more surprises. Admitting it had one of the documents in question, the army claimed that it was still sensitive to national security and could not be

declassified. Anticipating this I had made a caveat in my petition: that if there was any matter in these documents still sensitive then this could be redacted with a security deletion and the rest of the report could be shared. This information was anyway dated and secondary literature on it was already in the public domain. Something similar was done with a committee report that investigated the failures leading to the 1999 Kargil war in Kashmir. But the army bureaucracy refused, instead offering to share the report with the CIC and leaving it to that office's judgment. The CIC in turn refused to make the report public arguing that he could not "substitute my own judgement for that of the Army top brass." Mine isn't the only example. Journalists Kuldip Nayar and Sandeep Unnithan,have both filed RTIs to get access to records relating to India's 1962 war and 1971 war, respectively. In these cases, the CIC accepted the logic of declassification and instructed the relevant ministries to follow a logical and mature declassification policy. But these instructions went nowhere. In other democracies, declassification is done by an expert body of scholars, historians and bureaucrats who deliberate and decide what to restrict and what to declassify. In India this process is missing. Bureaucrats who created the documents control their declassification. And they often are gripped by a fear of what will be revealed. The RTI law in theory should signal to bureaucrats to start being accountable. Yet in practice, there is no political will from New Delhi to instruct bureaucracies to help ordinary citizens with information, or give them the manpower to do so. In this environment, bureaucrats can easily avoid this law. These episodes suggest that the RTI act needs to be bolstered. First, the staff strength of the CIC needs to be augmented. Second the powers of that body must be strengthened. CIC officials should be allowed to initiate contempt proceedings against bureaucrats that do not implement its orders. In my case, at least the CIC advocated declassification at first. Third, all RTI requests and information gleaned through them must be shared on the Internet. Finally, the CIC must hear from experts during its deliberations. It cannot argue, as it did in my case, that one cannot substitute for the judgment of the military. Without such modifications, the obvious loss is for democratic accountability. This legal issue can have profound implications for India's democracy. Without access to government documents, academicsespecially historianscan only compose hagiographies of leaders or one-sided views of political events. The government denies citizens greater understanding about big events such as India's 1962 war against China, and may unfortunately skew their views. It's time to lift the veil of secrecy. Mr. Mukherjee is a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi

India: The mess of democracy (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML22Df01.html) By Swati Lodh | Asia Times Occupy Wall Street: what would Gandhi say? Those considering the future of the Occupy movement should look for inspiration to Gandhi (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/21/occupy-wall-street-gandhi) By Ruchira Gupta | The Guardian Year of protests (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Year-ofprotests/articleshow/11209736.cms) Times of India Editorial Lokpal: the real issue (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Editorials/Lokpal-the-realissue/Article1-785869.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial CBI must not report to the Lokpal.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-realtruth/entry/cbi-must-not-report-to-the-lokpal) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Let a new Parliament handle the Lokpal Bill (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/kamalmorarkas-blog/entry/let-a-new-parliament-handle-the-lokpal-bill) By Kamal M Morarka | Times of India

Held to ransom (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/jugglebandhi/entry/held-to-ransom1) By Jug Suraiya | Times of India Playing with fire (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Playing-withfire/articleshow/11209549.cms) By Vijay Darda | Times of India A few fatal flaws (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/few-fatal-flaws-932) By Bharat Karnad | Asian Age After sound and fury, a bill at last (http://www.asianage.com/editorial/after-sound-and-fury-billlast-927) Asian Age Editorial Punjab Makes An Effort To Bring Environment In Political Discourse (http://www.countercurrents.org/dsharma221211.htm) By Devinder Sharma | Ground Reality Macaca 12-22-2011, 08:57 PM Scaling Caste Walls With Capitalisms Ladders in India (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/world/asia/indias-boom-creates-openings-foruntouchables.html) By LYDIA POLGREEN | The New York Times On his barefoot trudge to school decades ago, a young Ashok Khade passed inescapable reminders of what he was: the well from which he was not allowed to drink; the temple where he was not permitted to worship. At school, he took his place on the floor in a part of the classroom built a step lower than the rest. Untouchables like him, considered to be spiritually and physically unclean, could not be permitted to pollute their upper-caste neighbors and classmates. But on a recent afternoon, as Mr. Khades chauffeur guided his shimmering silver BMW sedan onto that same street in a village in the southern state of Maharashtra, village leaders rushed to greet him. He paid his respects at the temple, which he paid to rebuild. The untouchable boy had become golden, thanks to the newest god in the Indian pantheon: money. As the founder of a successful offshore oil-rig engineering company, Mr. Khade is part of a tiny but growing class of millionaires from the Dalit population, the 200 million so-called untouchables who occupy the very lowest rung in Hinduisms social hierarchy. Ive gone from village to palace, Mr. Khade exclaimed, using his favorite phrase to describe his remarkable journey from the son of an illiterate cobbler in the 1960s to a wealthy business partner of Arab sheiks. The rapid growth that followed the opening of Indias economy in 1991 has widened the gulf between rich and poor, and some here have begun to blame liberalization for the rising tide of corruption. But the era of growth has also created something unthinkable a generation ago: a tiny but growing group of wealthy Dalit business people. Some measure their fortunes in hundreds of thousands of dollars, and a handful, like Mr. Khade, have started companies worth tens of millions. With their new wealth they have also won a measure of social acceptance. This is a golden period for Dalits, said Chandra Bhan Prasad, a Dalit activist and researcher who has championed capitalism among the untouchables. Because of the new market economy, material markers are replacing social markers. Dalits can buy rank in the market economy. India is moving from a caste-based to a class-based society, where if you have all the goodies in life and your bank account is booming, you are acceptable. Milind Kamble, a Dalit contractor based in the city of Pune in Maharashtra State, said that out of the 100 or so members of the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in his city, only one was in business before 1991. We are fighting the caste system with capitalism, he said. An Immobile Society Bollywood may love a rags-to-riches story, but historically India is not a nation of Horatio Alger stories. Social and economic mobility are limited, a product of Indias layers of cultural legacies: the Hindu caste system, the feudal hierarchies established by its many invaders and the imperial bureaucracy imposed by Britain. The idea that with hard work and determination, anyone could

succeed found scant purchase here. Independence changed that somewhat. Indias Constitution, which was largely drafted by a Dalit, Bhimrao Ambedkar, outlawed the practice of physical untouchability, which relegated Dalits to the bottom of the social ladder and condemned them to low-status jobs, like leather work and barbering. It established affirmative action for Dalits and tribal people in politics and government jobs and education. The practice of physical untouchability, which prevented Dalits from walking on the same streets as upper-caste people, drinking from the same wells or even looking such people in the eye, has virtually disappeared, though it remains in practice in some remote areas. Dalits still lag behind the rest of India, but they have experienced gains as the countrys economy has expanded. A recent analysis of government survey data by economists at the University of British Columbia found that the wage gap between other castes and Dalits has decreased to 21 percent, down from 36 percent in 1983, less than the gap between white male and black male workers in the United States. The education gap has been halved. Another survey conducted by Indian researchers along with professors from the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard showed that the social status of Dalits has risen as well they are more likely to be invited to non-Dalit weddings, to eat the same foods and wear the same clothes as upper-caste people, and use grooming products like shampoo and bottled hair oil. For most of Indias history after independence, the government was the only thing that could improve the Dalits lot. For nearly all Indians but especially for Dalits, a government job, even a low-level one, was the surest ticket out of poverty, guaranteeing education, housing, a salary and a pension. Few in the socialist government or in Indias generally risk-averse society saw entrepreneurship as an attractive option. But that has started to change. Since 1991, when Indias economy opened to the world and began its astonishing growth trajectory, hundreds of thousands of new businesses have been created, leaving an opening for millions of people who never imagined that owning their own business was even possible. A small handful of Dalits were uniquely poised to take advantage. Caste is a delicate subject in Indian life, spoken of only sotto voce. The once strong connection between caste and occupation loosened long ago, and generalizations are risky, but certain cultural affinities remain. Knowledge-based businesses like information technology have attracted large numbers of Brahmins, the traditional learned caste. The business castes tended to focus more on retail and wholesale trade than manufacturing. Messy industries like construction are closer to the traditional occupations of the lowest castes. One Dalit businessman in Pune has turned the traditionally undesirable work of pest control into a million-dollar company. Mr. Kamble made his fortune in Indias building boom. Dalits have started small technology companies, installing networking equipment, while others have set up factories to make water pipes and sugar. In this complex society, Dalits are turning disadvantage into an advantage, Mr. Prasad said. Starting From Nothing Ashok Khades rags-to-riches story stands out because of how completely he transformed himself, with some luck and some help from Indias opening economy, from an illiterate cobblers son to a multimillionaire player in the booming oil services industry. He was born in a mud hut in Ped in 1955, one of six children. His parents were day laborers who toiled in upper-caste farmers fields for pennies. His father would often travel to Mumbai, then known as Bombay, to work as a shoe repairman. He came from a family of Chamhars, a caste at the very bottom of the Hindu hierarchy. Their traditional job was to skin dead animals. They were poor and always hungry. One day, his mother sent him to fetch a small bag of flour on

credit from a nearby flour mill so she could cook flatbread for dinner. But it was the monsoon season and Ashok slipped in the mud. The precious flour landed in a puddle. I came home weeping, he said. My mother was weeping. My brothers and sisters were hungry. There was nothing in the house. But that hunger gave him drive. That was my starting day, he said. Mr. Khade got his first big break that year, when he won admission to a school run by a charity in a nearby town. Away from the village and its deeper caste prejudice, he thrived. Upper-caste teachers nurtured him, and he strived to impress them. But caste was not entirely absent. In the schools musty register from 1973, the year he finished high school, next to his name is his caste: Chamhar. All through school, poverty gnawed at him. Students had to provide their own paper to write their exams, and one day he found himself without even a few pennies to buy the necessary sheets of foolscap. A teacher tore pages from the attendance ledger. Too poor to buy string to tie the pages together, he used a thorn from a tree. None of it mattered. He graduated near the top of his class. Macaca 12-22-2011, 09:01 PM Setbacks and Luck Mr. Khades elder brother, Datta, had managed to get an apprenticeship as a welder at a government-owned ship building company, Mazagon Dock, in Mumbai. He persuaded young Ashok to move to the big city. The tiny room where Datta lived with relatives was already full, so Ashok slept for a time under a nearby staircase on a folding cot. Mr. Khade dreamed of becoming a doctor and studied at a local college. But Datta, who supported the entire family, begged his younger brother to drop out of school and start working. Datta helped Ashok get a job as an apprentice draftsman at Mazagon Dock. What seemed like a setback turned out to be a stroke of luck. His flawless drafting skills and boundless appetite for hard work won him promotions. In 1983, he was sent to Germany to work on a submarine project. One day, he saw the pay slip of one of his German colleagues, who earned in one month more than Mr. Khade earned in a year. I thought about my familys needs, he said. My sisters needed to get married. I knew I could do better than working for someone else. When he returned from Germany, he began laying the groundwork to start his own company. The risk was enormous, and it was almost unheard of to leave a steady job to start a company. But his two brothers were expert offshore welders. They had good contacts from their years at Mazagon Dock. And the economy was changing after years of stagnation as the 1991 reforms began to reduce the bureaucracys control of the economy and stimulate growth. It was obvious there was a chance to make a lot of money, he said. The brothers used their savings to finance the small subcontract jobs they began with, and in 1993 they got their first big order, for some underwater jackets for an offshore oil rig, from Mazagon Dock. Mr. Khades hunch was right, and his timing was impeccable. Faster growth meant Indias appetite for fossil fuels grew ever more rapacious. His company, which builds and refurbishes offshore oil rigs, has expanded rapidly and he is expanding to the Middle East. He recently signed a deal with a member of the royal family of Abu Dhabi to work on oil wells there, and he is building what will be Indias biggest jetty fabrication yard on the Maharashtra coast. He has 4,500 employees, and his company is valued at more than $100 million. His two brothers are now in politics one leads the Ped village council, the other is a member of the state assembly, both holding seats reserved for Dalits. Mr. Khade has bought vast tracts of land

around his village, the same plots where his mother, now 86, used to work for upper-caste farmers for pennies a day. Now she dresses in expensive silk saris, rides in a chauffeured car and wears gold jewelry. The sons of upper-caste families now work for Mr. Khades company. By any measure he is a man who has made it, and big. An untouchable boy the business partner of a prince? Mr. Khade said. Who would believe that is possible? Mr. Khade probably would not be in business with a prince had he not attended a networking cocktail reception hosted by the Dalit Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the five-star Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai this year. There he met the Indian businessman who introduced him to the Arab sheik, who helped him to globalize his company. These kinds of connections are crucial to the nascent Dalit business community. Because Dalit businessmen often lack the social connections that lead to business ideas, loans and other support, a group of Dalit entrepreneurs created the chamber in 2005. It aims to build those networks so Dalit business leaders can help one another grow. The group has about 1,000 members, all of whom run companies with an annual turnover of at least $20,000. It recently organized a meeting where Dalit businessmen pitched ideas to Tata Motors, one of Indias biggest car companies. Mr. Kamble, the Dalit contractor, said that of the 10 companies that attended, 4 had signed deals and 4 more were in negotiations. There was a time when people like us could not even approach a company like Tata Motors, he said. Now we go meet them with dignity, not like beggars. We are job givers, not job seekers. The group has persuaded the government to embrace contracting preferences for Dalits like the ones that have helped businesses owned by women and minorities in the United States. It also seeks to persuade private companies to embrace affirmative action policies that would create more jobs and business opportunities for Dalits. Few Options for Women Despite the success of men like Mr. Khade, a Dalit entrepreneur is still much more likely to be a poor woman who has no choice but to start a small, low-profit margin business because so few other options are open to her, said Annie Namala, a researcher and activist who has worked on Dalit issues. A survey completed this year of Dalit women entrepreneurs in Delhi and Hyderabad found that most made less than $100 a month from their businesses. These are basically survival enterprises, Ms. Namala said. These women would prefer a steady job, but no jobs are available so they start a small business and work very hard with very little return. Despite gains for some Dalits, a recent paper from the Harvard Business School that used government data from 2005 found that even after the economic liberalization, Dalits were significantly underrepresented in the ownership of private enterprises, and the employment generated by private enterprises. Even for those who have had wild success in business, social acceptance has proved harder to attain. While wealth insulates them to some degree from lingering caste prejudice, barriers remain even for rich Dalits. Names often reveal a persons caste, so one Dalit businessman who installs solar water heaters changed his last name because he worried that upper-caste people would not want a Dalit installing an appliance associated with personal hygiene in their homes. Even Mr. Khade, with all his wealth and newfound status, does not want to offend potential uppercaste clients. His business card reads Ashok K, leaving off the last name that reveals what he is: a Dalit.

Indias Boom Brings Fortunes to Some Dalits (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/indias-

boom-brings-fortunes-to-some-dalits/) India Ink Rags to Riches (http://video.nytimes.com/video/2011/12/21/world/asia/100000001158042/ragsto-riches.html) India Ink The False Promise of Biometrics (http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/the-false-promiseof-biometrics-in-india/) By AMAN SETHI | International Herald Tribune Parliamentary Committee Rejects UID Project And Biometric based NPRVindicates Citizens Demand For Reviewing UID And NPR (http://www.countercurrents.org/twa221211.htm) By Toxic Watch Alliance | Countercurrents Out-of-textbook thinking (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/mihir-s-sharma-out-oftextbook-thinking/459403/) By Mihir S Sharma | Business Standard Say goodbye to cheap new drugs (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/bhupeshbhandari-say-goodbye-to-cheap-new-drugs/459399/) By Bhupesh Bhandari | Business Standard Major miner problems (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/major-minerproblems/459402/) Business Standard Editorial Food must not be reduced to security (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/food-must-not-bereduced-to-security/891039/) By Ela R. Bhatt | Indian Express Patronising the poor, in perpetuity (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/patronising-the-poor-inperpetuity/891034/) By Dipali Rastogi | Indian Express Another white revolution, please (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2738764.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial India food law: The hungry republic (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16291300) By Soutik Biswas | BBC My Business: The slum dweller who founded a food chain (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business16248442) BBC Textile crisis waiting to happen (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2738779.ece) By L. N. REVATHY | The Hindu BusinessLine India Plans to Borrow $9.5 Billion Pledging Assets to Fund Budget Deficit (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-22/india-said-to-plan-9-5-billion-loan-as-asset-salesfall-short-of-target.html) By Anto Antony | Bloomberg Much to account for (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/much-to-account-for/459401/) Business Standard Editorial India Panel: Economy May Face Stagflation Risk (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204552304577114011961088008.html) By MUKESH JAGOTA | Wall Street Journal 10 Predictions for 2012 (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/22/tech-journal-10predictions-for-2012/) By Amit Agarwal | IndiaRealTime A Conversation With: Sachin Pilot (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/a-conversation-withsachin-pilot/) By HEATHER TIMMONS | India Ink An Impending Water Bomb in Kerala (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/22/animpending-water-bomb-in-kerala/) By Nissim Mannathukkaren | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-22-2011, 09:09 PM Only for Muslims (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310548/only-for-muslims/) By Yaqoob Khan Bangash | The Express Tribune Just the other day I was attending a Christmas function, where Father Francis Nadeem, the tireless promoter of interfaith harmony in Pakistan, narrated a very sad story. He said there is a dahibhalla stall in Lahores cantonment area which has a sign saying only for Muslims. Using this example, Nadeem highlighted the fact that it is not only legal discrimination against the minorities which needs to change but, more importantly, it is the attitude of the people towards them which needs to fundamentally change.

When I was in university studying Indian history, I spent a lot of my time thinking why the partition happened. After all, Muslims and Hindus had lived in South Asia, for over a millennia what had changed now? Also, as Gandhi mentioned, Hindus and Muslims in India were from the same stock racially and thus hardly different in that respect. Among other factors, one reason stood out as one of the most critical elements in the Partition intolerance. The Partition happened not simply because Muslims were a separate nation, or that Hindus were a separate nation, it happened because some people (on both the Hindu and Muslim sides) could not tolerate living with each other and, hence, had to be separated. The carnage of Partition where hundreds of thousands of people; innocent Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others were killed on both sides of the divide was a testament to the level of intolerance which had pervaded the society. Since Partition, the curse of intolerance has not left the subcontinent. It seems that people here are still enslaved by their primordial sense of violence and discrimination. We might have better infrastructure, industry, and the luxuries of modern life, but if we still cannot rise above such basic evils, we have not yet reached civilisation. The major religions of the world teach that humans are primarily good beings, who have fallen from the grace of God because of sin. In a way, the struggle for humankind is to undo that sin so that humans might be reconciled to God and live in the beatific vision of God in heaven. Therefore, it is thinking of the self in all things (the root cause of Adam and Eves sin), which needs to be mastered and curtailed. Intolerance too comes from putting oneself at the centre of the universe, rather than God. Obviously, if God is the centre and we all are His creation, then everyone has to be treated equally and with respect. It is this goal in life that all of us hope to achieve and struggle towards but it seems that in this Pakistan is still far behind. It will be Christmas in a few days which is both a Christian and a Muslim feast. Obviously, Jesus Christ is the central figure in Christianity but, he is also one of the most important prophets in Islam. The Holy Quran says: We sent Jesus, son of Mary: We gave him the Gospel and put compassion and mercy into the hearts of his followers. (57:27). Among other things, the message of Christ was of repentance and tolerance. In his famous comment, Jesus said that if someone strikes you on one cheek, present him the other. This was the extreme example of tolerance where even harm was responded to by compassion. Similarly, the Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) worked tirelessly to end intolerance in society he was in and tried to ensure that all people could live together in peace and harmony. His efforts at making peace among the various feuding tribes in Arabia, his treaties with Jewish tribes, his excellent relations with Christian kings, are all testament to the centrality of tolerance in his message. In this season which reminds us of the birth of Christ or Isa; let us reinvent Pakistan and create it on the basis of love and tolerance, rather than intolerance and hatred, and move ahead on our quest to be reunited completely with our Maker.

Pak violates ceasefire to cover infiltrating ultras along LoC (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pakviolates-ceasefire-to-cover-infiltrating-ultras-along-loc/20111222.htm) Press Trust Of India Have you heard about this Indian Hero? (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-thehero-of-nubra/20111222.htm) By Claude Arpi | Rediff Did AQ Khan unwittingly sell India his nuke designs? (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slideshow-1-did-aq-khan-unwittingly-sell-india-his-nuke-designs/20111222.htm) Rediff US expert claims Khan network supplied nuke technology to India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/US-expert-claims-Khan-network-supplied-nuketechnology-to-India/articleshow/11206360.cms) TNN Next round of talks (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/22/next-round-of-talks.html) By Tariq Osman Hyder | Dawn The curse of nationalism (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/22/the-curse-of-nationalism-2.html) By Jawed Naqvi | Dawn Macaca

12-22-2011, 09:17 PM Why the Haqqani Network is Not on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136974/audrey-kurth-cronin/why-the-haqqani-network-isnot-on-the-foreign-terrorist-organiza) The Politics Of Naming and Shaming By Audrey Kurth Cronin | Foreign Affairs Members of the Haqqani network have killed hundreds of U.S. citizens and carried out spectacular acts of terrorism, including against the U.S. embassy, NATO headquarters, the Intercontinental Hotel, the Indian embassy, and the British Council -- all in Kabul. Yet the organization is not on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations. This apparent lapse is not for lack of bipartisan support: In a September letter, U.S. Senators Lindsay Graham (RS.C.) and Kirsten Gillibrand (DN.Y.) urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to add the network to the list, to curtail logistical, financial and political support for the groups terrorist activities. The appropriate answer to their inquiry would seem obvious. The Haqqanis are both foreign and terrorists, after all. In the event, Clinton punted the request; indeed, the matter is not as simple as Graham and Gillibrand seemed to believe. The Haqqani network differs in form, function, and focus from most groups that make the terrorist list. Moreover, it is not at all clear that designating the organization would achieve the intended U.S. policy results. U.S. terrorism lists have evolved dramatically in the past 30 years. The first list, that of state sponsors of terrorism, drawn up in 1979, focused on states alone. At the time, that made sense. Regimes in Iran, Libya, and Syria, for example, supported, directed, and supplied terrorist proxies to kill Americans and threaten U.S. interests. The states themselves evaded direct confrontation with the stronger power. By placing state sponsors on the list, which led to cutting off sensitive exports and prohibiting most foreign aid, the United States pressured fragile regimes to change their behavior. Sometimes it worked: In secret negotiations over disarming weapons of mass destruction, Muammar al-Qaddafis Libya sought normalization and removal from the list. But at the end of the Cold War, state sponsors and their toadies lost ground. Independent groups no longer beholden to governments overshadowed them. Both the means and the ends of terrorism shifted: Globalization increased access to powerful weapons and self-generating sources of support; and Marxisms decline made way for a range of religious, extreme right-wing, and apocalyptic causes. Well before 2001, the number of casualties per terrorist attack had increased, and groups such as Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda had eclipsed traditional state-supported groups such as the Abu Nidal organization. To adapt, the Clinton administration decided to bypass state-centric measures and aim directly at terrorist groups themselves. The effort eventually resulted in a complex thicket of overlapping sanction regimes. For example, the 1995 Specially Designated Terrorists list was designed to freeze the U.S. assets of those groups that threatened the Middle East peace process. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act expanded those sanctions to include restrictions on immigration. This act laid the groundwork for the U.S. Secretary of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), first created in 1997. By the end of the decade, the legal architecture was in place to target groups, although individuals might still evade sanctions if their membership were unknown or their financial activities clandestine. Following 9/11, the George W. Bush administration passed Executive Order 13224, which expanded the legal basis for targeting individuals -- "specially designated global terrorists" -- and those who support, assist, do business with, or are in any way associated with them. Other innovations have followed, but the upshot is greatly expanded power for the Treasury Department to go after those who engage with terrorists or knowingly aid their efforts, including through charitable contributions. Still, the FTO list remains the gold standard of U.S. terrorist sanctioning, since it targets entire terrorist organizations, is a proven successful tactic, and has the widest potential legal repercussions. Members may not enter the United States, and those already here may be deported. Financial institutions must freeze the assets of designated FTOs and inform the Treasury Department of their existence. Beyond financial and immigration restrictions, the FTO list is symbolically important: It draws widespread scrutiny, in the United States and abroad. According to the terms of the act, the U.S. secretary of state is authorized to designate an FTO if

three conditions are met: First, the organization is foreign; second, the organization engages (or plans to engage) in terrorist activity; and third, the terrorist activity threatens U.S. citizens or U.S. national security interests. There are thousands of terrorists, bandits, criminals, and insurgent groups that clearly satisfy the first two conditions, but the third condition is the rub. The secretary of state has final say in listing new groups. There are countless cases in which competing priorities, special circumstances, or political sensitivities make it preferable to keep a group off the list and instead deal with it through less public means. And, since designations are often legally contested, each one involves a long interagency process of collecting open and classified evidence and building a dossier that will be defensible in courts. Groups that publicly claim "credit" for their deeds (which the Haqqani network does not) are thus easier to designate as FTOs. Even in the wake of a spectacular attack for which a known group claims responsibility, this process typically takes a year. So the list is by no means agile, and although it has grown from its initial 30 in 1997 to 49 today, many surprising groups are left off. Beyond the Haqqani network, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, for example, never made it to the FTO list. Sanctioning U.S. citizens who supported the PIRA was politically impossible and would have derailed ongoing negotiations in Northern Ireland. (Splinter groups, the Real IRA and Continuity IRA, were added in 2001 and 2005, respectively, following their rejection of the U.S.-mediated 1998 Good Friday agreement.) Other groups that have been condemned by the State Department but never officially designated FTOs include the Ulster Defense Association, the Japanese Red Army, and the Lord's Resistance Army. The timing of the addition of some other groups was also questionable. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group was designated in 2004, shortly after Qaddafi accepted civil liability for the Lockerbie bombing and surrendered his chemical and nuclear weapons programs. As the group had pledged to overthrow Qaddafi's government, this was apparently a concession to him. The Pakistan-linked Indian Mujahideen, which helped facilitate the 2008 Mumbai attacks (killing 163, including six Americans), was not added until 2011, when the administration wanted to signal closer ties to India. The FTO list, moreover, is not even always the best vehicle for managing a terrorist threat. To target particular individuals, for example, it can be more effective to enact financial sanctions under executive order. Indeed, most of the senior leadership of the Haqqani network has already been added to the specially designated global terrorists list. Moreover, groups or entities that have few assets, supporters, or members in the United States (such as the Haqqani network) suffer limited practical consequences from joining the FTO ranks -- besides being placed on notice by the U.S. government. Macaca 12-22-2011, 09:19 PM The Haqqani network also has atypical characteristics that muddy the picture. First, it is not so much a "group" as a clan-based criminal syndicate that makes use of terrorist tactics, including extortion, smuggling, weapons manufacture, kidnapping, and attacks. Formal designation could be legally questionable: While it is admittedly semantics, there are no other "networks" currently on the list. Haqqani leaders receive funding from wealthy donors in the Gulf as well as from al Qaeda, with whom they closely cooperate. In addition, according to reports in The New York Times, a sizeable proportion of their money is extorted from the U.S.-backed construction firms erecting roads, schools, and other infrastructure in eastern Afghanistan. That makes economic sanctions tricky; the money trail could potentially lead right to the U.S. government. The Haqqanis are also savvy power brokers, jockeying for position in a post-drawdown Afghanistan. They have controlled the wild mountainous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan for decades. They have deep local roots and see the United States as an occupying power. Military force will not eliminate them from their own turf, especially as U.S. troops withdraw. So, as repulsive as it is, any future peace settlement will have to come to terms with them. Indeed, one reason the Obama administration has never designated the group an FTO is precisely because it has its eye on this endgame. The Haqqani network's ties to Pakistan complicate the picture still further. For years, the network has been a gun for hire for the Pakistani government. Cell phone records even revealed calls

between Pakistan's intelligence agency and the operatives that attacked the U.S. embassy in Kabul. With its sanctuary in North Waziristan, the Haqqani network is exactly the kind of organization that the United States could have sanctioned through the 1979 state sponsors of terrorism list. But Pakistan has never been on that list, and the United States would not add it now because Pakistan's government would be outraged. If all Washington cared about were sanctions, naming Pakistan a state sponsor would be tempting. But since the United States needs Pakistan's cooperation to formulate an exit strategy and stable future for Afghanistan, it is a political nonstarter. Designating the Haqqani network could have its benefits. For one, it would bring further U.S. attention to a network that is attacking and killing U.S. citizens. That would be a gratifying symbolic step. Unfortunately, however, the real policy impact of listing the network as an FTO would be too little, too late. Because of the Haqqani network's form and revenue sources, such designation would have minimal practical effect. The organization's robust criminal enterprises would be hard to touch, especially as the United States withdraws from Afghanistan. If the United States is really out for impact, it should remember the old 1979 state sponsors of terrorism list. Indeed, to get serious about terrorist sanctions, the country should reexamine its financial ties to Pakistan.

Afghanistan disaster (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/22/afghanistan-disaster.html) By Brian Cloughley | Dawn BONN II: FROM TRANSITION TO TRANSFORMATION IN AFGHANISTAN (http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/bonn-ii-from-transition-to-transformation-in-afghanistan3528.html) By Mariam Safi | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Ex-Soviet states aid U.S. transit (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/21/ex-sovietstates-aid-us-transit/) By Donna Cassata | Associated Press How Obama Can Fix U.S.-Pakistani Relations (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136978/hassan-abbas/how-obama-can-fix-us-pakistanirelations) By Hassan Abbas | Foreign Affairs A tinpot despot (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310552/a-tinpot-despot/) By Zafar Hilaly | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-22-2011, 09:27 PM Obama Should Apologize The facts are in: NATO forces mistakenly killed Pakistani soldiers. Its time to swallow American pride and say were sorry. (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/22/obama_should_apologize) By C. Christine Fair | Foreign Policy In the wee hours of Nov. 27, U.S.-NATO and Afghan forces based in Afghanistan's Kunar province engaged a Pakistani military outpost in Pakistan's tribal agency of Momand. Little information is publically available -- or likely to be -- about what happened or how. What is clear is that after several NATO airstrikes, 24 Pakistani soldiers were dead and many more injured. The episode, and the U.S. response, battered the ever-strained U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan immediately cut off ground routes for logistical support of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, and insisted that the United States vacate Shamsi, one of the airfields from which the U.S. launched drone attacks. In quick succession, Pakistan convened a parliamentary commission to determine whether and how Pakistan will remain engaged with the United States. Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled all of its ambassadors to hold a high-level strategic discussion about how Pakistan should refashion its relations with the United States. Their recommendations will be considered by the same parliamentary commission. Pakistanis, whether civilian or military, whether in the government or on the street, want out of this relationship and deeply believe that Americans do not value Pakistani lives. They may not be wrong. Pakistani military officials quickly denounced the attack as deliberate, unprovoked U.S. aggression and demanded both an immediate apology and a renegotiation of military and intelligence cooperation. That Pakistani officials made such pronouncements in the complete absence of information about the attack cast aspersions on their motives. The move appeared to be another effort to wriggle free from Washington's poisonous embrace, abandon military operations against

anti-Pakistan militants, and pursue an independent Afghan policy. While rejecting the Pakistani military's account, NATO and U.S. officials declined to officially speculate about the details of the event -- much less offer an apology -- until a full investigation was complete. The investigation is now complete. The report has been issued, and the Pentagon released a statement on Thursday saying only that "U.S. forces, given what information they had available to them at the time, acted in self defense and with appropriate force after being fired upon." There was, the statement said, "no intentional effort to target persons or places known to be part of the Pakistani military, or to deliberately provide inaccurate location information to Pakistani officials." Instead, "inadequate coordination by U.S. and Pakistani military officers... resulted in a misunderstanding about the true location of Pakistani military units." The statement expressed regret, but neither President Barack Obama nor Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has issued a forthright apology. Unfortunately, neither is likely to do so given the toxic atmosphere in Washington and the looming presidential campaign. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, urged Obama to apologize, but he was quickly cut down. Munter has sought to mitigate Pakistanis' anger by saying in Urdu "humay bahut afsos hai" ("We are very sorry"). On Monday, he joined several interfaith leaders in offering a prayer at Islamabad's Faisal Mosque for the Pakistani soldiers killed on Nov. 27, offering, "We share in this grief, and we share in this sorrow." The author's contacts here in Islamabad and in Washington lament that instead of heeding the sagacious advice of the ambassador, who understands the raw sentiments of Pakistanis, some within the U.S. government dismiss Munter as "having gone native." While the Pentagon report apportions blame to both sides, an astute reader can only conclude that the most heinous mistakes were not made by Pakistan. The report claims that NATO and Afghan troops came under fire from Pakistani positions. (Official Pakistani sources refute this.) Believing they were under attack by insurgents, the NATO and Afghan troops called for suppressive air fire. The report concedes that, contrary to established standard operating procedures, NATO did not inform Pakistan that the operation on the border was taking place. This supports early U.S. claims that NATO-Afghan forces came under fire. After all, how could the Pakistani soldiers know that the forces moving near their area of operations were "allied forces"? (Americans dismiss this and say Pakistan should have known better. After all, the insurgents do not have helicopter gunships.) While one can get caught up in the details of who fired first and why, NATO's failure to follow established procedures is indefensible. But this is not the most egregious mistake. The worst -- and fatal error -- was the fact that the Americans provided the Pakistani army with incorrect coordinates for the designated targets of AC130 gunships and attack helicopters. In the early days of the incident, there were several claims and counterclaims about whether the coordinates were given, whether they were correct, and whether the Pakistan army had cleared the coordinates before the attack. However, the report makes evident that Pakistan's clearance of the coordinates or lack thereof is immaterial: The strikes would still have killed those innocent soldiers because the coordinates were simply wrong. The details of the report, and its efforts to apportion blame across all sides, will not satisfy Pakistanis, who feel they have suffered too much and received too little from this partnership over the last 10 years. They want nothing more than an apology from Obama. Despite the report's tedious efforts to parse culpability, it is obvious that most of the onus falls on the United States and NATO. So why does the United States steadfastly refuse to do the right thing and issue a clear apology to Pakistan and its citizenry in and out of uniform? Like Pakistanis, American officials and citizens alike are war weary and angry. As the endgame in Afghanistan approaches, Americans are now -- or should be -- confronting the vacuity of our Afghan policy. Vice President Joe Biden, who has taken a lot of heat for saying, "the Taliban, per se, is not our enemy," was right: We invaded Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda. The Taliban were not the immediate objects of our intervention. (For this reason, Biden advocated for a robust counterterrorism strategy and advised against a counterinsurgency policy that implied a war on the Taliban and affiliated fighters rather than on al Qaeda.) Once the United States decided to make the Taliban the enemy -- for the simple reason that the Taliban and affiliated fighters are killing American and allied troops whom they see as occupying Afghanistan -- it also made Pakistan an enemy as well. For much of the last decade, the Pakistanis have supported the insurgents that are killing U.S. and

allied troops and civilians, even while benefiting from American assistance and military reimbursements for assisting the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Just as Pakistanis are deeply aggrieved that U.S. forces killed 24 of their soldiers, Americans are increasingly outraged that thousands of troops have been killed or maimed in Afghanistan at the hands of Pakistan's proxies. Many have died or suffered injuries from IEDs manufactured with products made in Pakistan. Pakistan has made little effort to denature or add tracers to ammonium nitrate used in such IEDs and claims it is impossible to stop the "smuggling." There is also copious evidence that Pakistan's spy service actively facilitates the insurgents. The two countries are fighting a peculiar proxy war, and the United States and its citizenry are only now appreciating the reality of this grotesque situation. American anger over this duplicity is justified. Pakistan's ruling generals have taken U.S. funds with one hand and funneled them to their murderous proxies in Afghanistan with the other. But who got us into this situation? Ultimately it is the fault of the U.S. government, which chose to wage a war that was not winnable, whether with the allies it has or the allies it could cultivate. Pakistan is the only viable logistical route for the war in Afghanistan. How could the United States think it could defeat Pakistan's proxies in Afghanistan while depending on Pakistan to fight that very war? It is a maddening fact to any realist that while Washington found a way to funnel $20 billion (and climbing) into Pakistan despite its history of supporting terrorism and nuclear proliferation, it could never find a way to move logistics through Iran's deep sea port in Chabahar, even though Iran initially supported the war in Afghanistan. Washington grimaces at the suggestion of working with Afghanistan's western neighbor even though Tehran's record on both terrorism and nuclear proliferation is but a shadow of Pakistan's. Macaca 12-22-2011, 09:30 PM And the absurdity doesn't stop there. In the most twisted of realities, some of Pakistan's most antiAmerican trucking barons have enriched themselves by facilitating the logistical supply for the war with the hope of keeping the Americans in the Afghan killing fields as long as possible. After all, any dedicated insurgent seeking to end the war would have had better luck blowing up trucks piled up at either the Chaman or Torkham border crossings. Yet loss due to pilferage or destruction never exceeded 5 percent all of cargo. Why? Thanks to the Pashtun trucking mafia, the various Taliban organizations and petty officials along the routes make a killing from U.S. military's logistical needs. Five percent (or less) is an optimal level of loss that keeps everyone rolling in cash. But neither the United States nor Pakistan will benefit from a continued and escalating standoff. America needs Pakistan to conclude its Afghanistan misadventure. This requires Pakistan both to stop encouraging its militant proxies' violent endeavors and to productively assert its influence to achieve a negotiated settlement that is palatable to most in the country. Washington also wants to keep an eye on Islamabad's quickly expanding nuclear arsenal and terrorist assets such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba -- the group that carried out the Mumbai attacks -- and other international menaces. Finally, the United States wants Pakistan somehow to be at peace with itself and its neighbors. As for Pakistan, it's an economic disaster case. Pakistanis have long endured incomprehensible electricity outages. Now, they lack inadequate gas to cook or heat their homes. Public transportation has been strangled by shortages in compressed natural gas. Water is in acute scarcity. Pakistan's manufacturing sector is struggling to remain competitive under these adverse conditions. Although Pakistan has told the IMF to take a hike, most informed Pakistanis concede that it will again have to approach the IMF sooner rather than later. As Pakistan knows well, the United States is a key actor in that institution. In short, Pakistan and the United States must forge a sustainable way of working together because the strategic and regional interests of both depend on it. The United States must swiftly act to rectify this mess first by apologizing. Second, the U.S. military must hold to account those officers who are responsible for this tragedy. Not only should the appropriate personnel be demoted or ousted per the severity of their negligence, but prosecution may also be merited. Americans will howl in protest, noting years of Pakistani perfidy. They may rightly counter that no senior Pakistani military or intelligence officials lost their jobs when Osama bin Laden was found hanging out in Abbottabad, a military garrison town not far from Islamabad. Nor did any general's head roll when "rogue" scientist A.Q. Khan was caught in various nuclear bartering imbroglios; no Pakistani general that has overthrown a government has been charged with treason despite the fact

that Pakistan's constitution calls for such punishment. But the United States is not Pakistan. The United States claims to promote democracy, accountability, justice, law and order, and human rights. Now is the time to prove it. Pakistanis need to know that their lives matter as much as those of others.

Pentagon expresses 'regret' over Nato airstrike that kiled Pakistan soldiers (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8973532/Pentagon-expresses-regretover-Nato-airstrike-that-kiled-Pakistan-soldiers.html) By Rob Crilly, Islamabad and Alex Spillius | Daily Telegraph U.S.: Poor coordination, mapping data led to Pakistani deaths in cross-border raid (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-poor-coordination-mapping-data-led-topakistani-deaths-in-cross-border-raid/2011/12/22/gIQAruo8AP_story.html) By Karen DeYoung and Ernesto Londono | The Washington Post U.S. Erred in Deadly Attack ("][/URL] By [URL="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577114733535255836.html) By JULIAN E. BARNES AND ADAM ENTOUS | Wall Street Journal Is there anybody out there? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83650&Cat=9) By Aasim Zafar Khan | The News Will it be business as usual? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83649&Cat=9) By Muzaffar Iqbal | The News Pentagon: US concedes mistakes in Pakistani deaths (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_US_PAKISTAN_AIRSTRIKES? SITE=OKOKL&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) By LOLITA BALDOR | Associated Press US account of airstrikes that killed 24 Pakistanis (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_US_PAKISTAN_AIRSTRIKES_GLANCE? SITE=OKOKL&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) By U.S. Concedes Error, but Says Pakistan Fired First at Border (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/world/asia/pakistan-and-us-share-blame-in-strike-onborder-posts.html) By ERIC SCHMITT and MATTHEW ROSENBERG | The New York Times U.S. probe cites mistakes in deadly Pakistan air strike: report (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-usa-pakistan-strike-idUSTRE7BL0HU20111222) Reuters A maddening waltz (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/22/a-maddening-waltz.html) By I.A Rehman | Dawn Macaca 12-22-2011, 09:36 PM Pakistan's Rulers Have Very Perverse Priorities (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/pakistans-rulers-have-very-perversepriorities/250328/) By Jeffrey Goldberg | The Atlantic There is an interesting, and depressing, development In the continuing Pakistani "Memogate" controversy -- the one in which the now-former ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani, is accused by Pakistan's ruling military elite of trying, with Pakistan's civilian-elected President, Asif Ali Zardari to foment democratic reform in his country. Haqqani, back in Pakistan and under continual investigation, is now being accused of helping the U.S. locate Osama Bin Laden. Yes, "accused." There are two ways for the Pakistani military to grapple with the fact that Bin Laden was hiding out in Pakistan: They could apologize to the U.S. for, advertently or not, hiding the greatest mass murderer in American history, and they could conduct a serious internal investigation to discover how it came to pass that Bin Laden found refuge in their country. Or, alternatively, they could throw a fit about the "violation" of their border by American soldiers hunting the aforementioned greatest mass murderer in American history, and investigate not how Bin Laden got into Pakistan, but how CIA operative gained access to Pakistan. The Pakistanis have obviously chosen the latter course, to their shame. The military is actively seeking to punish anyone who might have helped the U.S. find the world's most notorious terrorist. Pakistan is today a country with very perverse priorities. Here is coverage, from Pakistan's Nation newspaper, of Haqqani's Bin Laden-related travails:

ISLAMABAD - Pakistan's former Ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani has stated that he neither had issued visas to the US citizens nor had provided any information to the US about the Osama bin Laden presence in Abbottabad. 'Let me state clearly for the record that these wild allegations are totally baseless and refuted completely by the official record. The Embassy of Pakistan in Washington DC never issued unauthorised visas in three years and 5 months that I served as Ambassador', he said in his written statement submitted to the Inquiry Commission on Abbottabad Operation on Monday. Husain Haqqani, also appeared before the Commission here at the Cabinet division on Tuesday and faced a number of questions from the Commission members. About the accusation that Haqqani aided America in locating Bin Laden, the report goes on to state: ...Haqqani said he was on his way to Islamabad via London and Dubai when the operation was conducted and he found out about it upon landing at Heathrow Airport in early morning of May 2. 'I was instructed to immediately turn around, which I did, and returned to Washington by around 5pm local time', he said. He said he had fully defended the country's interests following the Abbottabad raid and played a role to ensure that the US government, Congress and media do not blame Pakistan government, Armed Forces or intelligence services for allowing Osama bin Laden's presence in the country, as that would have been a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1267 and 1373. 'I was also to protest the violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by US forces in conducting the action and to point out that how US had violated the norms of international conduct between two sovereign countries. I faithfully and diligently carried out my instructions. I met with the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Deputy National Security Adviser of the President of the US to register protest over violation of Pakistani sovereignty'.

Rumble In Pakistan (http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/12/21/rumble-in-pakistan/) By Walter Russell Mead | The American Interest Pakistan army wants Zardari out but not a coup (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/uspakistan-military-idUSTRE7BL0K820111222) By Michael Georgy | Reuters Pak journo receives threatening SMS after report on Pasha (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pak-journo-receives-threatening-sms-after-report-onpasha/20111222.htm) Press Trust Of India ISI chief in a sticky situation over memogate scam (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/isi-chief-ina-sticky-situation-over-memogate-scam/20111222.htm) By Amir Mir | Rediff The mad who drink their own blood (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310551/the-mad-who-drink-theirown-blood/) By Farrukh Khan Pitafi | The Express Tribune Hear hear, Mr Prime Minister (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310546/hear-hear-mr-prime-minister/) The Express Tribune Editorial Point of no return? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83653&Cat=8) The News Editorial Back off boys! (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83648&Cat=9) By Mehreen Zahra-Malik | The News Real issue: regime change (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83651&Cat=9) By Ayaz Amir | The News Thus spake Gilani (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83652&Cat=9) By Harris Khalique | The News Something is rotten... (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\23\story_23-122011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Second act of the memo drama (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\23\story_2312-2011_pg3_5) By Malik Muhammad Ashraf | Daily Times Macaca

12-23-2011, 07:35 PM Hear hear, Mr Prime Minister (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310546/hear-hear-mr-prime-minister/) The Express Tribune Editorial Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani needs to be thoroughly commended for his very timely and brave speech on the floor of the National Assembly on December 22. In it, he said many of the things that need to be said at this stage, by the countrys elected chief executive, as tensions between the civilian government and the military simmer to a boil. Perhaps responding to the ministry of defences reply to the Supreme Court of a day earlier, which had suggested that the army and the ISI were not under its control, the prime minister very rightly said that there cant be a state within the state; [and that] they [the establishment] would always be answerable to parliament. He added that all institutions of the country are answerable to parliament and this is how things should be in fully functional democracy where rule of law and the Constitution is supreme. The prime minister is also correct when he says that it was the civilian government which put its full weight behind the establishment after the May 2 raid in Abbottabad or after the Salala raid of November 26. For that, he feels, it is getting a very raw deal. Perhaps, one particularly telling remark of his was when he indirectly referred to calls being made regarding the alleged issuance of visas to Americans by the countrys former ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, saying that he wanted to know how Osama bin Laden was living in the country for six years. Of course, it doesnt help this government in particular, in that its record on governance and delivering public services to citizens is most inadequate. However, the issue in question is not the performance of the present government per se, but rather that of which institution is supreme according to the countrys Constitution, and whether the powerful military is to be subordinate to parliament. Since the latter represents the popular will of the people, as manifest through the holding of general elections, it necessarily follows that the parliament be sovereign in its role as the nations supreme decision-making body, and all other institutions of state be answerable/accountable to it. The reality is otherwise as many of us know. The establishment is in charge of large sections of foreign policy and in many instances also calls the shots with regards to domestic policy. It has appropriated to itself the states policies towards important matters such as ties with America, with India and the countrys participation in the war on terror and the fight against domestic militancy and extremism. What is being advocated is not exactly heretical or extraordinary. It happens, by and large, next-door in India, where an elected civilian government, albeit with allegations of corruption and a tainted public image, has a military that is subordinate to it. The reason that India never had a military coup is because its civilian leaders asserted themselves and the country held regular elections. Parties contested them, the winners making a government, and if they did badly and failed to deliver, the people voted them out at the next election. This, indeed, is how things are done in a mature democracy, something Pakistan can, for now, only aspire to. In this context, Prime Minister Gilanis remarks make eminent sense and should be welcomed by all those who want to see the country as a state that operates as a fully functional democracy and not one where the military dominates all other institutions, and where policies formulated by the establishment guide the nation. It goes without saying that in a democracy, all institutions of the state are answerable and hence subservient to parliament. This stand should have been taken by the PPP, which has fought several dictatorships in the past, in the first place, but better late than never. While the prime minister rightly made a strong case for the government to be allowed to complete its term, he did say that the military was disciplined and that it followed the Constitution. This is also welcome because it does not make for a blame-game and in fact, suggests an attempt by him to assuage the powerful institution, while at the same time clearly saying that whatever is happening will not be taken lying down by the PPP-led government.

No control over operations of Army, ISI: govt (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/22/no-control-overoperations-of-army-isi-govt.html) By Nasir Iqbal | Dawn The chasm widens (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/23/the-chasm-widens.html) Dawn Editorial The army chiefs statement (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310969/the-army-chiefs-statement/) The Express Tribune Editorial On the cusp of a defining moment? (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\24\story_24-12-2011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Saving the day? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83819&Cat=8) The News

Editorial All the presidents missteps (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/all-the-presidentsmissteps/891504/) By Murtaza Razvi | Indian Express For whom the bell tolls (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/23/for-whom-the-bell-tolls.html) By Cyril Almeida | Dawn Macaca 12-23-2011, 07:40 PM The core contradiction (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/23/the-core-contradiction.html) By S. Akbar Zaidi | Dawn THE core political economy question facing Pakistan today is whether the military in Pakistan has a place in civilian affairs, or whether it should be permanently removed to the barracks and be made answerable to a civilian elected government. The core contradiction being faced by Pakistan, one that has a bearing on almost every aspect of political and public life, ranging from domestic politics, the economy, foreign relations to a lot more, is between Pakistans military and civilian forms of government and control. This core contradiction has been defined and dominated by Pakistans military since the 1950s, almost without break and without opposition. Perhaps the only time when the hegemony of the military was broken, albeit for a short time, was after the militarys abject humiliation in 1971. Soon after, due to the ineptitude and failure of a civilian democratically elected government, as well as complicit political actors in the opposition, the military found its way back, first through Balochistan and subsequently all over Pakistan in 1977. For 30 years, till 2007, the military has governed at times, but always ruled and held power without much civilian discontent. Pakistans political class has lived comfortably with the military without feeling much discomfort and without seeing much contradiction in a subservient relationship. This hold of the military was tempered, but not fully broken, in 2008, just as it was in 1971, when the military was forced to yield power to a democratic movement. The moment to resolve the contradiction and to ensure that there would be a break from the past, so that civilian authority would once and for all dominate and define Pakistans future, lasted some months, but was never fully enforced. The first few months after the elections, when the two main parties were working together, represented a key possibility for both to enforce their writ over Pakistans political equation. As in the past, that opportunity was lost. The military was not going to give up its power and domination voluntarily and some attempts to take that authority by civilians was greatly contested by the military which prevailed. More opportunities have arisen just in this year when the military and its institutions have been weakened, not due to civilians asserting their legitimate authority, but because of military failures, such as Abbottabad and Mehran base. However, the legitimate holder of political power, i.e. the democratically elected civilian government, has been unable to put the military where it belongs. Key moments to replace military hegemony with the bona fide representatives of the people, continue to be lost. This core contradiction between the military and civilians is played out in multiple manifestations, ranging from issues of Pakistans sovereignty of its borders to those related to memogate. This contradiction is observable in almost any decision that the government takes. Government spokespersons went out of their way to state that all stakeholders were on board when the MFN status was announced for India. It is absurd that the military needs to clear an elected governments economic and trade initiatives, but this is precisely the nature of Pakistans political contradiction. Much of Pakistans politics can be explained through this contradiction. Civilian elected governments (as opposed to those which have been propped up by military rulers, such as the 2002-07 Musharraf democracy) cannot function unless this contradiction is resolved. They cannot work freely with the shadow of the military hanging over them. The military is not a democratic institution and to assume that it is a check on elected government is a fallacy of huge proportions. The institution of the military and the institution of democratically elected government are opposed to each other, with both having a very different perspective on governance,

representation and authority. The idea that some sort of balance needs to be maintained between civil and military institutions is complete folly given the nature of power in Pakistan. It results in playing into the hands of the military establishment. Democracies need to be free of the burden of the military determining key issues, or of sharing views about decisions which dont affect them. Trade with India is a good example. Why on earth does the military need to be on board for decisions related to commerce or the economy? Will it also be on board when the government decides to increase the purchasing price of wheat and rice, or when it lowers the rate of interest? Democracy cannot function in an environment in which civilian governments fear the military. Nor can it work effectively if political leaders turn to the military for help as they have on numerous critical occasions in the past, to bail them out against an inefficient and corrupt government. If checks are required on the workings of a government, a strengthened judiciary and civil society and media as well as a more effective political opposition ought to be enough. To suggest that a political party or a political leader is supported by the establishment or is seen favourably by the military undermines the basic foundations of democracy. Just as the military should be resisted publicly when it interferes in affairs that pertain to parliament, so should its attempts to create political parties or to support political leaders. However, this can only happen once the core contradiction between civilian and military institutions is resolved, and the responsibility of doing this rests unambiguously on civilian actors. Only then will Pakistan be a free democracy.

Zardaris counter-insurgency (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83814&Cat=9) By Wajahat S Khan | The News Can Pakistan's accidental president survive? (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/23/uspakistan-zardari-idUSTRE7BM0LJ20111223) By Michael Georgy Civil-military faceoff: beyond reasonable doubt! (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\24\story_24-12-2011_pg3_3) By A R Siddiqi | Daily Times Well, he did... (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310987/well-he-did/) By Amina Jilani | The Express Tribune Dont discount the civilians yet (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310990/dont-discount-the-civiliansyet/) By Ejaz Haider | The Express Tribune Shenanigans, dangerous shenanigans (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310973/shenanigansdangerous-shenanigans/) By Kamran Shafi | The Express Tribune Of smoke and fire (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111223&page=8) By Ismail Khan | The Friday Times Army wants more heads to roll (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111223&page=5) By Shahzad Raza | The Friday Times Macaca 12-23-2011, 07:48 PM Pathology of gradual fall (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111223&page=4) The Army is repeating the same mistakes: undermining democracy at home, favouring terrorism, and ignoring the global suspicion of its complicity with its non state actors; East Pakistan is happening all over again By Khaled Ahmed | The Friday Times The fall of East Pakistan contained some early symptoms of what was to follow: the gradual decline of the state through isolation and dysfunction. The first symptom appeared in 1970 when the uprising started in East Pakistan. The state reacted by manifesting the following pathology: 1) it went into denial; 2) it developed a 'national consensus' around this denial; 3) it isolated itself in the international community; and 4) it developed the self-damaging aetiology of externalising internal contradictions on to external factors. When the war in East Pakistan started, the world took notice of the mass movement behind the

resistance to the Pakistan Army. A vast population started escaping into India - 9 million - but the numbers were denied by Pakistan in an obviously incredible 'military estimate'. Then West Pakistan drummed up nationalism and showed that the nation was 'united' against the uprising. Then it condemned the world for siding with India that had 'caused the uprising through a conspiracy'. Pakistani textbooks still say India was never reconciled to the creation of Pakistan and broke it up through an invasion in 1971. Isolationism is bad for all states and puts them morally in the wrong even if the cause is noble. Even superpowers cannot bear the pressure of international isolation. Pakistan today is internally united - against the US plus the world - and this benefits the Army as it goes into another war of impossible odds. Pakistan is still externalising its internal conflict and blaming it on America, India, and for good measure, Israel. The Army is taking it down another road of disaster fighting two powers it cannot win against, India and the US. East Pakistan is happening all over again. Today there is no Cold War to rescue us. (In 1971, even Cold War netted us no backers, except for the US, which warned off India from a coup de grace strike on West Pakistan.) The Army is repeating the same mistakes: undermining democracy at home, favouring terrorism and ignoring the global suspicion of its complicity with its non state actors. At the level of strategy, it is worthwhile to remember what an army officer wrote after the East Pakistan debacle in a book titled The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative (OUP 2002). The author, Major General (Retd) Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, commanded the SSG (Commandos) and commanded an infantry battalion in East Pakistan in 1970-71, was a POW in India after the war, and later commanded Pakistan Rangers as director-general, before retiring in 1990. He points to the flawed doctrine that the defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. (Replace this with 'defence of the Western border lies in the defence of Eastern border', which neglects both the Tribal Areas and Balochistan where terrorism is embedded.) No effort was made to augment the defence of East Pakistan to gain time before the counter-offensive against the enemy could begin from West Pakistan. Major General (Retd) Hakeem Arshad Qureshi's central argument was that internal issues cannot be brushed under the carpet and lack of resources ignored. He insists that all strategy should be based on an assessment of Pakistan's resource-base. Pakistan cannot secure itself unless it is economically strong. He recommends 'lying low' even if it takes us 50 years to develop as an economically independent and sovereign state. Today of course the only way we can do this is by linking up with two neighbours with high growth rates: India and China. Instead the Army - with full national consensus - is taking on the international community led by the US. Even those who hate the US as much we do are not on the same page with us. Philip Bobbit in his book, The Shield Of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (2002), states: 'The strategic thinking of states accustomed to war does not fit them for peace, which requires harmony and trust, nor can such thinking be abandoned without risking a collapse of legitimacy altogether because the State's role in guaranteeing security is the one responsibility that is not being challenged domestically and thus the one to which it clings'. A nation's self-portrayal is its nationalism. As early as 1980, the United Nations held a conference on the purely subjective nature of nationalism and its function of internal exclusion and external aggression. In Europe, nationalism has been exposed as a myth-making function of the state that leads to epochal wars. As a touchstone of legitimacy, however, it permanently endangers the security of the state, either by a similar nationalism in the neighbourhood or by reason of the neighbour's response to the aggressive nationalism of the state. Strategy is nothing when not coupled to the resource base and internal cohesion. Al Qaeda in Pakistan is sensitive to its resource base and constantly kidnaps rich people for ransom and robs banks through its Punjabi Taliban proxies. But Pakistan's strategy is wedded to an unrealistic mission statement because the kind of material support it needs is not there. The 'epochal' war with India, begun in 1947 and still going on, adds to the pressures that the state has to bear to merely survive. If the state is relatively small it must carefully determine who the enemy is and how 'conquerable' it is, given the resources of the state. If the status quo is not to the liking of the state with a limited resource-base, then anti-status quo policies have to be politically framed, not militarily.

The Army has based its strategy on ghairat which it conflates with sovereignty. The nation follows the Army's lead - which reminds us of East Pakistan. The Army put the world at risk through jihad and its consequence: international terrorism. Jihad has virtually destroyed Pakistan's internal sovereignty by conceding con-dominion to the jihadi militias fighting India and its new ally the US in Afghanistan. Pakistan's external sovereignty has also been destroyed by the tendency of jihad to farm out the formulation of strategy to its commanders in the field. Pakistan's strategy towards Iran, Central Asia and Russia was effectively formulated after 1996 by the Taliban commanders. It is happening once again. Today Pakistan's internal sovereignty is under challenge by Al Qaeda. Its external sovereignty is at risk from the isolationism embraced by the Army and the 'national consensus'. As outlined in Mark Duffield'sGlobal Governance and the new War, the 'liberal' world dominion today links development to security and finds in the process of exclusion - (through language policy in East Pakistan and Blasphemy Law in Pakistan) - under nationalism a cause of internal chaos and external war. What happened in East Pakistan was caused by this process of 'exclusion', which first produced internal chaos, then triggered war with India. One must keep in mind that General Yahya's action in East Pakistan was 'propelled', if not 'forced', by nationalism in West Pakistan. That nationalism is still alive and has become complicated by jihad and its global outreach in total negation of the nation-state. The state has become dysfunctional and, once again unmindful of the narrowing resource-base, Pakistan is faced with wars it cannot win. Pakistan has taken on America today because of its flawed view of India as an eternal enemy. Without a strategy that could be understood and supported by the world, Pakistan wants Afghanistan left open to a repetition of what it did there after the exit of Soviet Union in 1991. The world could not understand the strategy of the Pakistan Army in 1971 and abandoned it. It is today worried about Pakistan's path-dependent syndrome of plunging into wars but is compelled to focus on the global threat of Al Qaeda embedded in Pakistan with its variety of affiliates whom Pakistan says it will not fight 'because they are our brothers'. Macaca 12-23-2011, 07:52 PM Pakistan Defence Pvt Ltd (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\23\story_23-122011_pg3_2) By Gulmina Bilal Ahmad | Daily Times Generally throughout the entire history of Pakistan, the defence budget has been continuously increasing. Particularly in the last decade the budget allocated to defence expenditures has witnessed enormous growth, from $ 2.5 billion in 1999 to around $ 5 billion in 2011. The reason cited by defence experts is the various external and internal threats, especially evolving after 9/11 and the initiation of the war on terror. The finance for this growing expenditure is supported through the earnings of the citizens of Pakistan. Let me make it clear to everyone that here I am not making a case against the budget allocated to the security of the country, as security is the foremost issue for Pakistan nowadays. My concern is that if the people of Pakistan are contributing for the defence budget and are willing to sacrifice the financial requirements of other sectors for safeguarding the country, then they also have the right to know what policies are being employed by the security apparatus for this purpose. Pakistan has been outsourcing its defence activities to civilians or non-military groups since the outset. Starting from the war in Kashmir immediately after independence, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Kashmir movement and finally in the current war on terror where tribal lashkars (militias) are being formed to battle militancy. Numerous platforms have been invented in various eras according to requirements, whether it is the Pak-Afghan Council, Muttahida Jihad Council or the latest talk of the town, the Pakistan Defence Council (PDC). This last mentioned amalgamation of right-wing mainstream political parties and banned militant outfits has received colossal limelight in the aftermath of the NATO attack. The recent rally held in Lahore on December 18 by the PDC was attended by thousands and was under the very symbol synonymous with the sovereignty of the country. The rally was not only attended by mainstream political figures but also the leaders of banned terrorist organisations. Ijazul Haq, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, General Hamid Gul and Syed Munawar Hasan shared the stage with Hafiz Saeed, head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). The reason for the sudden rise of these organisations is very simple. As I mentioned in my previous article, these militant outfits are pouncing on the opportunity to exploit the sentiments of the already enraged citizens for their own vested agenda to regain their foothold.

A successful rally staged at Minar-e-Pakistan by any party has always been termed as a significant event, where the ripples are felt all over the country. This event has created the same effect and perhaps signals a fight back by the militant organisations through a show of force. What has been most disturbing for me is that all this took place under the very nose of the authorities. Although reportedly the organisers ignored the instructions of the administration in every manner, from posting of banners regarding the event to the inclusion of banned outfits, still there was no action taken against them. What message can be interpreted from all of this? Why was the event permitted in the first place? If 500 seminaries termed to be illegal by Interior Minister Rehman Malik are to be shut down by January, due to their association with militant outfits, then why has any action not been taken against the elements involved in this event? Not only was the event highlighted by the media, but also the fiery rhetoric of Hafiz Saeed given special coverage. Is it not so that the media by law is barred from the coverage of banned outfits and terrorist organisations? The very fact that these banned organisations are still working so openly in our society, without any fear or even a slight concern for the rule of law and state authority, makes evident the will of the authorities to tackle extremism. One thing is certain that we are again working towards outsourcing of our defence to yet another consortium known as the PDC. Outsourcing or privatisation of defence is not a phenomenon only restricted to Pakistan. Perhaps the pioneer in this regard is the US, where private military contractors and private defence contractors are present in strong numbers and are not only operating within the US but worldwide. These military contractors are active in conflict zones, providing assistance to the US military. Companies such as Xe Services (Blackwater), Vinnell Corporation and several others are all participating in operations, security and training assignments worldwide. Worldwide these private militaries are also notoriously known as mercenaries and these mercenaries have also been linked to human rights violations; one reason being they are not under the direct authority of any government. In Pakistan we are repeating the same mistake that we made during the Afghan war during the 80s and 90s. The private armies created then from a strategic perspective came back to haunt us. The difference between the case of the US and Pakistan is that in the US at least the people know what policy is being implemented through their money, while in Pakistan the people are ignorant of how much money is being diverted to these groups and why. More finances are acquired by them through private donations, again by misleading the people. Is our military, 500,000-strong, not competent enough that we have to turn towards these notorious groups for assistance? The simple and obvious answer is no. Not only the conventional forces but the added nuclear capability is more than enough to deter any threat facing Pakistan. Then who are the real defenders of Pakistan? These mercenaries fuelled by misguided religious zeal, financial gains and other vested interests or those who have laid down their lives at Salala, at Mehran Base and in operations against the terrorists in the tribal areas? How could the militant outfits, which have been involved in terrorist activities and responsible for the deaths of innocent people, become the defenders of Pakistan? At least we should decide whether the security and defence of Pakistan is to be delegated to private armies or not. If the decision making echelons want to go down this lane, then they will have to be honest with the people and become answerable to them. Macaca 12-23-2011, 07:57 PM Civil-military relations in Pakistan (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\24\story_24-12-2011_pg3_4) By Farhat Taj | Daily Times Militant outfits known for close ties with the military establishment of Pakistan held the Difa-iPakistan Conference (Defence of Pakistan Conference) on December 18, 2011. They declared jihad as an obligation for Muslims and threatened the US, NATO forces and India with violent jihad. One of the participants, a former General of the Pakistan Army, Hamid Gul, said that Islamic revolution rather than democracy is the solution for Pakistans problems. The Difa-i-Pakistan rally, in which thousands participated, is a political tactic by the military establishment to put pressure on the already besieged civilian government. The right-wing forces are being mobilised and holding rallies all over Pakistan. If the political parties, such as the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) hold public rallies, they might come under terror attacks by some among those who participated in the Defence of Pakistan Conference. This is also part of the larger agenda of the establishment to take away political space from the political parties such as the PPP and ANP in order to entrench the right-wing political forces in the

politics of Pakistan. It is not that the establishment has allied itself with the religious forces only for foreign policy objectives. The military-militant alliance has a strong internal dimension too. The alliance is aimed to neutralise the centrifugal ethnic secular political parties such as the ANP and sideline the mainstream secular political parties of Pakistan, such as the PPP. Religious forces accord religious legitimacy to direct and indirect military rule in Pakistan and the military provides space to the religious forces, which stand little chance in making inroads in Pakistani politics through the normal democratic process on the political landscape of Pakistan. Over time the tactics of the establishment to use the right-wing forces against the democratic forces in Pakistan have improved. Now the establishment has right-wingers with and without beards Imran Khan as a case in point of a beardless Talib (singular of Taliban). The Difa-i-Pakistan rally was a combination of both: the Taliban with and without beards. The common denominator is that they both support the establishments use of religious bigotry in the foreign as well as domestic policies of Pakistan. Through the media and right-wing political forces, a faade of public anger against the US, NATO and the political government of Pakistan is being created for the formers presence in Afghanistan and the latters poor governance. There are no informed debates on Pakistani proxies interventions in Afghanistan that has brought Islamists from around the world to the country followed by the NATO and US forces. True that the PPP-led government is marred by poor governance, but the military cannot absolve itself from it. How can the civilian government ensure good governance when it has no control over the countrys foreign policy and large sections of domestic policy? Important attempts by the government to reduce the sufferings of the people of Pakistan have been thwarted by the military. A case in point is the governments granting of most favoured nation (MFN) trading status to India. This move by the civilian government has the potential to contribute to the economic revival of Pakistan by normalising trade relations with India. But this has been rejected by the military through its proxy, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). Hafiz Saeed, chief of the JuD, whose activists dominated the Difa-i-Pakistan Conference, declared that his group will never allow the government of Pakistan to grant India MFN status; he called for revenge against India for the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and vowed to continue violent jihad in Kashmir. As I write these lines the news is coming that Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has spoken for the supremacy of parliament over the military and directly questioned the Generals for years-long stay of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. The PPP-led government should have taken such a firm position vis--vis the military right after taking power in 2008 when FATA and Balochistan were soaked in the blood of its people under state terrorism both continue to be so to date. The government should have asserted its authority and openly told the people of Pakistan that the military establishment is not allowing it to govern Pakistan in line with constitutional requirements. It is quite late now; but better late than never. The government must now assert its authority and show that there is a civilian leadership in this country. Back in the 1990s, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto confronted the then ISI chief, Javed Ashraf Qazi, with the reports that Pakistani, Afghans and Arabs were involved in the insurgency in Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK), which the prime minster said contradicted Pakistans position that the insurgency in Kashmir is indigenous. The ISI chief told her that originally the Kashmir insurgency was indigenous but now has to be carried on by the foreigners because the Indians have killed all adult Kashmiri men. This information was given by Benazir Bhutto to Husain Haqqani, former Pakistani ambassador in the US, which he reports in his book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (p 237). The point here is that with the civilian government seemingly asserting its authority, the military establishment may go to any extent to misguide and humiliate the government. Any non-issue can be converted into a matter of vital national interests the Memogate issue is a case in point. Pakistan has no precedent of holding its Generals accountable for the crimes they committed against the people of Pakistan and in the neighbouring states. In the end, the PPP-led government may be toppled. But it may be good for the future of democracy in Pakistan that the government now appears on the high moral ground. This will give an alternative to the people of Pakistan who might be led towards a rigged next election in favour of pro-establishment political parties, such as the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and another Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) type of religious alliance. The struggle against the military domination of Pakistans polity must go on. Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:04 PM The Difa-e Pakistan Rally in Lahore and its Implications for Pakistan (http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheDifaePakistanRallyinLahoreanditsImplicationsfor Pakistan_ajulka_231211) By Amit Julka | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

On December 18, more than 40 religious organizations gathered at Minto Park in Lahore for a jalsa organized by the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Defence of Pakistan Council). Prominent amongst those present were Maulvi Sami-ul Haq (the head of Jamiat Ulema-I Islam Sami and a prominent Deobandi scholar with close links to the Taliban), Liaqat Baloch of the Jamat-i-Islami, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed the Ameer of the JuD (Jamaat ud Dawa), Mohammed Ahmed Ludhianvi (Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan, now renamed as Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat), Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer (leader of Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith) and Hamid Gul, former DG ISI. Fazlur Rehman, the head of JUI-F (the other faction of the JUI) was conspicuous by his absence. However, out of all the groups present, the most visible presence was that of the Jamaat-ud Dawa. In fact, this was the first time that Hafiz Mohammed Saeed addressed such a large multi-group congregation. JuD key role in this rally can be gauged from the fact that its flags were visible across the large ground, and some newspapers like Nawa-i-Waqt estimated that attendance at the rally far exceeded Imran Khans rally earlier on October 31. The rally focused on Pakistans relations with the United States and advised the political leadership to abandon all cooperation with America. Organized at a time when Pakistan-US relations are at their lowest, the primary intent of this gathering seems to have been the consolidation of religious groups to reassert their position in Pakistani politics. Primarily, the congregation sought to reinforce Pakistans Islamic nationalism. The main banner on the podium was inscribed with the famous slogan of the partition years: Pakistan ka matlab kya? La allah ill allah (What is the meaning of Pakistan? The answer is: There is no God but Allah). Below it, the main heading proclaimed that Difa-e Pakistan jihad fi sabil allah se hoga (The defence of Pakistan lies in jihad in the path of Allah). A picture of the Pakistani flag adorned one side of the banner; while the other side carried the words Allah hu Akbar (God is Great). Images of weapons of war were also prominently displayed on the banner. The conference thus fused Pakistani nationalism with Islam and conflated Pakistans defence with jihad against external powers. Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer was particularly vociferous in his speech and declared that if America decides to attack Pakistan the whole country will participate in defence of the nation. And he added that the defence of the nation was also the defence of Islam. Such a stand benefits both the mullahs and the military. Recent incidents like the NATO air strikes have clearly aroused nationalistic sentiments in the country. Hence, a public display of patriotism by religious parties clearly increases their popularity with the public. On the other hand, the military had clearly lost popular confidence as the defender of Pakistan especially after the Bin Laden fiasco and the NATO air strikes. Thus, the backing of the mullahs to take on the US gives the military a much needed character certificate. The show of strength at Lahore indicates that there is some kind of a consensus between the military and the religious parties. At a moment when Pakistan is reeling under a political crisis (thanks to memogate and NATO attacks) such a public spectacle had to have the blessings of the agencies. By allowing such a public outburst by Islamic parties, the military might have killed two birds with one stone: obtain the support of religious organizations on the one hand and reaching out to the jihadi militants on the other, as a promoter of militant Islamic nationalism. Winning the confidence of the mullahs also serves another, more immediate purpose for the military. As it has become clear that the Establishment has reinitiated negotiations with the TTP (Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan), the support of the SIC (Sunni Ittehad Council) could be helpful in persuading the TTP to take a more flexible stand vis--vis the establishment. This could occur in two ways. Either the SIC will try to co-opt the Taliban and persuade it not to work against the military, or the militarys cooption of the SIC would isolate, corner and thereby force the TTP to come to the negotiating table. Many leaders of the Difa-e Pakistan movement like Sami-ul Haq and Hafiz Mohammed Saeed are known to have close contacts with the Taliban. These links will certainly play a major role in any future dialogue. The second possibility is that the Difa congregation was a political move by the military to put pressure on the civilian government and the opposition parties. Although religious parties in Pakistan have never enjoyed significant electoral support, they enjoy political power through indirect means. Firstly, it is entirely possible that the army is trying to put its political eggs in many baskets. Although not all religious organizations participating in the rally are involved in mainstream politics, they do have an indirect influence. By whipping up religious passions against countries like

USA, India and Israel, these groups can ensure that mainstream parties do not stray too much from the militarys line on these countries. This was evident from the numerous allusions to the civilian governments decision to give India MFN status. Lastly, by staging such a massive gathering in Lahore, it appears that the military is trying to bring JuD into mainstream politics, which is clearly an ominous sign of the times to come. Co-opting such groups could give an impetus and also a sanction for extremist politics in Pakistan in the future. As they get further entrenched in Pakistans polity, civilian governments will find it more difficult to contain them. All these factors could further destabilize and possibly reverse the process of the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:08 PM Fireworks in the frost (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Fireworks-inthe-frost/articleshow/11222714.cms) Times of India Editorial Folks, let's admit it - they are the coolest ones. While we may be numbed to the bone by winter, our western neighbours know no such paralysis. Instead, the big chill means big thrills for our Pakistani padosis, thawing the freeze by jumping in and out of hotbeds of intrigue. In their sizzling pursuits, they're accompanied by aides as coolly composed as memos, tattoos and the ISI. Sounds like a spy novel, you say? Correct - with a Khar, not a Carre. The hot crackle in our western wires began when a trans-atlantic memo somehow 'leaked' between Washington and Wagah. The red-hot chilli paper alleged Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari was seeking American assistance to stave off an impending coup. As US-Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz blew the shehnai on this secret, claiming a totally different Haqqani network in its wake, his revelations raised no laughs. Indeed, few military top brass finding 'Memogate' amusing, Pakistan army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani hotly demanded a probe to unearth those lowering the army's morale - but not, ahem, planning the impending coup. Tempers surging, President Zardari prudently flew off overseas for tender loving care unavailable in intriguing Islamabad. No one knew when or if he was coming back. Even upon Zardari's re-entry, rumours flew about this being a 'guest appearance' before a permanent departure into exile. Zardari's itinerary may relate to the second Pakistani secret revealed for all eyes only. Clearly a believer in equal-opportunity embarrassment, Mansoor Ijaz sprang his next leak: heavy plotting in Pakistan didn't stop at Zardari and his Yankee doodles. ISI chief Shuja Pasha undertook his own whistle-stop tour, allegedly raising support in Arab nations for an impending coup. Thus, while Zardari looked West, the military looked East. Those 'strategic' assets, after all, need to be nurtured - even at the cost of bulldozing a 'sovereign' civilian government. Which is not what you can say about those pictures of Pakistani actress Veena Malik, also raising temperatures all round. As PM Yousaf Raza Gilani sputtered angrily over an impending coup, Malik glowed with rage at her image appearing on a magazine cover in India, wearing little but an ISI tattoo. More burning secrets tumbled out into the subcontinent's snows. Malik claimed she had been wearing a bikini which however morphed into that perfect birthday suit. Keeping the heat up Malik then performed a vanishing act herself, gossips claiming she'd been spotted hopping across that borderline sporting a thermal burqa. But the actress emerged soon enough in Mumbai, huffing that she was returning to Pakistan to have her Indian visa renewed - so she could come right back. As we said, they richly deserve that Cool-Yule crown. For frost, fog or plain and clear fact, nothing deters our friends from across the border from warming their chill-blains with verbal fireworks and travelling busily about - even if they're only going round in circles. Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:17 PM Why call it black swan again and again (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\23\story_23-12-2011_pg3_6) By Uzma Ashraf | Daily Times It is always convenient to blame external hands and inherent systemic flaws while the one in

power is not capable to hit at the actual cause. And this is universally true. For example, the finance experts sitting as top regulators and central bankers knew the underlying causes of the second great depression that had set in since 2008 but they remained incapacitated to address the market forces at work. There has always been criticism on the IMFs conditionality programmes but even imperial Europe is seeking its bailout from the same IMFs oppressive policies, which have never worked for the development of a developing country so far. Geo-strategically, Kashmir has always been the main source of tension in South Asia since the birth of two rival states in 1947 India and Pakistan. They fought several wars over this issue. But now devoid of that luxury after the two neighbours went overtly nuclear in 1998, they are unable to leash their respective monsters that have grown colossal from the constant supply of nourishments over the last 60 years by consuming the lions share, particularly from the scanty kitty of Pakistans economy. For Pakistans case, it was initially the cherished Kashmir banega Pakistan (Kashmir will become Pakistan) slogan, which was later replaced by the strategic depth catchword. After nukes, what now was the big question mark in the minds of the true rulers and the intelligent strategists found a quick answer as the Soviet Union disintegrated and the mess crystallised into what is known today as the Taliban. It was most unfortunate that the political elite almost always remained incapacitated due to varied reasons to find a motto or a catchword to charm the power house for them. Once they got roti, kapra aur makan (food, clothing and shelter) but that too was buried deep in the abyss created by the split of the two wings. The enchanter of the buzzword himself was standing on the slippery grounds wet from the blood of the divide itself. After three decades of that split, the country is on the verge of perhaps multiple chasms in waiting. The potential threats, this time, are not merely due to inherent systemic flaws like geographical inconveniencies, or external hands but encompass deeper causes of injustice, deprivation, manipulation and oppressive domination not by foreign imperial lords but by the politico-military elites sitting in Islamabad who are not ready to accommodate linguistic, logistical, socio-economic, cultural and financial claims. Conveniences can be too costly at times. This is the fact that the leadership seems most oblivious to not only today but from the very beginning. And the costs have been constantly paid by innocent lives, in 1971 and almost every day since Pakistan provided sanctuaries to the extremist forces including the Taliban and their ideology. These physical sanctuaries, once temporary, have now become immortal in the form of infiltration into the local masses and transforming them into countless brands and shades of different sects and groups, including the Pakistani Taliban. Addiction for such convenient blame games have made us numb to realise what we have become today economically, socially and even morally. The policy on terrorism and joining the western alliance to counter the extremist faction is but one of its manifestations. The endless string of corruption scandals at the top political level is another case in point. The contagion does not end here. It has crept deep into the ruling elites strategy to survive without stopping at any point and realising the consequences of their shortsightedness. Sardar Mengal said just this week that Balochistan has reached the point of no return. Does that affect our rulers a tad certainly not. His must be taken as a call in vain but was that not the case in 1971 too? What have they thought of the humming going on in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the majority of the masses are ready to follow suit? Would it suffice to take support of the convenient blame game again and again and tag it external hands and be satisfied with the outcomes? It would not. Why not take stock of our actions today and not let another black swan emerge as Pakistan has experienced with the dismemberment earlier. Let justice be the rule and the whims of the ruling elites be subservient to the greater cause of solidarity. The writer is a Chevening scholar and is doing a PhD at AIIFL, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Honor Killings On The Rise In Pakistan

(http://origin.rferl.org/content/honor_killings_on_the_rise_in_pakistan/24429491.html) By Abubakar Siddique | Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:23 PM Pakistan's Jihadist Threat: Obama's Terrorism Challenge in 2012 (http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/21/pakistan-s-jihadist-threat-obama-s-terrorismchallenge-in-2012.html) The president made good on his pledge to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda. But the jihadist threat endures. By Bruce Riedel | The Daily Beast Al Qaeda is on the defensive in Pakistan, but its many allies and affiliates are on the march. Four years after al Qaeda murdered Benazir Bhutto, her warnings about the jihadist syndicate in Pakistan have been born out; it is the most dangerous terror threat in the world today. In 2008, Barack Obama promised to make the al Qaeda core, or al Qaeda al Umm (mother al Qaeda), his top target if elected. Three years later, the group is on the defensive, its leader Osama bin Laden found in Abbottabad, Pakistan and killed, his lieutenants hunted by drones and his successor Ayman Zawahiri under siege. Al Qaeda al Umm has never faced the pressure it is facing today. The groups allies and affiliates in Pakistan, by contrast, are under virtually no pressure. Indeed, they enjoy the support of Pakistans army and the patronage of its spy service, the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI. They are flourishing. This month, they held an open-air rally in Lahore, Pakistans second-largest city, at the spot where Pakistans founders first called for its creation in 1940: the Minar-e Pakistan. The founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group that attacked Mumbai in 2008, Hafiz Saeed, was the host and master of ceremonies. According to the police, at least 70,000 people joined the rally, which was called in the defense of Pakistan after two dozen Pakistani soldiers died in NATO airstrikes last month. Saeed, who now heads Lashkars official successor Jamat ud Dawa, called for jihad against India in Kashmir and NATO in Afghanistan. He said Israel has tried to steal Pakistans nuclear weapons in the past and failed, and now America was trying to seize the countrys nuclear arsenal and must be defeated. He called on Pakistanis to back the army in fighting America and for the overthrow of the civilian government of President Ali Asif Zardari, and he rejected Zardaris proposal for most-favored trade agreement with India. Instead, India must be punished for stealing Kashmir in 1947 and for helping Bangladesh secede from Pakistan in 1971. Jihad is the only answer to America, Israel and India. Along with the black and white flags of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the crowd was also full of the flags of a half dozen other terror groups like Sipha i Sahaba, which specializes in killing Shia, and the Afghan Taliban, our enemy in Afghanistan for the last decade. Other speakers included the son of Pakistans third military dictator, Ijaz ul Haq, who has long backed jihadist causes and is a supporter of Pakistans nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan, and Hamid Gul, a former director general of the ISI known to be very close to the Afghan Taliban leadership in Quetta, Pakistan. The common feature of all the groups and individuals at the Minar-e Pakistan is their long connections to the ISI. Ms. Bhutto had warned before her death that the alliance of jihadist terror and the army was the greatest threat to world peace today, a terror threat much more dangerous in the long term than bin Ladens gang could ever be. It was a remarkable declaration of strength and power. The jihadist groups promised further mass demonstrations in 2012 in Rawalpindi, the countrys military capital, and Karachi, its largest city and port. Saeed, who openly mourned bin Ladens death last May as the hero of modern jihad, graphically demonstrated the power of the jihadist syndicate in the worlds second largest Muslim country with the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. Four years ago, on December 27, 2007, this syndicate murdered former Prime Minister Bhutto. The UN investigation of the assassination concluded the plot was lead by al Qaeda--probably by its master terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri, who was trained for years by the ISI--and conducted with the help of other parts of the syndicate. It also concluded the ISI had deliberately destroyed the forensic evidence at the crime scene, probably to cover up its own hand in the killing.

Ms. Bhutto had warned before her death that the alliance of jihadist terror and the army was the greatest threat to world peace today, a terror threat much more dangerous in the long term than bin Ladens gang could ever be because it had control of the instruments of a state within a state. She predicted this syndicate of terror would be marching on Pakistans major cities within four years. She was all too right. Three years ago in Mumbai, the syndicate demonstrated its terror capabilities. It held the financial capital of India in its deadly grip for days, killing and wounding hundreds including Indians, Americans and Jews. The court testimony of an American, David Headley, who was the master spy for the attack and prepared the way with five visits to the city before hand, shows it was a joint Lashkar-ISI plot. That attack was the first major international crisis after Obamas electoral victory. The president has delivered on his promises to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda al Umm. He showed great courage and leadership in sending the SEALs to Abbottabad this year. In 2012 he will need to reset American policy toward Pakistan to contain the worst excesses and ambitions of the Pakistani army, the ISI and the syndicate of terror they sponsor while at the same time engaging and supporting those Pakistanis who want a democratic, progressive Pakistan like Benazir. That is a tough balance to get right. It may be the toughest challenge of his presidency.

California woman indicted on terrorism-support charges (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-security-funding-idUSTRE7BL0OB20111222) By Brett Wolf | Reuters Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:30 PM Love-hate takes a dip (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111223&page=6) The US and Pakistan are coordinating their war on terror in an atmosphere of total mistrust By Saeed Naqvi | The Friday Times Major General Ashfaq Nadeem, director general of military operations, says NATO forces had been told they were attacking Pakistani military posts but the helicopters kept firing. The death of 24 soldiers has raised a storm in Pakistan. In the early years of the US invasion of Afghanistan, it was fairly common for the US, NATO or ISAF to hit wrong targets. Military officials, attached to various embassies in Kabul, were full of stories on how the local "contacts", part of the improvised mercenary intelligence, had deliberately misled the Americans to attack, say, a wedding party belonging to a tribe with which the "contact" had an old score to settle. Countless scores were settled. Every incident had its own novelty, but the broad pattern was similar. The military official, mostly American, would be taken to an obviously secure place to meet a "contact" who would demand money, arms, and thousands of yellow packets of food. The "contact" would ask the US official to hold fire until he, the official, got a signal to summon the helicopter gunships to exhaust their magazines on the other side of the hillock on an Al Qaeda training session. On numerous occasions, the target was a wedding party. Double dealing with the Americans was built into Gen Pervez Musharraf's U-turn to fall in line in the war on terror. Musharraf was being invited to destroy exactly the forces Pakistan, the Saudis and the Americans had diligently trained to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. As the center of gravity of the war on terror gradually shifted from Afghanistan to the Pakistani side of the border, consuming Musharraf, destabilising a tense and divided Pakistan, and bringing a new set of political actors, Pakistan Army became less willing to part with all the "Mujahideen" assets it had built up once an Afghan Endgame became the incantation. This increased the trust deficit between Pakistan Army and the Americans. The US sergeant incharge of a communications center involved in the attack that killed Pakistani soldiers gave no credence to Pakistani protestations. The US and Pakistan are coordinating their war on terror in an atmosphere of total mistrust.

There is a school of thought in Kabul, close to the intelligence community, that believes that Pakistan's cross-border intervention in Afghanistan will continue until the Americans take on the GHQ in Rawalpindi. The growing divide between public opinion on both sides of the AfPak border may also come in handy at a time when the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the US is in the bargain. It reflects on the adversarial AfPak equation that the souring of US-Pakistan relations helps soften the Afghan mood towards the US, an enabling condition for the Agreement. Pakistan has no option but to respond to public outrage. Blocking of the two NATO supply routes to Afghanistan and denying the use of a Balochistan airfield to the CIA is actually a low risk retaliation when Iran, Hezbullah, and Syria are much more in the eye of a huge, global storm. Iran's Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh of Aerospace Division, has raised the stakes in the region by declaring that Tehran will target the NATO missile shield in Turkey if Iran is attacked by Israel or the US. All these distractions notwithstanding, the blocking of the NATO supply routes is no trifling matter either. Even though a large percentage of the supplies now take the central Asian routes, at least 40 percent of supplies have to traverse Pakistan. Further, Islamabad's virtual absence from the Bonn conference on Afghanistan upsets the White House script on an issue of considerable interest in the buildup to the November 2012 US presidential election. President Barack Obama has created an illusion that the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan by 2012. The script will emerge in bolder relief by May 2012 when Obama will host an important conference on Afghanistan. The conference, in Chicago, with NATO and other stakeholders in attendance, will take stock of the situation at that stage. It is just conceivable the global recession will be overshadowed by a war for which clouds are already gathering in and around the straits of Hormuz. Will a nice, big war help Obama's reelection? Whoever wins the election, the script in Afghanistan until 2014 and beyond will be written by that new administration after November 2012. Do you need a clairvoyant to enlighten you where President Hamid Karzai may be residing after 2014? ? Saeed Naqvi is Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation in News Delhi and an anchor "In Conversation" on NewsX U.S. acknowledges mistakes, doesn't take blame in Pakistan strike (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-pakistan-airstrike20111223,0,3343530.story) By David S. Cloud and Laura King | Los Angeles Times Deadly Pakistan border incident worsened by lack of trust (http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/22/lack-of-trust-big-problem-in-deadly-pakistan-borderincident/) By Adam Levine | CNN Bargaining leverage? (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111223&page=7.2) By Ali K Chishti | The Friday Times NATO is looking north (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111223&page=7.1) By Ali K Chishti | The Friday Times A troubled country (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/23/a-troubled-country.html) By Khalid Aziz | Dawn Salala report (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83820&Cat=8) The News Editorial After the Salala probe report (http://tribune.com.pk/story/310970/after-the-salala-probe-report/) The Express Tribune Editorial Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:37 PM

From East Pakistan to Bangladesh (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\23\story_23-12-2011_pg3_3) By Naseer Memon | Daily Times Disrespect to culture, denial to right of rule, economic exploitation and a discriminatory development paradigm were the key causes of discontent in the then East Pakistan that eventually culminated in the creation of Bangladesh. The myopic attitude of both the civilian and military leadership grossly underestimated the power keg of East Pakistan that left deep scars of embarrassment on our national history. While language and culture are central to most rights-based movements, economy and politics are the incendiary triggers of perpetuating ghastly disgruntlement. Undeniably the social fabric and political configuration of East and West Pakistan was poles apart. While West Pakistan was predominantly a feudal-led body of politics and society, East Pakistan had an entirely different socio-political vista. After 1857, Bengal became the first province under the British rule. It was the first regulation province of India under the jurisdiction of a High Court. Society and politics in Bengal was erected on starkly different building blocs not in jibe with the other provinces of Pakistan where British rule was deeply engrained in typical colonial structures and socio-political ambience. The landed aristocracy that shaped todays Pakistan was annihilated in Bengal in 1950 with the introduction of the East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act. It effectively routed landlordism in Bengal by fixing individual holdings at a mere 3.3 acres per head or 33.3 acres of land per family, whichever is less. The agriculture census of 1963-64 shows that out of 6.2 million farms some six million were of less than 12.5 acres size and 50 percent of them were only 2.5 acres or less. On the contrary, West Pakistan was marked by large land holdings, especially in Punjab and Sindh. For example, 30 percent of the land in Sindh in 1952 was owned by only one percent of the owners and the average holding was above 500 acres. In Punjab, 50 percent of the land was under the control of zamindars (landlords). This sufficiently indicates the distinct social and political milieu of the two wings. Since West Pakistan held hegemony over the decision making process, the Spartan and vibrant middle class-led East Pakistan often confronted the policies drawn and imposed by the landed aristocracy of West Pakistan. Resource haemorrhage and discrimination in pecuniary matters against East Pakistan was the key cause of conflict. In 1948-50 when East Pakistan had a net balance of payments surplus of Rs 622 million, West Pakistan had a net deficit of Rs 912 million. Similarly the foreign and inter-wing trade balance of the two wings from 1949-50 to 1957-58 shows East Pakistan having a surplus of Rs 3,636 million as balance of trade with foreign countries against the net deficit of Rs 3,047 million of West Pakistan on the same account. The trend remained consistent during the first and second five year plans when East Pakistan had a net surplus and West Pakistan had a net deficit in foreign trade and the surplus of East Pakistan was used to offset the deficit. Probably this prompted Sheikh Mujib to demand two separate currencies for the two wings under his popular six-point formula. The resource sharing conflict might have been assuaged had some reasonable balance in benefit sharing been maintained. What riled the Bengalis was unremitting discrimination in development opportunities. For example, the GDP growth in East Pakistan during the period was 2.2 percent against the heavily skewed 3.1 percent of West Pakistan. During the same period, per capita income in East Pakistan plummeted to -0.1 percent against +0.8 percent increase in West Pakistan. Likewise, during the five years from 1954-55 to 1959-60, GDP growth in East Pakistan was only 1.6 percent, i.e. half of West Pakistans 3.2 percent. Per capita income in East Pakistan nose-dived to -0.7 percent against +1.2 percent in West Pakistan. East Pakistan having almost 54 percent population was also discriminated against in public sector development. During the first five year plan, the total revenue expenditure in East Pakistan was Rs 2,540 million, which was less than one-third of the Rs 8,980 of West Pakistan. It was marginally ameliorated in the second five year plan from 1960-61 to 1964-65 when East Pakistan received Rs 6,254 million under the public sector development programme against Rs 7,696 million for West Pakistan, yet it was still 19 percent less. Cumulative figures of development expenditure of the two decades from 1950-51 to 1969-70 further explain the economic prejudice. Total development expenditure in East Pakistan remained disproportionately Rs 29,960 million against Rs 61,980 million in West Pakistan. Per capita GDP growth is another relevant indicator, which also depicts the same trend during the last ten years from 1959-60 to 1969-70. Per capita GDP growth in East Pakistan remained 17 percent against 42 percent in West Pakistan. Not only that East Pakistan was kept economically deprived and politically suppressed, it was also

under-represented in the state structure. The share of the Bengalis in senior level civil services was also flagrantly violated. During the first five years of the country, senior cadres of several departments were completely bereft of Bengalis. There were no Bengalis on any senior positions in the Departments of Commerce, Intelligence and Statistics, Supply and Development, Petroleum, Paper and Stationery Wing, Inspection Wing, General Concession Wing, Central Engineering Authority, Coal Commissioner and Textiles. This sufficiently narrates the sheer discrimination and economic plight of East Pakistan. The chief of the Constitution Committee, Justice Shahabuddin, said in his report that colonial behaviour was adopted towards the Bengalis. Lacking prescience, the political and military leadership rather than opting for introspection embarked upon stereotyped narrations. General Ayub rabidly loathed the Bengalis. He once vented his spleen by saying: I am surprised by Bengali outlook. They have cut themselves off from Muslim culture through abhorrence of the Urdu language...making themselves vulnerable to Hindu culture. On September 7, 1967 he wrote: God has been very unkind to us in giving the sort of neighbours [India] and compatriots [Bengalis]. We could not think of a worst combination. Hindus and Bengalis...If worst comes to the worst, we shall not hesitate to fight a relentless battle against the disruptionists in East Pakistan. Rivers of blood will flow if need be, unhappily. We will arise to save our crores of Muslims from Hindu slavery. Certainly General Ayub was no exception in his fulmination against the Bengalis. An assortment of such factors impregnated pernicious consternation among the Bengalis. Persistent political schism morphed into fratricide in 1971 that culminated in dismemberment of Pakistan.

Letter to a Pakistani diplomat (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\24\story_2412-2011_pg3_5) By Eqbal Ahmad | Daily Times Bangladesh: An Avoidable Controversy over Tipaimukh Project (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4823.html) By S. Chandrasekharan | South Asia Analysis Group 54 prisoners of 1971 war still in Pak jails! Guj HC writes to Centre (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/fifty-four-prisoners-of-1971-war-still-in-pak-jails-guj-hcwrites-to-centre/20111223.htm) Press Trust Of India Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:43 PM Bangladesh wrestles with trials from '71 war (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_BANGLADESH_WAR_TRIALS? SITE=CALAK&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) Associated Press It should have been like any other morning. But March 26, 1971, was the first full day of a war that would tear apart the region then called East Pakistan. When the fighting ended nine months later, as many as 3 million people were dead and East Pakistan - until then an annex of Pakistan - had become the independent nation of Bangladesh. Bangladesh marked the 40th anniversary of the end of its independence war this month, still struggling to close the deep wounds that accompanied its birth and divided over how to deal with those who allegedly aided Pakistan during the war. The fighting was just hours old at 7 a.m. when soldiers burst through the wooden door of Arun Kumer Dey's apartment on the Dhaka University campus. Dey's father managed the school's cafeteria, a popular meeting place for government opponents. The soldiers, firing machine-guns, quickly killed Dey's mother, 15-year-old sister, eldest brother and the brother's new wife. Then they left. Dey, then a teenager, and his injured father fell onto the corpses in grief. But the soldiers soon came back. "I begged for my father's life," Dey said. Instead, his father was taken away and executed, the body dumped into a shallow grave. "It still haunts me," said Dey, who now runs the cafeteria. And every day since then he has

wondered: "When will the killers and their collaborators be punished?" He may soon have an answer. Forty years later, the Bangladesh government has begun prosecutions tied to its war of independence. It has created an International Crimes Tribunal, charged seven people and said some could face the death penalty. With independent researchers saying about 1,800 people collaborated with the Pakistani army in committing atrocities, many more arrests are possible. International observers have guardedly welcomed the trials, though some are also concerned they could become weapons against the government's political rivals. Certainly the opposition sees it that way. The Bangladesh National Party, led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, said in a statement that the tribunal is "nothing but a servile, rubber-stamp organization" out to victimize the government's political opponents. All those arrested so far are members of Jamaat-e-Islami, a fierce opponent of independence in 1971 but also now a key Zia ally. Two of those arrested were Cabinet ministers during Zia's 20012006 government. Zia is also the longtime rival of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who pushed hard for the tribunals. She is the eldest daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the hero of the 1971 independence war and Bangladesh's first president. Hasina's government insists the trials will be fair, though guilty verdicts are widely expected for all those arrested so far. The seven face charges ranging from crimes against humanity to murder, arson, rape and looting. Six are in jail pending trial. The seventh man was freed on bail because of his age, and is being questioned at his home. The roots of the 1971 war go back to 1947, when independence came to British India and the colony was carved into mostly Hindu India and overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistan. The map drawn by the British created a tangle of geographic, political and cultural divisions. The new state of Pakistan was physically divided in two by the mass of India. To the west lay what is now Pakistan; some 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) to the east stood the annex of East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh. Nearly all political power rested with the Urdu speaking Pakistanis in the west, leaving the Bangla-speakers of the east feeling isolated and adrift. When the central government began pressing for Urdu to become Pakistan's sole official language, a Bangladeshi nationalist movement was born, growing over the years amid cycles of protest and crackdown. Eventually, demands for Bangladeshi autonomy turned into calls for outright independence, and on March 25, 1971 the protest movement turned into a war for independence. As attempts to quash the revolt grew increasingly bloody, India - seeking to weaken its longtime rival - began supporting the rebels. It was a nine-month spasm of horror and bloodshed. Bangladesh says Pakistani soldiers, aided by local collaborators, killed an estimated 3 million people, raped 200,000 women and forced millions of people to flee to India. Pro-independence fighters were targeted by Pakistani soldiers, as were members of the Hindu minority such as Dey who were often seen as agents of India. "We are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak military," the then-U.S. Consul General in Dhaka cabled the State Department in late March 1971. The soldiers were hunting down their political opponents by "seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down." Pakistan, which views the war as a closed chapter, disputes Bangladesh's toll of the dead and injured and denies any allegations of war crimes.

In Bangladesh, though, the war has never been forgotten. In the last national elections, in 2008, Hasina's now-ruling Awami League got immense support for its vows to prosecute war criminals. "Many of my friends were killed," M.A. Hasan, one of dozens of independent researchers who have spent years compiling data on the 1971 war. "We can't forget it so easily. It's a national trauma, it cannot be erased." He also urged the government to press for prosecutions of Pakistani army soldiers who are back in Pakistan, holding the trials in absentia if necessary. But with almost no one expecting Pakistan to turn over war crimes suspects, the country has turned inward in search of collaborators. The first trial began in October when Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a top official of Jamaat-e-Islami and allegedly one of the leaders of a pro-Pakistan militia, was charged with involvement in the killing of more than 50 people, torching villages and forcibly converting Hindus to Islam. Sayedee denies the allegations. If found guilty, the 71-year-old could be given the death penalty. Years after the killings, those left behind just want some justice. "My father, my mother were killed, isn't that true? Our family was traumatized. We have suffered terribly for so long," Dey said. "We want justice. We want to look toward the future. But we can't forgive the people who killed my family in such a brutal way." Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:48 PM A trafficker's secret (http://hoffman.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/23/a_nuclear_traffickers_secret) By David E. Hoffman | Foreign Policy One of the unsolved mysteries of the A. Q Khan nuclear proliferation network is whether there was another nation that benefited, beyond Iran, North Korea and Libya. Khan, the metallurgist who played a key role in Pakistan's quest for the atomic bomb, acknowledged selling equipment and plans that could be used for nuclear weapons to these three countries, but, by some accounts, he and his associates also referred to a hidden "fourth customer." Now, Joshua Pollack, an expert on nonproliferation whose work has appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the ArmsControlWonk.com blog, and the Nonproliferation Review, has written an article with a surprising suggestion: the fourth customer might have been Pakistan's bitter rival, nuclear-armed India. In a piece just published in Playboy, Pollack lays out several pieces of evidence that the Khan network's wares--including the key features of centrifuges needed to enrich uranium to higher levels for a weapon--may have found their way to India. Pollack reports that India's efforts to buy centrifuges in 1997-1999 and again from 2003-2006 offered clues to the source of their technology. The hints were contained in advertisements published in newspapers, and documents which India gave to potential suppliers. According to Pollack, the centrifuge design which India sought is "recognizable to the trained eye" as one that "almost mirrors" a design that Khan stole from a European firm in the 1970s and which he later used to build centrifuges for Pakistan. A centrifuge spins at extremely high speed to separate out the rare isotope uranium that is necessary to build a bomb. The rotor tubes of the centrifuges used by India are narrower and thicker-walled than the Khan designs, according to Pollack, but "are designed along the same distinctive lines: a single tube of managing steel with a bellows formed directly upon it, not manufactured as a separate component." The bellows is an accordion-like crimp in the tube that helps it remain intact at super-high velocities and under great stress from vibration. Pollack said India is one of only three countries in the world believed to be using centrifuges of this type at this time and the other two are already known to be Khan's customers. He also reports that India's

centrifuge design has small differences from the Khan type "that seem to make it more susceptible to failure." Pollack also says that others in Khan's illicit network--including Gerhard Wisser, a German living in South Africa-- sold technology to India, with or without Khan's knowledge. Pollack notes a partial admission by Khan, documented in the memoirs of former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf: "There is a strong possibility that the Indian enrichment program may also have its roots in the Dubai-based [Khan] network and could be a copy of the Pakistani centrifuge design." Musharraf pardoned Khan in 2004 after Khan publicly confessed his role in setting up the proliferation network. What might have been Khan's motive for selling nuclear equipment to Pakistan's arch-foe? Pollack argues that Khan was always on a quest for personal glory. He drew large sums of money from the nuclear sales, which helped him to become a prominent benefactor and philanthropist in Pakistan, something of a national hero. Pollack points out how Khan has rationalized his illicit dealings, saying that Iran and Libya probably couldn't master the technology anyway, and that North Korea already had a bomb design and plutonium, so it wouldn't make that much of a difference. India, too, already had a nuclear weapon. Pollack's piece does not prove that India was buying from the Khan network, but it keeps alive the question of who was the mysterious "fourth customer."

India, Pakistan, and Nuclear Confidence Building (http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2011/12/23/indiapakistan-and-nuclear-confidence-building/) By Frank G. Klotz | Council on Foreign Relations INDIAS CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE: A DECADE LATER (http://www.ipcs.org/issuebrief/india/indias-credible-minimum-deterrence-a-decade-later-179.html) By Tanvi Kulkarni and Alankrita Sinha | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Threats to Space Assets and India's Options (http://idsa.in/occasionalpapers/ThreatstoSpaceAssetsandIndiasOptions) By Deepak Sharma | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Indian Armys modernization drive gathers steam (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/IndianArmys-modernization-drive-gathers-steam/articleshow/11226877.cms) By Rajat Pandit | TNN Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:53 PM Kandhamal Survivors Apprehensive Of Bandh Call On Christmas (http://www.countercurrents.org/nayak231211.htm) By Jugal Kishore Ranjit & Bipracharan Nayak | Countercurrents We, on behalf of the Kandhamal Survivors Association - the victims of Communal Violence in Kandhamal that took place in 2007 and 2008 would like to bring the following matter for your kind attention and consideration. As you may be all aware of that a bandh-call has been given by Sangh Parivar from 24th to 27th December in Kandhamal district using the name of Mr. Lambodar Kahnar, the so-called Convener of Kui Samanyaya Samitee, which falls during the Christmas week. Since 2007, these people have been giving bandh-calls each year during the same time for one or other reasons. Now, it is clear that the reasons for bandh-calls are communally motivated and intended to create disturbance during the Observation of Christmas, to terrorize the Christian community people. Last year the reason was to remember/protest the murder of Hindus during violence, this year to demand the punishment for fake-caste certificate holders. Whole the year they would forget the demands, suddenly they would give a bandh-call for 24-26 December. Now, there is no doubt that the Bandh call has only one objective to materialize the interests of Sangha Parivar using the name of tribals. The bandh call had its harvests in 2007 and 2008 by facilitating large scale anti-Christian violence, when the district administration utterly failed to take any measure to protect the lives, properties of thousands of people. This time also we dont see any proactive measures by it although we have appealed at least three times to the district collector. We are afraid that it will not only create law and order problem, but also it will restrict the Christians

to celebrate the long awaited Christmas peacefully and freely. While we are in fully support of any genuine and democratic causes and demands by anybody, we do sincerely request all political parties believing in democracy and Indian Constitution to take necessary steps to make the administration to stop such practices of communal mobilization intended to terrorise the minorities. We would request you that you may, please, send letters to the district, state and national authorities and give press statements Needless to mention here that although we are for the freedom of expression and do not wish to curb democratic and non-violent demonstrations and political activity by any group, but we strongly believe it is the duty of the government to ensure that the minorities are allowed to observe their freedom of religion peacefully. In Kandhamal, we have had bitter experience. Out community has been deeply wounded, especially in the aftermath of bundh calls during and around Christmas. We are therefore apprehensive of such bandh calls and sincerely request your intervention.

Its All About the Muslim Vote (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/its-all-about-themuslim-vote/) By Margherita Stancati | IndiaRealTime Collapse of Modis third path (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/true-lies/entry/collapse-ofmodi-s-third-path) By Rajiv Shah | Times of India Haren Pandyas Murder: Questions without Answers (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16902.pdf) By Shastri Ramachandaran | Economic & Political Weekly Macaca 12-23-2011, 08:59 PM India: Caste System Faces Challenges (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/22/india-castesystem_n_1165874.html) By TIM SULLIVAN | Huffington Post As far back as he can remember, people told Hari Kishan Pippal that he was unclean, with a filthiness that had tainted his family for centuries. Teachers forced him to sit apart from other students. Employers sometimes didn't bother to pay him. Pippal is a dalit, a member of the outcast community once known as untouchables. Born at the bottom of Hinduism's complex social ladder, that meant he could not eat with people from higher castes or drink from their wells. He was not supposed to aspire to a life beyond that of his father, an illiterate cobbler. Years later, he still won't repeat the slurs that people called him. Now, though, people call him something else. They call him rich. Pippal owns a hospital, a shoe factory, a car dealership and a publishing company. He owns six cars. He lives in a maze of linked apartments in a quiet if dusty neighborhood of high walls and wroughtiron gates. "In my heart I am dalit. But with good clothes, good food, good business, it is like I am high-caste," he said, a 60-year-old with a shock of white hair, a well-tailored vest and the girth of a Victorian gentleman. Now, he points out, he is richer than most Brahmins, who sit at the top of the caste hierarchy: "I am more than Brahmin!" But in an increasingly globalized nation wrestling with centuries of deeply held caste beliefs, there is little agreement about what that means. Do Pippal and the handful of other dalit millionaires reflect a country shrugging off centuries of caste bias? Does caste hold still hold sway the way it used to? Even Hari Kishan Pippal isn't sure. "Life is good for me," says Pippal, sitting in his office in Heritage Hospital, one of the largest private medical facilities in this north Indian city. "But life is very bad for many, many people." The vast majority of India's 170 million dalits live amid a thicket of grim statistics: less than a third are literate, well over 40 percent survive on less than $2 a day, infant mortality rates are

dramatically higher than among higher castes. Dalits are far more likely than the overall population to be underweight, and far less likely to get postnatal care. While caste discrimination has been outlawed for more than 60 years, and the term "untouchable" is now taboo in public, thousands of anti-dalit attacks occur every year. Hundreds of people are killed. The stories spill from India's newspapers: the 14-year-old dalit strangled because he shared his first name with a higher-caste boy; the 70-year-old man and his disabled daughter burned alive after a dalit-owned dog barked at higher-caste neighbors; the man run over at a gas station because he refused to give up his place in line to a high-caste customer. But amid centuries of caste tradition that can seem immutable, there has been slow change. In an extensive survey by the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania, researchers found that dalits living in concrete homes, not huts made from mud and straw, had jumped from 18 percent to 64 percent between 1990 and 2007 in one north Indian district. Ownership of various household goods fans, chairs, pressure cookers and bicycles had skyrocketed over the same period. It also found a weakening of some caste traditions, with, for example, far fewer dalits being seated separately at non-dalit weddings. While most dalits still support themselves as rural laborers, there is also a growing dalit middle class, many of them civil servants who have benefited from affirmative action laws. "Caste is losing its grip," said Chandra Bhan Prasad, a dalit writer, social scientist and one-time Marxist militant who has become a leading voice urging the dalit poor to see the virtues of capitalism. In a consumer society, Prasad argues, wealth can trump caste at least some of the time. Growing economies also foster urbanization, he says, allowing low-caste Indians to escape traditional village strictures. Finally, economic growth also means that the traditional merchant castes are not large enough to fill every job. "This means other castes also have a chance" in the business world, Prasad said. To Prasad, the new millionaires are a way to prove that dalits can make it in a globalized world. "Don't say (success) is not possible because of the caste system," he said. "Here is a list of dalits who are doing so well." The list is impressive, even if its members are far from India's traditional centers of wealth, power and celebrity. They are, for the most part, blue-collar rich, often finding their niches in lessglamorous industries: building working-class housing developments, manufacturing immense concrete pipes, churning out cheap polyester shirts. No one knows how many wealthy dalit entrepreneurs have emerged since India opened its economy in the early 1990s, sparking some of the world's fastest economic growth. Hundreds certainly, maybe thousands. They are also increasingly visible. A decade ago, dalit businessmen regularly changed their last names, since these almost always identify someone's caste. Even Pippal did it at first, playing off the pronunciation of his name and calling his first company "People's Exports" to mask his caste background. Now, the dalit rich are chatting over cocktails at meetings of their own chamber of commerce, and setting up booths at dalit trade fairs. Top government officials are talking about a venture capital fund to make financing more easily available to entrepreneurs from India's outcast communities. The wealthiest, meanwhile, have become darlings of the Indian media, held up as proof that modern India is an increasingly caste-blind society.

Nonsense, says Anand Teltumbde, a prominent dalit activist. "These stories (about successful dalits) sit well with the middle class," said Teltumbde, who is a grandson of B.R. Ambedkar, an independence-era dalit lawyer revered as a hero by dalits across India. "The entire world has changed ... but the number of well-off dalits is no more than 10 percent. Ninety percent of dalits live a dilapidated kind of life." As for Pippal, he finds himself uncomfortably in the middle of this debate. He is a rich dalit who thinks very little has changed for India's outcasts, a man who credits his own success to hard work and one enormous advantage: ego. "From my childhood, I was thinking one day I will be a big man," he said. Raised in poverty, he only made it through high school before his father became ill, and he had to go to work pulling a rickshaw to support the family. His first break came when he married a dalit woman from a slightly better-off family that owned a small shoe workshop. Dalits have long dominated the shoe business. Caste is largely a reflection of traditional trades, and since making shoes involved working with the skins of dead animals, it was left to dalits. But Pippal shifted the focus of his father-in-law's workshop, concentrating on high-quality shoes and teaching himself a slew of languages English, Tamil, Punjabi, Russian, German to sell his footwear more widely. Today, he owns a 300-worker factory where 500 handmade shoes are turned out every day, then packed into boxes already marked with prices in euros and British pounds. The expensive ones retail for as much as $500 a pair. He used his footwear profits to start the small Honda dealership, and then the hospital. Immense profits are being made in India's private health care industry, as the new middle class seeks alternatives to the often-questionable care at most public hospitals. "I didn't know ABC about hospitals," Pippal said, laughing his barking laugh. He gleefully talks about the Brahmin doctors who at first worked for him very reluctantly. "Now they are earning lot of money from this hospital," he said. Of course, so is Pippal. He's still a long way from being a billionaire, but says his businesses have a total turnover of about $12 million a year. At first glance, Heritage Hospital doesn't look state-of-the-art. Pippal's office has stained green carpeting and paint coming away in bubbly clumps. On a recent day, masons were working near the main entrance, forcing patients to enter through a dark hallway beneath his Honda dealership, which is next door. Janitors do little but move around the dirt with wet rags. But it is cleaner and has more resources than the public hospitals most Indians must rely upon. Pippal proudly ticks off its assets: 150 beds, 187 doctors, a range of care from oncology to plastic surgery. Macaca 12-23-2011, 09:01 PM In so many ways, Pippal has proven himself a success. He is rich. He is greeted with respect on the streets. His children went to good schools, and grew up with friends from across the caste spectrum. Yet he also believes that he remains, very often, a figure of quiet contempt. "These people are very bloody clever," Pippal said of the high-caste businessmen with whom he deals. "When there are profits to be made, then everything (about his caste) is OK." "But in their mind, they're thinking: 'He is a dalit.'"

RICHEST INDIANS '11 (http://business.in.com/firstprinciples/specialreport/1322/1) Forbes India

Ghalib, Bharat Ratna And Lost Memories Of The Indian Republic (http://www.countercurrents.org/versey231211.htm) By Farzana Versey | Countercurrents 7 New, Promising Stars Of 2011 (http://business.in.com/article/special/7-new-promising-stars-of2011/31452/1) By Jasodhara Banerjee, Bharat Bhagnani | Forbes India The 'fight' to information (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/keya-sarkarfight-toinformation/459513/) By Keya Sarkar | Business Standard India is changing, but for whom? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/subir-roy-india-ischangingfor-whom/459519/) By Subir Roy | Business Standard From Bimaru to booming? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/aditi-phadnisbimaru-tobooming/459510/) By Aditi Phadnis | Business Standard Whats Important in Celebrating the Taj Hotel? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/22/whats-important-in-celebrating-the-taj-hotel/) By Kenan Machado | IndiaRealTime Moti Mahal: Delhis Gastronomic Pearl (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/22/moti-mahaldelhis-gastronomic-pearl/) By Diksha Sahni | IndiaRealTime Condom use low amongst India's unmarried youth - study (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/23/condom-use-low-amongst-indias-unmarriedidINDEE7BM04J20111223) By Nita Bhalla | Reuters India discovers gold-plated food (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16300248) By P Sivaramakrishnan | BBC India Tells Fake Scotch Whisky to Stop Using Glen Imagery (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/23/india-tells-fake-scotch-whisky-to-stop-using-glenimagery/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime Celebrating an Indian Christmas (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577115762854603078.html) Wall Street Journal 11 Reasons Why the West Should Outsource Christmas To India (http://business.in.com/article/special/11-reasons-why-the-west-should-outsource-christmas-toindia/31412/1) By Peter Griffin, Nilofer D'Souza, Abhishek Raghunath | Forbes India Macaca 12-23-2011, 09:08 PM Manmohan Singhs Xmas Letter to Mamata Claus (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/23/manmohan-singhs-xmas-letter-to-mamata-claus/) By Paul Beckett | IndiaRealTime Once again, Christmas is approaching. Once again, mailbags are stuffed with requests for presents. And once again, miraculously, India Real Time has got its hands on a letter sent from You Know the Number, Race Course Road, New Delhi. Interestingly, this years letter wasnt addressed to Santa-ji, c/o the North Pole but instead to Mamata Claus, c/o the East Pole. This is being interpreted by several government-funded think tanks in New Delhi as another sign of the millennial shift in power and wealth from the Old World to Asia, specifically India. Analysts note that Lapland, which had been one of Europes most dynamic economies, recently was forced into an embarrassing devaluation of its currency, with the DD (deerdropping) plunging 48% against the dollar in the past 20 minutes. We will let readers decide the significance for themselves. It is our job only and strictly just for fun to reproduce the letter verbatim here. We wish all India Real Time readers a very Merry Christmas. Dec. 23, 2011 Dear Mamata Claus: Here is my Christmas wish list this year. Please send me:

1 A lot of coal. Our power sector is in shambles and we are paying a huge bill for coal imports when you are sitting on massive reserves. In the spirit of the season, please share. 2 In return, Ill give you Pranab Mukherjee. I recently called him my most valued colleague in the Cabinet and I think he would make an excellent head elf. Ill throw in Chidambaram, too. He might make a good reindeer. 3 Foreign Direct Investment in multi-brand toys. It will be good for our toy economy, improve the toy supply chain (currently, 40% of the output of the Indian toy industry goes to wastage.) I dont see this harming mom-and-pop toy outlets but itll cut out the toy middlemen. I wish for the day when India is no longer a nation of subsistence toymakers. To that end, major investments are needed in industoyization. 4 An old-age pension. I know you recently nixed our new pensions bill. But I may be retiring soon (not that soon!) 5 Body armor for when I meet the press. 6 An invitation to Anna Hazare to hold his next fast in Singur. Then tell your farmer friends that hes a new Tata board member who wants to take another look. It seems to be our last chance to send this nettlesome man back where he belongs (Narendra Modis Gujarat.) 7 Some speeches like Lalu makes them. I think the guys peculiar but did you see him on the Lokpal yesterday? He said: I was born in 1948. Mere aane se pahle hi Angrez bhag gaye (even before I arrived, British fled.) That was comic genius. For the record, I was born in 1932. The British didnt leave for another 15 years. 8 A heads-up when you are going to deep-six one of my key foreign policy initiatives. I temporarily lost your number my bad otherwise of course I would have consulted you in advance about Teesta. But we need to remember that our friends in Bangladesh really need that water. They live in a very, very poor country that has long been regarded as the worlds economic basket case. (Dont pay any attention to reports that several of Bangladeshs human development indicators have recently shot past ours. Who wants to read that at Christmas?) Thats it. Ive taken up enough of your time already. You have a country to run! Feliz Navidad and Jai Hind Manny

India's Shameful Paradox Of Plenty (http://www.countercurrents.org/dsharma231211.htm) By Devinder Sharma | Countercurrents An outward-focused research culture (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shubhashisgangopadhyay-an-outward-focused-research-culture/459517/) By Shubhashis Gangopadhyay | Business Standard NREGA is money down the drain (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2742118.ece) By T. H. CHOWDHARY | The Hindu BusinessLine Indian Economy: Still Deteriorating at the Margin (http://www.realclearmarkets.com/blog/India %20%20_%2012212011%5B1%5D.pdf) By Jay Bryson | Wells Fargo Indian Realty Faces A Building Block (http://business.in.com/article/special/indian-realty-faces-abuilding-block/31102/1) By Udit Misra | Forbes India Centre must act to change the mood (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dccomment/centre-must-act-change-mood-987) Deccan Chronicle Editorial Bradman will always be the Don (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/nirmal_shekar/article2742076.ece) By NIRMAL SHEKAR | The Hindu

Numbers tell the story (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Numbers-tellthe-story/articleshow/11222911.cms) By Rudroneel Ghosh | Times of India Game isn't about cold statistics (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Gameisnt-about-cold-statistics/articleshow/11222867.cms) Times of India Crowd Set for Treat at Australia-India Boxing Day Test (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/23/crowd-set-for-treat-at-australia-india-boxing-daytest/) By Will Davies | IndiaRealTime Tendulkar greater than Bradman, says researcher (http://www.thehindu.com/sport/cricket/article2739143.ece) Press Trust Of India Macaca 12-23-2011, 09:11 PM Who Do Indians Bribe Most? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/23/who-do-indians-bribemost/) By Margherita Stancati | IndiaRealTime If the Lokpal Bill ever gets cleared by the Indian Parliament, episodes of everyday corruption, widely perceived as endemic, may finally start to decline. At the moment, the figures are not encouraging, according to a new study by the Berlin-based anticorruption group Transparency International. The report, Daily Lives and Corruption, offers fresh data on bribery in South Asia based on a survey of 7,500 people taken over the past two years. The results are alarming: they suggests that 39% of South Asians who had to deal with public services in the previous year admitted to paying a bribe. In India, more than half of the people surveyed, or 54% of respondents, said theyve paid a bribe. This was only worse in Bangladesh, where the figure is 66%, or two out of every three people. In Pakistan, the figure was around 50%, in Nepal 32%, in Sri Lanka 32% and in the Maldives 6%. As the Indian Parliament readies to vote on the governments proposal to set up the Lokpal, a anticorruption ombudsman, its worth taking a closer look at where corruption happens at a grassroots level. The study, which was broken down into nine public services, shows that across the region policemen were more likely to receive a bribe than most other institutions. In India, the most common reason people say theyve paid a bribe is to speed things up, followed by wanting to avoid getting in trouble with authorities, the study shows. Take a look at how frequently Indians pay bribes when dealing with the following public services: Police: 64% Land services (buying, selling, renting and inheriting property): 63% Registry and permit services: 62% Tax revenue: 51% Utilities (including water, telephone, electricity services): 47% Judiciary: 45% Customs: 41% Medical services: 26% Education: 23% Indias bribery patterns were comparable to those in Bangladesh and Pakistan, where policemen were also found to be the number one bribe takers. In Sri Lanka, bribing tax authorities was far more common. (Click here (http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Corruption.pdf) to

see the full report) The creation an independent corruption complaints agency at the national level along with parallel state-level units in India will offer citizens a powerful tool to fight corruption and hopefully bring these numbers down. Earlier this month, Transparency International released its yearly corruption rankings (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/01/india-sinks-lower-in-corruption-index/), which measured how common corruption is perceived to be in over 180 nations. All South Asian countries scored poorly, including India.

No Lokpal, no reservations (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/no-lokpal-noreservations/891391/) By Surjit S Bhalla | Indian Express National Interest: The caste of corruption (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/national-interestthe-caste-of-corruption/891508/) By Shekhar Gupta | Indian Express Paying the Bill (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/paying-the-bill/891513/) Indian Express Editorial Lok Pal - Barking up the wrong tree? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ammujoseph-lok-pal-barking-upwrong-tree/459511/) By Ammu Joseph | Business Standard One step forward, two steps back (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2742291.ece) The Hindu Editorial BJPs U-turn on Lok Ayuktas.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/bjps-u-turn-on-lok-ayuktas) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Anna Phase III: A Caricature of Maladies (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-mainstreammaverick/entry/anna-phase-iii-a-caricature-of-maladies) By Amaresh Misra | Times of India Sing a song of sixpence! (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Masquerader/entry/sing-a-songof-sixpence) By Anoop Kohli | Times of India Ratan Tata exhorts Indian youth to fight corruption (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ratan-Tata-exhorts-Indian-youth-to-fightcorruption/articleshow/11221225.cms) Press Trust Of India Anticorruption Bill Provokes an Outcry in India (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/world/asia/indian-plans-for-anti-corruption-agencyadvance.html) By JIM YARDLEY | The New York Times A Pocket Guide to the Lokpal Bill (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/a-pocket-guide-tothe-lokpal-bill/) By HARI KUMAR | India Ink Oppositions black money bogey (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/opposition-s-black-moneybogey-135) By Shashi Tharoor | Asian Age Macaca 12-24-2011, 07:29 PM In the year and now (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/In-the-year-andnow/Article1-786343.aspx) By Ramachandra Guha | Hindustan Times The Republic of India has a billion (and more) citizens who, at any given time, are involved in a thousand (and more) controversies. Knowing which controversy is the most significant is always hard, and often impossible, to judge. Even so, we can be fairly certain that 2011 will go down in Indian history as the year of the Great Lokpal Debate, just as 1962 was the year of the war with China, 1975 the year of the Emergency, 1991 the year the licence-permit-quota-raj was first undermined, 1992 the year the Babri Masjid was demolished. Vigorous arguments still rage on the causes and consequences of the China War, the Emergency, economic liberalisation, and the Ramjanmabhoomi movement. How then does one judge the import of events as they are unfolding? The eight months since Anna Hazares fast in Jantar Mantar have, even by Indian standards, been very contentious indeed. This coming week, the debate on the Lokpal Bill in Parliament and the threatened jail bharo andolan will complicate the picture further. It may be decades before a proper historical judgement is passed on the principal characters and events in this controversy. Living through the tamasha myself, I have been successively and sometimes simultaneously bewildered, confused, and exasperated. The first two emotions cannot be explained, but I should perhaps say something about the third.

I have been exasperated by, among other things, the repeated invocation by Team Anna and their television cheerleaders of the name and legacy of Mohandas K Gandhi. The distance between Hazare and the Mahatma in terms of moral courage and political understanding is roughly equivalent to the distance, in terms of cricketing ability and understanding, between this writer and Sachin Tendulkar. In fact, Hazare is not even a Gandhian. He has both preached and practised violence, and has never seriously pursued such quintessentially Gandhian projects as the abolition of caste distinctions, womens emancipation, and Hindu-Muslim harmony. The distance between Hazare and Mahatma Gandhi can be judged if one juxtaposes Mukul Sharmas book Green and Saffron (the first serious study of the Ralegan Siddhi experiment) to Louis Fischers classic The Life of Mahatma Gandhi. The distance between Hazare and Gandhianism can be judged if one visits the cooperatives and banks run in Gujarat by the Self-Employed Womens Association, whose founder, Ela Bhatt, has successfully nurtured ideals of caste and gender equality, and religious pluralism, among lakhs and lakhs of previously sectarian Indians. I have also been exasperated by the attitude of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Through 2011, the BJP undermined the dignity of Parliament by regularly disrupting its proceedings. Comments by senior BJP leaders endorsing Hazare left it unclear whether the principal Opposition party believed that it was the Ramlila Maidan, rather than Parliament, which should decide how laws are to be framed and when they are to be passed. Meanwhile, the sister organisation of the BJP, the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), aggressively supported Hazares movement. (One hopes it is only by oversight that, in his recent speech in Bangalore, Hazare did not speak of the by no means insubstantial corruption promoted by the BJP-run state government.) Finally, I have been exasperated by the behaviour of the ruling dispensation in New Delhi. A young journalist told me that while Gandhi became a Mahatma through his own efforts, we in the media have made a village patriarch a Gandhi. In fact, the government has done its bit in inflating Hazares significance. For in the winter of 2010-11, the prime minister had stayed silent while the Commonwealth Games and 2G scams broke. This is a key reason behind Hazares appeal. Cabinet ministers met with five men nominated by Hazare in a Joint Drafting Committee. In sanctioning this move, the prime minister placed this unelected activist above the leader of the Opposition. On the eve of Anna Hazares second fast in New Delhi, the government made the colossal error of sending him to Tihar Jail, and then, after a public outcry, releasing him. This elevated his status even further. When the fast eventually commenced, the media took over the job of reputation inflation, by repeatedly showing a split screen of Hazare on one side and the prime minister on the other. This was a face-off with only one winner. For in the winter of 2010-11, the prime minister had stayed silent while the Commonwealth Games and 2G scams broke. This is a key reason behind Hazares appeal. When I expressed these serial disenchantments to the sociologist Andr Bteille, he remarked that while Hazare had a right to be stupid, MPs and ministers did not. As an ordinary citizen, Hazare could say what he wanted. However, the Opposition parties had betrayed their mandate by their contempt for Parliament. The Congress had undermined Parliament too (by dealing directly with Team Anna). Cabinet ministers have behaved like boors at times. And through this action or, more often, inaction, of its current incumbent, the office of the prime minister had been most diminished of all. Here, then, is my interim judgement on 2011 that in the year now ending, Indian democracy has been debased by an opportunistic Opposition on the one side and a corrupt and incompetent government on the other. I wish readers of this column a less bewildering and less exasperating 2012. Ramachandra Guha is the author of India After Gandhi: The History Of The Worlds Largest Democracy More democracy, not less (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Moredemocracy-not-less/articleshow/11222843.cms) By Baijayant 'Jay' Panda | Times of India Cooked In Steam (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279386) By SUNIT ARORA | Outlook

India On Anger Street (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279385) By SUNIL KHILNANI | Outlook India In 2011, politics, policy loomed large over markets (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/24/markets-investing-yearinreviewidINDEE7BL0EU20111224) By Steven C. Johnson 'Many govts have tried to bring an effective Lok Pal' (http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/many-govts-have-tried-to-bring-an-effective-lok-pal/459597/) By Pranab Mukherjee | Business Standard Double trouble (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/double-trouble-215) By Dilip Cherian | Deccan Chronicle I do not agree that only by making laws will society be rid of corruption (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/i-do-not-agree-that-only-by-making-laws-will-society-be-ridof-corruption/891735/) By Rajnath Singh | Indian Express Lokpal will create Big Brother for the CBI (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/ %E2%80%98lokpal-will-create-big-brother-cbi%E2%80%99-216) By Trinath Mishra | Deccan Chronicle A slap on Team Annas wrists by the Bombay HC. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/thereal-truth/entry/a-slap-on-team-anna-s-wrists-by-the-bombay-hc) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Now, passengers can file online rail complaints (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/allahabad/Now-passengers-can-file-online-railcomplaints/articleshow/11228831.cms) By Ashraf Jamal | TNN I-T searches unearthed Rs 18700 crore in last 2 years (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/IT-searches-unearthed-Rs-18700-crore-in-last-2-years/articleshow/11227233.cms) TNN Macaca 12-24-2011, 07:36 PM How Indias untouchable entrepreneurs use capital to fight caste (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-indias-untouchable-entrepreneurs-use-capitalto-fight-caste/article2282858/) By STEPHANIE NOLEN | The Globe and Mail When Prashant Tambe sought a loan to expand his private college last year, the bank didnt turn him down outright. It was just red-tape-ism, the young entrepreneur said, using a popular Indian expression for business death by a thousand bureaucratic hurdles. His brother, Avinash Tambe, had an identical experience seeking funds to build his coal import firm. They have no illusions about the source of the banks reluctance: It began when they wrote their surname on their loan applications. The name Tambe identifies them as Dalits the people once known as untouchables, at the bottom of the Hindu caste system. And so despite the fact that the brothers have eight postgraduate degrees and two successful businesses between them, they struggle to get access to capital and chafe at the opportunities they are missing. They recently had an opportunity to share that frustration, and to seek out new partners, at a firstever trade fair organized by the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Its a strange irony and it tells you a lot about the ground reality of India, Prashant Tambe mused as they set up their stall in a vast Mumbai exhibition hall its popular wisdom in the country today that the booming economy will end the influence of caste, but the best way they can find to be part of that economy is to join a caste-based business association. The Dalit business lobby, founded in 2005, has 1,000 members; 180 of them came from across the country to exhibit and network at the three-day fair. There were companies making solar-power systems, military uniforms, car parts, pharmaceuticals, pesticides and industrial piping; there were also small financial-service companies and construction firms. The DICCI slogan is fighting caste with capital. But many business owners at the fair said they share one key problem: They cant get their hands on that capital.

As the Tambes and others described, Dalit business owners struggle to obtain conventional bank loans. Sometimes its malice from dominant-caste bank employees who do not want to see a Dalit business succeed, said Prashant Tambe; other times its simply that the bankers doubt that a firstgeneration Dalit business owner will have the acumen to be a safe loan risk. Almost always, they lack collateral while Dalits are a sixth of Indias population, they control only an estimated 1 per cent of the countrys wealth. The vast bulk of the population continues to be landless labourers working for occasional daily wages of one or two dollars. And they have no access to the other key source of funding for Indian entrepreneurs; loans from extended family or their caste community internal funding, as its known here. The Tambes father was the kind of general labourer called a peon here and their mother was a nursing assistant with a primary-school education; the cousin who is a co-owner of the coal business is the son of a cycle rickshaw driver. They pushed their sons to seek education, but they had no funds to bankroll their good ideas. The Indian government has attempted to address the issue through a Dalit-focused national finance-development corporation, but it provides only small loans of up to $5,000 enough, as DICCI chairperson Milind Kamble put it, to buy a large photocopier and set a family up as a corner copy shop, but not enough to bankroll an entrepreneur whose ambitions stretch beyond that. Kaushal Vidyarthee, who is working on a doctoral dissertation on caste and capitalism at Oxford University, said that one government policy has made a difference, in cases exactly like the Tambes: affirmative-action quotas, or reservations as they are known here, which set aside 15 per cent of government jobs for Dalits. With even an entry-level position, the family is able slowly to salt away enough money to fund a small entry into business; those jobs, and reserved seats for Dalits in educational institutions, are behind every Dalit-owned business he has examined. Thats what Mr. Tambe found when he opened Imperial Mineral Resources Pty Ltd. in 2008 to import Australian coal to Indias hungry energy sector. Private power plants were owned by wealthy members of dominant castes and didnt want to deal with him, so he turned to government-owned plants. But even there, dominant caste people made up the senior staff. He pressed on 999 people will say no but one will say yes and I started getting more contracts because I deliver on time with less profit margin. The firm did just under $1-million in business this year and has nine employees. Mr. Kamble hoped the trade fair would help small entrepreneurs make helpful connections, but the main audience he was targeting was not Dalit: Indian society perceives Dalits only as takers, he said, who need ration cards and a dozen other government programs that without government support or affirmative action Dalits cannot walk a single step. People dont know that in the Dalit community people are running corporate houses and running multinationals. Mr. Kamble, the son of a schoolteacher, is an engineer; in the early 1990s, he collected 25,000 rupees (today worth $5,000) from friends to begin his own construction firm, now worth millions. But raising that early cash was a struggle, and there was no one in his community to advise or mentor him. Hoping to pave the way for other Dalit entrepreneurs, the DICCI is setting up a $100-million (U.S.) venture-capital fund, which Mr. Kamble said would be operational by mid-2012. The sector-agnostic fund will provide risk capital to DICCI-member businesses, both market entrants and those seeking to expand. Prasad Dahapute, who will manage the fund through a small investment-banking firm Varhad Capital, said that the Dalit business elite had been approached to provide the capital. The fund so far has two anchor partners: Ashok Khade, chief executive of the $1-billion Mumbai-based Das Offshore Engineering, who is the oft-cited business hero of many at the trade fair, and Rajesh Saraiya, who heads the $400-million British-based steel trading firm Steelmont Pvt. Ltd. Of the 180 businesses that are here, 160 of them need debt or equity capital now, Mr. Dahapute said. The businesses they fund will need to be Dalit-owned, but first and foremost good ideas, he said; the venture-capital model means that new entrepreneurs will get the assistance of experienced directors. Godrej or Tata have been in business for 100 years, but we have no business history, Mr. Kamble

mused, citing two of Indias biggest conglomerates. But we are trying. Now we are making parts for the [Tata] Nano our dream is that in 10 years we will make our own car.

Delhis Neglected Homeless (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/23/delhis-neglectedhomeless/) By Nikita Mehta | IndiaRealTime Where motive is profit, education takes a back seat (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/openpage/article2745141.ece) By HEMA RAMANATHAN & PARVATHY P. B. | The Hindu 20 Questions For 2012 (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279377) Outlook India Development Dominoes (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279399) By PRAGYA SINGH | Outlook India Top Business & Economic Events of 2011 (http://in.reuters.com/news/timeline? type=businessNews&tl=2011122405543135020) Reuters Macaca 12-24-2011, 07:45 PM The State Highway To Aoshi (http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279396) A grey homogenisation has not yet eclipsed our rainbow palates By PUSHPESH PANT | Outlook India In happier times, Kashmir used to attract a large number of tourists, and one recalls a row of crowded food stalls in the vicinity of Shalimar and Nagin Bag that used to cater to this clientele an array of delicaciesfrom idli-dosa to tandoori tikka. What was intriguing was, to sample local fare gushtaba or tabak maazone had to scout really hard. Not so long ago, we had a similar experience down south. Small eateries in Kanyakumari advertised their mouth-watering Gujarati and Rajasthani thalis. This is what we feel reflects the ltc syndrome. Wherever you go, the tyranny of the tandoor follows and most often, the regional cuisine that is dished out is mostly inedible, under the general impression that Indians arent adventurous and like to stick to their own food. What has happened in the past few decades isnt really the evolution of a pan-Indian taste; the pseudonational menu needs scrutiny and deeper sociological analysis. True, taboos are breaking and prohibitions and prescriptions have lost their power over the majority of young Indians, specially those living away from home in cities, but this should not blind us to the fact that there is growing interest in traditional recipes and ethnic (regional and sub-regional) foods. In this age of identity politics, how could it be otherwise? Laloo Prasad Yadavs daughter may contribute recipes for a biriyani in an upmarket rice cookbook, but father would never lose an opportunity to flaunt his favourite chokha-litti. Doctors have tried their best to scare the daylights out of their clients, but this has not brought about any significant reduction in consumption of poorisubzi or kachori-jalebi in in the Hindi heartland and Rajasthan. Many companies, Indian and multinational, are striving to persuade us to choose healthier options for breakfast and snacking; almost all are flattering the Indian palate by imitating the time-tested indigenous stuff. But lets not give you the impression that the swadeshi banner is fluttering high, proclaiming a decisive victory over alien invaders. The talk that the tandoori murgh will make Kentucky Fried Chicken scram may have boosted Indian egos for a while, but as any objective person can testify, the all-American favourite has made steady inroads into our markets. The pizza toppings too have similarly stooped only to conquer in the long run. Paneer, aloo tikki bits, seekh kabab slices and curried chicken may sound delightfully desi but their treatment makes them phoren. Slowly but surely, those who frequent these fast food joints begin to forget the taste of the original dish. Collective amnesia in matters culinary can have disastrous consequences for a people. In the absence of shared benchmarks by the community, elegant recipes become a pale shadow of their classic selves. How can the counterfeit work magic? It is grossly unfair to blame others for our weaknesses. Our so-called master chefs of the heritage and other hyped varieties arent serving the cause of Indian food well either. Some, employed by five-star deluxe hotels, believe that only Frenchifying Indian food can help them gain status in the kitchen and favour with their patrons; others mindlessly ape the molecular pioneers in the west and hope they will be lauded for an adventurous spirit, if not for authenticity. Worst of the biradari are those who look down on their paying customers and consider them unworthy of the sublime fare their ancestors served to the nawabs and maharajas of yore. The lament is commonly heard in

places like Lucknow and Hyderabad, Ab kisey hai tameez khane ki? Kahan hain waise shaukeen? They cast a spell with this patter that is hard to break. Few muster up the courage to find faults with rank bad cookinga burnt-out or a raw burra. The same applies to a galoutimelt-in-the-mouth it may be, but utterly tastelessand a biriyani that is long on colour but very short on aroma and flavour. What lays claims to the Grand Mogul legacy is in fact Turko-Afghan, mediated by Punjabi food, blending the lowest common denominator of all three strands. This, alas, is confused by the natives and the foreigners alike, with the Taste of India. We have already let many a qorma and salan with a distinct character become extinct. Ditto for kabab. Boti kabab, dora kabab are seldom encountered in the public domain in their birthplace. The real tragedy is that many labour-intensive, time-consuming recipes in the regional repertoire have also disappeared due to the break-up of the joint family system and because well-trained domestic helps are hard to come by. We have been so completely swept off our feet by clever advertising that we seldom pause to ponder that, what is alleged to be prohibitively expensive is in fact used in minuscule, affordable quantities. Whatever the master chefs may state, great taste isnt created by exotic ingredients alone. The joys of the plebeian and the seasonal are many and their temptations no less alluring than recipes with a mystique. Whats heartening is that the young have started asking questions. They are insisting on value for money. Our only regret is that some are distracted by the size of the portions, while others are bought off with a little pampering of their egos. They are recognised as they enter and encouraged to order pompously by the stewards and restaurant manager. It is hard to resist the temptation to impress fellow guests. Remember, all restaurants have to change menus periodically, not only to provide novelty and weed out slow-moving items, but also to justify an increase in prices. The names change, but its the same old wine turned to vinegar in new bottles. Perhaps it needs to be emphasised that in gastronomic matters, the well-travelled and well-heeled Indian today is far more discriminating when the cuisine in question is European, Chinese, Japanese, Arab or Mediterranean. The dazzling diversity of Indian inheritance remains to be discovered. Some may have had a taste of Chettinad, Suriyani, Malvani, but for the multitude these words remain geographical indicatorsa rough guide to navigate the florid, overwritten food festival menus. Another problem with food festivals is that they keep unveiling and showcasing the same old gems every time. The diners remain strangers to the delightful staples and refreshingly different common dishes. The diversity is annihilated as the cliched stars steal the show again and again. This isnt meant to be a nostalgic lament. However, it would render us vulnerable to the charge of being economical with truth if candour was eschewed. We are firm believers that our cuisinefor that matter of any peoplecan only flourish if it enjoys a respect in family kitchens. No amount of designer dining, resuscitating fusion or cutting-edge science can bring back to life something that is dead. Recipes, like our costumes and idioms, are not akin to bespoke tailoring, which can be part of the life of the elite. If the corner grocery shop stops stocking required ingredients because there are no buyers, then no life-support system can work. Our major concern is that Indians who are willing to pay the proverbial top dollar for Norwegian salmon, New Zealand lamb or imported cheeses, chocolates and wines think that they are being ripped off if a scarce ingredient used in Indian cookingnorthern or southernis involved. People may visit Khari Baoli in the capital for a larkit is arguably the largest such market in the worldbut general awareness of Indian spices and other ingredients is eroding dangerously fast. We have nothing against labour-saving gadgets and pre-processed packaged ingredients if the quality is assured. The Indian market is replete with such riches that make working in the kitchen a joy. Across the land, housewives and single male cooks have benefited from this bounty. Coconut milk comes in cartons and ginger-garlic pastes without preservatives and additives are a boon. Advances in food processing, packaging and refrigeration have brought to the common mans table what was earlier the privilege of the rich. But we are constrained to shake our head in despair when dehydrated vegetables or those picked from the cold storage are routinely used and then people complain about insipid food! We buy on trust on the basis of claims made by packers that the basmati is from Dehradun (where hardly any paddy fields survive!). You can, with little effort, multiply illustrations to prove the point that few care for the purity and intrinsic quality of the ingredients. Macaca 12-24-2011, 07:53 PM

There is another interesting trend that is discernible. Restless people in search of their roots are not content to identify with just a geographical region, be it Kashmir or Kerala, the coastal belt or the heartland. They wish to know, What did grandma cook? Was it Bunt, Mappila, Suriyani, Malvani or Kathiawari, or Sambali Rohilkhandi fare? The variety of tribal repast is just being discoveredfrom the Northeast to the heartland. There is greater awareness about the riches of povertymillets and other coarse grains and plebeian vegetables. How all this will make an impact on the culinary mainstream is hard to tell. The times, as the old song goes, are changing. The Indian foodscape cant remain unaffected. But few can guess where the blowing winds will take us. Pushpesh Pant, A former professor at JNU, the writer is the author of India Cook Book and Gourmet Journeys in India The Aromas of India (http://www.outlookindia.com/content10824.asp#The Aromas of India) Outlook India Indian Flavors: Daniel Bouluds Quail with Garam Masala (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/indian-flavors-daniel-bouluds-quail-with-garammasala/) By SHIVANI VORA | India Ink Smartphones being tested as means to cut down on attacks on women (http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/smartphones-being-tested-as-means-tocut-down-on-attacks-on-women) By Suryatapa Bhattacharya | The National The Other Half - You too Mumbai? (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Kalpana_Sharma/article2744437.ece) By KALPANA SHARMA | The Hindu Christmas, the Anglo-Indian way (http://www.thehindu.com/arts/magazine/article2744484.ece) By HUGH & COLLEEN GANTZER | The Hindu Macaca 12-24-2011, 07:59 PM Failing states and their destinies (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Globespotting/entry/failing-states-and-their-destinies) By Indrani Bagchi | Times of India This week the world watched, agape, as North Koreans wept hysterically after the loss of their Dear Leader, Kim Jong il, who died in his favourite train, of "great physical and mental strain". The cameras of the official news agency rolled relentlessly as average North Koreans emptied their tear glands in a national outpouring of loud emotion, that apparently engulfed generals and commoners alike. Are they for real? You wondered if this was a nation of Stepford wives. You couldn't help noticing that the wailing was louder when the camera focused on them. Even prime minister Manmohan Singh was moved by the spectacle. His condolence message hoped the North Koreans "will overcome their grief with courage and fortitude." Next year, the same news agency will focus on North Koreans celebrating the centenary of the birth of their Great Leader, Kim il Sung - with equal happiness and exultation, no doubt. Meanwhile, the Great Successor, Kim Jong Un, is young, untested and hasn't had the benefit of his father's guidance for more than a couple of years, much of which the older Kim spent recuperating from a stroke. Thus, the first reports that the young Kim might opt for a collaborative rule, or "collective leadership" was expected - with his aunt and uncle Jang Song Taek and the all-powerful military, as intersecting power centres. Its always difficult to guess what's going on inside that reclusive country (why, for instance, is the only outsider so far invited to Kim Jong Il's funeral a Japanese magician?) but Kim Jong Un's older brothers could hardly be human if they did not consider playing some sort of a spoiler game. The Korean army reportedly doesn't care much for the young Un, who hadn't served in the military before becoming a four-star general. The army which is the most powerful institution is likely to control the reins of power, which could add to North Korea's complications. All this when this isolated northeast Asian state is in the midst of a nuclear crisis, diplomatic standowith its twin, South Korea, and lousy relations with Japan and US. North Korea is nuclear armed, weak and dangerous. Sounds familiar? In our own region, Pakistan is going through its own crisis, stoking fears that yet

another military coup may be at hand. Amemogate crisis that became much big than it should have, is now proving to be the undoing of a civilian government that was weak to start out. The army, as powerful in Pakistan as in North Korea appears to be intent onpushing things to the brink. President Adif Zardari had to rush to Dubaiafter rumours abounded of a coup against him. Pakistan's ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, is in hot water for apparently conspiring against the army/ISI combine. A third case is being made out against the ISI chief Shuja Pasha for working against the civilian government. The army in Pakistan may have been technically out of government but there was no doubt who holds the real power in Pakistan. A series of crises throughout this year has had a deleterious effect on the army itself - the worst being that Osama bin Laden was killed by US Navy Seals in Abbottabad, hitting distance away from Pakistan's elite military academy. A subsequent attack on the Mehran naval base by Al Qaeda-Taliban and therecent Mohmand attack by the NATO forces have severely dented the army, not to speak of the fact that its spy agency, ISI, is a heartbeat away from being declared a rogue all by itself. The economy is in shambles, Taliban and other terrorist groups are running tame, Pakistan's relations with the US is on the skids.... The army is back to being convinced it has toreturn to power. There are alarming similarities between North Korea and Pakistan. Both countries are at an inflexion point in their history. North Korea could take a different path from Kim Jong Il and make a deal with the international community for a better life for its citizens. Just as Pakistan's army could let the civilian government rule the country, foreign policy and economy. Not a chance. Both North Korea and Pakistan figure their best chance at survival is by capitalising on their dangerousness. both countries are now masters of dealing with the world with a gun held to their own heads. All eyes will now be on China. Pakistan and North Korea have been favoured protectorates of Beijing, two neighbours both with equal ability to make things difficult for Beijing. This uncertainty in their periphery comes at a time when Beiijing is itself in the throes of a crucial leadership transition in 2012 and some unnecessary social unrest. China's new leadership status in Asia is about to be tested. Will China be able to help resolve existential crises in North Korea and Pakistan?

Not just NKorea, political dynasties are all over (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_KIM_JONG_IL_ALL_IN_THE_FAMILY? SITE=NHPOR&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) By RAVI NESSMAN | Associated Press Macaca 12-24-2011, 08:07 PM Why is the army so popular in Pakistan? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/311424/why-is-the-army-sopopular-in-pakistan/) By Aakar Patel | The Express Tribune Earlier this month, journalist Najam Sethi sketched his thesis on why the army dominated Pakistan. He explained it in historical and cultural terms. He cited Jinnahs aggregation of power, the Muslim Leagues unconstitutional approach (referring to the violence of Direct Action Day) in getting what it wanted, the armys cultural connections with rural society and so on. He showed also how, correspondingly, in India the situation was different, because its leaders had always been constitutionally minded. The Congress Party had a democratic history going back to 1885 and Nehru represented its third generation of leaders. Sethi convincingly showed why the army was dominant in Pakistan. However, his thesis does not account for its popularity. A Pew poll reported by Reuters a few months ago said the army was overwhelmingly popular in Pakistan. It said 79 per cent of Pakistanis thought their army had a good influence on the country. The poll was taken after Bin Ladens killing to see if the army had suffered in popularity. It hadnt. This devotion to their army is obvious to those who follow Pakistans media. The Urdu media especially, but also much of the English media. The army is more popular in Pakistan than the countrys political parties and its elected leaders. The question is why. Why is an army that imposed dictatorship on Pakistanis four times (1958, 1969, 1978 and 1999), displaced governments Pakistanis elected another three times (1990, 1993,

1996) and hanged a prime minister still popular? Why do Pakistanis love the ISI, an institution whose former chief Lt-General Asad Durrani (a fellow columnist for this newspaper) says on oath that it meddles in elections and spent $ 1.6 million to see the PPP defeated? Why do Pakistanis hold their politicians responsible for the nations problems when Pakistans budget, its foreign policy, its security policy and its Balochistan policy are run by the army? Why do Pakistanis like an army whose chiefs arbitrarily grant themselves extensions (since 1947, India has had 26 army chiefs, while Pakistan has had only 14) because they can? Is the army popular because it is excellent at its function that of defending Pakistan? But the record there is rather thin. So is it popular because of a threat? Whose aggression is the army defending Pakistan against? The Pew poll said only 19 per cent of Pakistanis thought the enemy was internal the Pakistani Taliban. India is the enemy according 57 per cent of those polled. The poll found that 74 per cent of Pakistanis think India is a serious threat. What could the nature of threat from India be? The last war was fought in 1999 and would not have been fought had it not been begun by an unthinking general. Do Pakistanis actually believe Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi represent a military threat? This seems difficult to wrap ones head around. Do Pakistanis they hate India so much that they want the army to defy it? Only 14 per cent of Pakistanis have a positive view of India, which is half from the third that had a positive view in 2006. The poll said 92 per cent of Pakistanis thought their nation was in the wrong direction. But how could it be otherwise? The army has power but pretends to be subordinate to the PPP. The PPP pretends to be in charge, but actually has no real control over the budget, no say in foreign policy, no freedom to trade with India, no power to improve relations with America. Pakistan has lost its finest diplomat in the process. The last time a majority of Pakistanis felt their country was headed in the right direction was under Musharraf in 2005. The fault does not lie with the stars and it does not lie with the army which is only doing what is asked of it by its citizenry. The fault that Pakistan is a nation ruled by its army is that of the Pakistanis. The armys real power comes not from its guns, but its popularity. Next week we shall look at an unexplored explanation for this.

Two suspected Babbar Khalsa terrorists arrested (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/twosuspected-babbar-khalsa-terrorists-arrested/20111223.htm) Press Trust Of India NIA chargesheet may not be enough to nail 26/11 perpetrators (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/nia-chargesheet-may-not-be-enough-to-nail-26-11perpetrators/20111223.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff 26/11: What NIA chargeetsheet on Headley, 8 others reveals (http://www.rediff.com/news/slideshow/slide-show-1-nia-chargesheets-headley-8-others/20111224.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Modest but promising (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/modest-but-promising/891028/) Indian Express Editorial Macaca 12-24-2011, 08:17 PM Former Pakistan Army Chief Reveals Intelligence Bureau Harbored Bin Laden in Abbottabad (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38819&tx_ttnews %5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=73bd38ddec29c3a2860a5e6a3c9fde50) By Arif Jamal | The Jamestown Foundation In spite of denials by the Pakistani military, evidence is emerging that elements within the Pakistani military harbored Osama bin Laden with the knowledge of former army chief General Pervez Musharraf and possibly current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Former Pakistani Army Chief General Ziauddin Butt (a.k.a. General Ziauddin Khawaja) revealed at a

conference on Pakistani-U.S. relations in October 2011 that according to his knowledge the then former Director-General of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan (2004 2008), Brigadier Ijaz Shah (Retd.), had kept Osama bin Laden in an Intelligence Bureau safe house in Abbottabad. In the same address, he revealed that the ISI had helped the CIA to track him down and kill on May 1. The revelation remained unreported for some time because some intelligence officers had asked journalists to refrain from publishing General Butts remarks. [1] No mention of the charges appeared until right-wing columnist Altaf Hassan Qureshi referred to them in an Urdu-language article that appeared on December 8. [2] In a subsequent and revealing Urdu-language interview with TV channel Dawn News, General Butt repeated the allegation on December 11, saying he fully believed that [Brigadier] Ijaz Shah had kept this man [Bin Laden in the Abbottabad compound] with the full knowledge of General Pervez Musharraf Ijaz Shah was an all-powerful official in the government of General Musharraf. [3] Asked whether General Kayani knew of this, he first said yes, but later reconsidered: [Kayani] may have known I do not know he might not have known. [4] The generals remarks appeared to confirm investigations by this author in May 2011 that showed that the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was captured and killed was being used by a Pakistani intelligence agency (see Terrorism Monitor, May 5). However, General Butt failed to explain why Bin Laden was not discovered even after Brigadier Shah and General Musharraf had left the government. General Butt was the first head of the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan army and the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1990 to 1993, and again from 1997 to 1999. Sharif promoted General Ziauddin Butt to COAS after forcibly retiring General Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999, but the armys top brass revolted against the decision and arrested both Prime Minister Sharif and General Butt while installing Musharraf as the nations new chief executive, a post he kept as a chief U.S. ally until resigning in 2008 in the face of an impending impeachment procedure. Brigadier Shah has been known or is alleged to have been involved in several high profile cases of terrorism. The Brigadier was heading the ISI bureau in Lahore when General Musharraf overthrew Prime Minister Sharif in October 1999. Later, General Musharraf appointed Shah as Home Secretary in Punjab. As an ISI officer he was also the handler for Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was involved in the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. [5] Omar Saeed Sheikh surrendered to Brigadier Shah who hid him for several weeks before turning him over to authorities. In February 2004, Musharraf appointed Shah as the new Director of the Intelligence Bureau, a post he kept until March 2008 (Daily Times [Lahore] February 26, 2004; Dawn [Karachi] March 18, 2008). The late Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto accused Brigadier Shah, among others, of hatching a conspiracy to assassinate her (The Friday Times [Lahore], February 18-24). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistani top military brass had serious differences on several issues. One of the most serious of these concerned Pakistans relations with Osama bin Laden. However, the disastrous 1999 Kargil conflict in Kashmir overshadowed all of these. General Butt says that Prime Minister Sharif had decided to cooperate with the United States and track down Bin Laden in 1999. [6] According to a senior adviser to the Prime Minister, the general staff ousted Sharif to scuttle the get-Osama plan, among other reasons: The evidence is that the military regime abandoned that plan. [7] General Butt corroborates this. In his latest interview, he says that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had constituted a special task force of 90 American-trained commandos to track down Bin Laden in Afghanistan. If the Sharif government had continued on this course, this force would likely have caught Bin Laden by December 2001, but the plan was aborted by Ziauddin Butts successor as ISI general director, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed. [8] Arif Jamal is an independent security and terrorism expert and author of Shadow War The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. Notes: 1. Authors telephone interview with an Islamabad journalist who requested anonymity, November 16, 2011. 2. Altaf Hassan Qureshi, Resetting Pak-U.S. relations (http://e.jang.com.pk/pic.asp?npic=12-082011/Pindi/images/06_08.gif) (in Urdu), Jang [Rawalpindi], December 8, 2011.

3. See Government Army - America (http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=b4bYHC2_ito&feature=youtu.be) on Dawn News 11the Dec 2011 part 2 . 4. Ibid 5. Authors interview with a security officer who requested anonymity, Islamabad, May 2000. 6. Government Army - America (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4WLtaxxPPw) on Dawn News December 11, 2011, part 1. 7. Authors interview with a former government minister who requested anonymity, Rawalpindi, February 2006. 8. Government Army - America (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4WLtaxxPPw) on Dawn News December 11, 2011, part 1 .

Musharraf, Kayani knew Osama's whereabouts: Pak's ex-army chief (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Musharraf-Kayani-knew-Osamas-whereabouts-Paksex-army-chief/articleshow/11231991.cms) Press Trust Of India Macaca 12-24-2011, 08:22 PM America and Pakistan Sorry story (http://www.economist.com/blogs/clausewitz/2011/12/america-and-pakistan) The Economist WHEN the news came through on November 26th that up to 24 Pakistani soldiers had been killed in a cross-border incident involving American and Afghan forces, your correspondent was at ISAF HQ in Kabul preparing to interview General John Allen, the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan. The mood at ISAF was one of deep shock combined with a sense of foreboding. The timing was awful. General Allen had only just returned from a visit to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of Pakistans army general staff, in a bid to improve relations that were already under the severest strain. As well as closing the land corridor that provides ISAF with up to half of its supplies, Pakistan announced that it would boycott the following weeks international conference in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan. The only (grim) smiles were caused by a reporter from a German news magazine who took a German general at ISAF to task for what he seemed to think was a deliberate attempt by America to sabotage his countrys hosting of a successful conference. Although the official line was to offer Pakistan condolences for the loss of life and to wait for the results of an official investigation before saying anything more, it was clear that there had been a major screw up. It wasnt just the lethality of what had occurred on the eastern border that was troublingalthough it was the worst such friendly fire incident involving Pakistani forces in the ten years of the warbut the realisation that the air strikes had continued unabated for up to two hours. The release on December 22nd of the findings of the investigation largely bears out Pakistans version of events. After coming under fire from the Mohmand tribal region on the other side of the border, the American and Afghan commandos called in air strikes, apparently confident that there were no Pakistani forces in the areas and that the strikes would be hitting insurgents. That was wrong. The mistake was further compounded when the Pakistani border control centre was given incorrect data about where the fighting was taking place. Whether either General Allen or Americas defence secretary, Leon Panetta, will now issue the apology the Pakistanis have demanded is not yet certain. There is a precedent: Mr Panettas predecessor, Robert Gates, apologised in 2010 after a similar incident. Underlying the whole sorry story is the corrosive lack of trust between ISAF and Pakistan. ISAF is reluctant to tell Pakistani border forces precisely when and where it is carrying out operations against insurgents because it believes (with some justification) that the Taliban and their allies have in the past been tipped off by the Pakistanis when raids have been imminent. For their part, the insurgents often try to provoke incidents by launching attacks from positions near Pakistani troop positions. From Pakistans point of view, its border guards, poorly-equipped and with little situational awareness, are innocent victims caught in the crossfire. The problem is only likely to get worse. After the security gains of the past 18 months in the south and west, particularly in Helmand

and Kandahar provinces, the main focus of next years fighting is likely to be in the still very violent east of Afghanistan, which borders the Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan (where the formidable Haqqanis are based) and other lawless territories to the north. Unless ISAF and the Pakistanis can find a way of working better together, the potential for further bloody and politically destructive accidents will grow.

No apology (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/24/no-apology.html) Dawn Editorial China offers goodies to Pakistan, urges world powers not to abandon it (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-offers-goodies-to-Pakistan-urges-worldpowers-not-to-abandon-it/articleshow/11233118.cms) By Saibal Dasgupta | TNN Macaca 12-24-2011, 08:45 PM In Pakistan, history may not even rhyme, let alone repeat (http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2011/12/24/in-pakistan-history-may-not-even-rhyme-let-alonerepeat/) By Myra MacDonald | Reuters In his book, Between Mosque and Military, Pakistans former ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani wrote of how military coups in the past were carefully planned, yet carried out in such a way as to give the appearance of being a spontaneous reaction to an emergency. The Pakistan military always insists on an immediate provocation as the trigger of its coups, wrote Haqqani, who was forced to quit last month after being accused of involvement in a memo seeking American help to rein in the army, an allegation he denies. The armys ability to swiftly execute a military takeover within hours of a supposed provocation is often attributed to its having contingency plans for such occasions. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals a pattern of careful prior planning, including disorder in the streets orchestrated with the help of the reliable street power of Islamist political parties. No one in Pakistan is expecting an outright military takeover the army has specifically denied it. But that ghost of coups past is haunting Pakistan in its latest political crisis, one which could ultimately force out the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government of President Asif Ali Zardari. First of all, the signs pointing towards a civilian-military confrontation have been there for months before the scandal over the alleged memo. The U.S. humiliation of the Pakistan Army in the May 2 raid which killed Osama bin Laden, and subsequent attempt to corner it over its alleged support for Afghan militants, put the militarys back against the wall in a way not seen its disastrous Kargil war of 1999. That conflict led to the ouster of then prime minister Nawaz Sharif in a military coup. Secondly. the economy is in a mess, governance has ground to a halt, and the politicians are bickering, just as they did in the 1990s. To a military mind, that is no way to run a country, and especially not a country which the army the ultimate arbiter of national security sometimes finds hard to distinguish from itself. And thirdly, the army has had plenty of time to make careful preparations, if indeed it were to choose to move against the government. Its grumbling against Zardari and his alleged corruption has been an open secret for years rising most noticeably to the surface after the president left the country to visit France and Britain during the devastating floods in the summer of 2010. It was around that time that cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan was first cited as an alternative. Here was a man untainted by corruption allegations, whose views broadly match those of the army, and who might be groomed by what Pakistanis call the establishment to rise from his position as a virtual nonentity in politics to become strong enough to challenge the existing political parties. Though he denies taking support from the armys Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Imran Khans Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) is now on the rise. It plans a big Christmas Day rally in Karachi after bringing out tens of thousands in support in Lahore, the capital of Punjab, in October. (At the crudest formulation of Pakistans conspiracy theories, the military aided by the judiciary would drive the PPP-led government out of office, force elections earlier than the currently scheduled 2013, and install their own man at the head of government.)

Then to complete the parallels with the 1990s, the Islamist parties including the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the humanitarian wing of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba have been out in force, holding in Lahore this month what the Express Tribune called the biggest Wahhabi-Deobandi gathering seen in a long while. Yet for all the many parallels with the 1990s, history does not repeat itself. Even even the adage that history does not repeat itself but it does rhyme does not necessarily apply. In Pakistan, it jars. This is not the 1990s, when then army head General Pervez Musharraf could launch a military coup in 1999 and keep the Punjabi urban middle classes who dominate Pakistans political discourse sweet with economic growth. Now, in the midst of a global economic crisis and with regional security threatened by the Afghan war, any new government installed through forced early elections would quickly become unpopular through its inability to deliver. So why rush at it, when the PPP-led government is currently taking all of the heat for Pakistans many problems? Or as columnist Ejaz Haider wrote in reference both to the so-called Memogate scandal and Imran Khans argument that his political party is gaining the force of a tsunami, Lets also assume the army manages to get rid of the current government by acting as a force-multiplier in combination with sections of the media, the judiciary and the political tsunami thats about to engulf Pakistan. Would the structural problems that keep begetting us these crises disappear? The answer to these and many more questions is a big no. Unlike the 1990s, Pakistans chaotic media is far more outspoken now. Nobody can claim they dont know what may be happening behind the scenes. The army has been forced to issue two public statements about its intentions - first denying allegations that ISI chief Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha sought support from Gulf Arab leaders to launch a coup after bin Laden was killed, and then stating that it is not planning to take over. Every word of those statements is parsed and debated on Twitter within hours, or even minutes, of their release. And while the Urdu-language media is accused of supporting the military, the English-language newspapers have been forthright in their insistence that the democratic process must be respected, whatever their views of the government and president currently in office. The army has to remember this: a real patriot is the fellow who gets a parking ticket and rejoices that the system works, wrote Mehreen Zahra-Malik in The News. Back off boys! Meanwhile, pause to consider the internal situation of the army itself. For all that it remains a professional and disciplined army, that has not stopped mururs of discontent about a decision to award an extension to army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in his term of office to 2013. Whatever course of action he takes, he must balance the need to keep troop morale high (in the face of criticism both domestically and from the United States) while allaying any suspicions among those seeking to rise up the ranks that he might be tempted to dig in beyond 2013. Nearer term, are questions over the future of the Director-General of the ISI (DG-ISI), Pasha, whose extension to his own term of office expires in March. The military itself isnt without its own set of contradictions, wrote Najam Sethi in The Friday Times. The COAS (Kayani) and DG-ISI are both on extensions that remain the subject of disapproval within the rank and file. On top of that, both generals have been found wanting in defending the sovereignty of their own military spaces from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as well as those of the country from the Americans. As if all that is not complicated enough, the very structure of Pakistani society does not lend itself to simple solutions. The ethnic diversity which prompted Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, to pull away violently in a civil war in 1971, continues to plague the country with Baluch, Pashtun, Sindhis and even the Seraikis of southern Punjab resenting the traditional dominance of Pakistans northern Punjab heartland. On top of that, the tensions over the balance of power between urban versus rural populations which were settled in 19th century Europe by industrialisation and urbanisation have yet to be resolved in South Asia an oft-0verlooked dynamic true of both India and Pakistan. With the voter majority still in the countryside, no political party can easily escape the need to build up feudal

patronage networks, usually financed by corruption, in order to win enough seats in parliament. (As writer and columnist Ayesha Siddiqa has discussed in detail, the urban middle classes in Pakistan should not be confused with those who forced through progressive policies in 19th century Europe having grown rich during past periods of military rule, they tend to be more conservative and more inclined to sympathise with Islamists. For a historical view of how tensions between urban and rural voters, and between provincial demands and centralising authority, play out in the civilian-military imbalance in Pakistan, read Nadeem Paracha at Dawn.) Macaca 12-24-2011, 08:47 PM So given all these complications, how do the various players respond? The army, logically, should bide its time. In its defence, it says it wants a civilian government which can deliver the kind of governance it believes Pakistan needs: efficient, free of corruption and able to provide the economic growth that would make the country strong. (Kayani has been clear that one of the biggest threats to Pakistan comes from its weak economy.) But it has had a tendency in the past to behave tactically rather than strategically (the Kargil war being a case in point) so it remains unclear whether it has the patience to wait it out for the right conditions. Imran Khan is in a hurry rather like the tsunami he speaks of. He needs to capitalise on his rising support to strike reasonably soon through early elections.Waiting longer to build his political base, as some have suggested, would expose him to charges that his PTI is becoming more and more like any other party, as it collects new members who have built their political support the old way through the kind of feudal patronage that once characterised the rotten boroughs of English 19th century parliamentary democracy. The main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif, is pushing for early elections in the hope that it could still win before Imran Khans tsunami hits land. Yet at the same time, Sharif having been deposed in the 1999 coup- is deeply wary of the military. And the army is deeply wary of him he has until recently been more outspoken than the PPP in his criticism of the military, and has also challenged it with his calls for peace with India. The PPP is, if anything, in an even more peculiar quandary. Until the latest crisis, it looked set to lead the first democratically elected government in Pakistan to complete its term of office and hand over to another democratically elected government a badge it wore with a mix of grim honour and expedient compromise. Yet Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilanis decision this week to stand up to the army after years of trying to accommodate it has some asking whether he already senses the end is near. Go down fighting, according to this view, then the PPP can still claim the mantle of the martyr and recover to fight another day. This is, as columnist Cyril Almeida suggested in Dawn, is a no-win situation for Pakistan: Could this all be a Mexican standoff, where everyone in the circle has a gun to the next persons head, too afraid to pull the trigger but too scared to lower their weapon? If thats the case, a negotiated settlement could be reached and the country could limp towards the Senate elections (in March). But as the threats and shouts intensify, as fear and anxiety grow and panic begins to take hold, someone could prematurely pull the trigger. Who survives that bloodbath will only be known after the dust settles. The long view? Nobody knows what will happen. If the atmosphere in Pakistan is particularly feverish right now, that is less because people are expecting something to happen immediately in a rerun the 1990s, and more because it has become such a pressure cooker that only the very reckless would predict the outcome. In such a scenario, it might perhaps be best for other countries to pay attention to the do not disturb sign on the door.

Pakistan Army is back from the barracks (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1pakistan-army-is-back-so-india-needs-to-be-on-alert/20111224.htm) By B Raman | Rediff Memogate and the media (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/24/memogate-and-the-media.html) By Irfan Husain | Dawn Macaca

12-24-2011, 08:56 PM Thick muck (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/23/thick-muck.html) By Nadeem F. Paracha | Dawn The parameters and paranoia of the bygone Cold War just refuses to evaporate from the psyche of Pakistans military-establishment. That war might have folded with the folding up of the Soviet Union in 1991, but it seems Pakistans military-establishment is still largely stuck (albeit willingly) in the thick muck that this war threw up in this region in the 1980s. One can understand why. This establishment and its natural allies, such as the religious parties, the more militant expressions of political Islam and some upwardly mobile conservative outfits have for years ignored a number factors that facilitated the anti-Soviet forces to defeat the former communist empire on the battlefields of Afghanistan, sticking instead to a narrative that puts the Pakistani establishment and its allies at the center of the universe that undid the power of the Soviets. Of course, all the major reasons behind the Soviets defeat such as massive American financial and military aid to Pakistan and to the anti-Soviet Islamist groups, as well as the Soviet Unions own rapidly disintegrating economic system are conveniently bypassed and thus, one can still hear former military men, ex-ISI chiefs and members of various Islamic parties claiming how it was jihad alone that decimated a superpower. With almost all the wars that it fought with India going in the favour of the enemy, one can understand the need within the military-establishment to hold onto the many myths of the Afghan jihad. A jihad in which this establishment and its religious allies get goose bumps from a projected memory: i.e. of them being the brave figurative heroes on horsebacks vanquishing the forces of kufar (infidelity) instead of merely being the well-paid intermediaries and suppliers between Ronald Regans anti-Soviet neo-conservatives, the American CIA and Afghan Islamist guerrillas. It is these memories, constructed from some genuine exhibition of gallantry of the Afghan guerrillas, but filtering out the cynical fattening and baseness that the Pakistani militaryestablishment enjoyed from US handouts and support during the jihad, that the military wants to jealously guard. Haunted by its defeats at the hands of the Indians and the humiliation that followed, it found itself bestowed by a new-found prestige and political and economic enrichment during the Afghan jihad and the Ziaul Haq dictatorship; a fact and piece of luck the military-establishment was now willing to protect at any cost. In this it feared civilian set-ups the most. It still does. Announcing itself as the most competent and natural guardians of national interest, it continued to place its artillery on the Indo-Pak borders, but after the Afghan jihad, it became more-than-interested in what takes place in Afghanistan as well. But, of course, the economic and political perks and privileges that it now enjoyed within the country, also saw it being equally busy keeping an eye on civilian political set-ups that might threaten these perks. Topping the establishments list in this respect was Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). To the military the PPP was a remnant of civilian authoritarianism that could (through the populist vote) begin to undermine the militarys post-Zia upsurge and economic interests. By the 1980s these economic interests had also become strategically and ideologically tied to those of the industrialists and the traders (especially in the Punjab). So there is no surprise in the fact that the establishment decided to construct a right-wing anti-PPP alliance of conservative parties (led by an industrialist-turned-politician), Nawaz Shaif, and religious parties, many of whom had been the militarys partners in the US-Saudi-funded Afghan jihad. These too had benefited handsomely from all the dollars, riyals and weapons that had poured in during the war. Just before Benazirs first government was left packing for corruption, but more so for

undermining the militarys self-imposed and galvanized role as sole foreign and defense policy experts and guardians of national interest intelligence agencies, industrialists and sections of the press had gotten together to help fund the publishing of a series of press ads in national dailies against the corruption of the PPP regime. But then the establishment committed a mistake that it is yet to learn from, proving that it might fancy itself as being a clever political institution as well, but, really, its understanding of populist politics is as astute as that of a drawing-room strategists. Buy facilitating Nawaz Sharifs pro-military and pro-business (thus pro-Islam) Islami Jamhoori Itehad (IJI) come to power, the military-establishment did not (and still cant) grasp the fact that once a leader and a party starts engaging with the politics of votes and populist fanfare, he or she is bound to attempt to create constituencies through policies that, in spite of being even slightly propeoples or awami, are likely to go against the economic interests of a rich military. Of course, thats a very corrupt thing to do. Not that civilian regimes have been clean, far from it; but what goes missing in the great debate about corruption in Pakistan is the fact that corruption had been institutionalized not during civilian set-ups, but mostly during military dictatorships. One glance across economist Mehboobul Haqs report about the 22 richest families during the Ayub dictatorship (in the 1960s), or Ayesha Siddquas Military Inc. (2006) or even the racy Waiting for Allah by Chistina Lamb (1988), can easily confirm that as military dictatorships championed cleansing social and cultural ills and turn Pakistan into a military powerhouse and bastion of Islam, the trade-off in this context has always been the institutionalization of corruption within the armed forces, as well as among those willing to support dictatorships, and eventually across almost all sections of the society. Every time a civilian government has had to come in after a long military dictatorship, it has had to confront and address a long legacy of corruption, a severely dented political system and the resultant cynical, amoral social currents left behind the military regimes. Then there is the media, parts of which have always happily compromised with the benefits that come along by toeing the establishmentarian line that associates the establishments narrative of honor, faith and national interest (i.e. political influence, empty sloganeering and meddling in the ways of civilian regimes) with stability, economic growth and middle-class interests. The establishments gambit to put their own man in the shape of Nawaz Sharif as the leader of an elected parliament had to backfire. The backbone of Sharifs power (in electoral politics) was bound to become the electorate, the same men and women on the streets that the military does not trust but is willing to instill in them an awe-struck passion and love for the armed forces. This is a dichotomy the military just cant seem to break free from. With a baggage and legacy of corruption and the issuance of draconian policies and laws of military dictatorships, the militaryestablishment sounds rather contradictory when exhibiting concern over a civilian governments economic and political performance. But perhaps grudgingly willing to concede the fact that an all-out military take-over is no more an option (perhaps the only post-Cold War reality it is aware of), the establishment has gone on to repeat the Ayub Khan formula of creating the military-establishments own civilian expressions by propping up parties. Muslim League (Convention) during Ayub; Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an alliance funded by industrialists but many of whose members were co-opted by the Zia dictatorship; Pakistan Muslim League formed by Zia; the IJI, formed by the ISI and remnants of the Zia era; the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), formed by General Parvez Musharraf; and now, most likely the propping up of Imran Khans Pakistan Thereek-i-Insaaf and a possible new Islamic front in the shape of a revamped MMA. But the Nawaz Sharif example in this context suggests that if Khans party is able to get an impressive electoral response (especially in the Punjab), Imran too is more likely to take the same populist route as did Sharif. Where will that leave those who are clearly propping him up?

Such are the dynamics of electoral politics, especially in a country with a vast ethnic and sectarian diversity. And such are the dynamics detested by the military-establishment that has continued to treat this diversity as something of a threat to national interest (and thus demonizing it with the help of an artificial ideological singularity and concept of nationalism). Also, or thus, it has simply refused to come to terms with the fact that only a continuation of democracy is the only way to stop this diversity turning into a violent ethnic and sectarian monstrosity a monstrosity that actually rears its head during military dictatorships and when a civilian regime is constantly harassed by the establishment to toe its monolithic, myopic lines at the expense of letting democracy flourish by handing this diversity by giving it the rights that it deserves. Macaca 12-24-2011, 08:59 PM Now we come to what has been happening between the current PPP regime and the establishment, rather President Zardari and the military-establishment. In a previous piece I had lamented that how just like Z A. Bhutto, and Benazir Bhutto, Zardari, as head of state and of his party, is perhaps the most overt addressee of the military-establishments dogmatic postures and arrogant whims. Simply because he finally wanted to put to rest the establishments long-held perception of the PPP being a parasitic anti-establishment party always out to destabilise the nice little picture of stability, strategic balance and ideological robustness the establishment has build for us ignorant civilians. Nevertheless, as can be seen by the fast eroding pragmatic partnership between the military and Zardaris almost four-year-old government, and the way both the new and old scions of Punjabs power politics have been buzzing around a rather media-conscious judiciary that seems to be only eating, sleeping and breathing Zardari, one can safely suggest the attempts of yet another Sindhi leader to please the establishment has come to a naught. Reason? Corruption, of course. And undermining the judiciary and possibly selling out national interest and honour (to the Americans). Ive already talked in length about the corruption aspect that gets a tad overtly put on civilian regimes, but, really, the undermining of judiciary accusation is like saying one was trying to shrug off a bluebottle hell bent on sticking to a single leg in a sea of thousands of legs. And if this regime is selling out national honour to the Americans, then I wonder what were military regimes under Ayub, Zia and Musharraf selling (to the Americans)? The truth is, even if this is the most incompetent civilian set-up, it was elected and has the right to stand in another election and ask the electorate to judge them. The day state institutions and the military stop becoming the judge and jury of civilian regimes and consequently of those who voted them in (and can vote them out), is when we will be able to claim that yes, democracy certainly has arrived in Pakistan. Otherwise, Pakistan will continue being stuck in a vicious cycle and a whirlpool. This is the consequence of a self-righteous and contradictory display of cleanliness among its uniformed and judicial saviors who, in spite of the continuous failure of the singular and myopic concept of nationalism and elitist morality, have gone on to impose it over and over again, even if it has triggered military humiliation on battlefields, the crashing of the Two-Nation Theory, ethnic and sectarian bloodshed and terror evoked in the good name of the Lord. The establishment should be careful. Very careful, for Sindh has the seeds to become another tragedy like Balochistan. Calls for honor and action taken to defend national interest should be doing quite the opposite, instead of leaving province after province to violently shrug off the sense of humiliation they feel in the undemocratic and mischievous ways such calls and action are imposed by the military-establishment and their allies.

Going against a democratic consensus (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?

page=2011\12\25\story_25-12-2011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial History shows Pakistan's coups are self-defeating (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/editorial/history-shows-pakistans-coups-areself-defeating) The National Editorial The Plot Thickens in Pakistan (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/saad-khan/the-plot-thickens-inpaki_b_1165467.html) By Saad Khan | Huffington Post Rumors Buzz, but Pakistans Military Denies Talk of a Coup (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/world/asia/pakistan-military-seeking-to-quash-rumorsdenies-conspiracy-to-seize-power.html) By SALMAN MASOOD and MATTHEW ROSENBERG | The New York Times Macaca 12-24-2011, 09:07 PM Onwards to a nightmare (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/24/onwards-to-a-nightmare.html) By Abbas Nasir | Dawn SARDAR Ataullah Mengal`s comments, after Mian Nawaz Sharif called on him, made front-page headlines unlike the almost daily reports of dumped bodies in Balochistan. The news stories of the discovery of the latest batch of dumped, tortured bodies are often, if at all, found on the inside or back pages of most newspapers. One is unaware if TV bulletins carry these at all though one has watched the occasional programme on the issue. The reason isn`t necessarily that the whole media endorses the kill-and-dump policy of the security forces. It is more indicative of the fact that so many dumped bodies are found every week that perhaps the news `value` of such incidents isn`t as high as the latest twists and turns in the political arena. On a recent trip to Balochistan, a friend asked if I knew the significance of Dr Allah Nazar`s role. Continuing, my knowledgeable friend reminded me the doctor runs one of the most potent separatist militant groups in Balochistan today. With Brahamdagh Bugti`s move to Switzerland, there is a discernible reduction in the Bugtis` militancy. The Marris are still active but the most active and organised appears to be Dr Allah Nazar`s group. Allah Nazar is middle class and is not a tribal leader. Sardar Ataullah Mengal was perhaps right in telling journalists in Karachi, as he stood alongside Mian Sahib that things were out of my control and now in the hands of those who had been pushed to the mountains. Ataullah Mengal, who was once elected chief minister and had taken oath under the constitution, also lamented that the army was treating him (the Baloch) like they weren`t part of Pakistan. So don`t say it is my fault if I feel this way. Akhtar Mengal, the sardar`s elder son who was also a chief minister in the 1990s and remained imprisoned under Musharraf on the flimsiest of charges, has apparently given up politics and was content to get a safe passage abroad. The history is long as any Baloch will tell you. But surely in its latest phase, the whole saga was triggered by the rape of a woman doctor in Sui who alleged the rapist was a serving army captain. Gen Musharraf who was then at the helm prejudged the inquiry and proclaimed his officer`s innocence. When Nawab Akbar Bugti sided with the rape survivor, calling for justice, an enraged Musharraf blew a fuse himself and was also wound up by his relative and (according to some friends of his) the highly inflammable director-general military intelligence, Maj-Gen Nadeem Ijaz Mian. The army normally uses the Inter-Services Intelligence in such issues, but Musharraf tasked the Military Intelligence with sorting out those GHQ calls `miscreants`. And the MI went about its task with gusto. The agency made a politician, who wasn`t averse to cooperating with the establishment in the past, into an inspirational rebel leader. This wasn`t all. Akbar Bugti was killed and the Baloch separatist

cause gifted a legitimate high-profile martyr. Once the Baloch movement was labelled `foreign-backed` (which elements of it may well be), disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings of Pakistan`s own sons became acceptable as it was now a `national security` issue. Another explanation for the callous neglect towards these murders could also be that Baloch nationalism has manifest itself in tragic, ugly ways with the killing of innocent non-Baloch teachers/other settlers. If one researcher is to be believed, bodies have also been found with `Pakistan Zindabad` inscribed on them with sharp, knife-like objects, drawing blood. Mindless it may be but it doesn`t stop here. According to sources, after Musharraf`s exit, the influence of the MI was curtailed and ISI again given the upper hand, Although the ISI is now providing the `intelligence` that FC troops act on, if those usually across developments in Balochistan are to be believed, the other agency is also involved. Just find out who took a prominent Baloch separatist leader to Karachi for treatment, said one source. If you can get an answer, you`ll also know there is a sinister game on in our blighted land. What a political dialogue could have delivered appears more and more distant now thanks to the games the agencies are playing here. For their part, officials in Balochistan insist that no `innocent` Baloch has ever been killed. According to one official, Gen Javed Zia [the recently retired corps commander] used to ask politicians to inform him if they ever found out about anyone targeted unjustly. No one ever complained. However, it isn`t clear who the intelligence set-up and the FC teams assigned to work with it consider innocent. To them, it appears, the `guilty` aren`t necessarily those cited in (not convicted of) killing of innocent civilians or other militant activities alone. Anyone believed to be `inciting` separatism, the independent-minded intellectual for example, is said to be guilty too and punishable by death, a horrible death, without trial as the bodies testify. That there is no attempt to secretly bury the bodies, points to the blatant message. The officials gleefully point to the `decline` in separatist violence as a success of their brutal policy. They are oblivious to, or don`t wish to see, the widespread simmering discontent one witnessed on a recent visit. Conversations with many locals painted a hugely alarming picture. It ought to be mind-boggling that an establishment which all but charges an elected government with threatening national security and wants the issue to be dealt with `on merit` in courts, dispenses with the legal process in a part of the country crying out for justice. But it isn`t. What else would you expect from a military leadership that believes that fanatical zealots, including those avowedly inspired by Osama bin Laden, are the country`s second line of defence, despite its own tragic losses? Just look at the recent line-up of the patriotic luminaries under the `Difa-i-Pakistan` banner in Lahore. Tell me if this was Mr Jinnah`s dream come true or something he would be wary of, terming it his worst nightmare.

Bereft of reason (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\25\story_25-122011_pg3_2) By Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur | Daily Times Christmas in Pakistan how it once was (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/24/christmas-in-pakistan%E2%80%93-how-it-once-was.html) By Faiza Mirza | Dawn Peace on earth (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=83981&Cat=8) The News Editorial An endangered minority (http://tribune.com.pk/story/311416/an-endangered-minority/) The

Express Tribune Editorial Deadly place for journalists (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=83980&Cat=8) The News Editorial Macaca 12-25-2011, 07:19 PM Living in Fear of Intelligence Agents (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,805639,00.html) By Hasnain Kazim | Der Spiegel Hamid Mir leans back in his office chair, staring at his moblie phone. "Afraid? Am I afraid?" he asks. He shakes his head back and forth. "It would be a lie to say no." Since nearly midnight on Tuesday evening, his life has been turned upside down. His Blackberry rings, indicating he has received a text message. It reads, in broken English: "I have not seen a real bastard than you. I wish somebody comes and strip you naked. I hope some Army man has not done real dirty with your dear ones." Mir, 45, is one of Pakistan's most famous journalists. He hosts the daily talk show "Capital Talk" in Islamabad, interviewing public figures. He is the face of private broadcaster Geo TV. His business card reads "Executive Editor." He has been threatened often. After he wrote about corrupt politicians some time ago, then military dictator Pervez Musharraf banned him from broadcasting. Some say Mir sympathizes with the Taliban, while others believe he is a CIA agent, an Israeli spy or that he supports India. He laughs. "When one is criticized from all sides, it only shows that one is only required to be objective and truthful." Threat From Within But in Pakistan, the truth is risky. More journalists died there this year than in any other country. The organization Reporters Without Borders states that 10 journalists were killed in the country in 2011, out of a total of 66 worldwide. For the second year in a row, they named Pakistan the most dangerous country in the world for journalists. "In recent years colleagues were mainly the victims of terror attacks by separatist groups or radical parties," Mir says. "Or they died rushing to the scene of an attack when further bombs exploded." Over the last year, however, the source of threats has altered dramatically. "The main enemy now is the state, the army, the intelligence agency," Mir says. On Mir's Dec. 14 show, he discussed the question of whether General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency, traveled to various Gulf states to gather support for a coup back home after a United States operation in the northern city of Abbottabad ended with the killing of Osama bin Laden. The rumor began with a blog post by journalist Omar Waraich, who writes for British daily The Independent. In the posting, Waraich quotes Pakistani-born American businessman Mansoor Ijaz, who claims to have received corresponding information from a member of the US secret service. The affair in which Ijaz is wrapped up has rocked Pakistan. Details include reports that the country's former ambassador to the US, Hassain Haqqani, used a memo to Ijaz to request that US forces protect President Asif Ali Zardari from a military coup and limit the power of Pakistan's generals. The military was outraged, Haqqani lost his post, and the fallout between Zardari's civil government and the military has been palpable. 'Living Dangerously' Mir's show about the intelligence service boss has been rebroadcasted a number of times on Geo TV. On Dec. 19 a petition was registered at the country's highest court for the removal of General Pasha from his post on suspicion he was planning a coup. The next day Mir received the threatening text message.

The Pakistani military and the ISI are powerful institutions in the country. Army leader General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and ISI leader Pasha have been regularly listed by Western magazines as being among the world's most influential people. Though he was democratically elected, President Zardari is said to be at the mercy of Kayani and Pasha. "Those who dare to criticize the military are living dangerously," Mir says. He has done so often, not allowing himself to be intimidated. "But this text message still unsettles me," he adds. He published both the message and the telephone number from where it was sent in an effort to protect himself. One building away, in the capital bureau of the daily The News, Umar Cheema is sitting in the basement. Under a flourescent lighting, he and the paper's investigative reporting team are researching delicate stories on corruption and military interference in politics. The 35-year-old just published an article alleging that Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani paid less than the equivalent of 60 ($78) in income taxes this year. Stories like that create powerful enemies. Blossoming Media Industry But journalists in Pakistan yearn for such scoops, and over the last decade, the media landscape has grown into a large and colorful carnival of sorts. Every few months a fresh newspaper is founded, meanwhile some 90 broadcasters now exist, among them 30 news stations. Cheema is one of Pakistan's outstanding journalists. Although he has received offers for fellowships in the US, he sees his future in Pakistan. "We can achieve so much here," he says. "I don't believe that the military in this country will stage another coup. The last time was in 1998, when there was no media world in Pakistan." Still, Cheema, like Mir, sees the biggest threat to journalists as the military and intelligence service, not terrorism. His opinion is informed by personal experience. On Sept. 4, 2010, Cheema was in a cafe with friends at 3 a.m. It was Ramadan, when believers fast during the day, making late nights the best time to meet friends for a meal. On his way home two cars overtook him. "Men in police uniforms got out and accused me of running over a man and causing fatal injuries," he said. To save himself any trouble from the not particularly friendly men, Cheema agreed to get in one of their vehicles, thinking everything would be cleared up at the station. But he had hardly entered the car before they bound his hands and feet and then blindfolded him. Cheema believes they drove him somewhere in Islamabad or the neighboring city of Rawalpindi. There he experienced what Mir is now being threatened with. "A man told me that I had written bad reports and must now pay the consequences. They tore my shirt from my body and took my pants off. Then I was forced to lay on my belly on the floor." Five men beat him for a half hour using slats of wood and leather straps. "They forced me to assume different positions, they took photos and humiliated me. In the end, they also shaved my head and eyebrows." They then bundled him back in the car and drove him for around two hours. "They tied a cloth around my head and I couldn't see anything," Cheema recalls. "Then they threw me out of the car in the Chakwal District around 150 kilometers south of Islamabad." They also took care to ensure that Cheema arrived back in Islamabad in one piece so that he could share the news of the lesson he was supposed to have been taught. Someone had placed his car at the location with a full tank of gas. The person also placed 100 rupees (80 euro cents) in his hand for the highway toll he would need to get back home. Cheema was lucky -- he survived the seven-hour ordeal with his kidnappers. "It is very clear the ISI was behind it," he says. "They made clear that they were unhappy about my reporting." But it hadn't occurred to him that he might be the target of violence. "I never received any SMS like the one Hamid Mir got. But acquaintances repeatedly informed me that the ISI wasn't happy." Journalist Killed and Found in a Canal Syed Saleem Shahzad wasn't so lucky. The 40-year-old was also kidnapped in Islamabad at the end of May. He was subsequently tortured and later found dead in a canal. He had also reported critically on the military, writing about ties between Pakistani naval officers and the al-Qaida terrorist network.

"We know that ISI was behind his murder," says Hamid Mir. "Who else could it have been?" asks Umar Cheema. US government sources also claim there is evidence that the ISI ordered the killing. "That's nonsense," says one high-ranking ISI official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. What evidence is there that we had anything to do with that? The fact is that, by now, people try to blame the ISI for everything that is wrong in the world. But we're actually an honourable institution." The journalists themselves don't have any evidence to back their claims. "Otherwise I would have sued them already," says Umar Cheema. "But," he adds, "Saleem Shahzad was also directly warned by the ISI. He died a short time later." Hamid Mir has officially sought to have the mobile telephone number from which the text message threat was sent to him investigated. But only the military has access to the data from telecommunications companies in Pakistan. So far he hasn't obtained any information, and Mir doesn't believe he will in the future, either.

Zone of conflict (http://tribune.com.pk/story/311797/zone-of-conflict/) The Express Tribune Editorial Macaca 12-25-2011, 07:29 PM Pakistan's judiciary, not the army, holds the reins of power (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/pakistans-judiciary-not-the-armyholds-the-reins-of-power) By Shaukat Qadir | The National Relations between Pakistan's civilian government and the military have always held to a predictable pattern, but it seems that for the first time this relationship has changed. What happened and why? Coup rumours are again making the rounds in Pakistan, although the army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani has taken pains to deny them. The irony is that this government is fighting for its survival not because of an impending military takeover, but as a result of its own errors. Almost from its inception, and certainly since 1954 when Ayub Khan was concurrently defence minister and commander-in-chief, the Pakistan army has been a political force even when it was not at the helm of the state. This was always true except for a brief period during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's term as prime minister when, after its defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the army was firmly under civilian control. In the periods between military rule when elected governments were in power, the military has still been considered a political force. Even during the term of Gen Jehangir Keramat, perhaps the least politically threatening of the army chiefs, politicians would reach out to him to establish their "GHQ connections". Even though Gen Keramat was sacked by Nawaz Sharif in 1988, Mr Sharif never managed to tame the military and was eventually overthrown by another military dictator, Gen Pervez Musharraf. In her first term as prime minister, Benazir Bhutto also attempted to exert her influence over the military, but was destined to be toppled by the then-president, Ishaq Khan, with the support of the military. Every civilian government in Pakistan has learnt to live with the army's political role and adjusted to it in different ways. After Gen Musharraf was deposed in 2008, it seemed that the generals, having witnessed Gen Musharraf's disastrous course, were determined to stay out of politics and resume their constitutionally defined duties. This was a priceless opportunity for the elected government to deliver on good governance and clip the wings of Pakistan's army as a political force.

Far from doing so, the elected government neither governed effectively nor tamed the military. Continuing on a path of corruption, it ceded political space to the military. Had the elected government wanted to, the US incursion to assassinate Osama bin Laden on May 2 offered a priceless opportunity to sack the army chief and the director general of the ISI. Instead, it seems that President Asif Ali Zardari sought US assistance to keep the military at bay. The "memogate" scandal that broke last month involved the former ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, allegedly delivering a letter to the Pentagon asking for US assistance to stave off a military coup. One can only assume that in exchange Mr Zardari's administration was offering its subservience to Washington and control of Pakistan's nuclear assets. Nato's attack on November 26 on the twin posts at Salala was another opportunity lost by the elected government. Perhaps the government was aware that Gen Kayani, despite his apparent inaction, was the only person in Pakistan who could still stand up to the United States. The Americans have tried to defuse the situation, with senior military staff making statements to Pakistan's Supreme Court denying that the memo was credible, but the scandal refuses to die. Because the Supreme Court is now reviewing the issue, not only the fate of Mr Zardari's government, but the civilian-military relationship as a whole is under review. On December 22, Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani thundered on the floor of parliament that he would not tolerate "a state within a state", an unambiguous reference to the army. The next day, Gen Kayani did his best to dispel rumours of a coup but the rumour mill keeps churning. At the heart of this is the possibility of treason charges under Article 6 of the constitution; that trail could lead all the way to Mr Zardari and the presidential office. Having offered up Mr Haqqani as a sacrifice, the government would have liked to forget the scandal, but the Supreme Court has now sought responses from everyone concerned, including the chiefs of the army and the ISI. Both the army and the ISI submitted affidavits stating that there was enough evidence to implicate Mr Haqqani. The government, in turn, has challenged the Court's jurisdiction in the affair. But the Supreme Court's continued inquiry could very well capsize this government. The threat, then, posed to the elected government is not from the military but from the judiciary, which has implied that even the issue of presidential immunity is being considered. The most intriguing part of this affair is that, while the military seems fully conscious of the limits of its political power, the elected government's actions in the "memo-gate" affair has forced the military to become more involved. But it will be the decisions of the judiciary, not the military, that will see this government survive or fall. Brig Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer On the brink (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84181&Cat=9) By Asif Ezdi | The News Syed Mansoor Hussain (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\26\story_26-122011_pg3_2) By Syed Mansoor Hussain | Daily Times A story on memogate (http://tribune.com.pk/story/311842/a-story-on-memogate/) By Shahzad Chaudhry | The Express Tribune Instability in Pakistan (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2747546.ece) The Hindu Editorial Pakistan on the Precipice (http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/burki12/English) By Shahid Javed Burki | Project Syndicate Macaca 12-25-2011, 07:35 PM Beards, butter & the bomb (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/smokers-corner-beards-butter-thebomb.html) By Nadeem F. Paracha | Dawn When on December 18 leaders from more than a dozen radical religious parties, certain down-andout politicians, one very verbose former ISI chief and the son of a bygone and dead dictator graced the Defend Pakistan rally organised by the controversial Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD), I wondered, was

the military touched by this gesture? Were the militarys top cats elated by the sight of some very loud and angry beings saluting the countrys army, all the while spitting venom at the government and, of course, a Hindu India along with the US crusaders? Or was the military embarrassed? I mean, the cat has certainly not popped out of the bag so openly before. In other words, there has always been talk of how the military ever since Yahya Khans misadventures in the former East Pakistan, and especially ever since the reactionary Ziaul Haq dictatorship has been playing footsie with radical Islamist parties to undermine any force supposedly threatening the countrys sovereignty. Of course, sovereignty in this specific context usually means safeguarding the political and institutional hegemony and influence of the establishment and of Pakistan ideology, manufactured by the establishment (with the help of the once anti-Jinnah ulema and their urbane ideologues) from the 1970s onwards. It reached its propagated peak during Zias time and now is a mindless populist slogan that actually means nothing, really. Ever since Pakistans entry in the global war on terror (post-9/11), its armed forces have been at pains to explain to the concerned world that the countrys military and especially its intelligence agencies have nothing to do with the violent psychos whove been blowing up mosques, shrines and markets and slaughtering civilians in the name of jihad; and nor is the military in league with hate-spouting sectarian organisations. Yet there they were on December 18, eulogising the military, these political faces and the overt apologists and sympathisers of precisely the kind of barbarity and the barbarians the military says it has no links to and is at war with. Catch-22, indeed. Because if such are the forces that the military has used much of our tax money, US military aid and common frontline soldiers to fight against, then prey tell, why on December 18, were men who glorify terrorists seen polishing medals of an army that has fought a prolonged counter-insurgency with those whom these men consider a collective reincarnation of Muhammad Bin Qasim? In the aftermath of the humiliation that the military had to face in the event of the Raymond Davis issue, the Osama discovery, the Mehran Base attack (by Islamist terrorists) and finally the Nato attack on Pakistani soldiers, has the establishment finally let go of its pretence about being an institution that (after 9/11) had discarded its baggage of being a much radicalised and reactionary outfit? According to some observers of military politics, such as Najam Sethi, Hasan Askari, Ahmed Rashid and Ayesha Siddiqa, both conventional and clandestine Islamist outfits usually pour out onto the streets with given a tactical wink by the establishment as and when required. The reasons behind this have usually to do with the establishment wishing to whip up emotions against a democratic regime that it is not happy with or to brew widespread sentiment against either India or the US. If so, then this sudden unity and pouring out of both mainstream as well as shady Islamist groups, pro-establishment politicians, ex-ISI men and even some media personnel praising the military whilst sounding like Islamised Kim Il Sungs, is a cause for concern. Are these the only kind of men that the military, ever since Yahyas initial patronage of the Jamat-iIslami in 1970-71, been able to attract as a constituency? Forget about the US concerns (a country which, till the 1980s, was actually an encouraging partner in Pakistani militarys growing infatuation with Islamists), and also forget about Indian pangs as well. The concern should be ours first. Any rational Pakistani should be worried. Worried that today a lethal battery of nuclear warheads lies surrounded by an enigmatic military now being carried on the shoulders of men who applaud murderers of men accused of blasphemy, spit obscenities at actresses visiting India but refuse to condemn those who have mercilessly slaughtered over 36,000 soldiers, civilians and women and children.

Police had Indian Mujahideen kingpin, let him go (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Copshad-Indian-Mujahideen-kingpin-let-him-go/articleshow/11247616.cms) By Neeraj Chauhan | TNN 'Kashmiri tasked Headley to synchronise attacks on Jewish houses' (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/kashmiri-tasked-headley-to-synchronise-attacks-on-jewishhouses/20111225.htm) Press Trust Of India If baglifter comes, can bomb squad be far behind? (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/killer-

comedies/entry/if-baglifter-comes-can-bomb-squad-be-far-behind) By Soumittra S Bose | Times of India Macaca 12-25-2011, 07:43 PM US cannot rely on Pakistan for counterterrorism operations (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2011/12/us_cannot_rely_on_pakistan_for.php) By BILL ROGGIO AND CHRIS RADIN | The Long War Journal In CJ Radin's recent Threat Matrix report on US counterterrorism (CT) strategy, one area that stood out was the Obama administration's emphasis on partnering with Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda and allied terror groups, as set forth below in the "National Strategy for Counterterrorism": Our CT efforts in Pakistan have far-reaching implications for our global CT efforts. Al-Qa'ida continues to capitalize on its safe haven to maintain communications with its affiliates and adherents and to call on them to use violence in pursuit of its ideological goals. Therefore, the operational dismantlement of Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida will not eliminate the threat to the United States, as we are likely to face a lingering threat from operatives already trained as well as from the group's affiliates and adherents in South Asia and in other parts of the world. Disrupted terrorist attacks in 2009 and 2010--including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula's role in the failed December 25, 2009 aviation bombing and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan's involvement in the May 1, 2010 failed attack in Times Square--suggest that the determination of an expanded and more diverse network of terrorist groups to focus beyond their local environments may persist even with the ultimate defeat of al-Qa'ida in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater. In Pakistan our efforts will continue to focus on a range of activities that are pursued in conjunction with the Government of Pakistan to increase the pace and scope of success against key al-Qa'ida and affiliated targets. It is unlikely that any single event--even the death of Usama bin Laden, the only leader al-Qa'ida has ever known--will bring about its operational dismantlement. Therefore, a sustained level of intensified pressure against the group is necessary. As such, U.S. CT activities are focused on working with our partners to ensure the rapid degradation of al-Qa'ida's leadership structure, command and control, organizational capabilities, support networks, and infrastructure at a pace faster than the group is able to recover as well as on further shrinking its safe haven and limiting access to fallback locations elsewhere in Pakistan. There is one major weakness in this strategy, and that is its reliance on Pakistan "to increase the pace and scope of success against key al-Qa'ida and affiliated targets." The reality is that the Pakistani government has reached the limits of its cooperation with the US, and the relationship is only going to get worse in the near term. For years, the Pakistanis have rebuffed US pleas to attack the terror camps in North Waziristan; and in the wake of the US strike in Mohmand on Nov. 26 that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, it is safe to say that option is now off the table. In fact, the US gave up pressuring Pakistan on North Waziristan months ago after years of unrealistic declarations by US policymakers that Pakistan would move against terror groups in the tribal area. While some US policymakers have believed that Pakistan would eventually 'come around' and see the wisdom of eradicating terrorist sanctuaries in North Waziristan, we at The Long War Journal take a less sanguine view, and find it unrealistic to think that the incentives the US can provide to Pakistan, such as money, will sufficiently influence the fundamental ideological component of the Pakistani establishment to convince it to withdraw its support for jihadi groups. And the issue of North Waziristan is not trivial. Numerous terror groups, including al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and a host of smaller terror organizations, as well as a plethora of Pakistani terror groups, are based there. The Haqqani Network, which Admiral Mullen described as a "veritable arm of the ISI," and which threatens the Afghan state while supporting the host of terror groups, is headquartered in North Waziristan. As long as the Pakistanis are unwilling to move in North Waziristan, these groups will remain entrenched. Drone strikes can keep these groups off balance, but are insufficient for defeating them. And, as we've noted numerous times here at LWJ, al Qaeda and allied groups are not confined to

the small drone target boxes designated in North Waziristan and in South Waziristan (another terrorist haven, where Pakistan has taken only limited action against just one wing of the Taliban). As shown by the killings of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and Abd al Moeed bin Abd al Salam in Karachi, and the capture of Younis al Mauritani in Quetta, al Qaeda's presence in Pakistan is not confined to Pakistan's tribal areas. And again, as we at LWJ have pointed out many times previously, this merely scratches the surface of the alphabet soup of terror groups that operate in Pakistan, many with the support of the state, and cooperate with al Qaeda [see Pakistan's Jihad (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/pakistans_jihad.php), for instance]. While the current strategy is problematic, we acknowledges that most alternatives are also fraught with difficulties. There are no easy answers to the Pakistan problem. But, we should at least start with a realistic view of what we can expect from our relationship with Pakistan. Without that realism, we are more likely to just make a bad situation even worse.

The Fading U.S.-Pakistan Alliance (http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_fading_us-pakistan_alliance) By Richard Javad Heydarian | Foreign Policy in Focus War On Terror Shifts To Pakistan (http://www.rferl.org/content/year_in_review_war_on_terror_shifts_to_pakistan/24432153.html) By Abubakar Siddique | Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty PAKISTAN ARMY: BACK FROM THE BARRACKS---NEED FOR ALERT IN INDIA (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4824.html) By B.Raman | South Asia Analysis Group State without a state (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/state-without-a-state.html) By Munir Akram | Dawn A two-front suicide (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/a-two-front-suicide.html) By Muhammad Ali Siddiqi | Dawn Macaca 12-25-2011, 07:52 PM Winding down (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/winding-down.html) By Ardeshir Cowasjee | Dawn TODAY, we in Pakistan observe the birthday of the man who founded and made Pakistan just over 64 years ago. It is the official 135th anniversary of the birth of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. For much of the rest of the world, celebrations are afoot for the assumed 2011th birthday of Jesus of Nazareth, the second in Trinity. And in the ranks of the PML-N no doubt congratulations are being bandied about on the declared birthday of the Mian of Raiwind, two-time prime minister of this `hard` country, who never manages to cease being politically controversial. As for Jinnah, what it was he decreed for the country he made was laid out in his seminal speech of Aug 11, 1947, too well known and quoted to bear repetition by us few who wish to abide by his creed. For those who wish to interpret it their own way, it conforms merely to narrow expedient government vision; and to the bigots and the intolerant who sadly make up the majority of the 180 million it has been discarded or distorted into wishing what they wish it to mean. His creed is nationally long gone. `Secular` is almost a treasonous word, tolerance an equally treasonous practice as bigotry is largely the order of the day. Jinnah`s Pakistan became virtually moribund on his death and received the final fatal blow in 1949 when his trusted lieutenants brought in the Objectives Resolution. From then on, it was a steady downhill dive to where this truncated country now finds itself isolated and distrusted by much of the world which is concerned about its erratic policies and practices. The tragedy is that Jinnah, over the tumultuous years, has become more and more irrelevant to the youth of the country, and the elders tend to relegate him to whatever brand of history is convenient.

In February 2010, a columnist writing on this page made a remark directed at me. She informed me that while I search in vain for Jinnah`s Pakistan we are threatened with losing Pakistan`s Jinnah. We shouldn`t be surprised, she wrote, if in a few years time we come across a doctored photograph of the founding father in a turban and beard Jinnah`s person and his narrative are being tinkered with. A liberal Jinnah is unpalatable. In short, too many Pakistanis have denied and are denying that the man is his own person, that he was what he actually was. A false piety has been forced upon him by the leaderships we have suffered. He has been kidnapped by those who under no circumstances wish to live in a pluralistic state with a multi-polar polity where religion, in the words of Mr Jinnah, has nothing to do with the business of the state. The columnist ended with a plea that I do something about getting the founding father back. Well, it seems to be, at least in my lifetime, an impossible task. All our politicians, in and out of khaki, have blithely and meaninglessly trotted out their intent to restore Jinnah`s Pakistan and then done and accepted the exact opposite in the interests of expediency and their shaky chairs. Now to the tie up with the title of this column. For 22 years I have written for this publication. I started off in 1989 with letters to the editor after Ziaul Haq was taken away by his mangoes, when my old friend Ilahi Bakhsh Soomro was appointed caretaker information minister and removed the stringent Zia press laws.Then at the urging of a couple of Dawn staffers, I started submitting columns to that fine editor, Ahmad Ali Khan. He and his team gave me full cooperation and we had an amicable relationship, as I have had with all subsequent editors, down to young Zaffar Abbas who continues to maintain Dawn as the premier newspaper of the land. I must thank them all. Thanks also must be extended to those who have helped me in my research and in providing input to Roland deSouza`s involvement with all environmental subjects and issues, and to Amina Jilani who has for the 22 years seen to it that I have made no major blunders as far as the English language is concerned. On this last Sunday of this year, this is my final column in this space. Now, old at 85, tired, and disillusioned with a country that just cannot pull itself together in any way and get on with life in this day and age, I have decided to call it a day. To quote Winston Churchill (without at all making any even vague comparison) I am ready to meet my Maker. Whether my Maker is prepared for the ordeal of meeting me is another matter. The weekly writing has been a long and rewarding haul, and the column can record a few incidents where it has made a difference. I must also thank all those readers who have responded, generally favourably and with common sense. Bernard Levin who wrote columns with wit and erudition in The Times (London) from 1970 to 1997 once likened columnists to bakers. Bakers bake bread every morning, it is consumed, digested and forgotten. So is it with our daily columns, they are read, maybe digested, and the newspaper discarded. This may not be a final farewell as Editor Abbas has most generously told me that in the future should any issue crop up on which I feel I would care to comment, Dawn will carry my column though few and far between. So, to all my readers, my best for the festive season and to you all, to Pakistan and Karachi, city of my birth, my wishes that the coming year will be more peaceful, more tranquil and that those that pretend to lead may at least be imbued with a modicum of common sense.

Was Jinnah democratic? I (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\19\story_19-122011_pg3_5) By Yasser Latif Hamdani | Daily Times Was Jinnah democratic? II (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\26\story_2612-2011_pg3_4) By Yasser Latif Hamdani | Daily Times The deconstruction of Jinnahs vision (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?

ID=83975&Cat=9) By Iftikhar Murshed | The News Quaids Perspective (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/quaids-perspective.html) By FAIZA MIRZA | Dawn Failure was a word unknown to him (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/%E2%80%98failure %E2%80%99-was-a-word-unknown-to-him.html) By Ayesha Jalal | Dawn India, Pakistan and the Quaid-i-Azam (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/25/india-pakistan-and-thequaid-i-azam.html) By Jaswant Singh | Dawn Macaca 12-25-2011, 08:04 PM India's secret war in Bangladesh (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2747538.ece) By PRAVEEN SWAMI | The Hindu Forty-five minutes before 12.00 pm on December 14, 1971, Indian Air Force pilots at Hashimpara and Gauhati received instructions to attack an unusual target: a sprawling colonial-era building in the middle of Dacca that had no apparent military value whatsoever. There were nothing but tourist maps available to guide the pilots to their target but the results were still lethal. The first wave of combat jets, four MiG21 jets armed with rockets, destroyed a conference hall; two more MiGs and two Hunter bombers levelled a third of the main building. Inside the building the Government House East Pakistan's Cabinet had begun an emergency meeting to discuss the political measures to avoid the looming surrender of their army at Dacca 55 minutes before the bombs hit. It turned out to be the last-ever meeting of the Cabinet. A.M. Malik, head of the East Pakistan government, survived the bombing along with his Cabinet but resigned on the spot, among the burning ruins; the nervous system, as it were, of decision-making had been destroyed. For years now, military historians have wondered precisely how the Government House was targeted with such precision; rumours that a spy was present have proliferated. From the stillclassified official history of the 1971 war, we now know the answer. Indian cryptanalysts, or codebreakers, had succeeded in breaking Pakistan's military cipher giving the country's intelligence services real-time information on the enemy's strategic decision-making. India's Army, Navy and Air Force were lauded, during the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of Bangladesh's independence, for their role in ending a genocide and giving birth to a new nation. The enormous strategic contribution of India's intelligence services, however, has gone largely unacknowledged. Seven months before the December 3 Pakistan Air Force raid that marked the beginning of the war, India's Chief of Army Staff issued a secret order to the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, initiating the campaign that would end with the dismemberment of Pakistan. Operation Instruction 52 formally committed the Indian forces to assist the Provisional Government of Bangladesh to rally the people of East Bengal in support of the liberation movement, and to raise, equip and train East Bengal cadres for guerrilla operations for employment in their own native land. The Eastern Command was to ensure that the guerrilla forces were to work towards tying down the Pak [Pakistan] Military forces in protective tasks in East Bengal, sap and corrode the morale of the Pak forces in the Eastern theatre and simultaneously to impair their logistic capability for undertaking any offensive against Assam and West Bengal, and, finally, be used along with the regular Indian troops in the event of Pakistan initiating hostilities against us. Secret army The task of realising these orders fell on Sujan Singh Uban. Brigadier later Major-General Uban was an artillery officer who had been handpicked to lead the Special Frontier Force, a secret army set up decades earlier with the assistance of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency to harry the Chinese forces in Tibet. The SFF, which until recently served as a kind of armed wing of India's external covert service, the Research and Analysis Wing, never did fight in China. In Bangladesh, the contributions of its men and officers would be invaluable.

Brigadier Uban whose enthusiasm for irregular warfare was rivalled, contemporaries recall, only by his eccentric spiritualism later said he had received a year's advance warning of the task that lay ahead from the Bengali mystic, Baba Onkarnath. Less-than-holy war The war he waged, though, was less-than-holy. In July 1971, India's war history records, the first Bangladesh irregulars were infiltrated across the border at Madaripur. This first group of 110 guerrillas destroyed tea gardens, riverboats and railway tracks acts that tied down troops, undermined East Pakistan's economy and, the history says, destroyed communications between Dhaka, Comilla and Chittagong. Much of the guerrilla war, however, was waged by the volunteers of the Gano Bahini, a volunteer force. The Indian forces initially set up six camps for recruiting and training volunteers, which were soon swamped. At one camp, some 3,000 young men had to wait up to two months for induction, although the hygienic condition was pitiable and food and water supply almost non-existent. By September 1971, though, Indian training operations had expanded dramatically in scale, processing a staggering 20,000 guerrillas each month. Eight Indian soldiers were committed to every 100 trainees at 10 camps. On the eve of the war, at the end of November 1971, over 83,000 Gano Bahini fighters had been trained, 51,000 of whom were operating in East Pakistan a guerrilla operation perhaps unrivalled in scale until that time. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Brigadier Uban sent in Indian soldiers or, to be more exact, CIA-trained, Indian-funded Tibetans using hastily-imported Bulgarian assault rifles and U.S.-manufactured carbines to obscure their links to India. Fighting under the direct command of RAW's legendary spymaster Rameshwar Kao, Brig. Uban's forces engaged in a series of low-grade border skirmishes. Founded in 1962, the SFF had originally been called Establishment 22 and still has a road named after it in New Delhi, next to the headquarters of the Defence Ministry. The organisation received extensive special operations training from the U.S., as part of a package of military assistance. In September 1967, the control of these assets was formally handed over to RAW and used in Bangladesh to lethal effect. From December 3, 1971, Brig. Uban's force began an extraordinary campaign of sabotage and harassment. At the cost of just 56 dead and 190 wounded, the SFF succeeded in destroying several key bridges, and in ensuring that Pakistan's 97 Independent Brigade and crack 2 Commando Battalion remained bogged down in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Some 580 members of Brig. Uban's covert force were awarded cash, medals and prizes by the Government of India. November 1971 saw the Indian-backed low-intensity war in East Pakistan escalate to levels Pakistan found intolerable pushing it to act. On December 3, Pakistan attempted to relieve the pressure on its eastern wing by carrying out strikes on major Indian airbases. India retaliated with an offensive of extraordinary speed that has been described as a blitzkrieg without tanks. Rejecting an offer for conditional surrender in the East, the Indian forces entered Dacca on December 15. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi promptly ordered a ceasefire on the western front as well: if I don't do so today, she said of the decision to end the war, I shall not be able to do so tomorrow. How important was the covert war to this victory, and what cost did it come at? India's new communications intelligence technologies were clearly critical; three decades on, the government would be advised to make fuller accounts public, and publicly honour the anonymous cryptanalysts who achieved so much. The 1971 war history records that their efforts meant several important communications and projections of the Pak[istani] high command were intercepted, decoded and suitable action [was] taken. Indian communications interception, the history states, even prevented a last-minute effort to evacuate the Pakistani troops from Dacca, using five disguised merchant ships. The role of irregular forces, though, needs a more nuanced assessment. There is no doubt that they served to tie down Pakistani troops, and derail their logistical backbone. They were also, however,

responsible for large-scale human rights abuses targeting Pakistani sympathisers and the ethnic Bihari population. There is no moral equivalence between these crimes and those of the Pakistani armed forces in 1971 but the fact also is that the irregular forces bequeathed to Bangladesh a militarised political culture that would have deadly consequences of its own. India's secret war in Bangladesh would have served little purpose without a conventional, disciplined military force to secure a decisive victory a lesson of the utility and limitations of subconventional warfare that ought to be closely studied today by the several states that rely on these tactics.

Personal accounts of 1971 (http://tribune.com.pk/story/311847/personal-accounts-of-1971-4/) By Ajmal Kamal | The Express Tribune Arriving in Armanitola (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/arriving-in-armanitola/891746/) By Shombit Sengupta | Indian Express People for peace (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84184&Cat=9) By Beena Sarwar | The News Indian Naval Modernisation: Implications For Pakistan (http://www.eurasiareview.com/25122011indian-naval-modernisation-implications-for-pakistan-analysis/) By Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak | Eurasia Review Macaca 12-25-2011, 08:10 PM Sri Lanka: new test of India's global influence If India blinks, the political role of human rights could fall victim to China's rise. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/india/111219/sri-lanka-humanrights-war-crimes-tamil-tigers-united-nations-investigation) By Jason Overdorf | GlobalPost The Sri Lankan government's efforts to erase from history the final months of its 25-year-long war against Tamil separatists hit a snag this week, as humanitarian organizations blasted the report of an internal probe into alleged human rights violations and possible war crimes as a whitewash. Now, the fight for clarity, if not justice, may well depend on India. The Sri Lankan government's Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) posted its report on the last months of the civil war Dec. 16. But despite the government's hopes that the internal assessment would end calls for an international investigation, Human Rights Watch identified serious shortcomings in the 388-page report. Most troubling, the LLRC largely exonerated government forces for alleged violations of the laws of war, Human Rights Watch said. The way the war was ended in Sri Lanka must not be made into a positive example that other governments are encouraged to pursue or allowed to pursue, said Alan Keenan, Sri Lanka Project Director for the International Crisis Group. One of the major advantages of an international investigation would be to lay out in a credible way just how destructive that approach was. Whether that happens, however, could well depend on New Delhi's new willingness to stand up against bullying from Beijing which has blocked multilateral actions on human rights. The LLRC assessment is unlikely to satisfy either the US or India, which had demanded a clear roadmap for establishing accountability for human rights violations committed during the war. They haven't called for any specific prosecutions, Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said in a telephone interview. They haven't dealt with indiscriminate shelling. They haven't suggested that anybody senior has any responsibilities. It's actually much less than we expected. We thought that they'd try to do more to try to keep the possibility of an international investigation

at bay. The United Nations Secretary-Generals Panel of Experts concluded in April that both government forces and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conducted military operations "with flagrant disregard for the protection, rights, welfare and lives of civilians and failed to respect the norms of international law." Yet while the LLRC did rubbish previous government claims that the military killed no civilians at all, it downplayed or failed to investigate incidents involving the shelling of civilians with heavy artillery, sexual violence and the executions of rebels who attempted to surrender. The apparent whitewash was, of course, not wholly surprising. Both before and after the military push to end the civil war in which the UN report alleged tens of thousands of civilians may have been killed the repressive atmosphere in Sri Lanka has made it dangerous to speak out against the government, according to the International Crisis Group. Yet predictable or no, the LLRC report's many failings have highlighted the need for the international probe called for by the UN panel of experts, humanitarian groups said. The challenge is for the United States, and, particularly, India to find the political courage to address these atrocities, said Human Rights Watch's Adams. Indeed, it's an important test case for a new era of foreign policy in which China increasingly vies with the US for influence. Already, China's growing military and economic might has begun to hamper multilateral actions on human rights largely driven by the United States and Europe. In the last month's of the civil war, China's continued support for the government hamstrung a Western bid to use withholding arms as a way to influence the tactics of the Sri Lankan military. And after the conflict ended, Beijing, along with Moscow, has stymied efforts to push for an international investigation in the UN Security Council. "What [China's new involvement has] meant is that governments who otherwise might have been willing to push harder on the Sri Lankan government on issues of accountablity but also on other related governance issues like human rights violations and the decline of democratic standards in Sri Lanka have been more reluctant to do so." Engaged in projects to build a massive port, a highway, a coal-fired power plant and an international airport on the island, China has emerged as Sri Lanka's largest donor of bilateral aid committing $1.5 billion to the country's $6 billion reconstruction plan in June. Beijing's generosity has made talking tough difficult for the traditional regional powers like the US and Japan which was previously Sri Lanka's principal donor. But India's concerns are more immediate. New Delhi sees Beijing's move into the Indian Ocean as part of a so-called string of pearls strategy to encircle the country with potential naval and military supply hubs. And taking a tough stance on human rights could well alienate Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse likely to remain the country's leader for a long time and propel him into the arms of Beijing. The Chinese penetration of Sri Lanka has made things very difficult for India in recent years, said Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Without a larger international push, it's not possible for India to act on its own. So far, those concerns have prevented India from acting as strongly as humanitarian organizations believe is necessary. Though in bilateral talks New Delhi has expressed its displeasure with Rajapakse's progress in rehabilitating Tamils displaced by the war, for example, its public statements have been carefully measured to avoid causing too much offense. Moreover, India has not supported multilateral efforts to push for action against past and present human rights violations at the UN. That silence has been nearly as large an impediment as the outright opposition from China and

Russia, according to ICG's Keenan. To overcome the resistance, an international investigation will need the support not only of the US and Europe, but also of Japan and India. A strong statement from India would clear the path for other, smaller countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to follow suit. And New Delhi's current reluctance resonates just as loudly. There's every indication that Western governments are quite willing to do something to have the human rights council take some action on Sri Lanka, said Keenan. It's really India that has not yet sent the signal that it's willing to join that coalition.

Searching for the boy with the violin (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15818972) By Priyath Liyanage | BBC Why has the left neglected the Tamils of Sri Lanka? (http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/thestaggers/2011/12/sri-lanka-war-rights-during) By Emanuel Stoakes | The New Statesman Experiment with truth (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2735656.ece) The Hindu Editorial Sri Lanka: Lessons unlearnt and reconciliation deconstructed (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4822.html) By Kumar David | South Asia Analysis Group Sri Lankas Truth Commission: A Brief Assessment of the LLRC Report (http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/12/18/sri-lankas-truth-commission-a-brief-assessmentof-the-llrc-report/) By Gibson Bateman | Foreign Policy Journal Macaca 12-25-2011, 08:16 PM Minority-bashing: There we go again (http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/they-call-memuslim/2011/12/26/minority-bashing-there-we-go-again/) By ZIA HAQ | Hindustan Times A significant mass of this nation, after 60-odd years of nationhood, still lacks a heart. It cannot bear the sight of even crumbs being given to minorities. Gandhi, if we remember, said that a state should be judged by the way it treats its minorities. Lets consider the things that the right-wing, including the main opposition BJP, have said about this past weeks decision to earmark minorities a 4.5% share in jobs and university seats within an existing 27% reservation system for Other Backward Classes (comprising 1,900-odd socially disadvantaged groups). But before that, lets understand what this new political largesse is all about. First things first, this is no big fat pie thats going to rob all jobs and seats. It does not breach the existing level of government jobs and university seats 50% set aside for weaker sections. The 4.5% quota does not create any new groups but those already surveyed and approved for affirmative action. Including new beneficiaries or excluding existing ones require approval of not only certain statutory bodies but also of the Parliament. It merely creates a sub-category for minorities. So, while earlier backward groups among minorities, including Muslims, had to compete within the 27% OBC quota, they will now have to make it within the 4.5% share assigned to them. Whether this is a boon or bane, in terms of opportunity, is still being debated. Most importantly, this is not a Muslim-only offer, but for all minorities in this country. Now, lets listen in to some of the canards being spread. Reservation on the basis of religion is unconstitutional. Truth is nobody is being given reservation benefits on the basis of religion. Its being given on the basis of a communitys backwardness or disadvantaged status. And there is, in the Constitution, a clear promise for reservation benefits on the basis of backwardness. A number of Muslim communities are already listed among the backward classes. Their backwardness is constitutionally settled, up till the Supreme Court. It is they who benefit. But the right-wing is going to town. The Uttar Pradesh unit of BJP said it was holding demonstrations on December 27. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) showed up in

great numbers to protest against the reservation decision for Muslims in Indore. The Bajrang Dal, another right-wing outfit, announced launching a countrywide agitation too. In their rush to pan the reservation, some BJP leaders are uttering mumbo-jumbo. Former UP chief minister and BJP president Rajnath Singh said: I oppose reservation on religious grounds. Its unconstitutional. But we believe in social justice. Singh said (http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/minority-reservation-in-job-quota/1/165695.html) during his tenure (as UP chief minister) his government gave reservation benefits to not only the backwards, but even the most backwards and extremely backward communities. Rajnath Singh cannot claim to believe in social justice and oppose reservation to constitutionally validated backward minorities and yet be offering them reservation (as he claims) all at the same. Sorry, he has to come up again, re-collecting his thoughts and framing it better. BJP vice-president Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi said the 4.5% quota is the Congress partys dangerous political game, which can lead to a civil war among the different communities and castes. Theres hardly any doubt that, apart from having a social objective, the 4.5% sub-quota is also a political strategy. Only that it may not be a very bright political strategy to give far less that what has actually been recommended by a national commission. The government has already laid itself bare to the charge of tokenism. But did we hear the BJP say it foresees a civil war? Or is it trying to incite one? Two days after the new sub-quota has been implemented through an executive order to be applicable from January 1, 2012, we are yet to see even a brawl. In any case, the only way to sustain an efficient affirmative action system in this country is by gradually weaning off the fat cats and including more deserving ones from all communities. If the historically well-off Brahmins were to fall upon bad times, even they should be considered. But the larger point is that this nation ought to have faith in the notion of social justice. Elections alone do not a democracy make.

The Beastly Beatitudes of Subramanian S (http://www.tehelka.com/story_main51.asp? filename=Ne311211Coverstory.asp) By Ashok Malik | Tehelka Blocking website in India: Reliance Communications shows it is very easy (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/news/internet/Blocking-website-in-India-RelianceCommunications-shows-it-is-very-easy/articleshow/11233920.cms) By Javed Anwer | TNN India Orders Websites to Remove Content (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204552304577117962665684408.html) By RAGHAVENDRA UPADHYAYA And ROMIT GUHA | Wall Street Journal Courts challenge Facebook, Google content - report (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/23/indian-courts-challenge-facebook-googleidINDEE7BM0C220111223) Reuters Macaca 12-25-2011, 08:44 PM Tryst with destiny (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Tryst-withdestiny/articleshow/11244707.cms) By BORIA MAJUMDAR | Times of India Seventy thousand people at the MCG in attendance before the first ball is bowled; the three highest run scorers in Test match cricket playing for the final time together in a series; a chance for India to script history by beating Australia in Australia for the first time ever; an opportunity for the Australians to stem the tide of humiliating losses - the India-Australia Test series which starts today will be followed with rapt attention by cricket aficionados around the world. It is without doubt one of the most important Test series in India's recent cricketing history and will set the direction in which Indian cricket will move in 2012. A successful Test series in Australia will mean the BCCI will heave a sigh of relief and all its

commercial properties like the IPL will be supported by huge fan followings in the coming months. The failure against England will have been redeemed and all will be well again in Indian cricket's echelons of power. A reversal on the other hand will mean the clamour against excessive cricket and the evils of commercialisation will gather further steam. All in all, there is a whole lot at stake as the action unfolds on Boxing Day at the gigantic MCG, one of cricket's most famous amphitheatres steeped in history and tradition. From the cricketing standpoint, it might well be a test of Indian bowling against Australian batting. While Indian bats-men are expected to come good against a relatively inexperienced Australian bowling attack, India's chances in the series will depend on how the Indian quicks negotiate the hard Australian conditions - more specifically, if Zaheer Khan is third time lucky in Australia. Khan, who was forced to return to India twice before from Australia, will hold the key to an early Indian impact on the series. His presence will mean the Indians are capable of picking up 20 Australian wickets while another injury to him in Melbourne will mean the Australians going one up mentally moving into the New Year Test in Sydney. In fact, given the fragility of the Indian attack it might well work to India's advantage to get a fast bouncy track at the MCG in the first Test of the series. Most of India's recent overseas victories have been on bowler-friendly tracks, which help mask the deficiencies of India's quick bowling attack. In conditions conducive to fast bowling, lesser bowlers like Vinay Kumar or Abhimanyu Mithun can turn into a handful and India will be hoping that's the case down under over the next month. If good bowling conditions hold the key to India's chances, much also depends on Virender Sehwag and his abilities with the bat to establish a psychologi-cal hold over the Australians. In the Monkeygate series in 2007-08, it was Sehwag who helped turn the tables for India at Perth with a quick start in either innings on the fast bouncy WACA track. It was a dramatic change from the grinding approach adopted by the Indians at Melbourne and Sydney where the Australians managed to strangulate the Indian top order into submission. In a contest like India versus Australia played as much in the mind as on the field of play, Sehwag is crucial to India's chances in giving it back to the Australians. And then there is Sachin Tendulkar. Stuck at 99 hundreds for over seven months now, Sachin had reached Australia on December 8 to ensure he is in the best mental and physical space come Boxing Day. He practised for days in Melbourne and scored a flawless 92 retired in the tour match at Canberra. It was a deliberate act to not score the hundred which, he says, is best done at the Test match stage. He has scored a hundred in each of the four series he has played in Australia in 1992, 1999, 2003-04 and 2007-08 and there's no reason to suggest things will be any different this time. That the Australians are aware of Sachin's propensity to score runs in their country was best borne out by a Fox Sports discussion between Mark Waugh, Greg Blewett, Stuart McGill and Brenden Julian. When McGill mentioned that he was certain Sachin would score a hundred at the SCG, which could be the elusive 100th hundred, Waugh chided him by saying, "That's not the most revolutionary statement, Stuey! Rather, it is almost expected." That Sachin is the biggest draw is also borne out by the special themed exhibition at the cricket museum at the MCG. A number of Sachin's portraits and biographies are on display for the members and the December issue of the Yorker, magazine of the Melbourne Cricket Club, has a special feature on Sachin in Australia as its cover story. Every innings played by Tendulkar in Australia is documented in the feature and administrators at the MCG are hoping Sachin has his tryst with history in the first Test itself. Finally, with over 2,00,000 people expected to attend the Boxing Day Test over the first four days, this series is the best advertisement for a format of the game suffering from ill health. Test cricket, when played between traditional powerhouses of the world game in venues steeped in tradition, is alive, and that is the best New Year present for cricket and its administrators. One only hopes the action will match up to the hype. The writer is senior research fellow, University of Central Lancashire

Is Tendulkar a National Hero? (http://the-diplomat.com/sport-culture/2011/12/23/is-tendulkar-anational-hero/) By Sanjay Kumar | The Diplomat Sachin Tendulkar surpasses Sir Don Bradman (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/cricket/series-tournaments/india-in-australia/topstories/Sachin-Tendulkar-surpasses-Sir-Don-Bradman/articleshow/11247312.cms) By Sumit Mukherjee | TNN A Boxing Day Treat to Savor (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577114023397401602.html) By RICHARD LORD | Wall Street Journal Melbourne again (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/melbourne-again/891967/) By Desh Gaurav Chopra Sekhri | Indian Express Macaca 12-25-2011, 08:52 PM Our Uncivil Civil Society (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/25/india-journal-our-uncivilcivil-society/) By Anish Dayal | IndiaRealTime We suddenly have an identity now, a more sophisticated designation. We are no longer the masses or the undefined intellectual or consumerist middle class. We are the civil society. It is an epithet that in one go makes you feel more powerful and less apologetic about being the ruled and not the ruler. But how civil is this society? How civil are we? Great exemplary behavior at Ramlila Maidan by the multitudes which joined the Anna Hazare chorus is not a true reflection. That was a blip borne out of well channelized frenzy and the newness of the movement. The real lament may well be about us, each one of us, the individual leading up to the collective. Try standing in a queue anywhere, or get stuck with someone and forced to have a conversation. There is little chance that its not about how bad India has become, how bad is the traffic, how corrupt is everyone except us. Its the state of the nation talk, which safely presumes that the problem lies out there, somewhere in the undefined space which surrounds the pure and pious souls that each one of us possesses. Its you, not me. Its them, not us. From this thinking arises a demon which finds visibility almost every evening on news channels in the form of opinion and debate. In the name of democracy and freedom of speech, we get dollops of views and scoops of televised rage. The debate in India today is defined as more than half a dozen people of varying political and intellectual leanings shouting at you and at each other. Then there is the ubiquitous anchor, who adds to and usually ups the ante in order to achieve maximum cacophony. These are not frivolous public platforms. This is a media which reaches millions and hogs the popular mind space. It is a media which gives voice to both the metro-based intelligentsia and the various avatars of the common man. Therefore the inspiration for this brief deliberation upon the nature of debate in this country. Is this how we are or is this how we have become or is this how we are choosing to behave? According to recorded Indian traditions, a dialogue can be of three types: vaad, a discussion, which seeks to understand the opponents point of view and explain ones own in order to reach the truth; vivaad, an argument, which seeks to impose ones own point of view over that of another; and the third, vitandavaad, which merely seeks to demolish the other persons views, without really offering any alternative system. It does not require a vote to agree that between the three, understanding, imposing and demolishing, we have completely lost vaad, are hanging on to a bit of vivaad and mostly indulge in vitandavaad. This is undoubtedly the nature of debate in India today. Sadly. It is painful to hear our so-called intellectuals shouting at each other, cutting each other off and cross-talking when on the media. Its tragic to see well-heeled anchors inviting eminent people on their channels and then drowning them in their own opinions. It is downright depressing to see our Members of Parliament stall parliamentary proceedings by simply creating a din if there is opposition to their point of view. This

is nothing but vitandavaad in its most pure, distilled form. It has permeated the interstices of every forum, including our homes and our schools and our roads our very own microcosms. While Leonardo da Vinci pondered whether the greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions, Amartya Sen, the Nobel Laureate, immortalized the history of argumentative tradition in India in his brilliant tome The Argumentative Indian. Prof. Sen argues that the contemporary relevance of the dialogic tradition and of the acceptance of heterodoxy is hard to exaggerate. Discussions and arguments are critically important for democracy and public reasoning. Going beyond these basic structural priorities, the argumentative tradition, if used with deliberation and commitment, can also be extremely important in resisting social inequalities and in removing poverty and deprivation. Voice is a critical component of the pursuit of social justice. His caution on deliberation and commitment is noteworthy. Voice is critical, no doubt. But when replaced with noise or cacophony, it becomes either a saleable commodity in itself or a selfdestructive, all-consuming force that subsumes the very argument that it seeks to pursue or persuade. The ability to posture first and postulate later, to shout first and hear later, to be rhetorical always and rational never. This is the new omniscient mutant Indian adult. Two things therefore happen. First, we become an extremely loud and brash society, which thinks that the other human being across from you is always wrong, you are always right and you can never concede on any point since that will destroy your very existence on this Earth. Second, we lose all sense of pride in or desire for a collective opinion, a collective position, a collective wealth. Greater forms and opportunities of communication should have helped release the frustration, which maybe generations earlier experienced with a lack of ready access to public platforms. In the age of Twitter, the idea of a lack of opportunity to opine or inform is a joke. Ergo when there is so much public discourse, is there not a case for greater civility in approach? However, that itself has become the catastrophe. Vitandavaad, in the form of religious and social fundamentalism, in the form of personal attacks and assaults on public figures, in the form of rigid dogma-based rabble rousing, is the new venom. Is it coming from the same impatience which dictates much of the life on Indian roads when we jostle for space with nonsensical honking, or which prompts us to resist with every bone in our body the formation of a queue? Maybe and probably yes. The added element to this unexplainable cultural phenomenon is the new rush for lucre, your very own piece of the capitalistic pie, the drive to be better than the Joneses. This results in a unique new-masala mix Indian one who has argumentativeness in his cultural DNA, has grown up habituated to struggling and scrambling in short-supply situations and then, more recently, has been injected with the steroid of a liberalized economy and the aphrodisiac of the pursuit of happiness. Anything, even as harmless as a contrarian view, which comes in the way, is anathema. Sadly enough, this theme is handed down to the succeeding generation, too. Our children are told to go out there and get it, to acquire regardless of opposition or opinion. Rarely are instructions on inclusive growth or gentle persuasion doled out. Civility was meant for the ballroom waltz with the coy young lady, not for the hip-hop, house and techno nightclub. In young urban India, debates or disagreements on the street are increasingly settled with Tarantino-esque ease sigh, smile and shoot. Fractured homes and jilted loves now provide frontpage stories of chopped, unidentified bodies stuffed in gunny bags. These are the dots. And if you look hard enough, they are connected. Voltaires famous persuasion that I do not agree with what you have to say, but Ill defend to the death your right to say it is therefore probably an anachronism today. The nature of our debate thus hangs in the balance. Unless we imbue our argumentative

traditions with Prof. Sens deliberation and commitment, with civility and tolerance, with respect and forbearance, with vaad not vitandavaad, we are teetering on the edge of an abyss, where we may progress towards 9% growth but at the expense of building our nation. Anish Dayal is a lawyer based in Delhi and practices at the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court. An alumnus of Cambridge University, he works closely on policy and legislation, media, entertainment and sports law. The madness bug bites the Congress again.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-realtruth/entry/the-madness-bug-bites-the-congress-again) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Strong Lokpal, weak judiciary recipe for failure (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Swaminomics/entry/strong-lokpal-weak-judiciary-recipefor-failure) By SA Aiyar | Times of India Credit where it isn't due (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/creditit-isnt-due/459678/) Business Standard Editorial A few right steps (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-few-right-steps/891966/) By Nilesh Shah | Indian Express Allow airwave sharing (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2747363.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Game-changers in India Inc (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2747361.ece) By D.SAMPATHKUMAR | The Hindu BusinessLine Flip-flops in communication (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/C_R_L__Narasimhan/article2747261.ece) By C. R. L. NARASIMHAN India Getting Serious About Growth (http://blogs.the-americaninterest.com/wrm/2011/12/24/india-getting-serious-about-growth/) By Walter Russell Mead | The American Interest India Markets Weekahead: Time to build a long-term portfolio (http://blogs.reuters.com/indiaexpertzone/) By Ambareesh Baliga Top Business & Economic Events of 2011 (http://in.reuters.com/news/timeline? type=businessNews&tl=2011122405543135020) Reuters Macaca 12-26-2011, 08:27 PM Delhi's Year of Drama and Stasis The middle class and investors are frustrated with India's corrupt and inept politicians. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203479104577122284243746106.html) By SADANAND DHUME | Wall Street Journal It is only fitting that as the year draws to a close, the Anna Hazare movementwhich has dominated India's headlines since it burst on to the national stage in April with a demand for a tough new anticorruption ombudsmanis once again in the spotlight. Today Mr. Hazare, the 74-year-old activist who leads the movement, is scheduled to begin his third public fast this year. As of Boxing Day, more than 100,000 people had signed up online for his campaign to fill India's jails with protestors who feel that a bill currently before Parliament will create a toothless ombudsman (or lokpal in Hindi) beholden to the very politicians it's meant to police. Whether middle-class protestors fed up with corruption in public life will indeed end up flooding India's squalid prisons remains to be seen. Their current grouse hinges on abstruse technicalities about the independence of a federal investigation agencynot exactly the sort of thing that fires the average person's imagination. Mr. Hazare's supporters and the government may well come to a last-minute compromise before the three-day campaign kicks off on Dec. 30. Regardless of how the drama unfolds, two larger conclusions about 2011 remain unmistakable. Indian politics has entered a new era of turbulence, fueled by middle-class anger toward corrupt and inept politicians. And an inability to improve governanceto effectively link this new politics to better policiescould derail an economy that not so long ago was regarded as one of Asia's most

promising. To be sure, neither protest movements nor middle-class disdain for politicians are new phenomena in India. Grassroots outrage against perceived high-handedness and corruption helped topple governments in New Delhi in 1977 and 1989, and the rise of the Hindu-nationalist BJP to power in the 1990s was fueled as much by its (then) perceived probity as by passions released by its campaign to build a temple on the site of a disputed 16th century mosque in the northern town of Ayodhya. Nonetheless, the Anna Hazare movement marks a watershed. To begin with, aside from Mr. Hazare a former army truck driver with a seventh-grade educationthe movement's troika of high-profile lieutenants embody middle-class striving. Two of them, Arvind Kejriwal and Kiran Bedi, first entered public life through a brutally meritocratic national civil service examas a tax official and a police officer respectively. The third, Prashant Bhushan, practices law in the Supreme Court. All three are effortlessly bilingual in English and Hindi. They stand apart from a political class seen by its detractors as claiming power based on dynastic privilege and crude appeals to caste and creed, or by effectively buying the votes of the poor through populist government programs. The Hazare movement's ability to mobilize followers using the Internet, to communicate effortlessly through India's freewheeling 24-hour news channels, and to bring a notoriously apathetic middle class to the streets for a public cause, has no parallel in independent India's history. In short, for the first time since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1947 drowned a tiny minority of educated Indians in a sea of peasants, the middle classsome 300 million people by the most generous estimatehas found a voice in public life. It's not clear, however, that India's democracy will respond with the flexibility and imagination it needs to channel this new awareness toward practical solutions. If anything, the evidence thus far is discouraging. The Hazare movement itselfthough sparked by genuine idealismpushes the same old tired statist solutions to policy problems that have kept India backward to begin with. Where else would activists demand the creation of a new unwieldy government institution to solve problems brought on in large part by other large unwieldy government institutions? For its part, instead of an honest effort to give the country an independent anticorruption czaran unexceptionable goal in itself, if only a partial solution to the problemthe government has raised extraneous issues such as caste and religious quotas in the proposed new body. Meanwhile, foreign investors have begun to lose their stomach for the glacial pace of India's reforms. The suspension last month of a long-awaited decision to allow foreign direct investment in multibrand retail, which would have allowed in global stores such as Walmart and Tesco, crowns years of policy paralysis. Foreign investment fell for the third straight month in October to a paltry $1.2 billion. The rupee, Asia's worst performing currency in 2011, has lost nearly 20% against the dollar since March. Despite GDP growth slowing from nearly 9% to under 7% per year, and a fiscal deficit sure to overshoot the projected target of 4.6% for the year, the government has decided to plow ahead with an expensive food security bill that will offer subsidized grains to about two-thirds of the population. In an ideal world, the middle-class awakening embodied by the Hazare movement would force India's politicians to address the issue of corruption while deepening economic reform. Instead, the government has responded to the challenge with a familiar mix of obfuscation and populism. Should this trend continue, 2012 may well be the year that India's economy returns to a familiar placeas an Asian laggard overshadowed by its East Asian peers and largely ignored by the rest of the world. Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute

On a collision course (http://tribune.com.pk/story/312289/on-a-collision-course-2/) By Kuldip

Nayar | The Express Tribune Team Anna wants a lock to be put on Parliament. But its our duty to guard it (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/team-anna-wants-a-lock-to-be-put-on-parliament.-but-itsour-duty-to-guard-it/892339/) By Lalu Prasad | Indian Express Error of Commission (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/error-of-commission/892427/) Indian Express Editorial Why the Lokpal bill faces a constitutional challenge (http://www.rediff.com/news/special/why-thelokpal-bill-faces-a-constitutional-challenge/20111226.htm) By Sheela Bhatt | Rediff India Government, Activist Enter Anti-Graft Endgame (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203391104577122091854216590.html) By PAUL BECKETT | Wall Street Journal A question of balance (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/A-question-ofbalance/articleshow/11256874.cms) By Salman Khurshid | Times of India Lokpal is as Lokpal does (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/b-sraghavan/article2747362.ece) By B.S.RAGHAVAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Another constitutional authority cautions Team Anna.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/another-constitutional-authoritycautions-team-anna) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Comparison of the three versions of the Lokpal Bill (http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/00875/Comparison_of_the_t_875336a.pdf) The Hindu $128 billion siphoned out of India in a decade (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/128-billionsiphoned-out-of-India-in-a-decade/articleshow/11249526.cms) By Subodh Varma | Times of India Indian Politics in 2011 (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/26/indian-politics-in-2011/) IndiaRealTime HOW TO REVERSE THE POLITICISATION OF THE CBI ? (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4827.html) By B.Raman | South Asia Analysis Group How to reverse the politicisation of the CBI (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/how-to-reversethe-politicisation-of-the-cbi/20111226.htm) By B Raman | Rediff Macaca 12-26-2011, 08:31 PM Is the Economy Headed Back to 1991? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/26/is-theeconomy-headed-back-to-1991/) By Shefali Anand | IndiaRealTime Is Manmohan Singh, who brought India out of a financial tailspin in 1991, now leading the country back into another crisis? Twenty years ago, the current Prime Minister and then-finance minister, explained the urgency of implementing economic reforms in a historic budget speech. At the time, India was nearly bankrupt and on the verge of defaulting on its sovereign debt. The fault lay largely with Indias high current account deficit, which can increase levels of foreign debt, and a steep fiscal deficit, or the gap between the governments expenditure and its earnings, Mr. Singh explained. Meanwhile, the countrys foreign exchange reserves were not enough to pay its debt. Reforms proposed by Mr. Singh and the government in 1991 got India out of that mess and eventually on to a path of 8%-plus growth in gross domestic product. But in recent months, Indias economic picture is again looking grim. Growth has slowed sharply, down from the governments original target of 9% to around 6.5% for the year ending March 31, 2012, according to some estimates. The reform process has all but stalled. Indias current and fiscal deficit are both high, and a recent government bill to provide food security to Indias masses, will likely worsen Indias financial burden. It is fiscally irresponsible to propose undertaking spending without explaining where the funds will come from, Gita Gopinath, an economics professor at Harvard University, told Economic Times

newspaper. Some say things have changed sufficiently that todays troubles dont amount to an impending catastrophe. Were not on the verge of a crisis, says Sachchidanand Shukla, chief economist at Enam Securities Pvt in Mumbai. This time around, India has enough foreign exchange reserves to meet its debt obligations, he says. But in terms of the policy-making, were basically entering a regressive phase, says Mr. Shukla. Sentiment-wise theres been a huge downgrade for Indias economy, he says. Heres a look at how key pieces of current economic data compare to where India stood in 1991: Current Account Deficit (The difference between a nations total exports of goods, services and transfers, and its total imports of them) THEN: The current account deficit was estimated to be more than 2.5% of gross domestic product in 1990-91, said Mr. Singh in his speech. He described Indias balance of payments situation as exceedingly difficult. NOW: For years after the 1991 crises, the Indian government contained the current account deficit to less than 2% of GDP. But in recent years, the deficit has ballooned to 1991-like levels, thanks partly to higher imports and more recently lower exports. For the year through March 2012, economists expect the deficit to come at around 3% of GDP. Fiscal Deficit (The difference between the governments total revenue and its expenditure) THEN: The fiscal deficit is estimated at more than 8% of GDP in 1990-91, said Mr. Singh in his speech, calling it a cause for serious concern. He said It should be our objective to progressively reduce the fiscal deficit of the Central Governmentand to reduce the current account deficit in the balance of payments. NOW: The fiscal deficit for the year-ended March 2012 is expected to come in at 5.5% or 6% of GDP, much higher than the governments targeted 4.6%. The food subsidy bill will add to this burden, say economists, unless the government cuts back on its expenditure proportionately. Inflation THEN: Indias wholesale price index, a leading benchmark for inflation, increased 12.1% in the year ended March 31, 1991. Mr. Singh had called it a serious problem. He said: Inflation hurts everybody, more so the poorer segments of our population. NOW: Since early last year, the Reserve Bank of India has been battling 9% to 10% inflation, by increasing benchmark interest rates 13 times. The central bank, and economists, expect that for the year ending March 31, inflation will be around 7%. Foreign Exchange Reserves THEN: In early 1991, Indias foreign exchange reserves, comprising foreign currency, bonds and other assets, was around $1.2 billion. The current level of foreign exchange reserveswould suffice to finance imports for a mere fortnight, said Mr. Singh. NOW: After the opening up of the economy, foreign direct investment and foreign institutional investment into Indias capital markets helped boost Indias foreign exchange reserves. They now stand at $307 billion, according to the Reserve Bank. Economists say this can cover eight to nine months of Indias imports. External Debt THEN: External debt was 29% of GDP in March 1991, according to a recent research from Morgan Stanley. Persistent deficits, which were inevitably financed by borrowings from abroad, have led to

a continuous increase in external debt, said Mr. Singh in his 1991 speech. NOW: According to Morgan Stanley data, external debt was just 18% of GDP as of June 2011. Over the years, the composition of borrowing has changed. Mr. Shukla, the economist at Enam Securities, says that while in the nineties it was mostly government borrowing, in recent years Indian companies have been the major borrowers of foreign money, to grow their businesses or fund their short-term cash needs. Indian Rupee THEN: In a bid to improve Indias financial situation and attract a loan from the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Singh had instructed the central bank to devalue the rupee. This was done in two steps first by 9.5% against the U.S. dollar on July 1, 1991, and by another 11% two days later. NOW: In recent months, given Indias high current account deficit and muted foreign investment, market forces have pushed the Indian rupee sharply lower against the U.S. dollar. Its down nearly 18% since the beginning of the year to trade at around 52.70 rupees for one U.S. dollar. To resuscitate Indias economy in 1991, Mr. Singh had said: We must act fast and act boldly. The same holds true today, to bring India back to a 9% growth track.

The 1991 Speech Manmohan Singh Should Make Today (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/26/the-1991-speech-manmohan-singh-should-maketoday/) By Paul Beckett | IndiaRealTime Agricultural Policy Strategy, Instruments and Implementation: A Review and the Road Ahead (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16943.pdf) By Bhupat M Desai , Errol D' Souza , John W Mellor , Vijay Paul Sharma , Prabhakar Tamboli | Economic & Political Weekly National Manufacturing Policy: Making India a Powerhouse? (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16933.pdf) By Sunil Mani | Economic & Political Weekly Subscribing to digital (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/subscribing-todigital/459783/) Business Standard Editorial The very hurt locker (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/The-very-hurtlocker/Article1-787481.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Choking the banks (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/choking-the-banks/892425/) Indian Express Editorial Lack of long-term funds a challenge for housing sector (http://www.thehindu.com/business/article2750029.ece) By K. T. Jagannathan | The Hindu Stretched for funds (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Stretched-forfunds/articleshow/11256849.cms) Times of India Editorial The Right to Rotting Food, Inefficiently Delivered (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/26/economics-journal-the-right-to-rotting-foodinefficiently-delivered/) By Rupa Subramanya | IndiaRealTime Too little, too late (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/Too-little-toolate/Article1-787098.aspx) By Harsh Mander | Hindustan Times It can happen in India (http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Mumbai/It-can-happen-inIndia/Article1-787180.aspx) By Pramit Bhattacharya | Hindustan Times Do we know whose food is secured? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/do-we-knowwhose-food-is-secured/459661/) Business Standard Food bill: a vote-winner and budget-buster (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/25/india-foodbill-idINDEE7BM06120111225) By Abhijit Neogy and Mayank Bhardwaj Food grains for food security (http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2011/12/26/food-grainsfor-food-security/) By D H Pai Panandiker | Reuters

Promise of Food Bill is enormous (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/promisefood-bill-enormous-652) Deccan Chronicle Editorial Macaca 12-26-2011, 08:41 PM A university at war (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-university-at-war/892341/) By Saritha Rai | Indian Express If you want proof that higher education in India is a great big mess, look no further than Bangalore University. It is a university, not a riot site, and yet you can find hordes of policemen stationed there, looking to quell trouble. It is also the university whose vice-chancellor has sought police protection to walk about and function in his own campus. An ongoing power struggle between the vice chancellor and the registrar of the university has made things worse. Earlier this week, despite the police throwing a protective ring around him, the vice-chancellor, Prabhu Dev, was hit on the head with a stick by a group of protesting students. The university has seen four protests by different sets of students this month alone. In addition, teachers refused to conduct classes to protest an attack against a colleague, the director of distance education, by a right-wing group. If the students, teachers and the vice chancellor in one of the countrys large and better-known universities are all stirred up, it heralds the worst of times for the institution. All academic activity has come to a stop. Mind you, this is the city to which much of India migrates in search of a good education. Its colleges have applicants from the far corners of India and even overseas. Even the Chinese come to Bangalore to learn English and get themselves degrees in areas like engineering and computer applications. Bangalore University is one of Indias oldest, its origins back to 1886 when the British government launched it as Central College. It was named Bangalore University in 1964 to consolidate the citys higher education institutions. In its heyday, the university had illustrious students like Nobel laureate C.V. Raman, who was a researcher at the university, and technocrat Bharat Ratna M. Visweswaraiah. More recently in 2001, the university was accorded five star status by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council of the University Grants Commission. But today the university is in a state of disarray. Examinations and revaluations are the sticking points for the students. Rural students complain of lack of access to revaluation facilities. Students are yet to receive marks cards years after exams have been held. Some students are still waiting for revaluation results three years after applying. Others complain of discrepancies in their marks cards, including being marked absent for examinations and being wrongly awarded marks in single digits. When students sloganeer, We want justice, and the vice-chancellor describes the circumstances as mafia-like, the situation is clearly very dire. Here is one instance of apparently chaotic administration by the university. Some exams held in August this year in certain subjects of the distance learning undergraduate and graduate courses were declared null after wide accounts of malpractice. A new date for re-examination was announced, December 14,. But the exam was not held because some of the centres had not installed closed-circuit TVs to check malpractice as mandated by the university. The students allege that the university is playing with their future with such muddled actions. A television channel exposed the sorry state of the 200 students enrolled for Bangalore Universitys recently launched four-year integrated science course. These students make do with a guest house instead of proper space on the campus. Their chemistry lab does not have a single piece of equipment, their physics lab has only benches and its library is filled with rows of beds. In the past years, several complaints of malpractice were received about the process of selection and awarding Ph.Ds. Finally this year, in an attempt to elevate the standards of its 64 Ph.D streams, the university recently held an entrance exam and took it online. Over 1,500 students appeared. Only 19 per cent managed to get through. The university should have rightfully been a feeder for the proliferation of Indian and multinational corporations based in the city. Instead, it has become an arena for power play between right-wing

and other political interests, while administrators with suspect motives further their own agendas.

In 1936 or today, the same vitality can keep you forever young (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/in-1936-or-today-the-same-vitalitycan-keep-you-forever-young) By Hari Chand Aneja | The National Women on Campus: Negotiating Spaces and Silences (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16936.pdf) By Shadab Bano , Bijayalaxmi Nanda , Mahuya Bandyopadhyay , Nonica Datta | Economic & Political Weekly Koodankulam Diary (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16934.pdf) By L Ramdas , Lalita Ramdas | Economic & Political Weekly Regulating Internet Content (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16928.pdf) Economic & Political Weekly Editorial Mumbai develops a taste for fight clubs (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/26/mumbaifull-contact-fight-sport) By Jason Burke | The Guardian In Shillong, Carols and Dohneiiong for Christmas (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/inshillong-carols-and-dohneiiong-for-christmas/) By ROCKY SINGH and MAYUR SHARMA | India Ink India's 'little England' at risk of vanishing (http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/southasia/indias-little-england-at-risk-of-vanishing) Agence France-Presse For the people (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/For-thepeople/articleshow/11244826.cms) By Shanti Bhusha | Times of India Macaca 12-26-2011, 08:47 PM Pakistan conundrum (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Pakistanconundrum/articleshow/11256819.cms) Times of India Editorial Tensions between Pakistan's civilian and military leaderships have been simmering for some time now. Ever since the memogate controversy first broke, relations between Rawalpindi GHQ and Islamabad have plummeted. This was manifest last week in Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani's combative speech in parliament, reiterating the army's accountability to the legislature. Earlier, the defence ministry had admitted before the supreme court that it had no control over the army or the ISI. Although the supposed loss of Pakistan's external sovereignty is being loudly bemoaned, the lack of internal sovereignty of the civilian government, a key factor in Pakistan's political instability as it creates multiple centres of authority, is now turning critical. What adds to Pakistan's complicated scenario is that the army doesn't necessarily want to mount another coup at this juncture. It has been a happy backseat driver in the current dispensation and would prefer a pliant government to a messy takeover. Acute corruption and economic woes have increasingly soured the popular image of the government. But as long as Pakistan's security establishment remains tolerant of jihadi militias, normal commercial activity is impeded and foreign investment dries up. The army's refusal to shun the strategic use of terrorists means that the civilian leadership has no choice but to go along with this tactic. Having said that, the blame for the army's influence over the Pakistani polity also needs to be shared by the political parties. The latter have long jockeyed for the army's backing as a route to power. The recent rise in popularity of former cricketer Imran Khan's Tehreek-e-Insaf party may not be an exception. Khan's fiery rhetoric against the US while advocating a softer approach towards jihadis ignores the issue of the collateral damage such an approach inflicts on Pakistan's economy. With his mass appeal swelling - as evident from the recent rally in Karachi - Khan with the blessings of the army could become a serious political contender.

As long as institutions operate beyond their constitutionally mandated jurisdictions, instability will continue to loom over Pakistan. And as long as the Pakistani army refuses to comprehensively crack down on jihadi groups, Pakistan's image in the international community will continue to suffer, driving away foreign investors and triggering periodic political crises. With tensions between the army and the government coming to the fore, the jockeying for power is set to continue. New Delhi would do well to factor all this in. Opening lines of communication to the military as well as new players in Pakistan's polity should be a priority.

Will India-Pakistan Relations Improve? (http://business.in.com/article/biggest-questions-of2012/will-indiapakistan-relations-improve/31502/1) Pakistan is in turmoil. Its troubles in the tribal areas show little sign of abating; the economy too has taken a dive. The impending withdrawal of the USA from Afghanistan and the sudden acrimony in Pakistan-USA relations has also complicated the situation for India By Stephen Cohen | Forbes India Saeed motivated the 26/11 attack squad (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Saeed-motivated-the-26-11-attack-squad/Article1-787561.aspx) By Rajesh Ahuja | Hindustan Times Headley chargesheet: Why Mumbai crime branch is red-faced (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/headley-chargesheet-why-mumbai-crime-branch-is-redfaced/20111226.htm) Press Trust Of India 26/11: NIA and Mumbai Crime Branch in chargesheet wars (http://www.rediff.com/news/slideshow/slide-show-1-mumbai-attacks-nia-and-mumbai-crime-branch-in-chargesheetwars/20111226.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Macaca 12-26-2011, 08:53 PM Pakistan's faultlines The country's military is now fighting three wars but is talking to the Taliban the start of the endgame? (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/26/pakistan-military-taliban-endgame) By Mohammed Hanif | The Guardian "When we arrive at the endgame, these kinds of things are inevitable." Pakistan's former intelligence chief General Hamid Gul was on a TV talkshow referring to the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a midnight Nato attack along the Pak-Afghan border. General Gul sounded reassuring. He made the endgame sound exciting it was as if we were already playing in extra time and soon we'd all be able to do high-fives, go home and watch the highlights. All except the thousands of Pakistanis and many more Afghans who didn't make it to the endgame. As someone who oversaw the end of another great game three decades ago, Gul should know that these games have a way of lingering on. He chose to ignore the fact that the last endgame, which started with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, never really ended. As the Soviet troops began to leave Afghanistan in the late 80s, Pakistan was plunged into a series of massacres; bombs exploded in Karachi's busiest bazaar killing hundreds, an ammunition depot blew up near the capital Islamabad, raining fire on bewildered civilians for two days. Pakistan's military dictator General Zia ul Haq, the self-appointed godfather of the Afghan jihad, was killed along with his top generals and the US ambassador to Pakistan when a plane blew up in midair. Although none of these atrocities were properly investigated, the masters of the endgame managed to convince people that they were being punished for liberating Afghanistan from godless communists. And what happened to that blighted neighbour, Afghanistan, whom Pakistan had helped liberate? Egged on by Pakistan and India, the opposing mujahideen factions turned their guns on their own capital, Kabul, and reduced it to rubble. The fighting rumbled on for two more decades before Nato troops invaded and told the Afghans at gunpoint that they were free. Not all those Afghans were convinced of that during the 10 more years of fighting that followed. Pakistan, during this period, hosted about four million Afghans and two million internal refugees who changed the country's landscape for ever.

And now we are being told that we are approaching another endgame. There is no dearth of very well educated analysts who tell Pakistanis that what happened 30 years ago is not relevant any more, that the world has changed, that we should move on, get over it. The cheerleaders of a perpetual war in Afghanistan seem to suggest that collective amnesia is the only cure for all our problems. We are told that we should "learn to deal with it" because Pakistan, after all, has been harbouring bad people in its own backyard. The stock argument jumps from a wartorn border to a nuclear-armed state hellbent on taking down the world with it. Pakistan, it has been suggested often enough, doesn't really need political solutions but some kind of therapy. In the collective imagination of these analysts, the Pak-Afghan border is a rugged area where nothing grows, where people trade in nothing but arms and dreams of world domination; basically a bad place where bad people do bad things. When US drones shoot from the skies they kill bad people. When Pakistani or Afghan troops kill, they kill bad people. The real war is far removed from the media: it happens in villages with unpronounceable names, peopled by tribes whose motives are unfathomable. Whole communities have been lumped together like targets in a videogame. The only time we hear the rumble of war is when people in uniform are killed. These soldiers can be American or Pakistani or sometimes even Afghan. Then our analysts are bewildered, they seem to be suggesting that we might be fighting a war, but who gave the enemy the right to shoot back? Any sign of resistance is trotted out as proof that continued, overwhelming aggression is justified. It has never occurred to the planners and cheerleaders of this war that maybe there is one thing that these bad tribal people might share with the rest of us and that is the base urge not to get killed. It has never been discussed that only a decade ago, along this border, lived people who farmed and traded and sent their children to schools and hoped that they would get good grades. But then again we are told that those lives belong in an imagined past, we should get over it and throw ourselves into the good fight. It has often been said that Pakistan's military establishment has been fighting on both sides of this conflict. What is often ignored is the fact that the Pakistan army has been fighting a third fight: against its own people. Having bankrolled three earlier military dictatorships in Pakistan, Washington's policy-makers, instead of learning from history, decided to rebrand the "theatre of war" as Af-Pak. It is an attempt to wean Pakistan's military off its Indian obsession. The change of logo in this war doesn't change historic realities, though. Pakistan's military establishment is scared of India's size. India is scared of Pakistan's old habit of using freelance militants. Now both countries seem to have reached the conclusion that Afghanistan must burn so that they can feel safe and secure. India, in a perverse way, is emulating Pakistan, not realising that Pakistan hasn't become any safer by meddling in Afghanistan. If the declared strategy is fight-build-talk, then there has been a lot of talking about talking to Taliban. Pakistan wants to talk to the Taliban. Nato wants to talk to the Taliban. Pakistan alleges India is talking to the Taliban. But no one wants anyone else to talk to the Taliban. Meanwhile the Nato war machine grinds on with its own internal logic. Fight-build-talk doesn't make any sense to anyone except the property speculators of Kabul or the war contractors. The exasperation is palpable, why haven't we won after spending all the money and doing all the strategic reviews? America went hunting for Bin Laden in Afghanistan and a decade later found him leading a retired life outside a Pakistan military cantonment. When US leaders scratch their heads and ask whether Pakistan's army was complicit or just incompetent, all they need to do is to ask Pakistani people and they will get their answer: both. When you rent an army to fight your battles, you also get a country of 200 million people pulling in another direction. The Pakistan army might be incompetent, it may not know how to protect the country, but it does know how to protect its own interests. It has seen the future and it looks exactly like the past.

CARTE BLANCHE: Nothing but a lie... (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\27\story_27-12-2011_pg3_5) By Mehmal Sarfraz | Daily Times Correction of balance of power is a real issue (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\27\story_27-12-2011_pg3_4) By Babar Ayaz | Daily Times Pakistan to sack army chief Kayani, ISI boss Pasha? (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slideshow-1-pakistan-to-sack-army-chief-kayani-isi-boss-pasha/20111226.htm) Rediff Pakistan mulls sacking army chief Kayani and ISI boss Pasha: Report (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pakistan-mulls-sacking-army-chief-Kayani-andISI-boss-Pasha-Report/articleshow/11254793.cms) Press Trust Of India Macaca 12-26-2011, 08:59 PM Strategic sensitivities (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/26/strategic-sensitivities.html) By Muhammad Amir Rana | Dawn PAKISTANS strategic sensitivities are growing on its western borders. Pakistan has set up more than 700 security check posts along the Pak-Afghan border, as low-intensity warfare has increasingly gained more importance in the national security doctrine despite efforts to ward off such scenarios. The May 2 US operation to track down Osama bin Laden and the Nov 26 Nato air strikes on two Pakistani military check posts in Mohmand Agency, which caused the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers, the subsequent suspension of supplies to Nato forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan and the vacating of the Shamsi airbase by the US further increased these concerns, which need to be adjusted in the strategic doctrine. Changes in the strategic doctrine cannot come about overnight and have to factor in how the situation would evolve after the exit of Nato troops from Afghanistan. Pakistan did not have any major armed conflict along the Afghan border and had not deployed regular army units there until after 9/11. Pakistan deployed its regular forces at the border for the first time to stop infiltration of Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants when US-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime from power. Afghanistan has also stationed troops along the border where small-scale armed clashes with Pakistani forces have become the norm. According to data compiled by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, from 2007 to 2010, Nato forces and the Afghan National Army violated Pakistans borders at least 194 times. The violations included missile and rocket attacks on Pakistani check posts by Afghan forces, clashes between security forces and air and land incursions into Pakistan. In 2011, as many as 67 such incidents were reported in which 57 Pakistani soldiers were killed. A new and worrying development for Pakistan on its western borders has been cross-border attacks by Afghanistan-based militants on Pakistani security forces posts. At least 30 such strikes have been reported across Pakistans border with Afghanistan at Chitral, Upper and Lower Dir and Bajaur and Kurram in Fata, leading to the killing of 250 Pakistani security personnel and civilians. These militants are part of Taliban factions, who fled to Afghanistans border provinces, mainly Kunar, and their attacks have contributed to escalation in bilateral tensions. The third issue of concern is Afghanistans internal stability and the Afghan armys continued lack of capacity. According to analysts, US and Nato efforts to develop the security forces in Afghanistan have focused on numbers rather than quality. Also, the loyalty and credibility of Afghan security forces remain highly questionable. Analysts argue that the Afghan National Army is far from ready to assume operational command and tackle security responsibilities on its own. A major concern for Pakistan is the likely scenario of growing instability in Afghanistan after the Nato troops pull out. That can create trouble on the Pakistani side of the border as many political elements in Pakistans Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province are tied to power brokers on both sides. The nature of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan may trigger border tensions from time to time. The fourth major reason for growing strategic sensitivities is the concentration of militant forces along both sides of the border, which may continue to play the role of irritant not only in bilateral

ties but also in relation to the international community. Indias role in Afghanistan is also an issue central to the changing thinking on matters of strategic interest to Pakistan. The major casualty in this strategic transformation has been the Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement considered an important pact for expanding economic ties between the two countries and also with the Central Asian region. International gas pipeline and electricity transmission projects such as Tapi and Casa-1000 have still not materialised because of security concerns, mainly the decade-long insurgency in Afghanistan. In this perspective, some attempts have been made by the two countries and by the US to improve the situation. Although most of these attempts were aimed at normalising bilateral relations through developing cooperation in the security and economy sectors, the border security issue has remained at the core of these efforts. In April 2011, Pakistans Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani and ISI director general Lt Gen Shuja Pasha visited Kabul in a bid to establish an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned joint peace commission and made efforts for negotiations with the Taliban. The process continued relatively smoothly until the assassination of ex-Afghan president and head of the High Peace Council Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011. Despite a cooperation mechanism in the form of the Pakistan-Afghanistan-US tripartite commission established in 2003, which also comprises a border security sub-committee, and provisions and blueprints for sharing intelligence under the military intelligence-sharing working group, blame for cross-border incursions and attacks has been hurled from both sides of the border. A meeting of the tripartite commissions military border working group was convened in Peshawar on July 6 this year on Pakistans request. The committee suggested the establishment of a single point of contact with all Afghan national security forces through a hotline contact between the Pakistan Army and Afghan National Army, regular border flag meetings between local commanders and interaction/jirgas between the maliks of villages on either side of the border. But all these attempts have failed to find a workable mechanism, which has emboldened the militants to roam freely across the border and launch attacks on both sides of the border. This is a very delicate situation for Pakistan as any adjustment in its security doctrine would not only be related to the geo-political interests of the country but also to a change in the military structure which the Pakistan economy would barely be able to sustain. Another important aspect of any possible shift would be the sensitivities on Pakistans eastern borders with India. The threat perception on the eastern border would be crucial to adjustments in the national security doctrine.

Inquiries and coups (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84353&Cat=9) By Brian Cloughley | The News Pakistan demands a new US security deal to stop raids (http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/pakistan-demands-a-new-us-security-dealto-stop-raids) By Moosa Hasan | The National U.S. Prepares for a Curtailed Relationship With Pakistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/world/asia/us-preparing-for-pakistan-to-restrict-support-forafghan-war.html) By ERIC SCHMITT | The New York Times Macaca 12-26-2011, 09:04 PM Pakistani Christian on death row cooks own meals for fear of being poisoned A Pakistani Christian on death row after being convicted of blasphemy has described how she has to cook her own meals for fear of being poisoned in her first interview since being condemned to hang. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8977950/Pakistani-Christian-on-deathrow-cooks-own-meals-for-fear-of-being-poisoned.html) By Rob Crilly | Daily Telegraph The case of Asia Bibi has been taken up by Pakistan's small band of liberal reformers since it was reported by The Daily Telegraph in November last year. But it has also exposed the power wielded by extremist clerics and the persecution faced by a tiny Christian minority.

In her first interview from behind bars, she described the miserable conditions in prison as she waits for the chance to appeal against her conviction. "I am allowed to go out for only 30 minutes every day, and allowed to meet my family for one hour every Tuesday," she told Life for All, a Christian organisation. "I am given raw material to cook for myself, since the administration fears I might be poisoned, as other Christians accused of blasphemy were poisoned or killed in the jail." She added that a prison guard had recently been suspended for trying to strangle her. Human rights campaigners believe Pakistan's blasphemy laws are being abused to settle scores or persecute religious minorities. Mrs Bibi who uses a common Urdu honorific in place of her surname of Noreen was arrested after a row with women as they worked in the fields of rural Punjab. In court, she said she had been asked to fetch water. Some of the other women all Muslims refused to drink the water as it had been brought by a Christian and was therefore "unclean", according to Mrs Bibi's evidence. In the row that followed she was accused of defaming the Prophet Mohammed, which she denies. That was enough for a death sentence, although Pakistan's president has imposed a moratorium on hangings since taking power in 2008. This year, two of her high-profile supporters have been assassinated, including Salman Taseer, governor of Punjab, who was shot dead by one of his own bodyguards. The assassin has since been feted by religious leaders and many ordinary Pakistanis. Mrs Bibi, who has five children, said she prayed for her freedom but knew it could come with a high price. "I am hopeful that I will be released, although there is a bounty of about $8,000 offered by the Islamic clerics to anyone who will kill me. I have left everything on God, I will accept His will." Snipers have been deployed on church roofs in Lahore during Christmas to protect against attacks in a reminder of the threats faced by Christians.

The missing discourse (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/26/the-missing-discourse.html) By Shandana Khan Mohmand | Dawn The day the music died (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/26/the-day-the-music-died.html) By Hajrah Mumtaz | Dawn Macaca 12-27-2011, 07:56 PM Some surprising signs in Pakistan (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/somesurprising-signs-pakistan-911) Deccan Chronicle Editorial Historically, Pakistan has been a state driven by crises, much of them self-generated in order to attract international chiefly American assistance and attention. At a fundamental level, this has been the case because all institutions created in the name of democracy have been permitted to be overwhelmed by one of them, the Army, to such a degree that there has been wide acquiescence in the belief that the armed forces know best. Is this unhappy, if hugely undemocratic, state of affairs in a state of flux? Is it changing? Are unusual and unanticipated processes being unleashed in the country? Or is it merely that what is perceived as the all-powerful Army is just lying low in the face of an extraordinary challenge from the countrys civilian government? The questions are legitimate, but no one might have the answers yet. We shall know the score only as we go along. But whats clear is that surprisingly for Pakistan, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has stood up in Parliament and demanded that the Army and its shady intelligence arm, Inter-

Services Intelligence, frequently called a state within a state, report to Parliament and to the countrys elected government. He also pulled up the ISI chief for not first briefing the elected PM on his conversations with Ijaz Haidar, the Pakistan-American businessmen at the centre of the dubious Memogate affair. Tantalising developments such as these have not occurred before. Mr Gilanis sharp comments came after the defence ministry acknowledged in Parliament that the Army and the ISI do not report to the defence ministry. Just two days ago, the Pakistan Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, did not show up at an official dinner hosted by President Asif Ali Zardari. The Armys disdain of the civilians is not news in Pakistan. But the fact that the civilian leadership has chosen to stand up in the House to demand compliance from the Army is certainly extraordinary. There have even been rumours that the government may sack the Army chief and the head of the ISI. Such developments denote the gulf that has grown between the countrys real rulers the armed forces and its apparent rulers. More, they are likely to induce shock among Pakistan-watchers. What gives the civilian leaders courage is a mystery. Is it some foreign power? Or is it merely competitive politics in relation to cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khans Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, whose popularity is rising as elections draw near. In such a situation, India in particular needs to observe caution. India and Pakistan have this week engaged in high-level discussions on confidence-building measures. Nevertheless, we should remain on guard against surprise manoeuvres initiated by the Army or at its behest.

The PMs statements (http://tribune.com.pk/story/312727/the-pms-statements/) The Express Tribune Editorial Institutional infighting to be avoided (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\28\story_28-12-2011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Offence and defence (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84538&Cat=8) The News Editorial Remembering Jinnah in December (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=84540&Cat=9) By Liaquat H Merchant | The News Vicious circle of politics (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\28\story_28-122011_pg3_2) By Abdul Quayyum Khan Kundi | Daily Times Dangerous moments (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/27/dangerous-moments.html) By Mohammad Waseem | Dan Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:00 PM Divide and fail (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/dividefail-/459933/) Business Standard Editorial Pakistan establishment is more polarised than ever, making it less likely that the states problems will be addressed. Is Pakistan headed for yet another military coup? Or another election? The signals emanating from Islamabad and Rawalpindi are unclear, but a leaked memo this month suggesting the civilian government had sought US help to rein in the powerful military-ISI complex has unleashed a fresh set of tensions between traditional adversaries in the Pakistani establishment. Certainly both sides seem to be involved in an intricate two-step of threat and placation. Mr Gilanis outburst last week warning of conspiracies against the civilian government and describing the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military of running a state within a state had analysts sit up and take notice. Few civilian governments in Pakistan, which has been ruled by the military for 33 of its 64year history, have been so directly confrontational. Coming just when tensions between the US and the armed forces ratcheted up after Pakistani soldiers were killed in a border skirmish, Mr Gilanis statements assume fresh significance. Not that the military establishment seems particularly cowed. Last weekend, Pakistans powerful army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, not only gave President Asif Ali Zardaris official dinner in honour of Dai Bingguo, representative of Hu Jintao, the go-by, he did the same for a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. This is close to insubordination to the commander-in-chief and the countrys executive head. Yet, not only does General Kayani remain in harness in his Rawalpindi headquarters, both Mr Zardari and Mr Gilani have hastened to assure Parliament that there were no

plans to dismiss either him or Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the head of ISI, partners in the alternative power structure in Pakistan. Messrs Kayani and Pasha are not given to articulating their thoughts publicly they prefer to do so via favoured media, which has duly suggested foul intent by the civilian government (which, in its turn, claims the incriminating memo is forged). But it is clear that this upping of the ante is a result of a new threat perception by Rawalpindi. The US has responded to aggressive Pakistani feints by threatening to withhold funding, and it clearly plans to remain a player in Af-Pak even as it reaches across to strengthen ties with India. The default option of a coup, therefore, probably looks less attractive right now. That is why much is being read into the massive rally held by former cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan on Christmas Day. Unlike the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party, Mr Khan lacks a popular base, but is known to enjoy the backing of the military and conservative elements of the Pakistani establishment. He wisely chose an agnostic topic to rail against: corruption. Even so, the 100,000odd people who turned up at a rally can be considered a proxy for the popular support the military can muster if it comes to a contest at the hustings. But the deeply polarised nature of the Pakistani polity is unlikely to solve the deeper problems of a failed state.

The Baloch: a reluctant citizenry (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\28\story_28-12-2011_pg3_5) By Qaisar Rashid | Daily Times Macaca

12-27-2011, 08:05 PM Losing Pakistan, Losing Afghanistan? (http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/12/27/if-2011-was-aturbulent-year-for-obamas-foreign-policy-2012-looks-set-to-be-worse/#losing-pakistan-losingafghanistan) By TONY KARON | Time The foreign policy crisis horizon shows little respect for the calendar New Year: The Obama Administration ought to have a pretty good idea of the crises that await it in different global hotspots as it braces for election year, 2012. But a recurring theme in the current menu of challenges, whether in the Middle East, north or south Asia, Africa or Europe, is the declining leverage available to Washington to shape favorable outcomes. President Obama's reelection prospects may be in part shaped by events from America's shores, and yet in most cases the outcome of those events will be determined by others. If 2011 seemed unusually turbulent, 2012 well, best fasten that seatbelt. Herewith, a survey of the top ten global crisis issues facing the U.S. in the new year.

That which has for years been obvious to anyone willing to see beyond official pronouncements has finally become unmistakable even to the casual observer: The U.S. and Pakistan are pursuing different, and often conflicting objectives in Afghanistan. The illusions that have guided a decade of U.S. policy in Afghanistan have been shattered: whether the final straw came in the form of the Ray Davis incident last winter, or the raid on Abottabad that killed Osama bin Laden, the attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul by the Pakistan-backed Haqqani network, or the accidental killing of more than 20 Pakistani troops by NATO aircraft in a border incident in December (which prompted Islamabad to shut down NATO supply lines to its Afghan mission and order the U.S. to vacate a base from which drone missions are flown). The U.S. is reportedly now acknowledging the limits of its relations with Pakistan even as it tactically escalates a war in Afghanistan in which the supply lines depend on Pakistani goodwill. Pakistan has its own strategic interests in Afghanistan, which include installing a friendly government in Kabul, as distinct from the current one which Islamabad views as a proxy for India. And where its interests diverge from those of the U.S., it has shown time and again that it will pursue its own course. While U.S. officials routinely insist that Pakistan ought to share Washingtons goals lest it be drowned in its own homegrown extremist problem, the generals who are the power behind the throne in Islamabad see getting the U.S. to leave Afghanistan as the key to tamping down militancy inside Pakistan a battle that has cost Pakistan tens of thousands of lives. Not only has Pakistan consistently refused to act against the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis; it is also

moving to negotiate understandings with some of those militant groups on its own soil against which it has previously fought. Plainly, the Pakistanis are beginning to act on the basis that the U.S. is on its way out of Afghanistan, and hoping that China will make up for any shortfalls in aid created by distancing itself from Washington. Afghan President Hamid Karzai seems to share the same assumption, shaking off U.S. tutelage on issues ranging from corruption and governance to negotiations with the Taliban and localized security arrangements. Pakistan is not going to make life easier for the U.S. and Karzai in Afghanistan in the coming year, or help them shape a transition towards U.S. withdrawal on terms unfavorable to Pakistans goals. Theres more chance, unfortunately, of the increasing hostility between the U.S. and Pakistan leading to ever more dangerous clashes.

Next Year's Wars (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/next_years_wars?page=0,3) By LOUISE ARBOUR | Foreign Policy Next Year's Wars (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/next_years_wars?page=0,2) By LOUISE ARBOUR | Foreign Policy Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:13 PM How Pakistan Kids Itself on China (http://the-diplomat.com/2011/12/28/how-pakistan-kids-itselfon-china/) By Richard Weitz | The Diplomat Chinas senior foreign policymaker, Dai Bingguo, spent the last few days in Islamabad assessing conditions in the country, as well as the state of China-Pakistan relations. He also pledged Chinas continued economic and security assistance to Pakistan, misleading some Pakistanis into thinking that Beijing will ride to their rescue. The reality, though, is that the Chinese government has made clear in past crises that, while it seeks close ties with Pakistan, Beijing is unwilling to bankroll a break between Islamabad and Washington. The Pakistani situation is perhaps the most complex it has ever been. Islamabads ties with the United States and NATO are strained over border clashes, terrorism, and other issues. Meanwhile, Islamabad itself has been swept up with rumors of yet another military coup. All this chaos and uncertainty is calling into question Beijings geopolitical plans for Afghanistan and the rest of South Asia. Its been an annus horribilis for Pakistani-U.S. relations, beginning in January with the Raymond Davis affair, the dispute over the elevated U.S. drone attacks on Pakistani territory, the May 2 Special Forces attack on bin Ladens compound at Abbottabad in central Pakistan, the September attacks by a Pakistani-linked terrorist group against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, and finally the November 26 cross-border clash in which NATO forces killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers and wounded many others. The Pakistani government has retaliated for the latest incident by closing the two Afghan-Pakistani border crossings at Chaman and Torkham to NATOs supply convoys, giving U.S. personnel 15 days to vacate an air base in Balochistan used to assist drone attacks against insurgents and terrorists in northwest Pakistan, and suspending certain joint activities. Pakistan also withdrew Pakistani liaison officers from the Afghan-Pakistan border coordination centers and NATO headquarters in Kabul, boycotted the December 5 Bonn conference on Afghanistan, reinforced its border defenses, relaxed its rules of engagement, and launched a comprehensive review of Pakistans security cooperation with NATO and the United States. At home, the Pakistani military leadership and the Zardari government have come into open confrontation, with each accusing members of the other institution of plotting against it. The military forced the dismissal of the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington a few weeks ago over a leaked memo that worried about the prospects of a coup. The day before Dais arrival, Gilani told the National Assembly that, "Conspiracies are being hatched to pack up an elected government." Dai, an expert on South Asian affairs, visited Islamabad as a representative of Chinese President Hu Jintao, nominally to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Sino-Pakistan diplomatic relations and the closing of the Year of China-Pakistan friendship. As State Councillor, Dai outranks Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.

The Chinese government has some of its closest allies within Pakistans military and intelligence establishments. Dai conferred for some time with Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen. Khalid Shameem Wynne. The details of their discussion werent released in public, but Beijing probably wouldnt welcome a coup at this troubled time. After all, economic ties between China and Pakistan continue to develop, with two-way trade now exceeding $10 billion. Chinese firms have made substantial investments in Pakistans defense industry, energy, engineering, information technology, mining, telecommunications, as well as banking, transportation, and other infrastructure sectors. China provides technical assistance in such areas as agricultural production, environmental protection, natural resource exploitation, and outer space research. Beijing particularly favors high-profile mega projects such the Karakorum Highway, Gwadar Port, Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex, Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, Jinnah Sports Stadium and Pakistan-China Friendship Centre. During Dais visit, the two governments furthered their goal of expanding bilateral economic ties by signing a free-trade agreement (establishing the China-Pakistan Free Trade area), an accord to upgrade the Karakoram Highway, and a $1.6 billion (10 billion RMB) currency swap agreement between Bank of China and the State Bank of Pakistan. The latter would allow Chinese and Pakistanis to use both rupees and yuan as exchangeable currencies. In addition to the $250 million Chinese credit for upgrading and realigning the Karakoram Highway, the Chinese provided a $464 million loan to modernize the Guddu power plant. Some of these deals fell under the rubric of an extension of the Sino-Pakistani Five-Year Economic Cooperation Plan. They also appear to have made further progress in realizing Chinas offer to construct additional nuclear power plants in Pakistan, but this controversial assistance isnt being publicized. In terms of future opportunities, the Chinese government is also seeking to attract Pakistani investment to Chinas Xinjiang Province, which borders Pakistan and several Central Asian countries, by offering Pakistani firms a five-year tax waiver on their operations. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is preparing to organize a consortium to finance a $1.2 billion IranPakistan gas pipeline. A contribution of this magnitude would be six times greater than the $300 million China provided to construct Pakistan's Gadwar Port, and expectations are that the Chinese will eventually build a railway and supporting infrastructure between China and Pakistan. All this has been welcomed in Pakistan. An upbeat Christmas Day editorial in a leading Pakistani newspaper, The Nation, said that the visit and other evidence of Sino-Pakistani cooperation would provide the hope that the government is finally realizing that in the present day world of hostile and indifferent Western powers and the U.S., our survival lies in further strengthening our friendship with this time-tested friend. The paper reviewed all the economic and other help China has provided Pakistan without asking for anything in return, reminded us of how friends behave. It added that, The U.S. could do well to take a leaf out of China's book in its dealing with Pakistan. Pakistani leaders certainly seemed disposed to align themselves with China as much as Beijing permits. Both Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari effusively praised Chinas support for Pakistani efforts to safeguard their countrys sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They also affirmed a complete convergence of the two governments positions on foreign economic and security issues. Gilani pledged Pakistani backing for Chinas position on all core issues, adding that, We support One China policy and are totally committed to upholding of Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity. The prime minister ended his remarks by declaring that: Pakistan will remain a true and steadfast friend of the great Chinese nation. Long live Pakistan-China friendship. Dai responded in an equally positive tone, expressing gratitude for Islamabads positions on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang and affirming firm support for Pakistans national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. He stressed the need for both governments to further strengthen strategic coordination and practical cooperation in all fields including infrastructure, agriculture reconstruction and energy, expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges and security cooperation.

Yet despite Dais kind words, op-ed authors and other commentators need to realize that Chinas help to Pakistan has always remained circumscribed. Various Pakistanis have repeatedly proposed that China adopt their country as its new guardian, but Beijing has always rejected this poisoned chalice. In reality, China has provided only limited economic and security assistance, targeted to help Pakistan meet key needs that also coincide with Chinese interests, but not the kind of comprehensive economic and security assistance that Pakistan pines for. Beijings help remains considerably less than that provided by the reviled United States. Thanks to its status as a nuclear-armed state inundated by Islamist terrorists, Pakistan has been able to extract strategic rent from the United States, which has provided Islamabad about $20 billion in the last decade. Beijing has no desire to replace Washington as Pakistans new bankroller, and has instead provided cleverly targeted assistance in niche areas such as military and nuclear technology, as well as support for infrastructure projects that benefit China. Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:15 PM Furthermore, reports persist that Chinese leaders remain concerned about Pakistanis link with terrorism, and they may not be fully satisfied with repeated Pakistani assertions that Islamabad will use its influence and power to keep Islamist militants away from Chinese targets. Chinese officials have traditionally considered Pakistan a counterweight to India in South Asia, but Beijing also isnt eager to drive India into closer alignment with the United States. Dai pointedly noted that We want to intensify amicable and cooperative relations with Pakistan and other neighboring countries. Gilani reassuringly said that Pakistan also seeks to improve its relations with India and find a peaceful solution to all outstanding issues, citing the importance to the ongoing dialogue process with India and hope that it would be productive and result-oriented. Although they havent endorsed a permanent Western military presence in Afghanistan, Chinese officials would like NATO forces to remain in that country for a few more years in order to make Chinas border and investment in that country more secure. Dai denied any exclusionary ambitions when he said that, China supports Pakistan in developing friendly relations with other countries on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. And Beijing also wants Islamabad to play an active role in the Afghan peace process since China sees Pakistan as its main conduit to influence developments in Afghanistan. For example, Dai called on the international community to support Pakistans regional security role since Pakistan has considerable influence in Afghanistan, which must be taken into consideration by those trying to resolve the (Afghan) crisis. Whether they like it or not, Pakistani leaders will have to maintain ties with the United States rather than try to cozy up to China in an alliance that simply doesnt exist.

Pakistans millennium curse (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\28\story_28-122011_pg3_4) By Mehboob Qadir | Daily Times Beyond the Salala probe (http://tribune.com.pk/story/312784/beyond-the-salala-probe/) The Express Tribune Editorial Stakes and options (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84544&Cat=9) By Zafar Hilaly | The News What does Pakistan want in Afghanistan? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/312794/what-does-pakistanwant-in-afghanistan-3/) By Najmuddin A Shaikh | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:24 PM Delhi to Dhaka, with love (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/delhi-dhaka-love-951) By Shankar Roychowdhury | Asian Age Looking back in the 40th year of independence of Bangladesh, the War of Liberation in 1971 in what was then East Pakistan can be militarily encapsulated into two stages, first as a predominantly lowintensity conflict of insurgency and terrorism by the Mukti Bahini, from around April to December of

that year, and the next as a decisive, high-intensity conflict of two weeks, from December 3-16, in which the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force participated in support of the ongoing freedom struggle. Opposing them in both stages were elements of the regular Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force, supported by a large body of armed civilian auxiliaries recruited locally and absorbed as Razakars, Mujahids, Ansars and the East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces. The subsidiary conflict between the Razakar force and the Mukti Bahini involved Bengalis on both sides and was ferociously fratricidal. India shares its longest land border of 4,095 kms with Bangladesh, running contiguous with the Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura, with many shared commonalities of ethnicity, language and culture in each segment. It needs no reiteration that Indo-Bangladesh relations constitute an especially sensitive handle with care issue for India, in which the linkage of a common Bengali identity between the people of Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal constitutes a very significant factor in the development of friendly relationships between the two countries. This must be capitalised to the fullest extent. For its part, Pakistan will never forget that the sovereign country of Bangladesh was once its own eastern wing, neither will it forgive India for providing effective support to the liberation movement which culminated in the humiliating surrender of 93,000 troops on December 16, 1971, in Dhaka to the joint forces of Bangladesh and India. Pakistan has adopted Badla for Bangladesh as the guiding principle for its foreign policy vis-a-vis India, but realises that it is incapable of posing a credible military threat on its own without Chinese assistance. It has, therefore, selected the long war option of terrorism and low-intensity warfare to hit back at India. There are efforts to influence individuals in positions of authority in Bangladesh to support ties with Pakistan and facilitate the establishment of an infrastructure of sanctuaries, training facilities and provision of material aid for anti-Indian fundamentalist and tribal militant groups. India for its part must learn to cope with this unstated Pakistan factor which is present as an unseen background entity to erode goodwill for India and be prepared to forestall attempts to procrastinate and obstruct the timely progress of Indo-Bangladesh negotiations for amicable resolution of whatever issues are under consideration by both countries. Bangladesh is acutely conscious of its contiguity with India and the overwhelming disparity between the two nations. As the smaller of the two, Bangladeshi sensitivities are easily bruised and irritated by even small acts of apparent thoughtlessness or discourtesy on Indias part no matter whether unintended or how rapidly remedied. A gaffe by Indian diplomacy or bureaucracy even at individual level can thus create an adverse impact completely disproportionate to the issues or functionaries involved, and with the potential to reverberate all the way to New Delhi or Dhaka. In this context the major faux pas during the two-day visit to Bangladesh by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in September 2011 has had serious repercussions on Indias goodwill in that country. An ideological battle for the soul of the country is being fought on the streets of Dhaka between supporters of the Awami League and those of fundamentalist organisations like the Jamaat Islami. The new generation in Bangladesh born after the liberation struggle in 1971 find it difficult to connect with the past and perceive only inequalities in the present equations between India and Bangladesh. Many among them are labelled as Indian agents if they display any positive sentiments towards this country. Pro-India groups amongst them find it difficult going in view of the total lack of progress in addressing contentious issues between the two countries like the Tipaimukh dam, sharing the waters of the Ganga and the Teesta rivers or the recent Indo-Bangladesh treaty on resolution of territorial enclaves within each others territories. Even the affair of the nondescript Moore Island in the estuary of the Haribhanga River in the Bay of Bengal carries weight out of all proportion to its size. Though Islam is professed by the majority of the population in Bangladesh, the Awami League established secular principles in governance after the War of Liberation in 1971. But they were forced out of office after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 by a group of Bengali Army officers repatriated from Pakistan. The Awami League was followed by a chaotic series of governments who adopted a pro-Pakistan, anti-India and anti-minority stance to develop relationships with Saudi Arabia primarily to obtain aid. Nevertheless, the Awami League managed to retain its political foothold until Sheikh Mujibs daughter Begum Hasina became Prime Minister in 1996 and again in 2009. The fluctuating politics of Bangladesh are difficult to untangle within the space available here.

Suffice to say that India must make more efforts with far more energy and diligence than at present towards proactively countering Pakistan influence in Bangladesh. The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament

Dead Reckoning: A Response (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16947.pdf) By Sarmila Bose | Economic & Political Weekly Dead Reckoning: A Response (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16948.pdf) By Sarmila Bose | Economic & Political Weekly Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:31 PM From Babri Demolition To Supporting Anna Hazare: Changing Strategies Of RSS Politics (http://www.countercurrents.org/puniyani261211.htm) By Ram Puniyani | Countercurrents This December, Babri demolition act completed its 19years. On the occasion many a Muslim groups demanded the reconstruction of the masjid. This demand is just but is mired in many a complex legalities and is trapped in the politics in which there are many diverse players. One again needs to clarify that Hindutva is not a religion of Hindus. Religion of Hindus is Hinduism. Hindutva is the politics of RSS; it is a politics with sectarian vision. This is the vision of affluent upper caste- elite aiming to abolish democracy. Hindutva aims to bring a nation in the name of Hindu religion where the upper crust of society can rule as per the norms prevalent in feudal society. The trick involved here is that these norms of feudal society, the birth based hierarchy, is presented as a glorious tradition and in given the modern language and form. Demolition of Babri Masjid was a demolition of a national monument; it was also the beginning of a phase of politics where the communal undercurrents of Indian politics menacingly came to the surface. It was a signal for the violence against minorities at a higher pitch. It was a blatant insult of whatever Indian Constitution stands for. It was also the first major step for communal parties to come to occupy the seats of power in the Centre. After the initial sacking of the BJP Governments in the states where it was ruling, the polarization caused by demolition and post demolition violence went to frightening level and the communal party, BJP, which was at the margins of political structure, came to the fore as the major opposition party. Its parent organization, the real controller of Hindutva politics, RSS, started becoming more respectable and the social thinking was further vitiated with the biases against minorities. In due course the other minority the Christians were also brought under the firing range of the communalists leading to the ghastly burning of Pastor Graham Stains and later scattered attacks on Christian missionaries working in Adivasi areas, leading to massive Kandhmal carnage were witnessed. For the first time BJP, the party inherently committed to the anti democratic notion of Hindu Rashtra, grabbed the power at the Centre in 1996, when all other parties correctly refused to ally with it to share the spoils of power. But that changed soon enough and other political parties, obsessed with power opportunistically started sharing power with those accused of Babri demolition, those whose affiliates incited not only the demolition but also the violence against minorities in different guises. The coming to power of BJP at centre opened the floodgates of the political space that goes with power, and the task of RSS progeny, VHP, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram got facilitated. The state apparatus, police bureaucracy got more communalized. The education was communalized more openly with a tinge of promoting faith based knowledge at the cost of the scientific temper and rational thought. This also paved the way for further victories for BJP. The success of RSS propaganda is not merely that it targets the minorities; its bigger success is that it instils the fear in the mind of majority about the threat of minority. There is a ripple effect of this process and then a section of middle of the road elements also start turning over to support the Hindutva parties. Karnataka opened the floodgates of BJP for its entry into South. The political ideology of BJP and its group is gaining ascendance. The Babri demolition led to multiple processes, denial of justice to victims of violence became structural, and the minorities started being relegated to second class citizenship. The demonization

of minorities has by now gone to extreme levels. Christians are also being meted out the same treatment, particularly in Adivasi areas. This process of demonization of Muslim minorities later started being created around the issue related to terrorism. US propaganda after the 9/11, in which US created monster of Al Qaeda was the central force, brought immense disrepute to Islam and Muslims. US media coined the word Islamic terrorism, and the politics for control over oil resources was taken to absurd ideological manipulation and a religion and a religious community were subjected to immense targeting. In India also the propaganda against Muslims was taken to much worse levels with the global phenomenon of terror, falsely and cleverly attributed to teachings of Islam and Muslims. Now the RSS-BJP politics is entering the new phase. Having reached the acme of anti minority polarization, it has found the Anna Hazare movement as the new vehicle for its politics of undermining democratic institutions to bring in a parallel authoritarian structure where the Lok Pal plays the big brother. Though this sounds innocuous and is presented as a step to solve the problems, this is likely to create a new institution, beyond the control of democratic norms. Few people and groups who are calling the shots and asserting that they are The People, Anna is above Parliament, will rule through proxies of various types. This Anna movement has polarized the social layers according to those who look at either identity issues (Ram Temple) or symptomatic issues (Corruption) as the major issues while undermining the problems of dalits, minorities and other deprived sections of society. Identity issues or issues focused around symptoms, which are meant to preserve the status quo of political dynamics, and thats what politics in the name of religion is all about. Thats what Christian fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism or Hindutva, wants. Now since Ram Temple appeal is fading away, those for social-political status quo have jumped to the bandwagon of Anti-corruption. This is a shrewd move. Marginalized sections do feel left out from such I am Anna, We are the People type of assertions, the message is that only the shining India will have the say in the shaping of the nation, while the deprived India, will be permanently on the margins. In a sense the RSS-Hindutva politics is constantly changing its strategies to communalize, polarize the society and to distract social attention from core issues. While initially the Rath Yatras and communal violence have played their role in polarizing the nation along religious lines, now the social issue, corruption, is being used to further strengthen the hold of politics aimed at retaining social inequalities. Ram Puniyani was a professor in biomedical engineering at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, and took voluntary retirement in December 2004 to work full time for communal harmony in India. He is involved with human rights activities from last two decades. He is associated with various secular and democratic initiatives like All India Secular Forum, Center for Study of Society and Secularism and ANHAD.

JAMIA MILIA ISLAMIA Its history and the current trends (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4831.html) By R.Upadhyay | South Asia Analysis Group The C in Congress (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-c-in-congress/892432/) By Pratap Bhanu Mehta | Indian Express New Friends of Iskcon ? On The Gita Controversy (http://www.countercurrents.org/gatade261211.htm) By Subhash Gatade | Countercurrents Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:38 PM Ideological Convergences: Hindutva and the Norway Massacre (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16945.pdf) By Meera Nanda | Economic & Political Weekly Anders Breivik, the man who carried out the July 2011 massacre in Norway, counts the sanatana dharma movements in India among his allies in Europes supposed war against Islam. His manifesto refers to Koenraad Elst, a well-known Belgian critic of Islam who is also a strong votary of Hindutva in India. In addition, many other Indian writers are also quoted by Breivik. This essay looks at the shared world view, agenda and history of this school of Hindutva, and the anti-Islamic European right.

On 22 July, Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian, set off bombs in the heart of Oslo. He then went on a shooting spree on a nearby island where young members of the Labour Party were holding a summer camp. All told, he killed 77 people that day, many in their teens. He targeted the young people at that summer camp because he saw them as part of a multi-cultural left-wing cabal that was allowing a Muslim takeover of Norway. For him, they were the future category A traitors who had to be eliminated so that Europe could be saved from Islam.1 Even though Anders Breivik pulled the trigger, the massacre in Norway was by no means the work of Breivik alone. He is a product of years of immersion in a worldwide web of anti-Islamic ideas espoused by cultural nationalists of all stripes. The 1,518-page manifesto titled 2083: European Declaration of Independence that he posted on the internet just before he went on his killing spree, is a handbook of anti-Islamic literature from all around the world.2 India figured quite prominently in this manifesto. So far, the India connection has been limited in the media reports to the 100-odd references to India, including Breiviks ringing defence of sanatana dharma movements as allies of his war on Islam. The irony of a Muslim craftsman from Banaras embroidering the sword-through-the-skull badge for his army of Knights Templars odelled after 12th century Christian crusaders has also evoked much commentary.3 But there is a lot more to the India connection than meets the eye. The New Hindu Right It is not a coincidence that nearly all the references to India in the Norway manifesto come from writers associated with Voice of India, a Delhi-based publishing house. Since it was founded in 1981, Voice of India (VOI) has been deriding Islam (and Christianity as well) as demonic and violent political ideologies not deserving the respect and constitutional protections reserved for religions. In recent years, VOI has emerged as the hub where the sanatana dharma movements make common cause with Islam-bashers, anti-Christian pagans, New Age seekers, eepecologists/eco-feminists and other disaffected right-wingers from Europe and the United States (US).4 The Norway manifesto reveals how totally enmeshed it has become in the worldwide network of anti-Jihadi groups. VOI represents a significant hardening of the ideology of Hindu nationalism which is important for the secular left to understand. When it comes to explaining Hindutvas European entanglements, the Indian commentators and historians tend to start and end with M S Golwalker, the Nazi-loving supreme guide of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) from 1940-73. True to form, to explain the massacre in Norway, many Indian commentators have gone right back to We, Our Nationhood Defined, Golwalkers notorious book that was published nearly a century ago in 1939. The infamous passage in which Golwalker praises Adolf Hitler for ...keeping up the purity of the race and culture, by purging [Germany] of the Semitic races the Jews. Race pride at its highest has been manifested here is being cited as evidence that Hindu nationalists share a vocabulary of hate with European fanatics like Breivik.5 The fact that RSS has formally withdrawn the book from Golwalkers collected works and (at least formally) disowned any ideological affiliation with this particular book has not been fully appreciated by the critics.6 This fixation on Golwalker, however, overlooks the fact that, like anything else, fascism does not stand still. Right wing nationalisms in Europe and India have moved away from the rhetoric of racial purity to that of clash of civilisations. A case has been made by some (Bunzl 2005) that antiSemitism was invented in the 19th century to police the ethnically pure nation state, while Islamophobia is a formation of the present whose purpose is to safeguard a supranational Europes Judeo-Christian civilisation from a fundamentally distinct and supposedly inassimilable culture of Islam. Breivik and the VOI sources he cites see themselves as warriors in this war of civilisations. They are examples of designer fascisms that have learned to substitute biological racism with cultural racism, and to justify the latter in a seemingly liberal concern with saving democracy and secularism from cultures which are inherently incompatible with liberal ideals.7 Anders Breivik, for example, is firm in his support for the Jewish people and Israel: He counts being pro-Israel, anti-racist, antifascist and anti-Nazi as essential elements of his pan-European

crusader nationalism. Indeed, he lays out plans on how to wean away young people who are attracted to racist groups and indoctrinate them into opposing cultural Marxists and Islamists instead. Even though he says he fears the extinction of the Nordic genotype, he is clearly not a classic white supremacist, as he is open to alliances with non-Muslim Asians and Jews. What he insists upon is the right of European people to enforce the old rules of our culture on religious minorities (a vast majority of whom are Muslims), feminists, gays and cultural Marxists who preach tolerance and equality for these minorities. In India, too, a newer generation of Hindu nationalist has come of age that rages not against Semitic races, but against the Semitic god (the common god of the Torah, the Bible and the Koran) and the monstrous religions of the Semitic people Islam, above all, followed some notches below by Christianity (but excluding Judaism which like Hinduism, is an ethic religion, does not proselytise and does not have much of a presence in India). The racial angle, which in India (unlike in Germany) was always more a matter of cultural traditions passed down from hereditary ancestors than a matter of biological markers, has pretty much disappeared from the postGolwalker Hindu right. And as in the case of the European new right that Breivik represents, the new Hindu right is staunchly pro-Israel: India is now counted among the part of an unwritten axis with Israel and the US against Islamic terrorism (Prashad 2003). The selfstyled anti-jihadists in the US allied with George W Bushs administration and the conservative Heritage Foundation have been pushing for a closer partnership with India8 It is not race but a clash of civilisations between dharmic and Abrahamic civilsations that is central to the post-Golwalker Hindu right. This new Hindu right has been honing its radical critique of Semitic monotheistic religions from the perspective of yogic spirituality, largely through books published by the Delhi-based publishing house called Voice of India (VOI). Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:43 PM Intellectual Warriors VOI was founded in 1981 by two ardent Hindu revivalists and anti-Communists, Ram Swarup (1920-1993) and his friend, Sita Ram Goel (1921-2003). From the autobiographical account left behind by Goel, it appears that VOI was born out of frustration with what they saw as antiintellectualism of RSS.9 They wanted to get rid of the borrowed concepts from the west: instead of judging Hinduism from the vantage point of monotheism (as was done by reformist movements like Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj), they wanted to reverse the gaze and process and evaluate the heritage of these (monotheistic) creeds in terms of Hindu categories of thoughtto evaluate other religions on the pristine premises of Sanatana dharma (Goel 2000:9). VOIs goal is to produce baudhik kshatriyas or intellectual warriors who will defend the Hindu society against the triple threat of Islam, Christianity/westernisation and Marxism. The signature theme of VOI thinkers is that they blame all these three on the defective nature of the Semitic or Abrahamic god which makes monotheistic religions inherently intolerant, incurably violent and crassly materialistic, or non-spiritual. In contrast, Hindus are celebrated as the keepers of the universal Aryan spirituality in which god is not separate from the material world, and therefore, can be accessed in the human heart through yogic meditation. According to VOI, it is built into the DNA of monotheistic religions to be intolerant, violent and materialistic. From this they conclude that it is not Muslims or Christians who are to be blamed, but rather, in Goels words, criminal theologies masquerading as religions. In other words, to the extent that Muslims take their religion seriously, they cannot help being violent and intolerant, or, that a good Muslim would make a bad Indian or a bad citizen of any multicultural society. This sentiment lies behind the mantra of VOI the problem is not Muslims but Islam itself. (Christianity and Judaism, the other two Abrahamic religions, are treated with kid gloves, relatively speaking. Even though the activities of Christian churches in India are condemned, Christianity itself is praised for having evolved by rediscovering its pagan Greco-Roman roots and thereby becoming a sister civilisation of Hindus. Judaism is passed up in silence, as it does not have much of a presence in India.)10 Thus, VOI has taken it upon itself to add a theological dimension to Savarkar and Golwalkers political ideology of Hindutva. If, for Golwalker and company, the problem with Muslims was that they were not Indianised and loyal enough, for Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel and company, the problem with Muslims is the theology of the Koran itself.

The problem is that seeing the other through a theological lens renders their vices and our virtues eternal, god-given and inherent to the faith itself, and other than renouncing the faith, there is no hope for change. A primary focus on theology takes religions out of the stream of history, and into the realm of the timeless truths revealed once and for all by god or (in the Hindu case) seen by seers and sages. This eternalisation and essentialisation of faith traditions, as we see below, is what has allowed the convergence between Hindutva and the Islamophobes in the western world. A note of explanation regarding the use of the word Islamophobia in this essay is called for. Influential secularists like Salman Rushdie (along with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Taslima Nasreen and others), Kenan Malik, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris have argued that the term Islamophobia should be retired as it is often used to silence the critics of Islam, including Muslims fighting for reform of their own communities, by accusing them of racism.11 They insist, correctly, that criticism of Islam (as of any other religion or any other ideology) is perfectly legitimate, while prejudice against Muslims is not. While one must fight against persecution of Muslim people everywhere, open societies must not clamp down on criticism of Islam itself. This objection is sound in principle. But in practice, it is not that easy to separate prejudice against Muslim people from prejudice against Islam itself as somehow singularly evil and backward as compared to other religions. While criticism is legitimate, there are modes of criticism that can and do verge upon hatred and incite hatred. The Runnymede Trust report that defined the word in 1997 laid out eight such criteria, widely accepted by social scientists, which turn the criticism of Islam from an open to a closed variety.12 When Islam or any religion, for that matter is treated as a set of fixed dogmas, monolithic, incapable of change, and inherently oppressive to women and non-Muslims, the line between criticism of religious belief and racism is easily blurred: for how can you not be prejudiced against people who hold such beliefs? So the term Islamophobia, understood as a particular kind of essentialist, ahistorical criticism of the theological beliefs of Islam, will be used in this essay to describe what is happening in Europe and India when it comes to Islam and Muslims. In fact, it will be argued that with VOI, Hindutva has become genuinely Islamophobic. Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:47 PM Western Friends of VOI Evidence for the global reach of the VOI-school of Hindutva can be found in the Norway manifesto. Breivik proclaims grandly that his army of Knights Templar support the Sanatana [sic] Dharma movements and Indian nationalists in general. He believes that the Sanatana Dharma movements are suffering persecution from the Indian cultural Marxists as are their European cousins. These cultural Marxists, apparently, are holocaust deniers, or negationists, i e, they want to hide the genocide of Hindus at the hands of Muslims throughout Indian history. All the authorities that Breivik cites to argue in support of Hindu nationalist case come from the VOI lineage. Case in Point: The manifesto makes two references to a Belgian writer, Koenraad Elst. The first time Elst is mentioned is as the authority behind the highly contested claim that Muslims enslaved Hindus and drove them to their death in the Hindu Kush mountain ranges. (This reference comes in an article by Srinandan Vyas that is reproduced in the manifesto.) The second reference to Elst appears in the recommendations to the West regarding how to make the life of Muslim minorities in Europe so difficult that they will either give up Islam or leave. Elst is quoted here to suggest that although Islam is in decline, it can still take over Europe before it collapses. (Here Elst is quoted in an article by Fjordman, the anonymous Norwegian blogger well known for his anti-Islamic views, and hugely admired by Breivik.)13 It so happens that Koenraad Elst has one foot firmly in the European new right and the other foot in the Hindu new right spawned by the VOI-school. In the European context, Elst uses VOI-inspired arguments to put Islam down. In the Indian context, he brings his familiarity with Christianity (he is a Catholic) and his knowledge of the history of Nazism and other nationalist movements in Europe to bolster VOIs war on the theology of monotheism. In Europe, Elst is considered a leading Orientalist (as Fjordman calls him in the manifesto). He writes frequently for The Brussels Journal, a European nationalist, anti-Islamic blog that has a

history of fomenting anti-Islamic ideas and that was cited repeatedly by Breivik in his manifesto. Elst has also worked with think-tanks and publications which are suspected of links with Belgiums far right, anti-Islamic, anti-immigrant party, Vlaam Belang.14 In his writings on The Brussels Journal, Elst has used arguments from Vivekananda, Swarup and Goel to persuade his readers that the best way to criticise the prophet is to show that the divine revelations of Prophet Mohammad were born of deluded consciousness unaided by true spirituality which is available only to yogis. What Elst proclaims as the most fundamental critique of Islam is a direct product of the theology of Hindutva developed by the founders of VOI.15 (This yogic critique of Islam is not cited by Breivik.) In India, Elst is the darling of the Hindu right. He is held in great regard as the intellectual heir of Ram Swarup and Sita Ram Goel who practically took him under their wing when he was researching the Ayodhya conflict in the late 1980s. His book, Ram Janmabhoomi vs Babri Masjid: A Case Study in HinduMuslim Conflict was published by VOI and released by L K Advani. VOI has published at least eight more of his books, and he is counted among VOIs best-selling authors. He is the pioneer of the idea that Indian historians have conspired to negate or deny the alleged holocaust of Hindus by Muslims in India. No wonder his books (Negationism in India and Ayodhya and After) are cited as the real authority behind the essay on Hindu Kush reproduced by Breivik in his manifesto. Apart from Elst, all the other Indian sources Breivik cites are affiliated with VOI. The late historian K S Lal is cited four times to make the case for Hindu holocaust from years 1000-1525 ce in which 80 million Hindus were supposedly killed by Muslims. (One wonders why, if Muslims were so keen on annihilating the Hindus, did they remain a minority, never exceeding 25% of the total population of the Indian subcontinent throughout the Mughal empire when they were at the peak of their power, from around 1200 AD to 1857?).16 Sita Ram Goel himself makes an appearance in the manifesto in the context of Islamic oppression of Hindu dhimmis. N S Rajaram, VOIs acclaimed historian is cited to make the ridiculous claim that the wounds inflicted by centuries of Islamic rule on a large segment of the Indian intelligentsia and the political class have been so debilitating that they continue to live in a state of constant fear! Rajaram posts quite regularly on Jihad Watch, one of the most notorious anti-Islamic websites and a major resource for the Norway manifesto. Rajaram is a part of a coterie of amateurs, mostly living in the US, who have taken it upon themselves to write revisionist histories of ancient India claiming to show India as the cradle of Aryan civilisation with many great scientific achievements.17 VOI has quite a few other European and American fellow travellers apart from Elst. Among the more notable is David Frawley (aka Vamadev Shastri), an American convert to Hinduism, who teaches Ayurveda and Vedic astrology in the US. Like Elst, Frawley follows Ram Swarup and Goel in decrying Islam and Christianity as inherently intolerant and fit only for lower intellects. Like Elst again, Frawley tops the VOI bestseller list. Francois Gautier, a follower of Sri Aurobindo, and more recently of Sri Sri Ravishankar, is another VOI author who had a long career with the French newspaper La Figaro, which has been described as the mouthpiece of the French new right. Gautier is the brain behind the idea of creating a museum showcasing the Hindu holocaust at the hands of Muslims. A collection of his Ferengis Columns has been published by VOI. VOI has also published Daniel Pipes, a well-known American critic of Islam, who also finds many mentions in Breiviks manifesto. Well-known classics of anti-Islamic literature including William Muirs The Life of Mohamet and David Margoliouths Mohammed and the Rise of Islam back to the 19th century have also been reprinted under the VOI imprint. In addition to nurturing radical critics of Islam and Christianity, the founding fathers of VOI also tried to encourage the revival of pre-Christian and pre-Islamic pagan religions on the assumption that these ancient Indo-European religions shared the polytheism and ritualism of Hinduism. Ram Swarup personally mentored neopagans from many parts of Europe including Lithuania, Russia, Britain, Ireland, Iceland and Belgium (including Elst himself, who at one time harboured pagan sympathies). VOIs overtures to neopagans have not been terribly fruitful, as the nationalism favoured by indigenous Europeans, who want to bring back pre-Christian gods of blood-and-soil has been overtaken by an openly anti-Islamic Crusader nationalism exemplified by Breivik.18 Macaca 12-27-2011, 08:52 PM The Common Enemies: The Cultural Marxists Now that Breiviks manifesto has revealed the names of antiIslamic authors, bloggers, websites and groups that shaped his thinking, the great washing of hands has begun. Just about everyone named

by Breivik has issued stern statements distancing themselves from his violent deeds. Elst posted a statement stating that the Brussels Journal never ever carried calls to counter Islam by means of bombs or shoot-outs, whether of Muslims or non-Muslims. It carried criticism of Islam, but that is a perfectly legitimate exercise.19 In India, the response of the Hindu right has varied from total denial of any connection, to decrying the violence but supporting the reasons why he did it, to utter shock (as expressed by Praveen Togadia of Vishwa Hindu Parishad) that anyone would be so absurd to even think of linking European right-wing thinking with the most ancient Hindu cultural ideology. (The parallels with denials of linking Hinduism with acts of terrorism committed by Hindutvawadis are striking.) Decrying the violence is necessary but not sufficient, because the agenda of the Islamophobic right is much larger than spilling blood in the streets. As he makes it clear over and over again, Breiviks primary objective was to create a platform to consolidate anti-Marxist forces before Europe is overwhelmed demographically by Muslims. In other words, his first priority was to take down the cultural Marxists, or multiculturalists, who are supposedly appeasing Muslims. (Going by the hysteria over the Muslims, one could never guess that Muslims make up barely 2% of 4.5 million citizens of Norway!) This must surely sound familiar to Indian ears where the Hindu right has turned even those policies that do nothing more than safeguard the constitutional rights of Muslims as citizens of India as appeasing them. Indeed, Breivik advises his Hindu nationalist brothers to first go after the socalled appeasers, the cultural Marxist government and its left-wing sympathisers the category A and B traitors, respectively and only later resort to the counterproductive street attack on Muslims. So the appeasement of Muslims is the problem that Hindus and the European right share. But in India (as we see in the next section), the Marxists are not the only enemies: The Hindu right also targets the founding mantra of Indian secularism, namely, Sarva dharma sama bhava (equal regard for all religions). What do Breivik and his comrades have against the so-called cultural Marxists? The problem with cultural Marxists, Breivik says, is that they are egalitarian and want to create a society not merely of equal opportunity, but of equal condition. Channelling his favourite author, Fjordman, Breivik blames these cultural egalitarians for creating state policies that ensure that all groups of people should have an equal share of everything. This is creating a culture in which all minorities (Muslims, feminist women, homosexuals) are treated as victims deserving state assistance, and all ethnic Christian European men are treated as evil. Cultural Marxists in European governments, he says, lay penalties on the native European men who disagree with them and give privileges to the victim groups they favour. Blaming multiculturalism for social ills of Europe has become quite fashionable in the mainstream of European political discourse. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and France President Nicholas Sarkozy have all declared multiculturalism to be a failure in their societies. Many otherwise respectable commentators (e g, editors of the Jerusalem Post) have treated discontent with multiculturalism to be a legitimate concern which should not be delegitimised after the Norway attacks. Koenraad Elst expresses the sentiment of the right when he declares that the multiculturalist left has never had a better friend than the lone Norwegian terrorist because he has given them a second wind even as they were losing political support in the mainstream of Europe.20 Targeting multiculturalism as turning Europe into Eurabia, encouraging Islamic terrorism and/or cultural backwardness is more a reflection of the prejudices of those who make such claims than of the complex cultural history of Europe, which for most part, has been stridently monocultural. Contrary to the notion that European states embraced multiculturalism to encourage different communities to live happily side by side and be happy living with each other (to quote Angela Merkel), the official policy of European states has been guided more by the hope that the Muslim guest workers would pack up and leave. If in the beginning, countries like France and Germany favoured school instruction in Arabic or Turkish, it was not out of multicultural correctness but because these immigrants were expected to go back to Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and wherever else they had come from. When it became clear that the immigrants were here to stay, most western European countries extended no special favours for Muslims than those that were already a part of their national policies for accommodating the existing religious minorities of Catholics and Jews. As John Bowen,

the author of Why the French Dont Like Headscarves: Islam, the State and Public Space reminds us, most Muslim communities have adapted to the national opportunity structuresLike Catholics and Jews before them, Muslims build religious schools and associations usually with external financial aid and get involved in elections Muslims are adapting like everyone else and are divided like everyone else (Bowen 2010). If in the United Kingdom (uk), Muslims are getting state funds for schools, so are Catholics and Anglicans who, Bowen (2011) correctly reminds us, only admit students who regularly attend a Catholic or an Anglical church. Hindus, too, run their own state funded school in UK where all the students are Hindus who eat vegetarian food, do yoga, sing bhajans in praise of Lord Krishna and read the Bhagvat Gita as a part of the curriculum.21 If in France registered Islamic religious societies get free lease of state-owned land and state-backed loans to build mosques it is no different from the support the state extends to churches and synagogues as a well-established practice of French secularism (Bowden 2007, ch 3). There is no appeasement of Islam, only a fulfilment of Muslim migrants legal rights as citizens. The hysteria over multiculturalist mollycoddling is combined with an assumption that unlike other minorities, Muslims either do not want to, or are incapable of, adapting to the post-Christian cultural values of Europe. As long as they are good Muslims, the argument goes, they cannot be good Europeans (or Americans or Indians, etc). This is sheer prejudice. Muslims in Europe are not a monolithic block: as any other minority, some are more religious and traditional than others, some better equipped than others to confront the biases and make use of the opportunities. Polls after polls have shown that overall Muslim communities in Europe are more likely to vote and show a higher level of trust in the government than the general public. What is more, as Marieme Helie Lucas, an Algerian sociologist living in France, has affirmed in her many writings, the most determined and outspoken defenders of secularism (in France) today are citizens of Muslim descent, among them numerous women.22 Lucas points out a fact that often gets lost, namely, that women of Muslim origin in France took an active part in supporting the French ban on headscarves in schools and the recent ban on burquas in public. Nearly half of the Muslim community was in favour of these bans hardly a picture of unchanging Muslims incurably attached to their traditions and religious doctrines. The Islamophobic mainstream notwithstanding, the reality is more complex as revealed in a political crisis in France. As Olivier Roy, one of the most well-regarded scholar of Islam in France reminds us, in September 2004, in the middle of war on Iraq, a radical Islamist group took two French reporters hostage. The hostage-takers demanded that the French government annuls the law that banned headscarves in schools. The Muslims of France massively rejected this demand and stood with the French government against giving in to the hostage takers. As Roy asks, what more could be asked for? (2007: 97). The right wing has created a bogey of multiculturalism. It is much easier to blame the outsiders and their religion than face up to the real crisis that western economies are facing as a result of outsourcing and liberalisation. Macaca 12-27-2011, 09:00 PM War on Sarva Dharma Sama Bhava Resolute opposition to the ideal of multiculturalism a society where more than one cultures and religions can co-exist as equals is what unites the European Islamophobes with their VOI counterparts in India. Things are, however, relatively more complicated in India where religious pluralism expressed by the Gandhian dictum of sarva dharma sama bhava (equal regard for all religions), has been understood as the foundational assumption of modern Indian secularism. The traditional Hindu right centred on the RSS and its parivar, has long paid rather hypocritical and self-serving lip service to this doctrine of equal respect. The new Hindu right represented by VOI has declared an open war on sarva dharma sama bhava. The old Hindutva merely went after Muslims but treated Islam itself as a legitimate religion which satisfied the spiritual needs of its adherents, just as Hinduism did for the Hindus. The new Hindutva aspires not merely to subdue Muslims, but to free or deprogramme their minds from the evil doctrines of Islam. In this, VOIs project overlaps almost entirely with that of anti-Jihadists in the west who have taken it upon themselves to, as Breivik puts it (through Fjordsman again), go on an anti-Sharia defensive which will involve educating non-Muslims and Muslims about the real teachings of Islam.

The Sangh parivar (what we have called the old Hindu nationalism in this essay) is perhaps unique among right-leaning religious nationalist movements in the world for officially embracing a doctrine of religious pluralism and tolerance, namely, sarva dharma sama bhava. In practice, the Sangh has managed to turn the doctrine on its head, using it as a tool of chauvinism and anti-minoritism. Right from the founding of the republic, Hindu traditionalists managed to reinterpret Indian secularism which in reality was a defiant break from Hindu caste rules in matters of temple entry and access to religious learning as an affirmation of ancient Hindu dharma which taught that there were many paths to truth and many routes to spiritual salvation. This interpretation, which Mani Shankar Aiyar (2004:244) has correctly called a communal heresy, which says that equal treatment of all religions is not constitutional law, but only an expression of Hindu ethos, has allowed the Hindu right to claim that Hinduism itself is the best guarantor of secularism in India. By presenting Hinduism as inherently and eternally secular, this heresy also protects Hinduism from any further reform or rational criticism. What is more, the Hindu right has been able to oppose any and all concessions to religious minorities as contrary to the equal treatment of all religions and therefore pseudosecularist. One can safely say that the Gandhian mantra of multiculturalism and pluralism has, perversely, served the interests of Hindu nationalists quite well. If there is one thing that distinguishes the VOI school from the Sangh parivar it is its resolute rejection of sarva dharma sama bhava doctrine. The militants of VOI are adamantly opposed to the idea that all religions deserve equal respect. Even paying lipservice to this ideal, as RSS and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have always done, appears like an unbearable betrayal of the Hindu cause to them and they lambast the RSS for this in no uncertain term, calling it a paper tiger, and a big dinosaur with a small brain, etc (Goel 1997). Hinduism, they assert, is not any ordinary religion, but rather contains the very essence of religion itself: it is sanatana dharma, eternal cosmic truth. To equate Hindu dharma, this supposed mother of all religions, with violent creeds like Islam amounts to equating dharma with adharma, the ways of the devas (gods) with the ways of the asuras (demons), the higher and purer spirituality with darker and baser human interests. The contemptuous and insulting tone is clear from the following statements of Sita Ram Goel: A serious mistake that Hindu society has committed is to keep on repeating the slogan of sarva dharma sama bhava with regard to Islam and Christianity... To entertain sama bhava (equal regard) towards Islam and Christianity, by giving them the status of dharma is, to extend invitation to doom. A study of the scriptures, traditions and history of Islam and Christianity makes it more than evident that these ideologies are not worthy of being called dharma in any sense of the word. Contrary to this, they are brimful of imperialistic ambition. By accepting them as dharma, it becomes impossible to resist their imperialistic expansion (1999:28). Another VOI author, Abhas Chatterjee, associates Islam with spiritual degradation and demonic traits and declares that an equal respect for Islam would be tantamount to blasphemy: Islam is out and out adharma.Sanatana Dharma makes ample distinctions between dharma and adharma, between spiritual elevation and spiritual degradation. Following a path of adharma of tmsik vrittis (traits of darkness) or asuri vrittis (demonic traits) can only lead a person away from the God of Sanatana Dharma. If anything can be considered a blasphemy in Hindu spirituality, it is to equate dharma and adharma (Chatterjee in Goel 1997: 59, 66). Apart from sheer contempt for Abrahamic faiths, there are political reasons for why the militants want to bury the rhetoric of equal respect. If all religions are of equal worth, then why oppose religious conversions? If all paths to god are equally good, why should not people have the right and the freedom to choose one path to god over another? This undercuts their rabid opposition to religious conversions unless, of course, it is conversion to Hinduism. Moreover, the question why, if all religions are equally good, prefer Hinduism and not any other religion? is beginning to exercise Hindus living outside India who worry that their children will leave the Hindu fold. The nonresident Hindus are looking for a firmer definition of Hinduism that they can teach their children. An even bigger issue that vexes the new right is that if Hinduism is seen as just one more religion, at par with Islam or Christianity, then Hindus can stake no special claim on India. In their book, Hinduism is not just a religion, but rather the national culture of India that all Indians, regardless of their religious faith, must respect and adopt. Macaca 12-27-2011, 09:05 PM The Timidity of the Sangh

The VOI writers do not stop at lambasting the old guard, but go on to ask: Why has the Sangh parivar bought into this whole business of equality of religions? Why has it not been fanatical enough? Sangh parivar is not fanatical enough, they assert, because it has not been intellectual enough. RSS and BJP are accused of merely reducing Indias Muslim and Christian problem to the foreign origin of their faiths and their holy lands which lie in Saudi Arabia and Palestine and not in India. As Koenraad Elst put it, the old Sangh parivar reduces an ideological confrontation between religions to a purely political confrontation between nations, but does not take the next step of debunking the truth claims of their theological doctrines (2001:292) which he routinely labels false and monstrous.23 What is needed, the new right insists, is an open denunciation of the theological dogmas of Islam, Christianity and indeed, of Marxism and all modern doctrines of liberalism from a distinctively Hindu world view. Only then will modern Hindus be able to decolonise their minds of all alien ways of thinking. Only then, presumably, will Hinduism come into its own as a civilisational force around the world. What Hindus need, and what the Sangh parivar has failed to provide, are intellectual (baudhik) kshatriyas, or an intellectual warrior caste, that will openly declare war on monotheistic creeds for the express purpose of world conquest of Hindu dharma. The term intellectual kshatriya, which has become a staple among the new militants, was introduced by David Frawley, a superstar of VOI. Frawley may have coined the term, but the idea that Hindu society needs to be defended against ideological aggression from Islam, Christianity and Marxism has been around for much longer, propagated most assiduously by Sita Ram Goel and Ram Swarup. The Frawley-Goel-Ram Swarup camp lays out a plan of action for Hindu intellectual warriors. First and foremost, they have to give up thinking in the conceptual categories of their enemies, namely, all monotheist creeds, including the secularised ones like Marxists and Nehruvian secularists. (They see Marxism and liberalism as merely secularised version of monotheism.) On the contrary, Hindus are asked to turn the tables and put monotheism under a critical scrutiny from a Hindu perspective. The Hindus are exhorted to process and evaluate the heritage of these creeds and ideologies in terms of Hindu categories of thought Hindus have to reawaken to the sublime spirituality of their own Sanatan dharma and base their evaluation of the other religions and cultures on its pristine premises (Goel 2000: 14). The second duty of intellectual warriors is to cure Muslims of the disease of Islam by exposing the falsehood of Islamic theology from the vantage point of yogic spirituality. To get a flavour of the violent passions that energise this crowd, consider the following statement by Abhas Chatterjee: Islam is an anti-culture. It is an enemy culture, a parasite culture... In fact, Islam is the culprit, the Muslims its victims. Islam holds the Muslims prisoners to a life of hatred, bigotry, intellectual slavery and unspirituality Islam is the disease, Muslim is the diseased. Islam is the drug, Muslim is the addict (Chatterjee in Goel 1997:51). To add insult to injury, the Hindutva Islamophobes insist they are doing a favour to Muslims, and to the world at large, by denouncing Islam from a distinctively Hindu or yogic spirituality perspective. They will be rescuing and liberating Muslims from the prison house of Islam and they will be offering the whole world a unique gift of yoga and spirituality which will supposedly heal the modern world. Again the sheer hatefulness of the rhetoric is worth noticing: Muslims of Bharatvarsha would start returning to the Hindu fold only when they realise how obnoxious a doctrine Islam is, how false and fraudulent, how degrading and dehumanising, how unethical and superficial. History has bestowed a role on Hindu nation to help Muslims discover that Islam is not a religion at all but a political doctrine propounded to serve Muhammads imperial, political and occasionally carnal interest that Islam is a prison house that deprives them of their freedom of thought, powers of reasoning and qualms of conscience When, and only when, Muslims find out the reality of Muhammad and his creed, they would start walking out of Islam and feed proud to join their ancestral culture (Chatterjee in Goel 1997: 64-5). So rather than appease Muslims by pretending to respect their religion, Hindus need to come out swinging and denounce Islam itself.

The Twain Meet This vehement and hateful attack on Islam is what unites Hindu Islamophobes with their European comrades. The best representative of this union is none other than Koenraad Elst. He has celebrated the theological turn introduced by Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel and Arun Shourie as a revolutionary breakthrough in which Hindu thought has come into its own after centuries of either being of a provincial and unconvincing quality, or being in the shadow of the ideologies occupying the seat of political hegemony, chiefly Islam and a string of European imports, now united under the umbrella of secularism (2001:2). Elst himself has been a staunch champion of VOIs project of curing Muslims of Islam. In an interview with Ramesh Rao, one of his many admirers among the NRI community in the US, Elst supports the VOI line that Muslims have to be talked out of Islam. He went on to assert that We should help Muslims in freeing themselves from IslamEvery Muslim is a Sita who must be released from Ravanas prison.24 This is exactly the agenda of the Norway killer to educate the Norwegian society, including the Muslim immigrants that Islam is not a religion but a political ideology. This is the non-violent component of the crusade against Islam in Europe: to create an environment so hostile that practice of Islam becomes difficult and that Muslims have no choice to either leave or to give up their faith. Indeed, if there was any doubt about the shared ground between the VOI and European Islamophobes, Elst gives the same advice in almost the same words to the Norway killer as he does to his Indian admirers. The solution to the Islam problem is not to use violence, but to liberate the Muslims from the mental prisonhouse of Islam there is no reason to let our Muslim fellowmen as prisoners of the deluded belief system imposed by Mohammed. This war against the teachings of Islam is the real story behind the India connection to the Norway massacre. Macaca 12-27-2011, 09:12 PM Reform, even if by stealth (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/arvind-subramanianreform-even-if-by-stealth/459934/) By Arvind Subramanian | Business Standard The important and interesting question in India is not necessarily the absence of major economic policy reforms. Rather, it is: what is the set of useful reforms that can be implemented while maintaining adequate opportunities for venality and criminality for key decision-makers? Consider why reform languor is incentive-compatible for Indian politicians. First, a crisis, actual or imminent, which would be a great and guaranteed galvaniser of reforms, does not loom over the economy. Yes, growth is slowing down but at about seven per cent it remains impressive, whether compared to Indias past or Indias peers. Yes, inflation has been doggedly high but the dirty secret is that inflation, while bad for the consumer, has been great for the government, facilitating a decline in public indebtedness away from flashing amber territory. And, yes, the sudden and rapid depreciation of the rupee spells trouble for companies that have borrowed abroad excessively without protecting themselves against downside risks but this kick-in-the-pants depreciation courtesy of financial markets may be a welcome short-term boost that the economy needs. In short, why should Indian policy makers reform when reform does not seem necessary to produce reasonable economic outcomes? Indeed, that is also the implicit response of the current Chinese leadership, which faces the same allegation of policy stasis at a time when a number of serious imbalances are building up in that economy. Second, not only is the lack of reform not a problem, it seems to be compatible with sizeable rent extraction for those in power. Whether from land, spectrum or natural resources or just the inevitable booty from economic growth the status quo provides ample opportunities for politicians

and their favoured private-sector cronies to grease their pockets. The cash stash, in turn, equips politicians to curry favour with their constituents, by dousing them with goodies as the former seek re-election. The implication is that reforms that will undermine rent extraction are unlikely to happen. And by definition the major forms of rent extraction whether of the 2G sort or the laundering of wealth that happens via Mauritius will be undertaken or blessed by those at the very top. This is not to condone the governments action or inaction for what are seriously damaging outcomes. It is simply to note that persisting with calls for reform smacks of navete or a misreading of political economy. It is like asking the scorpion to stop stinging. Should we, then, give up on reforms? Yes and no. This cynical and depressing reading suggests that, yes, we should probably give up on major reforms that threaten rents. But we should not give up on reforms altogether. Successful reforms in todays India will probably happen but will take different forms: they will be endogenous, the result of unintended consequences or happen by stealth. Consider examples of each. Free and unrestricted capital and labour mobility within India is likely to provide the most sustained basis for reforms in the country. India as an economic union will allow the competition-betweenstates dynamic to flourish, allowing reforms and good governance in one or two states to spread to others. If Nitish Kumar distinguishes himself by providing essential services in Bihar, Ms Mayawati in neighbouring Uttar Pradesh cannot be impervious to that development in part because money and people are acquiring exit options. Technology will be the chief instrument of reform as unintended consequence. The computerisation of railway bookings two decades ago dramatically reduced the corruption, delays and harassment routinely visited upon the average traveller. Similarly, mobile and internet technologies open up possibilities for e-governance that cannot be anticipated in advance. Being able to create an electronic registry for land records might do more for urban governance than any direct attempts to improve it. Reforms by stealth are another means of improving outcomes. In banking, for example, instead of abolishing the directed lending requirements, which would elicit predictable opposition from current beneficiaries, India has chosen simply to expand the list of eligible beneficiaries. In the limit, if everyone is an eligible beneficiary, the directed lending requirement ceases to bite and be distortionary. In banking, and until recently in the airline sector, instead of privatising the incumbent public monopoly/monopolies, the government chose to leave them intact and instead allowed new entry to engender competition. Though not quite reform by stealth, the spirit was very much an attempt to minimise threats to the rents of powerful incumbents. So, what does this imply for potential reformers in this government (if indeed there are any left)? Reforming governance or tackling corruption whatever that might actually require is better not attempted because that will simply not be allowed to happen. But even within the narrower, political economy-constrained set of possibilities, two items that might qualify for energetic pursuit are the Goods and Services Tax (GST) reform and the Unique ID (Aadhaar) project. Both should be presented as essentially plumbing exercises, aimed primarily at improving processes. It is not that there will be no losers from the GST and Aadhaar efforts. In the case of GST, some states will lose revenue; but the political economy of that might be relatively easy to address, for example, through offers of compensation to the current leadership of those states as proposed by the 13th Finance Commission. Similarly, the hiccoughs in the Aadhaar initiative relate to personalities and turf rather than to any serious backlash from powerful vested interests. History will, of course, not forgive this government for presiding over the epic levels of corruption attained during its tenure. Historys verdict on this governments zeal in legislating equity-inspired outcomes through the Right to Education and Food Security Bills is also unlikely to be favourable: the tension, even contradiction, inherent in requiring the state to do more both financially and organisationally at the very moment when the states capacity along both dimensions has deteriorated substantially is going to be exposed. It would be a pity if apart from these sins of commission, history were also to indict this government for sins of omission: failing to undertake the important reforms relating to GST and

Aadhaar, which even our rent-addled politicians could probably live with and let happen. The author is senior fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics and Centre for Global Development, and author of Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of Chinas Economic Dominance. He has been selected by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the top 100 global thinkers Making a mess of estimation (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/a-k-bhattacharyamakingmessestimation-/459935/) By A K Bhattacharya | Business Standard Should iron ore exports be canalised? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/should-ironore-exports-be-canalised/459909/) Business Standard Fearing financial feedback (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/fearing-financialfeedback/459932/) Business Standard Editorial The industrial downturn (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Chandrasekhar/article2751470.ece) By C. P. CHANDRASEKHAR | The Hindu Unsafe at any speed (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2752719.ece) The Hindu Editorial Unconstitutional, unethical, unscientific (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2752711.ece) By PUSHPA M. BHARGAVA | The Hindu Hunger pangs (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/jugglebandhi/entry/hunger-pangs) By Jug Suraiya | Times of India Power play (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Powerplay/articleshow/11269371.cms) Times of India Editorial Indias National Anthem Turns 100 (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/27/video-indiasnational-anthem-turns-100/) By Diksha Sahni | IndiaRealTime Discussion on Caste, Heated as Always (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/discussion-oncaste-heated-as-always/) India Ink 100 years since 'Jana Gana Mana' was born (http://www.thehindu.com/arts/history-andculture/article2752111.ece) By ARUNANGSU ROY CHOWDHURY | The Hindu National anthem becomes disabled-friendly (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/Mumbai/National-anthem-becomes-disabled-friendly/Article1-787993.aspx) Indo-Asian News Service Indian anthem Jana Gana Mana turns 100 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16241465) By Shamik Bag | BBC 'We were against Portuguese colonialism - not the Portuguese' (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/We-were-against-Portuguesecolonialism--not-the-Portuguese/articleshow/11269415.cms) By Alexandre Moniz Barbosa | Times of India Restoring Delhis Crowning Jewel (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/27/restoring-delhiscrowning-jewel/) By Megha Bahree | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-27-2011, 09:16 PM 2011: Democracy's odyssey (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/2011Democracys-odyssey/articleshow/11269389.cms) By Anita Inder Singh | Times of India Did democracy break through or fall back in 2011? Protesters in many countries demanded the upholding of the essentials of the democratic idea: freedom, dignity and participation. In some authori-tarian Arab states, people ousted tyrants. In Tunisia, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali resigned last January after weeks of demonstrations against a quarter of a century of corrupt authori-tarianism. In Egypt, a combination of popular protest and the withdrawal of military support brought down the autocratic Hosni Mubarak. Libya's cruel Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown by his people and sections of his armed forces. Syria's Bashar al-Assad is looking over his shoulder in fear of being

toppled by a widespread demand for decent democratic governance. Recently ordinary, internet-savvy Russians took to the streets of Moscow and St Petersburg - the historical centres of revolution - chanting "Russia without Putin" in protest against a power-greedy ruler accused of rigging parliamentary elections in favour of his United Russia party. Putin's ability to use his control over Russia's security forces and vast oil and gas reserves could not repress and bribe Russians into submission. China's communist dictators seem anxious about the chances of political unrest which could turn out to be a Chinese spring. Protests have not broken out against despots everywhere. But tyranny cannot be taken for granted; it is never a natural state of affairs. 'Instant democracy' is not in the offing in the Arab world or in the former USSR. So those who see anti-authoritarian movements leading to 'the end of history' lament that spring has turned into autumn and might soon turn into winter. Egypt's army is now trying to suppress pro-democracy activists. And, given the chance to choose new rulers, 60% of Egyptian voters opted for Islamist conservatives rather than westernised liberals. That raises the question whether political Islam and democracy are compatible; indeed whether democracy is synonymous with being "western". In any case, voting is only the first step towards democracy. And politics is merely the art of the possible. The fact is that democracy is premised on uncertainty - and choice. The West's double standards have been on display yet again. Initially, the US expressed support for Mubarak and Assad. To Washington and its European friends, the Arab movements heralded "spring" only when it became clear dictators would not survive the swelling tide of popular protest. Nato helped the Libyan rebels to topple Gaddafi but the EU and US now want to stay out of the troubled politics of nation-building in a country riven by tribal divisions - and needing development largesse at a time rich western democracies find it hard to cope with their own economic troubles. Meanwhile, it's business as usual between Saudi oil despots and the West. At another level, some established democracies have failed to meet popular expectations. In several western cities including Madrid, London and New York protests erupted. Apparently against the inability of governments to do anything about - or even their suspected collusion with - socioeconomic forces fomenting inequality, greed and injustice. The EU's 'democratic deficit' has been exposed yet again by the Greek debt crisis, to the extent that there has been talk not only of the unravelling of the eurozone but of six decades of European integration. India's democracy - which, along with that of Japan, is the oldest and most stable in Asia since the end of World War II - is dented by corruption. Will the ruling Congress party push through the tough legislation demanded by anti-graft protesters to clean up corrupt politics, which is essential to increase the life choices of Indians? The pristine longing to determine individual destiny can never be suppressed; that is why Arab, Russian and Chinese autocrats cannot relax on the sword-edge. Disenchantment with American, European or Indian democracy will never mean a wish for dictatorship. But populist xenophobic parties could gain ground in Europe if unemployment rises and if living standards fall. And in India and western democracies, governments must introduce legislation to tackle sleazy governance and crony capitalism. Expectations of democracy are always high. No one expects much from dictators if only because they try to survive by crushing hope. But people living under dictatorship want - first and foremost intellectual and political choice, as a step towards improving their life chances. Those living in stable democracies have that choice; they want better functioning of their democratic institutions and more equitable economic delivery. The year 2011 will be remembered as the year when citizens of some democracies were disillusioned at the maladroit handling the economic mess in their countries. They blamed not the stars but their elected leaders whom they saw as underlings.

What about the autocracies? Putin is determined to win the presidential election next March, by hook or by crook, while Russian democracy activists remain leaderless. Like the Arabs yearning for freedom, they find that the path to democracy is never strewn with roses - and that the roses inevitably have their thorns. Whatever their faults, established democracies will remain durable, if only because their leaders wish to renew and re-forge consensus on dealing with new challenges. All told, 2011 is likely to be remembered as the year when popular protest left dictators fearing for their survival in 2012. The writer is a security analyst and visiting professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi

An anxious 2012 (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/anxious-2012-739) By K.C.Singh | Asian Age Lowlights of the year 2011 (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/m-j-antonylowlightsthe-year-2011/459908/) By M J Antony | Business Standard In fast forward mode (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/In-fast-forwardmode/Article1-788024.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial It's fund and games (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/It-s-fund-andgames/Article1-788030.aspx) By Sujata Anandan | Hindustan Times This is tunnel vision (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/This-is-tunnelvision/Article1-788027.aspx) By Abhijit Banerjee | Hindustan Times Corruption and the South Asian (http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/kurakani-inkathmandu/2011/12/27/corruption-and-the-south-asian/) By UTPAL PARASHAR | Hindustan Times Freeing the CBI (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/freeing-the-cbi/892723/) By G. P. Joshi | Indian Express Reserve Bank, refocus (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/reserve-bank-refocus/892724/) By Ila Patnaik | Indian Express Indias very own annus horribilis (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/india %E2%80%99s-very-own-annus-horribilis-909) By Inder Malhotra | Deccan Chronicle Fate of the Lokpal Bill (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2752512.ece) By | The Hindu BusinessLine The choices ahead (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/extraordinaryissue/entry/the-choicesahead) By Pritish Nandy | Times of India Just ignore Anna. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/just-ignore-anna) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Anna vs politicians - Round 3. No result in sight (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/randomaccess/entry/anna-vs-politicians-round-3-noresult-in-sight) By Rajesh Kalra | Times of India The Anna factor (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/The-Annafactor/articleshow/11269329.cms) Times of India Editorial 'Middle-class Indians find it easier to BRIBE' (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1corruption-middle-class-indians-find-it-easier-to-bribe/20111227.htm) By Anupama Jha | Rediff MORAL & LEGAL BATTLES AGAINST CORRUPTION (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4829.html) By B.Raman | South Asia Analysis Group Shifting Debate Over Lokpal (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/shifting-debate-overlokpal/) By HARI KUMAR | India Ink Macaca 12-28-2011, 06:53 PM The worldwide middle-class angst (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajitbalakrishnanworldwide-middle-class-angst/460048/) By Ajit Balakrishnan | Business Standard There are few periods in human history that have seen worldwide expressions of middle-class angst like the current one has. In India, this expression takes the form of sometimes tacit and occasionally explicit empathy with the Hazare movement; in the United States, it is the Occupy Wall Street movement; in Egypt, it is Tahrir Square. Similar middle-class protests are going on in Spain, Columbia, Chile, Brazil, Turkey and even Israel. On the face of it, there is little in common across these movements other that the fact that

participants belong to the middle class that broad group of people in contemporary society who have a college education and occupy secure professional positions. Layered on top of these demographics are cultural signifiers. In England, this has traditionally been accent and manners; in America, it has meant being employed in white-collar industries. In India and Egypt, it has meant being English-language educated, proficient and, more often than not, employed by the state. This class worldwide is angry. It is expressing its anger in newspaper editorials (most journalists are card-carrying members of the middle class), on TV talk shows and across social media, all of which have been traditional and honourable forums for expression of middle-class views. What is new is that they are now venturing out into the streets as well. The banners they carry are variants around a common theme: a protest against corruption and a desire for true democracy. The targets of their ire have been, depending on the country, Wall Street bankers (America), corrupt politicians (India) and oligarchic ruling families (West Asia and elsewhere). Everywhere the esteem of elected politicians has diminished. It was the economic historian Eric Hobsbawm who pointed out, in his 1964 book Labouring Men, that social conflict is clustered in specific periods of time: the 1840s, the 1870s and the 1890s. Other historians have added 1968-75 as another cluster. Each of these clusters saw waves of strikes and, sometimes, violent political actions which were countered with political repression by the authorities of each period. Hobsbawm conjectured that each of these periods of social conflict came at the end of a long period of economic prosperity, called a Kondratiev Wave after Nikolai Kondratiev, the Russian economist who first spotted them. The First Kondratiev Wave of prosperity was brought on by the original Industrial Revolution, and the societal conflicts of the 1840s signalled its end. Thomas Carlyle, writing at that time, pointed out the paradox of an England full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supplies for human want in every kind coexisting with high unemployment. For example, in areas like Lancashire and Yorkshire, the heartland of the Industrial Revolution, a third of adult males many of them handloom weavers were unemployed. The social unrest of the 1870s came at the end of the Second Kondratiev Wave, the prosperity that came during widespread deployment of railways and steam engines. The unrest of the 1890s came at the end of the Third Kondratiev Wave, the prosperity that came with the surging demand for electricity and the construction of a vast new infrastructure of power stations and transmission systems reaching every home, factory and office. The social unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s came at the end of the Fourth Kondratiev Wave, the age of mass production which saw the massive deployment of autos, tractors, aircraft, petrochemicals and the supporting infrastructure of highways, airports and associated repair, maintenance and distribution services. This era of prosperity, which was predicated on cheap oil, ended with the oil price hike by member countries of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). High levels of unemployment and dissatisfaction with the working style of the mass production regime brought on the social unrest at the end of this wave. According to scholars like the late Christopher Freeman of Sussex University, the era we are living through is the Fifth Kondratiev Wave, the age of information and communication technology. This era is creating a phenomenon that some observers call the hollowing out of the middle class. There is no unanimity about the cause of this shrinking of the middle class. In the United States, some point to the elimination of vast swathes of middle management thanks to the business process re-engineering movement. Others point to the outsourcing of services and manufacturing to countries like India and China. In places like Egypt, Latin America and India, the state bureaucracies and companies that were a haven for middle-class employment from the 1950s onwards have stopped recruitment in the last two decades. Employees in these entities are a frustrated and angry lot at their dead-end jobs. In India this blow has to an extent been softened by the growth of the IT outsourcing industry, but our brothers and sisters throughout West Asia, Latin America and in Europe have not had this luck.

The End of Anna Hazare? (http://the-diplomat.com/indian-decade/2011/12/28/the-end-of-annahazare/) By Rajeev Sharma | The Diplomat

Has Anna Hazare's campaign run its course? (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india16344145) By Soutik Biswas | BBC An anti-corruption fight for India's soul (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/editorial/an-anti-corruption-fight-for-indiassoul) The National Editorial The Rs 7.8-lakh reality cheque (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-rs-7.8lakh-realitycheque/893146/) By Y P Rajesh | Indian Express The aam MP (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-aam-mp/893149/) By Seema Chishti | Indian Express House vs Gallery (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/house-vs-gallery/893154/) Indian Express Editorial Wisdom of crowds (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/wisdom-of-crowds/893153/) Indian Express Editorial All eyes on the Bill (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/all-eyesthe-bill/460045/) Business Standard Editorial Reversing from fast to slow (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/Reversingfrom-fast-to-slow/Article1-788465.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Team Anna may be losing steam (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/teamanna-may-be-losing-steam-145) Deccan Chronicle Editorial Baby steps against corruption (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2755271.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Mission Impossible for Anna? (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tiger-trail/entry/missionimpossible-for-anna) By Sharmila Ravinder | Times of India Fix the system (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Fix-thesystem/articleshow/11283501.cms) Times of India Editorial How one man rattled the ruling alliance (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1yearend-2011-anna-domini-how-one-man-rattled-the-ruling-alliance/20111228.htm) By Saisuresh Sivaswamy | Rediff What Will Team Anna Do Now? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/what-will-team-annado-now/) By HEATHER TIMMONS | India Ink Look! The Government Passed a Lokpal Bill! (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/28/lookthe-government-passed-a-lokpal-bill/) By Paul Beckett | IndiaRealTime Yet Another Fast by Indias Anti-Corruption Crusader (http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/12/27/yet-another-fast-by-indias-anti-corruptioncrusader/) By JYOTI THOTTAM | Time The Election Battle Begins (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/28/politics-journal-thebattle-begins/) By Jyoti Malhotra | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-28-2011, 06:58 PM Brighter side to Indian economy (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2755139.ece) By BISWA SWARUP MISRA | The Hindu BusinessLine The overall mood about the Indian economy is gloomy as we are about to leave 2011 behind us and enter 2012. The sense of gloom is not difficult to appreciate as the progress on important secondgeneration reforms has been tardy, investors have lost tonnes of money in the stock market, external sector sustainability issues have resurfaced after a long gap, strains are observed in government finances and the growth prospects for the global economy have worsened. However, seen from a different perspective, the challenges faced in 2011 could well be paving the way for opportunities for the Indian economy to tap in 2012. For instance, the depreciation of the rupee by around 20 per cent, which made imports substantially costlier in the second half of 2011, would help in improving the price competitiveness of Indian exports in 2012. The interest rates, though they increased throughout 2011, have now peaked and the easing, when it begins in 2012, will boost credit growth and support higher output growth. The systemic recognition of NPAs in banks, which caused their levels to rise significantly in 2011, will help inculcate better credit discipline and will prompt banks to rev up their recovery mechanism. Improvement in asset quality, coupled with better growth in business on account of easing interest rates, would help banks in improving their earnings.

FORWARD-LOOKING STEPS Year 2011 will be remembered for a number of forward-looking measures. First, despite the slow pace on a host of reforms, the government approved the New Manufacturing policy on October 25, 2011. The New Policy has an objective to increase the share of manufacturing in GDP from 16 per cent to 25 per cent and create 100 million additional jobs in manufacturing by 2022. The Policy also envisages setting up seven National Investment and Manufacturing Zones with single-window clearance and flexible labour laws. Second, on the trade front, government came out with a strategy paper in May to double India's exports to $500 billion by 2103-14 and subsequently India entered into a comprehensive economic partnership agreement with Japan in August. Third, a new Draft Telecom Policy was formulated, which purports to achieve 100 per cent rural teledensity by 2020 from the present 35 per cent. The Policy further mandates that 80 per cent of telecom networks is to be domestically manufactured by 2020. Fourth, the last vestige of administered interest rates was done away with the deregulation of interest rates on savings bank deposits. Fifth, with a view to facilitate long-term debt finance for infrastructure projects, the RBI and SEBI came up with guidelines for setting up Infrastructure Debt Funds either as mutual funds or NBFCs. All these measure are significant from a medium to long-term perspective. Further, the assertion by the Prime Minister that important issues such as FDI in retail, the Companies Bill and the Pension Bill will be taken up at the politically correct time is indicative of positive intent. One should not forget that it is politics that sets the contours for economics. INFLATION FACTOR The medium-term growth story of India, founded upon domestic demand-led growth, demographic dividend and democracy, remains intact. The rating upgradation of India's long-term sovereign debt by Moody's and Dominion Bond Rating Service last week also point to the robust underlying growth drivers for India. What had changed in the short term (2011) was the investor sentiment in the wake of high levels of inflation for a relatively longer period of two years. The economic woes of India in 2011 centred around inflation. Stubbornness of inflation prompted the RBI to raise rates 13 times. High inflation and high interest rates create an atmosphere of uncertainty that hurts investment decisions where a medium-term view of the economy is to be taken. As the interest rates moved up, they prompted businesses to defer long-term investment decisions. A clear evidence of this was found during July-September 2011 when gross fixed capital formation witnessed negative growth. Another fallout of rising rates was lower earnings prospects of corporates, which has kept the FIIs away from the Indian market. Thus, economic costs of inflation have been really huge. Policymakers try to avoid higher levels of inflation as they hurt the poor most. Sustained high economic growth, coupled with government's intervention in the form of guaranteed employment generation programmes (MNREGA) in the recent past, has led to improvements in purchasing power both in rural and urban areas. The Approach Paper to the Twelfth Five-Year Plan has pointed out that average real wage rates increased by 16 per cent at the all-India level between 2007 and 2010. The growth in some of the relatively poorer states such as Bihar and UP has been around 20 per cent over this period. Further, government has indexed the MNREGA wages with inflation beginning January 2011. All these developments have helped to protect the living standards of the poor amidst high food inflation. Thus, in the recent episode of high inflation, economic costs seem to have outweighed the social costs associated with it.

SUSTAINING GROWTH The global economic outlook looks much strained at the close than what it was at the beginning of 2011. Nonetheless, the scenario looks much better than what it was two months ago, mainly due to better growth expectation from the US and broad consensus amongst Euro nations for a fiscal compact and the support to banks from the ECB. Back home, growth has decelerated significantly in the July-September quarter when compared with India's potential and the growth achieved in the past. Notwithstanding the deceleration, the overall growth that India would achieve in 2011 would still be decent when seen in the international context. The South-West monsoon rainfall has been above normal in 2011 and food inflation has been coming down consecutively for the past seven weeks. Manufacturing inflation, however, still rules at higher than acceptable levels. The non-food inflation numbers will also moderate in 2012 as the lag and cumulative effects of past rate hikes will play their course. Along with the inflation, growth too will moderate. Thus, a key issue for policy makers in 2012 would be to sustain growth. Hopefully, there will be a revival of investor confidence once inflation is brought under control and that, to some extent, would counter the pull on growth. The author teaches Economics at the Xavier Institute of Management, Bhubaneswar The poverty game (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/barun-roypovertygame/460016/) By Barun Roy | Business Standard After the demographic dividend (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sonalde-desaiafterdemographic-dividend-/460047/) By Sonalde Desai | Business Standard Redesign with skill (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/redesignskill/460046/) Business Standard Editorial Food security and the lesson from Rome (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2755138.ece) By ACHINTYA | The Hindu BusinessLine Fuel woes hit power sector (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2755117.ece) By A. A. KHAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Medicines for all (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2755375.ece) The Hindu Editorial 3 Disruptions That Can Benefit India In 2012 (http://business.in.com/article/special/3-disruptionsthat-can-benefit-india-in-2012/31552/1) By Udit Misra | Forbes India Indias Economy in 2011: Highs and Lows (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/28/indiaseconomy-in-2011-highs-and-lows/) IndiaRealTime Gandhi-Hazare nexus important to Indian economy (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/27/breakingviews-hazare-idINDEE7BQ0AC20111227) By Jeff Glekin | Reuters India economy close to bottom, says UBS (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/28/indiaeconomy-close-to-bottom-says-ubs-idINDEE7BR02920111228) Reuters Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:03 PM Watching the economy (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Watching-theeconomy/articleshow/11283347.cms) By Sudipto Mundle | Times of India As we approach the end of another year, the economy is being buffeted by multiple challenges on several fronts. While some of these problems are of our own making, there are others beyond our control. On the growth front, even optimistic official forecasters, who were earlier predicting a growth rate of over 8.5%, are now admitting that growth will be only around 7%. The latest monthly index of industrial production indicates that growth in the industrial sector has actually turned negative. The slowdown was expected, the expected collateral damage arising from monetary tightening and rising interest rates aimed at curbing inflation. Incidentally, there have been many complaints that

the central government will overshoot its deficit target, which indeed it will. But had it succeeded in meeting the deficit target, growth would have been even lower. Unfortunately, while the high interest rate policy has curbed growth it has failed to contain inflation. Inflation has persisted at around 9% for over two years now, even though the RBI continued to raise the repo rate that drives other interest rates. However, this instrument is effective when inflation occurs due to excessive demand, not when it is driven by cost-push factors, as in the present episode of inflation. During much of 2010, high inflation was being driven by rapidly rising food prices resulting from low growth in domestic food production. During the current year, however, the cost push has come mainly from rising commodity prices abroad: fuels, metals and food prices have all risen quite sharply this year. Under such conditions of imported inflation, interest rate hikes are not very effective in containing inflation. The RBI has now announced a pause in its policy rate hikes, anticipating a reduction in inflationary pressures. This is quite likely. Domestic food price inflation has declined quite sharply, and so has inflation of global commodity prices. Normally, this should lead to a significant reduction in the headline inflation rate. Unfortunately, much of the benefit of this moderation in global commodity price increases has been offset by rupee depreciation, since this again translates into a rise in the rupee price of imports, which then spreads to other products. The rupee`s depreciation by around 15% in recent months, while aggravated by domestic speculative activity, is primarily traceable to the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe. As observed during the crisis of 2008, the present crisis has again led to a large withdrawal of FII money from the Indian stock market, eroding its value by as much as 20%. This large withdrawal of portfolio investments from India has led to the depreciation of the rupee. The outlook for the Indian economy, as indeed for the world economy, depends in large measure on how the sovereign debt crisis in Europe plays out in 2012. The EU summit earlier this month, the latest of many, marked some significant achievements. To help stabilise stressed EU economies, EU countries will contribute 200 billion to an emergency funding facility of the IMF. This is in addition to the 440 billion European Financial Stability Facility already established by European governments, and a permanent 500 billion facility called the European Stability Mechanism to be established by June 2012. This is in addition to the relief already provided by private banks in writing down and restructuring their loans by up to 50%. These arrangements for bailing out stressed economies go a long way in dealing with the existing debt problem. But they do not deal with the fiscal problem that underlies the debt problem, namely, that most EU governments spend much more than the revenues they raise, especially in a variety of generous entitlement programmes of the welfare state. Unless these governments conform to prudent fiscal rules that align their spending with their revenues, the sovereign debt problem will keep recurring. Hence the most significant achievement of the last summit was the agreement by all EU governments, except UK, to commit to a fiscal compact. While this was a major step forward, details of how this will work are yet to be worked out. In particular, governments committing to fiscal discipline will need to know what they get in return. There is no agreement yet that they would be able to raise loans through the issue of Eurobonds, which would be shared liabilities of all EU members. However, Mario Draghi, the new president of the European Central Bank (ECB), has hinted that the ECB may be open to significant purchases of sovereign bonds issued by countries that comply with the fiscal compact. It is still too early to tell whether this will be adequate to stabilise global financial markets, though some recent market signals are promising. If this were to happen, it could mark a significant turnaround for the world economy, including India. It is reasonable to hope that a resolution of the EU crisis will unleash a rising tide of global economic recovery that will lift all boats, including India, in 2012. But it is quite disconcerting to observe the endless flip-flops on several key decisions at home - fuel price hike, FDI in retail, pension reform, Lokpal, etc. This is gravely eroding confidence in the ability of this government to manage the affairs of state. The writer is emeritus professor at the National Institute of Public Finance & Policy, New Delhi

It's going to be 2012, not 1912! (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/yearend-2011-its-going-tobe-2012-not-1912/20111228.htm) By Sheela Bhatt | Rediff Conserving the Taj Mahal (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2755374.ece) The Hindu Editorial How an Old Delhi Resident Sees New Delhi (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/28/howan-old-delhi-resident-sees-new-delhi/) By Krishna Pokharel | IndiaRealTime Will Delhis blueFROG Leap Over Mumbais? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/28/willdelhis-bluefrog-leap-over-mumbais/) By Margherita Stancati | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:07 PM What Are Indias Prospects At The London Olympics? India had its best medals tally ever at the 2008 Olympic Games. The entire country is hoping that it will better the count in 2012 (http://business.in.com/article/biggest-questions-of-2012/what-areindias-prospects-at-the-london-olympics/31562/1) By Geet Sethi | Forbes India Boxing, wrestling, shooting, archery, badminton these are events where Indian athletes are traditionally talented and we currently have fine talents who are in great form. Currently, they are on par with the best in the world. Saina Nehwal is ranked World No. 5. All the four players ahead of her are Chinese who are playing at a very high level. She has not had the best performance this year, but you can never count her out. She is an amazing talent. I am sure she will get physically much stronger and fitter and that will play a major role in getting her confidence back. She is definitely a genuine challenger for an Olympic gold. But if anyone has the courage, the talent and the boxing brain to win an Olympic gold, then it is definitely M.C. Mary Kom. She has won five World Championship titles which is an amazing feat in a physical contact sport like boxing. Womens boxing is being introduced in the Olympics for the first time in London. So, this is her first chance and maybe her last. It is tough to challenge for medals in team sports. The trend will mostly continue this time as well and I foresee individual sports giving India a much better opportunity to win medals at the London 2012 Olympics. Olympic Gold Quest [OGQ] already has 10 athletes who have qualified for the London Olympics: Gagan Narang, Sanjeev Rajput, Vijay Kumar, Annu Raj Singh, Shagun Chaudhary (shooting); Manoj Kumar and Devendro Singh (Boxing); Tintu Luka, Vikas Gowda and O.P. Singh Karhana (Athletics). All of them have a chance at an Olympic medal. There are many athletes outside OGQ who can shine in London. Ronjan Sodhi is a huge hope for India. Abhinav Bindra and Sushil Kumar are champion athletes and we all hope that they will both be at their best for the Games. There is a lot of controversy going on now in Indian sports with the hockey federations, the Sports Bill and the doping charges. But I dont believe top level athletes get swayed by whats happening in the world outside of their respective sporting arena. So, while a hockey player may be affected by the controversies afflicting hockey, I dont believe this will really affect the preparations of other athletes from other disciplines. The Sports Bill is basically good for Indian sportspersons and for Indian sports, so that should motivate our sportspersons to do well. Also, sportspersons are getting a great deal of support from the government, the national sports federations and organisations like OGQ. But there is still a lot of hard work to be done. We must not compromise on the quality of our preparations. [I]Geet Sethi, the winner of five World Professional Billiards Championships, the Rajiv Gandhi Khel Ratna, the Padma Shri and the Arjuna Award. He is a co-founder of the Olympic Gold Quest India's last cricket frontier (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16240303) By Suresh

Menon | BBC Pain and Glory From Down Under (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/pain-and-gloryfrom-down-under/) By PRASHANTH VENKATESH | India Ink Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:11 PM Red sunset (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/red-sunset/892721/) Indian Express Editorial The number of deaths from Maoist violence in Andhra Pradesh has touched a three-decade-low seven civilian victims and none from security personnel. This good news is a statistic, provided by the Special Intelligence Bureau, behind which lies an enormous human and counter-insurgency story. From a high of 227 deaths in 1991 and a terrible year as recently as 2008, when 36 policemen and Greyhound commandos were killed in a single incident, this is a job well done, over time. The significance of Andhras success lies in validating, unambiguously, the efficacy of talking to Maoists and yet never letting up the pressure. The security personnel, traditionally ill-equipped and under-trained for curbing a professional insurgency of the Maoist kind, had to be trained and provided with modern arms. Without investing in police forces, they cannot be expected to perform and succeed. The setting-up of the Greyhounds was Andhras point of departure. Along with a revamp of the state police, it turned the tide 10 years later in 1999. From 21 Naxal-affected districts out of 23 in the 1990s, seven deaths is as clean a slate as a Maoist-affected state has hoped for in a long time. Moreover, with its vigilant human rights groups, the battle in Andhra was fought under full public scrutiny. This is also a lesson in how to replicate a specific means elsewhere, allowing for varying ground realities. While Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have been serious and successful, and West Bengal too seems to have turned the page of late, Orissa still needs to get cracking. The intellectual-activist discourse, which discounts police casualties and the anarchic agenda of the Maoists, as well as the insistence on talks alone, miss the essence of Maoism their protestations of violence because of underdevelopment and deprivation is a cover for abject cynicism. Development deprives Maoists of their raison detre. Thats why they blow up every marker of it schools, bridges, roads, railways, etc. The two-pronged strategy of providing development which deprives Maoists of recruits and is also a supreme end in itself and using force has robbed Maoists of turf. Andhra offers the facts. Without being complacent, let the lessons be learnt. If one heavily affected state can be cleaned up, so can the rest. And lets put police reforms on the table immediately.

Assam Terror Assessment 2012 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/28122011-india-assam-terrorassessment-2012-analysis/) South Asia Terrorism Portal Nagaland Terror Assessment Year 2012 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/28122011-india-nagalandterror-assessment-year-2012-analysis/) South Asia Terrorism Portal Elusive Bihar Coherence (http://www.eurasiareview.com/27122011-india-elusive-bihar-coherenceanalysis/) By Deepak Kumar Nayak | South Asia Terrorism Portal Expanding the Middle Space in the Naga Peace Process (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16944.pdf) By Rita Manchanda , Tapan Bose | Economic & Political Weekly Insurgents in Assam brought on their knees during 2011 (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/insurgents-in-assam-brought-on-their-knees-during2011/20111222.htm) By K Anurag | Rediff Indias North East Region In 2011: Declining Violence And Distant Peace (http://www.eurasiareview.com/22122011-india%E2%80%99s-north-east-region-in-2011declining-violence-and-distant-peace-analysis/) By Bibhu Prasad Routray | Eurasia Review Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:30 PM The Next al-Qaeda? Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Future of Terrorism in South Asia (http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/next-al-qaeda-lashkar-e-taiba-and-future-terrorismsouth-asia) By Neil Padukone | World Affairs Journal In March 2009, President Obama said that Americas clear and focused goal in the region was not simply to kill Osama bin Laden, but to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and

Afghanistan and prevent their return to either country in the future. But what is al-Qaeda? This is a question that has been asked in one form or another since 9/11. But in the aftermath of bin Ladens death, when the media has promoted facile assurances that the terror organization was killed along with its visible public face, it has taken on a new urgency. Some, like Bruce Hoffman, have argued that bin Ladens close circle continues to pose the main global threat, while decentralization theorists like Marc Sageman state that the main threat no longer comes from a cohesive organization but from local, homegrown groups. In a sense, both are true. In his seminal work on suicide terrorism, Robert Pape writes that Al Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues . . . than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat. In other words, al-Qaeda was the glue that binds local Islamist insurgent groups around the world to one another, giving each access to a global pool of ideas and resources. The ties between local movementsGSPC of Algeria (now known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Hizbul Shabaab of Somalia, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Taliban in Af/Pak, even homegrown cells in the Westgive access to ideas, weapons, support, and power to each in their respective areas of operation; these links between the locals aggregate to produce what we think of as a global movement. But after 2001, the al-Qaeda of Osama bin Laden and his Afghan Arabs lost its physical stronghold, Afghanistan-based infrastructure, and much of its operational strength. A year before Abbottabad, Steve Coll wrote in the New Yorker that bin Laden and his deputy were hunkered down . . . surrounded by only about two hundred hard-core followers. Their adherents in Yemen and Africa number no more than a few thousand . . . Relations with the Taliban seem brittle. Unlike Hezbollah, Al Qaeda provides no social services and thus has built no [concrete] political movement. Computers recovered from bin Ladens compound suggest that its members, far from spending their time planning major attacks, have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are, according to political scientist John Mueller. Even as bin Ladens death is hailed as an important symbolic event, evidence suggests that alQaeda has lost most of its resources and connective capacity, leaving it as the mere figurehead of the militant movement. What comes next? The history of the organization offers an answer. From 1984, the Maktab alKhidamator Office of Services, the precursor to al-Qaedainitially focused on Afghanistan and, after consolidating a substantial presence there, became al-Qaeda in 1988. Embracing a global vision, this self-defined vanguard of the Islamic movement used its Afghan (and for a time, Sudanese) base to train, connect, and equip fighters from Islamist nationalist groups around the world. Today, while American sensors focus on the Hindu Kush Mountains, there is a group to the south, in Pakistani Punjab, following a similar local-to-global pattern: the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The group, whose name means Army of the Pure, was established in 1990 by Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, fighters in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Saeed, LeTs leader, was born in 1950 to a Punjabi family that had lost dozens of members on its journey to Pakistan in the wake of the 1947 partition. Carrying that deep grievance with him, Saeed was appointed to General Zia ul-Haqs Council on Islamic Ideology and taught Islamic studies at Lahores University of Engineering and Technology in the early 1980s. He then went to Saudi Arabia for higher studies, where he met Abdullah Azzam, bin Ladens mentor, who encouraged Saeed to start the forerunner to LeT, the Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad (the Center for Call and Guidance). The group focused predominantly on one region, Kashmir, abetting and, by the late 1990s, commandeering the insurgency there. Since then, Saeed has expanded the groups operations in scale and geographic reach to include attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir, logistics support to fighters in northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, assisting assassination attempts on Pakistani officials, bombings in urban Pakistan and Afghanistan, and contracting its bombing campaign in mainland India to locals like the Indian Mujahideen, an extension of Dawood Ibrahims organized crime network. Lashkar-e-Taibas crowning achievement, of course, was the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, involving a dozen coordinated shooting and bombing attacks and the deaths of 164 people. LeT has replaced Jamaat-e-Islami, the original Vanguard of the Islamic Revoluton, as the center of

political Islamism in Pakistan; with its stated aim of liberating Kashmir from Indian rule, LeT has received the greatest support from the Pakistani military in recent years. Political leaders such as former President Pervez Musharraf have given mixed signals, sometimes banning the group, sometimes denying having done so. In fact, LeT is the only militant group in Pakistan to have unequivocally increased in strength and reach after 9/11. Already funded by Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and elements of the Pakistani Diaspora, LeTs overground charity, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), was able to raise enough money for relief from the 2005 earthquake in Pakistanadministered Azad Kashmir to become financially independent of the Pakistani state. Global scrutiny after the 11/26 Mumbai attacks pressured the ISI to make Lashkar put its violent activities on temporary hold. But JuD (which after 2009 went by the name Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz Qibla Awal) has used the intervening time to build up a vast social services infrastructure that has solidified a broader Islamist movement throughout much of Pakistan. This movement recruits not only impoverished youth but highly skilled professionals. According to the Strategic Foresight Group, as early as 2005 LeTs assets included a 190-acre campus in Muridke, outside of Lahore, complete with 500 offices, 2200 training camps, 150 schools, 2 science colleges, 3 hospitals, 34 dispensaries, 11 ambulance services, a publishing empire, garment factory, iron foundry, and woodworks factories. It had more than 300,000 cadres at its disposal and paid salaries to their topbracket functionaries that were 12-15 times greater than similar jobs in the civilian sector. Globally, Lashkar trainees have fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere in Central Asia, while fighters from Bosnia, the Philippines, Somalia, numerous Arab countries, and even the United States and Europe have trained in LeT camps. LeT itself has cells in countries around the worldincluding India, Spain, Bangladesh, and Australiaand liaises with groups from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Even homegrown threats in the West like David Headley, Faisal Shahzad, the Falls Church Virginia jihad network, and UK terror cells bore a Lashkar stamp. Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:32 PM Following the al-Qaeda example, LeT is a central hub in the vast network of militant groups that abound in Pakistan. It trains, assists, and facilitates communications between organizations like Hizbul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) in Kashmir, Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI) in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Included in LeTs network are multinational organized crime syndicates like D-Company, the ISI and Pakistani Army, and of course, foreign militants like al-Qaeda itself. Initially al-Qaeda and other groups simply used LeTs operational infrastructuretraining camps, recruitment mechanisms, and media platformswhile maintaining strategic independence. But LeT has developed a sophisticated central-planning structure that has allowed it to move out on its own. LeTs global presence is expanding along with its ambitions. The 2008 Mumbai attacks were among the first in South Asia to target not only Westerners, but Israeli Jews, linking South Asian political Islamism to the global, anti-Zionist narrative. Counterinsurgency expert Andrew Exum argues that the worlds most dangerous organization is the terrorist whose actions precipitate a war between India and Pakistana profile that Lashkar could easily meet. Operating freely, globally, and with a large infrastructure and support base, Lashkar-e-Taiba is in many ways becoming the new regional leader of the global Islamist movement created by al-Qaeda. In an age of globalization, the ability to connect micro-level activities to macro-level trends is a key source of power. It is this ability that gave al-Qaeda its strength in 2001, and it is this potential that is empowering Lashkar today. Learning from the fate of the more hierarchical, bin Laden-commanded-and-controlled organization of ten years ago, groups such as Lashkar today have found that establishing networks of networks is the most efficient way to manage resources, carry out attacks, and remain resilient thereafter. Lashkars global contacts will enable it to direct confederations of militants in attacks throughout South Asia, Europe, or the United States, without compromising itself. But despite Lashkars increasingly ominous profile, in its narrow search for al-Qaeda, the United States has long overlooked LeT, its local like-minded affiliates, and the Pakistani state agencies that have long supported it. Correcting this tunnel vision cannot involve the same sledgehammer approach the US used against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after 9/11. This would not be possible in

Pakistan, given Lashkar-e-Taibas broader sociopolitical entrenchment there, or even desirable, given the likelihood that under such pressure the group would splinter into multiple, less manageable factions. Instead, given that the aggregation of its global links is the root of the threat posed by Lashkar, a sound medium-term operational strategy would be disaggregation. As the counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen writes, disaggregation focuses on denying the ability of regional and global actors to link and exploit local actors...and interdicting flows of information, personnel, finance and technology between and within theatres, much as the Sunni Awakening did in Iraq. To these ends, the US should extend its quiet, apolitical vigilance of the last five years, which have seen an integration of local criminal justice work, foreign intelligence, military action, public diplomacy, and civil society into the agile network that helped weaken al-Qaedas organization and message. But to act on the goals Kilcullen believes are crucialdenying sanctuary areas; isolating Islamists from local populations; disrupting personnel, money, and information flows [to and from Islamists across the region]; and ameliorating local conflicts that create the grievances on which jihadist systems preyWashington must think longer-term. It needs to understand that its security-centric engagement with Pakistan only bolsters the military economy that is a godsend to groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, and work to redefine the terms of engagement. The relationship should move from a fickle, transactional one based on short-term security needs to one that encourages genuine and sustainable growth, by economically reconnecting Pakistan to the rest of the region. Neil Padukone is a strategic affairs analyst and author of Security in a Complex Era

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT VERSUS PAKISTAN ARMY: THE ONGOING TUSSLE ANALYSED (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4832.html) By Subhash Kapila | South Asia Analysis Group Before a collision (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84624&Cat=9) By Kamila Hyat | The News Memogate: the odds are even now (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\29\story_29-12-2011_pg3_2) By Mohammad Taqi | Daily Times Is Pakistan's army conspiring to take over the government? (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/pakistan/111226/pakistan-armycoup-asif-ali-zardari) By Suzanna Koster | GlobalPost Harder times ahead (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/28/harder-times-ahead.html) By Mahir Ali | Dawn Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:41 PM The Pakistan Thorn in ChinaIndiaU.S. Relations (http://twq.com/12winter/docs/12winter_Pant.pdf) By Harsh V. Pant | The Washington Quarterly At a time when Pakistan is under intense scrutiny about its role in fighting extremism and terrorism, the world has been watching to see how Beijing decides to deal with Islamabad. Despite Pakistans growing diplomatic isolation in recent months, Chinas support has been steadfast, at least publicly. Two weeks after the May 2011 U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Pakistans Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani went to China on a four-day visit to celebrate the 60th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Of course, there is much to celebrate in a bilateral relationship that Pakistans ambassador to Beijing has described as higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey, and so on.1 China was the only major power that openly voiced support for Pakistan after bin Ladens assassination, defending Islamabad and emphasizing that the Pakistani government may not have known about bin Ladens presence on its territory. During Prime Minister Gilanis visit, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao affirmed that Pakistan has made huge sacrifices and an important contribution to the international fight against terrorism, that its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected, and that the international community should understand and support Pakistans efforts to maintain domestic stability and to realize economic and social development.2 Wen went on to state that China would like to be an all-weather strategic partner, and would do

its best to help the Pakistani government and people get through their difficulties. To underscore its commitment, China agreed to immediately provide Pakistan with 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role jets under a co-production agreement, even as negotiations continued for more fighter aircrafts including those with stealth technology. Despite this generosity, Pakistan wanted even more from Chinaunderscored by its expressed desire to have China take over the operation of Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea west of Karachi, in which Beijing has invested heavily in recent years and which serves an important role in the projection of Chinas naval prowess in the region. Pakistan has suggested that the port could be upgraded to a naval base for Chinese use. 3 China, however, immediately rejected this offer, not wanting to antagonize the United States and India with the formal establishment of a base in Pakistan. Ever since Chinese and Pakistani leaders underscored their nations commitments to each others core security interests at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Pakistan has occupied a unique position in Chinas foreign policy calculus.4 Their relations have been described as arguably the most stable and durable element of Chinas foreign relations.5 India has been the main factor that has influenced Chinas and Pakistans policies vis-a`-vis each other. China, viewing India as a potential challenger in the strategic landscape of Asia, has tended to use Pakistan to counter Indian power in the region, while Islamabad has gained access to civilian and military resources to balance Indian might in the sub-continent. The ChinaPakistan partnership serves the interests of both by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country.6 Each is using the other to balance India as Indias disputes with Pakistan keep India preoccupied, distracting New Delhi from the task of reaching its potential as a major regional and global player. Although some U.S. and Indian voices are asking the Obama and Singh administrations, respectively, to partner with China to restore stability in Pakistan,7 Pakistans utility for China is only likely to increase, particularly as India continues its ascent in the global inter-state hierarchy and pursues a more ambitious foreign policy posture primarily to counter China, resulting in a further tightening of the Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale. In 1950, based in part on their convergent interests toward India, Pakistan was among the first countries to recognize the Peoples Republic of China and break diplomatic ties with the Republic of China. Sino-Pakistan ties gained particular momentum after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, when China and Pakistan signed a boundary agreement recognizing Chinese control over portions of the disputed Kashmir territory. Since then, maintaining close ties with China has been a priority for Islamabad, and Beijing has provided extensive economic, military, and technical assistance to Pakistan over the years. And it was Pakistan that in the early 1970s enabled China to cultivate its ties with the Westwith the United States in particular, becoming the conduit for Henry Kissingers landmark secret visit to China in 1971and has been instrumental in bringing China closer to the larger Muslim world. Pakistan has supported China on all issues of importance to the latter, especially those related to the question of Chinas sovereignty, such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as other sensitive issues such as human rights. China has reciprocated by supporting Pakistans stance on Kashmir. China has emerged as Pakistans largest defense supplier, with joint projects that produce armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile frigates. Pakistans military modernization is dependent on Chinese largesse, with China supplying Pakistan with short-range M-11 missiles and helping Pakistan develop the Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.8 In the last two decades, the two states have been actively involved in a range of joint ventures, including the JF-17 fighter aircraft used for delivering nuclear weapons, an Airborne Warning and Control System, and the Babur cruise missile (the dimensions of which exactly replicate those of the Hong Niao Chinese cruise missile). In a major move for its indigenous defense industry, China is supplying its most advanced homemade combat aircraft, the third-generation J-10 fighter jet, to Pakistan in a deal worth around $6 billion.9 Negotiations are also underway between the two for the purchase of six new submarines by Islamabad. Beijing is helping Pakistan to build and launch satellites for remote sensing and communication, even as Pakistan is reportedly already hosting a Chinese space communication facility at Karachi.10 China also played a major role in the development of Pakistans nuclear infrastructure and emerged as Pakistans benefactor at a time when increasingly stringent export controls in Western countries

made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology. The Pakistani nuclear weapons program is essentially an extension of the Chinese one. Arms-control advocate Gary Milhollin aptly noted, If you subtract Chinas help from Pakistans nuclear program, there is no nuclear program.11 In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistans production of plutonium. China also provided technical and material support for the completion of the Chashma Nuclear Power Reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid-1990s. Although China has long denied helping any nation attain a nuclear capability, the father of Pakistans nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, acknowledged the crucial role China played in his nations nuclear weaponization when China gave 50 kilograms of weapon grade enriched uranium, drawings of nuclear weapons, and tons of uranium hexafluoride for Pakistans centrifuges. 12 This is perhaps the only case where a nuclear weapon state has actually passed on weapons-grade fissile material as well as a bomb design to a nonnuclear weapon state. Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:48 PM On the economic front, China and Pakistan have a free trade agreement, with China accounting for around 11 percent of Pakistans imports. The two sides are committed to achieving a trade target of $15 billion by 2015. 13 Chinas no-strings attached economic aid to Pakistan is more appreciated than the aid it receives from the United States (which often comes with riders attached), even as Chinese assistance is nowhere near what the United States has given to Pakistan; the United States provided $349 million in military and economic assistance to Pakistan in 2010 alone.14 Though Beijing did provide a soft loan of about $500 million to Islamabad to tide over Pakistan during the economic crisis in 2008, it did not end up giving a large-scale bailout package as was expected, thereby forcing Pakistan to go to the International Monetary Fund. Chinas economic cooperation with Pakistan is growing, with substantial Chinese investment in Pakistani infrastructural expansion, including the noted project in the port in Gwadar, which is strategically located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. The railroad from Gwadar through the Karakoram Mountains leading into Xinjiang in western China would provide China with an alternative energy supply route (China is building this strategic transport corridor despite Indian objections to its activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). Chinas presence in the Bay of Bengal via roads and ports in Burma, as well as in the Arabian Sea via the Gwadar port, has been a cause of concern for India. It has been suggested that Gwadar could provide China with a listening post from where it could monitor U.S. naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future U.S.Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.15 Though Pakistans naval capabilities do not, on their own, pose any challenge to India, the combination of Chinese and Pakistani naval forces could indeed be formidable for India to counter. With access to crucial port facilities in Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan, China is well-positioned to secure its interests in the region. Sino-Indian Interests and Relations Some in the Indian strategic community have suggested that China shares a range of objectives with India including a prosperous, sustainable, and secure Pakistan that does not remain a base for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.16 The rapidly deteriorating situation in Pakistan and its long-term consequences for regional stability might, some suggest, result in greater cooperation between Beijing and New Delhi to stabilize the shared periphery between the two nations. Turbulence in Xinjiang, such as the riots between Han Chinese and the Muslim Uighurs in 2009, is indeed forcing Beijing to pay greater attention to the sources of international terrorism in Pakistan, given the prospect of Islamist extremism spilling over from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the restive autonomous region of western China. Chinas concerns about Islamist militancy on its western border have been rising over the past few years and the security environment in Afghanistan and the larger Central Asian region remains a huge worry. Yet, China refuses to discuss Pakistan with India in order to ensure that its privileged relationship with Pakistan remains intact, and U.S. China cooperation on Pakistan has remained minimal. China and India share a range of objectives in Pakistan, including preventing the rise and spread of extremism, fostering economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, overall political stability and social cohesion in Pakistan, and the safety of Pakistans nuclear assets. Of all the major powers, it is China that can effectively leverage its growing economic profile in Pakistan to ensure Pakistans security establishment cedes power to the civilians, allowing the Pakistani state to function effectively. Chinese workers and assets have been targeted by extremists in Pakistan, and Chinese plans to emerge as a major investor in Afghanistan would remain a fantasy without Pakistan reining

in extremist groups in Afghanistan. The stability of the larger Central Asian region, crucial because of its oil and gas reserves, is also at stake. In recent years, the major powers have been keen to expand their influence in the region, and China is no exception. It shares many of the interests that other major powers such as the United States, Russia, and India have in Central Asia, including access to Central Asian energy resources, controlling the spread of radical Islam, ensuring political stability, and strengthening regional economies. Continuing instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses a serious challenge to realizing these objectives. Yet, Chinas relationship with India has been very turbulent recently, impeding the realization of these and other mutual interests. At the global level, their rhetoric is all about cooperation, and indeed the two sides have worked together on climate change, global trade negotiations, and in demanding that global financial institutions be restructured in light of the global economys shifting center of gravity. The case for Sino-Indian cooperation has been built by various constituencies to offer a counterweight to U.S. global and regional hegemony. China is a rising power that sees the United States as the greatest obstacle to achieving its preeminent position in the global political hierarchy. As a consequence, it realizes the importance of cooperating with other major powers like India to check U.S. expansionism in the world, even if only in the short term. India has different considerations, because it is still a long way from becoming a challenger to U.S. global predominance. Nevertheless, it has always tried to voice the concerns of the so-called developing world, strongly arguing for respecting the sovereignty of all countries and opposing the use of force in international politics. Concerns that the United States had become too powerful and unilateral, and that a unipolar U.S.-dominated world would not be in the best interests of weaker states like India, has made the idea of Sino-Indian partnership attractive to certain sections of the Indian strategic elite. India and China took strong exception to the U.S.-led air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, the campaign against Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq in 2003, and more recently the Western intervention in Libya, arguing that they violated the sovereignty of these countries and undermined the authority of the UN system. Both also favor more democratic international economic regimes. They have strongly resisted efforts by the United States and other developed nations to link global trade to labor and environmental standards, realizing clearly that this would put them at a huge disadvantage to the developed world, thereby hampering their drive toward economic development, the number one priority for both countries. Nevertheless, buoyed by the perception in the early months of the Obama administration that Washington planned to make its ties with China the centerpiece of its foreign policy in light of growing U.S. economic dependence on China, Beijing has displayed a distinctly aggressive stance toward India. Even though Beijing has solved most of its border disputes with other countries, it is reluctant to move ahead with New Delhi. China took its territorial dispute with India all the way to the Asian Development Bank in 2009, where it blocked an Indian application for a loan that included development projects in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China continues to claim as part of its own territory. Alarm is rising in India because of frequent and strident claims being made by China along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim (the latter sits between Nepal and Bhutan). The recent rounds of boundary negotiations have been a disappointing failure, with a growing perception in India that China is less than willing to adhere to earlier political understandings on how to address the boundary dispute. No results of any substance have been forthcoming from Sino-Indian border negotiations even as the talks continue endlessly.17 Also, the suggestion by the Chinese to the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in 2009 that the Indian Ocean should be recognized as a Chinese sphere of influence has raised hackles in New Delhi.18 Chinas lack of support for the U.S.India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact, which it tried to block at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and its obstructionist stance in bringing the terror masterminds of the November 2008 attack in Mumbai to justice have further strained ties.19 Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:51 PM Chinas rapid economic growth in the last decade has given it the capability to transform itself into a military power. Its rapidly modernizing military and the opacity surrounding its military build-up

remain a cause of great concern for India. Whatever Beijings intentions might be, consistent increases in defense budgets over the last several years have put China on track to become the power most capable of challenging U.S. predominance in the AsiaPacific. While Chinas near-term focus remains on preparations for potential problems in the Taiwan Straits, its nuclear force modernization, its growing arsenal of advanced missiles, and its development of space and cyberspace technologies are changing the military balance in Asia and beyond. As China becomes more reliant on imported oil for its rapidly growing industrial economy, it will develop and exercise military power projection capabilities to protect the shipping lanes that transport oil from the Persian Gulf to China. The capability to project power would require access to advanced naval bases along the sea lanes of communication and forces capable of gaining and sustaining naval and air superiority. In this context, Chinas so-called string of pearls strategy of expanding its naval presence and building diplomatic ties in and around the Indian Ocean littoral is generating concern in Indian strategic circles.20 Chinas increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean is occurring at the same time as Indian naval expansion has relatively slowed, and this could have great strategic consequences because Indias traditional geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean are increasingly at risk.21 Chinas Continuing Salience in Pakistani Foreign Policy With Indias recent rise as an economic and political power of global significance, Sino-Indian ties are now at a critical juncture as India tries to find the right policy mix to deal with its most important neighbor. Meanwhile, Chinese strategists remain concerned about U.S. attempts to encircle China and the profound effect on Chinese security of an eventual integration of India into a U.S. alliance. China, according to this view, needs to remain vigilant against the growing network running from Japan to India that would suffocate China.22 As India struggles to emerge as a global power with an ambitious foreign policy agenda, China can effectively scuttle Indian ambitions by continuing with its diplomatic and military support to Pakistan. Much to Indias chagrin, China has given ample indications in the recent past that it wants to follow that path. With the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari under intense pressure from the United States to do more to fight terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil, there are calls in Pakistan to adopt a foreign policy that considers China and not the United States to be Pakistans strongest ally and most significant stakeholder. Chinas emergence as the leading global economic power coupled with recent attempts by India and the United States to forge a closer relationship has helped this suggestion gain further credibility. Washington has historically been accused of using Pakistan in times of need and then deserting it for a policy that favors stronger relations with India to serve the larger U.S. strategic agenda. Pakistan remains angry about U.S. indifference after the United States used it to funnel aid to Afghan mujahideen and then turned its back on Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Whereas only around nine percent of Pakistanis view the United States as a partner, around 80 percent of the Pakistani population considers China a friend.23 The Obama administrations July 2011 decision to suspend a portion of U.S. aid to the Pakistani military has led many in Islamabad to become even more forceful in underlining Beijings importance for Pakistan. Reacting to the U.S. move, Islamabads ambassador to Beijing, Masood Khan, was quick to suggest that China will stand by us in difficult times as it has been doing for the pastyears.24 Though Beijing cannot replace Washington as an aid-provider to Pakistan, the tension in U.S.Pakistan ties provides an opportunity for Beijing to deepen its relationship with Islamabad. As it is, China is considered a more reliable ally that has always come to Pakistans aid when India has been on the rise, even to an extent that China has conveniently turned a blind eye to Pakistans strategy of using terror as an instrument of policy against India. Not surprisingly, Pakistan has given China a blank cheque to intervene in IndiaPakistan peace talks.25 Pakistan also seems to have allowed Chinese engineers to examine the remains of the stealth helicopter destroyed during the raid that killed Osama bin Ladendespite a direct request from the United States that China not be allowed to do so.26 Macaca 12-28-2011, 07:55 PM Forecast for the All-Weather Relationship With Indias ascent in the global hierarchy and U.S. attempts to carve out a strong partnership with India, Chinas need for Pakistan is only likely to grow. As tensions rose between India and Pakistan after the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, Pakistans Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Committee went to China to seek that countrys support, which was readily given. The visit resulted in the signing of a new agreement on military cooperation between the two nations, with Beijing agreeing to expedite the delivery of F-22 frigates to Pakistans Navy. Beijing has justified its arms sales to Pakistan on the grounds that India was buying similar weapon systems from the United States (it also is buying military hardware from the Russians). China has consistently defended Pakistans desire for high capacity weapons systems as normal for an independent nation seeking to bolster its security.27 In the years preceding the attacks in Mumbai, China blocked UN sanctions against the dreaded Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the organizations that planned and executed the attacks, despite a broad global consensus favoring such a move.28 Only when tensions surfaced between Beijing and Islamabad on the issue of Chinese Uighur separatists receiving sanctuaries and training on Pakistani territory did China agree to a ban on JuD. More recently, China has refused to reconsider its objection in the United Nations to proscribing the Jaish-e-Mohammeds Maulana Masood Azhar and some prominent LeT operatives based in Pakistan, despite New Delhis presenting detailed information on them to Beijing.29 With the exception of China, other major global powers such as Britain, France, Germany, and Russia supported the U.S.India nuclear deal as they were eager to sell nuclear fuel, reactors, and equipment to India. China, on its part, made its displeasure clear by asking India to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear weapons. The official Xinhua news agency of China commented that the U.S.India nuclear agreement will set a bad example for other countries.30 Since the U.S.India deal is in many ways a recognition of Indias rising global profile, China was not very happy with the outcome and indicated that it would be willing to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan.31 It was a not so subtle message to the United States that if Washington decides to play favorites, China retains the same right. Not surprisingly, Chinas plans to supply two nuclear reactors to Pakistan in defiance of international rules have gathered momentum. Chinese authorities have confirmed that the China National Nuclear Cooperation has signed an agreement with Pakistan for two new nuclear reactors at the Chashma siteChashma III and Chashma IVin addition to the two that it is already working on in Pakistan. This will be in clear violation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines that forbid nuclear transfers to countries that are not signatories to the NPT or do not adhere to comprehensive international safeguards on their nuclear program. China has suggested that there are compelling political reasons concerning the stability of South Asia to justify the exports, echoing Pakistans oftrepeated compliant that the U.S.India nuclear pact has upset stability in the region.32 The decision to supply reactors to Pakistanwhich has a record of dealing with North Korea, Iran, and Libyareflects Chinas growing diplomatic confidence and underscores its view of Pakistan as a prized South Asian strategic power. Recent suggestions emanating from Beijing that China is likely to set up military bases overseas to counter U.S. influence and exert pressure on India have been interpreted in certain sections in New Delhi as a veiled reference to Chinas interest in having a permanent military presence in Pakistan. Even though it might not be politically possible for the Pakistani government to follow through on such threats and openly allow China to set up a military base, New Delhi fears that Islamabad might allow Beijing use of Pakistani military facilities without any public announcement.33 Indian concerns have also risen that China and Pakistan are coordinating their efforts in regard to border issues with India. The presence of the Chinese military in the GilgitBaltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, purportedly to repair and upgrade the Karakoram Highway, has enormous implications for Indian security.34 Overall, it has been rightly observed that Chinas policy toward Pakistan is an object lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill.35 Nevertheless, there are indeed limits to ChinaPakistan ties. The relationship remains fundamentally asymmetrical: Pakistan wants more out of its ties with China than China is willing to offer. Today, while Pakistans domestic problems are gargantuan, China will be very cautious in involving itself even more. In September 2011, China Kingho Group, one of Chinas largest private coal mining companies, pulled out of what was to be Pakistans largest foreign-investment pact, citing concerns for the security of its personnel.36 Moreover, the closer China gets to Pakistan, the faster India would move into the U.S. orbit. Amid worries about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants on Chinas Muslim minority in Xinjiang, Beijing has also taken a harder line against Pakistan. The flow of arms and

terrorists from across the border in Pakistan remains a major headache for Chinese authorities, and Islamabads inability and/or failure to curb extremism makes it difficult for the Chinese to trust Pakistan completely. If Pakistan wants to keep receiving support from China, then it needs to demonstrate progress on this issue. As tensions rose between China and Pakistan in the aftermath of violence in the border town of Kashgar in Xinjiang in August 2011, President Zardari went to talk directly with local leaders and businessmen in Xinjiang, recognizing that if he was not able to mend fences with local leadership, Sino-Pakistani ties might be in real jeopardy. China, at least publicly, has continued to emphasize that its relationship with Pakistan is far more important than isolated incidents of violence. To be clear, Chinese involvement in Pakistan is unlikely to match the U.S. profile in the country in the short to medium term, and it is not readily evident if China even wants to match the United States. But flirtation with Pakistan gives China crucial space for diplomatic maneuvering vis-a`-vis India and the United States, and it will continue to utilize the relationship in pursuit of its larger strategic objectives. Pakistan is not going to be a common interest that binds China with either India or the United States any time soon. Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:20 PM China builds a plan to defend Afghan resource projects (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/china-builds-a-plan-to-defendafghan-resource-projects) By Syed Fazl-e-Haider | The National Accelerating Chinese investment in Afghanistan is focusing attention on the question of China's future role in that country. This week a Chinese company won the right to develop certain Afghan oilfields. This is not the first Chinese resource play in Afghanistan, nor will it be the last. The common perception has been that while investing vigorously, China will not engage politically or militarily in Afghanistan, for fear of stirring separatist sentiments in the volatile Xinjiang region bordering Afghanistan, among other reasons. This idea will seem less plausible when the US troop withdrawal starts in 2014. A Chinese military and political engagement in Afghanistan - including greater efforts against insurgents in Muslimdominated Xinjiang - would also serve China's long-term strategic aims. China has reportedly shown interest in setting up military bases in Pakistan's insurgency-hit northwestern tribal areas, along the border with Afghanistan. Chinese authorities believe that East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a terrorist group with bases in Pakistan, has been orchestrating attacks in Xinjiang including one which killed 19 people in the city of Kashgar last July. The Chinese believe ETIM terrorists acquired explosives skills, and firearms, in camps in Pakistan. China's military presence in tribal areas along the Afghanistan border would be focused on countering extremist elements fuelling unrest in Xinjiang. A politically stable and economically developed Xinjiang is essential to Chinese plans for regional trade and energy corridors in the region. China has also significant economic presence in Balochistan, the southwestern Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan. Already the biggest foreign investor in the port city of Gwadar, China reportedly plans to establish a naval base there. Gwadar, Balochistan's winter capital, is strategically located close to the Strait of Hormuz. A naval base there, plus military bases in north-west Pakistan, would help China to assume the role of regional policeman. For now, China's economic presence in Afghanistan enjoys the security shield of the US military. When US troops leave, China will have only two options - to leave Afghanistan or to find a way to defend their huge Afghan investments, such as the Aynak copper project, from Taliban insurgents.

In the Aynak deal, China must remain for 30 years for mining operations. It has also pledged to build rail and road connections to transport minerals to China. Last year, the Afghan authorities and the State-owned Metallurgical Corp of China (MCC) signed a $7 billion (Dh25.7 bn) deal to build a rail line from the border with Pakistan up through Kabul and the Aynak copper deposit south of Kabul and then up to the Uzbek border. What will be the fate of this project after the withdrawal of US troops? Under what conditions is it logical for China to make more huge investments in Afghanistan? It is hard to believe that resource-hungry China will just walk away from these projects. And to defend its projects, China is unlikely to rely solely on Afghan forces, which are still not fully reliable. It is highly likely, then, that China will come to replace the US in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan would continue to play a front line role against Islamist extremists as China's strategic ally, while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could assume the role now played by Nato. In all this Pakistan will be China's vital strategic partner. As an alternative to the US, Beijing can extend much-needed financial assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan has been the major supply route for US and Nato missions to Afghanistan. China, which shares a small, mountainous border with Afghanistan, may open a major route for overland transit of military supplies. The route could follow existing railway routes within China before crossing into Kazakhstan, where it could be linked up with supply lines that traverse Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. All this would permit development of adequate transit links into Afghanistan. Along with ocean links to Pakistan, this could provide China with sustainable ways to get military supplies into Afghanistan. On November 26, a Nato attack on a Pakistani border post killed 26 Pakistani soldiers. In retaliation, Islamabad has threatened to halt its efforts to persuade the Afghan Taliban to negotiate. But that incident merely demonstrated an emerging geopolitical reality: a strategic consensus between China and Pakistan threatens to scuttle US prospects of ending the war in Afghanistan. Islamabad is prepared for strategic cooperation with China, in a bid to cut the US out of Afghanistan. And China, ready and willing to exploit Pakistan's volatile relationship with the US, has the resources for both economic and military investment.

China wins $700 million Afghan oil and gas deal. Why didn't the US bid? (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/1228/China-wins-700-million-Afghanoil-and-gas-deal.-Why-didn-t-the-US-bid) By Tom A. Peter | The Christian Science Monitor Pakistani girl brought to US for treatment 'disfigured by her own nation's military' (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8982745/Pakistani-girl-brought-to-USfor-treatment-disfigured-by-her-own-nations-military.html) By Rob Crilly | Daily Telegraph Pakistani death squads go after informants to U.S. drone program (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakistan-death-squads20111228,0,3614850.story) By Alex Rodriguez | Los Angeles Times US scaling back expectations on Pakistan (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2011/12/us_scaling_back_expectations_o.php) By BILL ROGGIO | The Long War Journal Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:25 PM Dangers of a shared reality (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/29/dangers-of-a-shared-reality.html) By Faizullah Jan | Dawn IN Pakistan, journalism has become the riskiest profession. According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), out of 66 journalists killed worldwide in 2011, 10 died in Pakistan. For the second consecutive year, Pakistan has been declared the most dangerous place for

journalists more dangerous than even Afghanistan and Iraq. In an atmosphere of unabated violence against journalists, where the perpetrators and the reasons for their ire are many, news decisions become more risky; journalists then take news decisions following a different set of values than what most newsmen do worldwide. German scholar Wolfgang Donsbach says that news decisions are a highly complex phenomenon. In the case of journalists mainly in the western world, two general needs or functions involving specific psychological processes can explain news decisions. Journalists look for social validation of their perceptions when they decide what needs to be or does not need to be reported. They also want to preserve their existing predispositions in the process. These two factors work as a checklist for journalists as they take news decisions. Journalists have to decide what is true, what is relevant and what is, in a moral sense, good or bad. They must constantly make factual and evaluative decisions, Donsbach says. There are three conditions under which people in general and journalists in particular are most dependent on others. First, when the external reality is ambiguous and difficult to assess. Second, when there is a dualism between the physical and social reality, and lastly, when physical reality takes precedence over social reality. Therefore journalists and information-seeking people communicate with others to create a shared reality from the competing information. Thus people communicate with each other to get out of undetermined, unpredictable situations and create a shared image of the environment they live in. However, for Pakistani journalists it is not only a shared reality that is produced in communication. They dont look for just social validation; they also seek to determine the level of threat, which they think is reduced by diffusing risky information. In such a situation, journalists dont strive for scoops or exclusive news stories; instead, they share their information with their colleagues in other news organisations to avoid being singled out by threatening forces. This need for preservation at the expense of a plurality of opinion eats into the vitals of objective journalism. A single opinion and a single narrative prevails across the mass media landscape where people are exposed to only one reality, which is created in an environment of fear. Debate gives way to conformity, while difference of opinion is looked upon as deviant behaviour. Journalists either resort to self-censorship or get carried away by the fervour of patriotism, which is the outcome of a mob mentality. Nothing is more dangerous than a conforming mass media, which blocks out saner voices just for being different from the mainstream opinion and critical of the status quo. When a majority of journalists toe the line of the powers that be, it exposes the few who are sceptical of the dominant version of the truth, as they ought to be. In the US, the agenda for local newspapers is set by big corporations that own newspapers like The New York Times and Washington Post. Journalists working for other, smaller newspapers work in undetermined and uncertain situations. They go through a cognitive process where to report an event the way nobody else has reported it or to not report what everybody else reports can be embarrassing and jeopardise their professional standing. Journalists in Pakistan go through the same process, but for them avoiding a threat to their lives is more important than embarrassment or professional standing. For them, alarm bells ring out if their news stories stand out as different from those of others. They take care to report what everybody else does not only to ward off mere embarrassment or their professional worth, but also to protect their own lives. That is the reason why stories on the same issue in different newspapers contain the same version of the truth, while for readers browsing through different newspapers become an exercise in

repetition and a waste of time. Alternative opinion and competing versions of the truth become scarce. Thus the end losers are the readers and the democratic polity that thrives on a plurality of opinion rooted in debate. That is the reason why journalists in Pakistan try to stay with the pack and look towards each other for decision-making. Social networks of journalists comprise people of their own profession who work within a frame of reference built before an event occurs. Thus, the decision about reality represents group dynamics and group norms rather than the reality itself. As journalists have similar values and attitudes, it is rather easy for them to develop a shared reality. This shared reality does not constitute the reality itself. For their survival, journalists need to stick together but at the same time help readers build a healthy opinion; new angles of the truth should guide the structure and contents of news. So how can journalists be different in presenting the reality, which after all is a social construction, and also escape the wrath of those who hate dissent? For this to happen, journalists need to strengthen their ranks and enhance their professional capabilities by learning how to work in conflict and hostile environments. Before he was killed, Saleem Shahzad set a good precedent for other journalists by informing them about the threats to his life. Most recently, journalist Hamid Mir, averted at least for the time being threats to his life by disclosing immediately the obnoxious messages he had received. Balochistans long wait (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/29/balochistans-long-wait.html) By I.A Rehman | Dawn The reality of Balochistan (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84627&Cat=9) By Zafar Hilaly | The News Salala probe (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84913&Cat=8) The News Editorial Year-end or endgame? (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84919&Cat=9) By Mohammad Malick | The News Needed: a bloody civilian at the ISI (http://tribune.com.pk/story/313748/needed-a-bloody-civilianat-the-isi/) By Kamran Shafi | The Express Tribune Guns versus butter (http://tribune.com.pk/story/313740/guns-versus-butter/) The Express Tribune Editorial What are the Odds of a Coup in Pakistan? (http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/98938/pakistansmilitary-preparing-coup-detat) By Komail Aijazuddin | The New Republic Pakistani Civilians Reassure Military (http://blogs.the-americaninterest.com/wrm/2011/12/28/pakistani-civilians-reassure-military/) By Walter Russell Mead | The American Interest Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:32 PM Mayday! Mayday! Weve been nuked! Part I (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/greymatter/entry/mayday-mayday-we-ve-been-nuked-part-i) By Krishna Kumar Mangalam | Times of India The question India has to address is not what would happen if a couple of nukes were to fall into the hands of the LeT or other jihadi outfits in Pakistan, which have vowed to liberate Kashmir. The question is what are Indias options if Rawalpindi chooses to deliver a couple of nukes to these antiIndian jihadis? Will we deal with the jihadi nuke-menace as an anti-terror operation, as usual, or as a broader military conflict with Pakistan a nuclear-conflict, at that? Or, is this plain paranoia and an implausible scenario? There appears to be a strong gust of bonhomie sweeping the Indo-Pak relations though, admittedly, the catharsis is visible only in the Indian camp, for the moment. This started off with the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status Pakistan dangled before India earlier in November. It is

another matter that we gave MFN status to Pakistan in 1996. But, how resilient and durable is the intent of the political leadership of Pakistan in this peace initiative? Is the high command of Pakistan's power apparatus, the army, au fait with this development, and, more important, does this initiative bear the armys imprimatur? Lest we forget, barring the decade of 1940s, when India and Pakistan gained Independence, Pakistan has been governed by military rulers in every single succeeding decade, with 60s, 80s and the first decade of this century almost wholly dominated by the army. Also, Pakistans nuclear weapons were always controlled by its army, the only nuclear power in the world with such arrangement. Democracy is a facade that sits uneasily on the visage of Pakistan. Beginning with General Zia-ul-Haq, under whose regime the nation first acquired nukes in 1980s, the nuclear button never left the table of the chief of army staff at Rawalpindi, not even under civilian rule 1988-99, and, 2008 till date. Both the major wars of 1965 and 71 were waged against India when Pakistan was governed by military rulers, General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan, respectively. Thus, it is vital that any political or economic initiative to normalize relations between the two nations must have the unequivocal support of the Pakistani army. Whatever the quantum and quality of breakthroughs with the political leadership in Islamabad, India must factor in the veto of Rawalpindi over any such initiatives, and never be euphoric, never let the guard down. The government of the day must be well informed about the background strategic and tactical manoeuvres of the Pakistani army, even as it engages the political leadership of that nation. The latest news from Rawalpindi, read in the context of past history, is rather disquieting.

Nuclear pacts (http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=84630&Cat=8) The News Editorial Pakistan and India take steps to prevent accidental nuclear war (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8980657/Pakistan-and-India-takesteps-to-prevent-accidental-nuclear-war.html) By Rob Crilly | Daily Telegraph Progress on N-issues (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/29/progress-on-n-issues.html) Dawn Editorial Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:36 PM Mayday! Mayday! Part II (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/grey-matter/entry/maydaymayday-part-ii) By Krishna Kumar Mangalam | Times of India Democracy is a facade that sits uneasily on the visage of Pakistan. The government of the day must be well informed about the background strategic and tactical manoeuvres of the Pakistani army, even as it engages the political leadership of that nation. The latest news from Rawalpindi, read in the context of past history, is rather disquieting. In the first week of November, the BBC in a two-part series said that Bruce Riedel, a former security analyst in the CIA, had briefed US president-elect Barack Obama in 2008 that Pakistans ISI was behind the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. More than 170 people were killed in the attack. The report also quotes Mike Waltz, an official attached to the then US vice president Dick Cheney, as saying that the ISI was behind the Haqqani bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, in 2008. Fifty-eight people were killed in the attack. This comes as no surprise to India that the ISI was behind these attacks, but: Not many in the Indian intelligence establishment would have known this: That Pakistan is apparently shuffling its nuclear weapons in low-security vans on congested roads across the country in a bid to stop the US or India from pulling off an Abbottabad-like operation on its nukes. [The Ally from Hell in the Atlantic and the National Journal (USA), November 5] India, the US and the international community are getting themselves into a sweat over the possibility of these nuclear weapons getting into the hands of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Taliban or any of the several other terror outfits rampaging across Pakistan.

Surely, this is a complete misreading of the Pakistani armys professionalism, intent and the current situation. Pakistans official policy is to engage India in a low-intensity warfare using terror outfits in order to obtain what it considers a political and military balance of power in the subcontinent, and wrest the state of Jammu & Kashmir, if possible. The question India must address in this situation is not what would happen if a couple of nukes were to fall into the hands of the LeT or other jihadi outfits in Pakistan, which have vowed to liberate Kashmir. That is the least of our worries. The question is what are Indias options if the Pakistani establishment (read army) chooses to deliver a couple of nukes to these ant-Indian jihadis? If Pakistan can bluster its way out saying rogue army and ISI elements harboured Osama bin Laden (OBL) in Abbottabad for more than six years, without the knowledge of the political and army brass, what stops it from putting out a similar plea over the missing nukes? While many things can be said about the state of affairs in Pakistan the nature of its democracy, or the lack of it, the armys pole position in the republic, etc one thing can never be said: that it is a banana republic. And, even when it does subside into military dictatorship it is no tin-pot military dictator who governs the nation. Beginning with General Ayub Khan, the first commander in chief of Pakistans army, in 1958, down to General Pervez Musharraf, in 1999, a military coup in Pakistan was a very formal and orderly affair. Almost like a well-rehearsed national day parade. It was always the chief of army staff, with all the corps commanders in tow, who led it with no bloodshed on the streets, to boot. If anything, the people almost seemed to be welcoming of such a denouement, fed up with a decrepit and corrupt political dispensation that was supplanted. This is a record unmatched anywhere else in the world! And, none of the four military dictators were assassinated or overthrown. Barring General Zia-ul-Haq, who died in an airplane accident, all the others demitted office. Thus, let us rest assured that the Pakistani nukes will not slip out of the hands of the army, unless it explicitly desires it. Nor that OBL could have been harboured in Abbottabad without the explicit sanction of the army brass in Rawalpindi. To impute unprofessionalism upon the Pakistani army is a slur cast by people who understand very little about the working of this institution. When General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani assures the world that his nations nuclear assets are safe, I believe him. The fear that Pakistans 100-odd nuclear weapons are under threat of pilferage from vandals and jihadis is a slur. It doesnt matter that the mode of their dynamic camouflage is rather unconventional more municipality-like than militarylike. What must ring the tocsin, however, is that the army brass has become paranoid. Paranoid enough to start shuffling their nuclear assets around the country in low-security arrangements for fear that they are vulnerable to Indian or US poaching. People who are paranoid cease to think rationally, and their actions will be even less so. India, the US and the rest of the world must factor in a possibility of the strategic thinking in Pakistan falling below the threshold of sanity, or more ominous, becoming jihadi-driven, where the army establishment hand-delivers a few nuclear weapons to the jihadis to introduce an element of uncertainty into regional or global political dynamics, under the presumption that it would aid their foreign policy goals or advance their strategic interest in the subcontinent. The economic and political disarray of Pakistan is complete. Yet, the army, the only stable power centre in Pakistan, refuses to read the writing on the wall and continues to patronize terror outfits which have openly vowed to destroy India, Israel and the US. For an army which is bankrolled by the US, to turn back on its patron and provide a safe house to its most-wanted terrorist for over six years, can only be termed as an utter loss of sanity or, more alarmingly, a complete indoctrination into the jihadi mindset.

India-Pakistan CBMs (http://tribune.com.pk/story/312786/india-pakistan-cbms/) The Express Tribune Editorial Pakistan Proposes Removing Heavy Guns From LOC (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/27/pakistan-proposes-removing-heavy-guns-fromloc/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:45 PM A Hindu Nationalist Trips on His Words at Harvard (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1228/a-hindu-nationalist-trips-on-his-words-at-harvard-choudhury.html) By Chandrahas Choudhury | Bloomberg Earlier this month, the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard University took a vote on a proposal to terminate the appointment of the Indian economist and politician Subramanian Swamy at its annual summer school. The proposal was unusual because Swamy, who teaches two economics courses during the threemonth summer school and received a Harvard Ph.D. in 1964, was dismissed not for reasons of competence, but because of an essay he had published in an Indian newspaper in July called "How To Wipe Out Islamic Terror." The contents were judged to be so incendiary that they violated any reasonable idea of free speech, and cast into doubt Swamy's ability to treat students of all faiths objectively. In the U.S., the incident was debated mainly through the lens of an individual's right to free speech balanced against an institution's commitment to pluralism and equality. In India, however, Swamy's essay had cut much closer to the bone, coming as it did in the wake of a series of bombs going off during rush hour in Mumbai on July 13. Swamy's polemic addressed one of the most complex questions of the Indian subcontinent, deeply embedded in 1,000 years of history: Hindu-Muslim relations, and the violence visited by one community upon another. What was remarkable about it was that its prescriptions were miles to the right even of the position taken by India's most prominent Hindu right-wing party, the Bharatiya Janata Party. In his essay, published July 16 (no longer available on the website of DNA, the newspaper that published it, a tacit admission that it was too rabid to be taken seriously as an argument), Swamy wrote: The terrorist blast in Mumbai on July 13, 2011, requires decisive soul-searching by the Hindus of India. Hindus cannot accept to be killed in this halal fashion, continuously bleeding every day till the nation finally collapses. [...] Fanatic Muslims consider Hindu-dominated India an unfinished chapter of Islamic conquests. All other countries conquered by Islam 100% converted to Islam within two decades of the Islamic invasion. Undivided India in 1947 was 75% Hindu even after 800 years of brutal Islamic rule. That is jarring for the fanatics. In one sense, I do not blame the Muslim fanatics for targeting Hindus. I blame Hindus who have taken their individuality permitted in Sanatan Dharma [a concept in Hinduism meaning "the eternal law"] to the extreme. Millions of Hindus can assemble without state patronage for the Kumbh Mela, completely self-organised, but they all leave for home oblivious of the targeting of Hindus in Kashmir, Mau, Melvisharam and Malappuram and do not lift their little finger to help organise Hindus. If half the Hindus voted together, rising above caste and language, a genuine Hindu party would have a two-thirds majority in Parliament and the assemblies. The first lesson to be learnt from the recent history of Islamic terrorism against India and for tackling terrorism in India is that the Hindu is the target and that Muslims of India are being programmed by a slow reactive process to become radical and thus slide into suicide against Hindus. It is to undermine the Hindu psyche and create the fear of civil war that terror attacks are organised. [...] We need a collective mindset as Hindus to stand against the Islamic terrorist. The Muslims of India can join us if they genuinely feel for the Hindu. That they do I will not believe unless they acknowledge with pride that though they may be Muslims, their ancestors were Hindus. If any Muslim acknowledges his or her Hindu legacy, then we Hindus can accept him or her as a part of the Brihad Hindu Samaj (greater Hindu society) which is Hindustan. India that is Bharat that is

Hindustan is a nation of Hindus and others whose ancestors were Hindus. Others, who refuse to acknowledge this, or those foreigners who become Indian citizens by registration, can remain in India but should not have voting rights (which means they cannot be elected representatives). This is nothing short of a war cry. Among Swamy's other proposals were: "[D]eclare India a Hindu Rashtra [nation] in which non-Hindus can vote only if they proudly acknowledge that their ancestors were Hindus. Rename India Hindustan as a nation of Hindus and those whose ancestors were Hindus." And "annex land from Bangladesh in proportion to the illegal [Muslim] migrants from that country staying in India." In one stroke, then, Swamy sought to disenfranchise and reduce to second-class citizens more than 100 million Muslims in India, home to the world's third-largest followers of Islam. Soon after it was published, a group of Harvard students submitted a petition to the university asking that it sever ties with Swamy. Among the strongest supporters of the petition was the scholar of Hinduism and comparative religion Diana Eck, who argued in a letter she submitted along with 39 colleagues to the president of Harvard in August: Swamy used the recent blasts in Mumbai to cast suspicion on Indias entire Muslim population. Swamy went on to advocate a shocking series of counter-terrorism strategies including the destruction of mosques in India and a denial of basic voting rights to religious minorities unless they proudly acknowledge that their ancestors were Hindus. We wish to bring it to the attention of the University administration that a member of our faculty has expressed these extreme views, in a social context that has witnessed episodes of collective violence. We understand that Harvard occasionally benefits from the public profiles of those who teach at the institution, whether they work in business, government, or media. However, we feel that Swamys public profile is a detriment to Harvard. Freedom of expression is an essential principle in an academic community, one that we fully support. Notwithstanding our commitment to the robust exchange of ideas, Swamys op-ed clearly crosses the line into incitement by demonizing an entire religious community, demanding their disenfranchisement, and calling for violence against their places of worship. [...] How does one situate Swamy? It cannot in fact be said that his opinions should be thought of as characteristic of, or limited to, the lunatic fringe. Versions of it can be heard in the homes and associations of many middle-class Indian Hindus, who carry in their personal or family memory some of the psychic wounds of Partition, or are attracted to revivalist movements that are either nostalgic for a prelapsarian Hindu golden age prior to the invasions of India by Muslim chieftains (some of whom set down roots over hundreds of years, like the Mughals) across the second millennium. This kind of Hindu imagines an India very different from the secular state enshrined in the Constitution, and doesn't understand why a majority shouldn't practice majoritarianism as compensation for some of the real or imagined scars of history. So one might say that Swamy should be complimented for saying what he genuinely believes, instead of trying to dress it up in some more moderate or palatable form, as do some right-wing parties. One might also commend him for not wishing away the violence that unfortunately marks Indian history, as do many well-meaning liberals who seek to emphasize the nation's fabled, but to my mind problematic or ambiguous, tradition of tolerance. The India that Swamy sees is a much darker, bloodier civilization that the syncretic one posited (or in the eyes of some invented) by Jawaharlal Nehru's classic The Discovery of India, which, as the historian Ramachandra Guha writes, "sees India as a melange of cultures, without any single dominating essence." But the problem with Swamy's argument is that not only are his prescriptions distasteful and unrealistic, they are founded on two totalizing and therefore distorting binaries. These are the words "Hindu" and "Muslim," seen in his worldview as perfectly internally united and indivisible entities -practically two different species of human being -- without any tradition of mutual understanding or exchange on the one hand, and any internal differences or schisms on the other. Every Hindu is for Swamy the same: resentful and agitated. When in fact one of the main currents of modern Indian history is the struggle of Hindus from the lower castes to liberate themselves from the economic shackles and social taboos placed on them by high-caste Hindus. All Muslims are deserving of the same treatment as the Muslim who is a terrorist, unless they "acknowledge with pride that though they may be Muslims, their ancestors were Hindus" (how sadistic is the emphasis

on "with pride" in that sentence). All Indian Hindus must feel pride merely by dint of being Hindu, all Muslims should be seized by guilt or regret. Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:48 PM Must this be the price paid for realism about Indian history? Certainly not. But how should one think then about the "Hindu-Muslim issue?" Some of the clearest thinking on this difficult subject can be found in "A Place Within," a memoir by MG Vassanji -- a novelist of Indian origin, born in Kenya, now residing in Canada, and belonging to a faith, the Khojas, that contains elements from both Hinduism and Islam. Travelling in India, the country of his ancestors, in the 1990s (a decade wracked by Hindu-Muslim violence in the wake of the riots that followed the destruction of the Babri Masjid), Vassanji sees both its syncretism and its bigotry. He writes, "I could not accept Indias embrace and turn away from the violence. It must in some way be a part of me." Yet at the same time Vassanji is disturbed by the casual and intellectually lazy use of the words "Hindu" and "Muslim" as markers of past and present conflict -- not because they dont have an element of truth, but rather because they are "too exacting, too excluding." He writes: I have already said that I find the labels Hindu and Muslim discomforting, because they are so exclusive. [...] I refuse to use them this way, perhaps naively and definitely against a tide; but I am not alone. I use the distinction of Hindu and Muslim only in context, and especially when it has been used by people for themselves or others, as in the Gujarat violence [of 2002]. So deep is the suspicion when one talks of conflict, that one has to state over and over that to describe the murder of a Muslim here is not to deny, let alone justify, the murder of a Hindu elsewhere, that a fanatic group does not represent an entire people, and there is no entire people, Hindu or Muslim anyway. Attempts to create them, of course, have always been there. "Attempts to create them, of course, have always been there." Indeed, and Swamy's essay "How To Wipe Out Islamic Terror" might be seen as a classic instance ("we need a collective mindset as Hindus...") of the attempt to manufacture such a consensus. Does that mean Swamy should be barred from teaching "Quantitative Methods in Economics and Business" and "Economic Development in India and East Asia" -- the two courses he has for some years led in the summer at Harvard? Must one make a distinction between Subramanian Swamy the economist and teacher and Subramanian Swamy the politician and ideologue, and again between a person's public duties and his personal views? Swamy would, to my mind, be perfectly entitled to make these arguments in his defense. But they would require subtler gradations of thought, and more sympathy for difference, than Swamy demonstrates in his views on the obligations of Muslims in India. Extremist metaphysical literature (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/treasurehunt/entry/extremist-metaphysical-literature) By Narayani Ganesh | Times of India Bending towards justice (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/bending-towards-justice/893156/) By Tanweer Alam | Indian Express No devil in the detail (http://www.hindustantimes.com/ViewsSectionPage/ColumnsOthers/No-devilin-the-detail/Article1-788477.aspx) By Vivek Gumaste | Hindustan Times Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:54 PM Corruption in India: I was approached for a bribe (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/GlobalNews/2011/1228/Corruption-in-India-I-was-approached-for-a-bribe) By Rebecca Byerly | The Christian Science Monitor As New Delhi gears up for New Year's celebrations, the police are rolling out roadblocks. In the United States, roadblocks are a common way to check for drivers who have had one too many drinks on New Years, but for police in Delhi, these roadblocks often translate into "how much will they pay to get out of this?" And if the fight over the current anticorruption bill in Parliament and the recent hunger strike by activist Anna Hazare are any indicators, the situation is not likely to improve any time soon without

the help of hundreds of thousands of Indians pushing back against the system of bribery where they can. Mr. Hazare had inspired millions of Indians to protest against corruption this summer, and began a three-day hunger strike this week to press for tougher action against corruption in the country's bureaucracy. His fast aligned with the Indian Parliament negotiating an antigraft bill that would set up an ombudsman's office to investigate embezzling, influence peddling, and other forms of official theft. However, both the hunger strike and bill have fallen short of their objectives. After a high fever and poor crowd turn out, Hazare called off it off a day early. A compromise bill was approved by Parliaments lower house Tuesday, and is likely to pass the upper house Wednesday. If it does, it could establish an independent body at the central and state government levels to investigate charges of corruption. But Hazare and other opposition groups say the bill is weak, and will do little to truly tackle the countrys corruption. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the agency, which is responsible for monitoring this bill, will not itself become corrupt. According to Transparency International, 54 percent of Indians paid a bribe in the past year, and the organization ranked India 95 out of 183 countries in its Corruption Perception Index for 2011. Given these statistics, winning the daily battle of graft that has bled India of some $128 billion in the past decade is nothing short of herculean. But a recent encounter with a Delhi traffic cop gave me a little insight into how ordinary citizens can start fighting. On Christmas Eve, an Indian friend and I were parking, near a packed shopping area, when a cop looking for a little extra cash approached us. Our crime? The tinted windows on my friends car were too dark. Being a hothead from the American South, I was irate as it was clear to me the cop was just looking for money. However, my friend who is known for his prudence in these kinds of situations had a wiser approach. He simply told the policeman to give him the ticket. The cop paused, and then let him go. When the cop walked away, I asked my friend why we got out of the ticket. "You must understand the economics of bribery," he said. "It's Christmas Eve, the place is packed, and its high-time for making a quick buck. Every minute counts. In the time it would take him to write me a ticket, he could be making hundreds of rupees." As India struggles to tackle corruption with new laws and key arrests, ordinary Indians like my friend can make a difference by understanding the system of bribery pushing back where they can.

Societal morality to constitutional morality (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2758601.ece) By Z. M. YACOOB | The Hindu Corruption in India (http://tribune.com.pk/story/313744/corruption-in-india-2/) The Express Tribune Editorial Lokpal Legislation Debate Require Calmer Consideration (http://www.countercurrents.org/sachar291211.htm) By Justice Rajindar Sachar | Countercurrents Not in the picture (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/RajdeepSardesai/Not-in-thepicture/Article1-788847.aspx) By Rajdeep Sardesai | Hindustan Times The Great Lokpal Conspiracy Theory (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-great-lokpalconspiracy-theory/893641/) By Jaithirth Rao | Indian Express The bench in the Lokpal (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-bench-in-the-lokpal/893631/) By K.V. Vishwanathan | Indian Express Anna, the only party working to pass the Lokpal is the Congress.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/anna-the-only-party-working-to-

pass-the-lokpal-is-the-congress) By Prashant Panday | Times of India 'Constitutional Lokpal would have been difficult to repeal' (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Constitutional-Lokpal-would-havebeen-difficult-to-repeal/articleshow/11294838.cms) By V N Khare | Times of India Soon, drive to clear RTI backlog (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Soon-drive-to-clear-RTIbacklog/articleshow/11299037.cms) Times of India Indian Activist Calls Off Fast but Vows to Keep Fighting (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/world/asia/activist-anna-hazare-ends-fast-for-healthreasons.html) By VIKAS BAJAJ and HARI KUMAR | The New York Times From Hero to Zero: Media Now Pans Hazare (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/29/fromhero-to-zero-media-now-pans-hazare/) By Diksha Sahni | IndiaRealTime Ally Trips Indian Government on Lokpal (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/29/trinamoolembarrasses-indian-government-on-lokpal-bill/) By Vibhuti Agarwal | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-29-2011, 08:59 PM India's anti-corruption crusade far from over India's anti-corruption bill passed the lower house, but exposes the limitations of street protest politics. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/india/111228/anticorruption-bill-anna-hazare) By Jason Overdorf | GlobalPost The Indian government pushed a bill designed to fight corruption through the lower house of the parliament late Tuesday, in a move that has exposed the limitations of street-protest politics. Demonstrators can demand that a law be passed and vow to vote out politicians who oppose it. But they still cannot draft bills themselves. The government's so-called Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill would set up a powerful ombudsman to investigate and prosecute government officials for corruption, as the anti-corruption movement led by social activist Anna Hazare has been demanding since he first lauched a hunger strike this summer. But the proposed law does not allow the ombudsman to initiate investigations independent of a complaint. It does not put low-level officers of the bureaucracy under the ombudsman's direct supervision, and it does not grant the office control over the Central Bureau of Investigation, India's chief law enforcement agency, or allow it to constitute its own investigation wing. Moreover, the law gives the ruling government significant control over the selection of the members of the ombudsman's office. All these supposed shortcomings which Hazare's team has called non-negotiable have prompted the activist to embark on yet another a hunger strike, this one three days long, in protest. And he has called on his supporters to force police to arrest them through mass acts of civil disobedience, beginning Jan. 1. Team Hazare is hoping for a repeat of the massive, nationwide agitation that shook India's politicians out of complacency this August. At that time, tens of thousands of protesters disgusted by corruption scandals surrounding the Commonwealth Games and the distribution of 2G telecom spectrum licenses took to the streets in support of the activist's hunger strike. But at least some experts argue that the government's anti-corruption law could have a salutary effect. We have to see how it plays out, said M.R. Madhavan, a researcher at PRS Legislative Research. A lot of it will depend on the personalities involved in the first few years. Many institutions at the end of the day are shaped by the people running them. The Election Commission had largely been a somnolent body which was basically going through the motions of holding elections, said Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at Indiana University. But under a man called T.N. Seshan in the late 1980s, early 1990s it became a much more

formidable body, and a body that decided to take the statutory powers it possessed and genuinely implement them to make elections fair, open, honest and transparent. The niceties of the law notwithstanding, the Lokpal could accomplish the same transformation. I genuinely think that if you get a group of individuals in the Lokpal who are serious about this endeavor ... the Lokpal could become a similar institution, Ganguly said, citing similar successes achieved by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). A number of institutions in India do work, and do carry out the tasks they're expected to perform, he said. Before its proposal becomes a law, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government will also need to get the Lokpal bill through the upper house of the parliament where the coalition does not have a majority. Debate is underway there as this article goes to press, but there are only several possible outcomes. With the tacit support of two opposition parties that abstained from voting in the lower house, the bill could go through unchanged. It might be amended and returned to the lower house for reconsideration. It might be voted down, then later approved by a vote by the combined houses. Or it might be rejected and put off indefinitely, like a bill to set up a quota for women in the legislature that has theoretically been pending since it was passed by the upper house in March 2010. Whether its Lokpal bill works or not, however, the government's success in pushing it through the lower house where Singh's UPA enjoys a slim majority has stolen much of Hazare's thunder. It's easy to mobilize people who are angry because nothing is being done about all-pervasive corruption. It's far more difficult to rally the masses around a difference of opinion about the finer points of a piece of legislation just imagine if the Occupy Wall Street movement hinged on the nuances of banking reforms. Perhaps that's why, according to some estimates, only around 4,000 people showed up for the hunger striker's Mumbai demonstration Tuesday compared with a daily turnout of 30,000 to 40,000 people in Delhi this summer. But confusion and protest fatigue aren't Team Hazare's only problems. At the beginning of the anti-corruption movement, Hazare succeeded in mobilizing people against an amorphous lot of dirty politicians he portrayed as opposing the Lokpal bill. Now, his team is attempting to shift that anger onto the government and, more particularly, the Congress party announcing that he will campaign against the Congress during state elections in Uttar Pradesh this February. Hazare and company maintain that the anti-corruption movement can no longer stand outside and above electoral politics. But now that Hazare has joined the fray, what will he argue? And, more importantly, who will he campaign for? Even if the Congress-led UPA has failed to meet all Team Hazare's demands for the Lokpal bill, it can hardly be said that the Congress has taken no action against corruption though belatedly, perhaps. Along with its version of the ombudsman law, the government on Tuesday pushed through the lower house a law to protect whistleblowers and on Wednesday it also introduced a judicial accountability bill designed to set up a credible mechanism for investigating corruption complaints against judges. Moreover, only some of Team Hazare's objections to the Lokpal bill, such as the decision not to grant it control over the Central Bureau of Investigation can be traced to the Congress. Other dilutions, such as the rejection of a proposed amendment to grant the Lokpal constitutional authority and a decision not to compel the individual states to create their own anti-corruption watchdogs, were concessions to the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party and Singh's allies in the

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Trinamool Congress. And both of the Congress party's main rivals in Uttar Pradesh the caste-affiliated Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party abstained from voting on the Lokpal bill at all. Two things are certain. The war against corruption is far from over. And street protests will have limited usefulness in the next stage of the battle. At the end of the day you cannot get at something as nuanced as this with a few hundred people screaming, said Madhavan. The nuances have to be discussed in a civilized place, with people listening to each other. It doesn't always happen, but in some sense, parliament is supposed to do that.

More than Lokpal, does Anna need a speech writer? (http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2011/12/28/more-than-lokpal-does-anna-need-a-speech-writer/) By Diksha Madhok | Reuters Macaca 12-29-2011, 09:06 PM In One Slum, Misery, Work, Politics and Hope (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/world/asia/inindian-slum-misery-work-politics-and-hope.html) By JIM YARDLEY | New York Times At the edge of Indias greatest slum, Shaikh Mobins decrepit shanty is cleaved like a wedding cake, four layers high and sliced down the middle. The missing half has been demolished. What remains appears ready for demolition, too, with temporary walls and a rickety corrugated roof. Yet inside, carpenters are assembling furniture on the ground floor. One floor up, men are busily cutting and stitching blue jeans. Upstairs from them, workers are crouched over sewing machines, making blouses. And at the top, still more workers are fashioning mens suits and wedding apparel. One crumbling shanty. Four businesses. In the labyrinthine slum known as Dharavi are 60,000 structures, many of them shanties, and as many as one million people living and working on a triangle of land barely two-thirds the size of Central Park in Manhattan. Dharavi is one of the worlds most infamous slums, a clich of Indian misery. It is also a churning hive of workshops with an annual economic output estimated to be $600 million to more than $1 billion. This is a parallel economy, said Mr. Mobin, whose family is involved in several businesses in Dharavi. In most developed countries, there is only one economy. But in India, there are two. India is a rising economic power, even as huge portions of its economy operate in the shadows. Its formal economy consists of businesses that pay taxes, adhere to labor regulations and burnish the countrys global image. Indias informal economy is everything else: the hundreds of millions of shopkeepers, farmers, construction workers, taxi drivers, street vendors, rag pickers, tailors, repairmen, middlemen, black marketeers and more. This divide exists in other developing countries, but it is a chasm in India: experts estimate that the informal sector is responsible for the overwhelming majority of Indias annual economic growth and as much as 90 percent of all employment. The informal economy exists largely outside government oversight and, in the case of slums like Dharavi, without government help or encouragement. For years, Indias government has tried with mixed success to increase industrial output by developing special economic zones to lure major manufacturers. Dharavi, by contrast, could be called a self-created special economic zone for the poor. It is a visual eyesore, a symbol of raw inequality that epitomizes the failure of policy makers to accommodate the millions of rural migrants searching for opportunity in Indian cities. It also underscores the determination of those migrants to come anyway. Economic opportunity in India still lies, to a large extent, in urban areas, said Eswar Prasad, a leading economist. The problem is that government hasnt provided easy channels to be employed in the formal sector. So the informal sector is where the activity lies.

Dharavi is Dickens and Horatio Alger and Upton Sinclair. It is ingrained in the Indian imagination, depicted in books or Bollywood movies, as well as in the Oscar-winning hit Slumdog Millionaire. Dharavi has been examined in a Harvard Business School case study and dissected by urban planners from Europe to Japan. Yet merely trying to define Dharavi is contested. Maybe to anyone who has not seen Dharavi, Dharavi is a slum, a huge slum, said Gautam Chatterjee, the principal secretary overseeing the Housing Ministry in Maharashtra State. But I have also looked at Dharavi as a city within a city, an informal city. It is an informal city as layered as Mr. Mobins sheared building and as fragile. Plans to raze and redevelop Dharavi into a normal neighborhood have stirred a debate about what would be gained but also about what might be lost by trying to control and regulate Dharavi. Every layer of Dharavi, when exposed, reveals something far more complicated, and organic, than the concept of a slum as merely a warehouse for the poor. One slum. Four layers. Four realities. On the ground floor is misery. One floor up is work. Another floor up is politics. And at the top is hope. Dharavi, said Hariram Tanwar, 64, a local businessman, is a mini-India. Misery The streets smell of sewage and sweets. There are not enough toilets. There is not enough water. There is not enough space. Laborers sleep in sheds known as pongal houses, six men, maybe eight, packed into a single, tiny room multiplied by many tiny rooms. Hygiene is terrible. Diarrhea and malaria are common. Tuberculosis floats in the air, spread by coughing or spitting. Dharavi, like the epic slums of Karachi, Pakistan, or Rio de Janeiro, is often categorized as a problem still unsolved, an emblem of inequity pressing against Mumbai, Indias richest and most glamorous city. A walk through Dharavi is a journey through a dank maze of ever-narrowing passages until the shanties press together so tightly that daylight barely reaches the footpaths below, as if the slum were a great urban rain forest, covered by a canopy of smoke and sheet metal. Traffic bleats. Flies and mosquitoes settle on roadside carts of fruit and atop the hides of wandering goats. Ten families share a single water tap, with water flowing through the pipes for less than three hours every day, enough time for everyone to fill a cistern or two. Toilets are communal, with a charge of 3 cents to defecate. Sewage flows through narrow, open channels, slow-moving streams of green water and garbage. At the slums periphery, Sion Hospital treats 3,000 patients every day, many from Dharavi, often children who are malnourished or have asthma or diarrhea. Premature tooth decay is so widespread in children that doctors call them dental cripples. People who come to Dharavi or other slum areas their priority is not health, said Dr. Pallavi Shelke, who works in Dharavi. Their priority is earning. And that is what is perhaps most surprising about the misery of Dharavi: people come voluntarily. They have for decades. Dharavi once was known for gangs and violence, but today Dharavi is about work. Tempers sometimes flare, fights break out, but the police say the crime rate is actually quite low, even lower than in wealthier, less densely populated areas of the city. An outsider can walk through the slum and never feel threatened. Misery is everywhere, as in miserable conditions, as in hardship. But people here do not speak of being miserable. People speak about trying to get ahead. Macaca

Work

12-29-2011, 09:11 PM

The order was for 2,700 briefcases, custom-made gifts for a large bank to distribute during the Hindu holiday of Diwali. The bank contacted a supplier, which contacted a leather-goods store, which sent the order to a manufacturer. Had the order been placed in China, it probably would have landed in one of the huge coastal factories that employ thousands of rural migrants and have made China a manufacturing powerhouse. In India, the order landed in the Dharavi workshop of Mohammed Asif. Mr. Asifs work force consists of 22 men, who sit cross-legged beside mounds of soft, black leather, an informal assembly line, except that the factory floor is a cramped room doubling as a dormitory: the workers sleep above, in a loft. The briefcases were due in two weeks. They work hard, Mr. Asif said. They work from 8 in the morning until 11 at night because the more they do, the more they will earn to send back to their families. They come here to earn. Unlike China, India does not have colossal manufacturing districts because India has chosen not to follow the East Asian development model of building a modern economy by starting with low-skill manufacturing. If Chinas authoritarian leaders have deliberately steered the countrys surplus rural work force into urban factories, Indian leaders have done little to promote job opportunities in cities for rural migrants. In fact, right-wing political parties in Mumbai have led sometimes-violent campaigns against migrants. Yet Indias rural migrants, desperate to escape poverty, flock to the cities anyway. Dharavi is an industrial gnat compared with Chinas manufacturing heartland and the working conditions in the slum are almost certainly worse than those in major Chinese factories but Dharavi does seem to share Chinas can-do spirit. Almost everything imaginable is made in Dharavi, much of it for sale in India, yet much of it exported around the world. Today, Dharavi is as much a case study in industrial evolution as a slum. Before the 1980s, Dharavi had tanneries that dumped their effluent into the surrounding marshlands. Laborers came from southern India, especially the state of Tamil Nadu, many of them Muslims or lower-caste Hindus, fleeing drought, starvation or caste discrimination. Once Tamil Nadus economy strengthened, migrants began arriving from poverty-stricken states in central India. Later, the tanneries were closed down for environmental reasons, moving south to the city of Chennai, or to other slums elsewhere. Yet Dharavi had a skilled labor force, as well as cheap costs for workshops and workers, and informal networks between suppliers, middlemen and workshops. So Dharavis leather trade moved up the value chain, as small workshops used raw leather processed elsewhere to make handbags for some of the priciest stores in India. During this same period, Dharavis migration waves became a torrent, as people streamed out of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the teeming, backward northern states now at the locus of rural Indian poverty. After 1990, immigration was tremendous, said Ramachandra Korde, a longtime civic activist commonly known around Dharavi as Bhau, or brother. It used to be that 100 to 300 to 400 people came to Dharavi every day. Just to earn bread and butter. Leatherwork is now a major industry in Dharavi, but only one. Small garment factories have proliferated throughout the slum, making childrens clothes or womens dresses for the Indian market or export abroad. According to a 2007 study sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development, Dharavi has at least 500 large garment workshops (defined as having 50 or more sewing machines) and about 3,000 smaller ones. Then there are the 5,000 leather shops. Then there are the food processors that make snacks for the rest of India. And then still more: printmakers, embroiderers and, most of all, the vast recycling operations that sort, clean and reprocess much of Indias discarded plastic. We are cleaning the dirt of the country, said Fareed Siddiqui, the general secretary of the Dharavi Businessmens Welfare Association.

Mr. Asif, the leather shop owner, is a typical member of Dharavis entrepreneur class. Now 35, he arrived at the slum in 1988, leaving his village in Bihar after hearing about Dharavi from another family. He jumped on a train to Mumbai. He was 12. Someone from my village used to live here, he said. We were poor and had nothing. Mr. Asif began as an apprentice in a leather shop, learning how to use the heavy cutting scissors, then the sewing machines that stitch the seams on leather goods, until he finally opened his own shop. As a poor migrant, Mr. Asif could never have arranged the loans and workspace if Dharavi were part of the organized economy; he rents his workshop from the owner of the leather-goods store, who got the order from the supplier for the briefcases for the bank. Today, nearly all of Mr. Asifs workers are also from Bihar, one of the myriad personal networks that help direct migrants out of the villages. Mohammad Wazair earns roughly 6,000 rupees a month, or about $120, as a laborer in Mr. Asifs workshop. He sends about half home every month to support his wife and two children. He is illiterate, but he is now paying for his children to attend a modest private school in their village. He visits them twice a year. In the village, what options do we have? he asked. We can either work in the fields or drive a rickshaw. What is the future in that? Here, I can learn a skill and earn money. At least my children will get an education. Politics Now the place is gold, said Mr. Mobin, the businessman. He is sitting on the top floor of his building, surrounded by mens suits in the apparel shop. His family began in the leather business in the 1970s and has since moved into plastic recycling, garments and real estate. Slum property might not seem like a good investment, but Dharavi is now one of the most valuable pieces of real estate in Mumbai. Which is a problem, as Mr. Mobin sees it. People from all over the city, and the politicians, are making hue and cry that Dharavi must be developed, he said. But they are not developing it for the people of Dharavi. They will provide office buildings and shopping for the richer class. As Mumbai came to symbolize Indias expanding economy and the countrys expanding inequality Dharavi began attracting wider attention. Mumbai grew as Dharavi grew. If the slum once sat on the periphery, it now is a scar in the middle of what is a peninsular, land-starved city an eyesore and embarrassment, if also a harbinger of a broader problem. Today, more than eight million people live in Mumbais slums, according to some estimates, a huge figure that accounts for more than half the citys population. Many people live in slums because they cannot afford to live anywhere else, and government efforts to build affordable housing have been woefully inadequate. But many newer slums are also microversions of Dharavis informal economy. Some newer migrants even come to Dharavi to learn new skills, as if Dharavi were a slum franchising operation. Dharavi is becoming their steppingstone, said Vineet Joglekar, a civic leader here. They learn jobs, and then they go to some other slum and set up there. Dharavi still exists on the margins. Few businesses pay taxes. Few residents have formal title to their land. Political parties court the slum for votes and have slowly delivered things taken for granted elsewhere: some toilets, water spigots. But the main political response to Dharavis unorthodox success has been to try to raze it. Indias political class discovered Dharavi in the 1980s, when any migrant who jabbed four posts into an empty patch of dirt could claim a homestead. Land was scarce, and some people began dumping stones or refuse to fill the marshes at the edge of the Arabian Sea.

Rajiv Gandhi, then Indias prime minister, saw the teeming slum and earmarked one billion rupees, or about $20 million, for a program to build affordable, hygienic housing for Dharavis poor. Local officials siphoned off some of the money for other municipal projects while also building some tenements that today are badly decayed. The proliferation of shanties continued. Three decades later, the basic impulse set in motion by Mr. Gandhi that Dharavi should be redeveloped and somehow standardized still prevails. But the incentives have changed. Dharavis land is now worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Private developers do not see a slum but a piece of property convenient to the airport, surrounded by train stations and adjacent to a sleek office park. A sweeping plan approved in 2006 would provide free apartments and commercial space to many Dharavi residents while allowing private investors to develop additional space for sale at market rates. Many Dharavi civic and business leaders endorsed the plan, even as critics denounced the proposal as a giveaway to rich developers. For now, the project remains largely stalled, embroiled in bureaucratic infighting, even as a different, existential debate is under way about the potential risks of redeveloping Dharavi and shredding the informal networks that bind it together. They are talking about redeveloping Dharavi, said Mohammad Khurshid Sheikh, who owns a leather shop. But if they do, the whole chain may break down. These businesses can work because Dharavi attracts labor. People can work here and sleep in the workshop. If there is redevelopment, they will not get that room so cheap. They will not come back here. Macaca 12-29-2011, 09:15 PM Matias Echanove, an architect and urban planner, has long argued that Dharavi should not be dismissed as merely a slum, since it operates as a contained residential and commercial city. He said razing Dharavi, or even completely redeveloping it, would only push residents into other slums. They are going to create actual, real slums, he said. Nobody is saying Dharavi is a paradise. But we need to understand the dynamics, so that when there is an intervention by the government, it doesnt destroy what is there. Hope Sylva Vanita Baskar was born in Dharavi. She is now 39, already a widow. Her husband lost his vigor and then his life to tuberculosis. She borrowed money to pay for his care, and now she rents her spare room to four laborers for an extra $40 a month. She lives in a room with her four children. Two sons sleep in a makeshift bed. She and her two youngest children sleep on straw mats on the stone floor. They do everything together, she said, explaining how her children endure such tight quarters. They fight together. They study together. The computer sits on a small table beside the bed, protected, purchased for $354 from savings, even though the family has no Internet connection. The oldest son stores his work on a pen drive and prints it somewhere else. Ms. Baskar, a seamstress, spends five months worth of her income, almost $400, to send three of her children to private schools. Her daughter wants to be a flight attendant. Her youngest son, a mechanical engineer. My daughter is getting a better education, and she will get a better job, Ms. Baskar said. The childrens lives should be better. Whatever hardships we face are fine. Education is hope in Dharavi. On a recent afternoon outside St. Anthonys, a parochial school in the slum, Hindu mothers in saris waited for their children beside Muslim mothers in burqas. The parents were not concerned about the crucifix on the wall; they wanted their children to learn English, the language considered to be a ticket out of the slums in India. Once, many parents in Dharavi sent their children to work, not to school, and child labor remains a problem in some workshops. Dharavis children have always endured a stigma. When parents tried to send their sons and daughters outside the slum for schooling, the Dharavi students often

received a bitter greeting. Sometimes, the teacher would not accept our children, or would treat them with contempt, said Mohammad Hashim, 64. Sometimes, they would say, Why are you Dharavi children over here? Mr. Hashim responded by opening his own school, tailored for Muslim children, offering a stateapproved secular education. He initially offered the curriculum in Urdu but not a single parent enrolled a child. He switched to English, and now his classrooms are overflowing with Muslim students. Discrimination is still common toward Dharavi. Residents complain that they are routinely rejected for credit cards if they list a Dharavi address. Private banks are reluctant to make loans to businessmen in Dharavi or to open branches. Part of this stigma is as much about social structure as about living in the slum itself. They all belong to the untouchables caste, said Mr. Korde, the longtime social activist, or are Muslims. But money talks in Mumbai, and Dharavi now has money, even millionaires, mixed in with its misery and poverty. Mohammad Mustaqueem, 57, arrived as a 13-year-old boy. He slept outside, in one of the narrow alleyways, and remembers being showered with garbage as people tossed it out in the morning. Today, Mr. Mustaqueem has 300 employees in 12 different garment workshops in Dharavi, with an annual turnover of about $2.5 million a year. He owns property in Dharavi worth $20 million. When I came here, I was empty-handed, he said. Now I have everything. Dharavis fingerprints continue to be found across Mumbais economy and beyond, even if few people realize it. Mr. Asif, the leather shop owner, made leather folders used to deliver dinner checks at the citys most famous hotel, the Taj Mahal Palace. The tasty snacks found in Mumbais finest confectionaries? Made in Dharavi. The exquisite leather handbags sold in expensive shops? Often made in Dharavi. There are hundreds of Dharavis flourishing in the city, boasted Mr. Mobin, the businessman. Every slum has its businesses. Every kind of business is there in the slums. But surely, Mr. Mobin is asked, there are things not made in Dharavi. Surely not airplanes, for example. But we recycle waste for the airlines, he answered proudly. Cups and food containers.

From Dharavi, Another View of India (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/in-dharavianother-view-of-india/) India Ink In Dharavi: Misery, Work, Politics and Hope (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/indharavi-misery-work-politics-and-hope/) India Ink Macaca 12-29-2011, 09:20 PM Capitalism over Caste: The Success of India's 'Untouchable' CEOs (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2103056,00.html) By PATRICK DE JACQUELOT | Time When the Hindu temple in his hometown began falling apart, Ashok Khade agreed to pay for its reconstruction. He certainly had the means. Khade is CEO and co-owner along with his brothers of Das Offshore Engineering, a company that builds equipment for offshore rigs and boasts 20 million euros in annual sales. Still, the decision was quite remarkable for one simple reason: as a child, Khade hadn't been allowed inside the temple. Why? Because he's a Dalit, a member of India's "untouchable" caste. From those humblest of beginnings, Khade grew up to become the village's savior and benefactor. "I feel really successful!" he admits with a smile.

Khade belongs to a very small group of successful Dalit businessmen. But the number of companies founded and led by the men and few women of that community is growing, and these new CEOs want it to be known. With the help of the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DICCI), these untouchable entrepreneurs are organizing a big business fair in Mumbai, India's financial capital. "We are going to show off our knowhow to Indian companies and to Indian society as a whole," says DICCI President Milind Kamble. That Dalits can become millionaires by starting their own businesses is an astonishing phenomenon for Indian society. Heavily discriminated against, Dalits were until recently restricted to the least qualified jobs, like farming without owning the land of course. The only other option was to work in the public sector, which starting in the second half of the 20th century, began allotting a certain number of slots to the so-called Scheduled Castes, or SCs. Now, however, as India's economy is being redrawn along free market lines, both types of jobs are disappearing, according to Surinder Jodhka, a caste expert at the Nehru University in Dehli. With no other options available, some untouchables are trying to start businesses of their own. "For young Dalits the solution is often to raise 20,000 rupees (300 euros) and open a shop or a medical office," says Jodhka. The case for affirmative action The gradual modernization of the Indian economy has also increased the prestige of starting a business. Milind Kamble is a perfect example. "I'm the son of a small town teacher, in a family with no business tradition. My only advantage was that my family was educated," says Kamble. "When I got my engineering degree, my father really wanted me to get a job in the administration, but I said no. He was furious." After several years as an employee, Kamble created his own civil engineering company. Today, Future Constructions brings in about 10 million euros per year and Kamble, who always supported the Dalit cause, became a champion of Dalit entrepreneurship. For him, their weapon is "capitalism against castism." Kamble believes the traditional caste system cannot survive in a modern economic environment. "We were inspired by the American 'affirmative action' policies," he says. "They had black businessmen before having Obama as president!" Dr. Nanda K.K. describes himself as a pure product of India's own version of affirmative action. "When I was young, even when we had nothing to eat we would study," he recalls. "In the Andhra Pradesh, were I live, there was a system to push Dalits to study, and that's what helped me become a doctor. I had a reserved spot at the university, housing and a scholarship." After working for 15 years as a small town doctor, Nanda with the help of subsidies opened a hospital in Hyderabad, the State capital. Today he manages a hospital with 150 beds and 15 specialized doctors and works on anti-AIDS programs with "Bill Gates Foundation grants." But he dismisses the idea that all this help actually made things too easy. "These programs allow us to have financial stability, that's all. We have to be good doctors in order to succeed," he says. Still, starting a business remains very difficult for Dalits. "Business is done through networks, especially caste networks," says Surinder Jodhka. "Since Dalits are newcomers, they don't have these kinds of networks. That makes it much more difficult for them to get a loan from a supplier. Most often, they don't have any assets to put up as a guaranty for a bank loan. In other communities, you usually have land or property. There is still prejudice against them. People tend not to trust them." To help the development of Dalit capitalism, the Indian government passed a long-awaited measure last month requiring the state and public companies to make 20% of their purchases from Indian businesses. A fifth of those purchases 4% of the total will have to be made from businesses belonging to SCs or STs (Scheduled Tribes members of the country's old tribes.) For Shandra Bhan Prasad, a Dalit intellectual, it is a "historic" decision that will help the community's businessmen "enter the system." Indeed there is a lot of money at stake for these

companies: 4% of public purchases represent more than a billion euros. "At the beginning there won't be enough Dalit businesses to supply demand," says Digvijay Singhm, one of the leaders of the Congress party and former prime minister of Madhya Pradesh. "But newcomers will emerge to take advantage of the situation." Resisting a call for quotas Another often talked about measure involves requiring the private sector to hire quotas of outcasts. The idea, which was part of Indian National Congress President Sonia Gandhi's platform for the 2009 elections, has not been well received by the industry. "We really hope this will never happen. It would be completely inefficient," says Chandrajit Banerjee, the leader of the CII employers' union. The idea has been floating around for years but major companies are working hard to prove that they are already pushing for Dalit integration and there is no need for government intervention. "The Tata group is a strong supporter of "affirmative action," says CII President B. Muthuraman, who also serves as vice-president for Tata Steel. Muthuraman claims that 19% of Tata Steel employees are SCs or STs, a figure that corresponds roughly to their share of the population. None of the company's Dalits, however, have high ranking positions. "Not yet," he says. "The road is still long." Ashok Khade's rags to riches story, in other words, remains something of an anomaly in India. But it's proof that changes are afoot. His success also gives young Dalits a reason to be more optimistic. "I am the first Indian to become the partner of an Abu Dhabi prince," says Khade, who created a joint venture with a group from the Emirates.

Castes of mind (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/castes-of-mind/893639/) By Sunil Jain | Indian Express Macaca 12-29-2011, 09:25 PM Glossy faades cant hide an Indian spring (http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2012/01/pilgerindia-land-advertising) From Jammu Kashmir to Maharashtra, in a land of empty advertising slogans and fantastic wealth that barely conceals vast poverty, you can see the first signs of a popular new uprising. By John Pilger | New Statesman When the early morning fog rises and drifting skeins from wood fires carry the sweet smell of India, the joggers arrive in Lodi Gardens. Past the tomb of Muhammad Shah, the 15th-century Mughal ruler, across a landscape manicured in the 1930s by Lady Willingdon, wife of the governor general, recently acquired trainers stride out from ample figures in smart saris and white cotton dhotis. In Delhi, the middle classes do as they do everywhere, though here there is no middle. By midmorning, children descend like starlings. They wear pressed blazers, like those of an English prep school. There are games and art and botany classes. Shepherded out through Lady Willingdon's elegant stone gateway, they pass a reed-thin boy, prostrate beside the traffic and his pile of peanuts, coins clenched in his hand. When I was first sent to report on India, I seldom raised my eyes to the Gothic edifices and faades of the British Raj. All life was at dust and pavement level and, once the shock had eased, I learned to admire the sheer imagination and wit of people who survived the cities, let alone the countryside - from the dabbawallah (literally "person with a box") to the cleaners, runners, street barbers, poets, assorted Fagins and children with their piles of peanuts. In Calcutta, as it was still known during the 1971 war with Pakistan, civil defence units in soup-plate helmets and lungis toured the streets announcing an air-raid warning practice during which, they said, "everybody must stay indoors and remain in the face-down position until the siren has ceased to operate". Waves of mocking laughter greeted them, together with the cry: "But we have no doors to stay inside!"

Predators After the imperial capital was moved to Delhi early in the 20th century, New Delhi was built as a modernist showpiece, with avenues and roundabouts and a mall sweeping up to the viceroy's house, now the president's residence in the world's most populous democracy. If the experience of colonialism was humiliating, this proud new metropolis would surely be enabling. On 15 August 1947, it was the setting for Pandit Nehru's declaration of independence "at the midnight hour". It was also a faade behind which the majority hoped and waited, and still wait. This notion of faade is almost haunting. You sense it in genteel Lodi Gardens and among the anglicised elite with their enduring ambiguity. In the 1990s, it became a wall erected by the beneficiaries of Shining India, which began as a slogan invented by an American advertising firm to promote the rise of the Hindu nationalist BJP-led government. Shorn of Nehru's idealism and paternalism, it marked the end of the Congress Party's pretence of class and caste reconciliation: in other words, social justice. Monsanto and Pizza Hut, Microsoft and Murdoch were invited to enter what had been forbidden territory to corporate predators. India would serve a new deity called "economic growth" and be hailed as a "global leader", apparently heading "in what the smart money believes is the right direction" (Newsweek). India's ascent to "new world power" is both true and what Edward Bernays, the founder of public relations, called "false reality". Despite a growth rate of 6.9 per cent and prosperity for some, more people than ever live in poverty in India, and more of them than anywhere else on earth, including a third of all malnourished children. Save the Children says that every year two million Indian infants under the age of five die. The faades are literal and surreal. Ram Suhavan and his family live 60 feet above a railway track. Their home is the inside of a hoarding that advertises, on one side, "exotic, exclusive" homes for the new "elite" and, on the other, a gleaming car. This is in Pune, Maharashtra, which has "booming" Bombay and the nation's highest suicide rate among indebted farmers. Start the fightback Most Indians live in rural villages, dependent on the land and its rhythms of subsistence. The rise of multinationals' monopoly control of seed, forcing farmers to plant cash crops such as GM cotton, has led to a quarter of a million suicides, a conservative estimate. The environmentalist Vandana Shiva describes it as "recolonisation". Using the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, central and state governments have forcibly dispossessed farmers and tribal peoples in order to hand their land to speculators and mining companies. To make way for a Formula One racetrack and gated "elite" estates, land was appropriated for $6 a square metre and sold to developers for $13,450 a square metre. Across India, communities have fought back. In Orissa State, the wholesale destruction of betel farms has spawned a resistance now in its fifth year. What is always exciting about India is this refusal to comply with political mythology and gross injustice. As Sunil Khilnani wrote in The Idea of India: "The future of western political theory will be decided outside the west." For the majorities of India and the west, liberal democracy is now diminished to "the assertion of an equal right to consume [media] images". In Kashmir, a forgotten India barely reported abroad, a peaceful resistance as inspiring as Tahrir Square has arisen in the most militarised region on earth. As the victims of Partition, Muslim Kashmiris have known none of Nehru's noble legacies. Thousands of dissidents have "disappeared" and torture is not uncommon. "The voice that the government of India has tried so hard to silence," wrote Arundhati Roy in 2008, "has massed into a deafening roar. Hundreds of thousands of unarmed people have come out to reclaim their cities, their streets and mohallas. They have simply overwhelmed the heavily armed security forces by their sheer numbers, and with a remarkable display of raw courage." An Indian spring may be next.

Another Yellow Revolution (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/another-yellowrevolution/460148/) Business Standard Editorial

A more mobile sector (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/a-more-mobilesector/460152/) Business Standard Editorial One cheer for the bulls (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/debashis-basu-one-cheerforbulls/460149/) By Debashis Basu | Business Standard Easing food burden (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2758376.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Farm anger adds to India's economic worries (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/29/indiafarmers-protest-idINDEE7BS04P20111229) By Rajendra Jadhav | Reuters Macaca 12-29-2011, 09:30 PM In Solar Power, India Begins Living Up to Its Own Ambitions (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/business/energy-environment/in-solar-power-india-beginsliving-up-to-its-own-ambitions.html) By VIKAS BAJAJ | The New York Times Solar power is a clean energy source. But in this arid part of northwest India it can also be a dusty one. Every five days or so, in a marriage of low and high tech, field hands with long-handled dust mops wipe down each of the 36,000 solar panels at a 63-acre installation operated by Azure Power. The site is one of the biggest examples of Indias ambitious plan to use solar energy to help modernize its notoriously underpowered national electricity grid, and reduce its dependence on coal-fired power plants. Azure Power has a contract to provide solar-generated electricity to a state-government electric utility. Inderpreet Wadhwa, Azures chief executive, predicted that within a few years solar power would be competitive in price with Indias conventionally generated electricity. The efficiency of solar technology will continue to increase, and with the increasing demand in solar energy, cost will continue to decrease, Mr. Wadhwa said. Two years ago, Indian policy makers said that by the year 2020 they would drastically increase the nations use of solar power from virtually nothing to 20,000 megawatts enough electricity to power the equivalent of up to 15 million modern American homes during daylight hours when the panels are at their most productive. Many analysts said it could not be done. But, now the doubters are taking back their words. Dozens of developers like Azure, because of aggressive government subsidies and a large drop in the global price of solar panels, are covering Indias northwestern plains including this village of 2,000 people with gleaming solar panels. So far, India uses only about 140 megawatts, including 10 megawatts used by the Azure installation, which can provide enough power to serve a town of 50,000 people, according to the company. But analysts say that the national 20,000 megawatt goal is achievable and that India could reach those numbers even a few years before 2020. Prices came down and suddenly things were possible that didnt seem possible, said Tobias Engelmeier, managing director of Bridge to India, a research and consulting firm based in New Delhi. Chinese manufacturers like Suntech Power and Yingli Green Energy helped drive the drop in solar panel costs. The firms increased production of the panels and cut costs this year by about 30 percent to 40 percent, to less than $1 a watt. Developers of solar farms in India, however, have shown a preference for the more advanced, socalled thin-film solar cells offered by suppliers in the United States, Taiwan and Europe. The leading American provider to India is First Solar, based in Tempe, Ariz. India does not have a large solar manufacturing industry, but is trying to develop one and China is showing a new interest in Indias growing demand. Chinas Suntech Power sold the panels used at the Azure installation, which opened in June. Industry executives credit government policies with Indias solar boom, unusual praise because businesses usually deride Indian regulations as Kafkaesque. Over the last decade, India has opened the state-dominated power-generating industry to private players, while leaving distribution and rate-setting largely in government hands. European countries

heavily subsidize solar power by agreeing to buy it for decades at a time, but the subsidies in India are lower and solar operators are forced into to greater competition, helping push down costs. This month, the government held its second auction to determine the price at which its state-owned power trading company NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam would buy solar-generated electricity for the national grid. The average winning bid was 8.77 rupees (16.5 cents) per kilowatt hour. That is about twice the price of coal-generated power, but it was about 27 percent lower than the winning bids at the auction held a year ago. Germany, the worlds biggest solar-power user, pays about 17.94 euro cents (23 American cents) per kilowatt hour. India still significantly lags behind European countries in the use of solar. Germany, for example, had 17,000 megawatts of solar power capacity at the end of 2010. But India, which gets more than 300 days of sunlight a year, is a more suitable place to generate solar power. And being behind is now benefiting India, as panel prices plummet, enabling it to spend far less to set up solar farms than countries that pioneered the technology. In its solar power auctions, moreover, NTPC is not creating open-ended contracts. The last auction, for example, was for a total of only 350 megawatts, which will cap the governments costs. The assumption is that the price of solar power will continue to decline, eventually approaching the cost of electricity generated through conventional methods. Most Indian power plants are fueled by coal and generate electricity at about 4 rupees (7.5 cents) per kilowatt hour less than half of solars cost now. In this months auction, the recent winning bids were comparable to what Indias industrial and commercial users pay for electricity from 8 to 10 rupees. And solars costs are competitive with power plants and back-up generators that burn petroleum-based fuels, whose electricity costs about 10 rupees per kilowatt hour. At least during daytime, photovoltaic panels will compete with oil-generated electricity more than anything else in India, said Cdric Philibert, a senior analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris. This comparison is becoming better and better every month. In addition to the federal government, several of Indias states like Gujarat, where Khadoda is located, are also buying power at subsidized rates from solar companies like Azure Power. Analysts do not expect Indias solar rollout to be problem free. They say some developers have probably bid too aggressively in the federal auctions and may not be able to build their plants fast or cheap enough to survive. Consequently, or because their bids were speculative, some developers are trying to sell their government power agreements to third parties, analysts say, even though such flipping is against the auction rules. Mr. Wadhwa, of Azure Power, said a solar industry shakeout in India was almost inevitable. Initially, a lot of new players enter the sector, he said, and then the market settles with a few players who have a long-term commitment to the industry.

Paeans to India (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/paeans-india-377) Deccan Chronicle Editorial New Delhis Heritage Cinemas (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/29/new-delhisheritage-cinemas/) By Preetika Rana and Nikita Garia | IndiaRealTime Life in a Metro (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/life-in-a-metro/893635/) Indian Express Editorial Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:11 PM India plans to drive railways out of the Raj era into high-speed future (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/30/indian-railways-high-speed-plans) By Jason Burke | The Guardian The crowds, the chaos and the cows on the platform may soon be history. India's railways are to be given their most radical overhaul since the end of the British Raj with the introduction of high-speed trains on key lines :Dif an ambitious plan can be turned into reality:D.

A bill is to be introduced in parliament to allow funding, studies are under way and six proposed "high-speed rail corridors" have been identified. Instead of clunking in grimy, packed trains delayed by fog, elephants on the line or breakdowns, Indians and tourists can expect a rather different experience. Japanese consultants have been in Delhi, India's capital, demonstrating the bullet train which travels at up to 200mph. "We are planning for the future. The pace of growth of the economy means high-speed trains will be a requirement. Not immediately perhaps but certainly in a few years," said Indian Railways' spokesman, Anil Saxena. The most ambitious line would eventually connect the eastern port city of Kolkata with Delhi. Trains would stop at Varanasi, the holy city on the Ganges, and Agra, site of the Taj Mahal. Currently the journey can take 36 hours. A British firm has been commissioned to survey the first part of the route, from the capital eastwards to Bihar. Other routes will link cities in the south and west such as Pune, Ahmedabad and Mumbai. Overseas experts are not convinced that India either needs or can build high-speed railways. In France a mile of TGV track costs 15m, and much more through hills. In Britain the HS2 project has been priced at 33bn while California's bullet train is estimated at 70bn and will take more than 20 years to complete. The total investment in India, even if land is cheaper, would thus be immense, experts say. New stations would have to be built in leading cities and there are big safety issues. "The distances are massive, there are huge cities to go through or round and some very difficult terrain. And people are just not used to that kind of speed. Could they cope with that kind of technology?" said Christian Wolmar, a British transport writer. Indian trains today average 45mph which, though an improvement on 35mph two decades ago, still puts them among the slowest in the world. Wolmar suggested implementing more modest measures to cut travel times on existing track. Then there are the general issues blighting thousands of infrastructure projects including desperately needed roads, power stations, canals, sewage plants and bridges across India. Local experts say such scepticism is not justified. "There is definitely a need for such initiatives and [high-speed rail] is theoretically possible here," said Dr Varadharajan Sridhar, a specialist in Bangalore who pointed to the success of the metro in the Indian capital a project that many said was impossible to execute and to the high-speed train network being built in China, India's regional rival. "There is no reason why we can't do what China has done," he said. There have been safety concerns over China's high-speed train after a crash in July killed more than 40 people. But practical problems are nothing new to the Indian railway ministry. Its 1.25 million employees overcome all the usual hazards of daily Indian existence from packs of aggressive monkeys through to natural disasters and Maoist guerrillas to carry 25 million people to their destination every day. The ministry is reputed to be the second biggest public sector employer in the world after the Chinese army and, with a revenue of 13bn, has even made a profit in recent years. The railways have played a key cultural and historical role. Sudhir Kumar, author of a recent book on Indian railways, described the network as "the lifeblood of the country". "The railways have been so very important in the independence struggle of India, in the unification of India and in the economic life that anything that gets their wheels turning quicker is to be welcomed," Kumar said. Saxena, the Indian Railways spokesman, said that sitting on the roof of the trains, already forbidden though occasionally practised, would be discouraged.

Developing infrastructure, the Chinese way (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2758342.ece) By SHAILAJA FENNELL | The Hindu BusinessLine Shooting Dharavi, A Photographers View (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/shootingdharavi-a-photographers-view/) By HEATHER TIMMONS | The New York Times Kushinagar The legendary comics journalist chronicles the everyday struggles of Dalit villagers in eastern Uttar Pradesh (http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story/1260/Kushinagar.html) By JOE SACCO | Caravan Who Is Pure And Impure In India? (http://www.countercurrents.org/darapuri301211.htm) By Shura Darapuri | Countercurrents Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:19 PM On Road to Delhi, Indias Economy Gets Real (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-30/onroad-to-delhi-india-s-economy-gets-real-commentary-by-pankaj-mishra.html) By Pankaj Mishra | Bloomberg A few years ago, one of Indias private airlines started operating a flight from Delhi to the Himalayan city of Shimla, a few miles from my village. The brisk descent in a small turboprop aircraft isnt for those with a fear of flying. The runway on a table-top mountain seemed particularly short last week, when the plane, breaking free of the fog over Delhi, came down to a wintry Himalayan mist. Still, cutting down journey times to a fraction, the flight seemed too good to be true; and, having endured many very long drives up and down winding mountain roads, I became one of its keenest and more regular customers. The airline was subsequently bought by Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. (KAIR), one of the New Indias iconic corporate brands. Owned by Vijay Mallya, a man fond of horse racing and swimsuit calendars, Kingfisher simply ran out of money earlier this year, reflecting more broadly the troubles of most private airlines in India. They are struggling despite the favor shown to them by the government, which has systematically denuded the publicly owned Air India Ltd. The flight to Shimla was among those affected by Kingfishers drastic cost-cutting (KAIR). So, a few weeks ago, I found myself back on the road to Delhi with a couple of friends who had been visiting me in the town of Mashobra. Road Rage In the 1990s, the drive would take eight hours. In 2009, it took about 11, and this autumn it took almost 12. Stretches of the road, especially those near small cities, resembled four- lane highways anywhere in the world. Elsewhere, passing through roadside settlements, the road shrank to a single lane; and here the queues built up, the air grew thick with dust and exhaust, and road rage erupted out of even the air-conditioned vehicles. Construction sites were everywhere; but few signs existed that the highway was on its way to completion. Piles of concrete beams had been there long enough to allow grass to sprout from their moldy surface. There was rust on the girders. The paint on the signs surrounding the sites had faded; and, most significantly, hardly anyone was working there. Conceived at a time of confident prosperity, the roadworks seemed to have been quietly abandoned; and people like myself, who could afford to travel by air, had not noticed and were unaffected. The metaphor of highways has been deployed frequently to describe Indias potential, most famously by Thomas Friedman, who claimed in 2005 that India is like a highway full of potholes, but off in the distance, the road seems to smooth out, and if it does, this country will be a dynamo.

Like many other popular metaphors about India -- tiger, elephant, cellphone -- this one isnt wholly mistaken. Indian highways rank highly among the infrastructure projects crucial to sustaining the countrys rapid economic growth (INQGGDPY), which is threatened by inflation, declining industrial production, a weakening currency (the rupee has dropped about 15 percent against the dollar this year) and corruption scandals that implicate some of Indias most well-known politicians and businessmen. The question that Friedman asked in 2005 has grown more urgent: Is that smoother road in the distance a mirage or the real thing? Or, to put it differently: Did the perennial gap between illusion and reality somehow widen imperceptibly in the New India? Education Racket The answer to this question seemed obvious on the half- built highway to Delhi. The most conspicuous sights along the roadside were the placards for shiny new private educational institutions. They seem -- if you have never been inside one or met any of their alumni and looked only at the (misspelled) signboards promising professional success -- to be hectically preparing the basis for Indias demographic dividend: an overwhelmingly youthful population (WPOPINDI) that will soon become producers and consumers in the global economy. In actuality, while most state-funded schools and colleges are barely functional, private education in India is largely a money-making racket. In September this year, a study of schools in the biggest states discovered that Indias peers in adult literacy are Afghanistan and Papua New Guinea. Hundreds of millions of poorly educated and unemployable youth increasingly find themselves drawn to some peculiar forms of entrepreneurship. Twice on the highway from Shimla to Delhi, we were flagged down by groups of young men collecting taxes. I have often come across these soft forms of banditry on the country roads of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, two of Indias poorest and most populous states. The only difference here was that the young men seemed better educated, more resourceful and authoritative. One of the groups that stopped us near the Indian capital, less than a mile from an authentic police checkpoint, even had a jeep with the words Delhi Municipal Toll painted on the windshield. Bleak employment prospects and a general social breakdown - - of morality no less than law and order -- were pushing them into a career of crime. Their brazen modus operandi in one of the countrys richest regions hinted that Indias demographic dividend was more likely to boost crime rather than gross domestic product. For most of the previous decade, many Indians have been spellbound by a vision of imminent national greatness, oblivious to the basic fact that no country without a substantial manufacturing base and skilled workforce has ever become an economic superpower. A sense of unreality as profound as those that overwhelmed the central planners of Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev came to dictate discussions of the Indian economy. Businessmen, just like the government, deceived themselves, according to Rajiv Kumar, the secretary-general of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. We became complacent, he told the Financial Times this month, as we started believing in the myth that in India there were structural reasons that would keep growth above 7 percent for good. Of course, businessmen are obliged to talk up their prospects; boosterism of this sort helps money to circulate. However, the shattered illusions of New India implicate more deeply those journalists and commentators who made a fetish of aggregate national wealth, using a few success stories to generalize wildly. There were those who deliberately avoided a sober reckoning with Indian reality; but there were also many -- including myself -- who did not probe them enough. It explains why such a feeble ideological fantasy -- of an inexorably rising India -- could have beguiled so many people for so long. Pankaj Mishra, the author of Temptations of the West: How to Be Modern in India, Pakistan, Tibet

and Beyond Flawed Miracle (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577129900848577864.html) Wall Street Journal A day not too soon (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2761196.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Rupee posts biggest annual drop since 2008 (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/30/marketsindia-rupee-idINDEE7BT01K20111230) By Archana Narayanan BSE Sensex logs 1st annual fall in 3 years; outlook bleak (http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/12/30/markets-india-sensex-nifty-closeidINDEE7BT06Y20111230) By Devidutta Tripathy India's external debt rises to $326.6 billion (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/indiabusiness/Indias-external-debt-rises-to-326-6-billion/articleshow/11305875.cms) IANS Indias Most Valuable Firm? Hello TCS, Move Over RIL (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/30/indias-most-valuable-firm-hello-tcs-move-overril/) By Paul Beckett | IndiaRealTime India Shares Post First Annual Fall in Three Years (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577130193137649880.html) By KHUSHITA VASANT | Wall Street Journal Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:24 PM Over-reacting to the Raj The fixation with erasing the traces of our colonial past shows we haven't accepted it (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sunanda-k-datta-ray-over-reacting-toraj/460237/) By Sunanda K Datta-Ray | Business Standard All this hullabaloo over New Delhis centenary reminds me of a socially aspiring Bengali tycoon wisely informing a visiting European that only those who couldnt join the Bengal Club used the Calcutta Club. I didnt have the heart to tell him that in the era of which he was speaking, no Indian (including him and his ancestors) could enter the Bengal Club except through the servants entrance. A Daily Telegraph correspondent had to smuggle Mahatma Gandhi into his bedroom because it would have been the South African train episode all over again if Gandhi had been detected. The best Indians joined the Calcutta Club. Squabbling like jackals over the leftovers of the Raj is as demeaning as preening possessively among someone elses relics. Let us take pride in the education, administration and justice systems that the British left behind (though we are doing our best to destroy them) and let us glory in the discipline, fighting skills and superb ceremonial of the defence forces. But lets not gloat like Kiplings jabbering bandar-log in the ruins of the abandoned city over institutions that were created as symbols of white supremacy over the native population. New Delhi is one such. The British built it to escape Bengals increasing swarajist militancy. Northern India, home of their pet martial races, seemed more comfortable. The climate suited them better and Simla was more convenient for the annual exodus whose size, scale and cost drew criticism from liberal British opinion such as the Statesman represented. More significantly, Delhi pandered to the Mughal illusions that Queen Victoria had nursed ever since she was proclaimed Kaiser-i-Hind in a piece of royal one-upmanship over the Tzar of Russia, German Kaiser, Ottoman Sultan and Emperor of Austria. The Delhi Durbar with its two separate amphitheatres fostered the Mughal myth. The smaller was for the nobs, the bigger for ordinary folk, thus, replicating for King George V and Queen Mary the Diwan-i-Khas and Diwan-i-Aam of imperial Mughal audiences. The Indian role in a fantasy whose carefully researched and constructed make-believe world Eric Hobsbawm describes in detail was restricted to a handful of contractors who made fortunes out of cement and climbed many notches up the social ladder. They did as they were bid, like any obedient servant. The current junketing confirms India hasnt come to terms with its past. The Soviet authorities meticulously rebuilt the Winter Palace as a national heritage in what is now once again St

Petersburg without glorifying the Romanovs. Soviet guides used to be fully informed about the royals associated with the palace. Similarly, Communist China takes loving care of what Lord Elgins vandalism and looting left of the Forbidden City. That does not, however, make the Ching dynasty Chinas national model. Indias situation is more complicated because the past we are trying to exorcise and exalt, reject and embrace, was imposed on us by foreigners. Its bound to provoke strong emotions. I can understand the Bengal agitation to remove the Holwell Monument commemorating supposed victims of what the British called the Black Hole of Calcutta. But I cant understand the point of hauling down the statues of viceroys and generals and placing Gandhi or Patel on the same plinths. If we can claim the plinths as our own, theres nothing to stop us from one day claiming the entire setting as our very own handiwork. Without the colonial statuary, with British coats of arms erased and old street names changed, who can prove that independent India did not through its own skills and toil build Rashtrapati Bhavan, North and South Block and Vijay Chowk? After all, we have carefully removed all the evidence to the contrary! I have met people who are convinced Kolkatas Shaheed Minar was raised by or for freedom fighters. They have never heard of General Ochterlony who defeated Nepal and whom the British honoured with the minaret in 1848. So should India for, without him, Darjeeling, Dehra Dun, Simla and much of Kumaon, Garhwal and the Terai wouldnt have been Indian. Singapore is the one former colony without any hanky-panky about the past. It happened, its relics are there, but they dont impinge on todays serious business of making money. We could learn from that pragmatism. Tailpiece Its said that when the French statesman, Georges Clemenceau, visited India he was shown the remains of Historys seven Delhis and then taken to the site where the new British capital was being built. And what a magnificent ruin this will make! he exclaimed.

Kolkata's inclusive Christmas (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/subir-roy-kolkatasinclusive-christmas/460245/) By Subir Roy | Business Standard The Lutyens Legacy (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/29/delhi-journal-the-lutyenslegacy/) By Tripti Lahiri | IndiaRealTime | Business Standard Business in harmony with music (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/jyoti-pandelavakare-business-in-harmonymusic/460238/) By Jyoti Pande Lavakare Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:29 PM When a Fast Fails: Lessons From Gandhi (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/when-a-fastfails-lessons-from-gandhi/) By SAMANTH SUBRAMANIAN | India Ink Even Mohandas K. Gandhi, the architect of the Indian obsession with the hunger strike, did not always succeed in his fasts although success was, admittedly, measured by Mr. Gandhis own standards. He considered, for instance, a 1918 fast in Ahmedabad a moral failure. He had stopped eating in solidarity with striking mill workers, and three days into his fast, the factory owners agreed to raise worker wages by 35 percent. But Mr. Gandhi was unhappy: some of the workers had contemplated a suspension of the strike in favor of violence. During the strike, he had exhorted them to stick to the pacifist path, reminding them that they had their hands, their courage, and their fear of God. After the fast, he would regretfully say of the workers: They have not won their masters hearts, as they were not innocent in thought. They were only non-violent in deed. Mr. Gandhi could be ruthless about the conduct of his hunger protests. On Sept. 20, 1932, on the grounds of Punes Yerawada Prison, he started a fast to protest the notion of creating a separate electorate for Hindu Dalits, because he feared that the move would fracture Hindu society. His health deteriorated rapidly.

B. R. Ambedkar, who had advocated strongly for this electoral structure, had initially called the fast a stunt, but as Mr. Gandhi grew sicker, Mr. Ambedkar came under immense pressure to negotiate. The Poona Pact was born out of compromises that Mr. Ambedkar and Mr. Gandhi reached on Sept. 24. Mr. Ambedkar would insist on portraying the pact as a failure for Mr. Gandhi. In a book titled What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables, Mr. Ambedkar would write: When the fast failed and Mr. Gandhi was obliged to sign a pact which conceded the political demands of the Untouchables he took his revenge by letting the Congress employ foul electioneering tactics to make their political rights of no avail. Mr. Gandhi himself identified a 1939 fast in Rajkot as an unsuccessful, tainted one. The ruler of the princely state of Rajkot had revoked a set of political reforms, and when Mr. Gandhis fast did not produce the change he wanted, he asked the viceroy to intervene. There can be no room for selfishness, anger, lack of faith, or impatience in a pure fast, he wrote in Harijan. It is no exaggeration to admit that all these defects crept into my Rajkot fast I had in me the selfish desire for the realization of the fruits of my labor. If there had been no anger in me, I would not have looked to the Viceroy for assistance. He left Rajkot empty-handed, with body shattered and hope cremated. In Harijan in 1940, as per his custom, Mr. Gandhi posed himself questions and answered them. In one such query about the ethics of fasting, he argued that a fast out of love might appeal to the senses of a friend going astray. There is a possible risk [that] he would be tempted to go back to his old ways, Mr. Gandhi wrote. But then I can fast again. Ultimately the increasing influence of my love will either convert the friend to the extent of weaning him completely from his evil ways, or repeated fasts may lose their novelty, blunt his mind, and make it impervious to my fasting.

Is Lokpal Jinxed, or Was This a Serial Killing? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/is-lokpaljinxed-or-was-this-a-serial-killing/) By HARI KUMAR | India Ink Lokpal in the Rajya Sabha: Who Hates What (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/lokpal-inthe-rajya-sabha-who-hates-what/) By HARI KUMAR | India Ink Chaos at Midnight, Hung Lokpal (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/chaos-at-midnighthung-lokpal/) | India Ink Proudly Indian (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/proudly-indian-637) By Amish | Deccan Chronicle The Oxymoron of Team Anna (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/30/india-journal-theoxymoron-of-team-anna/) By Ranjani Iyer Mohanty | IndiaRealTime A subversion of Indian democracy? (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16361584) By Soutik Biswas | BBC Learn to walk before running (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/Learn-towalk-before-running/Article1-789300.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial At the rainbow's end (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/At-the-rainbows-end/Article1-789302.aspx) By Gopalkrishna Gandhi | Hindustan Times Politicians conspire to scuttle the Lokpal Bill..what now???? (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/politicians-conspire-to-scuttle-thelokpal-bill-what-now) By Prashant Panday | Times of India A tale of two cities (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Citycitybangbang/entry/a-tale-of-twocities) By Santosh Desai | Times of India Lokpal debate: Ancient parliamentary rules and ludicrous interpretations (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/randomaccess/entry/ancient-parliamentary-rules-andludicrous-interpretations) By Rajesh Kalra | Times of India Why I am happy that the Lokpal Bill could not be passed (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/masala-noodles/entry/why-i-am-happy-that-the-lokpalbill-could-not-be-passed) By Kingshuk Nag | Times of India Anna Hazare and the Lokpal Bill Debate: A Shakespearean Tragedy (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-mainstream-maverick/entry/anna-hazare-and-thelokpal-bill-debate-a-shakespearean-tragedy) By Amaresh Misra | Times of India

Right cause, wrong time (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Right-causewrong-time/articleshow/11306834.cms) By | Times of India When the law took its own course in 2011 (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1yearend-2011-when-the-law-took-its-own-course/20111230.htm) By Abhishek Anshu & Ranjit Kumar Sinha | Rediff 'Your insistence on the Jan Lokpal Bill as the central issue is misplaced' (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-insistence-on-quick-solution-will-provecounterproductive/20111230.htm) By Anil Athale | Rediff India wants Dr Singh to go! (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-wants-dr-singh-togo/20111230.htm) By Virendra Kapoor | Rediff The great Indian betrayals (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/the-great-indianbetrayals/20111230.htm) By Deepak Warrier | Rediff Acme of Insincerity, Ineptitude & Infamy (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4835.html) By B. Raman | South Asia Analysis Group Four fake CBI officers arrested (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Four-fake-CBIofficers-arrested/articleshow/11308313.cms) Press Trust Of India Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:39 PM Merry Christmas, Rev. Khanna: Thinking about Freedom and Intolerance in Kashmir (http://kafila.org/2011/12/25/merry-christmas-rev-khanna-thinking-about-freedom-andintolerance-in-kashmir/) By Shuddhabrata Sengupta | Kafila I want to begin writing this by wishing a very happy Christmas to Reverend C.M. Khanna, a Protestant presbyter in the All Saints Church, Srinagar, Indian held Jammu & Kashmir, who has been facing a situation that no free man should ever have to countenance (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pastor-held-in-valley-over-forced-conversions/878175/). He has had to face an arrest (though, thankfully now he is out on bail) and social ostracism for doing nothing that can be construed as criminal or harmful to any individual or society at large. I write this in solidarity with him and his family, and with all those who have been harassed for their faith, or for their lack of faith, anywhere. (Please follow this link for a comprehensive report (http://www.e-pao.net/epSubPageExtractor.asp? src=news_section.Press_Rele ase.Press_Release_2011.Report_of_fact_finding_team _to_Srinagar_regarding_arrest_of_Pastor_Khanna_201 11207) on Rev. Khannas situation, in the form of a press note submitted by John Dayal) I know that many people in Kashmir continue to be in prison for reasons of conscience, because they want to be free of the occupation. And this Christmas, my greetings are to them and to their families too. I know that Reverend Khanna is out on bail now, and that many others are not. And I hope that they too will see freedom soon. I am writing about Reverend Khanna not because I value his freedom more than that of others incarcerated in Kashmir, but because if we value freedom, we should not have to measure its value, or calculate its worth depending on who happens to get bail, and who happens to rot in jail. It is incidental that Rev. Khanna happens to be a Christian pastor in Kashmir, he might just as well have been a Muslim Imam in a small town in one of the southern states of the United States of America, a certain kind of Buddhist monk in China, a Jewish Rabbi in Saudi Arabia, a practicing Hindu in Pakistan or an Atheist in Iran. No person, anywhere in the world, should be persecuted or harassed or socially boycotted for their beliefs, their faith or lack of them, or for trying to convince others to join them in their faith or share in celebrating their doubt. States and societies that deny people this basic right, the freedom to articulate and communicate their convictions, cannot be considered to be free in any way. There is no denying that a part of Kashmir is in the grip of a brutal occupation by the armed forces of the Indian State. Kashmir is not free. There is no denying that a plebiscite under international auspices to determine what shape the people of Kashmir want to give to their sovereignty may well be the only way out of the violence and brutal force that reigns over Kashmir. My views on this matter are public knowledge, and have been freely expressed, both in this blog and in other fora. Today, I want to ask a serious question about the nature of the Azadi that the self-proclaimed

leaders of the Kashmiri people are demanding. I do not mean to demean or cheapen this demand, which I consider to be just and morally correct. I only want to know whether or not, many of those who voice this demand in Kashmir do so after due consideration to what freedom actually entails, or whether they are just automatically mouthing a demand whose depth they have no intention of plumbing. If the latter is the case, then the Azadi they will bring to bear on Kashmir will not be substantially different from the Barbadi (devastation) that is currently taking place there under the auspices of the Indian state. If the Azadi has to be pyaari-pyaari, meethi-meethi (beloved and sweet) as the passionate voices of crowds in Kashmir so often declare, then, it has to mean the freedom to uphold the dictates of ones faith and conscience, without fear, regardless of what name one gives to ones faith or lack of it. Without the freedom to believe or disbelieve as one chooses to, according to ones conscience, there cannot be a substantive or real Azaadi. It may be an Azaadi-baraye-Islam (an Azaadi for Islam) but that is not Azaadi. Azaadi Baraye Islam in a Muslim Majority province means the same thing as freedom for Hindus in a Hindu majority territory. This is freedom with qualifiers, and freedom with qualifiers is really, not freedom at all. I say this in relation to the recent troubles that have plagued Reverend Chander Mani Khanna, whom I referred to at the beginning of this post. The facts are common knowledge by now. Reverend Khanna, who has been living in Srinagar for quite some time, has been serving the small Christian community in Kashmir. Some time ago, some local people, who had been regularly attending his services, asked him to baptize them into the Christian religion. He was initially reluctant to do so, and only after satisfying himself that they were not asking to be baptized for any material benefit, he conducted the relevant ceremony, not in hiding, but in public, so that no ulterior motives may be attributed to him. Subsequent to this, he was first summoned before a Sharia Court by an individual a Bashiruddin Ahmed who is acknowledged to be the Mufti-Azam of Jammu and Kashmir by the state government and thus cannot be regarded as anything but a well known (if occasionally double dealing) lackey of the Indian occupation of Kashmir. This individual reprimanded severely Rev. Khanna, though he had no legal authority to do so, (as the Sharia Court has no legal or constitutional basis) and then legal notices were served on him by the official judicial system. Since Jammu and Kashmir, unlike some other states in the Indian Union does not (thankfully) have a draconian anti conversion law on its statute books, Rev. Khanna was arrested under sections of the Ranbir Penal Code to do with disrupting communal harmony and causing disaffection. Reportedly, no lawyer in Kashmir agreed to appear on his behalf. He was heckled in court, and threatened as he was finally released on bail in early December. Let us remember that this was an action undertaken by the very regime that the separatist leaders of Jammu and Kashmir oppose tooth and nail. Yet in this instance, they (the separatist leadership) seemed to have experienced no trouble at all in either remaining indifferent to the plight of Rev. Khanna, acting ambivalently at best, or in actually actively supporting the hated states draconian action. So a state that you say you hate is fine as long as it persecutes people who are inconvenient to you. This attitude should make it clear that several of the loudest voices in favor of Azadi in Jammu & Kashmir have no real commitment to the idea of freedom and the ethical responsibility that it entails. A case like this is a test. And we should treat it as one. If someone responds to it with prevarication, ambivalence or in support of persecution, then they cannot be trusted to respect freedom. Today they have looked away, or cheered, as a Christian Pastor is pilloried, tomorrow, they will do it to Pandits, or Shias, or Buddhists, or Atheists, or people who have a different idea of how the state or society should be administered. I am not a believer, and if I met Rev. Khanna, I would politely and respectfully offer him my fundamental disagreements with the tenets of his faith. But that does not mean that I do not respect his right to communicate what he perceives to be his faith to me. If I found his arguments and his passion persuasive, I may even agree to join his faith, as I would if I were convinced by the tenets of Islam, Advaita Vedanta, Mahayana Buddhism or any other religious world view. So far I have not had this good fortune. My doubts stay, and I remain, an unbeliever, keenly interested in all religions and beliefs, but content to hold my own ground in terms of doubt. The opposition to Rev. Khannas actions centre on the fact that a video of the conversion ceremony has the baptized declaring that they enter a new life in the Christian faith, renouncing the works of the devil. This has been taken to mean that the baptized are saying that their previous faith (in this

case, Islam) is the work of the devil. While I carry no brief for proselytizers of any sort, I do recognize that several religions, especially Christianity and Islam, do attribute deviation from their core beliefs to be inspired by the power which is not what they consider to be God. And there can be no ambiguity about the fact that this power, happens to be the devil. Thus, it is a bit specious for a believing Muslim to be offended by a Christian baptism ceremony invoking a renunciation of the devil, especially when the core beliefs and practices of non-Muslims (say in icon-worship, or the divinity of Jesus Christ) would equally qualify as the devils work for a Musllim proselytizer or defender-of-the-faith. Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:44 PM The other objection has been to the possibility of monetary or material incentives for conversion. Reverend Khanna flatly denies that he offered any material incentives to those who chose to convert. He in fact says that he repeatedly asked them to reconsider their desire, and took the step to baptize them only after he was convinced that the individuals concerned had no material motives. I take Reverend Khanna at his word, but let us for arguments sake, consider the circumstances of conversion for material gain. I have no hesitation in saying that if a religiously committed individual were to offer material inducements to people to convert, I would see nothing wrong with that either. After all, many religions promise their believers a better life in heaven their visions of paradise are all milk and honey. What difference does it make if one gets a little milk and honey in this life along with the next one ? Let us assume, hypothetically, that a person did offer material rewards. What wrong would that do? And why are we assuming that a little milk and honey in this life, especially if one is poor and desperate, are things to be looked down upon? What gives anyone the right to look down upon an appreciation of material rewards in this life, it those rewards rob no one else of their rights, and are not wrested by violence? The only conditions under which conversion can be said to be wrong in my view, is if it is obtained under duress and threat of violence. No one faith has monopoly over a history of coercion and violence. And in all instances, it is wrong. It has been said, by some, that Rev. Khanna represents a foreign funded initiative. Again, this is probably not true. But what if it were? Who is to say that the many well endowed Saudi petrodollar backed Salafi initiatives that are active in Kashmir, that are intent on turning people in Kashmir away from the kind of Islam that they have known for generations towards another kind of Islam, are not equally foreign-funded. Why cherry pick ones foreign funded agencies when it comes to proselytization ? Finally, we come to the most substantive point of all. The vast majority of Muslims in Kashmir are descended from people who converted freely, and of their own volition to the Islamic faith at some point or the other in the past. If we can respect the agency and freedom of these ancestors of todays Kashmiris to choose their own faith, why should we not extend the same respect to todays Kashmiris when it comes to the choices that they want to make to remain within Islam or to choose another faith, or to choose no faith at all. Only if this basic respect is guaranteed will the slogan of Azadi carry any meaning. Otherwise, it will be just as hollow as the claim that Kashmiris are as free as they can be within the Indian Union. All those who stand for Azadi in Kashmir, if their love for freedom is genuine, will, I hope, stand in solidarity with Reverend Khanna and his family this Christmas. I say all this because I hope that one day the occupation of Kashmir will end, and that all those who stay in Kashmir, including Reverend Khanna, or some one like him, will live as free men and women.

Kashmiri separatist clergyman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq launches radical website to prevent conversions (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kashmiri-separatist-clergyman-Mirwaiz-Umar-Farooqlaunches-radical-website-to-prevent-conversions/articleshow/11280433.cms) By M Saleem Pandit | TNN

J&K interlocutors: They came, they saw, they went (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/jkinterlocutors-they-came-they-saw-they-went/20111229.htm) By Varad Varenya | Rediff Kashmir: Curbing The Academics (http://www.countercurrents.org/majid291211.htm) By Burhan Majid | Countercurrents Kashmir Police register case for text book depiction of cops as 'cruel' (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kashmir-Police-register-case-for-text-book-depiction-ofcops-as-cruel/articleshow/11178296.cms) IANS Whatever Happened to Kashmir? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/21/politics-journalwhatever-happened-to-kashmir/) By Jyoti Malhotra | IndiaRealTime Kashmiri people should decide (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML20Df01.html) By Gyan Basnet | Asia Times 100 guerrillas waiting to sneak into Kashmir: Army (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/100guerrillas-waiting-to-sneak-into-Kashmir-Army/articleshow/11170064.cms) IANS Stop sending terrorists, will pull back guns: India to Pak (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indianews/NewDelhi/Stop-sending-terrorists-will-pull-back-guns/Article1-788907.aspx) By Shishir Gupta | Hindustan Times India Rejects Pakistan Proposal to Remove Big Guns from LOC (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/30/india-rejects-pakistan-proposal-to-remove-bigguns-from-loc/) By Tom Wright | IndiaRealTime Macaca 12-30-2011, 07:57 PM India's indeciveness is spoiling a good Bangladesh story (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias-indeciveness-is-spoiling-a-good-Bangladeshstory/articleshow/11306973.cms) By Indrani Bagchi | TNN Despite a steady upward trajectory in India-Bangladesh ties in recent months, India may be falling short in taking this relationship forward, a fact that is worrying the top foreign policy leadership here. "Bangladesh worries us," said top level sources in the government, less because of Bangladesh itself but more because of India's inability to take big decisions. Last week, traders in Akhaura, Tripura went on a strike, impacting bilateral border trade worth lakhs of rupees. They were protesting against the pathetic infrastructure of the integrated check-post at Akhaura, which has made trading a hellish activity. Six months ago, home minister P Chidambaram inaugurated the checkpost with a lot of fanfare, promising construction in 18 months. The traders' protest was obviously a reminder that the government had dropped the ball after promising much -- they were only persuaded to resume activity after senior officials from the Tripura government reaffirmed their commitment to complete construction on time. Manmohan Singh's Bangladesh initiative had been the most important piece of neighbourhood diplomacy by the UPA government, but it seems to be slowing down. First, the exercise was largely in response to the first steps taken by Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina. Second, while Bangladesh has actually moved far in addressing India's security concerns, the perception has gained ground that India is dragging its feet. In fact, India and Bangladesh have actually had a very productive year. A land boundary has been demarcated, the vexed issue of enclaves and adverse possessions resolved, India has been generous with tariffs leading to greater trade and investments. But India failed at the last minute to stitch together a Teesta rivers agreement with Bangladesh after promising to do so, because the UPA government could not get West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee to agree to the deal. Banerjee, famously capricious, dumped Manmohan Singh at the eleventh hour killing the PM's transformative visit to Dhaka in September. "Our inability to settle the Teesta issue is making small incidents flare up," sources said. The Shaikh Hasina government had gambled big on the India relationship, but with India failing to come up to

scratch, there is the inevitable bad blood that affects the bilateral relationship. In another incident, which became bigger than it otherwise would have, three Bangladesh nationals were killed in firing by BSF forces in Govindpur in Malda District and Narayanganj in Coochbehar District of West Bengal on December 16 and 17, which raised hackles in Dhaka. Dhaka lodged a strong protest with India. New Delhi "regretted" the incident, though said the firing had been in self-defence. In a statement, the MEA said, the policy of restraint by BSF personnel has "emboldened criminal elements" who have stepped up their attacks to facilitate their illegal activities and asked Bangladesh to take measures to restrict the movement of people along the border especially during night hours. The MEA spokesperson said, "It is the view of the Indian government that illegal activities, which sometimes lead to regrettable loss of lives on both sides along the border, need to be addressed through joint collaborative efforts and mechanisms." Recounting the incident, MEA spokesperson said, a group of around 50-60 miscreants from the Bangladeshi side pelted stones at a BSF personnel and tried to drag him towards the Bangladesh side. "Sensing imminent danger to his life, his two colleagues fired four rounds in all resulting in the miscreants fleeing the scene leaving the BSF jawan behind," the spokesperson said. Incidents like these should be resolved at the local level, but residual discontent with India has contributed to small incidents acquiring a bigger dimension than necessary. India is yet to appoint a high commissioner to Dhaka, a post that is one of the most important foreign postings for Indian diplomats. The last envoy, Rajeet Mitter retired a couple of months ago, and the post has been vacant since then. Sources said a slew of candidates from Navtej Sarna, India's ambassador in Israel to Pankaj Saran from the prime minister's office are in the running for the job. But the government is yet to make up its mind on a crucial appointment. The good thing is that India acknowledges the importance of Bangladesh and is willing to take small steps to keep the ties afloat, even as domestic politics has grounded substantive movement on issue that matter to Dhaka. Sheikh Hasina will be in Agartala on January 11 to receive a doctorate from Tripura University. But more important, she will be going down memory lane, because Agartala holds memories for their independence struggle, as well as some personal memories of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. It's a small gesture, but its important for states to develop an independent relationship with neighbours. Bangladesh politics continues to pressure the Hasina government on the Tipaimukh dam prompting a recent urgent visit by hasina's foreign policy advisers, Gowher Rizvi and Matiur Rehman, who met the PM to apprise him of the brewing crisis. It prompted Dipu Moni, Bangladesh foreign minister to defend their position this week. "We want a joint study on the project to find out if it has any adverse impact on Bangladesh," Moni said. There are any number of creative solutions to the Tipaimukh Dam issue, including making Bangladesh a beneficiary of it. Bangladesh is a good news story for Indian foreign policy. But India's window of opportunity is limited, and it needs careful political nurturing, which is not possible in the current environment of Indian politics.

Bangladesh Terror Assessment 2012 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/28122011-bangladesh-terrorassessment-2012-analysis/) South Asia Terrorism Portal Macaca 12-30-2011, 08:03 PM PLAYBOY MAGAZINE AND AQ KHAN: INCREDIBLE CREDIBILITY? (http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/playboy-magazine-and-aq-khan-incredible-credibility-3540.html)

By Alankrita Sinha | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies There is enough evidence internationally that adds credence to the notoriety of the AQ Khan network and its legacy of nuclear proliferation. However, along with facts, fiction too finds its way into this narrative from time to time. The latest in this case is a compelling piece by Joshua Pollack, in none other than Playboy magazine, insinuating that the fourth customer of the AQ Khan proliferation network was India. Pollack rests his case on three major factors. The first deals with the similarity in centrifuges used by India and those engineered by Khan. The second evidence is the case against certain entities that had been accused and later indicted for contravening South Africas non-proliferation legislation. The third being AQ Khan personality itself which would have shown no remorse in being treacherous to Pakistan in face of personal gains. This article explores all the evidences provided by Pollack while seeking to answer one central question: How credible is the evidence provided by Pollack in the face of facts, little known publicly as they might be? Pollack suggests that the centrifuges used by India for uranium enrichment are so similar to the design of the G-2 centrifuges of URENCO, stolen and used by Khan for Pakistans P-2 centrifuge, that despite minor changes, the design is recognizable to the trained eye. Moreover, he emphasizes how Indias late entry into the development of uranium centrifuges in the 1980s can be explained through the lack of indigenous capability in engineering one, and thereby points to the AQ Khan network in terms of providing assistance. However he desists from answering a cardinal question regarding the level of detail which can pin his case. There are many distinct levels at which his argument falters. At one level, similarities in centrifuge design is a necessary but not sufficient evidence at hand considering the fact that information regarding Indias centrifuge program has hardly any access points in the public domain. As Professor R Rajaraman critiques, one may like to hence question the source of Pollacks knowledge about the design and detail of Indias uranium centrifuges. He can very well speculate, but he cannot be certain. Another fact which he misses out is the contingency of Indias effort at uraniumenrichment and its interest in nuclear fuelled submarines. Indias nuclear weapons program was plutonium based and hence did not require highly enriched uranium (HEU). The need for HEU only surfaced in the 1980s because it was at that time that India became interested in the idea of submarine reactors. In fact, according to David Albright and Susan Basu, only in 1985 did India begin to receive manufacturing equipment and materials from German, Swiss, and French companies for its Rare Materials Project (RMP) hailed as Indias primary centrifuge enrichment facility. This brings us to Pollacks second evidence. According to Joshua Pollack, it is in this interest of securing manufacturing equipment and materials for uranium enrichment that India actually came in touch with the AQ Khan network. For the purpose of explicating his case further, Pollack points to the South African courts documents which directed an investigation into two corporate entities registered in South Africa - Krisch Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd and Tradefin Engineering CC. It was during this investigation that a German citizen named Gerhard Wisser and a Swiss citizen named Daniel Geiges were indicted for supplying nuclear equipment to Pakistan between 1986 and 1995. In fact, both Wisser and Geiges were indicted on ten charges, six relating to proliferating to Libya and four to Pakistan. Please note, none of the charges revealed anything about a link to India. Why then does Pollack insist that India was involved? His argument is predicated on the raised probability of proliferation after Wisser commissioned the production of flow-meter units designed for a hexafluoride application as is used by India. Even Albright and Basu concede that this raises a possibility of an Indian link but does not confirm it. More importantly, even the South African courts could not prove it. Last but not the least, Pollack uses AQ Khans personality as an enabling factor in order to make an argument for his treachery towards Pakistan. According to Pollack, Khans biography is as important as the man himself because it highlights his need for personal recognition and glorification. However, amongst scores of instances illuminating Khans need, for example his endeavour to sponsor higher education in Pakistan, none of these personal traits relate directly to his role in proliferating to India. In fact, Pollacks final clue is nothing more than a personal judgement in order to fill the gaps within his argument which cannot be explained by anything credible. Pollacks argument fails to link facts and contingencies which guide behaviour to the circumstantial

evidence which he so compellingly provides. Moreover, his argument presupposes that Khan had a power of unilaterally deciding action, without giving the Indian state any agency in this regard. But then again, one must also remember, the choice of the medium itself gives much leeway to Pollack to escape a far more severe criticism.

Revisiting MFN status (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/30/revisiting-mfn-status.html) By Sakib Sherani | Dawn Himalayan waters (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/30/himalayan-waters.html) Dawn Editorial Macaca 12-30-2011, 08:18 PM Counterterrorism in 2011: The Year of Abbottabad (http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/counterterrorism-2011-the-year-abbottabad-6298) By Bruce Riedel | National Interest The millennium began with a hijacking of an Indian airliner to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The plot, involving the Pakistani terror group Harakat-ul-Mujahedin, al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), was a harbinger of a decade of terror whose epicenter was Pakistanand this year the trail to high-value target number one, Osama bin Laden, finally ended there. On a clear night in early May 2011, American Navy commandos found and killed Bin Laden in his hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. After searching since 1998, the Central Intelligence Agency had finally found the most wanted man in human history. Thorough and careful intelligence analysis had tracked him down to a house in the garrison city that also houses Pakistans premier military academy. Abbottabad is just thirty miles north of the countrys capital, Islamabad, and the nearby military-general headquarters in Rawalpindi. It is located on the famous Karakoram Highway, which follows the ancient Silk Road from South Asia over the Himalayas and Hindu Kush to China. In American terms, it was as if Bin Laden were hiding just outside the gate of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, an hours drive from the White House and the Pentagon. Abbottabad is named after a British army officer and colonial administrator, Sir James Abbott, who founded the city as a cantonment for the British army in India in January 1853. Abbott fought in the British East India Companys wars against the Sikhs in the middle of the nineteenth century and was very fond of the city he founded. The CIA traced Bin Laden there by following the trail of a Pakistani acting as his courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Al-Kuwaiti had worked with Bin Laden in the planning of the 9/11 attacks and was his trusted emissary for carrying messages to the outside world. A Pakistani Pashtun tribesman who was born and raised in Kuwait and spoke fluent Arabic and Pashto, Al-Kuwaiti could move between two cultures easily. In 2010, the intelligence community traced him to Abbottabad and a three-story housing compound that seemed different from most other homes in the city. It was surrounded by an eighteen-foot-high wall topped with barbed wire, had no electronic signatures (phone or Internet), and seemed custom-built to hide someone. Privacy screens and interior walls obstructed vision into the compound from the outside. The children inside were home schooled, and the residents burned all of their garbage. Bin Laden had apparently moved into the house sometime in 2006, the facility having been customized for him in 2005. He was a recluse inside but not isolated from the world. Al-Kuwaiti brought him messages and letters from the outside, and Bin Laden dispatched his letters via his courier. After his death, the SEAL commandos scooped up scores of documents and computer files. In those were found correspondence from Bin Laden to his wives, children, and subordinates such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and others. He was very much in charge of his global terrorist empire and kept abreast of plots like the July 2005 London bombing. He was constantly pressing his lieutenants for more terror. Al-Qaeda practiced good tradecraft in concealing its leaders hideout for five years. But he could not hide in Abbottabad without some support network beyond al-Kuwaiti. Phone numbers found in the house by the SEAL team suggest that al-Kuwaiti was in touch with a Pakistani terrorist group. As reported by the New York Times in June 2011, al-Kuwaiti was apparently in contact with the Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen terror group, the same group he had collaborated with a decade before in

the millennium plot. It was created in the 1980s by ISI to fight India and has loyally worked with the Pakistani intelligence service for decades. Its leader is Fazlur Rehman Khalil, who lives openly in an Islamabad suburb. The most important mystery, of course, is what the Pakistani army and the ISI knew about Bin Ladens hideout. From the day the CIA became focused on Abbottabad, President Barack Obama decided that he could not trust the Pakistanis with information about the hideout. No Pakistani official was given any advance warning that the United States suspected Bin Laden was hiding in the Abbottabad complex or that Washington intended to send commandos to either capture or kill him. During months of surveillance of the compound and preparation for the SEAL operation, Pakistan was kept completely in the dark by Obama and his national-security team. It was an extraordinary decision. Since 2001, Pakistani leaders from General and later President Pervez Musharraf to todays President Ali Asif Zardari and the chief of army staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the real power in the country, had repeatedly promised to help America fight alQaeda. Now the American president correctly judged he could not trust them with vital information on the location of al-Qaedas top leader. Obamas decision spoke volumes about Americas real attitude toward its Pakistani partner. Abbottabad is not an ordinary city. Pakistans first military dictator, Field Marshall Ayub Khan, was born very close by. It is the home of the Kakul Military Academy, the Pakistani equivalent of West Point or Sandhurst. Some generals retire to its pleasant weather and surroundings. In short, from its founding during the Raj to today, it is a military city. From the moment the SEAL raid became public, Pakistanis have wondered what their army and intelligence services knew about Bin Ladens lair. One thing is certainno one believes President Zardari knew anything about Bin Ladens hideout. He is powerless and clueless about what the ISI is up to. Officially, the ISI says it too was clueless. Many Pakistanis find that hard to believe. Three days after the raid, an op-ed in the influential newspaper Dawn entitled The Emperors Clothes noted that there is a deep, deep sense of unease here. Pakistanis are asking did the army know he was there? They knew. They knew he was there (in Abbottabad). And they knew they could get away with it. But we dont really know. Perhaps the ISI really was ignorant of Bin Ladens whereabouts and negligent in looking for him. Maybe Musharraf and Kayani were just incompetent. They had been warned to look in Abbottabad. The Afghan intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, says he told Musharraf in 2006 in a meeting in Pakistan that Bin Laden was hiding in the area around Abbottabad. According to Saleh, in response to the news Musharraf banged the table and said am I president of a banana republic? How can you tell me Bin Laden is hiding in a settled area of Pakistan? The question of negligence or complicity about the armys role in Bin Ladens hideout is much more than academic. It has grave policy implications. If the army was clueless about finding where alQaedas leader was hiding for at least half a decade, then we can not rely on it to fight terror effectively. If the inner circle of al-Qaedas core, sometimes called al-Qaeda al-Umm, or mother alQaeda in Arabic, could outfox the ISI so easily, then Pakistani intelligence is a very weak partner. But if the army or parts of it were complicit in hiding Bin Laden for years, it suggests an astonishing degree of duplicity. A complicit army would have been al-Qaedas ally behind the scenes for years, maybe all the way back to 9/11. It would be the secret patron of global jihad on a scale almost too dangerous to conceive. We would need to rethink our entire relationship with Pakistan and our understanding of its strategic motives. If only a part of the army, an errant general perhaps, were complicit, it raises serious questions about the armys cohesion and internal loyalties. Who was the rogue, and who knew what he was up to? How many others are like him, perhaps guarding nuclear-weapons depots? For now, we dont know. The mystery of Abbottabad hangs like a black cloud over the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations. From that May night, the relationship has deteriorated quickly. American aid to Pakistan has been cut, clashes between NATO and Pakistani troops along the Afghan border have become deadly, the Zardari government is collapsing in a scandal called memogate that

revolves around the question of the armys complicity. Distrust on both sides is at an all time high. Al-Qaeda al-Umm has been devastated by Bin Ladens death and the drone war, but it is not yet defeated. If the pressure eases, it will grow back quickly. It still has many allies in Pakistan, including Harakat-ul-Mujahedin and others. The power of its allies in the army remains a mystery. Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. A career CIA officer, he has advised four presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues in the White House on the staff of the NSC. He is author of The Search for Al-Qaeda (Brookings Institution Press, 2008) and the forthcoming Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad (Brookings Institution Press, 2011) Taking a chapter from the 1980s playbook (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2011\12\31\story_31-12-2011_pg3_6) By Afrah Jamal | Daily Times Macaca 12-30-2011, 08:30 PM Murder Of Dr Shah Highlights The Insurgency In Pakistans Restive Balochistan Province (http://www.countercurrents.org/ghazali301211.htm) By Abdus Sattar Ghazali | Countercurrents In an apparent attempt to erase key forensic evidence in the Kharotabad, killing of five unarmed foreigners by Army led para-military force, Dr Baqir Shah was gunned down Thursday in Quetta, the capital of the strife-torn Balochistan province where a nationalist insurgency is underway. According to police, Dr Shah, a police surgeon, was on his way back from the hospital when the armed assailants opened fire on his vehicle. He passed away before reaching the hospital. On May 17, in Kharotabad, Quetta, five foreigners, including three women, approaching a paramilitary Frontier Corps check post were gunned down by the security personnel. An army Colonel also took part in the shooting of the unarmed foreigners. A video clip showing the Colonel shooting at the foreigners was uploaded at Youtube. As a police surgeon, Doctor Baqir Shah performed autopsy on the bodies of the five foreigners and determined that all died from bullet wounds, and found no trace of explosives on their bodies. He contradicted the police version that the five had died as a result of a grenade blast that they had themselves detonated. Tribunal Report In June 2001, the judicial tribunal on the Kharotabad incident found Col Faisal Shahzad of Frontier Corps, former Quetta police chief Daud Junejo and other FC and police personnel guilty of killing five foreigners and recommended legal action against them. The report said that FC and police exceeded their powers in taking action against the four Russian and one Tajik national. Videos presented before the tribunal showed that the foreigners had received terrorism training. But, the report said the five foreigners were unarmed, had no suicide jackets and had no plan to attack police and Frontier Corps when they were killed. They could have been arrested, the report said adding that the firing by security personnel was unjustified. The National Assemblys Standing Committee on Human Rights criticized in Oct 2011 the judicial report and the Chairman of the Committee, Riaz Fatyana, said that both Russian and Uzbek embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had cleared all those killed in the incident of having any links with any criminal or terrorist organization. Insurgency in Balochistan Dr Baqir Shahs assassination highlights the insurgency in Pakistans largest and restive province, Balochistan bordering Afghanistan and Iran. According to the Daily Times of Pakistan, the fifth military operation of our history is underway against the people of Balochistan but it seems that the rest of Pakistan remains oblivious to it. The

apathy of the government and the nation is something that has further alienated the Baloch from the Pakistani state. Thus a new wave of separatism has found resonance in Balochistan. The Daily Times pointed out that the Baloch insurgency started only to ask for their just rights but in order to quash their nationalism, the military under General Pervez Musharraf started using force. Even after the ouster of General Musharraf, the same policies are being carried out. The Baloch are only 3.57% of Pakistans 165.8 million people. Yet they identify themselves with ethnic homeland that cover 72% of Pakistans territory. Interestingly, most of Pakistans natural resources are in Balochistan, including natural gas, uranium, copper and potentially rich oil reserves. Although 36% of the gas produced in Pakistan comes from the province, Balochistan consumes only a fraction of production because it is the most impoverished area of the country. For decades, the central governments have denied Balochistan a fair share of development funds and paid only 12% of the royalties due to it for its gas. It is not surprising that an eminent Baloch nationalist leader, Sardar Ataullah Mengal said on Dec. 25 that the Pakistan Army has taken Balochistan to the point of no return. In 1972, Mengal became the first Chief Minister of Balochistan. However, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed his government on February 13, 1973, leading to a bloody insurgency and fanning anti-Pakistan feelings in Balochistan. In an exclusive interview with Dawn TV, Sardar Attaullah Mengal has said that the Baloch youth climbed on mountains for fighting and not for surrendering arms. He said that the Interior Minister Rehman Malik is always saying that the government would hold talks with those who would surrender arms before the government, adding that the Baloch people cannot surrender arms and honor before him. He said that he is unable to do anything to return the Baloch youth back from the mountains, adding that the only solution is to address the grievances of Baloch youth and return the missing Baloch people to their families. Sardar Attaullah Mengal said that the responsible should be punished so that the people saw them as punished, adding that instead of punishing them the government is showering flowers on them and telling the bereaved people to surrender. Kidnappings and Killings of Balochs According to the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC), during the first four months of 2011, as many 25 journalists, writers, human rights defenders, students, and political activists have been killed extra-judicially. 24 of the victims were arrested or abducted, disappeared and then killed. For example, prominent human rights defender and journalist, Mr. Siddique Eido and his friend, Mr. Yousaf Nazar Baloch, were allegedly arrested by the Frontier Corp and police on December 21, 2010. Their mutilated bodies were found on April 28, 2011 having been dumped next to the Makran coastal highway near Ormara, Balochistan province. The other victim, human rights defender Mr. Naeem Sabir Baloch, the district coordinator of Human Right Commission of Pakistan, was killed outside his house by unknown persons. He was working to compile a list of victims of forced disappearance, intended for the Supreme Court of Pakistan and High Court of Balochistan. The ALRC called on the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings should seek an opportunity to visit the region and to inquire into the matter. Local and international human rights organizations should demand immediate action from the government and the international community to deal with this extraordinary situation. In a comment on kidnappings and killings in Balochistan, Daily Times wrote on November 7, 2011: The entire nation should be ashamed of the brutalities unleashed by the military against its own people in Balochistan. Javed Naseer Rind, a young journalist, was abducted in September and his tortured, bullet-riddled body was found the other day in the province. More than a dozen Baloch, including women, were killed last week in less than 24 hours during a military campaign in Balochistan. US gives asylum to Baloch journalist

Tellingly, Siraj Ahmed Malik, a journalist from Balochistan was given political asylum by US in October 2011 on the plea that his life was threatened in Pakistan in view of abductions and killings in Baluchistan. On August 19, Malik, who is on a fellowship at the University of Arizona, applied for political asylum in the United States. In his petition, he said that his work as a journalist and ethnic activist in Balochistan, where he had exposed military abuses, made him likely to be arrested, tortured, abducted and ultimately killed by the government if he returned. The threat of disappearance was always lurking in the back of our minds, Malik wrote in his asylum petition. My friends, colleagues and I lived with the knowledge that yesterday it was him that disappeared; today it is someone else; tomorrow it could easily be me. According to his asylum file, agents accosted him in airports and hotels, detained and questioned him, and repeatedly threatened to teach me a lesson. Reporting about Maliks political asylum, Pamela Constable of Washington Post wrote: Activists including Malik assert that more than 5,000 Baloch have vanished in the past decade, but the issue has never been seriously addressed, while the government has both co-opted and persecuted Baloch tribal chiefs. In 2007, Pakistans military president fired the head of the Supreme Court, who sought to probe the disappearances. In 2008, a civilian government took office and an investigative commission was established, but little action has been taken. Abdus Sattar Ghazali is the Chief Editor of the Journal of America and Executive Editor of the online magazine American Muslim Perspective

Before its too late... (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\12\31\story_31-122011_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Pak editor Najam Sethi threatened by 'State and non-State actors' (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pak-editor-najam-sethi-threatened-by-state-and-non-stateactors/20111230.htm) By Rezaul H Laskar | Rediff 'Greater rights' abuses will ensue unless Pakistan's elected institutions assert themselves' (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111230&page=8) By Raza Rumi | The Friday Times The state within (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85072&Cat=9) By Babar Sattar | The News Whatever Lola wants (http://tribune.com.pk/story/314180/whatever-lola-wants/) By Amina Jilani | The Express Tribune Macaca 12-31-2011, 07:59 PM The closing of the Pakistani mind (http://tribune.com.pk/story/314556/the-closing-of-the-pakistanimind/) The Express Tribune Editorial The year 2011 must rank as one of the worst years in the nations life. It began with the killing of Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer and ended with the most internecine of politics to topple the incumbent government before its term in office via the memogate affair. This happened in the midst of an ominous national consensus which seems to have rallied behind the military against the United States, while all economic indicators presaged doom for 2012. Rage and excessive passion characterised the functioning of many key institutions, with the masses following their lead thanks to the dubious role played by a vastly expanding but increasingly cashstrapped media. Foreign affairs were most immoderately handled, with the army calling the shots and a divided community of politicians pushing each other to the point of no return. The Raymond Davis case was handled in a curiously unbalanced manner without regard to consequences, pledging qisas (hanging) but falling back on diyat (blood money). The year saw a new peak of the steadily gestated extremism in our collective national behaviour with the blasphemy law netting more innocent victims from among the minority communities. Moreover, the lawyers community, which everyone thought was tempered by the finer points of

law, exposed itself as an extremist fragment that actually encouraged criminal behaviour. What was most condemnable is that the nation bent to the command of the extremist because of fear while pretending to be pious and full of ghairat. The right-wing opposition embraced the violent worldview of the terrorists, thinking it went down well with the masses. The liberal was on the run, hiding his stripes lest he be the victim of the excessive passion of the conservative. The war against terrorism was decidedly not the war that Pakistan wanted to fight. Led by the army, the political lemmings decided to walk to the edge by calling the terrorists our own brothers. The result was that when Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, the nation minded the fact that he was killed some state-backed non-state actors actually observed namaz-i-janaza for him forgetting that he and his many local affiliates had killed innocent Pakistanis. You have to be a non-Pakistani to understand what was happening in June when the nation united and the politicians got together in an APC, led by the nose into what appeared to be Pakistans most isolationist phase. Pakistans relations with Isaf-Nato states plummeted and October saw what appears to be the endgame, not in Afghanistan, but Pakistan. When the state was expressing its willingness to fight the world and not the terrorists, and the people were forming a suicidal consensus, nothing was going right with the economy. The infrastructure wound down quickly, the railways gave up its ghost, the PIA started grounding its planes because of lack of funds, and the industrial sector was halted by the shortage of energy pushed by dwindling reserves of natural gas that Pakistan had been guzzling with no planning or the future. People living without electricity attacked public property to make the government heed their grievances. The only community that flourished were the terrorists that the politicians wanted to embrace and the military didnt want to take on because of its seeming obsession with the endgame in Afghanistan. The nations dumbing down became almost an epidemic, propagated in large part by the anchors of the TV channels. That said, a generally vibrant media was a welcome check and we can hope for relatively more mature comment in future. The increasing use of social media among many urban educated Pakistan is an added positive as well, since it is, to some extent, shaping public discourse. Furthermore, it has led to a more freeing of the rigid control of information exercised by the state. The year ended with mammoth political rallies organised after their leaders pushed the right buttons hate America, love the Taliban reinforcing the states isolationist trajectory. Yet with a new party emerging as a popular contender, the political scene was revitalised and many who had given up set aside their pessimism to take part in the new developments which will be played out 2012.

The year of fear (http://tribune.com.pk/story/314574/the-year-of-fear/) By Saroop Ijaz | The Express Tribune Bidding adieu to the dark shadows of 2011 (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\01\story_1-1-2012_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Another bad year? (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20111230&page=1) By Najam Sethi | The Friday Times Pakistan in 2011: The Downward Spiral Continued (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/saadkhan/pakistan-in-2011_b_1176027.html) By Saad Khan | Huffington Post Pakistanis cling to flawed democracy (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/pakistaniscling-to-flawed-democracy/article2287864/) By STEPHANIE NOLEN | The Globe and Mail One step forward (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/31/one-step-forward.html) By Abbas Nasir | Dawn Open spats The president returnsto a vipers nest partly of his own making (http://www.economist.com/node/21542216) The Economist A more complicated script (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/30/a-more-complicated-script.html) By Cyril Almeida | Dawn Macaca 12-31-2011, 08:06 PM

Why is the army so popular in Pakistan? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/314578/why-is-the-army-sopopular-in-pakistan-2/) By Aakar Patel | The Express Tribune With a population a seventh Indias size, with an economy a tenth Indias size, Pakistan maintains an army half Indias size. In September last year, the BBC reported the army telling the government it would need to spend an additional $1.28 billion. This money, Pakistan then informed the IMF, would come from a 50 per cent cut in the development budget and a 20 per cent cut in the non-development budget, the report had said. No nation can prosper by halving its development budget. But Pakistanis approve of this. Indeed, they are enthusiastic about it (if they think about it at all) given the armys popularity. Let us try and understand why. Indias national anthem was composed in December 1911, a century ago and 36 years before Partition. The anthem announces the geography of India. The first two regions we sing of are Punjab and Sindh. After Partition, of these two states, India got a third of one and nothing of the other. However, the anthems words do not seem out of place today. A Punjabi is Indias prime minister, and Sindh and the Indus are how India got its name. What is remarkable is that even in 1911, Balochistan and the Northwest frontier were not a part of the India of our imagination. The Pathan has always been a foreigner, even as a Bollywood character. At Partition, few Baloch Hindus were displaced and no Pashtun Hindus, because there were none. These two places were unaffected by Partition. The Partition of India on the west was actually only the partition of Punjab. Punjabis were savage with one another. Today, few Muslims remain in Indian Punjab, having been thrown out or killed, and almost no Sikhs and Hindus remain in Pakistani Punjab. So it was religious partitioning, but this is unimportant. The partition of Punjab was also a partition of its castes. This separation is its critical aspect and it defines the character of Pakistani Punjab. What had been a stable society in united Punjab became lighter on the side of the castes the Hindus dominated trade, commerce and heavier on the side of the peasant castes, which Muslims dominated. It is true that the largest component of all three Punjabi faiths Muslim, Sikh and Hindu was the peasantry and it was the dominant component of the British Indian army. However, the Hindu Punjabis had a very large mercantile population, comprising Khatris, Aroras and the Vaish (Baniyas). They were the creators of wealth and are today all in India. Two of these castes (Khatris and Aroras) were present in strong numbers in the Sikhs. Muslims had very few Khatris and no Baniyas. This is why Pakistani Punjab, though it contains over half of Pakistans population, does not dominate the countrys economy. The economy of Pakistan is commanded by one city in Sindh, Karachi. Over 50 per cent of all government revenue comes from Karachi. Despite the violence in Karachi, which is mainly of a secular nature, Sindh is more normal than Punjab. One reason for this is because it has a stable society. How? The Sindhi Hindus who left at Partition were replaced by two communities. One was the educated middle class of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the Mohajirs. The gap in the trading community created by the migration of Hindus was filled by Muslim Gujaratis of the Lohana caste Memon, Khoja and Vora. Quaid-e-Azam was also a Lohana, one of the most talented and prosperous trading castes of India. This is why Sindh is more normal than Punjab, despite the Mohajir-Pashtun skirmishes in Karachi. Because it is a stable society in terms of balance between those parts that are feudal and those parts that are mercantile. This balance is missing in Punjab. Pakistanis may feel offended at such reduction in their identity to what might be seen as a purely Hindu currency, caste. However, it is impossible to understand India without being aware of caste and I see no reason why this should not be true for the area that used to be India till 65 years ago. I would say that the Baloch are a nation, Pashtuns are a nation, Gujaratis are a nation, Tamilians

are a nation and Punjabis are a nation. But Punjabi Muslims are not a nation, only half a nation. How does this imbalance manifest itself in the way Punjab views the army? We shall explore that next week.

Countering terror in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php? issue=20111230&page=7) By Imtiaz Gul | The Friday Times Factors that hinder peace (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/30/factors-that-hinder-peace.html) By Khalid Aziz | Dawn Washed away by the tide of history (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\01\story_1-1-2012_pg3_2) By Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur | Daily Times Murdering the truth (http://tribune.com.pk/story/314570/murdering-the-truth/) The Express Tribune Editorial Dr Shah`s murder (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/31/dr-shahs-murder.html) Dawn Editorial Pindi where crime rules the streets (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/31/pindi-where-crime-rulesthe-streets.html) By Mohammad Asghar | Dawn 2011 saw 12 journalists killed in Pakistan (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/31/2011-saw-12journalists-killed-in-pakistan-2.html) By Ikram Junaidi | Dawn Macaca 12-31-2011, 08:18 PM US ups extremist fight in Pakistan (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_PAKISTAN_US_COUNTERING_EXTREMISM? SITE=OKTUL&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) By SEBASTIAN ABBOT | Associated Press Sultan Mehmood Gujar was a solid supporter of Islamist militants fighting in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India and even donated money to them, until he attended an innovative 40-day lecture series by a moderate cleric aimed at countering violent extremism. The course, given to the public at an Islamic school in a hotbed of militancy in Pakistan, had a profound effect on the 46-year-old property dealer, convincing him the militants were wrong to claim they were waging holy war, or jihad, justified by the Quran, the religion's holy book. "I was shocked to discover that what the militants were doing was against Islam," said Gujar, sitting on the floor at the madrasa in Okara city where the lectures were delivered. "Now I call them terrorists, not jihadis." Fazal ur Rehman, the cleric who runs the 400-student madrasa, recorded each of the 2-hour lectures he and others gave this past summer and would like to distribute the DVDs to reach a wider audience. But he lacks the money. The U.S. has created a new unit in Pakistan that aims to leverage such grassroots efforts by working with local moderates to counter violent extremism - the first of its kind set up by an American embassy anywhere in the world, according to U.S. officials here. The existence of the unit has never before been reported. Rehman and other clerics attempting to challenge extremism in Pakistan recently met with U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter in Islamabad, though the 50-year-old Rehman says he has not yet received support from the Americans. Okara has special significance because it is near the village of Ajmal Kasab, home of the only surviving gunman from the 2008 attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai that killed over 160 people. The U.S. chose Pakistan as the site for its new venture because it is home to a vast network of Islamist militants who have been fighting U.S.-led troops in neighboring Afghanistan for over a decade and have even organized attacks on American soil. The three-person unit in the U.S. Embassy public affairs section was established in July. It plans to work with local partners, including moderate religious leaders, to project their counter-extremist

messages and push back against the militants' extensive propaganda machine, said U.S. officials. It will use TV shows, documentaries, radio programs and posters. It also intends to ramp up exchange programs for religious leaders and public outreach to conservative Muslims who previously had little contact with American officials. "There are a lot of courageous voices speaking out against extremism here in Pakistan," said Tom Miller, head of public affairs at the U.S. Embassy. "Our job is to find out how we can amplify those narratives." The unit is just now ramping up operations, said officials. It was funded with an initial budget of $5 million that officials hope will grow. Officials declined to provide details on specific programs they are funding or plan to fund, for fear that publicly acknowledging U.S. involvement would discredit their partners. That's a major worry in this country where anti-American sentiment is rampant. Any cleric known to be taking U.S. help is likely to be shunned by many. There are other challenges as well. Many among clerics and the public who are considered moderates have mixed views - they often oppose the killing of innocent civilians in Pakistan, but support jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan or against neighboring India. Further complicating the situation is alleged Pakistani government support for some militant groups. Also, the militants are likely to strike back, as indicated by a recent trip the U.S. ambassador made to a madrasa in Faisalabad city to attend a meeting of moderate religious leaders who denounced suicide bombings and other forms of violence. Militants responded the next day by calling the Muslim cleric who hosted the event, Yasin Zafar, and warning he could be killed. The call was from a member of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, widely believed to be a front group for Lashkar-e-Taiba, an anti-India militant organization, said Zafar. "I was taunted for becoming a U.S. supporter," said Zafar. "I was told that I should be cautious because I may have provoked the Taliban." The ambassador's visit to the 900-student Jaamia Salafia was unusual because the madrasa teaches a puritanical strain of Islam followed by some Pakistani militant organizations, including Lashkar-eTaiba, although Zafar said he does not support the group. The meeting's participants railed against American drone strikes, which are very unpopular in Pakistan, said Zafar. The anger illustrated one of the difficulties for the U.S. in working with Muslim leaders who have the local networks to counter extremists. "They might disagree with how the U.S. is conducting some aspects of its foreign policy, but there is a huge opportunity to partner with these groups because of the mutual goal of stopping the Taliban," said Mehreen Farooq, who recently studied grassroots counter-extremism efforts in Pakistan for the U.S.-based World Organization for Resource Development and Education. The most intensive component of the new U.S. initiative will be a media campaign focused on raising awareness about civilians harmed by militant attacks, said Miller, the embassy public affairs chief. "We are trying to discredit these acts and take away the narrative that the militants are some kind of ideological heroes," said Miller. Surveys have shown that despite varying levels of support for militant groups within Pakistan, a majority of citizens oppose attacks that target civilians. Militants in Pakistan often deny responsibility for civilian casualties. The militants have an extensive propaganda network of newspapers, magazines and Internet videos - an effort that in some cases has been enabled by decades of support from the Pakistani government.

The government spent millions of dollars on a media campaign in 2009 trying to dent some of the support for militancy it had built up over the years. The successful initiative aimed to foster public backing for military operations against the Pakistani Taliban, a homegrown insurgent group seeking to topple the government and responsible for killing thousands in suicide attacks. But the campaign was careful not to single out groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba or the Afghan Taliban, which have received support from the government in the past and many believe still do, said a former government official who worked on counter-extremism programs. The program has since fizzled out, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. Islamic clerics who have met with the U.S. ambassador recently expressed hope they could steer Pakistanis away from militancy by explaining when holy war is justified. But they also disagreed on when that's the case. Zafar, the cleric who hosted the ambassador, said the insurgencies inside Pakistan and in the Indian-ruled part of Kashmir were unjustified. But he backs the Taliban's fight against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, a common sentiment inside Pakistan. "Afghanistan was invaded, and the Taliban are waging jihad to protect their homeland, their freedom and their rights, so I recognize that as jihad," said Zafar. Rehman, the cleric who conducted the 40 days of lectures, opposes the Afghan Taliban's fight but said he was powerless to compete with the extremists. "The militants have arms, are trained and have the resources to distribute their literature in bulk quantities," said Rehman. "We are very limited in our ability to distribute material to counter it."

2011: New low for US-Pakistan relations (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16369301) By Aleem Maqbool | BBC Pak-US ties see roller-coaster ride in 2011 (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/31/pak-us-ties-seeroller-coaster-ride-in-2011.html) By Shafek E Koreshe | Dawn CENTCOM Inquiry: Would It Heal Pakistani Wounds And Repair Damaged Relations? (http://www.eurasiareview.com/31122011-centcom-inquiry-would-it-heal-pakistani-wounds-andrepair-damaged-relations-analysis/) By Murad Khan | Eurasia Review Macaca 12-31-2011, 08:30 PM Indian subcontinent in world focus (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-yearend2011-the-year-2011-indian-subcontinent-in-world-focus/20111231.htm) By Anil Athale | Rediff The fading 2011 saw winding down of the war in Iraq. The situation is far from normal and there is a lingering doubt about the durability of the new regime, and anxieties (for Western powers) about the drift of the Shia dominated regime towards Iran. Yet the world headlines were indeed dominated by the happenings on the Western fringes of the Indian Subcontinent, ie the AfPak region. 'The Killing Fields' of AfPak were in news almost throughout the year. The year also began on a positive note for Indo-US relations as the euphoria generated by end of the year (2010) visit by President Obama generated much hope and hype. But despite these trends, the year 2011 will be remembered for two nonevents; Despite the armed clashes between the United States and Pakistan forces, the US-Pak alliance did not break. In spite of many high-level visits and lot of rhetoric, the Indo-US partnership failed to takeoff. It is nothing short of a political 'miracle' that the two belligerents remain formal allies. The miracle can only be understood in the backdrop of history and unstated 'interests' that keep them together.

The US-Pak alliance was always opportunistic; while the two allies shared the same bed, they both dreamt different dreams. In the Cold War era, the US needed bases to contain Communist Russia and China (till the Shanghai declaration of 1972 singed by Nixon and Chao En Lie). The US also needed the Pak army as its mercenary force in the Middle East, sort of boots on ground at discounted price. Pak milked the alliance to get arms and tech to neutralise ten times bigger India. Pakistan considers itself the heir to the Mughal Empire (that ruled over most of North and Central India) and its India centric approach reflects this myth. Anti-Indianism is embedded in its genes and genesis. Thus its using US (and now China) to balance India in military and nuclear field was logical. The inherent contradictions in this marriage of convenience came to fore forcefully in 2011. Post Zia an 'Islamised' Pak army is no longer the reliable mercenary force that the Americans wanted. The double game played in Afghanistan is a reflection of this reality as much as Pak's dream of having Afghanistan under its thumb as 'Strategic depth'. This author cannot resist the comment on absurdity of this proposition! You create depth by having an obstacle/buffer in front, not in the rear! The mood on the Pak streets is even worse, as the US has now replaced India as the prime 'hate' nation. Thus a democratic Pakistan would be an even bigger thorn for the Americans. The year began with the killing of three Pakistanis in Lahore by an American contractor Raymond Davis on January 28. The street protests in Pakistan, already in vogue since the sentencing for 86 years of an allegedly rouge scientist Ms Affia Sidiqa by American courts in the previous year. The near rupture in relations over this affair was avoided when after paying 'blood money' Davis was acquitted on October 3 and repatriated to the US. The contrast between Affia case and Davis affair was too stark for even the most docile Pakistanis to accept. Then on May 2, 2011, the American Navy Seals launched a successful raid near Pakistani Military Academy in Abbotabad and killed Osama Bin Laden. The Americans suffered their biggest setback in the ten-year war in Afghanistan when on August 6, 2011, allegedly Taliban shot down two American helicopters killing amongst others 22 Navy Seal Commandos of Team 6 that had raided Abbotabad earlier. Though the Americans have not publicised the event, one can only surmise that it was a 'revenge' attack for killing of OBL in May. Worse was to follow when on 26/11 (anniversary of Mumbai attack) NATO forces attacked a Pakistani post on the Afghan border with helicopter gunships for over two hours and killed 28 Pakistan soldiers. As an aside, even in the worst days of Indo-US tensions in 1971, Indian and American soldiers never came to face each other -- though during an Indian attack on Shakkargarh town an American Brigadier escaped being captured by the Indians in the nick of time. It is indeed the strangest military alliance where the allies seem to regularly kill each other's soldiers. What then explains this strange alliance? It seems that the glue that binds US-Pak in an alliance is the abiding American interest in Saudi Arabia and its oil. The Saudis on the other hand see the Pakistan army as its last resort if faced with its own people (especially, Shia citizens) and an 'Arab Spring' like street uprising. Iran and its nuclear ambition make the Saudi even more nervous than Israel. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, built with Saudi funding, is seen as a hedge against that threat. Thus, today it seems that it is Saudi Arabian interest and influence in Pakistan that constrains Americans in breaking with Pakistan. Will modern American arms continue to flow to Pakistan, either directly or through oil-rich Arabs, is a million dollar question that has no easy answers. Till such time as this complicated relationship remains intact, Indo-US partnership will continue to face difficulties. On December 16 this year, incidentally, the 40th anniversary of India's victory in the Bangladesh war, this author attended a talk by US Deputy Secretary of State, William J Burns at Pune. The American diplomat waxed eloquent on the emerging Indo-US relationship in an 'Asia Pacific Century'

and felt that the relationship had crossed a major threshold. Careful to stress that this was not for containment of China, the deputy secretary left it unsaid that it was all the same important to 'balance' China. But here again both the countries have to face major contradictions in interests in the Middle East. While in the Asia Pacific, the Indo-US interests indeed do converge, that is not the case in the Middle East. There are major differences between the two on Iran and Palestinian issue as well as continued building up of Pakistan military by the US. This author pointed out that during the last 20 years of interaction with the US, one has been pointing out this problem. The American view has been institutionalised by the fact that the boundaries of American Centcom and Pacific Command areas of responsibility lie along the Indo-Pak border. Thus while the US deals with India as an Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean power, it deals with Pakistan and countries to the West as part of Middle East. When pointed out that this contradiction has existed for the last 60 years and complicates the IndoUS partnership, the diplomat chose to brazen it out. More than even the nuclear issue, where the progress has been very slow, this fundamental divergence has kept the Indo-US relations from progressing further. In the coming year as US disengages from Afghanistan, this friction may reduce, but will never go away. These longstanding geo-political contradictions explain the nonevent of Indo-US partnership remaining still a 'work in progress' in 2011.

Three Formidable Barriers to the Advance of Democracy (http://kafila.org/2012/01/01/globalcapital-compliant-nation-states-and-totalitarian-communities-three-formidable-barriers-to-theadvance-of-democracy-by-ravi-sinha/) By Ravi Sinha | Kafila In 2 yrs, Aman Ki Asha has become a peace concept (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/In-2yrs-Aman-Ki-Asha-has-become-a-peace-concept/articleshow/11321700.cms) Times of India Pakistan violates ceasefire, BSF jawan injured in firing (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-violates-ceasefire-BSF-jawan-injured-infiring/articleshow/11315236.cms) PTI Macaca 12-31-2011, 08:45 PM Year that was, year that is (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/World/Year-that-was-yearthat-is/Article1-789610.aspx) Hindustan Times In some of the parts of the world that matter most to India, what happened last year and what to watch for in the coming one. PAKISTAN RECAP Military chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had a nice thing going in Pakistan when 2011 began. He had the civilian leadership and Washington jumping to his remote control. Then Abbottabad happened and it all fell apart. His army brethren and the Pakistani public all turned on him. The raid and the later Memogate scandal soured relations with President Asif Ali Zardari. Kayani struck back. He allowed the US policy to unravel. The ISIs defunct political wing was revived to push Imran Khan on to the political stage. Journalist Salim Shehzad was murdered. By the end of the year, Zardari was in the crosshairs. WATCHLIST 2012 ZARDARI: The embattled president will be at the centre of continued tensions between the judiciary, the military and the executive. The Zardari and Kayani relationship is now one of mistrust. However, the army would still prefer not to rule directly so they need to either bring Zardari to heel or replace him. AFPAK: The US will withdraw troops from Afghanistan through the year. It will also withdraw funding from Pakistan. But it will still bomb tribal areas at will. A new equilibrium is needed but its

hard to say what it will be if the US says it will bomb but not pay. And lets not forget the Taliban negotiations. ECONOMY: Pakistani half-joke that its a race now between their polity and their economy as to which will break first. The Pakistani governments revenue deficit is completely out of control. Nearly half the debt is financed by worthless bonds that Islamabad sells to itself. Islamabad hopes for a foreign bailout. The US wont. Saudi Arabia and China dont want to. Whatever he is, he is not a diplomat, he is not a liar. Pakistani attending an Imran Khan rally. Person to Watch: Asif Ali Zardari Nepal RECAP Nepal is arguably the most difficult of Indias small neighbours. Suspicions regarding New Delhi are the strongest here and Kathmandus government is the weakest. This past year saw three governments in Nepal and a continuing deadlock between India and the Maoists over how to merge army and guerrilla force. The Constituent Assembly had to be given another lease of life. These have all been part of the Indo-Nepal story for the past several years. The difference this time has been the developments of the past four months under the prime ministership of Baburam Bhattarai. The year ended with a resolution to the military-Maoist problem, opening the door to a 2012 turning point. The momentum may continue. WATCHLIST 2012 YEAR OF NEPAL: India has been reaching out to bury the hatchet and exchange vows with all its small neighbours. Last year was all about Bangladesh and, if not for Mamata Banerjees interference, that would have been in the bag by now. India has never had as good a relationship as it has with Sri Lanka today. Stabilising the polity of Nepal, however, would add hugely to Indias security. Especially if this went along with a settlement of the long list of bilateral disputes. Most importantly would be a change in the overall tenor of relations between the two countries. MAOIST HOLD: Bhattarais overtures to India has already earned him criticism from hardliners within Maoist ranks. He is helped by the fact that co-leader Prachanda takes the same line. But lower rank grumblings of surrender by the high-command could yet tip the apple-cart for India. And this doesnt even tough the factionalism that afflicts all the other five political formations in Nepal. CONSTITUTION: After four extensions, no one is hopeful about Nepal completing its charter by the end of May. But keep in mind that its largely done except for clauses on the formation of states and forms of governance. These are big, but not insurmountable. I have been given a timeframe of the end of November to complete the peace process and make the first draft of the constitution. I will do my best to meet that target. If I fail in that then I wont like to continue in this position. Baburam Bhattarai Person to Watch: Baburam Bhattarai United states RECAP President Barack Obama rounded off a grim year with a small but symbolic legislative victory over his Republican opponents. Hes had a tough 2011: the lowest ratings for an incumbent president, stubborn jobless rates and a gridlocked Congress. His inability to stop the US from losing its AAA credit rating encapsulated a year of little accomplishment.

His saving grace: his opponents are in worse shape. The Republican presidential candidate race has seen a new face top the polls every few months. Michelle Bachman, Rick Perry, Herman Cain have each had 15 minutes of fame and not much more than that. WATCHLIST 2012 IRAN: The USs number one foreign policy question will be what to do about the Shia powers nuclear weapon ambition. If it fails to stop Tehran, diplomatically or otherwise, the US will hand the Persian Gulf to Iran. Iran will be the regions sole nuclear power and have Iraq under its wing. The Arab states are watching. Should they seek nukes themselves? Or come to terms with Iran? RACE: The US will be a superpower in its quadrennial hibernation as it seeks to choose its next president. Obama should limp through if the Republicans continue to self-destruct. But his margin of victory is small. A small thing could spoil it all for him. Which is why hell be President Cautious through the year. CHINDIA: The Obamaites are over their infatuation with China. They are also over the idea India is ready to swoon into their arms. It helped that the Manmohan Singh government was shown to be as paralysed as the Obama administration. But Washington is likely to be tougher with China and more realistic about India, partly because presidential polls mandate that it will. Most people want to see India and the US in an American kind of marriage always holding hands, demonstrably kissing and being in love. Its not like that in an Indian marriage when both partners quietly go about their business without making much of the relationship. - Indian diplomat on the bilateral relationship Person to Watch: Barack Obama China RECAP: This should have been Chinas moment. The West on its knees. India nowhere on the scene. The Europeans begging for a few billion yuan. But Beijing behaved anything like a superpower in the making this past year. On the foreign policy side, it struggled to repair relations with almost all of its neighbours. It may have restrained itself with India and Japan, but it still sought to browbeat Vietnam and the Philippines. On the domestic side, Beijing began seeing democrats under the bed. The Arab spring triggered the worst anti-dissident crackdown in China since 1989. Ai Weiwei, incandescent Tibetan monks and restrictions on the sale of jasmine flowers were what mattered most in Beijings list of priorities. WATCHLIST 2012 SUCCESSION: It is now clear that Xi Jinping will replace Hu Jintao as party general-secretary in 2013 and Li Keqiang will succeed Wen Jiabao as premier. Xi should began opening his wings through 2012, visiting countries China rates as important. What is not yet certain is who will hold seats three to 12 in the new Beijing setup. Only then will it be clear who Xi will have to cut deals with. SLOWDOWN: China has been trying to slow its economy for some time. This coming years growth will fall below 10 per cent for the first time in a decade. But Beijing may not be so happy.that this has happened. If Europe tanks, it will lose its largest export market. If the US follows, it will lose its second-largest market. The Chinese response in the past has been to open up its coffers and build mountains of infrastructure and houses. It would prefer not to do so again as this would delay the structural reforms it wants to carry out. SOFT-SPEECH: After a few years of unpredictable foreign policy that has cost China dearly in the Asian region, Xi will have an opportunity to show that these were all just flashes in a pan. China claims to be a different kind of power, that it doesnt seek hegemony or empire. Its actions,

however, have been anything but. Next year will allow the Middle Kingdom to show a more middling foreign policy face. We do not want a blood-stained GDP Peoples Daily Person to Watch: Xi Jinping Ideas and solutions (http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/31/ideas-and-solutions.html) By A.G. Noorani | Dawn Elephant World Cup: Nepal's festival to lure back tourists (http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/elephant-world-cup-nepals-festival-to-lureback-tourists) By Stephen Nelmes | The National Macaca 12-31-2011, 08:50 PM Sri Lankas Ghosts of War (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/sri-lankas-ghosts-ofwar.html) By NAMINI WIJEDASA | The New York Times THE Sri Lankan governments defeat of the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2009 ended a three-decade war that took tens of thousands of lives. But only now is the government beginning to acknowledge its huge human cost. Two weeks ago, a government-appointed reconciliation commission released a long-awaited report, giving voice to the wars civilian victims for the first time. From August 2010 to January 2011, hundreds of people appeared before the commission in tears, begging for news of their loved ones, many of whom had last been seen in the custody of security forces. A doctor spoke of how they managed to survive under deplorable conditions in places littered with dead bodies and carcasses of dying animals. In October, I visited a rural school just 6 miles from Mullivaikkal, on the northeast coast of the island, where the army finally crushed the Tigers an area still off-limits to civilians. The government says there are too many land mines to allow resettlement; critics say there are too many bodies in mass graves. The classroom had a new roof, but more than two years after the war ended, its walls were still pockmarked with shrapnel, a window was shattered and the floor was cracked. Most students uniforms were discolored; many wore flip-flops and carried tattered bags. A 7-year-old with a deep scar across his back stared at me. A shell had landed while his family slept and his sister was killed, he told me in a thin voice. One child after another spoke of injuries and deaths caused by shelling; of lingering wounds; of forced conscription by the Tigers; of poor widowed mothers; and of family members missing after being taken into state custody. Since Sri Lankas independence from Britain in 1948, members of the islands Tamil minority have insisted that they face linguistic, educational and employment discrimination from the Sinhalese majority, which controls the government. The Tigers a sophisticated, well-financed guerilla group that formed in 1976 and pioneered the technique of suicide bombing sought to redress their grievances by violent means, with the goal of establishing an independent Tamil state. They routinely recruited child soldiers, killed Tamil dissenters and massacred Sinhalese and Muslims. In 1991, the group went so far as to assassinate the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, for having sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka in 1987 to enforce a peace accord. The Tigers held out against the Sri Lankan military until they were decisively defeated in May 2009. Some journalists called Sri Lankas final battle with the Tigers a war without witnesses. Aid workers were asked to withdraw from the conflict zone months before the government defeated the Tigers. Only handpicked reporters, mostly from state media, were allowed to embed with troops. Those journalists knew what they must not write, for fear of losing access. The others relied on organized tours that were meticulously choreographed by the army producing sanitized war coverage with the gory bits tucked away. As a result, there was no outside scrutiny of the controversial war.

But that did not mean there were no witnesses. As the army attacked, hundreds of thousands of civilians were trapped in between. They were the Tigers human shield, and a source for forced conscripts, including children. They were also witnesses. More than 950 people testified before the commission and nearly 5,000 submitted written statements. Survivors spoke of displacement, incessant shelling and morbid fear. The commissions report depicts a country where the rule of law is crumbling and where abductions, enforced or involuntary disappearances, protracted detention without charge and attacks on journalists continue. It proposes depoliticizing the police, disarming illegal armed groups and allowing a more independent media. While the commission makes sensible recommendations and exposes grave atrocities committed by the Tigers against ordinary people, it also demonstrates that government troops shelled no-fire zones in order to neutralize rebel attacks from within. The report is a valuable document, but regarding the wars terrible final weeks, it is largely an apologia for the army. The commission admits only that civilian casualties had in fact occurred in the course of cross-fire, and blames the Tigers for most of them. The commission asserts that the government was confronted with an unprecedented situation a massive human shield that left it no other choice but to respond as it did. However, on three separate occasions the government declared no-fire zones, giving the illusion of safety to hundreds of thousands of terrified civilians who fled into them. The rebels also went in, set up their heavy weapons among innocent men, women and children and proceeded to attack the military with gusto. The army retaliated and large numbers of civilians were killed. Sri Lankans no longer need to pretend that the army didnt shell zones where civilians were encouraged to gather, or subscribe to the fantasy that no innocents died when shells landed on or near hospitals. If Sri Lanka wants true reconciliation, simply blaming the Tigers is not enough. The government, and the country, must take responsibility for the dead, mend the lives of the survivors whatever their ethnicity and stop the vicious cycle of ethnic strife by arriving at a political solution that meets, if not all aspirations, most of them. Until then, the end of the war will not bring true peace.

Making LLRC Report Meaningful (http://southasiaanalysis.org/notes7/note641.html) By R. Hariharan | South Asia Analysis Group The Tamil diaspora does not want peace (http://www.asianage.com/interview-week/tamildiaspora-does-not-want-peace-173) By Mahinda Rajapakse | Asian Age Sri Lanka: Attempts to Join ASEAN- Fresh Insights (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4830.html) By V. Suryanarayan | South Asia Analysis Group For Lanka, India comes first (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/%E2%80%98lanka-india-comes-first%E2%80%99-913) By Mahinda Rajapaksa | Deccan Chronicle Macaca 12-31-2011, 08:56 PM India unprepared for urban transition (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/india-unprepared-forurban-transition/2011/12/20/gIQALA5aQP_story.html) By Rama Lakshmi | The Washington Post Mahatma Gandhi once said that India lives in its villages an adage that defined political and economic decisions for decades. In more recent years, policymakers shifted some of their focus to huge urban areas, as the economy boomed and cities swelled. But overlooked by planning officials and investors, analysts say, are hundreds of villages that have grown so quickly and changed so dramatically that they are hard to define. Researchers call them the missing middle, and they include places such as Kotwali, 120 miles north of New Delhi. A decade ago, most villagers here were farmers. Today, Kotwali is home to 12,000 people, less than 12 percent of them farmers. Among the sugar cane fields and dairy farms are new banks and

computer schools. Colorful concrete homes have replaced mud huts. Residents walk along welllighted paths. But Kotwali is still listed as a village in government records, and it is governed by a village council, or panchayat. Residents lack indoor plumbing, and electricity is available only six hours a day. There are no hospitals. Big investment befitting a town will come when the government stops calling us a village, said Ishtiyaq Mohammad Ansari, 42, a former village chief. We will have modern civic amenities like roads, electricity, water. The next natural step will be jobs for our unemployed youth. Young people say they need new opportunities because farm work is vanishing. We want sugar mills and factories to come here, said Mohammad Alam, 22, an undergraduate whose father switched from farming to watch repair. Kotwali is among 2,532 villages that the most recent census determined had lost their villagelike character in the past decade, the biggest such shift in the past century. But the federal and state governments continue to categorize them as villages and treat them as such for budget and planning purposes. With such transformation underway, analysts warn that policymakers must prepare as peoples ambitions change and they begin to demand modern amenities. Our policymakers are missing the middle, where about 300 million people live, said Aromar Revi, head of the Indian Institute for Human Settlements, which trains Indians in urban planning. They are rural in their lifestyle and access to services and markets, but urban in their aspiration. There is a massive under-investment of public resources in these large villages and small towns. Residents of Kotwali are already worried that their new alleys may need repairs in three years, which the village council might not be able to afford. If we become a town, the budget for road repair will get approved automatically and instantly, Ansari said. As a village, there is no guarantee that the money will ever come. At a recent conference in New Delhi, officials discussed the challenge of planning for these villages, which could alter the way India is governed and investment is directed in coming years. Should we think of urbanization as a set of pre-identified areas? Or think of it as a process? Our notion of urban planning needs to change, Pronab Sen, principal adviser to the governments planning commission, said at the conference. He talked about the challenge of converting villages from councils to the complex structure of urban taxes and municipal administration. No panchayat is capable of building roads, sewers or supplying electricity for these areas. Scholars say the changing villages reflect Indias unique urbanization pattern. Villagers here are not migrating to big cities, as they do in many Western and Asian nations. Instead, people are moving to nearby boomtowns, and some villages are becoming small towns. People are getting out of agriculture and not finding manufacturing jobs yet. Where will they go, what will they do? asked Amitabh Kundu, a professor of economics and dean of the School of Social Sciences at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Unless we provide jobs for the educated youth nearer their villages, we are going to have social unrest on our hands. Some scholars say India must disperse its development instead of concentrating investment in overcrowded, polluted big cities. India is where America was in the late 19th century in terms of urban transition. But we now have the opportunity to invest differently, Revi said. The 21st-century technologies like cellphones, broad-band Internet and renewable energy can help us plan for decentralized urban growth without moving big numbers to the big cities. Not everyone welcomes the transition. Fatehpur Beri, a large village that hugs the sprawling southern tip of New Delhi, was designated as a town in the census this year. But many residents

say they do not like their new status and fear the economic and cultural change that might follow. If we become a town, then we will have to pay taxes for our house, land and even for our buffaloes. Right now, we drink fresh milk every day. If we become urban, we will have to drink milk from packets, said Prakash Pradhan, 71, a farmer whose son has a government job. We will lose our intimate culture. In the cities, neighbors dont even make eye contact. I was born in a village. I want to die in a village.

How business can restore growth (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/tarun-das-howbusiness-can-restore-growth/460326/) By Tarun Das | Business Standard India courts food insecurity (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85070&Cat=9) By Praful Bidwai | The News India in the year gone by (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-yearend-2011recap-2011-india-in-the-year-gone-by/20111231.htm) Rediff We moved ahead despite the odds (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/wemoved-ahead-despite-odds-884) Deccan Chronicle Editorial A wasted year (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-wasted-year/894281/) By Tavleen Singh | Indian Express India 2011: The Year Gone By (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/india-2011-the-yeargone-by/) India Ink Top 10 India stories of 2011 (http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2011/12/30/editors-choice-top-10india-stories-of-2011/) Reuters Best of India 2011 (http://in.reuters.com/news/pictures/slideshow?articleId=INRTR2URUA#a) Reuters Oddly India (http://in.reuters.com/news/pictures/slideshow?articleId=INRTR29SA5#a=1) Reuters Macaca 12-31-2011, 09:02 PM Many of Indias Poor Turn to Private Schools (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/world/asia/forindias-poor-private-schools-help-fill-a-growing-demand.html) By VIKAS BAJAJ and JIM YARDLEY | The New York Times For more than two decades, M. A. Hakeem has arguably done the job of the Indian government. His private Holy Town High School has educated thousands of poor students, squeezing them into cramped classrooms where, when the electricity goes out, the children simply learn in the dark. Parents in Holy Towns low-income, predominantly Muslim neighborhood do not mind the barebones conditions. They like the modest tuition (as low as $2 per month), the English-language curriculum and the success rate on standardized tests. Indeed, low-cost schools like Holy Town are part of an ad hoc network that now dominates education in this south Indian city, where an estimated two-thirds of all students attend private institutions. The responsibility that the government should shoulder, Mr. Hakeem said with both pride and contempt, we are shouldering it. In India, the choice to live outside the faltering grid of government services is usually reserved for the rich or middle class, who can afford private housing compounds, private hospitals and private schools. But as Indias economy has expanded during the past two decades, an increasing number of Indias poor parents are now scraping together money to send their children to low-cost private schools in hopes of helping them escape poverty. Nationally, a large majority of students still attend government schools, but the expansion of private institutions has created parallel educational systems systems that are now colliding. Faced with sharp criticism of the woeful state of government schools, Indian policy makers have enacted a sweeping law intended to reverse their decline. But skeptics say the litany of new requirements could also wipe out many of the private schools now educating millions of students. Its impossible to fulfill all these things, said Mohammed Anwar, who runs a chain of private schools in Hyderabad and is trying to organize a nationwide lobbying campaign to alter the

requirements. Referring to the law, he said, If you follow the Right to Education, nobody can run a school. Education is one of Indias most pressing challenges. Half of Indias 1.2 billion people are 25 or younger, and literacy levels, while improving, could cripple the countrys long-term prospects. In many states, government education is in severe disarray, with teachers often failing to show up. Rote drilling still predominates. English, considered a prerequisite for most white-collar employment in India, is usually not the medium of instruction. When it took effect in April 2010, the Right to Education Act enshrined, for the first time, a constitutional right to schooling, promising that every child from 6 to 14 would be provided with it. For a nation that had never properly financed education for the masses, the law was a major milestone. If we nurture our children and young people with the right education, said Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, commemorating the act with a televised address, Indias future as a strong and prosperous country is secure. Few disagree with the laws broad, egalitarian goals or that government schools need a fundamental overhaul. But the law also enacted new regulations on teacher-student ratios, classroom size and parental involvement in school administration that are being applied to government and private schools. The result is a clash between an ideal and the reality on the ground, with a deadline: Any school that fails to comply by 2013 could be closed. Kapil Sibal, the government minister overseeing Indian education, has scoffed at claims that the law will cause mass closings of private schools. Yet in Hyderabad, education officials are preparing for exactly that outcome. They are constructing new buildings and expanding old ones, partly to comply with the new regulations, partly anticipating that students will be forced to return from closing private institutions. Fifty percent will be closed down as per the Right to Education Act, predicted E. Bala Kasaiah, a top education official in Hyderabad. As a boy, M. A. Hakeem listened as his father bemoaned the slow progress of his fellow Muslims in India. Son, he recalls his fathers saying, when you grow up, you should provide education to our community. A few months after Mr. Hakeem completed the 10th grade, his father died. A year later, in 1986, Mr. Hakeem opened a small preparatory school with nursery classes. He was 15 years old. Not yet old enough to vote, Mr. Hakeem held classes in his familys home and enlisted his two sisters to handle administrative tasks. By the mid-1990s, Mr. Hakeem had opened Holy Town. The school has since produced students who have gone into engineering, commerce and other fields. Im fulfilling my fathers dream, Mr. Hakeem said. When Holy Town opened, Mr. Hakeems neighborhood at the edge of the old quarter of Hyderabad had one private school, a Catholic one. Today, there are seven private schools within a half-mile of Holy Town, each charging a few dollars a month and catering to Muslim students with a largely secular education in English. Their emergence roughly coincided with the economic liberalization that began in 1991. For decades, government officials had blamed rural apathy for Indias high illiteracy rates, saying that families preferred sending their children into the fields, not the classroom. But as the economy started taking off, public aspirations changed, especially among low-income families. In India today, demand is not really a constraint for education its the supply, said Karthik Muralidharan, an assistant professor at the University of California, San Diego, who has studied Indian education. Parents are seeing education as the passport out of poverty. The rising demand created a new market for private schools, and entrepreneurs big and small have jumped at the chance to profit from it. Corporate educational chains opened schools tailored to

higher-income families, especially in the expanding cities. Low-cost schools like Holy Town proliferated in poorer neighborhoods, a trend evident in most major cities and spreading into rural India. Estimating the precise enrollment of private schools is tricky. Government officials say more than 90 percent of all primary schools are run by or financed by the government. Yet one government survey found that 30 percent of the 187 million students in grades 1 through 8 now attend private schools. Some academic studies have suggested that more than half of all urban students now attend private academies. In Mumbai, so many parents have pulled their children out of government schools that officials have started renting empty classrooms to charities and labor unions and even to private schools. In recent years, Indian officials have increased spending on government education, dedicating far more money for new schools, hiring teachers and providing free lunches to students. Still, more and more parents are choosing to go private. What does it say about the quality of your product that you cant even give it away for free? Mr. Muralidharan said. Most low-cost private schools also follow rote-teaching methods because their students have to take standardized tests approved by the government. But some studies suggest that teachers in government schools are absent up to 25 percent of the time. Poor children who attended private schools scored higher on reading and math tests, according to a study by Sonalde Desai, a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, and other scholars. There is not much teaching that happens in the government schools, said Raju Bhosla, 32, whose children attend one of Hyderabads low-cost private schools. I never even thought about putting my kids in government schools. Across Hyderabad, work crews in 58 locations are expanding government schools or constructing new ones. To education officials, the building spree signals a rebirth of the government system, part of an $800 million statewide program to bring government schools into compliance with the new law. For Mr. Sibal, the national education minister, government schools had atrophied because of a lack of money. Under Right to Education, states can qualify for more than $2 billion to improve facilities, hire new teachers and improve curriculums, he said. All these changes are going to transform the schools system in the next five years, Mr. Sibal predicted. As for the tens of thousands of private schools opened during the past 15 years to satisfy the publics growing hunger for education, Mr. Sibal said, Weve given them three years time, referring to the 2013 compliance deadline. We hope that is enough. Macaca 12-31-2011, 09:04 PM Skepticism abounds. Elite private schools, already struggling with requirements that they reserve slots for poor and minority students, have filed lawsuits. But the bigger question is what will happen to the tens of thousands of low-cost private schools already serving the poor. James Tooley, a British scholar who has studied private education in India, said government statistics grossly underestimate private schooling partly because so many private institutions are not formally registered. In a recent survey of the eastern city of Patna, Mr. Tooley found 1,224 private schools, even though government records listed only about 40. In Hyderabad, principals at several private schools said inspectors regularly threatened them with closings unless they paid bribes. Now, the principals say, the inspectors are wielding the threat of the Right to Education requirements and seeking even bigger bribes. Mr. Anwar, the private school entrepreneur trying to organize a lobbying campaign, estimated that roughly 5,000 private schools operated in Hyderabad. Can the government close 5,000 schools? he asked. If they close, how can the government accommodate all these students?

It is selfish to have a surrogate baby (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/31/designer-babies-selfish) By Julie Bindel | The Guardian Dire Need For Doctors As POSCO Stir Intensifies (http://www.countercurrents.org/nf311211.htm) By Newzfirst | Countercurrents Year Of Governments Contempt Towards Parliament, CAG, Environment And Health (http://www.countercurrents.org/twa311211.htm) By Toxic Watch Alliance | Countercurrents Tihar Jails New Years Resolution: 100% Literacy (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/31/tihar-jails-new-years-resolution-100-literacy/) By Preetika Rana | IndiaRealTime Pow, Right in the Fritter Warning: Vada pav, the Mumbai roadside staple, is super spicy and likely to induce cravings (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204879004577111220920814462.html) By ROB MIFSUD | Wall Street Journal Macaca 12-31-2011, 09:07 PM At School in a Mumbai Mill, Igniting a Desire to Learn (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/at-school-in-a-mumbai-mill-igniting-a-desire-tolearn/) By NEHA THIRANI | India Ink Jyoti Gupta, age 8, had never been inside a classroom when she started at the Sitaram Mill Compound Mumbai Public School this past June. When she started, she was a very naughty and unresponsive child, her teachers say. She routinely disobeyed teachers and ignored homework assignments. After six months of regularly attending the school, however, Jyoti has learned how to read and write basic English words and is now one of the brightest and most motivated students in her class, they say. The Sitaram school, located in Mumbais Lower Parel neighborhood, is one of the nine schools adopted by the non-profit organization Akanksha in partnership with governments in Mumbai and Pune. While official statistics say 96 percent of primary school age children in India are enrolled in school, the quality of education in government schools remains dismal. Teachers are absent about 25 percent of the time and about half of students drop out between the first and fifth grades. As a result, many parents during the past decade have sought out low-fee private schools, as Jim Yardley and Vikas Bajaj report in a story in Saturdays paper. About 40 percent of children in Mumbai attend private schools, according to one report. Akankshas project started in 2008. Akankshas founder, Shaheen Mistry, who now heads Teach For India, wanted to work in government schools to facilitate education reform on a larger scale. Akanksha is not alone in working with government schools in Mumbai the citys public school system lists 117 non-profit partners. The Sitaram school is located in a crumbling mill compound in central Mumbai. Bellissimo, a towering luxury apartment complex, casts a large shadow on the mill, which shut down more than three decades ago. Inside the classrooms, the air is periodically punctuated by the sounds of commuter trains passing on the railway tracks that run next to the school. The street leading up to the school is lined with shanties where a community of itinerant settlers from Bihar, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh has settled during the past five years. Some of the children from that community play on the street while their parents pick rags, clean apartments or work on construction sites. The school building houses a host of other organizations: a Marathi medium public school, an office for the city government, a voting card center, an office for the Unique Identification Authority of India, a library set up by another non-profit, Room to Read, and vocational classes run by the municipal corporation. On the second floor, kindergarten children stand together in a circle, clapping while learning how to enunciate different words. The teachers lead them in phonic exercises as they chant di-no-saurrr.

The ceiling is crisscrossed with strings of paper cut-outs with childrens drawings scrawled across them. In the corner, a line of school bags is dotted with Disneys Hannah Montana character. The wall is covered with letters of the alphabet, numbers and various art projects. At recess, an English accent rings out a recorded cassette of nursery rhymes as the children open their tiffin boxes to reveal an assortment of snacks. The proudest of the lot is Maggie who has an Indian equivalent of Ramen noodles though she sheepishly agrees with the teacher that it isnt the healthiest choice. While students in higher grades receive a government provided mid-day meal, kindergarten children do not qualify. The children come from poor nearby neighborhoods such as Dhobhi Ghaat, Saat Rasta and Ambedkar Nagar. Parents recruited Akanksha to run this school and lobbied the city government on its behalf because they wanted their children to be taught in English. In many of the families, the children are the first generation to receive a formal education, says Mandira Purohit, the schools principal. We hold parent classes every Thursday to teach the parents what their kids are learning so that they can help them with their homework. The parents of the community are very proactive and even volunteer in the school as helpers for Akanksha teachers. Started just six months ago, the school now has three classes, six teachers and a principal with a total of 76 children in the three classes. Akankshas teachers plan to keep adding classes as the kids grow older, eventually taking them to the 10th grade. Many of the teachers never intended to become teachers, but found that they had a passion for teaching through volunteering. We believe in teaching through songs, games, art experiential learning we dont teach by rote, said Ms. Purohit, who joined Akanksha as a volunteer eight years ago. Down the corridor, the first grade children are having a vocabulary lesson through story-telling. A circle of eager faces surrounds a petite 22-year-old teacher, Nikita Wadhwa, as she goes over words that start with the letters st. To get the lesson across, she is using a story about a young girl who helps people in need. Ms. Wadhwa, who recently graduated with a degree in management, was an intern at GQ and Vogue magazine before discovering her passion for teaching. She has been teaching for six months with Akanksha. A majority of the children havent gone to school before, or have attended vernacular schools, says Ms. Wadhwa, who is amazed at the progress they have made in six months. When they arrived they couldnt write A to Z. Now they form full sentences and speak properly. They have also opened up a great deal. Some of them were so shy at first, and now its impossible to make them stop talking. At the end of the school day, all of the students stand up and thank God for what they have. Enthusiastic singing of the national anthem follows the prayer before the children scurry away to collect their bags and water bottles. As they run out with excited shouts of See you tomorrow didi [older sister]! their voices echo down the dimly lit corridors. Macaca 12-31-2011, 09:12 PM The triumph of politics? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/thetriumphpolitics/460325/) Business Standard Editorial The new year will show whether anti-corruption, the primary issue of 2011, will be but a footnote in history. Will historians in the future, looking back at 2011 in order to detect in this turbulent year the seeds of things to come, isolate the anti-corruption movement as worthy of special study? Among the personalities of this past year, Kisan Baburao Hazare appears to stand out as having imposed his will on Indias public discourse. Nobody can guess in advance at the verdict of history. But there are already signs that can be read, and questions that should be asked. Did the year belong to Mr Hazare? Or has it ended with the sign that politics-as-usual will triumph over the sort of attempt to short-circuit processes that he led? After all, throughout 2011, it seemed that Mr Hazare and his followers promised so much to an India wearied of impunity at the highest levels. Yet there is little question today, as the Lok Pal Bill falters in Parliament, that Mr Hazares movement also has

suffered a setback. The question of why this happened is worth investigating as 2012 dawns. It is clear that, in some ways, Mr Hazare hit upon precisely the correct issue. Indias explosive growth has not been accompanied by the strengthening of institutions, or by the regulatory best practices that channel the rewards from growth correctly. Meanwhile, daily life for Indians is beset by leftover red tape from the Licence Raj, providing ample opportunity for a dehumanising round of supplication and graft. An attempt to address these twin menaces was long overdue. Yet it is equally clear that the way that Mr Hazare and, more importantly, his close advisors framed their agitation came in the way of its own success. When politics is the avenue for change, then an appeal to the basest anti-politics sentiment will undermine any movements success. That, in the end, is likely to be a limitation for any movement that, infatuated with the idea of civil society, eschews the nuts and bolts of political compromise. Some blame must attach to political parties that misread and tried to appropriate Mr Hazare. The Congress underestimated the anger in Indias towns which have voted for it, by and large, in the past two general elections engendered by its consistent dismissal of the needs of an urbanising India. The Bharatiya Janata Party and others in opposition assumed that they could ride an antipolitics wave, self-evidently an error of judgement. Yet Mr Hazares angry words against the ruling party, and his promise to target it in 2012s Assembly elections, show that the anti-politics crusaders themselves recognise that political mobilisation is the only way forward in a democratic polity. Indeed, the failure of the Lok Pal Bill to pass in the Rajya Sabha interpreted by some as the showing of indecorousness by the ruling alliance points to the supremacy of voters judgement in policy-making. After all, if a Bill is postponed until it can be passed, till a coalition in favour can be built following elections, is it a failure or an achievement of democracy? This coming year will hopefully provide the answers to some of these questions and also to whether the issues Mr Hazare raised will be but a footnote in the history of Indias decades of growth.

Caste And Politics In Regard To Anna Hazare (http://www.countercurrents.org/omvedt311211.htm) By Gail Omvedt | Countercurrents 'There is a method in the madness we see in India' (http://www.businessstandard.com/india/news/there-ismethod-inmadness-we-see-in-india/460342/) Business Standard Our system encourages people not to behave in the right way (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/%E2%80%98our-system-encourages-people-notbehave-right-way%E2%80%99-920) By N.R. Narayana Murthy | Deccan Chronicle Lokpal jitters (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/lokpal-jitters-912) By Dilip Cherian | Deccan Chronicle Ideas Expressed (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ideas-expressed/894293/) Indian Express Two suicides and a murder (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/two-suicides-and-amurder/894278/) By Meghnad Desai | Indian Express Anna Hazare and the Lokpal Bill Debate: A Shakespearean Tragedy (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-mainstream-maverick/entry/anna-hazare-and-thelokpal-bill-debate-a-shakespearean-tragedy) By Amaresh Misra | Times of India Only two reasons why Anna failed in Mumbai.. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-realtruth/entry/only-two-reasons-why-anna-failed-in-mumbai) By Prashant Panday jason577 01-01-2012, 01:25 PM Just happy to be here . Eisbr Kostm (http://www.karneval-fasching-kostuem-kostueme.de/kostuemekleinkinder/eisbaerkostuem-kostuem-tierverkleidung-faschingskostuem-karnevalskostuem-kinder86-98-j45.html/) Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:03 PM Public reason, Indian style (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/public-reason-indianstyle/894618/) By Pratap Bhanu Mehta | Indian Express In a democracy, public opinion is the ultimate God, or so it is said. Even authoritarian regimes, at some point, fear its wrath. 2011 was the year, not of individual heroes, but of public opinion: public

opinion railing against authority, oligarchy and corruption. But it was also a year in which public opinion, or so we are told, was transformed by the medium it used. Authoritarian governments found it hard to control flows of information and opinion. But the proliferation of new media from TV to Twitter also raised profound questions about the ways in which public opinion was going to be formed. Was the proliferation of new media forms genuine empowerment or did it rest on its own set of exclusions? Was it easier or harder for ordinary people to be heard? Where more people were expressing their opinion, did one have to shout harder to be heard? Would older forms of contribution to public reason survive? Could the old-fashioned, essay-style column, with complexity and nuance (and full disclosure, I have a vested interest in defending that genre), survive the Age of 140 Characters? Was the sound bite going to replace the sound thought? In short, what is the future of democratic discourse? It is said, rightly, that in a democracy, nothing has special authority: not God, not History, not Reason. In fact, the radical promise of democracy is just that as Kant put it, Reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens. But how are these agreements going to be produced? Every democracy has worried about this. We dont know how to institutionalise a conception of public reason in which all individuals can participate as free and equal individuals. But 2011 was an object lesson in the ways in which discourse operated in a democracy. Indian democracy is a feat of improvisation, and nothing reflects this more so than the character of our public argument. Here are some randomly collected lessons from 2011. There are two dangers in a democracy. The first is what Aeschylus warned about: Freedom will be interpreted to mean, Say whatever just came to your lips. The second danger is freedom will be interpreted to mean, Say just what you think others want to hear. Both the excess of the first and the restraint of the second pose dangers to genuine public reason. In most parties, spokesman succumbs to the first temptation, government to the second. Public Opinion can make the horse come to the water, it cannot make it drink. The most valuable trait in politics is not rhetorical power. It is silence. Those who speak the least shall be prime minister the longest. So long as the Anna movement used the power of music and maun vrat, they had a chance. The minute they took to the megaphone they blew it. Arguments are made for cutting others, not for advancing understanding. Representation is Reality till the Representation changes. For every argument, there is an available statistic. In economic discourse, the most important part of any claim is other things being equal. This is the part we are also most likely to forget. On important policy issues like the Food Security Bill, politicians can heed complex evidence: until the NAC weighs in. Those who speak in the name of the poor will never let the poor speak. Those who invoke the people really mean to say, It is my way or no way. Those who work for the public good work away quietly. Those who cannot, demand new laws. Our discussions are very principled. On each subject we invoke plenty of principles except the one relevant to the subject. The camera almost always lies. Or rather, the truth it represents is a function of the magnification angles of the camera. The allure of a camera may be even more corrupting than the allure of money. The thought that millions are watching them, brings the worst out of most people.

If you want facts dont look at news stories. There you will get opinion. But in an opinion column you might actually get an occasional fact. A news channel will have more opinion than news. The more important a news channel thinks it is the higher will be its ratio of opinion to news. India has immense diversity of opinion. Except that it is the same diversity over and over again. Search for consensus means: I dont want to be held responsible for making a decision. There is no immortality except through being recognised by the press. Alas, that is also short-lived. The professional standards of every profession have fallen, other than ones own. There is more space for book launches than book reviews. The difference between Hindi and English media is exaggerated. The English media pays homage to the vernacular by ethnic chic. The Hindi media pays homage to English by translating content. The power of Twitter is like the medium itself: confined and short-lived. Media is more likely to want war than the people. In a contest between fear and hope, fear always triumphs. The A word will remain prohibited in the media, if used in a critical context. Guess what it is? Hint: Something to do with people who own a hideous house. Only Indians can take the epithet Argumentative Indian as a compliment. Argumentative means someone who goes on arguing for the sake of it even after the issue has been settled. There are many more lessons to be learnt. But it is all of this that makes our democracy so wonderful and vibrant. It is, in Platos resonant description of democracy, a many coloured cloak decorated in all hues; this regime is decorated with all dispositions. You have to admire a democracy where Rajya Sabha debates can get high TRP ratings. God forbid, we dont want to tamper with this edifice. 2011 was the year of public mobilisation. Will 2012 be the year of public reason? The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research Quiet revolutions (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/ColumnsOthers/Quietrevolutions/Article1-789825.aspx) By Ashish Kothari | Hindustan Times The giant leaps of history (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shahid-javed-burkigiantleapshistory/460376/) By Shahid Javed Burki | Business Standard More corrupt, more accountable (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/more-corrupt-moreaccountable/894605/) By Dinsha Mistree | Indian Express Lokpal Drama (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/lokpal-drama/894282/) By Soli J. Sorabjee | Indian Express The saga of the Lokpal Bill (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2766561.ece) By PRASHANT BHUSHAN | The Hindu India highly corrupt..but so also are others in its comparison set. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/india-highly-corrupt-but-so-also-areothers-in-its-comparison-set) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Danger is Lokpal may go Bofors way (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Swaminomics/entry/danger-is-lokpal-may-go-boforsway) By SA Aiyar | Times of India

Anti-Dam Movement In Assam: Are Maoists From Jupiter? (http://www.countercurrents.org/selvam010112.htm) By Trevor Selvam | Countercurrents Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:10 PM Is growth enough? India's economic boom has widened the gap between rich and poor and now it's slowing down. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/india/111230/india-economywealth-gap-poverty-shivas-rules) By Jason Overdorf | GlobalPost For the past two decades, policymakers have been banking on rapid economic growth to lift millions of Indians out of poverty. But even as the boom has made it easier for the country's poorest people to afford refrigerators, televisions and mobile phones, the spending power of the rich has grown many times faster. Now, the widening gulf between those at the top and those at the bottom is steadily increasing the pressure on the many fissures in this highly fractured society and a looming slowdown could hit the poor harder than anybody. We have to see this in the context of a country that already bears a huge burden of stratification, but also caste and gender and all these things compounding each other, said development economist Jean Dreze, who played a key role in designing and implementing India's largest social welfare scheme. The fact that there's a new, rising dimension of inequality, that is income inequality, reinforces something that's already a big issue for Indian society and the Indian economy, Dreze said. Despite boasting the world's second-fastest economic growth, India has made little progress in eradicating poverty since it began liberalizing its economy in 1991, according to a new study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Instead, the gap between the incomes of the rich and poor has doubled, so the top 10 percent of workers now earn 12 times the amount earned by the bottom 10 percent while 42 percent of the country's 1.21 billion people survive on less than a dollar a day. Consider 36-year-old Indu Devi. Only semi-employed, she works from home sewing dupattas the scarf-like complement to a woman's salwar kameez, or loose pajama-like trousers for a local factory. In a good month, she earns $30; in a bad one, only $10. In the past 10 years, she's acquired luxuries like a television and a mobile phone partly because she owns her tiny room in an illegal structure in one of New Delhi's many unauthorized colonies. Devi shares a space the size of an American bathroom with a man and four children. There's no bathroom or sink. Water comes from a hand pump outside, shared with the neighborhood. The stove is a burner attached to a gas cylinder, and everything the family owns is hanging from half-adozen hooks on the wall: two sets of clothes for the adults, one to wash and one to wear; four sets for the kids, along with their school uniforms. Her thoughts about India's economic boom? Sometimes I feel frustrated, as I can cannot meet the demands of my kids all the time." Nobody will be surprised to hear that India's new wealth has been slow to trickle down. But as debate rages over government programs designed to provide more equal opportunities to the poor or simply to ease their suffering the bald facts beg the question: Is growth enough? Many economists point out that an increase in inequality is inevitable with rapid economic growth though the OECD found this was not the case for Argentina, Brazil or Indonesia over the past decade or so. In those three countries, the economists found, income growth of the bottom and middle groups outpaced that of the highest earners. And at least in Brazil where inequality remains much higher than in India in absolute terms higher taxes and a new focus on social

programs seems to have been a factor in making the difference. Some argue, as well, that rising inequality is not an evil in itself, so long as life also improves for the country's poor. The real problem is absolute, not relative poverty, they say. And the best way to address that is to make the pie larger, not to change the way you slice it up especially where government programs are hampered by corruption and inefficiency. This is inequality in outcomes, either in terms of consumption expenditure or in terms of income, said economist Bibek Debroy, a professor at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research. If you are talking about inequality in terms of access to health services, education, financial products, technology, the law and order system, then I'm prepared to buy the argument that we should be concerned. But that's not what this inequality is about. It's not that the benefits of economic growth don't trickle down at all. Debroy believes, for instance, that the biggest reason for the increase in inequality is geography, not class or caste. While the trickle has missed some parts of India altogether, he would argue, poor people like Indu Devi have seen marked improvements in their lives over the past 20 years. The trouble is that rapid growth and runaway consumption by the burgeoning middle class has simultaneously increased the aspirations of the poor and driven up prices. If I perceive that inequality is increasing, but I also perceive that over a period of time the prospects of my standard of living improving are getting enhanced, then I think I'm less concerned about inequality, said Debroy. But if I perceive that inequality is increasing, but my standard of living is not improving, then I tend to be more concerned. Right or wrong, many of those at the bottom see the glass as half empty. Despite a shortage of skilled labor, for instance, 25-year-old machinist Rajesh Kumar, who lives a few houses away from Devi, earns only about $150 a month. Based on India's erstwhile economic forecasts, he should be poised for great changes. Yet he's pessimistic about his prospects. "Even if the number of companies are rising, unemployment is also on the rise, Kumar said. "If the country progresses, the poor will only become poorer, as things will get more expensive. We can never progress." Now, India's booming economy is slowing down, perhaps dramatically. With inflation hovering around 10 percent, the central bank has raised interest rates 13 times since March 2010. But today India Inc. faces a drop in foreign investment and skyrocketing fuel costs resulting from a 20 percent plunge in the value of the rupee [7]. As a result, a manufacturing sector that had only just begun to take off is gearing down as signaled by a 5 percent drop in industrial output for October, the last month for which data is available. And, at least in private, investors and entrepreneurs are beginning to think the unthinkable: That GDP growth might just dip below 6 percent. Inequality problem solved, you might be tempted to say. But it looks like the poor will likely bear the brunt of the slowdown, too. They lack savings to carry them through bad times, of course, and they fight for work where competition is the toughest. But the downturn has also resulted in new criticism for the current government's social welfare programs, such as a planned expansion of the distribution of subsidized grain to cover two-thirds of the population. If I am able-bodied and in the working age group, I am not voluntarily poor, said Debroy. I am poor because I don't have access to the roads, I don't have access to health [care], I don't have access to education. So the right public policy intervention to me is the provision of those goods and services. In terms of access, too, however, the vast gulf between India's rich and poor appears to be acting

as a multiplier, worsening the country's long-standing problems while preventing action from being taken against them. The rapid growth of high-quality, private hospitals in India's cities means that the most vocal and influential citizens no longer complain about public facilities. All but the poorest Indians have abandoned the government's free schools, even as the current administration strives to make education a basic right. And though wealthy and middle-class Indians carp about leakages in the welfare system that distributes subsidized grain to the destitute, they do so primarily to argue against spending increases, without taking much interest in fixing the problem even amid Anna Hazare's anticorruption fervor [9]. This vast difference in perspective, incidentally, may also explain why none of the many Indian papers that reported on the OECD study mentioned its conclusion about the main reason for the dramatic increase in income inequality over the past 20 years: A widening gap between the regular, salaried workers [10] protected by the country's labor laws and the so-called contract workers outside the system. So, too, that difference in outlook may explain the silence on the OECD's recommended course of action: more flexible labor policies and higher spending on education and social welfare funded by progressive taxes. There's a pervasive problem in public policy of lack of attention to the underprivileged and insensitivity to their needs, which is not necessarily out of hostility to them, said Dreze. It's just that the people who run the show don't relate very closely to these people. The result of India's gross inequity, therefore, is a vicious cycle. India spends less on social programs than the world's other large emerging economies, according to the OECD study. Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:16 PM Brazil and Russia spend nearly three-fourths as much on social programs, as a percentage of GDP, as OECD member countries like the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, for instance. India spends only a fourth as much as the OECD average. The biggest reason for the discrepancy is that it has virtually no safety net for the aged or unemployed, apart from the recently created National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, a program that is often criticized locally as expensive and corrupt, and yet one that the OECD recommends expanding. It could go either way. Depending on the politics, you could see India moving toward more extensive welfare provisions and reconstructing the health-care system, said Dreze. You could also see the schooling system being privatized. There's a huge lobby of insurance companies that would like to see the health-care system go in the direction of health insurance. Nothing can be taken for granted.

CSR, an indication of government failure (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/cgopinath/article2766384.ece) By C.GOPINATH | The Hindu BusinessLine Poverty of reliable numbers (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/n-chandra-mohanpovertyreliable-numbers-/460378/) By N Chandra Mohan | Business Standard Cracking the kerala myth (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Crackingthe-kerala-myth/articleshow/11329131.cms) By | Times of India 2012 Boom or Doom? (http://blogs.reuters.com/india-expertzone/2011/12/13/2012-boom-ordoom/) By Rajiv Deep Bajaj | Reuters Little hope for 2012 The unprecedentedly poor macroeconomic numbers for 2011 are the price of govt mismanagement (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/little-hope-for-2012/460375/)

Business Standard Editorial India Inc's winter flowers (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-incs-winterflowers/460374/) Business Standard Editorial StatsGuru: 02-January-2012 (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/statsguru-02-january2012/460379/) Business Standard Biennial Budgets can rev up sluggish economy (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/b-s-raghavan/article2766387.ece) By B.S.RAGHAVAN | The Hindu BusinessLine What a ride (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/What-aride/articleshow/11329094.cms) Times of India Editorial Press The Best and Worst of 2011 (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/01/mumbai-journal-thebest-and-worst-of-2011/) By Nayantara Kilachand | IndiaRealTime Wishes & horses (http://www.asianage.com/columnists/wishes-horses-914) By Ashok Malik | Asian Age Signs of premature ageing? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/debashis-basusignspremature-ageing/460377/) By Debashis Basu | Business Standard Why should the consumer sacrifice? (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/why-should-theconsumer-sacrifice/894283/) By Shombit Sengupta | Indian Express Machine-made agriculture (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2766383.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial | The Hindu BusinessLine Drug Test Can one self-made woman reform health care for India, and the world? (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/02/120102fa_fact_levy) By Ariel Levy | New Yorker Murdered Indian girl was sacrificed for better harvest (http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/police-murdered-indian-girl-was-sacrificed-forbetter-harvest) Agence France-Presse Hope back in Calcutta (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/right-and-wrong/entry/hope-backin-calcutta) By Swapan Dasgupta | Times of India Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:23 PM BANGLADESH: Terror Funding Continues Unabated (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4838.html) By Rajeev Sharma | South Asia Analysis Group Under the Prime Ministership of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladeshhas undoubtedly cracked down on the jehadi brand of terrorism as well as terror outfits that have been needling India for years. But Dhaka may have to do more tomake these efforts more effective. Militant organizations such as Jamatul MujahideenBangladesh (JMB) or Harkat ul Jehad Islam (HUJI) have now been banned but they have not been liquidated. Another set of leaders have taken over. Some trainingcamps continue to impart both ideological and arms training. Mere banning ofthe radical groups has not seared the purpose. A top ranking JMB commander Mustafizur Rahman Shaheen who was recently arrested said during interrogation that JMB has not at all been liquidated with its banning, or with execution ofits topmost leaders Abdur Rahman and his deputy Bangla Bhai. He disclosed that JMB cadres were operating across the country under various banners with the mission to stage Islamic revolution. The JMB, HUJI and the rest of Islamic terrorist networkin Bangladesh were spawned by the al Qaeda and Taliban jehadis. They were trained by Pakistans Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistanbased major terror outfit Lashkar e Toiba (LeT). None of the umbilical cords has been cut for good. As many as twenty local and foreign NGOs including al Qaeda chief Osama bin Ladens International Islamic Front (IIF) have been financing radical Islamic groups JMB and HUJI. In addition, huge

funds regularly pour in every month from two Pakistani militant leaders Sajedur Rahman and Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim. These two Pak militant leaders send money through Hawala channel to JMB chief Maulana Saidur Rahman. This information has been revealed by Maulana Saidur Rahman who was arrested on May 26, 2010. JMB chief Saidur Rahman also disclosed that the JMB activists learnt operational tactics of hitting multiple targets simultaneously from the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, from whom they also acquired techniques for manufacturing explosive devices and arms. He also said that the JMB follows alQaedas ideology and works to expand and strengthen al Qaedas base in Bangladesh. Information about location of JMB suicide squad members was disclosed by JMB military wing chief Boma Mizan and Zaved Iqbal @ Mohammad bothof whom were arrested ahead of Saidur Rahmans arrest. Saidur Rahman disclosed that bin Ladens International Islamic Front (IIF) has been offering financial assistance to JMB and HUJI regularly as part of its worldwide endeavour to assist all pro-al Qaeda outfits. He admitted that huge funds were provided by IIF to JMB when theformer was apprised of the latters plan to carry out countrywide synchronized bomb blasts in Bangladesh and deployment of suicide bombers at strategic pointsin August 2005. Saidur Rahnan, who was former Habiganj District JEI Amir, also said that apart from IIF, JMB has also been receiving funds regularly from 20 local and foreign organizations including Saudi based World Assembly of MuslimYouth (WAMY), Rabeta-al-alam-al-Islami, Kuwait based Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, International Federation of Islamic Organizations, Islamic World Committee, Qatar based Charitable Society and UK based Muslim Aid. He also said that in 2008 the two Pakistan militant leaders Sajedur Rahman and Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim sent US $ 42 million for JMB through hawala channel. Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) Commissioner A K MShahidul Haque said that militant organizations regularly receive funds from expatriate Bangladeshi community settled in the US, Europe and Middle Eastcountries. Money is mostly received through hundi from these countries. The intelligence agencies of the country have found that Jamaat-e-Islami(JEI) even now works as a conduit of foreign funds. Funds are received regularly from Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya based NGOs to the JEI accounts in the Islamic Bank of Bangladesh and then handed over to other pro-alQaeda outfits in the country. This enables the party to indulge in money laundering and inciting the militants to take part in violent activities. The party had a plan to resort to serious violence during the last elections and made it clear to its cadres that some parliamentary seats including those of JEI Amir Matiur Rahman Nizami, Delwar Hossen Syeedi and Shahjahan Chowdhury must be won at any cost, including assassination, if so needed. The party had also planned to resist Awami Leagueat any cost as victory of AL in elections would spell disaster and result invirtual decimation of JEI. But this plan did not succeed as the Army-backedinterim dispensation that conducted the elections stood on the way affirming that no electoral malpractices or violence would be countenanced leniently. Internationally banned Islamic NGOs linked to terror funding were functioning in Bangladesh. These NGOs like the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), Al Harmain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) and Benevolence Society based in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Pakistan were directly linked with financing activities of the Islamic radical groups. Two RIHS officials,one from Sudan and the other from Yemen, were deported in 2006 for having channelized from Bangladesh over US $ 700,000 to local and foreign terrorist organizations. RIHS was forced to close its operations in Bangladesh thereafter. Earlier, Bank accounts of RIHS in Pakistan were sealed for its al Qaeda links. Another Islamic NGO Al Harmain Islamic Foundation had to wind up its operationsin Bangladesh under US pressure as it was suspected to have funded the 9/11 alQaeda attack on Twin Tower. Even former Finance Minister Saifur Rahman said that anumber of bank accounts in Bangladesh were under investigation for illegal transactions. Activities of the Islamic radicals will continue unabated until the sources of funds and patronage are identified and choked forever.

Why 2012 will be no different for security agencies (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slideshow-1-why-2012-will-be-no-different-for-security-agencies/20120101.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa Why India NEEDS to tackle cyber terrorism (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/why-india-needsto-tackle-cyber-terrorism/20120101.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa 13/7: Cops suspect IM terrorist Yasin Bhatkal was in Mumbai

(http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/13-7-Cops-suspect-IM-terrorist-YasinBhatkal-was-in-Mumbai/Article1-789897.aspx) By Shishir Gupta | Hindustan Times METASTASIS OF AL QAEDA?---PAN-AFRICAN TERRORISM (http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers49/paper4839.html) By B.Raman | South Asia Analysis Group Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:32 PM Mediator in Taliban-U.S. talks backed Kashmir jihad (http://www.thehindu.com/news/article2755817.ece) By PRAVEEN SWAMI | The Hindu Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Doha-based Islamist scholar who once called on his followers to back jihadist groups in Jammu and Kashmir, has emerged as a key mediator in secret talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, government sources have told The Hindu. In 2009, Mr. al-Qaradawi had issued a fatwa, or religious edict, asserting that the Kashmiris were properly fighting jihad against the Indian army. The jihad was legitimate, he argued, since mujahideen groups sought to create an Islamic state. Therefore, the edict concluded, it was incumbent on all Muslims to help Kashmiris gain their freedom from Indian aggression. New Delhi, Indian diplomatic sources said, has been warily watching Mr. al-Qaradawi's emergence as peace broker fearful that his growing influence could help regional jihadist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad find new sanctuaries in a rapidly changing West Asia or a future Afghan regime which includes the Taliban. Road map for deal Earlier this month, the sources said, Mr. al-Qaradawi helped draw a road map for a deal between the Taliban and the United States, aimed at giving the superpower a face-saving political settlement ahead of its planned withdrawal from Afghanistan which is due to begin in 2014. In return for the release of prisoners still held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, the lifting of United Nations sanctions on its leadership and its recognition as a legitimate political group, the Taliban was expected to agree to sever its links to transnational organisations like al-Qaeda, end violence and eventually share power with the Afghan government. Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's President, recalled his country's envoy to Qatar after The Hindu broke news that negotiations to open a Taliban office had reached an advanced stage angered, reports said, at the prospect of a deal that would have given Taliban legitimacy at a time when hardliners in its ranks are carrying out a lethal campaign targeting regime supporters. However, Kabul on Tuesday announced it would accept a Taliban liaison office in Doha as long as the talks were Afghan-led. Evidence that hardliners have increasing influence over Taliban decision-making, intelligence sources say, has been mounting. Earlier this year, for example, Sheikh Muhammad Aminullah who was placed on a United Nations watchlist in 2009 for aiding acts of terrorism was given command of its Peshawar shura, or command council. Born in 1973, Mr. Aminullah represents a new generation of Taliban commanders ideologically committed to al-Qaeda's vision. His predecessor, Maulvi Abdul Kabir, had only a peripheral military role, and was considered a key player in secret peace talks with the Afghan government and the United States. Islamists vs. jihadists Egyptian-born Mr. al-Qaradawi is seen by both the United States and the Taliban traditionalists as an ally in the battle against the growing influence of this new generation of commanders. Expelled from his homeland for his Islamist views, he has emerged over the last year as ideological pole star of the Muslim Brotherhood now West Asia's most influential political movement. In 1993, Mr. al-Qaradawi issued a landmark edict endorsing democratic pluralism; the Muslim Brotherhood later cast its embrace of electoral politics in Egypt and elsewhere as a form of da'wa, or proselytising missionary work. Even though Mr. al-Qaradawi said he remained committed to the spread of Islam until it conquers the entire world, he argued this could be achieved peacefully.

He condemned 9/11 and, in September, 2005, described the Iraqi jihadist Abu Musa'ab al-Zarqawi as a criminal. In a 2009 book, he defended armed jihad under specific conditions Kashmir, Iraq and, later, Libya were among those cases he endorsed but lashed out at al-Qaeda for a mad declaration of war on the whole world. Mr. al-Qaradawi explained his logic thus to Der Spiegel: The [Muslim Brotherhood] have tried [jihad], but [jihad] has not been helpful, and we have not gained anything out of [jihad] other than detention, suffering, and victimisation. The Muslim Brotherhood's decision to embrace electoral politics incensed al-Qaeda. In 2008, alQaeda's now-chief Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at the Muslim Brotherhood for accepting the Egyptian constitution, rather than God's word, as a source of law a fundamental betrayal, he claimed, of the precepts of Islam. In many countries, Brotherhood cadre clashed with salafi-jihadist groups sympathetic to al-Qaeda. The west's embrace of Mr. al-Qaradawi for its Afghan negotiations marks the restoration of an old, but little-known, relationship. Key Brotherhood leaders like Said Ramadan, the historian Ian Johnson has shown, were cultivated by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency for anticommunist operations along with several central and west Asian Islamists who fought with German fascist forces against the Soviet Union in 1941-1945. Expelled by Egypt's socialist rulers for his neo-fundamentalist views, Dr. Ramadan received a warm reception and a radio programme when he landed in Pakistan in 1948. The Pakistani-Canadian scholar Tarek Fatah said Dr. Ramadan's work was instrumental in turning a secular Muslim country into a hotbed of Islamic extremism. Dr. Ramadan also visited the White House in 1953, where he met with President Dwight Eisenhower.

Taliban mastering modern technology to circulate message (http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/taliban-mastering-modern-technology-tocirculate-message) By Zeeshan Haider | The National TTP losing its clout? (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/01/ttp-losing-its-clout.html) By Syed Irfan Ashraf | Dawn Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:40 PM Dynamism of diversity (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/01/smokers-corner-dynamism-ofdiversity.html) By Nadeem F. Paracha | Dawn Two of the most common comments I receive through emails are: If only Pakistan imposes a true Islamic system, well be able to get rid of the hypocrisies committed in its name. Of course, such suggestions are proposed by fellow Pakistanis. The other comment is usually from readers in India or the West. Its a simple question: Why are Pakistanis always so engrossed in religion? I am no scholar (religious or otherwise), but a student of history with a keen interest in understanding it through the lens of cultural anthropology. You see, most of us living in Pakistan have always been advised to look at cultural studies with suspicion. It has been embedded in us that this sort of enquiry leads one to question the very foundations of the countrys ideology. But the problem is, the less equipped or inclined we are to question what weve been told is our ideology, the more one-dimensional remains our understanding of the diverse range of people that reside in Pakistan; and also, we become more venerable to the continuous volley of half-truths and glorified delusions that have been coming our way from dictators, textbooks and the usual media crackpots. The whole notion of being a country buzzing with ethnic, sectarian and religious diversity becomes something to be afraid of, or something to be repressed with the help of an ideology that has, over the decades, been imposed upon this diversity by a curious nexus of so-called modernist Muslims and their puritanical counterparts. At the centre of this all is an ever-weakening state, which, from 1947 till 1977, shunned recognising the dynamics of Pakistans diversity by imposing a nationalistic, Muslim identity. It didnt work.

In the absence of the kind of rigorous democracy that a diverse nation requires, this allencompassing Muslim nationalism only ended up alienating the centuries-old cultural moorings of a number of ethnicities in Pakistan. So, as the Baloch, the Sindhis and the Pashtuns rose up in anger, as had done the Bengalis in the former East Pakistan, who eventually decided to rip themselves away from Pakistans ideological equation. Though the anti-diversity dynamics of Muslim nationalism was by and large successful in keeping this ideologys more radical advocates at bay, the 1971 East Pakistan debacle left this ideology vulnerable to the influence of what was once dismissed as the Islamist fringe. Gradually, especially with the arrival of the dictatorship of General Ziaul Haq, the ideologys early modernist Islam was turned on its head when the new ideologues wanted to Islamise the modern. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan gave way to Abul Ala Maududi. The kind of theological, political and cultural damage this long-winded attitude has inflicted in the past three decades has made the state and governments of Pakistan willing hostages to the abrasive and reactionary ways of the puritanical ideologues. Whats more, today, even some of the most educated young Pakistanis have lost the capacity to question what is dished out to them as Islamic/ Pakistani history and ideology. We are still not prepared to face an obvious truth that may call the very essence and foundation of our so-called ideology into question. Has not this ideology irst of the modernist One Unit Islam variety, and then the exhibitionistic and militarist version of it completely failed to achieve what it wanted to? That is, to turn a diverse Pakistan into a united, ideological whole based on religion. It was always an over-ambitious and Utopian task. We were never one people. The majority of us were Muslims (and still are), but our understanding of faith is intricately linked to and informed by the cultural moorings of our own distinct ethnicities and sects. Laws and policies cannot be made to succeed based upon the simple idea that all Muslims believe in the same God and the same book. What passes as Islamic law in certain Muslim countries would be an anachronism in Pakistan. Same way, what may be a success (as an Islamic law) in certain areas of the Deobandi dominated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could be offensive to the Barelvi or Shia of Punjab and Sindh. There has never been a wide-ranging consensus among the sects and ethnicities of Pakistan about the ideology of Pakistan. How can there be? Shouldnt the consensus be sought more on recognising the ethnic and sectarian diversity of this country, giving all democratic participants of this diversity as much autonomy as possible (through a fair democratic process) to take responsibility of just how much religion, or what sort of religion (if at all), would every ethnicity and sect want to use in their respective communities politics and society? The states role should be to make sure that such a national consensus holds and that none of the states institutions is allowed to identify with any one ethnic or sectarian group or ideology. We have to finally recognise (on an official level) that we live in a land of many ethnicities and multiple interpretations of Islam. This phenomenon has to be harnessed and celebrated, not repressed or be afraid of. This very repression has produced nothing but an ideological neurosis that we suffer from today.

Was Jinnah democratic? III (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\01\02\story_2-12012_pg3_5) By Yasser Latif Hamdani | Daily Times Fundamental rights violations in Balochistan (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\02\story_2-1-2012_pg3_2) By Sheikh Asad Rahman | Daily Times Predictions, past and future (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\01\02\story_2-12012_pg3_3) By Syed Mansoor Hussain | Daily Times Uneasy thoughts in the New Year (http://tribune.com.pk/story/315078/uneasy-thoughts-in-thenew-year/) By Tanvir Ahmad Khan | The Express Tribune Climbing out of the deep hole (http://tribune.com.pk/story/315081/climbing-out-of-the-deep-hole/)

By Abid Hasan | The Express Tribune Challenges ahead (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/01/challenges-ahead.html) Dawn Editorial Over the top (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85219&Cat=9) By Masood Hasan | The News New Year forebodings (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85215&Cat=9) By S Iftikhar Murshed | The News 2012 is here (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85212&Cat=8) The News Editorial Macaca 01-01-2012, 07:49 PM Remembering Salmaan Taseer (http://tribune.com.pk/story/315079/remembering-salmaantaseer/) By Pervez Hoodbhoy | The Express Tribune Governor Salmaan Taseer died at the hands of a religious fanatic on January 4 last year. Fearlessly championing a deeply unpopular cause, this brave man had sought to revisit the countrys blasphemy law which, as he saw it, was yet another means of intimidating Pakistans embattled religious minorities. This law which is unique in having death as the minimum penalty would have sent to the gallows an illiterate Christian peasant woman, Aasia Bibi, who stood accused by her Muslim neighbours after a noisy dispute. Taseers publicly-voiced concern for human life earned him 26 high-velocity bullets from one of his security guards, Malik Mumtaz Qadri. The other guards watched silently. In this long, sad, year more has followed. Justice Pervez Ali Shah, the brave judge who ultimately sentenced Taseers murderer in spite of receiving death threats, has fled the country. Aasia Bibi is rotting away in jail, reportedly in solitary confinement and in acute psychological distress. Shahbaz Taseer, the governors son, was abducted in late August presumably by Qadris sympathisers. He remains untraceable. Shahbaz Bhatti, another vocal voice against the blasphemy law, was assassinated weeks later on March 2. Political assassinations occur everywhere. But the Pakistani public reaction to Taseers assassination horrified the world. As the news hit the national media, spontaneous celebrations erupted in places; a murderous unrepentant mutineer had been instantly transformed into a national hero. Glibtongued television anchors sought to convince viewers that Taseer had brought ill unto himself. Religious political parties did not conceal their satisfaction, and the imam of Lahores Badshahi Masjid declined the governments request to lead the funeral prayers. Rehman Malik, the interior minister, sought to curry favour with religious forces by declaring that, if need be, he would kill a blasphemer with my own hands. In psychological terms, the reaction of a substantial part of Pakistans lawyers community was still more disturbing. Once again, they made history. Earlier it had been for their Black Coat Revolution, apparently welcome evidence that Pakistani civil society was well and thriving. But this time it was for something far less positive. Television screens around the world showed the nauseating spectacle of hundreds of lawyers feting a murderer, showering rose petals upon him, and pledging to defend him pro-bono. Another phalanx of lawyers, headed by Khawaja Sharif, former Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, rose up to constitute Qadris defence team. In his court testimony, a smugly-defiant assassin declared that he had executed Allahs will. Justice Sharif agreed, saying that Qadri had merely done his duty as a security guard. He said it was actually Taseer who had broken the law of the land by attempting to defend a person convicted of blasphemy and, in doing so, had hurt the feelings of crores of Muslims. Taseers was a high-profile episode, but there are countless other equally tragic ones which receive little public attention. Surely it is time to reflect on what makes so many Pakistanis disposed towards celebrating murder, lawlessness, and intolerance. To understand the kind of psychological conditioning that has turned us into nasty brutes, cruel both to ourselves and to others, I suggest that the reader sample some of the Friday khutbas (sermons) delivered across the countrys estimated 250,000 mosques. It is surely impossible to hear all khutbas, but a few hundred ones have been recorded on tape by researchers, transcribed into Urdu, translated into English, and categorised by subject at MASHAL BOOKS (http://www.mashalbooks.org). Since there was no conscious bias in selecting the mosques, they can be reasonably assumed to be representative examples.

Often using abusive language, the mullahs excoriate their enemies: America, India, Israel, Christians, Jews, Hindus, Shias, and Qadianis. Before appreciative crowds, they breathe fire against the enemies of Islam and modernity. Music is condemned to be evil, together with life insurance and bank interest. In frenzied speeches they put women at the centre of all ills, demand that they be confined to the home, covered in purdah, and forbidden to use lipstick or go to beauty parlours. But the harshest words are reserved for the countless deviant Muslims. Governor Taseer was considered one. The former minister for foreign affairs, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, is another. In a foul-mouthed speech that the reader can hear on the above website, Qureshi is denounced as haramzada by Maulana Altafur Rehman Shah of Muhammadi Masjid in Gujrat and described as a keeper [mujawar] of graves. Quoting Nawa-e-Waqt, this maulana of the Ahl-e-Hadith school calls Qureshi a lapdog who stands with his cheek on the cheek of Hillary Clinton. What, he asks, could be a matter of greater shame? Parliamentarian Jamshed Dasti, also accused of grave worship, is harshly condemned for being unable to name the first five verses of the Holy Quran. One presumes that most listeners have enough intelligence to ignore such violent fulminations. But at times their effects are deadly. One such sermon, according to Qadris recorded testimony, was the turning point for him. He had heard a fiery cleric, Qari Haneef, at a religious gathering in his neighborhood, Colonel Yousuf Colony, on December 31, 2010. It is then, says Qadri, that he made up his mind to kill his boss. Qadri had participated in the gathering in his official uniform, reciting the naat in praise of the Holy Prophet (pbuh). His official gun had been slung around his shoulder at the meeting. Four days later, he fulfilled his goal. To be sure, not all khutbas are ugly and violent. But even if 10 percent are and the data suggests this is an underestimate that still makes for roughly 25,000 dangerous ones every week. A civilised society cannot sustain this for too long. Surely, the Pakistani state will sooner or later have to come up with a mechanism for regulating what can be said at religious gatherings. A possible model might be that of Egypt, where khutbas are pre-recorded and approved by the ulema of Jamia Al-Azhar. Without some agreed form of control, Pakistan shall sink ever deeper into religious anarchy and fanaticism. The writer teaches physics and political science at LUMS and is a former head of the Physics Department at Quaid-i-Azam University. He holds a D.Phil in nuclear physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Macaca 01-01-2012, 08:01 PM Why a bloody civilian cannot be at the ISI? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/315074/why-a-bloodycivilian-cannot-be-at-the-isi/) By Shahzad Chaudhry | The Express Tribune This article is clearly inspired by Mr Kamran Shafis piece titled Wanted: a bloody civilian at the ISI, carried on these pages on December 30. The use of the words bloody civilian and the connotation that comes with that is his, not mine. Now, why cannot a civilian head the ISI because simply the ISI abbreviates Inter-Services Intelligence. No, the ISI was not a devious conception to be used to upstage sitting political governments, and neither is it there to assist the military governments support nervy politicians to seek legitimacy and political support. It was meant to assist the military yes, the military, and hence the Inter-Services nomenclature in providing intelligence about perceived threats to the mission in war. As for Mr Shafis mentioning of MI5 (counter-intelligence), MI6 (intelligence), the BND, the DGSE, the CIA and the RAW all are arms of their respective civilian political governments and hence have civilian bosses. Mossad is a different kettle of fish a halfway house in its mission; part military, part civilian and that is why it is mostly commanded by military men. The ISI is only military but a twist of fate brought it under the Cabinet Division of the Government of Pakistan, meaning the prime minister. The ISI, formed in the 1950s, was initially commanded by a colonel with the mission and objective to assist the armed forces in their war mission by providing them intelligence on the enemy. The colonel became a brigadier under Ayub Khan and its mission stayed the same. Around this time, despite martial law, which was first imposed in 1958, the dirty political legwork was restricted to the Intelligence Bureau and before it to the Special Branch, both civilian entities with officers mostly

pulled out of the Police Service of Pakistan. Come 1973; along with the birth of a new Constitution came the repositioning of the ISI under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. That is also when its political wing was set up. Prime Minister Bhutto did some more restructuring, too, to the military system and the military adjusted well to these changes. Between 1972 and March 1973, there was a major mutiny in the armed forces that rebelled against the leadership, both political and military, whom the rebels held responsible for the dismemberment of Pakistan. The rebellion, fairly advanced into its planning stages, was infiltrated and exposed, and all culprits held and punished with long banishment. Raja Nadir Parvez, a former military man and a current politician was a part of this largely popular group. This is when the military intelligence agencies acted to save a political government. Since the ISI is an inter-services department, it is heavily populated by uniformed people. A small percentage, probably much lower than 30 per cent, is civilian and that too because they provide the essential elements of continuity to very essential work in support of the military mission most others are on rotational assignments except in the past few decades where a core uniformed group has come into place for the sake of continuity. The ISI, as its prime mission, supports the offensive operational role of the Pakistani military that remains crucial to its overall mission. How the ISI gets introduced, however, to our people is as the deep state. Why one may ask and that will always remain a million-dollar question. Two military men have also contributed to bringing the ISI into disrepute Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf when both tended to use the agency to bolster their political standing through manipulation of the political environment. Air Marshal Asghar Khans case, pending in the Supreme Court, has enough fat on it to prove such a contention. What then is the solution? The answer: disassociate the ISI from any political work. That will mean moving it back to the military in an organisational correction and tasking it only with its original foundational purpose. Under the current structure, it could easily move under the chairman joint chiefs as an inter-service entity. As for the political leadership, if it still needs to manipulate the political environment, the task can be given to the Intelligence Bureau. A bloody civilian may still not be able to head the ISI.

PM-Pak army on a slippery slope! (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\02\story_2-1-2012_pg3_6) By A R Siddiqi | Daily Times Where is judicial independence, my lords? (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\02\story_2-1-2012_pg3_4) By Marvi Sirmed | Daily Times Coup dtat (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85217&Cat=9) By Farrukh Saleem | The News Power struggle could further destabilize Pakistan (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/12/30/134498/power-struggle-could-further-destabilize.html) By Tom Hussain | McClatchy Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:21 PM Causes and consequences (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/02/causes-and-consequences.html) By Hajrah Mumtaz | Dawn ONE could imagine the Pakistans militarys motto being if you want peace, prepare for war the idea being that if youre heavily armed and ready to fight, you are (probably) less likely to be attacked. This is also the idea behind the equally contested notion of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Pakistan, for reasons fathomable and not, has over the course of its history often found itself at the brink of, or at, various sorts of war. These include actual or seemingly imminent battles with Indian forces, the militarys involvement at varying levels in Afghanistan or Kashmir and, as in recent years, the war on terror and the growing militant-radical threat from within the countrys own borders.

The different aspects to these conflicts, the political and other imperatives and dimensions, are reasonably well documented by writers and researchers in Pakistan and elsewhere. Nevertheless, one would forgive a person who confessed to being at a loss to actually understand why a country as impoverished, economically weak and underdeveloped as Pakistan should persist in believing, as it appears from the outside, that its future lies in military strength. Does the country actually believe this? That is a moot point, especially now when in the wake of a number of disasters particularly from the point of view of the public discourse surrounding the effectiveness of our military forces people are beginning to ask questions that were simply not part of the agenda just months ago. Events such as the attack on PNS Mehran and the finding of Osama bin Laden, amongst a host of others, have dented what in earlier times seemed like Pakistanis unshakeable and reactionary nationalism and their defensiveness in terms of the army and its subsidiaries. History is replete with examples, though, that countries or people that wish to engage in war can often make do with an excuse as a reason. The weapons of mass destruction that were never found in Iraq, for example, were merely the excuse the US used to launch aggression. For countries that are ready, willing and to whatever extent, able, to fight, the smallest or most seemingly remote event can become a flashpoint that leads to a very real and bloody conflict. A number of intertwined factors, political, historical and sometimes cultural as well, can coalesce around what can appear as a relatively minor point, making the real-time cause seem quite bizarre. In terms of bizarre reasons to bring two countries to the brink of war, an error by Google Maps has to top the list, a little over a year ago when Costa Rica found itself having been invaded by Nicaragua. In November 2010, Nicaraguan troops briefly set up camp on Costa Ricas Calero Island and replaced the flag. To understand the import of this and the point about being prepared for war consider the disparity between the two countries. Post-revolution Nicaragua is impoverished and underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure, having experienced periods of dictatorship and US military intervention (although in 1990 it became the first country in Latin America to elect a female head of state). It is also heavily armed and reliant on revolutionary fervour as a unifying force. Costa Rica, by contrast, is Central Americas oldest democracy with a prosperous market economy. It does not have a standing army, but has a well-armed police force. Calero Island lies on the San Juan river that divides the two countries in the vicinity of the Caribbean coast. Costa Rica and Nicaragua fiercely contested this border area for nearly two centuries until 1858, when a treaty brokered by US president Grover Cleveland led to a detailed demarcation in 1897 under which both countries recognised Calero Island as part of Costa Rican territory. That day in November, though, former Sandinista commander Eden Pastora occupied the island and hoisted the Nicaraguan flag. Asked why by a stunned Costa Rican government, he implied that as far as he was concerned, he had liberated the island: See the satellite photo on Google and there you see the border, he told a Costa Rican newspaper. War was averted after mediation by the Organisation of American States and Google Maps, explaining that the error had been based on faulty data obtained from the US State Department, apologised. In an acidic comment, though, a spokesperson pointed out that Mr Pastora would have been better advised to have consulted a military map because while Google strives to ensure the accuracy of its maps, by no means should they be used as a reference to decide military actions between two countries.

Humour aside, it is sobering that in situations where two sides or even just one, for it does not take two to cause a war are prepared to fight, the smallest grievance can snowball into a raging battle. Public emotion, supported in the modern world by a jingoistic media, can lead to a state being encouraged towards aggression, which is why fomenting hatred of the other as has been the case in Pakistan against India, for example is a dangerous idea. It can create a certain sort of nationalism that could, for a time, be useful, but the costs in potentia can be fearsome. In the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai tragedy, public opinion reflected and fanned by the news media on both sides, which contributed to the stirring up of tensions and in many cases drew unwarranted conclusions, presented the two countries as being on the brink of war something that many at the time feared was a real possibility. It is also worth pondering how Pakistans current predicament in terms of public opinion about groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which use religion as their rallying cry, has been affected by state-sponsored efforts over decades to indoctrinate the citizenry towards the right. We are where we are, now, but it is worth considering how far the extremists ideology would have found traction within public imagination had the project to Islamise the state of Pakistan not been undertaken. It is not a matter of crying over spilt milk, so to speak, but of learning not to spill it habitually.

Deadly country (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/02/deadly-country.html) Dawn Editorial The Talibans pound of flesh (http://tribune.com.pk/story/315488/the-talibans-pound-of-flesh/) By Farrukh Khan Pitafi | The Express Tribune Welfare Work and Politics of Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16976.pdf) By Masooda Bano | Economic & Political Weekly Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:27 PM The problem lies with you (http://tribune.com.pk/story/315447/the-problem-lies-with-you/) By Bina Shah | The Express Tribune Living in Pakistan, I am unable to decide whether its people truly want honesty and transparency, or lies and corruption. I think the majority of our people have chosen dishonesty as a way of life. From the richest to the middle class to the poor, we live in hypocrisy, mendacity, and squalor. I think we prefer it that way. Pakistanis are truly addicted to lying. Its almost an automatic reflex. We do not love the truth. For those of you who tell me this is true the world over, I only know the environment in which I live, which is Pakistan. And I havent seen people like this anywhere else. Perhaps this is because telling the truth, being moral, being good, is hard work. And we are not brave enough for that. This is our national character, this is how the world perceives us. We had better face up to it, rather than hiding in denial. In truth, we are a cowardly nation. Afraid of the truth, afraid of hard work, afraid of consequences. Each human being has these tendencies. But in Pakistan, we indulge them, instead of striving to overcome them. Political parties, mullahs, intelligence agencies, bureaucrats, did not create this culture of dishonesty. They took advantage of it.

And nuclear might, and strong armies, and full coffers will not make us a strong nation, will not make us strong or good people. Instead of working hard to overcome our difficulties we cry and point the finger of blame at others. We still havent faced up to ourselves. So when you ask whats wrong with Pakistan, realise that the sickness is within ourselves. Each and every one of us. You students who choose to plagiarise and cheat, the problem lies with you. You men and women who enter into marriage under false pretenses, the problem lies with you. You people who make yourselves feel strong by thinking yourselves suprerior, the problem lies with you. You who look down on the poor while admiring the rich, the problem lies with you. You who allow religion to give you a sense of false complacency, the problem lies with you. You who pander to the powerful and the mighty, and ignore the weak and the frightened, the problem lies with you. Who are your gods? Not Allah, surely. Your gods are flawed beings who you admire and worship, and your own base selves. You who chastise your children, but never spend time with them, explaining right from wrong, the problem lies with you. You who assuage your children with toys and electronics, cars and jewels, the problem lies with you. Stop thinking the problem is the army, the politicians, the mullahs, the nation. The problem is us. We are the problem. The same students who plagiarise their papers, who cheat in their exams, are clamoring at rallies screaming for Inquilab. The same women and men who point fingers at the immoral leaders are cheating on their spouses. The same men who cry against the feudals and industrialists are cheating on their taxes and not paying their electricity bills. The same people who donate so much money to the poor are underpaying their servants. Each and every person in Pakistan contributes to this system. We are the problem. And each person who says, Not me, Im honest is the biggest liar of all. Including myself.

Hope in despair (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85362&Cat=9) By Beelam Ramzan | The News New year but with dark clouds overhead (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\03\story_3-1-2012_pg3_5) By Babar Ayaz | Daily Times Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:33 PM Pak polity and its throne of bayonets (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/pakpolity-and-its-throne-bayonets-402) By Sumit Ganguly | Deccan Chronicle Rumours are again rife in Islamabad that President Asif Ali Zardari, to assert control over the

overweening military establishment, may fire both the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D), Ahmed Shuja Pasha, and the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. It is, of course, an open question about whether or not he will be able to assert such authority even though he formally commands the requisite powers to do so. Tragically, the pattern of civil-military relations in Pakistan is such that the stated prerogatives of the elected leadership have meant little in practice. As is well known, the military asserted control as early as 1958. A pliant judiciary then proceeded to grant its imprimatur to the coup under the ill-conceived doctrine of necessity. Since that time, barring brief interregnums, the military establishment has remained primus inter pares within the polity. Worse still, under the tenure of Gen. Musharraf, it managed to penetrate virtually every facet of the state and beyond. In so doing it extended the overreach that had its genesis under the scrofulous rule of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. Undoing their disastrous legacies will not be an easy task for any civilian leader. That said, what explains the markedly divergent trajectories of India and Pakistan given that they both emerged from the detritus of British colonial rule in South Asia? Obviously, the common legacy explains little or nothing. Otherwise why would the Indian military remain subservient to civilian authority and why are their Pakistani counterparts virtually contemptuous of the same? The answers must be sought elsewhere. The roots of the two different civil-military dispensations must necessarily be traced to the nationalist movements that spawned the two states. It is worth recalling that the Indian nationalist movement, under the extraordinary tutelage of Mahatma Gandhi, was transformed into a massbased, democratic movement that sought to represent every segment of Indian society. Consequently, the habits of democratic argument, debate and negotiation became an essential feature of Indias political culture. Subsequently, Gandhis chosen lieutenant, Jawaharlal Nehru, also displayed extraordinary sagacity as Independence approached. He deftly defended the men and women of Subhas Chandra Boses ill-fated INA at the famous Red Fort trial. However, he also promptly cashiered them in the aftermath of the trials. In his judgment, these individuals had violated the oath of office, and hence could not be relied upon to remain loyal to civil authority. Worse still, they might sow political discord in the ranks of a post-Independence Indian military. Finally, given the impeccable credentials of the Indian leadership that assumed office following British withdrawal, the Indian military had to earn its nationalist spurs during the first Kashmir war. Pakistan, alas, was not so blessed. Its nationalist movement was woven around the autocratic and charismatic leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. His party, the Muslim League, did not come to enjoy the benefits of internal democracy. Furthermore, it failed to develop a mass following amongst all Muslim communities in the British Indian Empire. Instead, Jinnah, through his very adroit use of fears of Hindu domination, managed to forge a new nation. However, the Muslim Leagues lack of internal democracy, its absence of a mass political base and its failure to devise any blueprints for the governance of a new state, left the country in a most tenuous position after independence. When faced with the colossal tasks of melding a range of ethnic communities and a degree of Indian hostility, its civilian leadership proved to be ill-equipped. As public order broke down the bureaucracy in concert with the military chose to bypass the anaemic civilian authorities and seized the reins of power. Since the elitist civilian leadership lacked significant public legitimacy and the vast majority of the populace was unaware of their political rights as citizens, the organisers of the coup met little resistance. Once ensconced in office the military showed scant interest in bolstering civilian institutions and instead proceeded to eviscerate them. Furthermore, it embellished the security threats to the nascent state from its neighbour to legitimise its rule. It also exploited the Kashmir dispute to rally popular opinion. Over time the military helped generate an authoritarian political culture that neatly dovetailed with the countrys mostly feudal political order. Not surprisingly such an orientation towards politics blighted the growth of independent civilian political institutions, hobbled mass political participation and reinforced atavistic social beliefs and practices. Consequently, even when civilian governments came to the fore the overwhelming prerogatives of the military remained mostly intact. Some leaders made feeble, quixotic attempts at civil-military reform. However, these were ill-conceived, hasty or idiosyncratic. Given their haphazard features and the asymmetry of power, the military establishment almost inevitably prevailed. Pakistan, yet again, is at another critical turning point in its tortured history of civil-military relations. The standing of the military has taken a severe battering following the disclosure that

Laden had a safe haven within a stones throw of Pakistans premier military academy. Furthermore, the militarys overconfidence has led it to grossly mishandle relations with the US. This milieu may actually prove propitious for the civilian regime to forthrightly assert its privileges and thereby embark upon a new approach to civil-military relations. Can it gird its loins to undertake such a Herculean effort? The writer holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilisations at Indiana University Whither an independent judiciary? (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\03\story_3-1-2012_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Intrigue and national security (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85578&Cat=9) By Shamshad Ahmad | The News Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:39 PM Sindh Terror Assessment 2012 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/02012012-pakistan-sindh-terrorassessment-2012-analysis/) South Asia Terrorism Portal On December 12, 2011, the Gadap Town Police in Karachi, the Provincial capital of Sindh, rescued 53 children chained in an underground dungeon at a seminary, the Jamia Masjid Zakaria Kandhelwi Madrassa Arabia, situated in the Afghan Basti in the Sohrab Goth area of Karachi. These children had been chained for 30 days. Unearthing tales of torture, the Police revealed that the chained captives received indoctrination from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) instructors, preparing them to join the outfits jihad (holy war) on the Afghan front. One of the rescued students stated, We are being made mujahedeen (holy warriors) here. We are being made Taliban here. They say you should get training we will send you to fight. An unnamed Police official told the Press, The rescued students included kids as young as seven years old and 21 teenagers, and further revealed that the chained students were beaten and barely fed. Location of Sindh in Pakistan This gory incident is only the tip of the iceberg. There are more than 1,935 seminaries in Sindh, of which 1,800 are in Karachi alone. Crucially, most of the seminaries in Karachi are run by religious political parties that preach sectarianism and extremist Islamism, destabilizing both internal order in the country and regional security. Karachi, a city of migrants, is, today, a fragmented city. Karachis violent landscape has long been scarred by ethnic and sectarian conflicts, in addition to conflicts, and is plagued by extortion and politically motivated crimes as well. The Mohajirs (migrants from India, who came to Karachi during Partition) are supported by the militant Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), while Pashtuns constitute the political elite of the Awami National Party (ANP). A multiplicity of armed radical formations prominently including, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Sunni Tehreek (ST), and TTP dominate life in Sindhs capital city. Significantly, however, out of the 23 Districts in the Province, it is only Karachi which is constantly rocked by acts of ethnic and political violence, including an endless stream of target killings. In fact, all 1,048 terrorism-related fatalities in the Province, recorded by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP, all data till December 25) through 2011, have occurred in Karachi alone. The fatalities included 923 civilians, 60 Security Force (SF) personnel and 65 militants. Fatalities in 2010 stood at 172. The 2011 data includes Targeted Killings, which many believe are carried out by the terrorists, backed by warring political parties, while SATP data till 2010 excluded this category. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) had recorded 749 fatalities in Targeted Killings through 2010, and 490 in the first seven months of 2011. Some of the major incidents of violence in Karachi through 2011 included: December 9: Three Rangers were killed while four sustained serious injuries in a blast that occurred near Safura Chowrangi in the Gulistan-e-Jauhar area of Karachi. September 19: At least eight people were killed in a suicide car bomb attack targeting Senior

Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation Department (CID), Chaudhry Aslam, in the Darakhshan area of Karachi. August 18: Politically motivated ethnic violence claimed at least 27 lives in Karachi. August 1: 40 people, including activists of the MQM and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), were killed and several others were injured in various parts of Karachi. July 8: At least 35 people were killed and several were wounded when unidentified assailants attacked passenger buses and went on shooting sprees in several neighbourhoods in Karachi. April 21: At least 18 people were killed and 41 sustained injuries in a powerful blast that ripped through Rami Club building near Ghaas Mandi area of Lyari locality in Karachi. Karachi has, indeed, the unfortunate distinction of being the worst affected District in all of terrorridden Pakistan. The fatalities in Karachi exceed the fatalities in the entire province of Punjab (137) and Balochistan (672), and almost equal those in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (1,191). Unsurprisingly, Khalid Tawab, Vice President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, notes, There is law in Karachi but there is no order. HRCP Chairperson Asma Jahangir on August 23, 2011, observed that armed men from all political parties were involved in extortion and Target Killings on the roads of Karachi, making the city a living hell. The heads of all the parties would have to sit together to find solution to the crisis of Karachi where people of all parties were playing a game of death, she added. At the root of this sectarian, ethnic and political violence is the bhatta (extortion) system that has been prevalent in Karachi for the past two decades. The struggle is for the control of the countrys economic hub. Karachi accounts for over 50 per cent of the total revenue collected by the Federal Bureau of Revenue, and accounts for about 20 per cent of Pakistans Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Media reports indicate that all the major political parties participate in the collection of bhatta from their areas of dominance. Turf wars over control of bhatta among various parties have instigated target killings and gang wars. Prominent among the various criminal gangs operating in Karachi are the Rehman Dakait Group, Arshad Pappu Group, D Company (Dawood Ibrahim Group), the Shoaib Group and the the Lyari Gang. The Lyari Gang has been among the most active in extortion, drug peddling and gambling related killings, backed by the political groups like the Peoples Aman (Peace) Committee (PAC), the Kachchi Raabita Committee (KRC) and elements within the local administration. Gang wars are the defining feature of the underdeveloped Lyari neighbourhood, making it a virtual no-go area for common people. Regrettably, as one unnamed Police officer told the media, narcotics and gambling dens in Karachi were run under the patronage of Police officers, often up to the highest ranks. Enormously compounding the problem are the various sectarian-terrorist groupings operating in the city. These include LeJ, SSP, Jundullah, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Arakan (HuJI-A), Harkat-ulMujahedeen-al-Alami (HuMA), ST, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), Jafaria Alliance (JA), and the more recent, but increasingly visible TTP. Confirming the presence of TTP in Karachi, Federal Minister of the Interior Rehman Malik stated, on July 8, 2011, Intelligence Agencies have identified presence of the TTP in Karachi and the Government is working on it. On December 19, 2011, the CID arrested six TTP suspects and recovered weapons from their possession from different places, including the Korangi Industrial Area, Sohrab Goth and Saddar areas of Karachi. Officials said that the accused were associated with the TTP and were providing logistic support to TTP militants who arrived in the city from tribal areas. Apart from sectarian-terrorist groups, Karachi also provides space to mainstream religious groups such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Jamaat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JuP), Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JuI), Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith, Jamaat Ghurba-e-Ahle Hadith, Jamaat-ul-Muslimeen (JM), Dawat-eIslami (DI) and Tableeghi Jamaat (TJ). Many of these groups have direct linkages with armed extremist formations, and all of them have been instrumental in shaping the religious-sectarianextremist landscape in Karachi, and in fuelling ethno-political conflicts. Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:41 PM

Conspicuously, the religious-political-criminal groups involved in terrorizing Karachi have been aided and abated by the huge and unhindered inflow of arms and ammunition into the city. During a debate in the Senate on January 18, 2011, it was revealed that there were no less than an estimated two million weapons in Karachi alone. Abuse of a lax and deeply corrupted licensing system has enormously facilitated illegal arms possession. On August 1, 2010, Interior Minister Malik had claimed that some people in Karachi are keeping around 50 weapons on a single license. On August 8, 2011, in the middle of a wave of escalating violence, Malik had claimed that Karachi would be deweaponised in phases, and that all arms licenses issued by the Ministry of Interior would stand cancelled with effect from September 1, 2011. He added, further, that no arms licenses, except those issued by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), a Federal Department of the Government of Pakistan which has now been authorised to issue arms license, would be valid. Malik also stressed that criminals carrying illegal arms would be tried under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the Arms Ordinance, 1969. Possession of illegal weapons would be a non-bailable offence, with a minimum punishment of seven years, going up to life, imprisonment. A reward scheme was also announced for informers, with PKR 20,000 on offer for the recovery of automatic weapons and PKR 50,000 for heavy weapons. There have been repeated earlier attempts by the Government to de-weaponise Karachi, but each of these failed to accomplish their objectives. Partial data compiled by SATP has recorded 57 incidents of arms and ammunition recovery in Karachi in 2011, of which 33 incidents occurred after Maliks August Declaration on deweaponisation. The recoveries included Kalashnikovs, hand grenades, suicide jackets, TT pistol, and other sophisticated weaponry. The estimate of over two million weapons in circulation in the city, however, indicates clearly that these recoveries do not even begin to scratch the surface of the problem. Evidently failing to deal effectively with the situation, Malik has started making allegations about foreign hands in the Karachi violence. On July 17, 2011, even before his de-weaponisation drive was initiated, he had already declared, The use of Israeli-made weapons indicates foreign hands behind the Karachi unrest. Over 200 persons have been arrested and Israeli-made weapons, including AK-45, have been recovered from them. It proves that foreign hands are behind the unrest in Karachi. Weapons are being brought to Karachi from abroad. Not only weapons, even target killers also were coming from outside. Though the SFs have managed to arrest as many as 1,979 suspects through 2011 [till December 25], the core issues of weaponisation, ethnic violence, political patronage and sectarian strife continue to haunt Karachi. The courts, in any event, operate a turnstile system, quickly releasing a majority of those arrested, even as enforcement agencies fail to build an effective case against the accused. It is evident that peace cannot be restored to Karachi without the elimination of millions of illegal weapons, the extortion racket that is running the politics of Sindh, and the rampage of armed criminal and Islamist extremist groupings. On January 19, 2011, civil society activists and business representatives called for the complete de-weaponisation of Karachi in order to control target killings. Zia Ahmad Awan, President Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid, thus demanded, all the arms licenses should be cancelled and all the illegal weapons should be recovered across the board; the criminals should be treated as criminals irrespective of party affiliations and sympathies. The patronage extended to armed and extremist political, ethnic, sectarian and criminal groups has shattered the structures of society in Karachi. Before the province sinks deep into a civil war, the coalition Government of Sindh, comprising of the PPP, MQM and the ANP, will have to abandon its old policy of protecting terrorist and criminal elements, dismantle the bhatta system, and work towards the demilitarization of the population. Unfortunately, each of these political formations has deep vested interests in the perpetuation of these insidious systems and structures, and there is little reason to believe, despite escalating violence and fatalities, that effective action is now imminent. Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:49 PM Shifting Gears with Pakistan on Afghanistan (http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/shifting-gears-with-pakistan-on-afghanistan) By Lisa Curtis | Heritage Foundation

The Obama Administration has been banking on Pakistani cooperation with its strategy to start a political reconciliation process inside Afghanistan as it withdraws U.S troops from the battlefield and shifts responsibility for security operations to the Afghan forces. Pakistani leaders have demonstrated little interest in assisting the U.S. with such efforts, however, and it is time for U.S. policymakers to consider alternative policy options. U.S. Strategy Thus Far The U.S. has focused most of its diplomatic efforts with Pakistan in recent years on trying to find common ground on Afghanistan and encouraging better ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan on one hand and India and Pakistan on the other. The U.S. has also sought to enhance its civilian assistance programs to Pakistan, mainly through the KerryLugarBerman legislation passed in 2009 that called for $7.5 billion in economic aid over a five-year period. At the same time, the U.S has intensified drone missile attacks in Pakistans tribal areas, removing key al-Qaeda leaders from the battlefield and disrupting the groups ability to plot, plan, and train for international terrorist operations. The U.S. has also enhanced its unilateral intelligence operations inside Pakistan, which ultimately resulted in the successful operation to eliminate Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May. While the elimination of bin Laden marked a major step forward for the U.S in its fight against global terrorism, Pakistani military leaders reacted angrily to the fact that the U.S. acted alone without informing Pakistan, exposing a major disconnect in the relationship. Instead of seeking to explain how the worlds most wanted terrorist could have lived under the nose of the Pakistani military for so many years, Pakistani leaders have reacted defensively and continue to portray the operation as a grievance that Pakistan holds against the U.S. Pakistan : Intransigence on Afghanistan and Internal Chaos There are several signs that Pakistan is increasingly reluctant to play a positive role in establishing peace in Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan appears more inclined to pursue an independent strategy that involves retaining support for the Afghan Taliban leadership, headquartered in Quetta, and its allied Haqqani network of militants that operate out of the tribal border areas of Pakistan. For several years, the U.S. sought to prevail on the Pakistani military to take on Haqqanis sanctuary in North Waziristan. It is now clear that the Pakistani military has no intention of doing so even as the Haqqanis become more audacious in their attacks against U.S. interests in Afghanistan, including the U.S. embassy in September. Pakistan is reportedly engaging in peace talks with militants, including the ruthless Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is responsible for scores of attacks on Pakistani civilians and security personnel, a suicide bombing that killed several CIA officers in Afghanistan in December 2009, and the Times Square bombing attempt in May 2010. In mid-October, an All Parties Conference led by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani passed a resolution endorsing talks with Pakistani Taliban groups. A week ago, the deputy chief of the TTP, Faqir Muhammad, declared that the terrorist group was in talks with the Pakistani government and that these talks were going very well so far. If these reports are true, it would seem that the Pakistani government has learned little from its past mistakes of trying to strike peace deals with terrorists intent on undermining the Pakistani state. In early 2009, the Pakistan military (with backing from the central government) pursued a peace deal with the pro-Taliban militant group, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSMMovement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law). In April of that same year, the pro-Taliban militants moved from the Swat Valley into neighboring districts, revealing their intentions of expanding influence throughout the country. The Pakistani army finally deployed paramilitary troops to the region to retake the territory in bloody military operations that temporarily displaced more than 2 million Pakistanis. A prominent Pakistani daily ran an editorial this week declaring that talking to the militants is a profoundly unwise idea and noting that, in the past, the Taliban have used them as a ruse to regroup and then return to action as soon as they have regained a position of strength. At the same time that the military is apparently conducting negotiations with the TTP, it is also allowing tensions with the U.S. to escalate, possibly beyond the point of repair. Following an

accidental strike that tragically killed 24 Pakistani troops along the Afghan border on November 26, senior Pakistani military officials claimed the attack was deliberate and immediately closed down NATO supply lines running through Pakistan and forced the U.S. to vacate an air base in Baluchistan. While Pakistans frustration over the attack is understandable, the insistence that it was deliberate is not. The military situation along the AfghanistanPakistan border lacks clarity, and it is often difficult to determine where enemy fire originates. Afghan insurgents on the Pakistan side are known to fire from within close range of Pakistani army posts. The other negative trend in Pakistan is the brewing civilmilitary crisis that will likely make it more difficult for the U.S. to engage productively with Pakistan. In a controversy now referred to as memogate, the civilian leadership is under pressure because of allegations made by Pakistani American businessman Mansoor Ijaz, who claims that former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani used him to send a memo to U.S. officials asking them to prevent a potential military coup. Retired Admiral Mike Mullen, formerly Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he dismissed Ijazs memo and never took any action based on it. U.S. officials have also contradicted Ijazs claim that Pakistani President Zardari knew about the bin Laden raid before it occurred. The other curious aspect of the Ijaz affair is that Ijaz himself has been extremely critical of the Pakistani military and intelligence service in his writings and television interviews and has yet to credibly explain why he is suddenly turning on the civilian government. Despite the many questions surrounding Ijaz and his claims, Pakistans Supreme Court has taken up the case, and it is possible that Haqqani could be charged with treason. Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:52 PM Adapting U.S. Strategy to Realities in Pakistan The negative developments inside Pakistan over the past few months do not bode well for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The U.S. can no longer sugarcoat Pakistans unhelpful policies of supporting the Afghan insurgents who are plunging the region into deeper chaos. In this difficult context, the U.S. should: Shift more of its diplomatic attention to working with NATO partners to develop a strategy that brings more pressure to bear on Pakistan to end its support for Afghan insurgents and to assist international efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan. The international community must not allow peace efforts in Afghanistan to be held hostage to Pakistani demands. The Pakistani leadership must demonstrate a willingness to squeeze insurgents on their soil and use leverage to bring them to compromise with Afghan authorities and coalition partners. If Pakistan continues to pursue an independent Afghanistan policy that involves continued support to insurgents, the U.S. and NATO partners must look beyond Pakistan and toward other like-minded partners in the region to help bring peace to the country. This strategy will work only if the U.S. and international partners are willing to continue to support the Afghan authorities with robust financial and diplomatic support after 2014, when U.S. combat forces are due to withdraw from the country. Continue to prioritize development of alternative supply routes to Afghanistan. Pakistan already shut down the NATO supply routes for an indefinite period following the November 26 NATO strike. The U.S. must continue to build up the Northern Distribution Network and consult closely with the Central Asian states, which are also worried about the potential for the Taliban to regain power in Afghanistan. Slow down the Afghan withdrawal process to allow U.S. and NATO commanders on the ground more time to consolidate gains made in the South and to ensure that Afghan forces are sufficiently ready to take control of the nations security. Media reports suggest that U.S. NATO Commander General John Allen would like to see a freeze in U.S. troop withdrawals in 2012. General Allen also reportedly supports a strategy to shift more quickly to an Afghan lead in security operations, which would provide the advantage of allowing U.S. forces to backstop the Afghans for a longer period of time, as opposed to withdrawing U.S. forces too quickly and risking the gains of the past 18 months. A precipitous U.S. withdrawal could lead to civil war or the Taliban regaining influence, which would strengthen Islamist militant forces throughout the region and could even lead to a revival of al-Qaeda. Stay out of Pakistans civilmilitary struggles, but also quell disinformation involving the U.S.

government that is being used to discredit Pakistani officials. The Obama Administration deserves credit for correcting the record on Mansoor Ijazs claim that President Zardari knew about the bin Laden raid before it took place. Elements in Pakistan appear to be using the perception that Pakistani civilian officials are close to the U.S. to harm their reputations, which is damaging to overall U.S.Pakistan ties and will make it more difficult to preserve diplomatic relations between the two countries in the future. Go Around Pakistan If It Will Not Cooperate While it is in Americas interest to encourage stability in Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of 170 million, it is also vital to U.S. national security that international terrorists be rooted out from both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. must make clear that political reconciliation in Afghanistan is desirablebut only if it contributes to the ultimate goal of ensuring that Afghanistan can never again serve as a safe haven for international terrorists. Without a shift in Pakistans policies to encourage a genuine reconciliation process inside Afghanistan, the U.S. must be prepared to pursue a strategy in which it works more closely with Afghanistans other neighbors. Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation

Pakistan, US assume less cooperation in future (http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_PAKISTAN_US? SITE=ORROS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) By KATHY GANNON and ANNE GEARAN | Associated Press Whys it so hard to say sorry? (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/02/whys-it-so-hard-to-saysorry.html) By Irfan Husain | Dawn Mullah Omar: Last Man Standing (http://the-diplomat.com/2012/01/03/mullah-omar-last-manstanding/) By Luke Hunt | The Diplomat Bargaining bill (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/bargaining-bill/894923/) Indian Express Editorial Still a long way to go (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/02/still-a-long-way-to-go.html) Dawn Editorial Macaca 01-02-2012, 08:58 PM Mayday! Mayday! Part III (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/grey-matter/entry/maydaymayday-part-iii) By Krishna Kumar Mangalam | Times of India The economic and political disarray of Pakistan is complete. Yet, the army, the only stable power centre in Pakistan, refuses to read the writing on the wall and continues to patronize terror outfits which have openly vowed to destroy India, Israel and the US. For an army which is bankrolled by the US, to turn back on its patron and provide a safe house to its most-wanted terrorist for over six years, can only be termed as an utter loss of sanity or, more alarmingly, a complete indoctrination into the jihadi mindset. But, Pakistan is no stranger to brinkmanship. This has been its most favoured diplomatic tool, especially in its dealings with India. Just consider: Kargil war Pakistan sent its Northern Light Infantry into the Kargil sector of Jammu & Kashmir, which resulted in an armed skirmish between the two armies in May-July 1999. This was a grave misadventure, as it could have triggered a nuclear conflagration in the subcontinent. Nawaz Sharif was the prime minister and General Pervez Musharraf the chief of army staff. The only question at that time was whether General Musharraf confided in Nawaz Sharif before his leap of faith. Indian Parliament attack The Indian Parliament came under attack by five heavily armed terrorists, allegedly belonging to the LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed, on December 13, 2001, while both the Houses were in session. Twelve people were killed. India mobilized its troops along the border and there was a nerve-racking 10-month stand-off with Pakistan. This, too, could have led to a nuclear confrontation. General Pervez Musharraf was the president and the chief of army staff.

Nuclear proliferation The father of Pakistans nuclear weapons programme, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQK), was implicated in 2004 for nuclear proliferation to North Korea, Iran and Libya (and possibly Syria). General Pervez Musharraf was the president and chief of army staff at that time. Of course, AQK was actively involved in these activities from the mid-80s; but then, after 1977, the nuclear and missile programmes of Pakistan were always under the thumb of the Pakistan army. AQK, clearly, was the fall guy. 26/11 On November 26, 2008, Mumbai came under attack by 10 heavily armed terrorists who rampaged through the citys landmark destinations and hotels killing at least 170 people and injuring 300 more. The lone terrorist captured alive and the radio intercepts between the terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan revealed the active involvement of the ISI in the attack. Asif Ali Zardari was less than three months into his presidency and the chief of army staff was General Ahfaq Parvez Kayani. Again, the only question left unanswered was whether Zardari knew about this terror attack stage-managed by his army and the ISI. Whodunit Osama bin Laden was hunted down by the US Navy SEALS on May 2, 2011, and it came as no surprise that he was hiding in the garrison town of Abbottabad, a few miles from the Pakistan Military Academy. But the US seemed to be perplexed, or so they pretended; the world community, too, seemed bemused and wanted the Pakistan administration to come clean. The Pakistan administration, as usual, disclaimed all knowledge of OBL living on its territory, in a tone of injured innocence interspersed with the occasional belligerence of self-righteous indignation. The question, which any Indian can tell is not one whether Pakistan knew OBL was on their territory, but one whether the Pakistan civilian administration knew that OBL was enjoying the hospitality of its army and the ISI in the garrison town of Abbottabad for six long years. The US, for its own reasons, is fighting shy of calling a spade a spade and consoling itself with pinning the blame of harbouring OBL on some rogue army and ISI elements. It is a no brainer that if this assumption were true then these rogue army and ISI elements must be very high up in those establishments foot soldiers will not have the chutzpah to pull this off. Admiral comes clean Just before he retired from service in September, the much decorated chairman of Joint Chiefs of (US) Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, denounced Pakistan for playing a double game in the US-led war against terror in Afghanistan and called the Haqqanis a veritable arm of Pakistans ISI. The Haqqani network, which operates in North Waziristan tribal belt of Pakistan and in the contiguous areas of Afghanistan, is allied to the Taliban and the OBLs al-Qaida.

Shared waters & glacial melt (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/01/shared-waters-glacial-melt.html) By Naseer Memon | Dawn Is Babbar Khalsa plotting a terror strike in poll-bound Punjab? (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/is-babbar-khalsa-plotting-a-terror-strike-in-poll-boundpunjab/20120102.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Macaca 01-02-2012, 09:03 PM India's Maoists Going Urban? (http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=4090&Itemid=404) By Neeta Lal | Asia Sentinel Indias Naxalite rebels, for years bottled up in the poverty-stricken middle and eastern regions of the country, have forged a new strategy to infiltrate into Indias premier industrial hubs, intelligence officials say. According to the Union Home Ministry, the Maoists have formulated a major change in strategy designed to further expand out to target Indias commercial areas including the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra, the countrys commercial capital of Mumbai and the diamond hubs of Surat and Vadodara. The intelligence officials say the new strategy is to zero in on the countrys vulnerable industrial pockets. Large numbers of ultras have been reported to have been apprehended and interrogated in Maharashtra recently, including 10 Maoists from West Bengal in the southern city of Pune. They

were said to be masquerading as casual laborers in different industrial units. Security agencies suggest that the Naxalites, formally known as the Communist Party of India (Maoist) are likely to further expand their turf through what they call a Golden Corridor Committee. The rebels urban unit, they say, is recruiting cadres in different cities of Maharashtra and Gujarat. The underlying message is ominous -- that western India, which was hitherto considered relatively safe from the groups terror activities -- will now be one of the eight strategic areas for their operations. Already 221 Maoist violence-related deaths have been recorded in Maharashtra between 2008 and November 2011. The state has reported 51 deaths this year, a rise from 45 in 2010. These fresh revelations highlight the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance governments continued inability to tackle the Maoist menace. The coalition branded the group a terrorist organization on 22 June 2009. As of June 2010, 83 districts in nine states had been identified as Naxalite targets. The Naxalites currently operate across a red corridor stretching from the southern state of Andhra Pradesh to the central state of Chhattisgarh and into West Bengal, bordering Nepal and Bhutan. They have also forged close fraternal ties with northeastern insurgent groups like the Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF) and Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur while tapping Nagaland for procurement of their ammunition. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described the Maoist insurgency as the biggest internal security challenge since Independence. In 2009 alone, the group launched over 1,000 attacks and killed 600 people. The insurgents started their armed struggle in 1967 with a peasant revolt in Naxalbari village in West Bengal. After regrouping in the 1980s, they recruited thousands of poor villagers, arming them with rifles snatched from police. The rebels currently have an estimated 20,000 combatants, including 6,000-8,000 hardcore fighters. The Naxals have been charged with running an extortion economy under the garb of a popular revolution. They extract enormous sums of money from mining companies, police say. According to a Reuters report, the rebels extort about US$300 million from companies in India every year to fund their movement. The effect of the insurgency has taken a heavy toll on business. Work on a US$7 billion steel plant by Indias third largest steel producer, JSW Steel Ltd, has been delayed. Rebel strikes have also slowed work on two separate plants by the worlds leading steelmakers Arcelor Mittal and the South Korean-owned Posco in eastern India. Two years ago, the Indian government launched `Operation Green Hunt, a coordinated military operation to seek to cleanse the eastern states of Maoists. The operation now covers most Maoist strongholds like Chhattisgarh's Bastar region, southern Orissa, the Jangalmahal area of West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar. The operation has succeeded in eliminating several Maoist leaders and turning popular sentiment against them to some extent. The military has also dealt a blow to Maoist cadres by killing top leaders including Sende Rajamouli, Patel Sudhakaran Reddy, Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad and Kishenji. Four tier-two leaders Narayan Sanyal, Sushil Roy, Amit Bagchi and Kobad Ghandy are currently in jail. Experts describe Kishenji's recent death as a decisive blow to Maoists rank and file. However, observers point out that while Operation Green Hunt has dented the Maoists militarily and eroded their support base, it has not tackled the root of the problem. The governments anti-Maoist military operations have ravaged entire villages, destroying the villagers habitats and livelihoods, said Pradeep Mahanto, formerly with the Central Reserve Police Force. This has deepened the villagers resentment against the state. However, one benefit has accrued to the government. Unlike in the past, Mahanto says, the villagers no longer see the Maoists as Robin Hood-style saviors. Theyve seen how the ultras deserted them, hiding in forests while Operation Green Hunt was on. This has welled up public

angst against them. Another manifestation of popular anger against the Maoists came during the November by-elections in the tribal-dominated Umarkote constituency in the eastern state of Orissa (now called Odisha). The polls saw thousands of voters turn up in defiance of a Maoist call to boycott the elections. But why has the Indian government not been able to fully contain the Maoist menace? Theorists suggest that the rebels get clandestine foreign support and that their agenda is scripted outside the country. RSN Singh, author of the book `Asian Strategic and Military Perspective, writes that the Maoist leadership is not a bunch of alienated people. They are aided and abetted by China, he charges. For China, Singh writes, the Maoists are the most reliable tool in the proxy war that it is waging against India. In the event of an Indo-China armed conflict the Maoists would act as fifth columnists. Experts say a logistical problem in managing the ultras threat in India is an unambiguous overlap of authority. While national security in India comes under the domain of the central home ministry, state governments too have to be involved in military strikes at their level which creates multiple points of authority for those manning the anti-Maoist operations. Scholar Althea Carbon writes in her award-winning essay, Naxalism - The Biggest Security Threat to India - that the movement highlights various underlying weaknesses of Indias governance, political institutions and socio-economic structure. In other words, the Naxalites socio-economic alienation and their economic and political inequity cant be tackled through military force alone. The problem calls for a three-pronged solution: social and economic development, multi-lateral dialogue and military force, Carbon suggests. Currently, however, the main instrument employed by the government to address the threat is increased deployment of the armed forces. This creates more problems than it solves. For instance, the enforcement of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act -- which endows limitless power upon police personnel to shoot anybody they perceive to be a `threat -- is a travesty of human rights. The act has created widespread resentment against the military among the tribals, who then end up supporting the ultras. Its a classic Catch 22, sums up Mahanto. The multi-faceted Naxalite problem requires a nuanced and sustainable solution, not brute force.

India: Manipur Terror Assessment Year 2012 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/28122011-indiamanipur-terror-assessment-year-2012-analysis/) South Asia Terrorism Portal Why Manipur made the headlines in 2011 (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/why-manipur-madethe-headlines-in-yearend-2011/20111231.htm) By K Anurag | Rediff Macaca 01-02-2012, 09:07 PM Some thoughts on the media (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85579&Cat=9) By Faiz Ahmed Faiz | The News Recently a lady journalist asked me about my opinion about Indian journalists, and I told her that instead of asking me she should ask several people selected at random about their opinion (without disclosing that she is a journalist). I am afraid the majority of the opinions may not be very palatable to journalists. In a Rajya Sabha channel panel discussion, Madhu Kishwar, a senior journalist herself, said that Indian journalists are `bribable and `manipulable who got freebies of land, flats, etc. I do not agree entirely with Madhu Kishwar, because there are many honourable journalists doing their job excellently, but there is a different perception in the public about several others. Traditionally, there were two roles of the media (1) to provide information to the public, and (2) to provide entertainment. In the transitional period of our history through which India is presently

passing (from feudalism to a modern society), and which is a very painful period, there is a third role, that is, to give leadership to the people in the realm of ideas. As regards the first two roles, no doubt the media should also provide some entertainment like music, sports, etc. apart from providing information, but when 90 percent of its coverage goes to entertainment and only 10 percent to the real issues which are basically socio-economic then clearly the Indian media has lost its sense of proportion. Today 80 percent of the Indian people are living in horrible poverty, with massive problems of unemployment, price rise, healthcare, education, housing, etc. and social evils like honour killing, dowry deaths, etc. Yet 90 percent of the media coverage (particularly the electronic media) goes to film stars, fashion parades, pop music, disco dancing, reality shows, cricket, etc. If I had not raised such a hue and cry I am quite sure the recent birth of a film stars child would have been front page headlines, instead of being relegated to the seventh or eighth page due to my protest. While reading John Steinbecks `The Grapes of Wrath (which was about the migration of Oklahoma farmers, who had lost their livelihood in the Great Depression in USA, to California) I was reminded of the terrible agricultural crisis in recent decades in India. Millions of farmers have lost their livelihood (as farming has become uneconomical for the poor and middle peasants) and have fled to cities for jobs which are not there. In England during the Industrial Revolution the displaced peasants got jobs in the newly arising industries. In India there has been in recent years a manufacturing decline or stagnation, and many factories have become real estate. The displaced peasants end up as domestic servants, street hawkers, criminals or beggars, and the girls as prostitutes. Farmers suicides (due to indebtedness, etc.) have crossed a quarter million in 15 years the largest in world history 47 suicides on an average every day, as recorded by the National Crime Records Bureau, which is under the Union Home Ministry, and this may be an underestimate. (See P Sainaths video speech online `Inequality, the Agrarian Crises, and the Media). 860 million Indians are living on 25 rupees a day, and 47 percent of our children are malnourished, a much higher percentage than in sub-Saharan African countries like Ethiopia and Somalia. The gulf between rich and poor has steeply widened in India in the last 20 years. I need not go into the pitiable situation of unemployment, healthcare, etc. This being the sordid picture, is the media justified in devoting most of its coverage to film stars, fashion parades, pop music, cricket and astrology? Is the media not deliberately seeking to divert the attention of the people from the real issues facing the nation to non-issues? Is the Indian media not behaving like Queen Marie Antoinette, who when told that the people do not have bread said that they could eat cake. By promoting superstitions like astrology, instead of rational and scientific ideas, is the media not playing an anti-people role? As regards the third role of the media, that is, giving leadership to the people in the realm of ideas, this is almost totally missing. In the transition period in Europe, from the 17th to 19th centuries, the European media played a glorious historical role, and helped in the transition from feudalism to a modern society. Great writers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Thomas Paine, Junius, John Wilkes, etc. attacked feudal ideas e.g. religious bigotry and despotism, and propagated the (then) revolutionary ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity, and religious freedom. I would like the Indian media to play the same glorious role. Some people say that the media should supply the people what they want. With respect I cannot agree. The media is not an ordinary business which deals in commodities, it deals with ideas. Hence instead of pandering to the low tastes of the Indian masses, who are largely still very backward and steeped in casteism, communalism and superstitions, the Indian media should try to uplift their mental level by spreading rational and scientific ideas, and thus make the Indian masses part of enlightened India. This will win the respect of the Indian people for the media. The great Hindi poet Kabir wrote: Nindak neeray raakhiye,/aangan kuti chawaye. The Indian media should look at my criticism in that spirit. The writer is a retired justice of the Supreme Court of India, currently serving as chairman, Press Council of India

Plural Societies and Imperatives of Change: Interrogating Religion and Development in South Asia (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16970.pdf) By Surinder S Jodhka | Economic & Political Weekly Religions, Democracy and Governance: Spaces for the Marginalised in Contemporary India (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16971.pdf) By Gurpreet Mahajan , Surinder S Jodhka | Economic & Political Weekly Religious Transnationalism and Development Initiatives: The Dera Sachkhand Ballan (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16972.pdf) By Gurharpal Singh | Economic & Political Weekly Social Constructions of Religiosity and Corruption (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16973.pdf) By Vinod Pavarala , Kanchan K Malik | Economic & Political Weekly In the Name of Development: Mapping Faith-Based Organisations in Maharashtra (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16975.pdf) By Surinder S Jodhkaa , Pradyumna Bora | Economic & Political Weekly From Parliamentary to Paramilitary Democracy (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16962.pdf) By | Economic & Political Weekly "Muslim Societies: Rise And Fall" (http://www.countercurrents.org/hamid301211.htm) Book Review By Saiyid Hamid | Countercurrents Macaca 01-02-2012, 09:12 PM Indias drug trials fuel consent controversy (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/indias-drug-trials-fuelcontroversy/2011/12/01/gIQAAcCrUP_story.html) By Rama Lakshmi | The Washington Post Two months after he lost his wife to Alzheimers disease, 80-year-old Sharad Geete made a shocking discovery. The free drugs his wife, Sheela, had been receiving for two years before she died were part of a clinical trial. The doctor told us that the medicines will be given free and that they were going to be launched soon by a foreign company. Not once did he say it was an experiment or a trial. If I knew, would I have taken the risk? asked Geete, sitting in his home in Khandwa, a small town in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Since India eased guidelines for conducting drug trials in 2005, the number of Indians participating has shot up to 150,000 from close to zero, as international drug companies take advantage of lower costs here. But questions about the consent process have fueled fears that many Indians are entering the trials without knowing the risks. A Madhya Pradesh state government probe found that six doctors had violated ethical standards in gaining patients consent for participation in drug trials and did not compensate those who suffered adverse side effects in 76 drug trials on 3,300 patients since 2006, according to results released last June. In the wake of the recent controversies, the Indian Council for Medical Research invited public feedback on draft guidelines about compensation for injuries that occur during clinical research. The consent form that Geete signed said the medicines were part of a study. I was so stressed about my wifes health, I said okay, okay to everything and signed on the form. We never questioned the doctor, we trusted him blindly, Geete said about his wife, who was a singer. She became bedridden and stopped speaking or hearing us. She became a vegetable. Across India, 1,700 people who participated in clinical drug trials died between 2007 and 2010, the governments drug regulatory agency said, although no autopsies were carried out to determine the causes of the deaths. In 2010, 22 families of the dead were compensated by U.S. and European drug companies, ranging from $2,000 to $20,000. Clinical drug trials in 2010 generated business worth $300 million in India, according to the Confederation of Indian Industry. Conducting drug trials here saves the companies almost 40 percent of the total cost of drug development because health-care professionals are cheaper and liability is not very high, analysts said. The large pool of patients with diverse illnesses and doctors who speak English also make it an attractive destination for outsourcing trials.

India is emerging as a hub for drug trials, and Indian patients are like guinea pigs, said C.M. Gulhati, editor of the Monthly Index of Medical Specialities journal. The ethical review panels are bogus, he said in an interview. The drug control authority approves almost all the trial applications without rigorous scrutiny. And poor, unsuspecting patients get duped, while doctors and hospitals earn money. In the central Indian city of Indore that Geete and his wife visited for treatment of Alzheimers, patients participated in trials for Indian subsidiaries of companies including Novartis, Pfizer, Merck, Glaxo SmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, according to documents retrieved by activists using the right-to-information law. U.S. drug companies have conducted trials for Parkinsons disease, seizures, eye infection, and heart and gastric illnesses. A handful of doctors had turned it into a business on the side. And most patients had no idea what was going on, said Anand Rai, a doctor at the government-run M.Y. Hospital and a whistleblower. Many of the trials were conducted on children, mentally ill patients and illiterate people. Rai said he retrieved forms that showed thumb impressions and were countersigned not by independent witnesses but by doctors. The Hindi form was one page long, with difficult words, Raid said, and the English forms he retrieved were about 30 pages long. Last month, Rai said he received an e-mail from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration office at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi seeking specific information on the clincial trials of concern that were conducted in Madhya Pradesh. A Merck spokesman said in an e-mail that the company was aware of the allegations but its subsidiary MSD in India had provided information about their trials to the Indian drug regulatory agency, and was not found liable for any compensation and no deaths were reported in their trials, which have been continuing for five years. A spokesman for Pfizer said that the company canceled its trial in Indore because proper processes were not followed, and that it has produced an audio book in Indian languages that is shared with staff and patients, to educate participants about their rights and responsibilities. People will think twice and thrice before coming to a hospital in Indore now because of this scandal, said Sharad Pandit, chief medical health officer in Indore. But one doctor named in the probe said that all the trials have been ethical and legal, and that the protocols were the same as those followed in South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. The consent process is very detailed, meticulous and standardized. Even less-educated and illiterate patients understand the nuances of blinding, control and randomization, said Apoorva Puranik, a neurologist who said he conducted trials on 40 patients on behalf of MSD, Pfizer and Eisai, a Japanese drug company. The FDA has already approved the new dosage of Eisais Donepezil tablets for patients suffering from Alzheimers disease, partly based on the Indore trials, he said. An FDA spokesman declined to share any information on the drug. Questions about the consent process arose last year in a demonstration project of a vaccine for sexually transmitted cervical cancer carried out by the Seattle-based charity PATH International and the southern Andhra Pradesh state. Hundreds of young school girls were vaccinated after obtaining consent from their teachers and dorm wardens, instead of their parents. The immunization card given to the girls was in English instead of their native language, activists said. PATH International had said the goal of the study was not to assess the efficacy or safety of the vaccine but generate evidence to introduce it into Indias immunization program. But an investigative report by Sama, a New Delhi-based womens health advocacy group, said many young girls suffered from acute stomach aches, headaches and dizziness. The government subsequently stopped the study. Last month in Indore, a government probe recommended that doctors videotape the process of

securing consent, and put up large signs on the hospital walls that inform patients about ongoing drug trials. Meanwhile, health activists across India are collecting signed testimonials from hundreds of drugtrial participants and their families. We will soon launch legal claims against drug companies, said Amulya Nidhi, a health activist with the Health Rights Forum in Indore.

Immunisation push propels India towards victory in war against polio (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/02/india-winning-war-against-polio) By Jason Burke | The Guardian ICG Report On Tamil Women Is Woefully Wrong (http://www.countercurrents.org/paramsothy020112.htm) By Janani Paramsothy | Countercurrents 82-year-old found guilty of raping 10-year-old (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/82year-old-found-guilty-of-raping-10-year-old/articleshow/11345176.cms) TNN Shivering and hungry, on the streets of Delhi (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show1-shivering-and-hungry-on-the-streets-of-delhi/20120102.htm) By A Ganesh Nadar and Priyanka | Rediff India Welcomes 2012 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203462304577135781264787016.html?m od=WSJINDIA_hpp_MIDDLELSMini#slide/1) IndiaRealTime Macaca 01-02-2012, 09:18 PM Grunge in the Ganges (http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/grunge-in-the-ganges/) By DAN MORRISON | International Herald Tribune I needed to do a double and then a triple take to believe my own eyes. Last month, on the last afternoon of a seven-day boat journey down the Ganges River, from Allahabad to Varanasi, my companions and I came upon a waste line pouring raw sewage into the river. The sludge appeared a short distance from Varanasi and just a bit upstream of a water-intake plant where, in a toxic loop, a rumbling diesel pump and four cast-iron pipes transport it back to the homes of local residents. Contaminated drinking water due to poor sanitation is a problem across India and much of the developing world. But it takes either a corps of engineer-saboteurs or an epic dose of incompetence to design a system so obviously harmful as the one I saw that frigid day on the Ganges, especially in a country where as many as half-a-million children die each year from water-borne diseases. This system that unintentionally delivers fecal coliforms into drinking water is a high-contrast example of the challenges facing a new multibillion-dollar effort to clean up the worlds most populous river basin and of the kind of slack public administration that Indians have to contend with every day. Officials say the Indian government has updated its approach after a prior clean-up effort that cost $169 million between 1985 and 2000 but ultimately failed to bring pollution levels within acceptable limits. For example, in September 2010, coliform an indicator of human and animal waste in the Ganges at Allahabad, where millions come each year to immerse themselves, averaged 3,000 times the acceptable level for bathing. Industrial effluent has increased at the city of Kanpur after the rank failure of an ambitious system to treat tannery waste. Indias new plan, which was approved in June and whose first phase will be funded in large part by the World Bank, has a more comprehensive approach than the previous. Instead of narrowly focusing on waste treatment in individual cities, it approaches the Ganges River basin as an integrated whole and aims to maintain an ecologically healthy flow of water amid expected population growth and increasing demand. Its literature resounds with expensive lessons learned. The challenges are huge. Wastewater treatment requires electricity, and power is usually in short supply. Indias cities are growing at rates that far outstrip the capacity of their infrastructure. The central government in Delhi, and the governments of five separate states, with their many departments and bureaucracies, will have to work together as never before. The people who live

along the Ganges will have to learn that even a holy river has limits and that household refuse, industrial waste and corpses would be better disposed of elsewhere. Ecologists say its difficult to overestimate the complexity of the web of actions and considerations that go into saving a river and improving the health of the people who rely on it. In addition to money, political will and technical know-how, I hope this new generation of Ganges defenders has the foresight to avoid foul-ups like the one I saw near Varanasi. Dan Morrison is a journalist and the author of The Black Nile. What's Cooking In India's Kitchens? (http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=4089&Itemid=404) By Shobha Shukla | Asia Sentinel Will the Food Security Bill Fight Hunger? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/will-the-foodsecurity-bill-fight-hunger/) By MALAVIKA VYAWAHARE | India Ink Food as people's right (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2769348.ece) By M. S. SWAMINATHAN | The Hindu All in the name of the farmer (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2769198.ece) By MEKHALA KRISHNAMURTHY | The Hindu BusinessLine Farmer for the future (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/farmer-for-the-future/894931/) By Yoginder K. Alagh | Indian Express Pow, Right in the Fritter (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/02/pow-right-in-the-fritter/) By Rob Mifsud | IndiaRealTime Macaca 01-02-2012, 09:23 PM Is your city smart enough? (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/is-your-city-smartenough/894919/) By Ayesha Khanna | Indian Express The 21st century has been referred to as the urban century. By 2050, over 70 per cent of the worlds population will live in cities. The rate of urbanisation is staggering: more than 400 million people in China and 215 million people in India will migrate to cities by 2015. Todays cities can barely handle the burden of their current populations: core services like energy, water, communications, transportation and public safety are inefficient and increasingly decrepit. The burden on the environment is also profound: cities only occupy 2 per cent of the earths landmass, but account for over 75 per cent of our resource consumption. Indian cities like Delhi and Mumbai will be stretched to breaking point. Management professor C.K. Prahalad famously said in 2009, India needs to build a minimum of 500 new cities urgently. However, it has to be done from scratch to accommodate people who are on the move and to provide them better quality life. Whether India builds new cities, or extends and develops existing ones, it needs a new city governance model that is faster, better, cheaper. Smart cities herald a new age where information technology, not roads, buildings or bridges, will form the core infrastructure. A network of sensors, cameras, wireless devices, data centres and powerful analytics will enable the government to provide more efficient services, maintain a low carbon footprint and create an entrepreneurial environment for its citizens. Given the potential for such intelligent governance, cities with digital infrastructures are called smart cities. Today, there are over 125 smart city projects of varying sizes all over the world, including new cities like Songdo in South Korea and Masdar in the UAE, and existing cities like Stockholm and Rio de Janeiro. It is estimated that over $40 trillion will be spent by 2030 on city infrastructure projects with over $1 trillion invested in smart technologies over the coming decade. India too has declared that it will build seven new smart cities in the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. Meanwhile, the private sector has already started building one new medium sized city (with an average population of half a million people) called Lavasa, nestled in the hills between Mumbai and Pune. After being stalled by environmental protests for one year, construction in Lavasa has recently been given the clearance to restart and the city aspires to both use sustainable design and information technologies to create a model city for Indias burgeoning urban population. Throwing technology at cities will not abate its problems, especially in India. The majority of new cities built to accommodate the new middle class will not be private developments catering primarily to the rich. They will require heavy participation from the government, and corruption, bureaucracy and budgetary constraints make it difficult to execute information infrastructure and integration

projects, the hallmark of smart cities. In fact, viewing a city just through a technological lens is problematic in itself: cities reflect the values and cultures of the communities that live in them, not the technologies they use. The original assertion that city governance needs to be faster, better and cheaper, is therefore utterly flawed: first and foremost, city governance needs to have local representation and citizen participation, which is further enabled by efficient and cheap information infrastructure. If the values that governments seek are equity, sustainability, and productivity, to name a few, then the city must strategically build the technological infrastructure that will generate those goals. In existing cities like Mumbai, where people are overflowing and 60 per cent of the population lives in slums, the answer will lie in using people as infrastructure. Using the mobile phones that almost every person in the city carries must be utilised in governing the city. For example, using network analysis, the geolocation function of the phones will enable the transport authority to inform residents of the public transport schedules and to divert traffic as certain areas become more congested than others during the course of the day. Bangalore based non-profit Mapunity, founded by Ashwin Mahesh, leverages just-good-enough cheap information infrastructures generated through a variety of sources to enable citizen participation and government transparency. Mapunitys BTIS (Bangalore Traffic Information System) used mobile phone usage and taxi radio systems to create a GIS infrastructure that reports traffic real-time to citizens via text messages. Responsive systems based on the strategic combination of smart infrastructure and mobile phones should meet three conditions: (i) the privacy of citizen data used must be respected by law; (ii) the government must reach a deal with the telecommunication companies about the terms of using the data gleaned from mobile services; (iii) data from sensors, cameras and government agencies, and from mobile phones, should be made transparent and public so that citizens may innovate new products and services themselves. For new satellite and medium-sized cities, it is easier to design the smart infrastructure in a comprehensive way so that all the government agencies use electronic records that are integrated and governance is transparent. Investments such as data centres, analytics engines and wireless devices for managing the city can be made as part of the initial capital investment. However, care must be taken to use frugal innovation as far as possible even in the creation of new smart cities. Indias smart cities might consist of a patchwork of technology modules that use people as infrastructure and employ analytics to create the information flows that empower citizens and improve city life. The writer is director of the Hybrid Reality Institute, a research and advisory group focused on emerging technologies Is 2012 the year for India's internet? (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16354076) By Rajini Vaidyanathan | BBC The living's not easy (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/SitaramYechury/The-living-snot-easy/Article1-790265.aspx) By Sitaram Yechury | Hindustan Times Stable, for now (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2769352.ece) The Hindu Editorial Testing times for India (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/kamal-morarkasblog/entry/testing-times-for-india) By Kamal M Morarka | Times of India Factory activity jumps to highest since June (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/02/indiaeconomy-factory-pmi-idINDEE80102Y20120102) By Yati Himatsingka | Reuters The Market for Human Organs (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16967.pdf) By Amal Joseph | Economic & Political Weekly Workers Discontent and Form of Trade Union Politics (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16963.pdf) By Maya John | Economic & Political Weekly Indian cinema's growing snob appeal (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/vanita-kohlikhandekar-indian-cinemas-growing-snob-appeal/460516/) By Vanita Kohli-Khandekar | Business Standard Macaca

01-02-2012, 09:27 PM Get Out and Protest for Economic Renewal! (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/02/economics-journal-get-out-and-protest-foreconomic-renewal/) By Rupa Subramanya | IndiaRealTime The end of 2011 witnessed a political establishment fixated on debating a new anticorruption bill thrust upon it by activist Anna Hazare and his team. After much sound and fury, the bill failed to pass, and no one came out ahead. This caps a year in which political debate and discussion were focused on corruption and concerns about repatriating black money abroad. While these dramas were unfolding, eating up policymakers time, no one much bothered with the economy. They were more concerned with counting political gains and losses arguably mostly losses, as things played out. But, partly because the body politic was so distracted, there are now potentially much more damaging economic costs that the country may have to bear in the coming years. To put it sharply: Can India afford another year of wasted parliamentary sessions? Could a thriving economy exist in a country with a dysfunctional political system? It might be possible for a rich country with a well-functioning bureaucracy, and good laws, regulations and institutions in place to do well even in a climate of political gridlock and policy paralysis. A few years ago, for example, Belgium didnt even have a government for about a year but the Belgian economy did alright just the same. Canada until recently had a series of unstable minority governments which didnt manage to pass any major legislation but yet the economy boomed and the country weathered the global financial crisis because it had effective regulators, operating in a strict regulatory environment, who are independent of the politicians. But the situation in India is very different from these rich countries which can function more or less on autopilot. Like other emerging economies, theres a lot of work yet to be done in making the Indian economy globally competitive and ensuring sustained high rates of economic growth. This, in turn, will be necessary to achieve every other social objective most importantly the alleviation of poverty. This past year of policy paralysis in India might not have been so bad if the overall economic picture had been bright. The facts tell the opposite story. Consider the broad macroeconomic picture. According to the latest data, economic growth has fallen to below 7%, with gross domestic product expanding by 6.9% in the third quarter compared to a year earlier. While a respectable growth rate almost anywhere else in the world, its a far cry from all of the talk even a year ago that India would overtake China and jump to double digit growth. Even 7% was seen as a threshold below which the economy wouldnt sink. What is worse, its not forecasted to be much better next year. Double digit growth is a distant mirage that no one is even talking about anymore. But one macroeconomic variable that is solidly in double digits or thereabouts is inflation, which remains persistently high despite the repeated attempts by the countrys central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, to curb it. What makes this especially harmful is that inflation has been most pronounced in the food sector, which gobbles up a large share of a poor familys budget so high inflation has a disproportionately harmful effect on the poor. Recently, the annual rate of food inflation has been dropping, but that is a recent phenomenon that comes after months and months of rising prices. Coupled with this is an Indian rupee apparently in free fall. Asias worst performing currency, it has weakened to more than 50 rupees to the dollar in recent weeks, a trend driven in large measure by foreign investors fleeing the Indian economy and by the inflationary effects of rising global commodity prices, especially oil. This combination of macroeconomic woes is why Wells Fargo in a recent report said that the Indian economy is still deteriorating at the margin.

In this climate, the Indian economy clearly doesnt have the luxury of operating on autopilot. The coming year is going to require not only astute macroeconomic management but, equally, a renewed legislative push to move forward the stalled economic reform agenda. But is there a silver lining in this otherwise grim picture? While Ive previously criticized Team Annas Lokpal, or anticorruption ombudsman, proposal, the good news might be that theres now a social movement out there which is able to galvanize at least a segment of the urban middle class around issues of concern to them. Understandably, corruption is paramount among those. But having done what it can to push this issue, social activists might reflect that a sharp drop-off in the Indian economys performance will sooner or later have a direct impact on the material well-being of the urban middle class by at least as much, if not more, than the ill effects of corruption. So if you now have some social capital, why not use it toward productive ends and get people power to prod politicians of all parties into jumpstarting the stalled economic engine? I, for one, would love to see late night televised parliamentary debates on the state of the economy and what needs to be done to put economic growth on a sounder footing. A few weeks ago, Kiran Bedi, a leading member of Team Anna, made the odd assertion that a speedy passage of the Lokpal would boost the Sensex, the countrys principal stock index. What would be sensible to say instead is that righting the economic ship would be the best thing that could happen, not just for the Sensex, but for all Indians rich and poor.

Political Bickering and Government Inaction Marked the Year in India (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/world/asia/india-ends-year-of-political-bickering-andgovernment-inaction.html) By JIM YARDLEY | The New York Times The key drivers of corruption..and why the JLP is not the solution (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/the-key-drivers-of-corruption-andwhy-the-jlp-is-not-the-solution) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Don't take sides (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Dont-takesides/articleshow/11341559.cms) Times of India Editorial Corruption and Fairy Tale Elections (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16957.pdf) Economic & Political Weekly Editorial Lokpal Bill: Lessons from the Karnataka Lokayuktas Performance (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16961.pdf) By Narayana A , Sudhir Krishnaswamy , Vikas Kumar | Economic & Political Weekly The Circus is in Town (http://epw.in/epw/uploads/articles/16956.pdf) Economic & Political Weekly Editorial A Happy New Year of Sycophancy, Madamji (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/02/ahappy-new-year-of-psychophancy-madamji/) By Tripti Lahiri Macaca 01-03-2012, 08:06 PM An anti-corruption revolution that is uniquely Indian (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/an-anti-corruption-revolution-thatis-uniquely-indian) By Subhash Agrawal | The National Future historians may well point to 2011 as an epochal year in Indian politics. It was the year when multiple corruption scams implicating senior officials and cabinet ministers unfolded simultaneously, involving unbelievable sums of public money - by some accounts, equivalent to almost one quarter of India's GDP - and putting in doubt the process of public policy formation in areas such as telecommunications and infrastructure, key components of future growth. More importantly, the country's expanding middle class finally emerged from its comfort zone to express outrage at this public looting. This frustration was epitomised by Anna Hazare, a respected social reformer, who led a national campaign to establish a new and powerful anti-corruption body, the Lokpal. Hundreds of thousands of people supported this demand by taking to the street, while millions more show support online.

Over many twists and turns, and through much drama on the streets and inside Parliament, the proposed Lokpal bill eventually failed to become law in the winter session of parliament that concluded last week. But the fight over India's corruption problem is far from over. All through the year, there have been fierce exchanges between the ruling Indian National Congress party and the main opposition, the BJP. There also remain very strong schisms within the country's influential civil society on whether or not any proposed new ombudsman is a sensible way to tackle corruption. For every Medha Patkar supporting Mr Hazare there is an Arundhati Roy opposing him vociferously. To add to the confusion, there are at least two versions of the Lokpal bill: the one introduced in Parliament by the government is universally considered weak, while the bill proposed by Mr Hazare and his team raises serious practical issues, including the wisdom in creating yet another powerful and ultimately autocratic body which may be accountable to no one. In recent weeks, Mr Hazare and his advisors appear to have undermined their own movement by speaking too much, on every issue under the sun, and with some rather intemperate and unbending rhetoric. Unless there is course correction, Mr Hazare risks being depicted by the government as a crackpot rather than a serious reformer. All this rhetorical jousting and legislative gamesmanship has made the issue more befuddled and complicated to follow, perhaps allowing the political class a way to escape from the dragnet. If this is India's Arab Spring moment, then it is also uniquely Indian, in that there are circles within circles, hundreds of self-styled leaders who claim to be speaking on behalf "of the people" and a million mutinies instead of a single Tahrir Square. Despite these complications, the significance of Mr Hazare's campaign cannot be overemphasised. He has brought the issue of corruption into mainstream Indian political debate for the first time in more than a generation and has succeeded in engaging and mobilising the urban middle class - and India is a rapidly urbanising country. Unlike past major protest movements in India, be it over caste-based job reservations or economic reforms, the issue of corruption unites a broad swath of Indian society. At a very fundamental level, the roots of urban middle class anger are the same as the despair of Indian villagers that has led to the Maoist insurgency: terrible governance, stifling corruption, huge economic disparity and total absence of any official urgency. All this is what inflames the Hazare movement and makes it such a potent threat to the political establishment. In fact, the issue of corruption and governance is likely to become the most animated political pivot in the near-term, especially with five states of the country scheduled for elections in the next two months. By taking the Gandhi family head-on and by name, and by associating corruption primarily with the Congress party, Mr Hazare has raised the stakes rather spectacularly for Congress, especially in Uttar Pradesh (UP), the country's most populous and politically important state. For some time, there has been over-anticipation in the media and within the Congress party of Rahul Gandhi's eventual accession to power, and a good result in the UP elections, where he has been campaigning intensely, was seen as the appropriate starting point. Should the Congress party do poorly in UP due to the Hazare factor, the situation could lead to greater instability. Congress is intrinsically populist, and despite having some top economic brains and reformers, the Singh government has actually given out massive subsidies and loan waivers to party faithful in recent years. India's overall fiscal deficit has increased to almost 12 per cent, up from 8 per cent in 2004 when the Congress took over. Further subsidies enshrined in a proposed food security bill now threaten to raise this much higher. Looking beyond the issue of corruption, the strange twists and turns of the this anti-corruption campaign have allowed a closer inspection of India's fabled democracy - and it is not the pretty picture Indians usually see. Yes, India votes often, votes in large numbers and its poor usually vote the most. But India's democracy remains mired in personality-centric or caste-based dynamics, susceptible to cheap demagoguery.

An American analyst once said that Indian democracy appears to represent the people without adequately serving them. An independent anti-corruption watchdog, proposed by Mr Hazare or something else entirely, may yet change that.

India fighting for a less corrupt year (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA04Df03.html) By Ranjit Devraj | Asia Times Indias Anti-Corruption Contest (http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tharoor40/English) By Shashi Tharoor | Project Syndicate Indias anti-corruption movement loses steam (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/indias-anticorruption-movement-loses-steam/2012/01/02/gIQAm5NeWP_story.html) By Simon Denyer | The Washington Post PM soft-pedals corruption (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2771984.ece) By RANABIR RAY CHOUDHURY Social Movements And Social Change (http://www.countercurrents.org/puniyani030112.htm) By Ram Puniyani | Countercurrents All is not lost (http://www.deccanherald.com/content/216259/all-not-lost.html) By B G Verghese | Deccan Herald On Indias darkling plain (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/india %E2%80%99s-darkling-plain-652) By Jagmohan | Deccan Chronicle Anna's stir, and lessons for civil society (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/bs-raghavan/article2772019.ece) By B. S. RAGHAVAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Corruption, Lokpal and the IAS brotherhood (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/masalanoodles/entry/corruption-lokpal-and-the-ias-brotherhood) By Kingshuk Nag | Times of India The idea of Citizens charter is great..but it needs to be practical (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/the-idea-of-citizen-s-charter-isgreat-but-it-needs-to-be-practical) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Fame game (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/jugglebandhi/entry/fame-game) By Jug Suraiya | Times of India The federalism question (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Thefederalism-question/articleshow/11355014.cms) By Karan Singh Tyagi | Times of India Was Hazare's timing completely OFF this time? (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show1-was-hazares-timing-completely-off-this-time/20120103.htm) By A K Bhattacharya | Rediff What Next for Hazare Campaign? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/03/what-next-forhazare-campaign/) By Vibhuti Agarwal | IndiaRealTime India's weakest premier (http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/india-s-weakest-premier1.959666) By Ravi Menon | Gulf News Proud to Be Madams No. 1 Fan (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/03/proud-to-bemadams-no-1-fan/) By Tripti Lahiri | IndiaRealTime Macaca 01-03-2012, 08:11 PM Infrastruggles One of Indias most important industries has a knackered balance-sheet (http://www.economist.com/node/21542184) The Economist ONE recent evening in Mumbai a tangerine Lamborghini could be seen taxiing past a sign prohibiting bullock carts, wheeling left and then letting rip on the Sea Link toll-bridge, one of the citys few bits of decent infrastructure. For three miles all the drivers Michael Schumacher fantasies must have came true. But by the fourth he drove off the bridge back into reality: roads whose surfaces often wash away during the monsoon and whose repair is said to be in the hands of mafias. The supercar returned to rickshaw speed. For the past half decade Indias infrastructure industry has enjoyed a Sea Link moment; a blast of growth when one could imagine that the private sector could deliver all the new roads, bridges, power stations and airports that the country needs so badly. The government says the boom will

continue. Over the next five years it predicts that infrastructure investment will reach a new high relative to GDP, with some $1 trillion spent, half of it by the private sector. The trouble with this rosy prediction is that the balance-sheets of many Indian infrastructure firms are as potholed as the roads they resurface. The backdrop is a slowing economygrowth has dipped below 7%and a deep ditch of debt at infrastructure firms (which typically build, own or operate projects, or do a combination of the three, sometimes in partnership with the state). Government decision-making has slowed, partly due to drift at the top and because officials are scared of being accused of graft. All this has led to a triple whammy of distress, says Vinayak Chatterjee of Feedback Infra, a consultancy and engineering firm. First, new business has all but ground to a halt. Larsen & Toubro, one of the biggest infrastructure and engineering firms, saw a 2% quarter-on-quarter rise in its domestic order book at its last set of results. This is much less than it is used to. Money pits Second, cash flows are under strain. Firms get paid when they begin a project and when they reach milestones towards finishing it. Banks and investors are reluctant to hand over more funds. Finally there are worries about long-term profits. During the boom, firms bid recklessly for contracts (including an extension to the Sea Link bridge, won by the Reliance Group, run by Anil Ambani). With high interest rates and inflation a number of these deals may turn out to be duds. Some completed projects, including Delhis new airport, are losing money. The warning lights are flashing. But figuring out exactly what is going on is not easy. The industry is fond of financial engineering that has a whiff of subprime about it. Individual projectsfor example an airport, power plant or stretch of roadare typically put in special-purpose vehicles which issue non-recourse debt. Infrastructure firms, which are often listed, have several kinds of links to these vehicles. In their accounts they may consolidate them on their balance-sheet, or, if they do not control them, treat them as investments. The result is dauntingly complex. Taking six big infrastructure firms disclosures in their annual reports, it is possible to find no fewer than 531 subsidiaries, joint ventures or associated entities. It gets more fiddly. Firms may lend money to projects they own no stake in and to contractors. They invite in minority investors at multiple levels in their holding structures, including privateequity funds that may use debt to finance their purchases. And overlaying all this is sloppy disclosure and a habit of focusing on firms stand-alone accounts. Roughly speaking, these try to capture the core business, pretty much as defined by the managers, rather than the consolidated accounts which try to include all subsidiaries and investments, warts and all, and which are the accounting benchmark globally. Those consolidated figures are at least published annually (and more frequently by some noble firms) and are the best guide to what is going on. Take 70 or so listed infrastructure firms from the BSE-500 index, broadly defined to include power, telecoms, construction and asset owners, and the effects of the boom are plain to see. Leverage has risen dramatically (see chart). Just over half of these firms had ratios of net debt to gross operating profits (or EBITDA) of over three times last financial year, and/or have net debts in excess of their current market value, two rules of thumb to identify knackered balance-sheets. Thanks to heavy investment, the 70-odd firms were cashflownegative (defined as EBITDA less capital expenditure) to the tune of $12 billion. Assuming a 12% interest rate, their accounting operating profits last year only just exceeded their interest costs. Exclude state-owned and telecoms firms and leverage is worse (see table). From public disclosures it is impossible to work out the liquidity position of these firms, but it is likely that most will have to refinance existing credit lines in todays far less forgiving world, a process not helped by high local rates and a weak rupee. It looks like a mess. Shareholders have taken a beating, with the market value of those 70-odd stocks having fallen by some two-fifths since March 2011. Indias banks may be next in line for a thrashing. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the regulator, reckons they have 13% of their loan book in infrastructure (vaguely reassuringly, the RBIs implied absolute debt figure roughly matches the $130 billion of gross debt of the 70 listed firms). Thus far non-performing loans are lowso low it suggests banks are fibbing. But the RBI is probably right that a rickety infrastructure sector does

not endanger the banking system. What it does endanger is Indias growth prospects. Those new airports, roads and bridges are essential. And the country does not need financial zombies, slashing their investment in order to shore up dodgy balance-sheets. Some reckon the solution is to develop a bond market, so that more debt can be raised. But while a more sophisticated capital market might mean more funds available and might even reduce the amount of financial engineering going on, it is not the solution to todays predicament. Instead, two things need to happen. The government needs to unsnarl stalled projects. And infrastructure firms need to raise lots more equitynot debt. That might dilute the stakes which are held by some of the magnates who control these businesses, but would be a fair price to pay to resuscitate the balance-sheet of a vital industry. Even on selfish grounds it makes sense, hastening the day when an honest Indian oligarch can at last put the pedal to metal in his supercar for more than three miles in a row.

Power Problems Threaten Growth in India (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550304577136283175793516.html) By ERIC YEP | Wall Street Journal The Basic Shortages that Plague Our Schools (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/03/indiajournal-the-basic-shortages-that-plague-our-schools/) By Saumya Roy and Antara Ganguli | IndiaRealTime At M.A. Ideal School, Teenage Teachers, Hopeful Parents (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/at-m-a-ideal-school-teenage-teachers-hopefulparents/) By SRUTHI GOTTIPATI | India Ink Hello, How Are You? Hello, How Are You? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/hello-howare-you-hello-how-are-you/) By SRUTHI GOTTIPATI | India Ink Get out of the box (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/get-out-of-the-box/895349/) By Arun Maira | Indian Express It is all black (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2772020.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Real steel in the making (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2771988.ece) By S. K. GUPTA | The Hindu BusinessLine Will 2012 be a better year for the Indian Property Market (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/A-brick-on-the-wall/entry/will-2012-be-a-better-year-forthe-indian-property-market) By E Jayashree Kurup | Times of India Why the food security bill is fatally flawed (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1why-the-food-security-bill-is-flawed-bidwai/20120103.htm) By Praful Bidwai | Rediff Aakash tablets: 14 lakh booked in 14 days (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/news/hardware/Aakash-tablets-14-lakh-booked-in-14days/articleshow/11347895.cms) By Harsimran Julka | ET Bureau Bajaj unveils Nano's rival RE60, promises 35 km per litre (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Bajaj-unveils-Nanos-rival-RE60promises-35-km-per-litre/articleshow/11353388.cms) Agence France-Presse Bajaj unveils its first-ever 4-wheeler 'RE60' (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/india-bajajcar-idINDEE80204R20120103) Reuters Bajaj Unveils Four-Wheeled Vehicle RE60 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203550304577138153050635504.html) By NIKHIL GULATI | Wall Street Journal Bajaj RE60 Is It A car? (http://forbesindia.com/article/auto-expo-2012/bajaj-re60-is-it-acar/31900/1) By Ashish K Mishra | Forbes India Worries Over Indias Growth (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/03/video-worries-overindias-growth/) IndiaRealTime India Inc's interest paying ability at 5-yr low: Crisil (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/indiacrisil-outlook-idINDEE80205I20120103) Reuters

Macaca The daughters return A glimmer of hope in the sad tale of sex-selective abortion in India (http://www.economist.com/node/21542208) The Economist

01-03-2012, 08:16 PM

THE march of sex-selective abortion in Asia seems relentless. Not every society adopts the practice, but those that doand they include the two largest countries on earthhave seen it spread through every social group, unhampered by growing wealth. Indeed, middle-income couples seem more willing and better able to manipulate the sex of their children than are the poor. And they are more likely to want smaller families, increasing the premium on sons in countries where males are seen as more valuable. As a result, richer areas have more sex selection than poorer ones and sex selection tends to rise as countries get richer. In China the sex ratio at birth is much more distorted in rich Shanghai and Guangzhou than in poor Tibet. From 2001-11, Indias GDP more than doubled and the census of 2011 found only 914 girls aged 0-6 for every 1,000 boys, worse even than the abysmal tally in 2001, when there were 927 girls per 1,000 boys. (India counts the sex ratio differently from the rest of the world, which expresses the idea as the number of boys per 100 girls; using the international measure, Indias child sex ratio rose from 108 in 2001 to 109.5 in 2011.) In 2001 India had 6m fewer girls than boys aged 0-6; by 2011 the number had risen to 7m. It has long been assumed the process of reversing sex selection does not happen until countries are richer than India or China are now. One of the few to have succeeded in ending the practice is South Korea, where the sex ratio at birth peaked in 1990 and has since fallen to near-normal levels. South Korea did not manage fully to reverse the trend until its GDP per person had reached about $12,000. Chinas is now $8,400, Indias $3,700. Both countries have been campaigning against sexselective abortion for years, making it illegal to terminate pregnancies just because parents want a son (or indeed to inform parents of the sex of a fetus), launching save the daughter campaigns, andin Indias caseenlisting Bollywood stars to sing the praises of girls. All, it seems, to no avail. Now, however, comes evidence that India may in fact be succeeding. In a pair of articles in the Indian Express, Surjit Bhalla, an economist, and Ravinder Kaur, a sociologist, use a different set of figures to get a different result. On the basis of the national sample surveys (NSS), they calculate that Indias sex ratio at birth swung from 924 females per 1,000 males in 2004-05 to 977 in 2011, a stunning turnaround in favour of girls. The NSS figure is not comparable to the census. It shows the sex ratio at birth, whereas the census shows the ratio for children aged 0-6 (census figures for the sex ratio at birth have not been published). But there are reasons for thinking the NSS is reliable. The sample size, of 125,000 households, is large. And when the NSS does produce figures comparable to the census, they closely match it (for example, the NSS and census figures for the child sex ratio in 2001 and 2011 are almost identical). The new figure represents a very big change. A sex ratio of 977 girls to 1,000 boys is closer to what prevailed in the 1960s than it is to more recent decades. So it is possible that the sex ratio has begun to change recently in ways not captured by the census. If so, why? Mr Bhalla and Ms Kaur pin the explanation squarely on the behaviour of parts of Indias middle class. What they call the mature middle class, those with an annual income of 170,000 rupees ($3,200) for a family of five, no longer practises sex selection. Ms Kaurs research in five Indian states finds that richer middle-class families are no longer using sons as vehicles for upward mobility. A combination of female education, the spread of modern social attitudes through television, government policies and a dawning sense that daughters are more likely than sons to look after parents in old age are all having a cumulative effect. This is persuading the richer parts of the middle class that girls are as valuable as boys. The authors reckon this slice of the population has almost doubled in size in six years, from 27% in 2005 to 50% in 2011, so its preferences explain the change in the figures. The argument might seem to contradict the view that sex selection rises as people get richer. In fact, at slightly lower levels of income, the link is as strong as ever. Mr Bhalla and Ms Kaur find sex selection has run rampant among what they call the emerging middle classesthose with an income of 90,000-170,000 rupees a year. But since this group has declined as a share of the population,

from 68% in 2000 to 41% now, their preferences have a smaller impact. Thank you, Mr and Mrs Middle Until further evidence appears (more census numbers, for example) the conclusion that India is reducing sex selection in the mature middle class will remain tentative. Still, regional data back it up. Monica Das Gupta of the World Bank points out that the 2011 census shows the sex ratio is beginning to return to normal in Punjab and Haryana, states where sex-selective abortion used to be common, but which now report big changes in attitudes to girls. These are rich states with many mature middle-class families. Meanwhile, in nearby Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra, the sex ratio is getting worse. These are states with more of the emerging middle classes. Because there are many such states and some, like Uttar Pradesh, are huge, they explain why the national child sex ratio became more distorted in 2001-11. When the 2011 census appeared, some Indians agonised that the whole country was going the way of Punjab and Haryana. That looks unduly pessimistic. The distortions in the newly offending states are small compared with those that once gripped Punjab and Haryana. Indias efforts to cut sex selection may be starting to pay off, after all. And it is pretty clear why. We can thank, say Mr Bhalla and Ms Kaur, the education- and equality-of-the-sexes-oriented middle class for this turnaround.

Not a level battlefield (http://www.hindustantimes.com/ViewsSectionPage/ColumnsOthers/Not-alevel-battlefield/Article1-790732.aspx) By Suparna Banerjee | Hindustan Times Bills of the same fate (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/bills-of-the-same-fate/895348/) By Coomi Kapoor | Indian Express Cutting-edge or cut it out? India's TV quandary (http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/southasia/cutting-edge-or-cut-it-out-indias-tv-quandary) Associated Press India on $1,000 a Day (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/india-on-1000-a-day/) By SHIVANI VORA | India Ink India's flashy new rich drive luxury car boom (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/india-autosluxury-idINDEE80204U20120103) By Henry Foy | Reuters Macaca 01-03-2012, 08:23 PM 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species Meet the weaker countries that will suffer from American decline. (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8_geopolitically_endangered_species? page=0,6) By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI | Foreign Policy 7. PAKISTAN Although Islamabad is armed with 21st-century nuclear weapons and held together by a professional late 20th-century army, the majority of Pakistan is still pre-modern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Conflict with India defines Pakistan's sense of national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir sustains a shared and profound antipathy. Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability, and a decline in U.S. power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan's consolidation and development. Pakistan could then transform into a state run by the military, a radical Islamic state, a state that combined both military and Islamic rule, or a "state" with no centralized government at all. At stake: Nuclear warlordism; a militant Islamic, anti-Western, nuclear-armed government similar to Iran's; regional instability in Central Asia, with violence potentially spreading to China, India, and Russia.

Colonisation of a new kind (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85757&Cat=9) By Tahir Ali | The News

Shift in US focus? (http://thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=85754&Cat=9) By Maleeha Lodhi | The News Nato consignments (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/03/nato-consignments.html) Dawn Editorial No more to do more (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/03/no-more-to-do-more.html) By Syed Fazl-e-Haider | Dawn Pakistan Taliban commanders "at each other's throats" (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/03/us-pakistan-militants-idUSTRE8020GP20120103) By Chris Allbritton | Reuters Pakistani and Afghan Taliban groups set up council to coordinate attacks (http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/pakistani-and-afghan-taliban-groups-set-upcouncil-to-coordinate-attacks) By Zeeshan Haider | The National Taliban factions regroup to fight US forces (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/03/al-qaida-talibanask-pakistani-militants-for-help.html) By Sailab Mehsud | Dawn Enter the year of the Taliban (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA04Df01.html) By M K Bhadrakumar | Asia Times It may take an age to die down (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/It-maytake-an-age-to-die-down/Article1-790724.aspx) Hindustan Times Editorial Rage against age (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Rage-againstage/articleshow/11354162.cms) Times of India Editorial Think peace (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Thinkpeace/articleshow/11354552.cms) Times of India Editorial Why is Gopal Das free and not Khaleel Chishty? (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-is-gopaldas-free-and-not-khaleel-chishty/20120103.htm) By Shivam Vij | Rediff Macaca 01-03-2012, 09:01 PM Pakistan the Unreal A son's tale of a death ripped from the headlines -- and the novel that foretold it. (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/pakistan_the_unreal) By AATISH TASEER | Foreign Policy In December 2010 I sent off the changes to my first work of fiction set in Pakistan. I should say published work because really I was concluding a writing cycle that, having begun 10 years before with a failed novel, had led me to nonfiction and memoir before bringing me full circle back to the novel. The looping lessons of this journey were what formed my earliest ideas of fiction and nonfiction in the special context of writing about Pakistan, a place where reality often dwarfs the best efforts of the imagination. My relationship to the country has always been a complicated one. My father was Pakistani, but I had grown up away from him in New Delhi with my mother and had known neither him nor his country until the age of 21, when I first went to Lahore to seek him out. That time of great personal upheaval coincided with my first wish to be a writer, and knowing next to nothing about the mechanics of fiction but seduced by its glamour, I sat down to write a novel about the experience. It was an abysmal failure, a baggy black hole of a book. I tried to calm my well-founded fears about it by taking comfort in the urgency and relevance of the real-world circumstances that had inspired the novel. But no outside reality, no matter how compelling, can rescue a work of fiction that doesn't work on its own terms. A writer needs distance if he is to create an autonomous fictional world in which the complexities of lived experience are distilled; he cannot still be in the throes of the experience he is writing about. And I, age 22 or 23, was still very much consumed by the great drama of seeking out my father in adult life. It had not gone quiet; its overarching lines were yet to reveal themselves. In the end, after a considerable amount of self-delusion, I abandoned the novel -- An Internment, I think it was aptly called -- and from its salvageable remains I wrote and published in 2009 my first book, a travel memoir, Stranger to History, which was the story of my relationship with my father, interwoven with the account of an eight-month journey from Istanbul to Lahore. Nonfiction, at the time, allowed me to state plainly my position as an insider-outsider in Pakistan.

To write convincing fiction about a place, one must possess a deep, almost effortless knowledge of that place. One might even argue, as W. Somerset Maugham did in The Razor's Edge, that "it is very difficult to know people and I don't think one can ever really know any but one's own countrymen." But Pakistan was, in an important sense, my country. It was not only the place from where my father came; it was also the place from where my maternal family had come in 1947 as refugees to India; and until that Partition of 1947, India and Pakistan, especially the Punjab, had everything from language and literature to food, dress, and wedding songs in common. Still, 60 years of hermetically sealed separation is not a short amount of time; countries and societies can go their own ways. Pakistan was, as far as I was concerned, a sphere of both deep familiarity and unfamiliarity. Nonfiction allowed me to express the acute particularity of my lens without damaging the credibility of the writing. Yet, a decade later, I returned to fiction. Why? Pakistan, in recent years, has been fertile ground for the imagination. Mohsin Hamid's Moth Smoke was the first work of fiction to capture, through the story of a young man who becomes its victim, the nihilism and violence of Lahori society. Daniyal Mueenuddin went further. In his book In Other Rooms, Other Wonders, he managed through eight exquisite stories of feudal life in Pakistan to express the country's terrible underlying brutality. That same ability, of depicting one thing while actually suggesting another, can be found in contemporary Pakistani art as well. The young painter Salman Toor, for instance, invariably uses scenes of apparent merriment, of laughter, of frolic, to hint at darker, more menacing aspects of his society, such as rage and violence, cruelty and oppression. In his painting Paradise Villas, two lovers stand outside an ocher mansion in Lahore. The young woman, with long flowing hair, has thrown her head back against her lover's shoulder. Seeming almost to swoon, she holds a glass of red wine in one hand, a mobile phone in the other. Servants lurk in the background, one watching sullenly from a distance, the other bringing drinks and ice on a silver tray. And there is nothing, except the hint of a darkening sky, casting a strange silver light over the scene, that can be pointed at to justify the deep unease one feels at seeing the painting. It was unease such as this that brought me back, after the failed attempt 10 years earlier, to writing fiction about Pakistan. It is also perhaps what makes Pakistan -- with the notable exception of V.S. Naipaul's Among the Believers and Beyond Belief -- a place better served in this time of uncertainty by fiction. Serious nonfiction books of recent years, such as Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark's Nuclear Deception, Anatol Lieven's Pakistan: A Hard Country, and Bruce Riedel's Deadly Embrace, explain the political implications of the turmoil in Pakistan. What they don't capture is the depth of the malaise. That malaise had never been deeper than when Benazir Bhutto was killed in 2007. I was in Lahore at the time. The days that followed the death of Pakistan's former prime minister were days of great emotion. The political landscape had in one stroke been made much bleaker. In a country swaying from trauma to trauma, it had produced an outpouring of grief, of breast-beating, riots, and mourning. But the intimation I had, the one I later found too subtle to express in nonfiction, was of catharsis. I felt that under the great show of emotion there lay a feeling akin to euphoria. It had something of the air of the 10th day of the Shiite mourning for Ali and Hussein, an air almost of carnival, where beneath the self-flagellation and tears, there is release. And it was this, the grotesque quality of those days, that drew me back to fiction. At about the same time I encountered the story of the young scion of a rich Pakistani family, who after being blackmailed by someone in his office over a sex video, commits a spectacular act of violence against his blackmailer. I cannot say what made the story seem so quintessentially Pakistani: something in the cocktail of beards and sex, videotape and violence; something at once modern and medieval. The two things, the cathartic violence at the time of Bhutto's death and the story of that young man, fused in my imagination. Three years later, reconfigured completely, they fought their way out in the form of a novel -- Noon -- my first set in Pakistan. But fact and fiction rarely keep to their lines in Pakistan. A couple of weeks after the novel was sent to my publisher, my father, the governor of Punjab at the time, was assassinated by a member of his own security detail. And I, in New York, found myself outside a Manhattan deli staring down at my father's 26-year-old assassin on the front page of the New York Times, trying hopelessly to separate the real from the surreal.

With my father's death, the violence I had only an intimation of in 2007 -- violence as release -came nakedly to the surface. His killer was showered with rose petals; billboards of him were erected throughout Lahore; men came to give food and money in thanks for what he had done; there were huge rallies of support demanding that he be freed. Some of this I had anticipated in my novel. I wrote: "Outside a kind of orchestral violence reached its climax. Chants thundered and every now and then a pane shattered, drawing from the crowd a howl of euphoria." But Pakistan surpassed my expectations. And having only just returned to writing fiction, I found my imagination once again stilled before the unfolding of a new and uglier reality.

A long, sad year after Salman Taseer's killing (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/oped/article2772464.ece) By PERVEZ HOODBHOY | The Hindu Can Pakistan step back from the brink? (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16382174) By Ahmed Rashid | BBC Saluting a brave man (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\01\04\story_4-12012_pg3_6) By Mehmal Sarfraz | Daily Times Shaheed Salmaan Taseer: a year later... (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\04\story_4-1-2012_pg3_1) Daily Times Editorial Salmaan Taseer: a legacy of resistance (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\04\story_4-1-2012_pg3_2) By Ishrat Saleem | Daily Times Has anything changed since Taseers murder? (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316023/has-anythingchanged-since-taseers-murder/) By Raza Rumi | The Express Tribune We never learned (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316018/we-never-learned/) By Sami Shah | The Express Tribune One year on (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316012/one-year-on-2/) The Express Tribune Editorial Macaca 01-03-2012, 09:05 PM Irresponsible celebration (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/03/irresponsible-celebration.html) Dawn Editorial WHILE other countries usher in the new year with impressive fireworks displays and general merriment, Pakistan greets the occasion in a much more grim fashion: by counting the number of fatalities and injuries caused by `celebratory` gunfire. This has become an unfortunate annual occurrence. This paper reported on Monday that three people were killed while over 50 were injured on New Year`s Eve in Karachi due to celebratory gunfire despite the fact that a ban was in place prohibiting firing in the air. Across the city, as soon as the clock struck 12 heavy firepower was unleashed as residential neighbourhoods began to sound like war zones. The situation in other cities in the country on New Year`s Eve was not too different, though thankfully there was no loss of life reported. It is unfortunate that along with New Year`s Eve, cricket matches, weddings and even chaand raat are now valid excuses to bring out the firepower. Rowdyism on New Year`s Eve is an issue around the world, but in Pakistan the violent nature of this society and the fact it is awash with guns makes the problem more acute. Apparently, the problem is that many in Pakistan have a strange definition of fun: putting oneself and others in danger by breaking the law and indulging in reckless behaviour all seemingly fall under the category of `fun`. In a similar vein Basant was banned because people could not celebrate the festival responsibly, with many insisting on flying kites using deadly glasscoated string. People have every right to celebrate and let off steam, but this should be done responsibly. While the state is to blame for failing to enforce the law, people equally share the blame for indulging in reckless pursuits such as aerial firing in the name of celebration. Both the state and society need to play their roles to end this madness.

Kayani kills the rumours...but! (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\01\04\story_4-12012_pg3_3) By Elf Habib | Daily Times An unbecoming tantrum (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316021/an-unbecoming-tantrum/) By Feisal

H Naqvi | The Express Tribune Banishing memogeist (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316026/banishing-memogeist/) By Ejaz Haider | The Express Tribune A Smart Legal Coup Dtat Is Underway In Pakistan? (http://www.countercurrents.org/ghazali030112.htm) By Abdus Sattar Ghazali | Countercurrents Is civilian rule in Pakistan about to fall once again? (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Jan-03/158622-is-civilian-rule-inpakistan-about-to-fall-once-again.ashx) By Shahid Javed Burki | The Daily Star Macaca 01-03-2012, 09:12 PM Achilles Heel In Balochistan (http://www.eurasiareview.com/02012012-pakistan-achilles-heel-inbalochistan-analysis/) By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty | South Asia Terrorism Portal At least 16 persons, including women and children, were killed and another 35 were injured in a suicide attack near the residence of tribal elder Shafiq Mengal, son of former acting Chief Minister and Federal Minister Naseer Mengal, on Arbab Karam Khan Road in Quetta, the Provincial capital of Balochistan, on December 30, 2011. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. Prior to that, on December 29, 2011, unidentified assailants shot dead a Police surgeon, Baqir Shah, who had played a key role in exposing the extra-judicial killing of five foreigners, including three women, in Quetta. Shah, who reportedly had not been provided any security despite being attacked in the past, had conducted the autopsy of five foreigners, including Russians and Tajiks, who were shot dead by Pakistani Security Forces (SFs) in Quetta on May 17, 2011. The autopsy report had contradicted the Quetta Police Chief Daud Junejos claim that the foreigners had not died due to shooting by law enforcement personnel, but because of a blast which they triggered with the help of explosives and suicide vests. Shahs report revealed that they died from multiple bullet wounds. Significantly, while media reports had then claimed that the victims were unarmed and carried no explosives, footage on several TV news channels had shown SF personnel firing a volley of bullets at the foreigners as they lay on the ground near a security check post. Earlier, three bullet-riddled bodies of Baloch Nationalist Party Mengal (BNP-M) activists were found in the Zero Point area of Khuzdar District on December 12, 2011. The victims, identified as Bashir Ahmed, Sanaullah Mardoi and Allah Bakhsh Mardoi, had been abducted earlier, on an unspecified date. Balochistan has for long earned notoriety as the land of extra judicial killings, disappearances, SF high handedness, and repression, as well as a playground for terrorists operating beyond the frontiers of the Country. The Province witnessed 711 fatalities, including 542 civilians, 122 SF personnel and 47 militants in 2011, as against 347 fatalities, comprising of 274 civilians, 59 SF personnel and 14 militants in 2010, according to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM, all data till December 31, 2011. These numbers are likely to be underestimates, as access to media and independent observers is severely restricted in Balochistan). Overall fatalities in 2011 thus increased by 104.89 per cent over the preceding year. Incidents of killing rose by 116 per cent, from 150 in 2010 to 321 in 2011. Further, the number of major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) increased by 152.17 percent, with 58 such incidents recorded in 2011, as against 23 in 2010. More worryingly, fatalities among civilians increased by almost 97.81 per cent, and at least 123 of 542 civilian killings appeared to be extra judicial in nature that is, executed by state agencies. The victims of these extrajudicial executions were either political activists or people opposing the oppressive nature of governance in the Province. Unsurprisingly, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), a non-governmental organisation, in a statement issued on December 9, 2011, observed, Bodies of at least 225 missing persons have been recovered from various parts of the Province since July 2010. The situation is particularly grave for non-Muslims and minority Muslim sects. As

many as 80 members of the Shia community have been killed in the Province this year [2011] alone, for no reason other than their religious belief. HRCP also has serious concern at targeted killing of teachers, intellectuals and non-Baloch settlers in Balochistan. The murder of two HRCP activists and three journalists in the Province in 2011 signifies the dangers that those highlighting human rights violations face on a daily basis. It is a matter of grave alarm that 107 new cases of enforced disappearance have been reported in Balochistan in 2011, and the missing persons are increasingly turning up dead. It is scandalous that not a single person has been held accountable for these disappearances and killings. Earlier, on September 18, 2011, the Commission had expressed serious concern over the increasing number of decomposed bodies of missing persons being recovered from different parts of Balochistan, noting, Around 188 decomposed dead bodies have so far been dumped in desolate places in different parts of Balochistan since June 4, 2010 Most of the victims were political opponents, students and cream of the society. A report of the fact-finding mission of the HRCP which visited the Province between May 4 and 7, 2011 had observed, Enforced disappearances continue to be a matter of great concern. It has been noted that dead bodies recovered have had signs of extreme torture. All authority seems to vest with the Security Forces. The civil administration, elected by the people and meant to represent them, appears to have ceded its powers. Perturbed by the worsening situation, Pakistans Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, on March 2, 2011, remarked that the Government should take practical steps instead of issuing policy statements regarding abduction and targeted killings in Balochistan. Significantly, during the course of the proceedings, Balochistans Advocate General Salahuddin Mengal observed, We are recovering dead bodies day in and day out as the FC [Frontier Constabulary] and Police are lifting people in broad daylight at will, but we are helpless. Who can check the FC? End the burning issue of missing persons first and then blame the Balochistan Government for not controlling law and order. Regrettably, however, FC Inspector General Major General Ubaidullah Khattak on December 13, 2011, simply dismissed these allegations and claimed that 90 per cent of the missing Baloch persons were involved in criminal activities and had been killed by their own organisations. Not surprisingly, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, senior leader of the BNP-M, on December 19, 2011, warned that Balochistan would not remain with Pakistan if extra-judicial killings of Baloch nationalists and excesses by SFs were not stopped immediately. Balochistan will not remain with you, Mengal declared, adding that the violence and killings by SFs had taken Balochistan to the point of no return and steps had to be taken to engage the youth who have been driven into the mountains by the Army. Similarly, Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) parliamentarian, Lieutenant General (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch, on February 25, 2011, had alleged that the security agencies were behind the abduction and killing of political workers and national activists in Balochistan. Baloch insurgents and Pashtun Islamist and sectarian terrorists, meanwhile, retained capabilities to carry out acts of sabotage on a daily basis across the Province. Acts of violence were, crucially, not restricted to a few areas, but occurred in practically every one of the 26 Districts of the Province, including capital Quetta. According to FC data, a total of 1,328 violent incidents took place across the Province in 2011. Terrorist violence in Balochistan has had a significant sectarian overlay. Balochistan witnessed 89 fatalities in 12 incidents of sectarian violence in 2011. 11 of these occurred in Quetta alone, with 63 persons killed. The remaining incident occurred in Mastung District. In the worst such attack in 2011, 26 Shia pilgrims were shot dead by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militants in Taftan, a town that shares border with Iran, in the Ganjidori area of Mastung District, on September 20, 2011.

Separately, Federal Minister of Interior Rehman Malik, on July 13, 2011, disclosed that, over preceding three years, 134 Punjabi-speaking people had been killed in Balochistan. As in previous years, Islamist terrorists left no stone unturned to attack and disrupt the principal NATO supply lines to Afghanistan, which pass through Balochistan. Partial data compiled by SATP recorded 59 attacks in Balochistan in 2011, on oil tankers and trucks ferrying NATO supplies, marginally down from 66 in 2010. However, the loss of lives in these attacks rose from 12 in 2010 to at least 19 in 2011. Rising extremism and violence, attacks on NATO convoys, and the arrest of high profile al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists has repeatedly demonstrated the presence of the Quetta Shura and al Qaeda networks in North Balochistan. Since 2009, at least 22 al Qaeda and six Afghan Taliban militants have been arrested in the region. The Pakistan establishment, however, continues to brazenly deny this reality. Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Muhammad Aslam Raisani on August 4, 2011, dismissed media reports about the existence of Quetta Shura or the presence of Mullah Omar or al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri in Balochistan. Similarly, Federal Minister of Interior Rehman Malik stated, on June 5, 2011, The propaganda of the Taliban Quetta Shura is baseless, if anyone has concrete evidence about their claims, it must be shared with Government. And further, Over 30 raids have been conducted on the presence of Taliban across Balochistan, but they were not found. Macaca 01-03-2012, 09:14 PM However, the arrest in Quetta of senior al Qaeda leader, Younis al-Mauritani, believed to have been responsible for planning attacks in the US, Europe and Australia, along with two other senior al Qaeda operatives, Abdul Ghaffar Al Shami aka Bachar Chama and Messara Al Shami aka Mujahid Amino in a joint raid by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the FC, disclosed on September 5, 2011, proves the hypocrisy of the Pakistani claims. The lackadaisical approach of the Pakistani establishment has evidently emboldened the extremists. While the number of SF personnel killed in 2010 stood at 59, it has increased considerably to 120 in 2011. At least 28 people were killed and over 60 injured in two suicide attacks targeting the residence of the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the FC, Brigadier Farrukh Shehzad, in Quetta on September 7, 2011. The attacks targeted and wounded the DIG, whose Force was involved in the arrest of Younis al-Mauritani and two other al Qaeda operatives in Quetta, in an operation announced on September 5, 2011. The quantum jump in violence can be attributed to the rising desperation among the Baloch nationals. Despite Balochistans natural resource wealth (including the countrys largest deposits of coal and copper, as well as copious quantities of other minerals), Balochistan is Pakistans poorest province, with 45 per cent of the population living below the poverty line. There is rising resentment in the Province over the fact that, despite the annual revenue of USD 1.4 billion that the Provinces gas output generates, the Federal Government remits only USD 116 million in royalties back to the Province. Baloch nationalist Insurgent groups, on the other hand, continued to sabotage economic infrastructure, mostly gas pipelines. According to the SATP database, 2011 recorded at least 52 incidents of attack on gas infrastructure, as against just three in 2010. At least 170 such incidents have been recorded since January 1, 2005. Significantly, the insurgents involved in these attacks focus on targeting the economic interests of the Provincial and Federal Governments, rather than causing loss of life. Of the 711 fatalities recorded in the Province in 2011, Baloch insurgents are confirmed to have been involved in the killing of 69 civilians and 43 SF personnel. The material losses inflicted by the Baloch insurgents, however, are very substantial. The Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC) Balochistan General Manager Mohammad Haroon had noted, on February 14, 2011, Last year [2010], the SSGC suffered a loss of over PKR 100 million due to targeted attacks on gas pipelines. The company has suffered an equivalent loss this year [2011] too, as attacks have picked up. Meanwhile, the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan (initiation of the rights of Balochistan) package which was approved by the Parliament on November 23, 2009, acknowledging the widespread deprivation and neglect that prevailed in Balochistan, failed to deliver. The package, included six constitutional, five political, 16 administrative and 34 economic proposals, and set a three-years implementation period. It has, however, so far succeeded in delivering just 34 of the 61 proposals though even for these the actual benefits accruing to the people are questionable. The Federal

and Provincial Governments are, moreover, yet to initiate several mega-projects that are part of the reforms package. Another ground for resentment is the Governments policy of compensation to victims of violence. On June 28, 2011, the Supreme Court was informed that PKR 400,000 was being paid by the Balochistan Government as compensation to heirs of common citizens who fell victim to bomb blasts, target killings or sectarian violence, compared to PKR two million paid to the heirs of deceased SF personnel. The Court, expectedly, asked the Federal and Provincial Governments to consider removing the discrepancy by enhancing, to a reasonable level, the amount of compensation for common citizens arguing, Is a common citizen a lesser species? Islamabad has sought to pacify the Baloch by offering peace talks with the nationalist rebels. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, on June 5, 2011, stated that the Government was ready for political dialogue with estranged Baloch leaders, in the larger national interest. Again, on October 11, 2011, he declared that the Government wanted reconciliation and remained prepared to hold talks with dissident Baloch brethren to find an amicable solution to the issues of Balochistan. The Baloch, however, appear to have lost faith in the establishment. Balochistan BNP-M chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal, on July 15, 2011, had noted that the Government was neither strong enough nor serious enough to resolve the Balochistan issue. He added, further, that announcements of packages, and the formation of jirgas and committees, were aimed at deceiving the Baloch people. Islamabads policy of encouraging Islamist extremists, while using brute force against those demanding genuine rights and redressal of long standing grievances, can only lead to a continuing blood bath in the resource rich Province, creating more trouble for the increasingly crippled national economy. Peace can only remain elusive in Balochistan as long as Islamabads duplicity persists. Macaca 01-03-2012, 09:20 PM Balochistan: parliament, SC and the other (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\04\story_4-1-2012_pg3_4) By Qaisar Rashid | Daily Times History is the best instrument of indoctrination. Can anyone count the number of years required to heal the wounds of the atrocities inflicted on the Baloch by the states security apparatus? The Balochistan of today is tormented with all types of inhuman affliction ranging from forced abductions to forsaken dead bodies (bearing the marks of torture of all kinds). Is Balochistan considered an enemy territory? Even an enemy is not dealt with like that. The ruse of national security has ravaged Pakistan; the artifice itself is a gigantic menace to the federal concord. It was Muhammad Ali Jinnah who remained worried about the backwardness and aloofness of Balochistan. Before 1930, he started pleading for the introduction of reforms (such as formation of a legislative council) in Balochistan to give it a semblance of a province. Did he do all that effort to make the Baloch susceptible to the homicide being committed today? Secondly, who tasked the security apparatus with creating a (consequent) rancorous Baloch generation? In fact, it was a failure of the federation in undertaking development work in Balochistan after 1947 or even after July 1970 when Balochistan attained the formal status of a province. The development of Gwadar Port does not represent the development of Balochistan. Why should the Baloch not raise a voice for their rights? The state apparatus should not have tried to muffle their voice; it is not meant for that. Now, each abduction or dead body prejudices the chances of appeasing the Baloch. The Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package introduced by the incumbent elected government has been denigrated. With each passing day, hopes for resolution are vanishing. Is anybody listening? Why should anybody (who matters) listen? The prime objective of the sitting government is to complete its term by circumventing issues that may prompt a direct conflict with the states security apparatus. Parliament is giving the impression of following a strategy of abandoning the Baloch to the mercy of the states security apparatus. Parliament should declare if it has excluded the Baloch from the list of bona fide Pakistanis. If it has not, why is it observing criminal silence on their plight and grievances? The Supreme Court is already encumbered with deciding on one scandal or another. Ironically, the so-called national security suffered an existential threat from a memo but not from the continual disappearances of the Baloch and appearance of their dead bodies subsequently. On the scandal,

both the army chief and DG ISI were heard at the Supreme Court but why the wails and screams of the Baloch are not heard there? The Baloch are pointing the finger at the states security apparatus. Why is this matter not probed? Why can the Supreme Court not ask them what role their institutions are playing in Balochistan? Certainly, the cost of this indifference is being paid by the Baloch. The murder of Dr Baqir Shah, a police surgeon, has added fuel to the fire of grievances. In May 2011, Dr Baqir Shah was assigned the task of finding out what killed the five foreigners: a blast or bullets? If he had said blast, probably he would have been allowed to survive unscathed. By telling the truth that the bullets of the police and the Frontier Corps (FC) killed the unarmed men and women at Kharotabad, he signed his own death warrant. Dr Baqir Shah is dead now. Against those five dead bodies, his body was pierced with bullets. Dr Baqirs crime was to call a spade a spade. Is anybody ready to take pride in the name of a state where truth is the victim? Pakistanis should not let his message of courage and speaking truth (against all odds) die. He should be honoured posthumously with the highest civil award. In which part of the world is the states security apparatus alleged to have been involved in the forced abductions and killings of its citizens? Is it a Nazi fascist state in the guise of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan? Does Islam sanctify the practice of forced disappearances and then extrajudicial killings and dumping of dead bodies along the roads? Is it a barbarian age Pakistan is passing through? Apparently, the collective conscience of Pakistanis is dead. Why can the federation not speak to the Baloch youth who have taken refuge in the mountains? Reportedly, most of them are educated. If the DG ISI can secretly visit a foreign country to meet a foreign national to gather information on an unsigned memo, why can the DG ISI not meet Baloch dissidents (or nationalists) and negotiate with them in the best interests of the state? The DG ISI, like the army chief, is a government servant who is not supposed to be ego-driven. Secondly, the states security apparatus must be aware of the fact that the tax collected from the revenue that accrues from selling the resources of Balochistan is converted into their salaries; the same tax also feeds the expenditure incurred on the upkeep of their weapons. The security apparatus must feel grateful to the Baloch and serve them as humble government servants. Even the ego of the state cannot be considered supreme. Instead, the ego of a common Pakistani is supreme. It was the democratic will of the people expressed in electoral terms in the 1945-46 elections that led to the emergence of Pakistan. Pakistan is not a conquered territory. It is a shared property of the people, common Pakistanis. Hence, it is the citizen first and the state later. Balochistan is under virtual siege. Balochistan needs to be demilitarised. In Balochistan, civilians should be empowered to run the provincial affairs. Balochistan should be given all opportunities to translate its part of provincial autonomy (which is enshrined in the 18th Amendment) into action. Lastly, the state should make arrangements to speak to the Baloch dissidents. Macaca 01-04-2012, 07:26 PM Drawing parallels between Balochistan and Kashmir (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/04/drawingparallels-between-balochistan-and-kashmir.html) By MURTAZA HAIDER | Dawn The insurgencies in Balochistan, in Pakistan and in Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) in India have much in common. An armed struggle by the youth has taken root in both places. The 2000-plus bulletriddled bodies recovered from the unmarked graves in four districts in Indian occupied Kashmir as well as the mutilated bodies of hundreds of Balochi youth left to rot in the desert in Balochistan are examples of how violence is destroying the social order and the moral fabric of Balochs and Kashmiris alike. While the establishment in India and in Pakistan may argue that Balochistan and Kashmir have nothing in common and thus no lessons could be learnt from each others experience. I would argue just the opposite. The unfortunate circumstances in Balochistan and the Kashmir valley share several common traits, which make it necessary to learn from the past and present mistakes. Since the partition in 1947 Muslims in J & K and the Balochs in present-day Balochistan have campaigned for greater local autonomy. A large part of Balochistan was under Kalat Khanate, a princely state similar to the greater Kashmir, whose fate was left undecided at partition. Sixty-four years hence, Balochs in Pakistan and Muslims in the Kashmir valley are still vying for a resolution.

In both Balochistan and the Kashmir valley, the Indian and Pakistani establishments have responded with brute force to counter the legitimate grievances of their people. Thus violence has erupted in the streets. Thousands have died in the insurgency in Balochistan in separate spats of violence that peaked at various points in time in the past six decades. The Baloch insurgency during the 70s reportedly caused the death of 5,000 Baloch insurgents and 3,300 troops when 55,000 armed Baloch insurgents faced off against 80,000 Pakistani troops. Even the Iranian air force joined in to bomb Baloch insurgents. The Shah of Iran was wary of the Baloch nationalist movement spilling into the Irans Baluchistan and thus dispatched his air force to pound Baloch targets.(1) Hundreds of Balochs have died in the current wave of violence, while hundreds of thousands of Baloch tribesmen have been forced out of their lands to take refuge in Sindh and Punjab. Analyst Alok Bansal estimates that as much as six brigades of Pak Army are currently deployed in Balochistan. Similarly in India, the violence in J & K peaked during the 90s when reportedly 60,000 to 80,000 Kashmiris were killed. The resulting violence has forced thousands of Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs to flee Srinagar and other parts of Kashmir valley. The establishments propaganda machines have also worked the same way in both places where the insurgents have been labelled as anti-state militants and terrorists. Those in the media or academia who dare question the States version are also dubbed as traitors and terrorist sympathisers. In Pakistan, the State also affixes the anti-Islamic label to the insurgents. Meeran Gichki while researching the conflict in Balochistan at the University of Arkansas argued that news media were used to channel popular nationalism by the military-bureaucratic elite, which tends to exclude political minorities like Baloch nationalists as foreign conspirators, while using Islamic symbolism to create a sense of national unity within different nationalities in Pakistan.(2) He further writes that the segmentation of the media market in Balochistan, portrays the Pakistani government and its military as an occupying force. Despite being diametrically opposed to each other on almost all matters related to foreign and domestic policies, Islamabad and New Delhi have surprisingly adopted identical high-handed approaches in dealing with insurgencies in Balochistan and Kashmir valley. Not so surprisingly, both establishments have met failures of equal proportions. Notice also the similarity in how Islamabad and New Delhi accuse each other of fanning the separatists flames in each others territories. The official versions from both establishments hold foreign elements responsible for insurgencies rather than seeing those as indigenous struggles. Democracy, in its narrowest manifestation as electoral politics, exists in both Balochistan and J & K such that a provincial assembly in Balochistan and a state legislature in Jammu and Kashmir is in place. However, electoral politics have not helped resolve the disputes because the marginalised groups have shunned electoral politics after witnessing no progress toward addressing their key demands over the years. The sham democracy in Balochistan deserves a closer scrutiny. The Baloch nationalist parties boycotted the elections in 2008 in protest against the murder of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. The void left by the nationalists was filled by those who enjoyed the support of the establishment. However, the resulting provincial assembly has been mostly ineffective in asserting its writ in the province. Balochistans chief minister and the advocate general are on record accusing the Frontier Corps of running a parallel government in Balochistan. The coalition government in Balochistan has no one else but to blame itself for its ineffectiveness. The poorly cobbled together coalition has put PPP in control of an assembly of 51 members that had to lure 45 members with ministries to win their support for the coalition. Not being a minister must be quite a distinguishing trait in Balochistan Assembly. How can one explain PPP occupying the chief ministers office with only 7 seats and a fewer than 52,000 votes cast for the seven PPP parliamentarians. Even with 15 seats in Balochistan Assembly, the Musharraf backed Pakistan Muslim League exerts no influence in the province because it no longer enjoys establishments unconditional support. Even a bigger scandal, which puts in questions the very legitimacy of the Balochistan Assembly, is that of the bogus votes that were instrumental in electing the sitting parliamentarians from Balochistan to the provincial and national assemblies. A review of the electoral rolls by Pakistan Election Commission and NADRA has revealed that 65 per cent of the registered 4,520,766 voters in

Balochistan were fake. Balochistans total population in 2008 was estimated at 8 million. The 18-years and older cohort, as per 1998 census, accounted for 46.2 per cent of the population. This puts the population of eligible voters in Balochistan around 3.7 million voters. How then did the voters list include 4.52 million voters in Balochistan? Furthermore with 65 per cent fake votes, the verified voter list in Balochistan shrinks to 1.58 million voters. The Election Commission in 2008 recorded 1.493 million votes casting the provincial elections. With 1.58 million real voters, the voter turnout in Balochistan was miraculously high at 94.3 per cent! Thats quite a turnout considering that the nationalist parties had boycotted the elections. Apart from similarities between the insurgencies in Balochistan and Kashmir valley, significant differences do exist as well. For instance, education is free up to College and University levels in J & K. This has contributed to higher literacy rates in J & K as well as in Kerala, which is the most literate state in the Indian Union. Another marked difference is that the Indian constitution, under Article 370, grants special autonomous status to J & K. One implication of Article 370 is that it prevents non-Kashmiris from buying land in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, the existing law and traditional practices discriminate against even those Kashmiri women who marry non-Kashmiris. While these women could inherit land, however their children would not inherit immovable property from their mothers.. These constitutional stipulations have helped maintain the ethnic mix in J & K to a large extent. However, Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs, who were forced to flee the Kashmir valley, have obviously been disadvantaged by the same law. Macaca 01-04-2012, 07:27 PM Perhaps Balochistan is also in need of an Article 370 to protect the territorial rights of the indigenous peoples (Balochs, Pashtuns and others) of Balochistan. Without such protection, the territorial rights of Balochs may not be respected or safeguarded. An example of property right violations could be observed in Gwadar. Adeel Khan, while writing in Asian Survey references a scathing report published in Herald about the great land robbery in Gwadar.(3) He quoted Herald as follows: Some observers share the view that the Gwadar project is one of the biggest land boondoggles in Pakistans history[T]he local people owned the land through generations but lacked documents of ownership. The elite have bribed revenue clerks to register Gwadar land in their names; the land was then resold at rock-bottom prices to developers from Karachi, Lahore, and other major cities illegally allotted to civilian and military bureaucrats living elsewhere. [T]he poor and uneducated Baluch [i.e., Baloch] population had been shut outGwadar became a lightning rod for Baluch hatred of Punjabi-ruled Pakistan. Between the construction of new cantonments in Balochistan and land being acquired through other means, Pakistan Army is expanding its foothold in Balochistan. Balochs, Pushtuns and others are weary of the expansion of garrisons and housing schemes, which the locals believe will turn them into a minority on their own soil. Herald in June 2008, as quoted by Adeel Khan, further stated: The Pakistani army is the biggest land grabberIt is giving away the coast of Baluchistan [Balochistan] for peanuts, to the PunjabisIn Gwadar, the army is operating as a mafia, falsifying land records. They say we dont have papers to prove our ownership of the land, though weve been there for centuries. The real crisis in Balochistan is that of trust. Since the partition in 1947, Balochistan has been a reluctant constituting member in Pakistans federation. The establishment, and the rest of Pakistan, has done precious little to win their trust. Instead, several military incursions in the province have turned successive generations of Balochs against the federation. At the same time, Balochs have benefited little from the resources that have flown out of their lands. Balochistan produces much more natural gas than it consumes. Even when it is constitutionally guaranteed a greater share of natural gas for domestic consumption, Balochistan is still denied a fair share in the very riches it produces. With the land grab in Gwadar and elsewhere, it is no surprise that Balochs see no incentives in staying within the federation. An immediate and complete withdrawal of the Frontier Corps from Balochistan is a necessary

prerequisite for trust building. Also needed are constitutional reforms, similar to Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which recognise and guarantee indigenous control over resources in Balochistan. Furthermore, judicial intervention is urgently required to reverse all land transactions in Gwadar and elsewhere to ensure that developers only acquire the right to develop (by paying royalty or user fees) while the ownership of the land remains with the indigenous peoples of Balochistan. Pakistans establishment has to demonstrate genuine interest in the welfare of ordinary Balochs by embarking on an honourable and just partnership with Balochs. The past six decades of military incursions have shown that brute force has failed to subdue Balochs. It is time to give justice and respect a chance.

Alok Bansal (2008): Factors leading to insurgency in Balochistan, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19:2, pp. 182-200. Gichki, Meeran (2010). Baluchistan: Democratization and national conflict in Pakistan.Masters thesis in Journalism. University of Arkansas. Khan, Adeel (2009). Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation. Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 6, pp. 1071-1091. Macaca 01-04-2012, 07:35 PM Taseers killing symbol of a withering state (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/04/salmaan-taseer %E2%80%99s-assassination-%E2%80%94-symbolising-a-withering-state.html) By Badar Alam | Dawn The man who killed Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer on January 4, 2011 is a symbol of many things that have gone wrong in Pakistan. He stands for subversion of the rule of law in the name of religious passion; he symbolises disregard for the code of professional conduct and institutional discipline under the garb of a self-declared war between religion and its real or imagined challengers; and, most essentially, his conduct is an affirmation of the states failure to regulate the society through constitutional, legal and administrative means. Mumtaz Qadri, who pulled out his official gun and emptied it on Taseer on that fateful day in the capital, was so consumed by his religious frenzy that he decided to act as the prosecutor, the judge and the executioner all rolled into one to punish the governor for raising his voice for a woman convicted under the blasphemy law. Never mind he turned his back on his professional duty and official responsibility by killing the same man he was assigned to protect. In his self-assumed role as a protector of religion, he conveniently forgot that he had a covenant with the state as its employee and its representative to protect its citizens. His public reception as a hero betrayed the dangerous, near fatal, readiness among large sections of the society, including lawyers, to undermine, even pull down, the state and its institutions, including the courts, at the altar of controversial beliefs and debatable edicts. Such a slaughter is, slowly but surely, leading Pakistan to a situation where chaos and anarchy are the only option and nihilistic religious fanaticism the only thing to govern our personal and collective conduct. Taseers assassination, however, was neither the first nor the final manifestation of the withering away of the Pakistani state though, by far, it remains the most potent, most obvious symbol. Over the last three decades, the countrys slide into mayhem has passed through some remarkably unfortunate incidents involving the blasphemy laws. The first of these, undoubtedly, was the introduction of the laws in 1986 which helped many Pakistanis take revenge on their personal, sectarian, religious and even political enemies accusing them of committing blasphemy. When the Federal Shariat Court, in 1990, declared that the only possible punishment for blaspheming against the Prophet of Islam was death, it only took another big step towards giving the society the licence to kill. Subsequent events showed how. In 1994, a charged mob in Gujranwala accused, Muhammad Farooq, a local practitioner in traditional medicine, of blasphemy, snatched him from a police station and stoned him to death in the most brutal manner. That was the first sign that the society was no longer willing to trust the

state and its institutions when it came to trying those accused of blasphemy. Gujranwala also created huge international headlines in 1993 when an illiterate Christian minor in a village was accused of writing blasphemous content on the walls of a local mosque with the help of two others who also could not even read and write. During their trial, mobs would gather around the court, demanding death for them. As the state showed no sign of moving against the mobs, next came an armed attack on the accused, killing one of them on the spot and injuring the other two. The only action that the government took was to shift the case from Gujranwala to Lahore, making its failure to protect its citizen loud and clear. After the trial court awarded death to the accused, they appealed before the Lahore High Court against the verdict. Arif Iqbal Bhatti, then a high court judge, found the evidence against them wanting and acquitted them in 1995. Bhatti was gunned down in Lahore In 1997, with no one having been arrested, let alone tried and punished, for his murder. That was the final proof that the state has totally given up guarding the fundamental rights of its citizens to life, to fair trial and to express their legal views without fear or favour on anything remotely seen as blasphemous. It was only a matter of time before the state officials became accomplices rather than being negligent bystanders. In 2001, Yousuf Ali, convicted under the blasphemy law and imprisoned at Kot Lakhpat jail Lahore, was killed by a fellow prisoner who received active help from prison officials as well as some interested outsiders. The murder showed that the employees of the state were untroubled by the requirements of their profession and duty when it came to aiding and abetting those who had taken upon themselves to punish others for blasphemy. Next, one of the state officials became an assassin himself and this was years before Qadri appeared on the scene. In 2004, a police constable assigned to guard a Christian accused of blasphemy at a Lahore hospital killed his ward with a brick cutter. The only difference between him and Qadri was the weapons they employed. The former could have but did not use his official gun but the latter did not think twice before using his official gun, provided to him to protect lives rather than take them. There are also clear parallels between Bhatti and Taseer: Both had represented the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in Lahores electoral politics; both believed that the blasphemy accused enjoyed the constitutional guarantees to be tried fairly and within the ambit of the states institutional and judicial writ; both represented the state at a very high level one as a high court judge, other as a provincial governor; and both had not committed any blasphemy on their own though they had recommended procedural reforms in the registration and trial of blasphemy cases. And then there is the final parallel: in both cases, the state has only further surrendered to the wishes and whims of a society on the rampage. The judge who awarded death penalty to Taseers killer fled Pakistan last October, after angry lawyers in Rawalpindi forced him out of his courtroom and religious groups openly issued death threats against him and his family. Qadris supporters have also allegedly kidnapped Taseers son, Shahbaz Taseer, and investigators say that one of their demands in return for his release is that his fathers killer is set free. The state and its institutions, in the meanwhile, have kept on retreating to the point of exercising next to no control over the society. It does not even so much as surprise anyone anymore that raising a voice for those being accused of blasphemy for reasons having nothing to do with faith, those being convicted for blasphemy under flimsy evidence and those being killed by mobsters and target killers for real or perceived religious insults has become a life-threatening exercise few are willing to take up. This certainly answers why Taseers family alone is mourning his death while the rest of the country is at best ignoring the anniversary of his assassination and at worst supporting his murderer.

A Pakistani state of mind (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/04/a-pakistani-state-of-mind.html) By SALMAN HAQQI The Holy Grail of national security (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=2012\01\05\story_5-1-2012_pg3_3) By Shahab Usto | Daily Times The struggle ahead (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\01\05\story_5-12012_pg3_2) By Mohammad Taqi | Daily Times

Macaca

01-04-2012, 07:43 PM Pakistan and the United States (http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=4097&Itemid=197) By Ehsan Ehrari | Asia Sentinel The deteriorating U.S.-Pakistan ties do not seem to have yet reached a nadir since the assassination of Osama Bin-Laden by US Special Forces last May. They seem to be finding new low points each week. Pakistans foremost journalist, Ahmed Rashid, states that the army of his native land has issued orders to treat the U.S. as an enemy and attack any planes intruding into its territory The killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers as a result of an errant NATO attack has not helped matters. Pakistan wants an apology from President Barack Obama, which is not expected to be issued for now. In the meantime, rumors of a planned coup for the ouster of the highly inept Zardari government are hot inside Pakistan despite the denials of General Pervez Kayani, the current army chief. The domestic politics of Pakistan are so rotten that it needs social movement a la the Arab Awakening (aka the Arab Spring) is necessary to completely overhaul the system. However, the sad reality is that social movements cannot be created; they spring from seemingly minor events like the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the desperate Tunisian fruit seller. All he wanted was a decent way to earn wages so that he could buy himself a car. His personal humiliation at the hands of the petty bureaucrats of Tunisia resulted in his decision to burn himself alive. The flames that burned his body eventually brought down the Taghoots (dictators) of Tunisia and Libya and the Pharaoh of Egypt. Manifestations of anger in Pakistan, on the contrary, have the many faces of militant Islam. There are protests supporting the phony blasphemy laws, which are essentially anti-Christian in their focus. No politician or religious leader has the guts to oppose them without fear of being assassinated. There are frequent bombings of Shiite mosques and religious gatherings, which are expressions of Sunni fanaticism. There are suicide attacks on the military, which are also essentially Islamist in origin, but are also puzzling in the sense that Pakistans Army has had good-to-verygood ties with the Islamist groups. In fact, if the Army were to adopt a militant posture toward the Islamists which appears increasingly impossible because its rank and file also have a growing number of staunch supporters of Islamism then it could score a bloody but decisive victory against those forces. That would also transform Pakistan into a country of political stability and religious moderation. As one deciphers the aforementioned statement of Rashid that the Pakistani Army is now treating the United States as an enemy it appears that these countries are hell-bent on taking divergent paths for reasons of their own. From the US side, there remains an overwhelming state of confusion and rising antipathy toward Pakistan for not toeing the American line. The old adage that Pakistan is heavily influenced by Allah, the Army, and America has the last actor (America) in the process palpably fading, for better or for worse. As long as the Pakistani Army refuses to play the role of the gendarme of American war-related goals in Afghanistan, the yawning gap of differences may turn into the outbreak of periodic hostilities in the form of skirmishes on the Pak-Afghan borders. From the Pakistani side, the rising spiral of anti-Americanism is also showing its face in the rising popularity of Pakistans Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI or justice movement) party, led by former cricket legend Imran Khan. Unlike the staunchly pro-American Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the PTI is palpably anti-American. At a time when as reported by the Pew Research Center 73 percent of Pakistanis hold an unfavorable view of the United States, and at a time when only 14 percent of them think it was good that Osama Bin Laden was killed, there is virtually no chance of any meaningful rapprochement between Islamabad and Washington. Since the Pakistani Army has adopted an overall anti-American approach, it is also likely to develop a nexus with the PTI, especially if it captures 20-30 percent of the legislative seats in the next election. However, Imran Khan is not likely to become the next president or prime minister of Pakistan, even though his personal popularity is reported by the Pew survey to be around 68 percent among the Pakistanis. In order for a US-Pakistani rapprochement to become a reality, the United States has to adopt significant changes in its policies. However, there is no constituency for such a development inside

the American political arena, regardless of whether or not Obama wins the next presidential election. If there are no positive overtures from Washington toward Islamabad, no civilian government in Pakistan would dare make a move for the creation of similar overtures. The PPP is a moribund entity, in terms of its ability to govern in the aftermath of memogate, in which President Asif Ali Zardari allegedly asked for US help in forestalling an army coup detat. The Army is convinced that the former Pakistani ambassador to United States, Hussein Haqqani, was merely carrying out the wishes of his boss when he allegedly prepared that memo. And the chances of finding the Zardari regime not guilty of that alleged crime in todays Pakistan are zero. As Pakistan and the United States continue to drift apart, one has to wonder whether this drift is a permanent one or whether there are likely to be some pleasant surprises in the making whereby the erstwhile partners would succeed in reviving their former ambivalent ties. The resurgence of even ambivalent relations appears considerably better than the present days drift toward escalating antagonism between Islamabad and Washington.

Tick-tock! (http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\01\05\story_5-1-2012_pg3_6) By Harlan Ullman | Daily Times Pakistan-US relations: year end review (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316512/pakistan-us-relationsyear-end-review/) By Tariq Fatemi | The Express Tribune The Great Game revisited (http://tribune.com.pk/story/316480/the-great-game-revisited/) By Imtiaz Gul | The Express Tribune Macaca 01-04-2012, 07:53 PM Talking to the Taliban:an elusive peace in Afghanistan (http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2012/01/04/talking-to-the-talibanan-elusive-peace-inafghanistan/) By Myra MacDonald | Reuters It is the season for progress on Taliban talks. In January 2010, the London conference on Afghanistan put the idea of negotiating with the Taliban firmly on the international agenda. In February 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a major policy speech, insisted it was time the United States began to talk to its enemies. Her speech was accompanied by a leaked report that Washington was in fact already holding direct talks with the Taliban to try to convince them to join a political settlement and sever ties with al Qaeda. And now we have the Taliban agreeing to open a liaison office in Qatar to help speed along the talks process as Washington prepares to withdraw most combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. But what are we actually looking at here? A quick-fix settlement that could provide just about enough cover for war-weary western governments to pull their troops out before Afghanistan descends again into civil war? Or a serious process which might offer an enduring peace? Do we believe the Taliban are now more amenable to talks than they were before? Or rather that domestic political compulsions in the United States are driving it more rapidly towards the exit? Lets be clear. The idea the Taliban would be willing to negotiate some kind of power-sharing deal, and that talks could be helped by measures like the release of prisoners, has been around for a couple of years, if not longer. Moreover, a lasting settlement would require not just a deal with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, but also reconciliation among all the different actors inside Afghanistan as well as deep-rooted governance reform. It would need intensive regional diplomacy to prevent the countrys neighbours from undermining any settlement whether this be driven by Pakistans unhappiness with Indian involvement in Afghanistan, or the temptation for Iran to queer the pitch as its row with the west over its nuclear programme worsens. Arguably the chances of reaching a lasting settlement are less now than they were before the United States sent extra troops to Afghanistan in 2010 aiming to decisively turn the tide and force the Taliban to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Since then, the military campaign has splintered the Taliban, making it harder for its Pakistan-based leadership to bring younger and more radicalised fighters into an overall settlement. The souring of ties between the United States and Pakistan over 2011 particularly after the killing of bin Laden on May 2 - and the deteriorating political environment inside Pakistan itself, all argue against the chances of making a real and

enduring peace process work. In that context, a new book due out this month on the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda by Kandahar-based researchers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn could hardly be better timed. An Enemy We Created, The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010 should be compulsory reading for anyone trying to separate reality from political spin. It is also an essential guide to what might yet be achieved through talks, and what might have been achieved had serious talks been held earlier. The authors, who edited the memoirs of former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, examine in detail the failure of attempts to convince Afghanistans then Taliban rulers to expel Osama bin Laden in the years before the Sept. 11 2001 attacks. That these attempts were not inevitably doomed to fail is underlined by their assertion that the relationship between the younger and less experienced Afghan Taliban and the Arabs in al Qaeda was considerably less close than was commonly assumed (an argument also made by other scholars.) However, they argue that Washingtons single-minded focus on bin Laden jarred with the Talibans often conflicted views - where international pressure to expel al Qaeda competed with their own domestic insecurities as well as concerns about how such a move would be viewed by Muslims outside Afghanistan, particularly in the Arab world . Even after the Sept. 11 attacks, the authors argue that an outcome other than war might have been possible. A different development of the conflict is imaginable. Neither the United States nor the Taliban displayed the political will or insight to make it happen. While this assertion will no doubt be fiercely disputed by historians for years to come, what is relevant to today is that the two sides did not know how to talk to each other. While the United States was in a hurry just as it is now keen to bring a quick end to the Afghan war the Taliban dithered, worried about their position inside Afghanistan. While the United States focused on international terrorism and the threat to its own people, the Taliban filtered its views through the prism of Islam. Even today, it is hard to see how two such different entities one a superpower, the other a relatively new and fragmented movement can talk to each other directly without an outside mediator, and a great deal of time and patience. As for the present situation in Afghanistan, the authors argue that a settlement incorporating much of the Taliban movement is becoming harder and harder as the U.S.-led military campaign separates the leadership from new and younger fighters in the field. There are still possible interlocutors and options for discussions at the moment, but the veteran Talibans leverage over the chain of command is becoming increasingly limited, to a degree that significantly hampers their influence over all parts of the movement currently fighting, rendering the chance of forging a lasting peace more and more unlikely. Indeed, while the authors assert that the supposedly unbreakable link between the Taliban and al Qaeda was the principal strategic blunder of the war, they argue that younger fighters, with no memory of peace in Afghanistan, are now in fact more likely to be drawn towards al Qaeda and other militant groups. The new and younger generation of Afghan Taliban are more susceptible to approaches by foreign jihadist groups, including al Qaeda, causing an increasingly ideological shift in the conflict. This development, paired with an overall increase in suspicion among the Afghan population as to the United States and its real intentions, bodes ill for the future. Current policies are a key factor driving the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda together None of that is to suggest that talks are pointless, nor that they should not have been started in earnest much earlier. But it does indicate that it will be incredibly difficult to reach a lasting peace agreement - and bear in mind, the more talk there is of a settlement with the Taliban, the greater is the incentive for their rivals and enemies to prepare for civil war, or for spoilers to try to sabotage the process. (To be fair, the United States and its allies have also been preparing for a situation in which there is no settlement by the end of 2014.) And in the interests of keeping everyone honest, we should look out for any widening discrepancy between the U.S. domestic political need for a quick fix way out of Afghanistan, and the realities on the ground.

******************************* An Enemy We Created (http://www.anenemywecreated.com/An_Enemy_We_Created/Welcome.html) is due to be released on January 18. And among many good reports on a political settlement on Afghanistan, do also read this overall examination by the Afghan Analysts Network (http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2290); and from earlier last year, this report by The Century Foundation (http://tcf.org/publications/2011/3/afghanistan-negotiating-peace/pdf). For a more micro level look at the kind of compromises which might need to be made, read this report by Antonio Giustozzi and Claudio Franco (http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2349) about how the Taliban have been allowing schools to operate in areas under their influence in return for the introduction of a more conservative curriculum.

Afghan schools open, but under the Taliban's rules (http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/afghan-schools-open-but-under-thetalibans-rules) By Antonio Giustozzi | The National Al Qaeda remains entrenched in Pakistan's tribal areas (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2012/01/al_qaeda_remains_entrenched_in_1.php) By BILL ROGGIO | The Long War Journal Taliban join hands (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/04/taliban-join-hands.html) Dawn Editorial Militant groups in Pakistan form united front (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/militant-groups-in-pakistan-form-unitedfront/2012/01/03/gIQAwEvMYP_story.html) By Karin Brulliard and Haq Nawaz Khan | The Washington Post The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda: Debunking the Terrorism Narrative (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fawaz-gerges/the-rise-and-fall-of-alqa_b_1182003.html) By Fawaz Gerges | Huffington Post New Year Brings Good News on Terrorism: Experts Wrong Again (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/experts-predictions-wrong-6334) By John Mueller | The National Interest Global terror: Potential flashpoints in 2012 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-16399275) By Frank Gardner | BBC Macaca 01-04-2012, 08:03 PM Bangladesh-India border: "Wall of Death" Life at the India-Bangladesh border is hostile and strange, and often deadly. (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/india/111225/india-bangladeshborder) By Maher Sattar | GlobalPost If they see me talking to you, theyre going to give me a lot of trouble, says Abdul Rahim. Standing at the very edge of his property on the Bangladesh-India border, the 48-year-old Indian farmer is half a step away from illegally crossing into the Bangladeshi village of Chander Haat. But its not the possibility of getting caught trespassing by Bangladeshi border guards that worries him. Behind Rahim, a couple hundred meters into the Indian side of the border, is the worlds longest and bloodiest barbed wire fence. Dubbed the wall of death by locals, the 4,000 km barrier spans the length of the fifth-longest border in the world, and is manned by Indias Border Security Force (BSF), whose guards kill both Bangladeshis and Indians with impunity. Rahim claims the BSF routinely harasses him and has occasionally beaten him on suspicion of aiding or sheltering illegal Bangladeshi migrants and smugglers.

It's a tense border. Despite India helping Bangladesh gain independence in 1971, relations between the two countries have remained strained since the 1947 partition of India, when the subcontinent was split along religious lines, creating East Pakistan where present-day Bangladesh is. Partition resulted in a bloodbath, with over 1 million killed in the space of a few months and more than 10 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs displaced in one of the largest mass migrations in human history. Little progress has been made over decades between the two countries on hot-button issues like smuggling, supplying arms and refuge to Indian insurgents, and control of the numerous rivers that flow through both countries. Targeting undocumented migrants But the standout crisis dominating Indian discourse is undocumented migrants. Official estimates are that there are 2 million undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in India. A number frequently reported in India media is 20 million. Like Mexican undocumented migrants in the United States, their Bangladeshi counterparts are the favored scapegoats of the Indian right blamed for unemployment, crime, terrorism, "low-key Talibanization," and "disturbing our indian sex-ratio statistics." This has created a situation where many say Indias border guards are trigger-happy. On Jan. 7, 2011, Felani Khatun and her father arrived at the barbed wire a little after the early morning call to prayer had rung out from a nearby mosque. Dressed up in traditional bridal wear and wedding jewelry, the drowsy 15 year old had fallen asleep several times during their overnight journey to the border and could barely keep her eyes open. Felani, born in India to parents who were undocumented migrants there, was returning to Bangladesh to get married. But it was daylight now, and Felanis father Nurul Islam was afraid. The local smugglers he had paid Rs 3000 ($70) to help him and his daughter across insisted however that everything was fine, and the two began to climb up the ladder that had been arranged for them. Nurul Islam made it over successfully. Moments later, as Felani reached the top of the 2.5m high fence, Indian border guards who had spotted them came running out and shot her dead from close range. [The BSF shot] without any warning. I dont understand why they didnt shout anything, remembers Nurul Islam, who has been relocated with the rest of his family to the Bangladeshi village of Ramkhana, near where his daughter died. I wish theyd said stop. If theyd just said stop she wouldve been saved. Felanis lifeless body hung from the fence for five hours, in full view of Bangladeshi and Indian farmers living nearby. Eventually, the BSF slung her hands and feet onto a bamboo pole and took her away. It was over 30 hours before her body was handed over to Bangladeshi authorities and returned to her father. They took her jewelry, Nurul Islam said, sardonically. A photo, first published in Indian newspaper Anandabazaar, of Felanis corpse hanging from the fence sparked a huge uproar in Bangladeshi media. The Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced during a visit to Dhaka in July that the BSF would use non-lethal weapons, and that they would no longer shoot at civilians under any circumstances. Stemming the cattle trade Six months later the deaths on the border continue to pile up.

Except now they come about in more creative ways. Shootings are rarer, but Bangladeshi border guards report recent incidents of fatal beatings, strangling, stoning, and poisonous injections. Human rights group Odhikar accuses the BSF of killing over 1,000 Bangladeshis in the past decade. The BSF themselves admit responsibility for the deaths of 364 Bangladeshis and 164 Indians since 2006. That was when their government began constructing the fence, inspired by Israels West Bank barrier. But neither the barbed wire nor the extrajudicial murders have been successful in stopping a lucrative, illicit trade in cattle. Cows in Bangladesh sell for three to four times what they fetch in India, and resourceful traffickers have devised new, brutal ways to get around the obstacle. Rahim, the Indian farmer who witnesses this happen almost nightly, describes the procedure: They use ramps to get the cows up to the middle part of the wire fence. The wires here are a little bit further apart than the rest of the fence. They loosen the wires a little bit more, then they bind the legs and the mouth of the cow, haul it up the ramp and pass it through to the other side. It takes 10 minutes to get 50 cows through, says Rahim, But its not easy to get 10 minutes. The smugglers always follow the BSF, keeping an eye on them, waiting for an opportunity. The BSF guards arent cartoon villains, and Rahim is aware that they are doing a dangerous job. The smugglers are reckless people, he says, they dont hesitate to attack the BSF. They are armed with sickles, knives, and they threaten the BSF. They say leave us alone if you fear for your life, were here to die anyway. Though the anti-smuggling and anti-immigration efficacy of South Asias Berlin Wall is debatable, its impact on those living nearby is not. Bangladeshis have predictably bristled at the prospect of being corralled in by their giant neighbor, which surrounds them on the west, north, and east, and which they have always been a little bit paranoid about. With a growing population of 150 million packed into an area smaller than Iowa, the fence is also making many Bangladeshis claustrophobic. A barbed wire fence is a psychological expression of hegemony. They have surrounded the people of Bangladesh on three sides with barbed wire, said Adilur Rahman, the general secretary of Dhaka based rights group Odhikar, High powered floodlights, barb wire it looks like a World War II concentration camp. The floodlights beam directly into the home of 9-year-old Anis Ahmed, who complains that they are so bright he has trouble sleeping at night. Macaca 01-04-2012, 08:06 PM Hostilities run deep Anis works on his familys farm every day on the Bangladesh side of the border near the northern village of Amgaon. Their land goes right up to the border, where lush green rows of rice plants imperceptibly switch from Bangladeshi to Indian. According to international regulations, the fence cannot be closer than 150 meters to the actual border, so the actual fence falls behind rows of Indian crops. There are no clearly visible signs demarcating the exact point where Bangladeshi soil becomes Indian. Locals are simply expected to know where the line is. Most of them do, and they stay away. But the precocious Anis and his 11-year-old cousin Shohir

Jamal often walk across it to examine what lies beyond the fence. We go up to see the barbed wire fence, says Anis, When we go up to it they [the BSF guards] mock us, scold us. They say Ei Bengali admi, bhago giya, bhago giya [hey Bengali, go away]. They swear a lot at us, but things we dont understand really. The children here are growing up surrounded by an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion. Everyone in their village is viewed as a potential smuggler or an accomplice of smugglers. Many are. People here are very poor, and supplementary income is precious. Manik, the local schoolteacher, was recently arrested and given three years detention by the BSF during his first foray into cattle smuggling. Akbar Ali, an elected member of the local government here, has just returned having completed his own three-year term for trafficking cows. Suspicions run deep. During the day Anis and Shohir work side by side with the Indian farmers like Rahim, whose crops fall between the border with Bangladesh and the barbed wire fence. The proximity, however, does not imply interaction. They dont talk to us. The BSF dont want them to have a good relationship with Bangladeshis, says Anis, They [the BSF] worry that theyll end up helping people cross the border. Rahim regrets this new distance with once close neighbors. When we were children we used to play together every day, he recalls. We used to eat at each others houses. I went to school in Bangladesh. Because the fence had to be built 150 meters within Indian territory, Rahim and more than 100,000 other Indians have found themselves on the wrong side of the barbed wire. Rahim is cut off from the rest of his country, trapped within a slice of land about as wide as an airport runway. The gates at the fence open only for three hours: 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., noon to 1:00 p.m., and 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. These are the only times when Rahim and his family can move back and forth to visit relatives, go shopping, or send their kids to school. Children frequently miss school because they arrive after the gate has been closed. Rahims daughter lives with a relative 40 kilometers behind the wire. He estimates that he sees her only once in five months or so. If we go to shop at 4:00 p.m., we have to make sure were back by 5:00 p.m., otherwise were locked out for the night, he complains. As he speaks, a woman comes wading through a stream on the Bangladeshi side of the border. She is carrying multiple cell phones in her hands. Theres no electricity in our houses, explains Rahim, Were cut off from the electrical grid. So we have to sneak over to Bangladesh when the guards arent looking to charge our phones. The wire fence makes us feel like prisoners, he said. One day, when he has saved enough, Rahim says he plans to move to the other side of the fence. His expectations arent high for what may be in store there, but at least he will have ended his status as collateral damage of a stalemate between nation-states.

Arrest the ebb (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Arrest-theebb/articleshow/11341544.cms) Times of India Editorial Check the Downslide in India-Bangladesh Relations

(http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChecktheDownslideinIndiaBangladeshRelations_pdas_0 40112) By Pushpita Das | The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Macaca 01-04-2012, 08:11 PM In the beginning were the words Muslims revere the Koran. But its study is not tabooand is in some quarters increasingly daring (http://www.economist.com/node/21542162) The Economist RELIGIONS invite stereotypes, holy texts even more so. Non-Muslims often see Islam as a faith followed by people who hew so closely to an unchanging set of words that they ignore awkward new facts sooner than contradict its message. For critics, this attachment to a text encourages extremistslike Boko Haram, a group that in December attacked Nigerian churches: hotheads can generally find a passage that seems to justify their violence. Such passages abound in the Koran, just as they do in the founding texts of Christianity, Judaism and many other religions. There is also a long tradition of interpreting such verses in reassuring ways. For example, it is often stressed that the Korans injunction to slay the unbeliever wherever you find him relates to a specific historical context, in which the first Muslims were betrayed by a pagan group who had signed a truce. But when it comes to parsing holy writ, there is one big difference between Islam and most other text-based faiths. Barring a brief interlude in the ninth and tenth centuries, and a few modern liberals, Muslims have mostly believed that the Koran is distinct from every other communication. As Gods final revelation to man, it belongs not to earthly, created things but to an eternal realm. That is a bigger claim than other faiths usually make for their holy writings. The Koran may be interpreted but from a believers viewpoint, nothing in it can be set aside. Yet, at least in the calm, superficially courteous world of Western academia, debating the precise text of the Koran is increasingly commonas at a conference hosted by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), part of the University of London, in November. One organiser was Muhammad Abdel Haleem, an Egyptian-born professor who has translated the Koran into stylish modern English, drawing acclaim from many, but grumbles from purists. Other contributors included a professor from Turkey, and a scholar based in Iran. But most were non-Muslims who study the text as they would any other written materialas prose whose evolution can be traced by comparing versions. New techniques, such as the use of digital photography, help compare variations and solve puzzles. All participants implicitly accepted the idea that methods used to analyse Homer, say, or German myths might elucidate the Koran. In much of the Islamic world, even the agenda of such a meeting would be controversial. What can be debated in most Muslim countries differs hugely from what is discussed in the West. Staff at a London-based Islamic research body, the Institute for Ismaili Studies, have ranged from radicals like Mohammed Arkoun, a leader of the French deconstructionist school, to traditional Sunni or Sufi scholars. They follow the trail of al-Suyuti, a 15th-century Egyptian who accepted the existence of slightly different versions of the Koran. Such diversity under a single roof would be impossible now in Karachi or in Cairo, the bastion of Islamic scholarship. There, the interpretation of Islam and its history is strictly a task for believers. Non-Muslim offerings would be called orientalism, based on colonial arrogance. Muslims in such places who take a different view face not only academic ostracism but physical danger. Egypts leading advocate of a liberal reading of the KoranNasr Abu Zayd, who died in 2010was denounced as an apostate, forcibly divorced from his wife and had to spend his later life abroad. The rise of Islamism in Egypt offers no prospect of a friendlier climate. Meanwhile, scholars in Europe, stimulated by the manuscripts in great European libraries, are working hard to find out how and when the Korans written form was standardised. In America more effort has gone into relating the Koran to what is known from other sources about political and social history. Patricia Crone, of Americas Institute for Advanced Study, once argued that Islam originated in a revolt by Semites against Byzantine and Persian power. She has revised her views, but copies of her 1977 book Hagarism change hands for hundreds of dollars. A burst of new Koranic scholarship erupted at SOAS in the 1980s. These days, it is one of several

British campuses where scholars say they find it hard to get funding for work that threatens orthodoxya change they ascribe to the influence of conservative Saudi donors. But in France, the home of literary theory, and Germany, the fatherland of textual analysis, free-ranging study of the Koran continues. If you want to argue that partial versions of Hebrew and Christian stories are visible in the Koran, or that its historical portions are inaccurate, nobody will stop you. Most Muslim children are told that they need know only one thing about the Korans origin: that it was revealed over a period of 23 years by the angel Gabriel to Muhammad. But Islam has more to say than that. A well-known narrative tells how the fourth ruler of the Muslims, Caliph Uthman, realised that several variants of Gods revelation were circulating, and established a single version, ordering the destruction of all the others. Non-Muslim scholars, too, see signs of a conscious, but not wholly successful, effort to settle on a definitive form. The continuing variations are not all trivial. Dots over a single letter can change the tense or person of a verb, notes Keith Small, an American participant in the SOAS event. His book, Textual Criticism and Quran Manuscripts, says efforts to standardise went on for four centuries after Uthman. Before the beginning Excitement surrounds the study of some Koranic material found in Yemen in 1972. Early analysis of images of these folios suggests some may precede the first big standardisation. This study is being undertaken in Germany, not Yemen. But in the light of the Uthman story, the survival of divergent early material (which escaped the standardisers efforts) need not be unbearably shocking. After all, Islamic tradition also credits Muhammad with accepting at least seven oral versions of the Koran, albeit differing only a little. Turkey and Iran stand out as mainly Muslim countries where, in academia at least, it is possible to talk about the Korans textual origins. Turkeys secular constitution helps to safeguard free inquiry. Ankara University and Istanbul University still reflect the rationalist ethos of a secular republic; the Islamist tone of Turkeys present government affects newer campuses. If Iran is a little more open than most Arab countries, that is because of Shia Islams stress on theology, and the interpretation of texts, as a continuous enterprise. A Paris-based Shia writer, Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, has caused a stir recently by arguing that the Sunni/Shia split was really over the text of the Koran. Most Shias would say this overstates the schism. On core beliefs Irans Shia clergy remain united: they agree that the text they now have is exactly what Muhammad was told. Such tenacity is a reminder that if people expect Islam to change into something like liberal Christianitytreating scripture as a useful but fallible aid to beliefthey are wrong. As Mustafa Akyol, a Turkish writer, says: If you say the Koran is a human text, then you cease to be Muslim. Over hadiths, sayings about Muhammads life, there is flexibility; some can be weeded out as unsound or outdated. But nothing in the Koran can be dismissed. Yet some attitudes can shift, Mr Akyol adds. His book, Islam without Extremes, cites slavery as an issue where the Korans words can be reread. The text favours freeing slaves, but does not demand the abolition of the practice. Does that mean God condones slavery, or that God spoke within the norms of the seventh century which are open to change? he asks, noting that several Muslim theologians have said the latter. As it happens Christians have made similar points, picking over the words of Saint Paul. Islam, like Christianity, offers rigidity for those who yearn for it. But it leaves room for nuance too.

Using the cow (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/using-the-cow/895763/) By Javed Anand | Indian Express Where is the Muslim actress? (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/where-is-the-muslimactress/895272/) By Irena Akbar | Indian Express Draco(w)nian (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/draconian/895346/) Indian Express Editorial Macaca 01-04-2012, 08:20 PM Rethinking Safety in Delhi (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/04/india-journal-rethinkingsafety-in-delhi/) By Veronica Weis | IndiaRealTime

Something has gone fundamentally awry in the fabric of a city when reoccurring headlines of rape, dowry killing and other gender-based violence are treated as banalities, acknowledged with cursory glances. Its no surprise, then, that when you broach the topic of public safety with a woman in Delhi, she will likely launch into a litany of horrifying stories ranging from street harassment to rape. Its a rare opportunity for catharsis. And while the accounts may vary, the most haunting commonality is a distinct tone of resignation. Yet another recent public survey has suggested the extent of the problem. Released in December, a Navteq and TNS Market Research study found that more than 50% of women living in the capital fear for their safety while in public. This figure is almost encouraging given that a 2010 report by the Delhi governments women and child development department; Jagori, a nongovernmental organization; and UNIFEM put the estimate closer to four out of every five women. The normalization of violence against women convinces women that there must be some justification for being out in public, especially past dusk. The tragedy is that families are so accustomed to this status quo that they adapt, set curfews and stay up waiting in fear for their daughters to walk through the front door. And while these expectations might be understandable given the risks, the consequence is that a girls freedom and agency is unjustly limited, stunting her potential for growth. This mentality has other social drawbacks. The burden of fault is put on the victims, instead of on the officials responsible for ensuring that public spaces remain safe for everyone. Less than a year ago, Delhi Police Commissioner B.K. Gupta inflamed women all over the city by implying that if theyre out alone at night and fall victim to crime, the police shouldnt be blamed. But this remark wasnt just one unwitting mistake. At a conference in July, Mr. Gupta went so far as to suggest that Delhi is safe for women compared with other big cities internationally and that perceptions to the contrary are fabrications of the media. He made these comments the same month that Thomson Reuters Trustlaw Women, a source of legal information on womens rights, ranked India the fourth most dangerous country for women. Last year, the home ministrys National Crime Records Bureau announced that for another consecutive year, Delhi registered the highest number of reported rapes of Indias 35 largest cities. At 414 cases, it towers over the next city on the list, Mumbai. Such outspoken remarks in the face of contrary evidence by a senior public-safety official and key decision-maker is counterproductive. It suggests that instead of focusing on what should be done to address the alarming crime rate, officials are more interested in avoiding responsibility. This dismissive official tone, made worse by the widespread problem of corruption and weak rule of law, explains why women agree that the police should have a primary role in ensuring their safety yet the majority in Delhi steer clear of seeking their help after an incident of harassment or genderbased violence. The relationship between the public and Delhis law enforcement is broken, and its the women who are suffering. The new 2010 data on increases in gender-based violence demonstrates that the current strategy is not sufficient. A womens safety expert in Delhi who has worked with victims explained that women avoid the authorities because the process will be long and not stream-lined, so justice could take years. Theres also the rational fear that the cop could turn it around on the victim if the other person has a political connection or offers a bribe. Not to mention that most police lack the sensitivity to handle such issues, so their usual response to a female is to dismiss the incident as not a big deal so they can avoid the extensive paperwork associated with filing such complaints. The heavy backlog of court cases means the pursuit of justice will be long and arduous. One suggestion for how to alleviate the clogged courts would be to form a separate court where genderbased violence cases could be filed and expedited. And while Mr. Gupta has laudably mentioned that this is an option that he favors, no steps have been made toward creating such a court. Adding to the problem are the historical fragmentation and disjointed identities of Delhi residents. The citys urban sprawl arguably has led to a clash between urbanites and suburbanites. A 40-yearold woman in February was brutally gang raped by three men who drove in from Sonepat, a town 30 miles north of the capital. The citys history of scattershot urban planning further engenders

crime. As Ranjana Kumari, director of Delhis Centre for Social Research, explained to The Guardian, only 37% of the city was ever planned. The rest isslums, villages, with no proper lighting or development. There are many pockets of crime. With few successful official efforts to halt gender violence, citizens organizations have stepped in. Most recently, Whypoll, a citizens networking group founded by two journalists in 2008, launched FightBack, the citys first womens emergency mobile phone app. Whypoll is also responsible for the most comprehensive and current survey on the citys 100 most dangerous locations for women. Identifying the regions of the capital with the most gender violence is the first step toward a solution. The Whypoll audit, combined with the Delhi polices own citywide analysis, presents a detailed illustration of the target areas for improvement. Public transportation and roadsides account for the overwhelming majority of harassment and assault reports filed by women. And when victims are asked why these crimes occur, women suggest that lack of visible law enforcement, poor lighting and overcrowded public transportation options are at fault. These opinions are consistent with the advice of NGOs and womens safety authorities. To address the issue, experts have offered two major policy recommendations: rethinking the role of law enforcement and improving city infrastructure and transportation. Simply boosting the police presence on buses and in major transportation centers around the city could yield significant and immediate benefits, especially if more officers are specially trained to be sensitive and alert toward harassment and to confront perpetrators of crimes against women. Because crime occurs where people think they can get away with it, roadsides and bus stops need to have proper lighting so that women are not left alone in the dark. The city needs to use the list of most dangerous areas to perform infrastructure audits to determine where suitable lighting and maintenance needs to be improved. Similarly, adding more buses on overcrowded routes would help reduce unwanted groping, lewd comments and harassment. The metro serves as a perfect example. The women-only compartments have greatly alleviated some of these problems. It would therefore only make sense to introduce women-only buses to popular routes around Delhi. But simply separating the sexes is not enough for a true solution. Families and communities and especially men and boys need to be engaged and educated about the harms of violence against women. We need parents, especially mothers, to raise their sons to respect women. We also need parents who will raise their daughters to stand up for themselves when harassed in public spaces. Communities must rally together to protect their mothers and daughters and make public intervention and activism during such crimes a staple of civic duty. Holly Kearl, the founder of Stop Street Harassment, offered this tip, Community campaigns to end street harassment can be effective. Often it is just a few people harassing a lot of people, so if a community can come together to survey, map out or document where the harassment is happening, they can pinpoint problems and work to address them in a targeted way. Delhis women deserve better. After all, its our mothers, daughters and female relatives who are out on the streets facing persistent violence. Its time to stand up for them and demand that a stronger safety framework is implemented. One of the greatest tests of the law is the extent to which all citizens can exercise their freedom and basic civil liberties. And its clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Delhis government is failing. Veronica Weis is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist currently serving as an AIF President Clinton fellow in Delhi The politics over Mumbai's slums (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/the-politics-over-mumbaisslums/20120104.htm) By Mahesh Vijapurkar | Rediff Excreta Matters: Report Says Urban India Drowning (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/04/excreta-matters-report-says-urban-indiadrowning/) By Geeta Anand | IndiaRealTime

Lucknow Residents Scared Sleep Will Turn Them to Stone (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/04/lucknow-residents-scared-sleep-will-turn-them-tostone/) By Shefali Anand | IndiaRealTime Macaca 01-04-2012, 08:25 PM For Indian Women, a Long Wait for Equality in Parliament (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/world/asia/04iht-letter04.html) By NILANJANA S. ROY | International Herald Tribune As its winter session wound down last week, it was clear that the Indian Parliament would remain a male bastion for the near future. The lower house, almost 90 percent male in its composition, had ensured that a bill intended to increase the number of female members would not be passed for at least another year. In March 2010, feminists and womens organizations had celebrated the passage of the Womens Reservation Bill in the upper house, after a fierce 13-year debate among political parties. It seemed then that a battle of some significance had been won. The bill would amend the Constitution to reserve one-third of seats in Parliament and in state assemblies for women. Despite sometimes chaotic proceedings in the upper house, the final vote was nearly unanimous, with 191 votes for and one against. When it passed, Brinda Karat, a member from the Communist Party of India and a longtime campaigner for womens rights, spoke for many when she said: The bill will change the culture of the country, because women today are still caught in a cultural prison. We have to fight stereotypes every day. The numbers bear her out. Indias first Parliament had roughly 4.4 percent women in the lower house. The framers of the Indian Constitution had assumed that the number of women would increase on its own, as the country developed. But the number of women members of Parliament has remained low in the more than six decades since Indian independence. The present Parliament, Indias 15th, has 59 women in the 545-seat lower house, or 10.8 percent, and 24 women in the 242-seat upper house, or just short of 10 percent. According to the InterParliamentary Union, the Geneva-based international organization of parliaments, the worldwide average of female representatives in national parliaments is 19.3 percent, which places India at the lower end of the scale. To take effect, the proposed amendment must be ratified by the lower house before being approved by at least half of Indias state legislatures and the president. But what some had expected, after the 2010 victory, to be little more than a formality in the lower house has turned into yet another exhausting round of battles. The primary opposition to the bill appears to come from the complexities of caste-based politics. An oft-repeated objection was summarized by Sharad Yadav, a member of Parliament who in 2010 declared that the bill would only help upper-caste elite women get elected. The basic argument, made by political parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party, which represents mostly lower castes, and Mr. Yadavs own Janata Dal (United), is that quotas for women will come at the expense of the disadvantaged and the Muslim minority. Many analysts, like the academic Zoya Hasan, would disagree. In an article published in 2004, Ms. Hasan, a political science professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, made a more blunt argument: that resistance to quotas for women has been driven more by male politicians fears of losing their seats. The relentless opposition to the Womens Reservation Bill since it was tabled in the Lok Sabha the lower house points to a more substantial and determined opposition that goes beyond the so-called caste parties mentioned above indeed, it cuts across caste, class and party boundaries, she wrote. The most strident opposition to womens quotas has come from male politicians who fear that their political careers would be put at risk. Setting aside seats for women would require male members of Parliament to give up about 180 seats in the lower house a substantial sacrifice of power in an institution that has seen female prime ministers and female speakers, but few female members. Unlike members of the upper house, members of the lower house are directly elected and therefore more likely to be swayed by local electoral politics and caste, class and ethnic interests.

Although the debate over the bill focuses on the possible setbacks for disadvantaged castes, it rarely addresses whether quotas for women are of themselves desirable. This might be in part because of what is widely considered the success of quotas for women at the village level, in what are known as the panchayati, or local council elections. In an influential 2003 study, the economists Esther Duflo and Raghabendra Chattopadhyay examined how the experiment had worked. Despite the handicaps they may face in terms of education and prior experience, and the preconception of weak leadership, women have a real impact on policy decisions, they concluded. Female council heads, they found, tended to give higher priority than their male counterparts to issues like public health and education. The difference more women in Parliament might make could involve what issues are on the agenda, or more subtle differences in the working culture of the houses. For now, the 59 women in the lower house are not in a position to make a collective difference. Given that India has never had a Parliament where women have an equal voice, its not easy to imagine what a more representative legislature would look like. As 2012 begins, even the bills most ardent supporters acknowledge that Indias female members of Parliament have a battle on their hands. But some took heart from a statement made by the president of the Indian National Congress party, Sonia Gandhi, the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. As the winter session of Parliament drew to a close with parties debating a proposal, which ultimately failed, to set up an anti-corruption ombudsman, Mrs. Gandhi mentioned the Womens Reservation Bill and pledged to fight for its eventual passage in the lower house. The first female president of the Indian National Congress party, the poet-politician Sarojini Naidu, would have approved. As a young leader of Indias independence movement, Ms. Naidu was among a score of women who campaigned for the right to vote. It took them from 1917, when the Indian National Congress party backed womens sufferage, to 1926, when women could vote and run for some state legislatures, to see the first changes, and then several more years before all women in India had the right to cast ballots. I am only a woman, Ms. Naidu said disarmingly, as she began a 1917 speech to the chiefly male stalwarts of the Indian National Congress. Nine years later, she had what she wanted: the right for women to vote along with the men. It had taken, like most political victories in India for women, a great deal of time and patience.

Girls, interrupted (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/indicus-analytics-girlsinterrupted/460704/) By Indicus Analytics | Business Standard Kept in her place (http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Samar/Kept-in-her-place/Article1791224.aspx) By Samar Halarnkar | Hindustan Times Why The Govts Assurances On Koodankulam Are False (http://www.countercurrents.org/sundaram040112.htm) By P K Sundaram | Countercurrents A Conversation With: Air Pollution Expert Dr. Gunasekar (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/a-conversation-with-air-pollution-expert-drgunasekar/) By HEATHER TIMMONS In A Village, Private Schools Do More With Less (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/in-avillage-private-schools-do-more-with-less/) By HARI KUMAR | India Ink Is Medical Technology Coming of Age in India? (http://forbesindia.com/blog/technology/is-medicaltechnology-coming-of-age-in-india/) By Seema Singh | Forbes India Reversing India's downward trajectory (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shyamponappa-reversing-indias-downward-trajectory/460732/) By Shyam Ponappa | Business Standard No business like news business (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/no-business-like-

news-business/460730/) Business Standard Editorial The new years shows same as the old (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-new-yearsshows-same-as-the-old/895768/) By Shailaja Bajpai | Indian Express Will Indian Publishing Continue To Boom? (http://forbesindia.com/article/biggest-questions-of2012/will-indian-publishing-continue-to-boom/31782/1) By David Davidar | Forbes India Luxury housing doing well? (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/A-brick-on-thewall/entry/luxury-housing-doing-well) By E Jayashree Kurup | Times of India Poor aam admi will be a loser in the year ahead (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slideshow-1-poor-aam-admi-will-be-a-loser-in-the-year-ahead/20120104.htm) By Gopal Krishna | Rediff Macaca 01-04-2012, 08:31 PM Looking ahead to 2012 (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/kaleidoscope/entry/lookingahead-to-2012) By B Pradeep Nair | Times of India If theres one thing that I am looking forward to this year, its a change in our mindset. The world around us is rapidly evolving, thanks to science and technology. But our responses to many contemporary issues continue to be stereotyped and often warped by anachronistic values and judgements. Here are some areas where a break from the past would be welcome. Move from symbolism to practice We as a nation revel in symbolism. Patriotism, purity, virtuosity, morality, non-violence... the list goes on. We throw stones at dogs and make lives of animals miserable, while at the same time worship them. We litter public places with gay abandon, even while being obsessed with purity and cleanliness when it comes to religious practices. We value, respect and honour our national flag, song and anthem; though we waste public money and resources, and destroy public property. We need to realise that national symbols, our language and traditions draw their strength from the state of our nation and our people. Patriotism is not just about standing up for Jana Gana Mana, but its more about contributing to our national wealth. End, not the means If a signboard has to be put up at a public place, hardly any thought goes into whether people can read it or not. Either it will be positioned at a wrong place, or it will be in a language very few people can read. The typical stereotyped response often heard is: Let people learn the language and then read it! It symbolizes our attitude to many situations, where bureaucratic procedures, traditional concepts or misplaced sense of values take precedence over convenience and comfort of the common people. Political consensus A cliche that is merely heard, never brought about. The American equivalent is bipartisan approach. They dont merely talk about it, they actively practise it. Look at the way the anticorruption and Lokpal debate went both in Parliament and outside. We dont have a solution to the problem everyone is so clear about. We need to change the way politics is practised in our country, all the more because in a democracy its the political decision-makers who are the final authority. Separate the private and the public A lot of public fights in our country are about personal matters and beliefs. Be it the dress we wear or the food we eat or the language we speak or the source of strength we believe in. A number of public issues are left unattended and unresolved, because there is little time or energy left after battling personal egos. The private and the public are mixed up so badly that often policy decisions are taken based on personal whims rather than on public interest. Move on... Heres an often-spoken about scene that typifies our indifference -- a suited and booted nouveau riche, while travelling in his newly acquired SUV, lowers the windshield to throw the banana peel on the road. Helen Keller said, "Science may have found a cure for most evils; but it has found no

remedy for the worst of them all -- the apathy of human beings." Looking forward to a brighter and enriching 2012.

Value Education and Life Skills (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/educable/entry/valueeducation-and-life-skills) By Meeta Sengupta | Times of India Anna's stir, and lessons for civil society (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/bs-raghavan/article2772019.ece) By B. S. RAGHAVAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Maharashtra CM shows the right way to fight corruption. (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/maharashtra-cm-shows-the-rightway-to-fight-corruption) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Much fury, little substance (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Much-furylittle-substance/articleshow/11367262.cms) By Cartoonist Faces Ban on Right to Poke Fun (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/04/cartoonist-faces-ban-on-right-to-poke-fun/) By Preetika Rana | IndiaRealTime Recession is a state of mind (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2774851.ece) By R. SRINIVASAN | The Hindu BusinessLine Towards a level playing field (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2775109.ece) By NAVIN CHAWLA | The Hindu A repeat of the nervous 90s? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/subir-royrepeatthenervous-90s/460620/) By Subir Roy | Business Standard The mystery of the falling rupee (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/abheekbaruamysterythe-falling-rupee/460619/) By Abheek Barua | Business Standard Should banks bail out companies? (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/should-banksbail-out-companies/460598/) Business Standard More Sreedharans (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/more-sreedharans/460617/) Business Standard Editorial Board of political control (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/boardpoliticalcontrol/460618/) Business Standard Editorial Law for 'Metro straphangers' (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/m-j-antony-law-formetro-straphangers/460597/) By M J Antony Introducing Bajaj Autos Brand NewCar? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/introducingbajajs-brand-new-car/) By VIKAS BAJAJ and SRUTHI GOTTIPATI | India Ink Don't call it a car (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/dont-call-itcar/460731/) Business Standard Editorial Tata Nano, world's cheapest car, struggles to gain traction (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/04/nanocar-idINDEE80300W20120104) By Tony Munroe | Reuters Macaca 01-05-2012, 08:31 PM Indian Revolution Born in Farce Ends in One (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/world/asia/05iht-letter05.html) By MANU JOSEPH | International Herald Tribune Last week in Mumbai, an old man accepted defeat. Anna Hazare sat cross-legged on a stage, enduring yet another fast and staring bleakly at a massive public ground that can fit 100,000 people but was not filling up with supporters as he had expected. Just a few thousand had turned out to watch, a small fraction of the numbers the 74-year-old man had attracted during his earlier fasts in New Delhi to demand the creation of a powerful anti-corruption body called the Lokpal that would primarily roast politicians and bureaucrats. The news media, too, had grown tired of his fasts. All this and poor health forced Mr. Hazare to end his demonstration just a day after he had begun his

three-day fast. As his nine-month-old revolution floundered, the government presented its Lokpal bill in the upper house of the Parliament, where it was defeated by members citing its various provisions and technicalities. For more than four decades, Parliament members have been trying to create a Lokpal, and they have, not surprisingly, failed, because it would be suicidal for them to succeed. Mr. Hazare has promised to return and fight another day on the streets, which he certainly will do, but with diminished halo and media support. The self-styled revolution of the urban middle class against the corrupt political class elected by the masses appears to be over. It is over not for want of ideals or self-righteous rage, but because of the way it began, last April, as a spectacle on television news channels. The news anchors projected a man with outdated rustic ideas, including flogging as a cure for alcoholism and chopping off limbs as a punishment for corruption, as the new hero of the middle class. The Indian news media generate public interest through two distinct kinds of stories the reporters story and the editors story. In 2005, when Parliament passed the Right to Information Act, which gave any Indian citizen access to most government documents, it was the result of a long and difficult process of influencing public opinion by reformers and persistent reporters. It was never a sexy story. Beat reporters kept pushing the many aspects of the idea of right to information, and the story slowly made its way from the inside pages to the front pages, from the periphery of television reportage to prime-time discussions. It was the reporters story, and at the end of it, all the public was reasonably well informed about the act, why it was important and how they could use it. The anti-corruption movement, on the other hand, was an editors story from the very beginning, from the moment Mr. Hazare arrived in New Delhi in April, sat on a wayside with his supporters and threatened to starve to death if the government did not create the Lokpal. Television news quickly converted Mr. Hazare into a saint who had arrived from his village to fight the corrupt authorities in New Delhi. On the first day of his fast, there were no more than 300 people around him, but the cameras framed the fast in such a way that it gave the impression that something big was going on. Among his core supporters there were several impoverished poets whose laments were chiefly against people who go in cars and people for whom there are big shiny roads while the poor have nothing to eat. In short, their laments were not only against politicians, but also against the newly prosperous middle class. At the time, the television news media, which are largely headquartered in New Delhi, had very little understanding of Mr. Hazare, who is from the western state of Maharashtra. Until last April, his influence was confined to rural parts of Maharashtra. By the time the anchors asked the important question Who exactly is Anna Hazare? it was too late. They had already proclaimed him a modern saint, and he had amassed millions of supporters in a matter of days. As it turned out, Mr. Hazare is not a man the urban middle class would normally call a saint. Mr. Hazare has in the recent past supported the anti-migrant stand of Raj Thackeray, whose outfit, Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, has frequently assaulted migrants from north India in Mumbai. The novelist Arundhati Roy, accusing Mr. Hazare of tacitly backing right-wing violence, asked in an article in The Hindu: Who is he really, this new saint, this Voice of the People? After the medias canonization of Mr. Hazare, his utterances and actions slowly began to expose him as a very different man from what people had been led to believe. He praised the chief minister of Gujarat State, Narendra Modi, for rural development even though the image of Mr. Modi in the national conscience is of a man accused of having a role in the killings of hundreds of Muslims in communal riots. On a television show, Mr. Hazare recommended amputation and death for the corrupt. He has also said that drunkards should be flogged. And last month, when he was asked to comment on the governments plan to allow foreign investments in the retail sector, Mr. Hazare compared foreign retailers to the East India Company, which once colonized India. He said: The British came here for trading and commercial purposes and ruled this country for 150 years. How

could the government forget it? It was exactly men like him from whom India had liberated itself in its struggle for modernity. Also, he has declared that in the approaching state elections he will campaign against the Congress party even if this means supporting other corrupt politicians. His priority, he has stated, is to punish the Congress for not passing his version of the Lokpal bill. So a movement that was born in a farce has ended in a farce. But Mr. Hazare, despite the erosion of his credibility, still has support in the middle class because of its deep hatred of politicians. Also, the people who have walked long distances holding candles and wearing I am Anna caps are embarrassed to admit that they were wrong. They want to believe that a revolution can clean India of corruption, even though some of them have most likely done things like bribe nursery school officials to secure their childrens admissions.

Was Anna Hazare a Media-Created Farce? (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/was-annahazare-a-media-created-farce/) The New York Times Mulayam better option than Mamata for the Congress? (http://www.rediff.com/news/column/mulayam-better-option-than-mamata-for-thecongress/20120105.htm) By T V R Shenoy | Rediff Quarrelsome couple (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2778342.ece) The Hindu Editorial 'Mamata's compulsion is to be seen as fighting for the people' (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Mamatas-compulsion-is-to-be-seenas-fighting-for-the-people/articleshow/11379717.cms) By A B Bardhan | Times of India How Do You Solve A Problem Like Mamata? (http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/01/05/howdo-you-solve-a-problem-like-mamata/) By Vibhuti Agarwal | IndiaRealTime With allies like these (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/with-allies-like-these/896277/) Indian Express Editorial Talk is cheap (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Talk-ischeap/articleshow/11379967.cms) Times of India Editorial BJP Feasting on Rotten Apples (http://forbesindia.com/blog/economy-policy/bjp-feasting-on-rottenapples/) By Dinesh Narayanan | Forbes India BJP in a mess of its own making (http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/dc-comment/bjp-messits-own-making-245) Deccan Chronicle Editorial BJP wont worry about Kushwaha backlash..after all it has Annas support! (http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/bjp-won-t-worry-about-kushwahabacklash-after-all-it-has-anna-s-support) By Prashant Panday | Times of India Macaca 01-05-2012, 08:36 PM The B-school divide Uncertainty about the India story keeps recruiters away from the top schools, but the smaller ones look forward to a busy placement season (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/shyamalmajumdarb-school-divide/460830/) By Shyamal Majumdar | Business Standard As the slowdown clouds get darker in the new year, there is an interesting divide among the countrys business schools. Even as the mood is gloomy in the top schools (Indian Institutes of Management, International Business School and so on) that are set to start with their placement season, the not-so-marquee names are having a reasonably good run. Reason: most of the usual names offering the real top-dollar jobs consulting firms, global commercial and investment banks will be missing from the campuses of leading B-schools this time. The absence of these companies could have a serious impact because finance and consulting have been the top draws among B-school students. For example, 29 per cent of IIM-Ahmedabad students this year took up summer internships with financial services companies. The corresponding

number for consulting companies was 22 per cent. The same thing happened during the 2008 slowdown, but the difference this time is that even those Indian companies that recruited a lot from these schools in 2009 are reluctant to visit campuses. They havent dropped out, but will make fewer offers since they are now unsure of the domestic consumption story. The CEO of a large enterprise says the problem magnifies when word spreads that the big boys are not coming. Bonafide recruiters also start thinking, should I go to the campuses? If I go, should I offer what I was offering last year? he says. People involved in the placement process also say many students at these schools who saw MBA admissions as the ticket to good jobs have started questioning the return on investment, perhaps for the first time in several decades. What makes matters worse is that the public sector banks and corporations that recruited heavily from IIMs after the 2008 slowdown are reluctant this time since most of the candidates jumped ship as soon as the job market improved. Though the public sector undertakings (PSUs) are still recruiting MBAs in large numbers, the intake is mostly from second-rung schools. So, its more or less certain that top B-schools are headed for a long and tedious placement season this year with fewer offers coming their way. The scene is, however, dramatically different in the second-rung schools (mostly those outside the top-20) that havent yet seen any decline in the number of offers coming their way. This is unusual considering that during the 2008 slowdown, career placement officers in many of these schools had seen the hiring season continue long after graduation, extending into the summer and beyond. The reason is that there are enough companies that have jobs on offer at relatively lower levels but at a much more reasonable cost. The slowdown, thankfully, hasnt impacted this segment of the job market. For example, almost all technology companies are sticking to recruitment targets drawn up at the beginning of the financial year. In fact, they will recruit over 250,000 engineering graduates (the number was 200,000 last year) from across the countrys lesser-known campuses this year. There are huge employment opportunities also in sectors like retail, health care, defence, hospitality and consumer durables. That the job market is still bullish for students of the second-rung institutes is also reflected in a recent survey done by HR firm Manpower. Indian employers, the survey says, are the most bullish worldwide when it comes to hiring, with robust recruitment plans. With a net employment outlook an indicator of hiring intentions of 41-plus per cent, Indian employers are bullish about their recruitment plans for the first three months of 2012. According to the report, the services sector (49-plus per cent) and the mining and construction sector (47-plus per cent) present the brightest hiring opportunities for job seekers in the next three months. In fact, India and Japan were the only Asian economies (Chinese employers are the least optimistic) in which hiring prospects are expected to improve. In a separate monthly report, job portal Naukri.com said hiring activities have surged across all sectors. The monthly Naukri Job Speak index an indicator of online job demand showed that hiring moved up across all sectors. Others say India, to a large extent, is insulated from the job scarcity in the developed world. The employment generation in the country as a whole also continues to rise despite the economic slowdown. A Labour Bureau study on the effect of economic slowdown on employment between July and September, 2011, showed that overall employment in the country increased quite a bit during this quarter. All sectors, except leather and transport, saw an increase in employment. Though all this is good news, what is perhaps not is that salary increases will be muted. In these uncertain times, almost all companies are refusing to increase average salary offers from last years levels. The other change, of course, is the rise in the variable component of the salary package, the underlying principle being you get a part of what you earn for the company.

Divestment dilemmas (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2777964.ece) The Hindu BusinessLine Editorial Disinvestment disrespect (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/disinvestmentdisrespect/460845/) Business Standard Editorial An oil slick for the fisc (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/an-oil-slick-forfisc/460846/) Business Standard Editorial How brands are being tested (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/madhukar-sabnavishow-brandsbeing-tested/460847/) By Madhukar Sabnavis | Business Standard A family entertainer (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/bhupesh-bhandarifamilyentertainer/460848/) By Bhupesh Bhandari | Business Standard Indian tea, a bitter brew for some (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2777994.ece) By MOHAN MANI | The Hindu BusinessLine Waiting for e-services (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2778211.ece) The Hindu Editorial The road to safety (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/The-road-tosafety/articleshow/11379840.cms) By Bornali Bhandari & Diya Dutta | Times of India Wield the stick (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Wield-thestick/articleshow/11379944.cms) Times of India Editorial Trucking Along on Indian Roads (http://forbesindia.com/article/auto-expo-2012/trucking-along-onindian-roads/31914/1) By Ashish K Mishra | Forbes India Key political risks to watch in India (http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/05/india-risksidINDEE80408N20120105) By Frank Jack Daniel | Reuters Macaca 01-05-2012, 08:43 PM Many Indias, and Just as Many Calendars (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/manyindias-and-just-as-many-calendars-choudhury.html) By Chandrahas Choudhury | Bloomberg Four days ago, like many of you, I entered 2012 in a sentimental haze induced partly by alcohol, and partly by reflecting on the narrative threads that suddenly emerged from the events of the long, life-changing year gone by. The idea of a calendar is one of the most durable, global fictions of our lives, a common set of hooks on which to hang our days and years, and to mark endings and beginnings. But in India the hegemony of a universal calendar is persistently subverted. To look at a calendar here is to see that one is living in a multitude of months, years and indeed eras; Indians are potentially always at some kind of end, middle or beginning -- a strangely warming and mindexpanding sensation. Our calendars probably have more text on them than any other in the world: They use the modern Gregorian calendar, the calendar of civil life, to map the different calendric systems used by Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jains and Parsis. Some of the best-known names in Indian publishing -- the Mumbai-based house Kalnirnay, for example -- don't publish books but calendars in all the major Indian languages. Cumulatively, they sell tens of millions of copies each year. On Jan. 1, I hung up one of these calendars -- a Hindu "panchang," or calendar-almanac, which marks onto the Gregorian calendar the dates and times of religious and astrological significance for Hindus. I saw that, while the core of me was in the mental universe of the Gregorian calendar's 2012, I was also simultaneously in other calendric universes: in year 2068 of the Vikram Samvat calendar, used in India's north and west; in year 1933 of the Saka calendar, used in India's west and south; in year 1418 of the Bengali calendar, which is part of the mindscape of eastern India; and in year 1433 of the Islamic Hijri calendar. Most of these calendars are lunar or lunisolar and are made up of 12 months of 29.5 days. Each month is divided into two halves pegged to the waxing and waning of the moon. How these calendars reconcile the 354 days of a lunar year with the 365 days of a solar year is part of their individuality. In my own religion, Hinduism, an "adhika masa," or an extra month, is added to the calendar every 32 months. This means that festivals never appear on the same date every year, and Hindus must always reference their calendars. (For instance, the spring festival of Holi appeared on March 20 in 2011, and on March 1 in 2010, and is due this year on ... run to your calendar!)

The intimate place of the lunar calendar in Hindu daily life was usefully explained by Ram Gopal Ratnam for The Organiser in the 2010 essay "How Many New Years Do We Have?" He wrote: The Earths movement around the Sun is not cognizable for a common man. We can infer the same by observing the climatic changes. We can merely know it is winter or summer or rainy season. ... It is a matter for the scientist or the astro mathematician who computes the Panchang. The solar calendar can be called a scientists calendar. ... The lunar movement is visible. Even a layman can observe and understand the lunar movement. You have to just observe the sky and do some simple calculations and you can arrive at the festival days. So, you can call this a common mans calendar. Indeed, when India became an independent nation-state in 1947, it wasn't just laws, constitutions, state boundaries and structures of land ownership that had to be reformed and assimilated into a single frame, but calendars. In 1952, the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, instituted a Calendar Reform Committee to work out a "unified national calendar." In the committee's report, published in 1955, Nehru explained: I am told that we have at present thirty different calendars, differing from each other in various ways, including the methods of time reckoning. These calendars are the natural result of our past political and cultural history and partly represent past political divisions in the country. Now that we have attained independence, it is obviously desirable that there should be a certain uniformity in the calendar for our civic, social and other purposes and that this should be based on a scientific approach to this problem. Among the Calendar Reform Committee's recommendations was that India's unified national calendar should follow the Saka calendar. The committee chose to open the Saka Era on Chaitra 1, 1879, which corresponds to the Gregorian calendar's March 22, 1957. In a magisterial essay published in 2000 called "India Through its Calendars," the economist Amartya Sen explained that the range of Indian calendars provides an index of the diversity of Indian worldviews: The variety of calendars, divided not only by religious connections but also by regional diversity, seems to be deeply hostile to any view of Indian unity. However, it must be noted in this context that many of these calendars have strong similarities, in terms of months, and also the beginning of the year. For example, the Kaliyuga, the Vikram Samvat, the Saka, the Bengali San and several other calendars begin very close to each other in the middle of April. There is evidence that their respective beginnings were typically fixed at the same point, the vernal equinox, from which they have moved over the long stretch of time in the last two millennia, during which the "correction" for the integer value of the length of the year in terms of days has been slightly inadequate -- again in much the same way. Further testing the achievement of a united calendrical perspective is the difficulty of identifying a principal meridian and a reference location (like Greenwich in the U.K.). The ancient city of Ujjain, the capital of several Hindu dynasties and the home of many literary and cultural activities through the first millennium A.D., seems to be the most durable reference location for many of India's calendars. The Vikram Samvat calendar, which began in 57 B.C., apparently originated in this ancient capital city. But it is also the base for the Saka system, which began in 78 A.D., and a great many other Indian calendars. Indeed, even today, Ujjains location is used to fix the anchor point of the Indian clock. Indian Standard Time, which governs our lives, still remains a close approximation of Ujjain time five hours and 30 minutes ahead of Greenwich Mean Time. Sen's essay also makes note of an attempt to devise a synthetic pan-Indian calendar well before the one sponsored by the nation-state in 1952: the Tarikh-Ilahi, or God's calendar, of the Muslim regent Akbar, launched in 1584. To know an Indian calendar, then, and to understand its rhythms, is to know something untranslatable about India. In a globalizing time, this truth applies as much to Indians themselves as to those interested in India. In an end-of-the-year column on Dec. 23 last year, the writer Aakar Patel said as much, asking Indians to make a new year's resolution to "mark" the date as a way of enriching their lives:

Today is the last day of the Gujarati month of Magsar (what other Indians call Margshirsha), and it is the dark night of the new moon. U.R. Ananthamurthy once said educated Indians have lost contact with their almanac. What a devastating observation. We live by the solar calendar, but our grandparents marked their days on a lunar year, because it was then important to know the amount of moonlight available. Because of this shift, we now know when Valentines Day arrives, but not when we should celebrate Sharad Purnima. Fortunately, since we are vaguely familiar with the major festivals and where they fall, we only need to consult the almanac regularly to understand the rhythm of India. And with that, I leave you today, Jan. 4 -- or the 11th day of the second half of the winter month of Poush -- and head off for a little reading-and-rambling vacation in the town of Ranikhet in the Himalayan foothills.

Homeless in India: Out in the cold (http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/homeless-inindia-out-in-the-cold) By Suryatapa Bhattacharya | The National On the rise: Cost of giving up begging (http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Onthe-rise-Cost-of-giving-up-begging/Article1-791824.aspx) By Neelam Pandey | Hindustan Times Windows in the ceiling (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/windows-in-the-ceiling/896275/) By Sujatha Ramdorai | Indian Express In Chhattisgarh village, cops see human sacrifice in girls mystery death (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/in-chhattisgarh-village-cops-see-human-sacrifice-in-girlsmystery-death/896343/) By Ashutosh Bhardwaj | Indian Express Hard living in the Himalayas (http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/article2778010.ece) By NILABJA GHOSH | The Hindu BusinessLine Macaca 01-05-2012, 08:48 PM Indians split over cow ban (http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA06Df05.html) By Neeta Lal | Asia Times Rarely, if ever, has an animal and its meat been the object of such dissonance as the cow has been in India. Referred to reverentially as kamdhenu (one who fulfills all needs), the animal occupies a prime place in Hindu religious rituals and customs. The issue of its slaughter thus invariably kindles strong passions across the socio-political spectrum. While the far-right Hindutva groups oppose the cows' butchering, :Dliberals are vehement that what kind of meat one eats ought to be a matter of personal choice in a democracy:D. Against such a contentious backdrop, the ban by the government of the Hindu nationalist right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on cow slaughter in the central state of Madhya Pradesh - with an exceptionally stringent law - has resurrected the age-old debate. The Gau-Vansh Vadh Pratishedh (Sanshodhan) Act, which has already received the presidential stamp, makes cow slaughter a serious offence punishable by up to seven years in jail. The law will also trigger punitive action to varying degrees against those who transport cows to slaughter or store beef. The new legislation, say critics, is basically the old bugbear of "cow politics" masquerading as a matter of "public interest and communal harmony". It could have serious societal ramifications, too, considering it will permit an authority to randomly inspect homes and eateries on the pretext of seeking "evidence". This is tricky territory - apart from stoking religious sentiments, such "inspections" may well encourage abuse or harassment amounting to an infringement of human rights. More so as the onus, under this act, is on the accused to prove his or her innocence. A special symbol

The cow has dominated the Indian political matrix for decades. As far back as 1966, Delhi witnessed an outbreak of a massive agitation on the issue of a ban of cow slaughter. Almost all Indian communal political parties organized a massive demonstration - attended by thousands of people - in support of a national ban on cow slaughter. It climaxed in violent rioting in front of parliament, resulting in the death of eight persons and injury to hundreds. In April 1979, Acharya Vinoba Bhave, considered a spiritual heir to Mahatma Gandhi, went on a hunger strike to pressurize the central government to prohibit cow slaughter throughout the country. Bhave terminated his fast after five days when the then-prime minister Morarji Desai assured him that his government would try to implement the anti-slaughter legislation expeditiously. Interestingly, according to some Brahmanical texts, the killing of animals and eating of beef was common during Vedic times. Even now, many Hindus or even cattle owners do not want cowslaughter banned. Historian D N Jha writes in his book, Paradox of the Indian Cow: Attitudes to Beef Eating in Early India, that "traditional Hindu religious heritage carries the load of the misconception that his ancestors, especially the Vedic Aryans, attached great importance to the cow on account of its inherent sacredness". The "sacred" cow has come to be considered a symbol of community identity of Hindus whose cultural tradition is often imagined as threatened by Muslims who are thought of as "beefeaters", writes Jha. And adds, "The sanctity of the cow has, therefore, been wrongly traced back to the Vedas, which are supposedly ... the fountainhead of all knowledge and wisdom." In other words, Jha concludes, sections of Indian society have traced back the concept of the sacred cow to the very period when it was sacrificed and its flesh was eaten. Cow slaughter is currently banned in many states - Gujarat passed the Animal Preservation Act in October 2011 that prohibits killing of cows along with buying, selling and transport of beef. Odisha and Andhra Pradesh states allow butchering of cattle other than cows if the animal carries a "fit-forslaughter" certificate. In West Bengal and Kerala, consumption of beef is not deemed an offence. However, what complicates the cow dynamic further is the fact that the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution specify that the state must take steps for "... prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves ..." At the same time, legal eagles point out that banning cow slaughter violates two fundamental rights at the heart of India's constitution - the freedom to live and act (and eat) as one wishes (provided that doesn't infringe other people's rights), and the right to "carry on any occupation, trade or business". The ban, feel the opponents, thus strikes at the very root of India's pluralistic and multi-religious society under the bogus pretext of respecting the "religious sentiments" of a community. A sizeable number of Hindus eat beef, nor do their scriptures prohibit its consumption. In southern Kerala, for instance, beef accounts for nearly half of all meat consumed by all communities, including Hindus. Sociologists attribute another reason to the widespread consumption of cow meat in India - it is a far cheaper source of animal protein for the poor than lamb or chicken, which retail at double the price. Small wonder, India's beef consumption post-independence in 1947 has witnessed a much faster upward spiral than any other kind of meat. "If the real objective is to prevent cruelty to animals," say liberals, "then why single out the cow when hundreds of other animals are maltreated?" Already, the management of cattle resources across India has been a deeply contentious issue with animal-rights activists. It is a common practice for farmers, they say, to brutally beat bullocks that plough their fields. Circus owners are notorious for maltreating the very animals that provide them their livelihood. Horses and camels, that entertain tourists on Indian beaches, are often brought to

hospitals with profuse bleedings and injuries. In face of such a grim reality, the new law smacks of hypocrisy. "Cow slaughter has become a political tool in the hand of those who base their politics on religious identities," says political analyst Ashok Pandit. "The MP [Madhya Pradesh] government's sudden love for a hapless animal is basically the invention of a remote control to manipulate religious minorities." Besides, observers point out, in states where demands for a ban on cow slaughter is opposed on religious lines, it is not so much for religion, but because the issue is projected as a matter of "identity". The Hindu nationalist right-wing BJP - known to resort to issues of identity and the politics of symbols - has often ignited the cow issue to stoke religious sentiments. In March 2010, the BJPdominated assembly in the southern state of Karnataka (the last Indian state to pass the cow protection bill) faced vehement protests from Muslims. The cow slaughter issue often drives the BJP's agenda, say political observers, because it relies on the Hindu vote bank for its main support. The party has also advocated stringent cow rights legislation across the country. Critics say the law deliberately targets Muslims who tend to be meat traders or butchers, to fuel religious tension. In 2010, a Muslim butcher in Himachal Pradesh killed a cow in a fit of rage after it had failed to give milk for more than three years, triggering violence. Hindu protesters vandalized two mosques in an unsavory backlash, setting one of one of them on fire. Ironically, the ban on cow slaughter has done something worse - it has driven the beef business underground. Ergo, it is still available to those who love this meat and have the "right" contacts.

Cattle class: native vs exotic (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/sainath/article2778130.ece) By P. SAINATH | The Hindu Holy cow! Small is beautiful (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/sainath/article2775282.ece) By P. SAINATH | The Hindu Macaca 01-05-2012, 08:53 PM Of rumours dark and benign (http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/05/of-rumours-dark-andbenign.html) By Jawed Naqvi | Dawn TAMED gorillas that could walk and talk like humans came with sophisticated Soviet weapons to East Pakistan to liberate the region from West Pakistan. That`s how Bangladesh was formed. The rumour persisted for years across northern India`s hamlets and towns until some of the school kids, the chief vectors of the widespread myth, went to college. There they learnt the spelling of `guerrilla`; some discovered its links with the Mukti Bahini. In the Indian city of Lucknow late on Monday night, a high court judge was woken up by his domestic staff. They had made dozens of panic-stricken calls to alert him about an impending disaster. The judge and his family must leave their bed and troop out of the house in the freezing cold at once. If you don`t, you would turn into stone sir, pleaded the cook his voice trembling with fear. Hardly a home was left untouched by the galloping rumour. By morning the hoax had spread to the far corners of Uttar Pradesh though the geographical circumscription was puzzling. Leave your beds or you would turn into stone. Strange command. Thousands clambered into the streets and parks mostly in a dazed state. No one knows how it all began. It is not always easy to divine the havoc wreaked by the absence of a common language among carriers of an already spurious idea. Cultural aloofness, blind faith and mischief are other potent ingredients that stir a rumour. jaama pyjaam

Shafiq Durrani`s leftist detractors at Delhi`s Jawaharlal Nehru University pointlessly thrashed the soft-spoken Muslim activist in the mid-1970s. The assault happened largely because the Jamaat-iIslami acolyte spoke idiomatic Urdu. His communist rivals, who mostly came from Bengal and southern India, had failed to figure out the difference between and . Aap jaame se baahar jaa rahi hain , the genial Durrani had chided an abusive female partisan. But his advice to her to not cross the limits of agreeable behaviour was too chaste a phrase for the ignorant hordes to grasp. They descended on him with the ferocity of raging bulls. paan paan Kahat hain ki nau lakh saal hoi gae hain The -chewing constable in Ayodhya bearing an archaic 303 rifle was confident of his historic facts when I met him under the left dome of the Babri Masjid. This was a few months before the mosque was razed by a deluded mob. Lord Ram was born within four feet of the central dome of the 16thcentury structure, the constable claimed, his mouth brimming with red spittle from the . , he declaimed in pure Awadhi. (`They say it happened 900,000 years ago.`) Ramayana The constable`s knowledge of history is not any more or less deep than the Delhi mob`s that didn`t want to hear of a host of different traditions and lore of the in India. There is a genuine fear among the mythmakers that other versions would dilute the dominant narrative they carefully chose to turn an open and eclectic canvas of Hinduism into a narrow variant of Semitic religions. I have yet to come across a mosque-going Muslim or a church-going Christian in South Asia who would question any of the mind-boggling claims of superhuman feats of their heroes as the Hindus can. On the contrary, a number of Muslim clerics had vociferously rejected the news of Neil Armstrong`s landing on the moon as Zionist propaganda. Rumours seem to abound in fractured societies with greater ease than they do in cohesive groups. Mistrust and a lack of confidence in the `other` help breed dark myths. Doctors from Aligarh Muslim University`s medical college were once forced to go to the TV to assure the patients that its doctors were not evil. Pamphlets had been circulated by right-wing groups to the effect that Muslim doctors in Aligarh were administering poison to Hindu victims of a communal incident nearby. I was manning the bureau for a wire agency in Colombo when news spread like wildfire (I think it was in 1995) that idols of the elephant-faced Lord Ganesha were drinking milk in gallons across India. A temple to Sai Baba in Colombo reported a similar event. Throngs of devotees Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Buddhist milled around the spot to see the spectacle. I was escorted in through the backdoor. Since there was no Ganesha idol on that side, I `fed` a spoonful of milk to a marble replica of Nandi, the mythical bull identified as a companion of Lord Shiva. While illiteracy and ignorance in Indian villages contributes to prevalence of obscurantism, and they fall prey to rumours, the phenomenon has not left urban India untouched.A monster-inspired panic in the Indian capital a decade ago centred around the as yet unverified exploits of the Monkey Man. The Herald In a piece titled `On the Trail of an Uncanny Creature` , wondered if the mass hysteria was as mass as it was purported to be: No-one wants to be the only chap on the street who hasn`t seen what all his neighbours have. The article compared the Monkey Man with 1800s London`s SpringHeeled Jack, an alleged Victorian jumping semi-humanoid often said to have breathed fire and who was reportedly witnessed by reputable people. The Monkey Man story broke in the excruciatingly hot month of May in 2001. There was little else happening apart from the unending saga of a defence scandal. The Al Qaeda attack on New York was still months away and nothing like the parliament attack that took place in December was even conceivable. The international media went crazy after the Monkey Man. Whatever the explanations, the beast seemed amazingly malleable and, indeed, prolific. One Delhi resident spoke how it was a monkey until it turned into a cat when grabbed. One criminal took advantage of the situation. He wore a mask so that witnesses would think that he was just one

more Monkey Man. And so the story from Uttar Pradesh has heralded another year in the land of fancy rumours, outlandish beliefs and self-induced hysteria. Mercifully we have been largely spared the ordeal of turning into stones although some of us did freeze out there in the cold just to stay human.

The Riddle Of Representation: Issues in The Caste Census Debate (http://www.countercurrents.org/stephen050112.htm) By Cynthia Stephen | Countercurrents Rethinking Social Justice (http://www.countercurrents.org/yadav050112.htm) By Yogendra Yadav | Countercurrents The Year of Justice in Gujarat (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-the-year-ofjustice-in-gujarat-ishrat-godhra-and-more/20120105.htm) Rediff Macaca 01-05-2012, 08:57 PM For a fine balance (http://www.hindustantimes.com/editorial-views-on/Edits/For-a-finebalance/Article1-791784.aspx) By Vikram Sood | Hindustan Times A few weeks ago, social media received the attention of the sarkar when the government tried to control Twitter, Facebook and other internet services for having posted or allowed to be posted what was described as scurrilous and objectionable material on their sites. There was a furore in Indias online world with charges that the government was trying to curb freedom of expression. While it is essential that India should preserve the freedom of speech and expression, surely this cannot be an absolute right. The government may use the strong-arm tactic to make others fall in line, but there is no clear remedy for an individual who reasonably expresses his or her thoughts on Facebook or Twitter, only to face obnoxious, vituperative comments. It is for the internet services to provide remedies, and insist repeatedly that such services are available. It cannot be a more difficult task than controlling an uncouth lout on the street who chooses to be abusive or obnoxious and who can be abused in turn, reported to the authorities or ignored as an individual. Except that in the case of social media, the abuser has created evidence against himself. While these are issues that could be worked out by social media services and governments of the countries in which they operate, States have other worries as well. Mass media, in its different forms, has been used by the State to manufacture consent or create dissent in other countries. The former involves media management, the latter is more in the nature of psychological warfare used in peace time, indeed at all times, as an exercise of soft power. The traditional vehicles for the purpose have been the newspaper, radio, television or the cinema. However, for the insurgent or dissident, these instruments have always been beyond reach, either to own or manipulate. With the onset of the communication revolution and the arrival of the personal computer, laptops and internet, the State lost its upper-hand. The single lane mountain track suddenly became an eightlane super-highway: one that was cheap, fast and accessible to all, whether terrorist, criminal, arms-merchant, smuggler, human trafficker or money-launderer. It is worth following what happened in the US the mother of so many inventions and the strongest protagonist of democracy and individual freedom and how it tackled the problem. In the two years preceding September 2001, many of the would-be hijackers of the aircraft that rammed into the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon, were living in the US and communicating with the operation centres of al-Qaeda in West Asia. The National Security Agency (NSA), Americas largest and most sophisticated electronic intelligence agency, had been listening but never conveyed this information to anyone. Post 9/11, the US went into overdrive. Rapidly, the NSA under George Bush developed its capability further, engaging in a gigantic vacuum cleaner-like surveillance of all the data that crossed the internet, including email, web surfing, social media, cell phones and this was just domestic surveillance. The US has now developed an interception technology the NarusInsight Suite (NIS) to capture and reconstruct various aspects of webmail traffic including email, chat, draft folders, address books and much more. The company boasts that it can capture 10 billion records a day with applications in wireless, WiFi, prepaid, broadband voice and data. There is very little left uncovered. The data captured represents enough information to fill 37,000 new Libraries of Congress, says

James Bamford in his book The Shadow Factory. Armed with this data, the terrorist suspect watchlist in the US now measures half a million and growing. Many names are there by mistake, many people suffer ignominies because of these inaccurate lists. The US has created a super secret behemoth and outsourced top private contracts as well. There are 250,000 such contractors on top-secret programmes; more than 1,200 government organisations and 2,000 private companies work on top-secret programmes at more than 10,000 locations in the US. This is a manifestation of the growing industry-intelligence complex. Dana Priest and William Arkin, in their book Top Secret America, have disclosed that the US is now building a huge clandestine fourth branch of government, little known to many in the US. It is possible that this huge apparatus has prevented another terrorist attack in the US. Techniques of technological surveillance used in Afghanistan and Iraq are now being used in the US to investigate political activists and ordinary citizens. Though the terror threat is far greater in India than in the US, we do not have any facility of the same reach and magnitude. Our National Terrorist Research Organisation seems fairly hamstrung; the new institutions that have been introduced are top-heavy as well as top-down, with the bottom rung weak, untrained and under-motivated. We cannot have the same kind of apparatus that the US has, but at least we can take intelligence seriously, which needs a change in the attitude of the government, bureaucracy and the media, with its powerful reach. Inferior intelligence will only mean repeated failures. What the NSA is doing in the US will inevitably be need to be done in India too, maybe in a scaled-down version either because of lack of funds, expertise or appreciation. We simply have to learn to give up some of our freedoms to preserve our liberty and independence. There cannot be absolute and uninhibited freedom. There has to be a balance between the needs for security and the desire for freedom. Vikram Sood is former secretary, Research & Analysis Wing Is Lashkar training women for suicide bombings in India? (http://www.rediff.com/news/slideshow/slide-show-1-is-lashkar-training-women-for-suicide-bombings-in-india/20120104.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Real-time online tracking: A boon or a bane? (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/real-time-onlinetracking-a-boon-or-a-bane/20120104.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Is Bihar module behind IM's resurgence? (http://www.rediff.com/news/report/is-bihar-modulebehind-ims-resurgence/20120103.htm) By Vicky Nanjappa | Rediff Lashkar raising 21 female terrorists against India: Army (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Lashkar-raising-21-female-terrorists-against-IndiaArmy/articleshow/11353523.cms) Press Trust Of India vBulletin v3.7.4, Copyright 2000-2012, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.

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