CREATING THE MULTI-PURPOSE AND MULTI-SCALAR VIRTUAL REGION: NEW REGIONALISATION IN THE BALTIC SEA AREA

Tassilo Herrschel and Benjamin Gore

(University of Westminster, Centre for Urban and Regional Governance, 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, e-mail: t.a.herrschel@wmin.ac.uk; b.b.gore01@wmin.ac.uk)
Paper presented at the 6th EURS Conference, Roskilde, 21-23 September 2006 Draft, please do not quote without authors permission

Introduction: The New Regionalism and contradictory scales: The New Regionalism means many things to many people. While this has contributed to its popularity and trendiness in current debate among academics and policy makers, it also reflects (and reinforces) the lack of clarity about its meaning, contents, and, in particular, operation in practice. Much of the latter has been likened to a black box (Latour, 1987), highlighting the rather less than clear understanding of the mechanisms of regionalisation and regional policy making in practice. Not only are there diverse views on the changing relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors and their respective roles in driving regional agendas (shift from government to governance debate, e.g. Jessop, 1997; Rhodes, 2003), but there is also a very different, even diametrically opposed, usage of the adjectives new and old in conjunction with the term regionalism, denoting contrasting characteristics attached to different spatial scales. Wunderlich (2005) distinguishes two main conceptual underpinnings for the two main strands of the new regionalism debate: 1) subnational and urban focused (Norris, 2001, see also Cox 1998, Perreault 2003; Whitehead 2003), drawing on the multi-level governance debates (Bache and Flinders (eds 2004), Stubbs, 2005, Hooghe and Marks 2001), and revolving around the making of competitive regions, be they sub-national micro-regions (mono- or polycentric city-regions), transnational macro- regions, or meso-regions somewhere inbetween, and 2) the international scale of regionalisation as free trade areas (Ethier 1998; Corrado et al, 2005), e.g NAFTA, drawing mainly on regulationist reasoning (Jessop 2001) - that is the link between economic processes and corresponding structures of governance. These two sets of debates have run largely separate from each other. But as Hettne and Sderbaum have recently pointed out (2001?), they are essentially part of the same story of the propagated new regionalism. In effect, they see it as consisting effectively of two layers, the external national/international framework as the main parameters circumscribing scope for, and the requirement of, regional responses, and the intra-regional dimension, revolving around interlocal relationships, region-specific issues and perceived threats, legacies and histories (identities) (see also Paasi 2001) as the basis of a sense of belonging (regionness) and the perceived relevance and reality of a region. (see also MacLeod 2001). In spite of these complexities, what is clear, in more general terms, is the distinction between two separate sets of characteristics of region building. Generally referred to as old and new respectively, different features are associated with the two categories, depending on the respective condition at the beginning of the presumed changes. But, as argued in this essay,

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rather than following a simple sequential shift from old to new, whereby the latter, as repeatedly suggested, replaces the former, there seems to be a need for concurrency of the two. They are two sides of the same coin. This means that whatever features of old regionalism there are first, they will be complemented by the relevant new features of the respective new form of region. The outcome of this combination would then be the comprehensive or integrated new regionalism, that is the whole package of formal, institutionalised and territorially fixed technocratic qualities, and flexible, policy -oriented and -driven approaches to forming and using regions.

Old And New Or New And Old - Conflicting And Contrasting Qualities Under The Same Labels The term and notion of new regionalism gained in popularity during the 1990s in two ways: On the one hand it was discussed in the context of Free Trade Areas as a response to the challenges of a liberalised (multilateral) global economy (Lagendijk and Comfort, 2000; Ethier, 1998; Burfisher et al, 2003), revolving inter alia around the stepping-stone vs. stumbling block debate (see e.g. Telo, 200?). On the other hand, towards the end of that decade, new regionalism was conceptualised in the context of city-regions and localitybased region building from the bottom up (Sderbaum, 2002, Hettne, Scott 2003). In the first set, much of the arguments are rooted in trade and integration theory (Burfisher et al, 2003; Mattli, 200?). There, the new is seen to encompass deeper integration (through coordination, Panagariya, 1999), including institutionalisation and regulation of the economic region (Burfisher et al, 2003). At the intra-national level, by contrast, the focus is on raising competitiveness and attracting FDI, which includes both scenarios enhancing existing advantages to outcompete the competition, but also, in more peripheral areas, to attempt protecting against further marginalisation through global economic processes. The result may be a rather more insular lregionalism, encouragingg a them and us mentality. Bringing the two scales of regionalism together and viewing them as interrelated parts of the same story, has been one key feature of Hettnes and Soderbaums discussions of new regionalism. Wunderlich (2005) views them as the founding fathers of this wider, more comprehensive understanding of new regionalism. And this includes the relationships, that is linkages (Urry 2003) between the different layers of government (networks, horizontal and vertical links, and includes variability, unpredictability and generally less structure). Subsequently, ..new regionalism .has emerged as part of a more comprehensive attempt to understand and assess the impact of globalization on economic well-being ( Frisken and Norris, 2001, p 467). But what it continues to do is make a clear reference to territory as a given (Macleod and Goodwin, 1999), often akin to a spatial fetishism (MacKinnan et al, 2002, p 297) which ignores internal variations and underlying dynamics. In this simplified view, it serves as the container for its many characteristics, including politics, economics, culture, identity (Paasi, 2001), administration and governance (Giordano, 2000; Tomaney and Ward, 2001; Keating,2001) (see in Paasi 2003). . As illustrated in Figure 1, at the international level of region building, old means nonintegrated and loosely connected arrangements between nation states, whereas new is associated with deeper integration (certainly in terms of establishing regional rules and regulations) and institutionalisation of (international) regions (see e.g. Ethier 1998). The unique model of the European Union often serves as a term of reference for successful integrqation. These arrangements are generally driven by national governments and are mainly for defensive reasons, either political or economic. The greater depth of the new

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regions can be seen as finding its expression in more institutional harmonisation (Ethier, 1998). What is not discussed, however, is the impact on responses to rapidly changing, more volatile conditions, contrasting with the presumed rather constant, continuous path of change of old. Much of the new dynamism and push for change in the ways of doing things originates from businesses and their representatives, rather than government (Burfisher et al 2003; Mattli, 2002).

Figure 1

: Scale and the opposite meanings of old and new in regionalism old-international regionalism shallow, border focused, defensive, often in form of free trade areas

deep integration, territorially driven (equalised, homogenised), externally shaped (top-down), managerial

deep integration, lowered borders, states as elements of cooperation, institutionalised

old-local regionalism

new international regionalism

shallow cooperation, temporary, actor focused, non territorial, non institutionalised new local regionalism

How can existing forms of regions and regional policy making, however defined and operationalised, respond to such pressures and, possibly, transmute into some new, more responsive format? At the international level of Trade Areas, such changes may equate to a shift towards closer integration and formalisation of existing loosely knit regional structures? Thus being new effectively means being more fixed and institutionalised (Figure 1). This contrasts diametrically with the projections of new regionalism at the micro, intra-national scale, and, certainly in the case of the BSR, the transnational meso-regional scale. Here, new means less fixity and less depth, allowing actors to join and leave the regional

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arrangement at will. This differs from locally based old regions, where institutionalisation and, especially, territorial (primarily economic) embeddedness (Scott and Storper 2003, Sabel 1994, on embeddedness per se see also Hess, 2002?), centred on the firm and production as region-building forces (see MacKinnan, 2002), nhibited such flexibility. Instead, there tends to be a set hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing sizes (Leitner 1997). In contrast, here, new regions are deemed to be loose alliances based around actor networks (Clegg, 1997) and policy objectives (Herrschel, 2005). Economic pressures are presented as the main, paramount drivers of these changes, pushing for cooperation between localities across internal borders in city-regions (see Barnes and Ledebur, 1998). This also became evident from the case studies during the ESRC-supported seminar series last year. What also came to light, however, is the adjustment of actors to the new conditions and, indeed, their way of operation, albeit with considerable variations. And, it is still early days to see whether, following actor network thinking (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000), that actors are shaped by their very actions, which may, of course, mean both further entrenchment in set ways, or embarkation on a conversion in ways of doing things. Cooperation is argued by new regionalists at the city regional level (Cox, 1998; Perreault, 2003; Whitehead, 2003) - though also, uniquely, at the EU level- to be the necessary answer to globalisation-induced pressures for greater competitiveness. The example of the Finnish Uusimaa Regions participation in the Baltic meso-regional initiatives Baltic Palette and Gulf of Finland Growth Triangle illustrates the ptimary importance of the goal;to increase (economic) visibility (by teaming up with others) and more effectively showcasing the potential opportunities for prospective investors. The case of the wider BSR, however, highlights that translocalization (see Jessop , in Sderbaum, 2005) may also be motivated by environmental or perceived soft security based threats,. or pursue the simple purpose of lesson learning or knowledge sharing. Even more pragmatically, some Baltic groupings were simply established as vehicles for acquiring EU funding. Such bottom-up defined and pursued contrasts with the old regionalist, method of higher tier governments setting regions up as part of their own (managerial) agendas. In both cases, a collaboration is possible in a group of either weaker actors (actual or perceived) seeking to gang up to improve their prospects in a wider political (strategic) and economic context, or whereby one strong state/locality seeks to secure its leading position by extending (or re-establishing) its sphere of influence and thus power base (economic and/or political) to at the regional scale. In the Baltic context, the Euroregion Baltic (ERB) is an example of such a grouping of weaker sub-national actors, while the Invest in Sweden Agencys Go Regional vision is suggestive of Swedens self-perceived economic dominance of the BSR. In both cases it is about finding partners to boost ones own prospects and opportunities. This means that, ultimately, it is local or individual actors interests that shape the arrangements to their respective advantage. Formality, structure and institutions, as well as identities and regional images, are inherently intertwined with territory and clear jurisdictions as part of governmental ways of doing things (Herrschel, 2005). And it is this territorially-based integration and togetherness, that is at the centre of the suggested respective shifts from old to new. And these are usually presented as general shifts across the board. Consequently, regardless of associated specific qualities, discussions suggest a replacement of one mode of responding to external challenges whether economic or political- to another. But depending on the scale of regionalisation stretching from local units to states, the beginning and subsequent directions of change at the intra-state and inter-state levesl are diametrically opposed. But, as this paper will argue, evidence on the ground,suggests less of a shift than a need for complementarity between old and new practices. In this, existing ways of doing regions are expanded, rather than replaced by new ways. How this is done reflects local conditions, including the personalities of the main decision makers.

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At the sub-state level, going new is seen as a move of formal, territorially fixed and institutionalised structures to include more flexible, virtual forms of region building. The former provides the instruments for implementing policies, making them happen on the ground in a more technocratic sense, while the latter offer a more strategic, policy-oriented perspective, but without the detailed concerns of project implementation. Together, though, they provide flexibility, strategic policy making and institutionalised and legitimised ways of implementation. Effectively, there are thus two halves to the story, which have been viewed and adopted as separate ways of doing regions. In this way, it is also a bringing together of what Mathiesen (DISP 162, no 5, pp 53-61) refers to as soft and hard networks. While the former reflect tentative, potential possibilities of collaboration and network building, the latter is put into practice (arranged), possibly in the form of formalised knowledge networks. Taken together, they build, as he calls it, the habitus of a city region, that is the conditions for network building and their operation. There are thus two roots to economic policy making the notional, imaginative on the one side, and the fixated, materialised (real), on the other. This duality is also becoming clearer from policy making in practice. It seems that whichever of the two conditions (roots) is in place first needs to be complemented, rather than replaced, by the other missing part, to provide the complete environment for effective (imaginative and conventional) policy making. But labels and associated qualities are not necessarily clear, as pointed out above and in Figure 1. In fact, local and international regionalism show a mirror image of their respective characteristics under the labels old and new. Consequently, it is argued that rather than speaking of a shift from old to new, which in any case is rather less than clear in its meaning, one should rather refer to an addition of new ways of regionalisation to achieve a complete set of means and expressions of integrated region building (figure 1).

Towards comprehensive (integrated) regionalism Much of the current new regionalism debate focuses on the two halves of regions and region building: as separate entities, each following their own paths of development and ways of looking at regions. It also distinguishes between two main scales of region building, each with quite different features attached to the respective phases or types of regionalisation. Much of the multi-level governance debate draws on European experiences (where there are many levels of formalised, if not always clearly defined relationships, reaching from the supra-national to the local level (see Rosamond, 2000). But these debates tend to focus on individual examples, rather than placing them in a wider, holistic context. But this is crucial for exploring the interaction between, and relative importance of, external factors (framework for region building) and internal factors, such as localism and inter-local competition. Looking at the EU, for instance, an admittedly quite special case of international cooperation, old and new very much reflect the regional qualities as also suggested in the now so much en vogue discussions of sub-national, locally based region building. And it is the new features which are beginning to attract attention vis-a-vis the strict forms and rules about the nature and operation of regions established by the EU, because they are increasingly put under strain, as the number of member states and the nature of political and economic challenges change. Thus, the example of developments at the sub-state level, with their growing numbers of informal alliances and policy/project-driven collaborative arrangements in response to identified common interests (even if only temporarily), could provide new avenues of regional policy making at the EU level, too. This could complement the essentially rigid modes of inter-state engagement and technocratically driven policy making as currently practised, without resorting to yet more structural change and

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institutional rearrangements. It is not necessary to change established ways of doing things per se, but merely extending them by new practices to obtain a full set of regionalism. These may mean more structure, if the existing forms of collaboration are shallow, that is lacking in institutionalisation and thus a clear avenue to implementation. Conversely, depending on whats there already, it may mean less structure, but more flexibility, imagination and responsiveness. It is the interface between the two, the ability, willingness and modus of region building/regionalisation in response to the external challenges, that sit at the centre of a truly new regionalism. It is essential, therefore, when seeking to analyse that interdependency, to compare different regions, so as to be able to take into account different conditions within the regions and outside (See Hettne/Sderbaum). But both are needed at both levels. And in the EU context, it entails allowing for flexible groupings of shared interests without institutionalisation and debates, andapplying urban ideas to wider systems. It neednt be shift, but rather complementarity and an extension of existing ways of doing things. At the intra-state level, this means adding flexibility and virtuality to fixed structures, and at the inter-national level, it is adding some fixed structures to flexible soft arrangements to provide for implementational power and capacity. In fact, at both scales the other halves are the respective opposite ends. Both processes of region building vary across and between places/countries, irrespective of their scale of operation and rationalising, rather than responding uniformly to a perceived uniform(ing) challenge of globalisation, reflecting differences in geopolitics, history, traditions and established ways of doing things (Paasi, 1995, 2001 etc. (in above). These set the conditions for regions to be identified, defined, and agreed on, both from within and outside an area, whether real or imagined. Still, boundaries (real and/or imagined) are (and continue to be) viewed as crucial in the region-making process as instruments of clearly identifying and demarcating powers and responsibilities between governments and other actors, while also providing reference points for a sense of entitlement and belonging. This is all closely associated with, and attached to, the territorial dimension of a region, continuing to give territoriality a key role in the acceptance of a region as real and thus credible. This very traditional view competes with increasingly popular new forms of regions as virtual spaces, projected for marketing purposes, and points to the need to combine the two types of region building. But that is far from easy, as in many minds territory equals region per se, especially when it comes to the implementation of policies, and thus has dominated discussions on region building, its nature and organisation. The challenge is to reconcile the desire to protect own interests, identities and powers through the safe feature of boundaries and fixed territories, while also engaging with the far less predictable and certain forms of region building through vague collaborative engagement with other actors. It is this that the new locally-based regionalism proposes as the way forward. This is all very well, but as some of the interviewees in metropolitan economic development agencies pointed out, but when it comes to the crunch of demonstrating effectiveness and the ability to deliver to business investors, real power needs to be there in order to make things happen on the ground. alking shops and paper factories alone wont do. In other words, while a more openminded and imaginative way of building regions and shaping regional (economic) agendas is required as part of the drive for more competitiveness, there also need to be clear elements of traditional government with technocratic undertones. But this should not be seen as the starting point to building regions, but rather the instrumental side of the process, following on from the virtual strategic notions of (temporary) regions for specific purposes.

Bringing the two halves together: Integrated regionalisation as synthesis of formal and informal (virtual) constructs

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However understood, practiced or conceptualised, whether shallow or deep, externally (extra-regionally) or internally (intra-regionally) defined and shaped,, the dominant conventional understanding of regions has shown a close association with territoriality. This has implied a (real or imagined)degree of fixity, commitment and order. But then there has also been arealisation of the significance of more illusive qualities. Paasi (2001 tijdschrift), for instance, points to the importance of regional symbols and narratives as anchor points of regions,giving them popular relevance and legitimation . Indeed, identities are variable as well, shaped as outcomes of processes of the continued (perpetual) rewriting of self and social collectives (Paasi, 2001). He suggests making the distinction between a regions identity as described through specific (objective) characteristics which mark it out from others (see e.g. Schrijver, 2004), and the constructed personal identity held in peoples minds. There is thus a distinction between the externally perceived characteristics and seeming essence of a region, its territory and boundaries often visible to the independent observer as reliable and predictable. And there is the perception of a region from within, whether a collectively held image embraced by its population, or individually by single actors or residents (Herrschel, 2005). These are much less concrete and fixed, but rather inherently variable and fuzzy, and not territorially exactly defined. Depending on the rationale of those participating in, or feeling part of, a region, this can be perceived as an advantage or disadvantage, depending on the rationale of joining, or the established general expectations of what makes a region. But emerging practice shows that this neednt be so, as evidence from the BSR region shows. Globalisation, together with the changes in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, have been one of the main drivers of the strong interest in, and debate on, regions and regionalisation. And this includes all spatial scales international to local. The notion of region has thus become much broader, more diffuse, and more complex than traditionally has been the case. Old certainties, especially the grounding in territoriality, actual or imagined, at the national level or below, and government and administration as expression of statehood and driver of regionalisation, have become less clear, as government expanded (extended) into governance and territoriality moved increasingly from the physical to the notional imagined (imagineered). But there continues to be a search for the right structures for effective regional governance, suggesting a need for reforms and changes to existing institutional arrangements and relationships in the interest of feigning better results. For instance, taking a North American perspective, Frisken and Norris (2001) criticise the new regionalism for not appearing more successful than earlier attempts at metropolitan reform and governance (p 476). Thus, it is reform they are presuming to be needed as part of the changes, that is modifications to structure and fixed arrangements, implicitly seen as directed (established) from outside/above. But this is exactly what new regionalism shouldnt be about. Rather, it is about making do with existing structures, but using them more imaginatively and thus (hopefully) effectively in policy making. And collaborative arrangements among neighbouring localities, rather than seeking to go it alone, are a key feature of this new thinking which seeks to overcome established institutionalised divisions and obstacles, or, at the international level, aims to add implementational powers to existing informal arrangements of collaboration. But each place needs to calibrate its own way forward in adopting the regional agenda and putting it into practice. Much of this revolves around finding the best, that is most workable and locally effective combination of old and new forms of regions, i.e. technocratically led government-driven policies and projects (often centring on planning departments), with more blue sky thinking economic development strategists seeking to bring a range of vested interests on board and develop a common agenda for achieving an agreed agenda. How these interact, and how the power balance works out, are shaped by local factors, including

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personalities and past experiences, as well as economic prospects and a perceived sense of opportunities (confidence). Further research into this delicate and complex relationship, and the ensuing mechanism of regionalisation, is required and planned. The following examples from across Europe seek to illustrate in a more schematic form different ways of engaging with new forms of regionalisation, and relating them to existing ways of doing regions.

Regionalisation in practice territory, structure, and virtual regions Getting the structures right has been at the centre of the battle for more competitive and successful regions). Yet while the academic debate concentrated on the questions of territorial scale (Brenner 1999, 2001; Marston 2000; Howitt 2003) and associated size and nature of government (or governance) (Keating 1998; Jessop 2003), in many cases, practitioners have moved on. Interviews by the authors with local, regional and national decision-makers across the Baltic Sea Region suggest that there is more to competitiveness than structure. Indeed, while in some cases there continues to be a strong reliance on structure and institutions, especially in the former communist countries in the BSR, and concern with getting these right, in many instances structure may be more of an obstacle than an opportunity to further local interests through a more collaborative approach (Hauswirth et al 2003). Perhaps inevitably, as the examples suggest, challenges to established, set ways of doing things arose, often from within the government machinery, triggered by individual actors, seeking to overcome an inherently competitive (or even suspicious) relationship between the representatives of the conventional, technocraticadministrative view gathered around planning, and the more recent policy and processoriented focus shown by economic development agencies. The latters interaction with business groups often triggered a questioning of the efficacy of established governmental practices, pushing instead for new ways of doing things. And this often generated intragovernmental rivalries about power and influence. In a way, this duality reflects to some extent the distinction made by Brenner (2001) between singular and plural meanings in the politics of scale, that is effectively between conventional territorial-hierarchical as is views and the more imaginative, creative projection and utilisation of spatial scale, often reaching across different dimensions (Alderman, 2002; 2003; Appleton, 2003; Paasi, 2003a (in 2004)). But rather than seeing the two as separate strands, reflected in equally parallel debates, this research here suggests that they are two sides of the same coin. Indeed, they are not part of successive waves of using scale in a regional context, but rather are concurrent, whether across places or within individual places governance and related politics. These interlinkages add to the complexity in understanding, as Paasi (2004) points out, not just in the transformations of state or economy, but also the spaces of, inter alia, identity, belonging, citizenship, and self, as they are seen in different contexts and filled with varying meanings and interpretations. The institutionalization/ deinstitutionalization of region, place and scale are in fact inseparable elements in the perpetual process of regional transformation (Paasi, 2004, p 542)

New regionalism in practice: Scale-dependent variability in meaning, purpose and reality of regionalisation across the BSR rolling macro- and micro- regional processes into one? A hotbed of regional activity, the BSR is, perhaps surprisingly, an area of significant diversity, where different cultures, languages, histories (and thus legacies) and ways of doing things meet. And whilst there are historical precedents of regional cooperation in the BSR, most

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notably the Hanseatic League, much of this explosion of regional activity can certainly be deemed new in the sense that it shows all the hallmarks: multi-actor, multi-level and multiissue, and, arguably most importantly, transterritorial. And this stretches across different scales of region making from the micro-scale of translocal regions (the smallest being one city and its hinterland) to trans-national regions, ultimately reaching for the global scale. And these processes can be motivated and implemented either through top-down, state-led initiatives, or more bottom-up interests coming from within the emerging regions themselves. These two relationships and processes intersect in the BSR (see Figure 2 below),generating a multitude of variations of regionalisation processes in their territorial reach, policy ambitions and target formulation. All this occur almost simultaneously within the BSR, thus illustrating the complexities and, very much the fuzzy and pleasing everyone nature of new regionalism. This also demonstrates the dangers of drawing overtly generalised conclusions on the nature and ways of working of new regionalism by simply drawing on merely one of its many aspects. Many different forms, understandings and expectations of region are concurrent in the BSR, making it not one region, but in fact many regions, each with its particular visions, implicit boundaries, participating actors and imagined outcomes. Most theories of new regionalism focus on the macro-level or micro-level, but it would seem that a neglected scale of analysis is that of the meso-regional level, which is regarded by some to be almost synonymous with the macro-level. But this is to neglect the unique position and features of the meso-regional scale, shaped by bottom-up and top-down forces, which the case of the Baltic well illustrates. The meso regional scale, sitting between the local and, ultimately, global, is the most fertile ground for the development of new regionalism, because reaches in both directions, towards the local-regional (intra-state) level and the inter-state (international) level, both with heir own ways of approaching region-building more or less integratonist, technocratic or territorial both in theory and practice (see figure 2). The meso-level sits at the heart of the notion of the integrated regionalism described above entailing the complementarity of the features of old regionalism and new. The unique mix of actors, experiences, ambitions and established ways of doing things facilitates, indeed, requires, negotiations between the many, at times conflicting, expressions of region and regionalisation. Here, in the BSR, national governments, the EU, city-regions, sub-national regions (metropolitan and/or not), transnational NGOs and their regions, they are all stakeholders. For regionalism in al its diversity and variability one might also say, chaos to still function and promise successful policy outcomes, a negotiated complementarity between the old and new, and the different ways of doing regions, either top-down or bottom-up, is essential. But how can this be achieved? Is there a magic formula, or a set of conducive conditions that need to be in place? In the case of the BSR, other than opening up the region to increased cooperation in the aftermath of the Cold War, albeit an important outcome, there is little evidence to suggest that subnational initiatives have been very effective in terms of achieving set and/or proclaimed policy targets on the ground. But then, such assessments are difficult because of the very nature of the evolving regionalisation. Indeed, the BSR is, according to many, still very much a region in the making. But for many of the plethora of regional initiatives created over the last decade or so,, the reality is that talking shops and paper factories are as far as things go. But then this also shows the need to bring together the imaginative, strategic side of the new regionalism, with its at times pie in the sky thinking and the paper and website imaginations to go with it, and the practical, conventional old regionalist aspects of project implementation on the ground. New regionalisation and new regions alone cannot yield such politically so valuable tangible results. It requires the consent and resources of established mechanism or governance, and that is real power to effect things, mainly hard finance Political leadership is important in this process to identify and forge and utilise the many possible links that may exist between formal and informal, old and new forms of doing regions. Visions as drivers of imaginations and strategies, however realistic in their

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implementational scope, may come from the bottom up, or top down, whereby the latter promises easier implementation than the former, because of the better access to good old fashioned resources across an areas administration, especially, if we refer to nation states. But such a driving through of new forms of regional cooperation may face resistance, undermining the chances of such initiatives becoming successful. In addition, it raise many questions about legitimacy and transparency of such processes, especially, if they are achieved through informal dealings behind closed doors. In the BSRs case, the last decade has shown many changes in perceptions, ambitions and expectations among the countries around the Baltic Sea. This has affected the enthusiasm for regionalisation and the outcomes of such processes, that is the many different regions that were created within the geographic extent of the BSR. Initial ambitions have been superseded by developments and, of course, learning processes, especially in the aftermath of the initial enthusiasm about cooperation after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The fact is that the different regional visions in the BSR are rooted in the self-perceived needs and interests of the different actors concerned, and are influenced by factors such as culture, history (and legacies), perceived opportunities and threats. And these have been in flux in their various combinations. there is a clear distinction between offensive and defensive inspired initiatives. As the example of the Helsinki-Tallinn Euregio highlights, there has been a shift in the Finnish and Estonian perceptions of one another. For whilst in the immediate years after the Cold War, Estonia was perceived by Finland as something of a little sibling to be nursed back to help, it is now viewed, at least in certain economic sectors as a rival - the catch up phenomena. Such variability and unpredictability are, or course, a hallmark of the notion of new regonalism, and show the dangers of making sweeping generalisations on the basis of singular observations at a particular time and place when it comes to the purpose and mechanisms of regional developments and the applicability of related theories. For instance, even the choice of a name for newly created regions can be very contentious, mainly for historical reasons. Thus, the Hansa label was not acceptable to the Scandinavians for it is symbolism of former German hegemony. Yet the alternative, seemingly more innocent Baltic label is unpopular with the Finns because of the implicit dominant Swedish position (past and present) . What is typical of each vision and their associated spaces is the attempt to place the participating actors at the centre of the perceived/imagined regional construct, or at least as in a crucial bridging function to an imagined (advantageous) other. For instance, Finnish and Norwegian visions of a wider New Northern Europe (constituting, but not wholly comprising, the BSR), positions them as the centres of gravity of their respective imagined constructs. But these, as with the initiatives of the other Nordic Council members, can be seen as responses to the perceived diminished general relevance of the Nordic sphere as an in-between space within post-Iron Curtain Europe. During the Cold War this was advantageous (being seen as neutral bridge between East and West). But this role is no longer required, substituted by direct contacts and routes of communication. Linking the Nordic and Baltic spheres was thus a purely defensively motivated initiative, aimed at avoiding economic and political marginalisation on the geographic periphery of Europe. Whilst this attempt may seem as teaming up with considerably weaker (formerly communist) partners, it still enhanced Finnish and Norwegian overall visibility, was expected to create new economic opportunities, and addressed security concerns, especially vis--vis Russia. Indeed, whilst many initiatives could be deemed environmentally motivated, the most frequent underlying motivation is economic development. If this includes maintaining certain environmental qualities, e.g. for tourism, then such issues became region-building, too. catastrophe would equate to economic catastrophe (the collapse of the fishing and tourism industries). In the a aftermath of EU expansion, new conditions are in place for regionbuilding financially incentivised as part of EU policy objectives, reflecting a close link

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between old and new regional agendas, and institutionally provided by the perceived protection afforded by being an integral part of Europe, especially in relation to Russias sphere of influence. Yet being a neighbour of Russia has also been viewed as an opportunity, although Russias initial interests in participating in Europe have given way to its new policy objectives as cash-rich energy exporter. The regional visions and economic aspirations of many Baltic actors, e,g. Latvia (the Amber Gateway) and Finland (the Northern Dimension Initiative) hinge on Russian participation in Baltic initiatives. But these changes in conditions underline the temporal nature of visions and derived regional initiatives They are discarded and adapted to suit new challenges and opportunities. There is also the issue of scale/size and regional interests. Intra-national marginality can be a significant motivation to participate in regional initiatives, as in the case of Schleswig-Holstein and Gdansk (something of a selfstyled capital of the BSR). And this is also reflective of the importance of political leaders in recognising such opportunities. Some actors, such as Hamburg, can pick and choose from a position of strength which initiatives they would like to participate in. But others are not so fortunate, and, from a weaker economic position, are forced to make the best of the avenues available. Sweden, based on its perceived relative economic strength, is more of a pro-active, leading actor within the BSR, seeing itself as the natural base for commercial regional headquarters of large organisations in the region Go Regional. The structure of new regional organisations are suggestive of governance at work. But given the fact that most Baltic initiatives are led and (co-)funded by old-style regions with strong roles for national government (the EU, Nordic Council, cities and administrative regions), holding the so important purse strings on which sub-national initiatives need to draw, old regionalism is still very much a part of the new. Regional and local initiatives may well have cleared the way for open cooperation in the BSR, however, regional developments are subject to the very specific interests and agendas of nation-states, the EU, and the established structures and responsibilities within public administration. The origins of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the umbrella organisation for all Baltic cooperation established in the early 1990s, illustrates this continued role and importance of the national level, and established actors seek to protect their existing powers in influences, as the very ideas behind establishing the inter-state agreement of the CBSS illustrates.

One of the main features of the new regionalism is the imaginative, flexible creation of regions to suit specific purposes. The outcome may be a bewildering array of regions, giving a sense of disorientation and even chaos. The following Figure 2 illustrates this diversity and flux in meaning and geography.

Figure 2: Intersection of factors shaping new regions: Facilitation (source) and scale (scope)

Macro Level (International/Quasi/Part-Continental)

In-between spaces

European Union, Norden, The (New) Hanse

P U S H A D P U L

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Baltic Sea Region (BSR) as Meso-Regional Scale (e.g. CBSS)

Real and Imagined Transnational Regions (involving governmental and non-governmental actors) as in-between spaces

South Baltic Arc*, Baltic Palette*, STRING*, Bothnian Arc, Union of Baltic Cities, BSSSC, Baltic Development Forum, Helsinki Commission, resund Region*

National Level Subnational (Micro-) Regions (administrative, e.g. Skane, and imagined, e.g Vilnius-Kaunas Dipolis) Local Level
TEXT = Bottom-up, muti-issue TEXT = Bottom-up, single-issue TEXT = Top-down, multi-issue TEXT = Top-down, single-issue
What is the nature and purpose of the theoretically neglected meso-scale? When studying a region as complex as the BSR, the flaws/inadequacies in, and also confusion resulting from, current regional terminology, are extremely apparent. Regional terminology has fallen behind recent regional developments, thus necessitating a review and clarification exercise. Terms such as transnational region do not effectively convey the complexity of the regional structure and scalar relationships in the BSR. Whilst sub-national new regionalism seeks to project the image of an open shop in the global marketplace, the expectations of the state and supranational level will differ between winners and losers. As illustrated in Figure 3 below of regional agendas, often summarised in catchy slogans, such programmes/initiatives (generally served first and foremost as vehicles for the specific interest and politics of the relevant proposals architect and core members, and thus varied in content, provided legitimation and objective. These include inter alia a New Hanse, Mare

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Balticum, Euro-Baltic Region, Scanno-Baltic Political Space, Nordic-Baltic Belt, Region North, Network North and Ostseeraum. But perhaps this was to be expected in the formative moment (see Ringmar, 1996) that was the decade following the end of the Cold War. And academics contribute to this plethora including Kirby (1990) and Klinges (1994) concept of a Baltic World and what Lehti and Smith (2003) recognise as the New Northern Europe. Thus, the Amber Gateway, Yule-land can be seen as attempts to restructure a changing world.. And, as academics such as Lehti (in Lehti and Smith, 2003) acknowledge, the imagining of the Baltic is very much an ongoing process. Figure 3: Slogans as regional agendas within the BSR at different spatial levels National Investment Agency, Local/Regional Development Agency
Estonia Latvia Lithuania

Slogan/Self-Description

Estonia is a country located at the heart of the Baltic Sea Region Europes fastest growing region Latvia is located at the crossroads of northern and eastern Europe on the east coast of the Baltic Sea Lithuania the Centre of the New Europe Lithuania is a key to rich Scandinavian, huge CIS, growing eastern European, and fast developing Baltic States markets The gateway between the EU and the CIS The most central city in Europe (according to the 1990 findings of the National Geographic Institute of France) Kaunas, central Lithuania, your gateway to Europe Your access to business in the Baltics (Invest in Denmark) A New Approach to a New Europe (Invest in Denmark) It is considered to be the gateway to the Baltic Region The place to invest and grow in Scandinavia. The most connected, strategic location in Northern Europe Copenhagen Center of the resund Region

City of Vilnius

City of Kaunas Denmark

City of Copenhagen

City of Aarhus Sweden North-eastern Skne East Sweden Finland

Aarhus - at the centre of Europe A natural base for your regional headquarters in the Baltic Sea Region A Baltic market place East Sweden a Baltic Hub Finland The Business Center of the New Northern Europe Finland: the best of both worlds

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Helsinki Region

Dynamic centre of expanding markets The Business Capital of Northern Europe Europes Magnetic North Poland the heart of Europe Pomerania and Gdansk form the centre of Baltic Sea Region cooperation Pomerania plays a major part in the economic, political, research and cultural life, not just of Poland, but also the whole of the Baltic Sea region At the Centre of Europe Our greatest asset is being situated at the heart of Europe, at the natural crossing point of routes between Scandinavia and Southern Europe and between Western Europe and the Baltic countries The window to Europe Germany: Gateway to Europe Traditionally, Hamburg is the hub for all kinds of goods in Northern Europe and continues to be the central gateway for oversea trade with the Baltic The land is at the crossroads of trade and industry following Hanseatic traditions A region for investors in the heart of Europe with strong traditional ties to Northern - and Eastern Europe

Poland Voivodeship of Pomerania (Northern Poland)

Voivodeship of Western Pomerania (Northern Poland)

Russia, St Petersburg (and Leningrad Region) Germany Hamburg

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Schleswig-Holstein

Due to its geographical location, our state is Europes natural bridge to Scandinavia and a natural and historical gate to Eastern Europe Schleswig-Holstein at the top of Germany and in the centre of Europe At an international level, it is the intersection between northern and southern Europe

Source: authors collation of websites and documents

Summary and conclusions: Much of the current debate on regionalism centres on an either/or dichotomy between old and new forms of regionalism, both in theory and practice. There is talk about a shift from one to the other mode of regionalisation, of learning new practices and, most importantly, the need for such changes in region building to maintain competitiveness. And regions are portrayed as the main vehicles of such competition for corporate investment, often in conjunction with a notion of learning good - that is seemingly successful - practice in policy making (MacKinnon et al, 2002). This proposed shift, however, is less clear cut than may seem at first sight, as the case of the Baltic Sea Region has illustrated. Sitting between subnational, trans-local regionalisation on the one hand, and trans-national regional agendas, on the other, the regional initiatives within the BSR draw on both and thus offers interesting insights into the multiplicity of regional agendas, their raisons-dtre, and their modi vivendi, leading to the need to continuously negotiate between the two sets in their many

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incarnations, and against the backdrop of changing conditions. For once, the notions of old and new vary considerably in their respective attributes between spatial scales - inter-state and intra-state. While the former is associated with a shift from less to more integration and institutionalisation, the latter is just the opposite, a move from institutionalised, technocratic arrangements to open, virtual forms of ad hoc regions. Secondly, changes regionalisation practices and processes appear to refer less to the actual changes on the ground than to those in the mindsets of policy makers at different levels between local and national. It refers to the awareness that conventional ways of doing regions, mainly from a state managerial, technocratic perspective, are not all that is possible, but that there is potentially more to regions when it comes to projecting policy interests onto different scales. Regions as marketing concepts, as spatial constructs to project a range of qualities that go beyond those available to individual localities, are at the centre of the new meaning. Developed new regions are essentially virtual, helped in their publicising by the internet, and draw on cooperative arrangements between existing real policy spaces, often through their respective leaders. They are thus essentially time limited and project specific, with no specific administrative structures attached. They are thus thin arrangements, represented through no more than an office and a secretary. But these new arrangements cannot replace old established practices in regionalisation altogether. Somewhere, envisaged and promised projects and developments need to happen on the ground to give the virtual a reality, and thus credibility. And for this it takes actual investment and implementation powers and legitimacy, such as provided through old style technocratic structures and institutionalised arrangements. So it is this connection between the old and the new in its many, ultimately infinite, expressions, that seems to be the actual arena of change towards a new regionalism. It is this that marks the shift, the realisation to adopt new practices in addition to the old established practices. The new is the ability to connect the two effectively will ultimately decide on the success of regional projects both of the conventional and virtual kind, rather than bringing in an altogether alternative way of doing things. It is an extension of established structures and practices, and this may go both ways, if taking the diametrically opposed qualities into account between inter-state and intra-state regionalisation. And spaces like the BSR, drawing on a broad range of regional scales and thus their associated particular goals and understandings of regionalisation, offer a particularly diverse and thus interesting example of the multi-facet nature of regionalism in its full, integrated extent as a sum of old and new.

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