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SORROW IN AQUINAS By Amy Gordon A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters Degree in Philosophy (M.A. Ph) Advisor Professor Maxime Allard Reader Professor Lawrence Dewan Dominican University of Philosophy and Theology The Department of Philosophy 96 Empress Ave. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT : In this work, I explore "sorrow" and "pain" in the Prima Secundae of Aquinas Summa Theologiae in response to an existential query concerning the prevalent concept of "depression" and the use of antidepressants as a praxis understood in relation with the constitution of the biomedical subject or "neurochemical self". In reading Aquinas on sorrow, I employ a hermeneutic approach to the text in relation to my question, focusing upon the passionate subject and the conditions and the effects of sorrow or pain in relation to pleasure, in order to expose the remedies which Aquinas proposes in 1-2.38 of the Summa. I ultimately argue for the possibility of a "negotiative" ability of living as a passionate human being, according to which both sorrow and pleasure (especially pleasures involved in the bodily remedies which Aquinas proposes) are recognized as constituting a significant part and content of the ethical project, and not either as hindering it or else wholly constituting it.

3 Appreciations Very special thanks to my advisor, Maxime Allard, OP, who helped to provide the inspiration for this thesis from the basis of a directed reading which I had taken under his guidance in 2006. Since that time, throughout many discussions, courses, and readings, he has proved an inexhaustible fund of keen philosophical acumen, wisdom, humor, and patience in a stellar degree, for which I am deeply grateful to him. In addition, his generous sharing of his own researches on passions, sorrow, and remedies in Aquinas with me have proved to be indispensable and highly stimulating and profound sources of insight into Aquinas works which have deeply enriched my own perspectives and opened up new and surprising directions, exciting continually deeper interest in these issues. I would like also to thank Fr. Lawrence Dewan, OP. I count myself extremely fortunate to know Fr. Dewan and to have received the benefits of participating in his courses and seminars. Through Fr. Dewans lectures and class notes and published works, I have been consistently granted access to comprehensive, brilliant (and yet accessible) expositions of Aquinas` thought, which continue to enlighten and inspire me in exploring the Thomistic oeuvre. I would like also to express deep gratitude to my family and my friends who have graciously provided a lot of insight through discussions and patiently and humorously supported me throughout all of my research and writing.

Table of Contents Title Page.........1 Abstract............2 Appreciations...........3 Table of Contents.............4 Introduction ...............7 History and Stakes of the Project.............7 Status Quaestionis: Neurochemical Subjects of Depression? .........8 Philosophical Issues.......10 Existentialism and Sorrow.........10 Contribution of Aquinas.........12 Appropriating Aquinas Ethical Implications...............13 Questioning Remedies...........14 The value of pleasures .......16 Methodology..........17 Works accessed......18 Outline of Chapters........19 Chapter One: Describing the Subject of Passion .............24 Introduction........24 The Soul as Subject of Passion: 22.1....27 Degrees of passion.27 Breadth of reception ..28 Most proper passion...29 Appetitive more than Apprehensive: 22.2.31 Sensitive more than Intellective: 22.3....35 Summary37 Chapter Two: Love and Pleasure as Subjective Context of Sorrow...40 Introduction40 Different forms of love: 26.1.....42 The passion of love: 26.2 ......43 The subject of pleasure......................46 Elements of the passion of pleasure: reading 31.1....47 Pleasures and movement: reading 31.2..49 Pleasure as passion: reading 31.3...50 4

5 Pleasure more in bodily experiences than joy51 Associations of sensitive pleasure with rational objects as particulars: reading 31.4...51 Commonality of pleasure from its sources or causes: from question 32...53 Summary54 Chapter Three: Pain and Sorrow ..55 Introduction55 Whether pain is a passion of the soul: 35.1...57 Conjunction and perception: pleasure and pain..57 Reflexivity of the appetite..58 Tristitia and Dolor: 35.261 Importance of pain for life.62 Pain most properly a passion 63 Pleasure and Sorrow or Pain: Sharing the Subjects Experience The relational logic of pleasure and sorrow or pain..64 Contrariety of pleasure and sorrow or pain: 35.3..65 Whether every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure: 35.467 Whether contemplation has a contrary sorrow: 35.5..70 Prominence of fleeing pain over pursuing pleasure: 35.6..74 Interior sorrow greater than pain: 35.7..78 Four species of sorrow: 35.8..81 Summary84 Chapter Four: Causes and Effects.86 Introduction86 The Causes of Sorrow87 Sorrows object: 36.1.....88 Love and desire in sorrow: 36.2.....91 Appetite for unity (appetitus unitatis): 36.3...93 Unity at stake whether evil can wholly corrupt good: 48.494 Privation of form and privation of operation: (evil of pain and evil of fault): 48.5....97 Relation between a subject's perfection and external things..98 Excess of unity? 99 Objective requirements for perfection.....100 The role of appetite or love for unity within sorrow102 A greater power: 36.4 .103 Contours of the subject revealed..105 The Effects of Sorrow or Pain ........105 Pain preventing learning: 37.1 ....106 5

Burdening: 37.2 ...110 Impeding operation: 37.3 ....112 Sorrow most harmful to life: 37.4 ......113 From effects to remedies: towards the next chapter ...115 Chapter Five: Remedies ...118 Introduction..118 Parts of this chapter .....118 Pleasure as remedy: 38.1 .....119 Tears flowing: 38.2 .122 Manifesting one's sorrow more exteriorly and even by words123 Significance of tears.124 The compassion of friends: 38.3..126 Interpolating useful friends...129 Contemplation of the truth: 38.4..131 Sleep and baths: 38.5...134 The significance of bodily remedies....137 Ethical Perspectives on the Remedying of Sorrow: Towards a Conclusion....138 Exploring the negotiative human being: complicating the passionate subject.141 Conclusion .142 Limitations of this thesis .144 Ethical explorations via sorrow in Aquinas ....144 Associations between sorrow and existential inquiry .145 Significance of pleasure ......145 The four species of sorrow ......146 Gains of the thesis ...147 Bibliography148

7 Introduction History and stakes of the project There have been many and varied opinions on the wide range of human experiences encompassed by the word sorrow, as varied as the fields of the professionals and practitioners who find it their responsibility to speak concerning their manifestations. Jennifer Radden's history of melancholy reveals the complex ways in which Western philosophy, religion and culture has perceived and dealt with various forms of sadness, which sheds light on remarkably diverse interpretations of the kinds of experiences which came to be characterized as depression only late in the 19th century.1 Beginning with the Greeks, whose interest lay in melancholy as a sickness, her history of melancholy includes the Aristotelian text which motivated the Renaissance and particularly Florentian fascination with melancholy as the accompaniment of genius, proceeding to the question of acedia for the desert fathers, to its transformations as commonplace irritations or as potentially a sin against charity for Aquinas in the Middle Ages, from which point acedia's meaning shifts after the Protestant Reformation to a lack of diligence, to the scientism of the 19th century giving place to more sophisticated biotechnologies of the 20th and 21st centuries. Throughout history, we can see that melancholy has been traced to physical states, or it has evolved (in the form of acedia) to be a serious temptation religiously, or viewed as a commonplace affliction that can affect any person, but which however is particularly an occupational hazard for monks and solitaries. We also see the appearances of full-blown manias and pathologies which were observed to some extent in every 1 Radden, Jennifer, The Nature of Melancholy: from Aristotle to Kristeva. Oxford University Press, USA: 2000.
Radden offers a historical anthology of Western religious, literary, and scientific texts with diverse accounts of what is now called depression.

age, but with particular scientific emphasis and classification in the 19th and 20th century.

Status Quaestionis: Neurochemical Subjects of Depression? Today, despite many interesting critics and resistances, the articulation of pain and sorrow is frequently a very pragmatic and technological one; the problem is biological or more specifically, neurochemical. The rise in the use of antidepressants has earned many critics as well as faithful proponents. There are more critiques of antidepressants than those individuals whose objections Dr. Kramer of Against Depression associates with romantic penchants for melancholy.2 Horwitz and Wakefield3, in drawing attention to an unquestioning appropriation of sadness as a disorder, drew more focus upon the ancient distinction between sadness with a cause and sadness without a cause. Jeffrey Stepnisky4 came at the question from the point of sociology; echoing Nikolas Rose5 he asks When did we become neuro-chemical selves? Questions may continue to liven debates concerning antidepressants: from the scientific point of view concerning the unproven assumption that a decrease in serotonin causes

2 Kramer, Peter D. Against Depression. New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2006. 3 Horwitz, Allan V. and Jerome C. Wakefield. The Concept of Depression. The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow into Depressive Disorder. Oxford University Press: 2007. Horwitz and Wakefield critique the inadequate diagnostic tools and widespread screening techniques for depression as a medical disorder, especially the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) definition of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) as it fails to take into account the context of the symptoms and thus fails to exclude from the disorder category intense sadness (...) that arises from the way human beings naturally respond to major losses. (14) (italics from text). 4 Stepnisky, Jeffrey. Narrative and Selfhood in the Antidepressant Era. Thesis. University of Maryland, 2006. Digital Repository at the University of Maryland, 30 May 2006. Web. 15 July 2009. (1) <http://hdl.handle.net/1903/3724>. Stepnisky studies the relationship between antidepressant medications, selfunderstanding, and the narrative construction of self, and argues that antidepressants are components of the larger social processes of risk, biomedicalization, and individualization. 5 Rose, Nikolas. Neurochemical Selves. Biotechnology, Commerce And Civil Society. Ed. Nico Stehr. Somerset: Transaction, 2004. 89-128.

9 depression6; from the medical point of view in terms of potentially harmful side-effects or the risk of drug dependency; from the political point of view with respect to the constitution and maintenance of the biomedical subject in a community in which individuals are increasingly pressured to take responsibility for managing their pain or sadness (or even for moods by the growing diagnostic bracket creep according to which symptoms of everyday life become included either under the definition of a disorder7 or by way of the promotion of a cosmetic psychopharmacology8as by Dr. Kramer); from the politico-economic perspective concerning the professionalization of the definition, sources, production, marketing, and sale of these remedies; or from the sociological concerns of increasing limitation in the accepted praxes towards living with sorrow, which result in an increasing individualization of the sorrowful subject who manages his affliction with pills. While such questions may be raised concerning the science, philosophy, praxis, and politics of antidepressants and the challenges these present towards a holistic understanding and care of the self, the heart of these questions may be to some extent reducible to the critique of the self-disseminating power of the biomedical narrative as a dominant (while yet frequently contested) perspective of the human being. A Foucauldian critique of bio-politics can still 6 The hypothesis of the role which serotonin is supposed to play as a neurotransmitter affecting levels of
depression still remains problematic in scientific literature. Lacasse and Leo review this literature in juxtaposition with the claims of advertisements promoting specific SSRIs. See Lacasse, Jeffrey, and Jonathan Leo. Serotonin and depression: A disconnect between the advertisements and the scientific literature. Med2 (12): e392. 8 Nov. 2005. Web. 20 July 2009. < http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020392> 7 Stepnisky, 25-26. 8 Cosmetic psychopharmacology is a term popularized by the psychiatrist Dr. Peter Kramer (Kramer, Peter. Listening to Prozac. Penguin Books: 1993) as a therapy having the effect that the subject becomes better than well." (xvi) This concept implies the expectation that it is now sometimes possible to use medication to do what once only psychotherapy did to reach into a person and alter a particular element of personality (for which process Kramer recommends that the psychopharmacologist use skills ordinarily associated with psychotherapy) (97).

further be traced to the concerns which arise from any phenomenon originating from and within the matrices of self-maintaining, interlocking, and increasing spheres of mass-power.

Philosophical Issues A philosophical approach to sadness seeks to press deep into these questions. Coming from the perspective of philosophy, what are the presuppositions and implications of a transferal of the treatment of these human problems to the province of biotechnology? What are the stakes and contexts in which we move today towards a technology of the self according to which managing sorrow as a threatening biological problem is a priority which edges out other interpretations of sorrow? Are we justified in assuming that pills will control our sadness - or if it is so, that we should want pills to control our sadness? What are the subjective foundations of sadness, and what implications does this have with respect to the projects of managing sorrow?

Existentialism and Sorrow In formulating these questions, we cannot forget the contributions of existential philosophers to this kind of inquiry. Existential philosophy, according to Maurice Friedman9, is not so much a philosophy as it is a mood embracing a number of philosophies (or perhaps we should say - of philosophers). He describes this temper in terms of a reaction against the abstract and purely rational in favor of the dynamic and concrete, as well as positively favoring choice, commitment, authenticity, and the actual situation of the existential subject as the starting point

9 Friedman, Maurice. Worlds of Existentialism: A Critical Reader. Humanities Press International: 1991. 10

11 of thought.10 Existentialism is then defined initially as a mood, a mood that is characterized by being a reaction in favor of something else. Thus to some extent, we see a congruence between existentialism and sorrow (or at least, sorrow as a passion that rejects or resists a certain situation insofar as something else is valued more - even if the subject may be hard-pressed to define what that something is). The engagement of existentialism, insofar as it begins from the actual situation of the existential subject, is also the kind of engagement which any kind of serious or ethically-motivated inquiry into pain or sorrow elicits. As moods, both existentialism and sorrow have a unique function in philosophy. Insofar as each appears as resistance, reaction, and revolution from the normal, the easy, even the pleasant, whether in the arena of theoretical discussion or in the world of immediate relations between persons and things, each exercises in a way critical and even a potentially subversive function. The instabilities which existentialism and sorrow create may be hard to integrate within a normal functioning system either of philosophy or a peaceful rhythm of life. There is a relationship between existentialism, sorrow and hermeneutics, at least insofar as hermeneutics names a possibility of approaching these experiences, of illuminating them. Here we name our own specific interest in a hermeneutics of facticity which convinced that life is toil and trouble (Sorge), would keep a watchful eye for the ruptures and the breaks and the irregularities in existence.11

10 Cf. Friedman, 3-4. 11 Caputo, John D. Introduction: Restoring Life to its Original Difficulty. Radical Hermeneutics. Indiana University Press: 1988. Caputo is commenting upon a 1923 lecture given by Heidegger called Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity which Caputo defines as a reading of life which catches life at its game of taking flight and thereby restores factical existence to its original difficulty. (1)

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Contribution of Aquinas What relevance does Aquinas bear for these concerns? His own work resembles the format of a conversation, of the disputed questions of the universities of his time, as a living synthesis between varying traditions, the questions of the present, and his own originality as author-moderator. Our interest, therefore, will be to create a conversation; or rather, to initiate a dialogue between the work of Aquinas and the present, that both may be better illuminated, to reveal ways in which we can engage with his work in the present. Accordingly the work of this thesis is both humble and audacious. Our intention is to discover what options Aquinas can offer to an existential question which arises from a prevalent trend in the practice of using antidepressants. The work of Aquinas provides particular insight to this quest. In his long, sustained treatment of pain and sorrow, we see the resistance which pain and sorrow represent in life develop vivid significance against the backdrop of the subject oriented from love towards pleasure. In treating systematically of something like pain or sorrow in this way, specifically in treating it as the opposite of pleasure, we begin to discover that pain and pleasure are not opposites; that pain and more increasingly - sorrow - has its own object (even if that object is nothing). Pain and sorrow, unpredictable and unpleasant, difficult to integrate within a narrative and having the tendency to disrupt life instead, nevertheless can constitute a subject's disposition in a life which does not at every moment guarantee stability, satisfaction, or perfection to the subject.

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13 Appropriating Aquinas Ethical Implications My reading of Aquinas first focuses on what I call the experiential necessity of sorrow. By experiential necessity I mean that pain and sorrow are deployed from conditions (in terms both of the subject and the world) present in everyday life, which are also inextricably linked with more fundamental movements of the subject via love and pleasure. This experiential necessity of sorrow leads to its existential challenge insofar as the experiences of sorrow are to be embraced and integrated within a subject possessing all the interior dynamics and resources which make such an embrace possible. Although pleasure constitutes a more fundamental movement of life, pain and sorrow become increasingly significant to the subject for per accidens12 reasons - because they affect the subject in such a way that love is more strongly felt, in hindering pleasure, in that pain or sorrow becomes almost a being attached to oneself - an ens rationis.13 Sorrow can thus have negative possibilities within the subject, extending to the possibility of restricting the subject's ability to act. These ambiguous possibilities of sorrow in the subject lead us to note a kind of ethical imperative that is associated with the harmful effects of sorrow. If we are interested in approaching a care of the self, we can find elements for such a reading in Aquinas' text through the proposal of certain remedies of sorrow. This text extends not only to a care of the self, however, but also to the care of the other: this is not a story or confession written in the first 12 For a treatment on St. Thomas use of the Aristotelian distinction between being per se and being per accidens
in his own metaphysics, see Dewan, L., Being per se, Being per accidens, and St. Thomas' Metaphysics. Science et Esprit 30 (1978) 169-184. 13 Cf. ST I.36.1

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person about life experiences, nor quite an impersonal voice which comments on the vicissitudes of life from a philosophical perspective, nor yet one which claims to address the symptoms of people belonging to a specific group or category such as those suffering from depression. The discourse we highlight throughout 36-39 enables an inscription of a subject of sorrow that can potentially be any human being, and which is not restricted to those who have been designated as pathologically sorrowful. The existential implications of pain and sorrow apply equally to myself as to another, so likewise do the ethical concerns which motivate a care of the self apply equally to myself and the other. Questioning Remedies An important ethical question that seizes us here concerns the question of remedies of sorrow, with which we will finish our analysis of Aquinas. Why does this thesis close with an analysis of the remedies of sorrow if our intention is a philosophical one, motivated by the existentialist mood and consequently disposed to claim some positive value in sorrow? Should we not as philosophers be slightly suspicious, or at least critical of these remedies for that very reason that they soften sorrow? Isn't the task of the philosopher to disturb, to make things difficult, to preserve the trembling at the verge, a la Derrida, Kierkegaard, even Socrates himself? There is something suspect about soothing to the philosopher. What if these remedies act to soothe a person in a way that reduces their existential freedom and capacity to choose what is difficult? What if they even approach a manipulation of the person? Is there a risk inherent within these kinds of remedies that they likewise soothe a person's sometimes painful ethical awareness? Why should we, in building a case for the positive (Aquinas would say the honourable and useful)

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15 dimensions of sorrow, end with a list of remedies from a pastorally-minded friar? This approach becomes justified over the course of uncovering sorrow's effects. If reading the causes of pain and sorrow in Aquinas gives us ground to respect that subject, to learn more carefully of sorrow what it may show us concerning the subject's love, capabilities, or valuations of a problematic situation, we find out at the same time that the effects of pain and sorrow pose threats to integrated subjectivity. There are possibilities of fascination, absorption, melancholy and madness14 and withdrawal from life; there is even the possibility of corruption of the subject, who begins to take pleasure in a situation that previously moved him or her to sorrow. Even granting that some operations following from sorrow may be valuable and useful, sorrow still requires a certain loosening up or mitigation in order to maintain that the capacity of the subject to act and to operate remains free, so as not to become over-focused on the present evil which is identified in sorrow, and which can lead to anxiety or even acedia, which renders a person stupid. The value of pain and sorrow as existential experiences becomes outweighed so far as the ability of the subject to act is removed, when pain or sorrow start to overpower the equally and even more fundamentally existential postures of pursuit and embrace. The logic of the effects of sadness shows how sorrow may present obstacles to activity; the activities of learning, of enjoyment, of any activity, and lastly of the movement which is necessary for life. Aquinas, with these stakes as his interest, begins to pose a solution to sadness that incorporates existentially human requirements. There is something even more realist, even more ethically responsible in speaking about 14 Cf. ST 1-2.37.4 ad 3. The edition of the Summa for this work, unless otherwise specified, is the Piana ed.
Collge Dominicain d'Ottawa: Ottawa, 1953. .

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remedies for sorrow than simply building a case for its existential and even epistemological value with respect to underlining admirable goods negatively. How is it possible to soften sorrow's harmful effects, to maintain the possibility for pursuit and embrace in coexistence with this tendency to valuate something as bad, to reject or to flee what is harmful? The first remedy Aquinas proposes is for the subject to regain pleasure (38.1). The experience of sorrow itself draws attention to the subject's more fundamental desire for pleasure, and moderating sorrow with pleasure helps to maintain the ability of the subject to act. The value of pleasures In embracing the value which an existentially-motivated exposure of sorrow presupposes, reveals, and upholds, it is essential to appreciate at the same time the honourable15 role which pleasures play, and perhaps which gain more weight and significance from the experience of sorrow. Aquinas challenged the pedagogy of philosophers who held that all pleasures were bad. He interpreted these doctrines to arise from a pedagogical intent to draw people back from bodily pleasures (to which they are already prone) towards a medium of virtue.16 Aquinas remarks on the inconvenience of this opinion, noting those who decry against pleasures are caught taking pleasures themselves, and human beings are more inclined in these matters by example than by
15 An honourable or honest good (bonum honestum) in a Thomistic lexicon concerns that which is good for its own sake, in distinction from a thing being good insofar as it is useful or pleasurable. (ST I.5.6) In motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio. 16 This discussion takes place in the Summa Theologiae (ST) 1-2.31.4. It recalls a similar discussion in X Ethics (1172a28-1172b7). Aquinas comments upon Aristotle's text in his comentary on the Ethics (Ethic. lib. 10 l. 1 n. 7 & 8). Aquinas, Thomas, and Enrique Alarcn (ed.) Corpus Thomisticum. Pampilonae: Ad Universitatis Studiorum Navarrensis, 2001. Web. Summer 2009. <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org>. For this work, all quotations from Aquinas' commentary on the Ethics (Ethic.) are derived from this source, unless otherwise noted.

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17 doctrines that are ignored. This reading of Aquinas' remedies of pleasure encourages an appreciation of the presence, the value, and the usefulness of pleasures in a life that is marked with sorrows. The kind of ethical perspective which emerges here is concerned with a navigation of the experiences to which one is subject as inextricable, valuable, embraceable and potentially useful17 conditions of ones own unique existence as a human being.

Methodology My own method in this thesis is simple, as befits the scope of a master's thesis. My approach to Aquinas's text is a hermeneutical one; I read it and derive its logic in relation to closely connected portions of the text and attempt to comment upon it in a way that illumines its intelligibility and relevance to my own professed existential and hermeneutic stakes. In a way, even if I had not been interested in this approach, necessity would have imposed it upon me, inasmuch as there has been little written on the particular topics in Aquinas concerning the stakes of sorrow in the Summa Theologiae. These are the scholarly limitations of this work, that I have focused much of my research upon the original text. In this text, for the most part I follow Aquinas' order in commenting on questions, articles, and the objections, respondeos, and replies to the objections within each article. The work, while it occasionally draws upon other Thomistic sources within the Summa and without (the latter chiefly in footnotes, as I make reference to De malo and to Aquinas' commentaries on 17 Within the confines of this work, we do not systematically comment upon the possibility of sorrow being
useful, because we do not discuss the moral goodness or badness of pain or sorrow in Aquinas which is covered in question 39 of the Prima Secundae. The discussion on whether sorrow is a useful good (bonum utile) takes place in ST 1-2.39.3.

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the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics) has mostly been concentrated in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae, drawing chiefly from upon questions 22; 26; 27; 31; 32, and particularly 35-38 which concern sorrow. I do not include question 39 on the moral goodness or badness(bonitate et malitia) of pain or sorrow, because to some extent a moral value of sorrow is presupposed in our stated existentialist ethical perspective on sorrow. From this perspective, our concern with Aquinas work is to describe the subjective conditions and trajectories of sorrow, and also to provide some light on practical questions regarding the remedying of pain or sorrow in relation to our initial question concerning a neurochemical approach to treating sorrow. Works accessed I have been fortunate enough to have had access to the works of my teacher, Maxime Allard who has written on specific and most relevant topics to my interest (Des effets de la tristesse, De lusage ethique des bains; Between being passionate and acting passionately; Triste la virtu; Les passions de la connaissance18) I have also had access to lecture notes from Fr. Lawrence Dewan which have proved invaluable in developing my background research on the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. There are some very interesting and useful articles concerning Aquinas on passions, on particular passions of love, anger, etc. (which can also be seen in the bibliography). Others would have been directly relevant, but my access to these was limited. Otherwise, I have been fortunate to access a variety of materials concerning passions and emotions in general and on the history of melancholy (as can be seen in the bibliography).
18 While not all of these works are published, the last item in this list has been published (Allard, M. Les passions de la connaissance: Thomas d'Aquin, lecteur de Qohlet 1:18. Science et Esprit 59/1 (2007) 35-49.

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19 For my original resources I used the Pianine edition of the Summa Theologiae from Ottawa (Collge Dominicain d'Ottawa, 1941) often providing my own translations (particularly for Thomistic texts outside of the Summa Theologiae) while sometimes I have recourse to the online version of the Summa compiled by Kevin Knight.19 Outline of Chapters In the first chapter, I attempt to show the kind of subject which makes an analysis of sorrow in Aquinas possible. I am interested in Aquinas' description of powers within a subject which make a subject receptive to activations of power of any kind, both positive and negative (that is, encompassing possibilities from perfection to harm). Appreciating Aquinas understanding of passion as being of the sensitive appetite will help to reveal the vulnerability or susceptibility of the human being as well as the unique negotiations between natural perfection and pleasure, between pain and sorrow, and between the body and the soul as appears in the causes and effects of pleasure and pain and particularly the remedies of pain or sorrow in Aquinas' work. Passion signifies the possibility towards a very broad range of phenomena. Passion for Aquinas, however, more properly evokes something that is worse for a subject, inasmuch as in being drawn from its own good, it is more evident that a subject is drawn by something else. The methodology of the first chapter consists of taking question 22 of the Prima Secundae and commenting on the three articles in order. The second chapter focuses on the subjective context within the subject as passionate. I identify the orientation of the subject through the passion of love and with reference to the

19 I refer to Summa Theologiae. New Advent, 2008. Web. Aug. 2009 <http://www.newadvent.org/summa> 19

passion of pleasure in particular. The passion of love or amor will be treated, drawing chiefly upon question 26 of the Prima Secundae, articles 2 and 3. Pleasure will be discussed at more length, in drawing upon question 31, articles 1-4, which lead to the inscription of the greater commonality of pleasures in experience, such that pleasures constitute a norm of experience for the subject. The normalcy of pleasure (in terms of its primacy in experience) is particularly highlighted in terms both of the tendency towards pleasure by love, the most primary passion, and also because of the great number of events which deploy pleasure, thus constituting pleasures as the greater part of our everyday experiences. This shows the strength of the inclination for the subject and reveals the kind of investment which the subject has in these passions particularly, an investment which will help to make sense both of the necessity of sorrow from a subjective point of view, and of the pain of sorrow itself. The third chapter introduces the question of pain or sorrow in following the progression of articles 1-8 in question 35 of the Prima Secundae. First I underline the relationships between pain and sorrow in 1-2.35.1 and 2, which provide the background for identifying a reflexivity at the heart of the experience of both pleasure and pain and illuminating in a particular way the significance of pain in the experience of the subject and as a paradigm of sorrow. The reflexivity which we discuss at this point helps to distinguish sorrow from pain in article 7 where sorrow or interior pain appears to be greater than exterior pain (or pain simply) because the mode of introduction of the harmful object is more immediate to the appetite. This chapter also seeks to situate the experience of pain and pleasure in relation to each other as everyday experiences. It negotiates a shift from the normalcy of pleasure considered independently towards an

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21 inclusion of the experience of pain, or in other words, shows the necessary presence of sorrow in our lives in relation to pleasure. I take note of Aquinas' discussion of the contrariety, affinity, disparity between these passions especially in articles 3 and 4, which begin to illuminate the everyday correlations, both essential and the accidental, between pleasure and pain (chiefly in the responses to the objections). In 35.5, in which Aquinas discusses contemplation, I identify a litmus case illuminating the presence of sorrow aligned with the greatest joy (after this test case of contemplation, every lesser kind of activity can likewise be tied to accompanying pain or sorrow (at least per accidens). The shift towards the possibility of a greater significance which pain may have over pleasure occurs textually in article 6 where Aquinas discusses which movement is greater, that towards pleasure or away from sadness. While pleasure remains the stronger movement per se, there are per accidens ways in which the experience of pain or sorrow can be more prominent than the movement drive towards pleasure. Reading article 7 of 35 reveals how interior pain or sorrow is greater than exterior pain. Finally, I end by looking at article 8, in which article Aquinas elaborates four species of sorrow, which are differentiated in terms of object or effects. In chapter four, I discuss the conditions in the subject which cause sorrow. Drawing upon all the articles of question 36 on the causes of sorrow, I comment upon the object of sorrow in article 1 which concerns a present evil (for this analysis, I also have recourse to the first question of De malo in Aquinas). From here, reading Aquinas in articles 2 and 3 of question 36, we see the preceding passions of love and desire, and find that sorrow concerning a loss is felt more than sorrow that stems from desire or mere privation. In article 3 of 36 I look at the desire

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for unity as a cause of sorrow, and I also have recourse to another discussion from the Summa Theologiae (I.48.4) in which Aquinas discusses whether evil can wholly corrupt good in a subject, and I.48.5, speaks of subtraction of the form or part of it that is required for the integrity of the thing, and of subtraction of the due operation in some respect. Continuing to article 4 of 37, I move from interior considerations of subjective conditions of sorrow to an external cause which is a power that is greater than the subject (because otherwise the subject would succeed in achieving the end of its inclination, i.e. in being conjoined to the object of its love or its perfection). Chapter four also discusses the effects of sorrow, drawing upon question 37. This question in Aquinas explores the power of sorrow to hinder the activity of learning (article 1), the burdening the operation of enjoyment (article 2) the hindering of that operation concerning that which is saddening (although sadness increases operation of which it is the cause) and finally, how sorrow opposes the proper bodily movement (article 4). These effects delineate the potentially harmful trajectories which sorrow creates, but also indicate ways in which the subject of sorrow can begin to be addressed; each contains, according to its own logic, the possibility of a space for the remedying of sorrows. The fifth and final chapter follows question 38 of the Prima Secundae which concerns the remedies of sorrow. The logic of remedies is found paradigmatically in the first article, which concerns the efficacy of any pleasure for mitigating sorrow. These remedies follow the logics of rest (the pleasure in article 1), and techniques of dispersion and appropriate activity (as the tears, sighs, and words of article 2), the pleasure resulting from the love of friends in article 3, the joy

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23 of contemplation of the truth in article 4, and the efficacy of baths and sleep and similar remedies in article 5. After commenting on the significance of these remedies, I look at bodily remedies in terms of their accessibility and efficacy and return through this question on bodily remedies to the initial phenomena which motivated this thesis (the prevalence of usage of antidepressants). In comparing these remedies, I center upon an associability present in Thomistic remedies which leads to the possibility of a negotiative subject of pleasure and pains, in contrast with a subject possessing a different kind of agency of control over or containment of depressive forces in the practice of antidepressants. Then I combine these elements towards a conclusion.

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Chapter One: Describing the Subject of Passion Introduction As we pointed out in the introduction, it is necessary for us to appreciate Aquinas understanding of the passionate subject. Our purposes will be not so much a historical or comparative reading, but only is concerned with providing us with the conceptual equipment of Aquinas description of passion. Our method, as we noted in the introduction, is a hermeneutic one. The importance of this section for our work is to unveil the relationship or a capacity of a subject towards such happenings. Aquinas negotiates passion between the apprehensive and appetitive powers, between the sensitive and intellective. This is a subjective inscription of passion, or on a wider scale, a passionate inscription of subjectivity which lays the conditions of openness to things that inscribe the subject in a dynamic relationship with the world which affects it. The treatise on the passions in Aquinas occurs within a section of the Summa Theologiae that is concerned with the works of the human being, the image of God, who like God is the principle of his own works.20 The section on passions follows the discussion concerning human beatitude and the voluntary in human acts.21 In the prologue to question 6, which opens the discussion concerning the voluntary and the involuntary in human acts, Aquinas remarks on the

20 Prologus, Prima Secundae. Sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eis voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem. 21 Question 1 of the Prima Secundae concerns the ultimate end of the human being, which is beatitude (discussed in ST 1-2.2-6) which is followed by the voluntary and involuntary and matters relating to human acts (ST 1-2.6-21).

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25 relation between human acts as a means of arriving at beatitude. In this prologue, passions are presented as acts which the human being has in common with the other animals. They are treated after the properly human acts because the latter are closer in nature to beatitude itself (which is treated first of all). Aquinas' treatise encompasses the distinctions, relations, order, of the passions, some causes and effects, as well as their moral good or evil. It spans questions 22-48 and covers 130 articles - a remarkable length for a treatise in the Summa Theologiae. Within these discussions, we see diverse approaches to passions, some of which have strong traditions behind them. In Aquinas corpus of the passions, there are elements of ontological, psychological, physiological, moral, and therapeutic approaches to passion. Each thread plays some role in his work: the interest, however, which binds these threads together is an ethical one, concerning the significance of passions both as proceeding from the human being and in their relation to the happiness of the human being. With passions, we are dealing with human acts, but on a broader scale than those which we may strictly speak of as voluntary. We are discussing the acts which form the changing landscapes, platforms, and frequently the content which moves, influences, structures (and is likewise influenced or structured by) our lives. Passions are a way of speaking about a subject in the world, a subject who is not impervious to the world and who is being affected by it. In this particular account, Aquinas avoids focusing on a dichotomy (or even a distinction) between passivity and activity. One of the results of his analysis is that there will be no easy, clear-cut way to assign moral responsibility to a subject in a forensic sense. The subject becomes a site of events via the capacity for reception, and there are dynamic powers within the

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human being which have more and less degrees of actuality and potentiality. In question 22, the first article gives receiving as the initial key to understanding passion. Here it becomes evident that our interest lies in what the subject gains or loses - what happens to a subject vis--vis an event named as passion. This focus on what happens to a subject also illuminates the subject by way of centring the phenomenological gaze on the whole subject, that is, this gaze concerns not only the subject as the source of certain powers, by way of a forensic approach to analysis, but incorporates discussion on the actual, current, or beingexperienced state of the subject as the result of these powers, as well as the powers which make it possible. Passion is inscribed in terms of a proper and a more general sense: that is to say, a passion in which reception and a loss prove harmful to the subject is more passionate than a perfection received. In the second article, Aquinas negotiates between the apprehensive and appetitive powers: which is more prominently at work in passion? Aquinas focuses more on the appetitive power (by which the subject is affected by real things) as belonging more prominently to passion than cognition by which the subject knows the thing.22 In the third article, Aquinas shows the sensitivity: that irreplaceable bodily change that marks a passion from another kind of appetitive event. It is through being sensitive that we are most passionate: this faculty is the most attentive. It requires something only a little active

22 This emphasis which we highlight on appetition in view of the fact that Aquinas will say that passion is more (magis) in the appetitive part than in the apprehensive part is not meant to obscure the fact that apprehension is not also a mode of being drawn to a thing. Nor do we intend to gloss over the fact that some apprehension is necessarily involved in every passion of the soul. Instead we note that Aquinas' formulation of 22.2 and his careful response reveals a nuanced anthropology that will influence Aquinas' options for remedies of certain passions.

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27 (parvis activis) for us to relate to it passionately. My own reading hypothesis is that each of these articles present a more narrow or proper meaning of passion as they progress, in other words, that passion is revealed in greater depth via the being drawn to things rather than apprehending them, and is more revealed with the accompaniment of sensitive movement, than by an intellectual appetitive movement. We now turn towards the first article, which reveals in which ways the soul can be the subject of passion.

The Soul as Subject of Passion: 22.1 The objections to 22.1 lay emphasis upon the nobility of the soul, with the consequence that attributing suffering (even in a generic sense) to the soul appears dubious: a soul, of its nature, can not be corrupted or degraded: either it remains the same (or as Aquinas will point out in the first part of the respondeo, perfected). The objections successively point out that the soul has no matter (the proper subject of passion) (arg. 1) ; neither can it be moved (arg. 2); nor is it subject to corruption, which is a characteristic of something that is prone to passion (arg. 3). Degrees of passion In answering the question, Aquinas delineates three degrees of what it means to have a passion - with the most proper sense being the last. The first and most general sense is simple reception, which may also constitute a kind of perfection. The second consists of reception with loss. The third meaning is the reception of something harmful and the loss of what is appropriate, which event would demonstrate the strength of the agent, as being so strong as to turn the subject aside from its own inclination. Concerning this last mode, Aquinas says And this is the most

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proper mode of passion. For to be passive is said in view of the fact that something is drawn to an agent, and because it recedes from that which is natural to it, it seems to be drawn especially to another thing. 23 Breadth of reception This very wide possibility of interpretation has the implication that there is no simplistic assignation of good or bad to passion; rather, passion concerns the relationship of the subject with its own capacity to actualize its powers or have them actualized24 or to receive some perfection from something else; in both cases, what is common is the reception. Likewise the subjects passibility means that something which comes to the subject by nature can be removed from it. The category of passion encompasses both the subjects potentiality for perfection and vulnerability to being held back or deprived of that perfection. If we shift our lenses slightly, we begin to see the existential impacts of this interpretation. In this word recipere, we see an emphasis on the real conjunction of the agent with the patient. The agent really enters into a thing, so as to qualify its own being; for example, a patient has not simply "lost health" - the patient is sick. It is because of this intimate exchange of one's habitual way of being for the imposition of (or the "being drawn" towards) an alien disposition that causes Aquinas to situate passions within the soul or the unitive principle of the human being - there is a conjunction with something which (when it has a corruptive agency) 23 Translation my own - the Latin follows: Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo
quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem; quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur ad aliud trahi. (ST 1-2.22.1). 24 Another treatment of "to be passive" occurs in ST I.79.2, which concerns the question whether the intellect is a passive power. Aquinas also explains the threefold ways of beng passive, in each case, he focuses on a different meaning he wishes to emphasize: in the Prima Secundae, the focus is on passion as "that which is drawn to an agent. In the Prima Pars case, that which emerges from potency into act is to be passive.

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29 fundamentally affects a thing at the heart of its identity. After Aquinas analysis, the soul is inextricably a partaker of the passions of its sensitive appetite. The lofty and untouchable, one might say privileged standpoint of the soul itself (as appearing in the objections) is fundamentally wrenched; the capacity of the soul extends not only to receiving perfections, but it appears (as one with the composite) as vulnerable.25 The consequences are that the soul is no longer exempt, a bystander or watcher of the passions, it is one with them and not privileged so as to be apart from the experience of passion. In reading this, we come to appreciate another dimension which the passions teach us the teleological implications of this framework. Here, the perfection of the human being appears according to the logic of passion; perfection is in a manner of speaking received (in distinction from, for example, being always already autonomously actualized) in the way that passion also involves reception.26 Most proper passion In drawing to the end of this article, we note that Aquinas focuses on the most proper mode (propriissimus modus) of passion. We see that passion additionally means for Aquinas that by which something is drawn to an agent. This other way of describing passion (as 25 See, for example, the soul's susceptibility to becoming absorbed by strong passions as appearing in certain
discussions of the Secunda Secundae: I1-2.46.3; I1-2.53.6 or similarly that reason (ratio) or the good of reason (bonum rationis) can be absorbed in I1-2.123.8; I1-2.149.2 ad 1; I1-2.151.4 ad 3. 26 The potentiality of the human being is something which Aquinas uses as one indication that the human being is not his own happiness (ST 1-2.2.7). See also Housset, who notes the eschatological significance of passions: Il devient alors possible d'lucider la signification eschatologique de l'a passion: elle dit que l'homme n'est pas luimme sa propre fin, qu'il n'est lui-mme que dans l'attention ce qui se donne lui et que l'amour, dans toute l'extension du terme, est sa rponse ce qui l'appelle. La passion n'a donc pas pour fin d'tre rduite en activit, mais elle conduit exister sa propre inadquation en dcidant du sens de ce qui est prouv. Housset, Emmanuel. La sagesse des passions selon St. Thomas. L'intriorit d'exil: le soi au risque d'altrit. ditions du Cerf, Paris: 2008. 379. (125)

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distinct from something being received) becomes more evident in the more intense range of passion, in that something loses which is convenient to it. Despite the initial inclusion of perfection as partaking in the upper limits of passion, the growing emphasis of passion as being something contrary to a thing is seen in light of an event that involves a loss of the way of its being. Considered simply, a things loss of something that belonged to it involves a kind of corruption of that thing, or at least of the way it formerly was. Even here, we see Aquinas centres the gaze on the subject; it is because we notice the subjects movement turning aside from its own inclination that we call it a passion. These possibilities appear as degrees of intensity along the lines of being passionate whereby the worse the passion, the better of a passion it is; the more a subject is drawn from its own inclination, the more it appears to be influenced by the power of something else.27 At the end of article 1, the reader is left with dynamic scales of measurement of degrees of passivity and of perfection, the most passionate end of which is worse for the subject. Aquinas reaffirms the existential possibility of each mode of passion with equal weight at the end of the article: et his tribus modis contigit esse in anima passionem. We see in the answer to the first objection another sense in which passion is more proper - pati properly belongs to matter, whence it is only found in composites of matter and form.28 In the answer to the second objection, Aquinas notes that while to undergo passion 27 The sense of better and worse here is thus opposed to the inscription of better and worse passion
whereby a passion that concerns a perfection of the subject is better and one which involves a defect of the subject is worse (deterius) (which is the approach which we will see in the answer to the third objection (ST 1-2.22.1 ad 3). 28 The passibility of composites of matter and form is due to matter, which is in potency (cf. ST I.3.2) and also limits form (cf.ST I.14.1) which tends towards infinity (cf. ST I.7.1 & 2). Matter and form as constitutive of a composite mutually affect each other as can be seen in Aquinas' inquiry into the infinity of God (ST I.7.1) which involves him in a discussion concerning how matter becomes finite (finitur) from form and form from matter, leading to the following remark which reveals the potency of matter to many forms: Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia, antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas; sed cum recipit unam, terminatur per illam. The difference which Aquinas ascribes in this article to the ways in which matter and form

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31 (pati) and to be moved does not belong to the soul per se, yet it belongs to the soul per accidens. He responds to the third objection by saying that the argument (ratio) put forward in the third objection concerns a passion which involves a change to something worse. This kind of passion of the soul can only belong to the soul per accidens, but it belongs to the composite per se, which is corruptible. Appetitive more than Apprehensive: 22.2 The second article initially presents a case for the fact that passions are chiefly an apprehensive phenomenon. 22.2 begins with an objection which, in suggesting that passion belongs more to the apprehensive part of the soul than the appetitive, draws particular attention to the difference between these two modes of being drawn to a thing. The objector notes different ontological rankings between these two modes on the basis of priority: What is first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause.29 Because passion is found in the apprehensive before it is in the appetitive part, the argument runs that passion belongs more to the apprehensive than to the appetitive part. The second objection, working from the premise that what is more active seems to be less passive, argues that since the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part, it would seem that passion belongs more to the apprehensive part. Finally we see in objection 3 the point that sensitive apprehension also happens via a bodily organ (so the requirement of a bodily change for a passion from 22.1 would also be met).
affect each other in this article is that matter limits or contracts form, whereas form perfects matter. The principle regarding matter here as being potential towards many forms and yet defined by that one which it receives is relevant to the principles concerning the use of bodily remedies, which we will see later on. 29 Cf. Metaphysics II 993b22-25.

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The sed contra cites Augustine for whom the word passions signifies the same thing as affections. In the respondeo Aquinas again draws attention to the central characteristic of passion which implies a being drawn of the subject towards an agent. He argues that the note of passivity is more (magis) seen in appetition than in apprehension. He makes this distinction on the basis that it is through the appetitive power that the soul has an order to things as they are in themselves (res ipsas).30 The difference between appetite and apprehension on this score is that among the apprehensive powers, which receive the intention of a thing (in its own way), the completion of the operation exists within the mind.31 The process of an appetitive passion, on the other hand, exists not only in the subject as something that is simply added or received, but includes also an agency and a movement, first of the object, whereby the object gives the subject an aptitude and an inclination32 for it, which means also a movement on the part of the subject of complaisance or of resistance. The significance of real things in that the subject is related to the composite existent and not only the intention of the thing, highlights the particularity involved in each object of passion. The particularity and substantiality of real things will lead us in a way to the significance of the next article, which notes that it is through the sensitive appetite that we are more passionate. The answer to the first objection undertakes to explain the reason why passion appears as more in the appetitive and less in the apprehensive. In relation to the point recalled from the

30 This heavy emphasis on the influence of res ipsas will be modified when it comes to pleasures and pains, when apprehension gains its more prominent role when considering particular passions 31 Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. (ST 1-2.22) 32 Aquinas usually expresses the difference between cognition and appetition by means of the notion of inclination (cf. e.g. ST 1.16.1)

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33 Metaphysics which drew attention to levels of ontological priority in a genus, Aquinas gives an account of the intensity (intensio) of perfection33 according to which something approaches perfection of being. He also shows on the other hand degrees of intensity of defect when he notes that in those things which relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from that which is perfect, because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect.34 Passion relates to defect because passion belongs to something inasmuch as it is in potency. Aquinas also insists that passion is more active only because it is first more passive (ad 2). We will see that appetitive movement adds something more than cognition implies. Appetition, as opposed to being an activity that is completed within the subject, consists in a further movement from the self to other, which extroverted action highlights for Aquinas the power of the external object that so affects the subject that it is oriented towards it. The appetitive power is thus certainly active in one way (because it is more the cause of exterior movement than the apprehensive power), but this activity is based on a more profound passivity or responsiveness to the influence of an object.35 The reply to the third objection distinguishes two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed: one through a spiritual change according to which it receives the intention of a thing (and this belongs to the act of a sensitive apprehensive power, as the eye is changed by the 33 Intensio and its contrary remissio or withdrawal, were avidly discussed in the thirteenth century, which we
will discuss more in chapter four (See also Shapiro, Herman. Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms. Speculum 34, 1959. p. 413-427). 34 ST 1-2.22.2 ad 1 35 Vis appetiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem prout est in seipsa; per actionem enim exteriorem venimus ad consequendas res. (ST 1-2.22.2 ad2).

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visible, not so that it is coloured, but that it receives the intention of colour). There is also another natural change of the organ, when the organ is changed from its natural disposition (as becoming hot or cold, or changed in some other way). While this kind of change happens only per accidens to the act of the sensitive apprehensive power, the act of the sensitive appetite is per se ordered to this kind of change (whence some natural change is included in the definition of the movement of the appetitive part) - whence it is clear that the aspect (ratio) of passion is found more in the act of the sensitive appetite than in the act of the sensitive apprehensive power. This potent susceptibility to the influence of real things in a way is structuring us long before we even learn to think, to analyze, to reflect upon the things or our relations toward them. We are fundamentally oriented in these ways prior to being conscious of what we are oriented by - and certainly prior to complex reflexive analyses of these orientations. Here it becomes clear that passion can structure a subject in a way that is not explained, preceded or formed, or even necessarily articulated with some kind of rational apprehension or assessment of the object. Passions, here understood in themselves - that is, in their formal and material character, have to do with a a being affected by something. At this point in the inquiry, the key factor in a passion is the object or the thing; not as the only cause, but as the cause outside the subject which influences the subject to relate to it in a unique manner. In terms of having more influence, the object is of greater significance than the apprehensive processes which unite in presenting the object.36 The subjectivity which Aquinas sketches here is not an intellectual or cognitive one. The 36 The role of the apprehensive power in passion will appear in other discussions concerning particular passions
which we will treat later with respect to pleasure and sorrow, which require both conjunction and apprehension (cf. ST 1-2.31.1; 35.1).

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35 power of the subject is its passibility, which on account of its correlate openness to the world, reveals, preserves and at the same time bridges the experiential space of difference between the subject and object.

Sensitive more than Intellective: 22.3 In the objections to the next article (22.3) the difference in the kinds of objects which can affect the appetite are seized upon. 22.3 attempts to claim that passions are in the province of the intellectual appetite as the proper site of divine things or of the good taken universally. In other words, Aquinas speaks here of the possibility of passions being in the will (here using the term intellective appetite over that of voluntas). Which has priority, or, what is more closely worded to our concern - what partakes more of passion as we have delineated it - the being-towards particular entities in a sensitive way, or being towards goodness universally, willingly? The next article deals with this under the aspect of inquiring whether passion exists more in the intellective appetite or in the sensitive appetite. The three objections take up the approach to passions based on their object. If the object is the cause of passion, then logically it seems that the more noble the object, the more it should create passion in the subject. Thus divine things, as a better kind of good, ought to cause passion in their proper site, which is the intellectual appetite (insofar as the intellectual appetite concerns those things that are beyond sensible representation). The first objection cites one mans experience of receiving divine things; the second discusses from the point of view of the power of the universal good; the third works from the common name which is given to joy and

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love, as these are predicated of purely intellectual creatures, such as God and the angels. By the time we come to this third objection, joy and love are already the property of purely intellectual creatures. The body of the argument centres upon the most proper physiological dimension of passions which Aquinas identified in 22.1 (transmutationem corporalem) On the other hand, the operations of the intellectual appetite does not require a bodily change, because its operations are not in virtue of a bodily organ.37 Aquinas' response indicates that passion is more properly in the sensitive appetite because it is exercised by means of a bodily organ. The sensitive appetite is in reality such because it concerns bodily movement. This leads us to the question: why would some appetitive acts concern bodily movement and not others? It could be the manner in which we receive these things; perhaps when things are less mediated by knowledge they appear more intensely under the simple aspects of good and bad (or difficult; impossible; enjoyed; lost; approaching; and similar things). On the other hand, could we not also say that knowledge creates more passion, as in the example of suffering divine things as pointed out in the first objection? The response to the first objection, which declares that there can be an affection towards divine things and a conjunction with them by love, but this nevertheless happens without bodily transmutation (ST 1-2.22.3 ad 1). Thus in this case there is love and a conjunction, but it is not understood according to passion as Aquinas primarily inscribes it. In the reply to the second objection,
37 Note that Aquinas' language does not exclude the possibility of a bodily change being conjoined to an intellectual activity, for it is possible that the act of the intellective appetite may redound to the sensitive appetite: In virtutibus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu. (ST 1-2.38.4 ad 3).

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37 Aquinas highlights the passibility or suggestibility to which we already alluded, adding that because passion does not depend only on the power of the agent, but on the passibility of the patient. According to Aquinas, the sensitive appetite is a more passible faculty; things need to be only a little active (parvis activis) in order to prevail upon it. The response to the third objection is interesting for our purposes, however. This response reclaims joy and love as the provenance of the sensitive appetite, which, in the objection, were attributed to God, angels, and the human being in respect of the intellective appetite as simple acts of the will. Here, borrowing Augustines words, it is seen to be a usurpation of language that the vocabulary of passion is borrowed to define analogous acts of the will, which has similar works. From this response to the third objection, we see one additional point - that passions emerge as more primary in terms of being more known to us; thus the simple acts of the will are actually less known to us, and are instead spoken of in terms of what appears to be more familiar to us - passions of love, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, etc. The significance of these passions is seen in that their language is enlisted to signify the acts of the will which have ontological priority over acts of the sensitive appetite, because they have more in the nature of actuality than do the passions.
)

Summary In the course of our reading of these three articles, we sought to unveil the subject of passion in Aquinas by means of discussing the kind of event to which passion refers: its degrees, and the powers of the soul which make it possible. These descriptions of the ways in which the subject is more passionately affected forms an interesting basis for a phenomenology 37

of passion. We see in the order of articles 1-3 of question 22 of the Prima Pars a careful negotiation of passion between perfection and harm (and tending more towards harm), between apprehensive and appetitive powers and more towards the appetitive power, between the intellective and sensitive powers and more towards the sensitive powers. The soul is the subject of all of these powers which work together, mutually influencing each other. The subject who emerges is one who is the centre of many powers but who is susceptible in the whole unity of his or her being in virtue of the capacity for passion. Passions can concern the perfection or the harm of the subject (and more properly tend toward the latter, inasmuch as the power of the agent is more revealed in drawing the subject from its proper inclination). Passions likewise mean a presence in the world and to the world, the subject of passions relates directly to objects via the appetitive and particularly the sensitive appetitive power. If passions bring something of their own38, they also bring the world to the subject and the subject to the world. They also bring the subject to oneself, via the relations with the world, as we will see in discussing the passions of pleasure and pain in particular which consider the good or the bad as conjoined to the subject. This aspect of passions is drawn out more fully in terms of particular passions, as we will see with respect to love and pleasure as passions which perfect the subject: which love 38 See, for example, where Aquinas discusses whether the concupsicible and irascible powers obey reason:
Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu; quia appetitius sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. (ST I.81.3 ad 2). The something of its own (aliquid proprium) Aquinas explains in terms of the fact that the sensitive appetite is not moved only by the estimative power (in other animals) and the cogitative power in the human being (which is guided by universal reason) but also by imagination and sense (ibid.). There is a similar point in ST 1-2.17.7 in which Aquinas inquires whether the sensitive appetite is commanded by the will. Aquinas notes the ways in which the movement of the sensitive appetite is not wholly subject to the command of reason, on account of the bodily disposition which is not subject to reason, or on account of the sensitive appetite being aroused suddenly. Aquinas also includes in this reflection the point that reason does not relate to the passions as a despot, but has instead a political or royal position with respect to the passions as to the free who are not totally subject to command (ad liberos, qui non totaliter subduntur imperio).

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39 does in adapting the appetite to something good39 or pleasure insofar as it denotes the conjunction of the subject with something good. Our focus on these passions of love and pleasure in the following chapter will be chiefly to prepare the background for an analysis of pain and sorrow and to articulate the fundamental relationships between love, pleasure, and sorrow in constituting the subject's experience.

39 Aquinas inquires elsewhere (ST 1-2.28.5) whether love is a passion that harms the lover, and comes to the
conclusion that if the love be of something convenient that it profits and is bettered by that love. In this, however, he distinguishes between love speaking formally (as to whether love's object is suitable or not to the subject) and also speaks in terms of the material element of love, whereby a bodily change can harm the subject per accidens by way of being excessive: Amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum. Nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur; sed magis si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur. Quod vero captatur ad aliquid quod non est sibi conveniens, ex hoc laeditur et deterioratur. Amor ergo boni convenientis est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis; amor autem boni quod non est conveniens amanti, est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis. (...) Et hoc quidem sic dictum est de amore quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis; sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis. (ST 1-2.28.5).

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Chapter Two: Love and Pleasure as Subjective Context of Sorrow

Introduction In the last chapter, we sought to describe the passionate subject for Aquinas; to establish the soul as the seat of passion and to clarify the manner of passions engagement in terms of its degrees of more and less proper passion (i.e., more properly appetitive than apprehensive, more properly sensitive than intellective). Now our aim is to discuss particular passions. Before we approach pain and sorrow, two other particular passions merit particular attention. These are love and pleasure. Love enters in the Prima Secundae from the start as the first among the concupiscible passions, for reasons which we shall see. Pleasure (like sorrow) falls under the four principal passions (which are joy and sorrow, hope and fear)40. Our methodology in this chapter will be more programmatic than the methodology of the other chapters (which are generally shaped by the order of Aquinas' articles), and thus we are leaving out a description of most of the other passions. Aquinas' description of passions identifies two modes of passions: passions which concern the good or bad simply, which are in virtue of the concupiscible power, and passions which concern the good or bad under the aspect of difficulty, which belongs to the irascible power. We do not treat of the complete passionate complex of Aquinas in terms of irascible passions as well as concupiscible passions in this thesis, but focus primarily on pain and sorrow (and love and pleasure inasmuch as they explain or illuminate the 40 See ST 1-2.25.4. 40

41 stakes of pain and sorrow). In focusing on pain and sorrow in this these, our concern is identified with the most passionate passion41 - involving a conjunction with something bad. It is not our intention to deliberately present a simplified picture of the passionate subject, such that the roles of hope, fear, audacity, despair, and anger are neglected, but rather to focus on illuminating these still more fundamental logics of love and pleasure as concupiscible passions orienting the subject, and thus, in a brief fashion, to introduce the kind of subject who is affected by sorrow and a more primary backdrop of that subjects experience against which pain and sorrow enter. Pain and sorrow, as we will see in the following chapter, become written against more common experiences of love and pleasure. Love is a passion which precedes and causes sorrow, while pleasure is an experience which can be compared and contrasted with sorrow because pleasure concerns a conjunction and a perception of a present good, while sorrow concerns a similar union with a present evil (malum). Love in Aquinas is the passion which creates in a subject an inclination towards the good. Love gives the subject an "aptitude" for its end: it makes other passions possible; it is a principle of appetitive movement in a subject.42 Pleasure, in distinction from love, involves the realization of a certain conjunction with perfection; in this sense, it is more specific than love and is a consequence of love (which also concerns the good). The wide range of operations which are correlated with pleasure make it possible to look at the experience of pleasure as constituting 41 See for example this passage from question 22 on passion: Quando huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius,
magis proprie habet rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laeititia. (ST 1-2 22.1). And also in the question on pain and sorrow: Dolor secundum quod est in appetitiu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae, sicut molestiae corporales proprie passiones corporis dicuntur. (ST 1-2.35.1). 42 Cf. ST 1-2.25.2.

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a norm in experience (as well as being the end to which the subject is oriented by the passion of love43). The movement of the soul which constitutes pleasure results from a rest in having achieved the present good; pleasure occurs when the exterior movement by which one tends towards the end has ceased (cf. ad 2). There remains an affection (immutatio) of the appetite by the appetible good, which makes pleasure to be a movement of the soul. Aquinas' text places significant emphasis on the causes or deployments of pleasures to illuminate their subject (the case will differ for sorrow, which is more focused upon the internal conditions of the subject which cause sorrow rather than the kinds of events which could cause sorrow). After having elaborated the significance of pleasure in our lives, in terms as being the end to which love orients the subject, and also in terms of the wide variety of constant sources which one's experiences in the world provide for pleasure, we can move forward to seeing how pain and sorrow enter this context of love and pleasure which constitute what is normal in our lives.

Different forms of love: 26.1 In question 26 article 1, before asking whether love is a passion, Aquinas asks whether it is in the concupiscible power. Beginning with the supposition that love pertains to appetite

43 Aquinas distinguishes love as the first of the concupiscible passions in the order of execution, but pleasure as
first in the order of intention: Secundum ordinem intentionis (...) delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum. (ST 1-2.25.2).

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43 because its object is the good, and the good is the object44 of appetite45, Aquinas speaks of a difference of love according to different appetites: the natural appetite, the sensitive, and the intellective. In the sensitive and intellective appetites, the apprehension of the object is present to the subject, whereas in the natural appetite, the apprehension does not coexist in the one having appetite, but in the author of nature. Love is a complacency for the good in the sensitive and intellective appetites, and a kind of connaturality in the natural appetite. The operation or function which Aquinas ascribes to love is that which is the principle of movement tending towards the beloved end. Insofar as this movement is sensitive, it would pertain to the concupiscible appetite, because it concerns the good absolutely (and not in respect of some difficulty, which condition would constitute it an object of the irascible power).

The passion of love: 26.2 Aquinas also asks whether love is a passion in 26.2. Here I draw attention to this article and to the objections in particular, which identify difficulties in reducing love to a passion that point to the uniqueness of love among the passions. The first objection identifies love as a certain virtue 44 Cf. ST I.5.1: "Bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed differunt secundum rationem tantum (...) Ratio enim
boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile; unde Philosophus in I Ethic (11094a3) dicit quod "bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. See also Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's phrase that "the good is what all desire. In his commentary on the Ethics, Aquinas notes that "the good" is numbered among primary things, so much so as to cause the Platonists to place goodness as prior to being. For Aquinas, they are "convertible": "Deinde cum dicit: ideo bene enuntiaverunt etc., manifestat propositum per diffinitionem boni. Circa quod considerandum est, quod bonum numeratur inter prima: adeo quod secundum Platonicos, bonum est prius ente. Sed secundum rei veritatem bonum cum ente convertitur. Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt. (Ethic. lib.1 l. 1. n 9) 45 Aquinas distinguishes between the nature of the good and the notion (ratio) of the good: the nature of good is such because of its intrinsic perfection, while the notion of goodness refers to perfections appeal to appetite. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles 1.37.

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(virtus)46, citing Dionysius. The second suggest that love is a kind of union or nexus (citing Augustine)47, which concerns relation rather than passion, while the third objection notes John Damascene's definition of passion48 in terms of being a certain movement, which does not seem to belong to love, but rather to desire. Thus, the first objection places love as a positive power, the second approaches love as a conjunction, and the third suggests that to love is ascribed the movement which really belongs to desire. In the respondeo of this article, Aquinas initially defines passion in the broad sense, so far as it concerns the effect of an agent in the patient. Aquinas describes the process according to which an agent produces a twofold effect in a patient, such that the agent gives form and the movement following upon that form (in this case, a connaturality for the end and the movement towards the end). The first change of the appetite (immutatio appetitus) in this process is love, which Aquinas also calls a complacency in the appetible thing. From this change follows movement towards the appetible thing, which is desire, and finally rest in the loved object, which is joy (gaudium). The responses to the objections answer the difficulties with viewing love as a passion. The answer to the first objection notes that because love is a principle of appetitive movement, it is called a virtus by Dionysius (as virtus signifies a principle of movement or of action). The reply to the second notes that union pertains to love, inasmuch as through the complacency of the appetite the lover holds himself to that which he loves, just as to himself, or to something of his

46 The citation is from De Div. Nom. cap. IV (PG 3, 713). 47 The citation is from VIII De Trin. cap. 10 (PL 42, 960). 48 The citation is from II De Fide Orth. cap. 22 (PG 94, 940).

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45 own (sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui).49 Thus union is a consequence of love and not itself the relation of union (love is a "unitive power" - citing Dionysius)50. Love functions as if it were a power internal to the subject, being a form bestowed on the subject by the object of love. Love thus has the role of a principle of other passions inasmuch it concerns the first aptitude of the subject towards the good or end. Love is the cause of all the passions, because it concerns this original change wrought on the appetite of the tendency given to the subject towards good. Pleasure concerns the aim or end of love, which is the conjunction with the good, and its discussion in the Prima Secundae follows closely after the discussion of love in the passions The passions of hatred and of concupiscence enter between love and pleasure: whereas love concerns an aptitude or "consonance" with the good, hatred concerns a "dissonance" with something evil, to that which is apprehended as something repugnant or harmful.51 We do not treat of hatred in depth here, because although one could argue that hatred would seem to be more immediately related to pain or sorrow than love, hatred receives a relatively small treatment among the other passions, and even when Aquinas discusses the causes of pain or sorrow, love and desire enter more explicitly in the discussion.52 We also do not discuss hatred at length here because our own interest in these passions is largely programmatic: we wish to

49 ST 1-2.26.2 ad 2. 50 The citation is from De Div. Nom., cap. IV (12 PG 3, 709). 51 Cf. ST 1-2.29.1 Aquinas makes a parallel between the natural appetite which has a "natural consonance" to
that which is convenient to it which is natural love, and a "natural dissonance" to that which is repugnant and corruptive of it. Similarly in the animal or intellectual appetites, just as there is a certain "consonance" of the appetite to that which is apprehended as convenient, hatred concerns a dissonance to that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful, which for that reason has the aspect of "bad. 52 Cf. ST 1-2.36.2 and 3.

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focus upon love and pleasure as the fundamentally orienting passions of the subject. Aquinas describes the passions of love, pleasure and desire in terms of the relation of the good to the subject - inasmuch as the pleasurable good of sense adapts and conforms the appetite to itself, it causes love, inasmuch as the absent good attracts to itself, it causes desire, and inasmuch as the good is present to the subject who is resting in it, it causes pleasure.53 We now turn to look at pleasure.

The subject of pleasure There are eight articles in the question on pleasure.54 The order of these questions allows Aquinas to uncover whether delight is a passion (31.1) whether it is in time (31.2), whether it differs from joy (31.3), whether it is in the intellective appetite (31.4), to compare delight of the higher appetite to that of the lower (31.5), to compare sensitive delights among each other (31.6), to see whether any delight is not natural (31.7) and whether one delight can be contrary to another (31.8). We will rely on articles 1, 3, and 4 of question 31, which throw light upon how pleasure functions as a passion (1 and 2) and how it compares experientially with joy (3 and 4). Exploring these other articles (31.5-8) concerning sensible and intelligible pleasures in relation to each other, the possibility of non-natural or unnatural pleasures, and finally whether one pleasure may impede another would be interesting and useful for comparing with pain and
53 Cf.ST 1-2.30.2 Aquinas discusses how the difference of the active power in terms of its absence and its presence, causes the subject either to be moved toward it or to rest in it: "Nam secundum quod est (finis vel bonum) praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri. 54 Aquinas uses the term delectatio which will be referred to here as pleasure and occasionally as delight.

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47 sorrow and perhaps provide some insights for remedies of sorrow. However, we do not spend time on them here because Aquinas reflects on the relationships between pain and sorrow in other ways in question 35 (which we will discuss in the following chapter) which concerns our central focus more.

Elements of the passion of pleasure: reading 31.1 The objections to the first article of 31 cite problems with classifying pleasure as a passion. In first objection Aquinas relies on Aristotle's statement that pleasure is an operation (and notes the distinction between operation and passion in the proposition of John Damascene).55 The second objection notes that pleasure has a different grammar from passion: pleasure is not in the process (moveri) but in the completion of movement (in motum esse). The third objection, citing Aristotle, points to the aspect of perfection in the description of delight, and argues that being perfected is not a suffering or being altered (pati vel alterari). But to be perfected in this way is not to undergo passion or be changed (pati vel alterari)56 therefore it
55 II De Fide Orth. cap. 22 (PG 94, 941). Aquinas quotes Damascene as follows: Operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est motus contra naturam. The answer to this objection will note that operation is spoken of pleasure causally rather than essentially. 56 Here Aquinas cites VII Physics (246b2). See Aquinas' commentary as well (Phys., lib. 7 l. 5 n. 4): Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius et aliter etc.; et sumitur a proprietate rei. Ridiculum enim est dicere quod homo vel domus vel quidquid aliud, alteretur ex hoc ipso quod accipit finem suae perfectionis: puta si domus perficitur per hoc quod tegitur, vel per hoc quod lateribus ornatur aut cooperitur, ridiculum est dicere quod domus alteretur, quando cooperitur aut lateratur. Est etiam manifestum quod alteratio non est eorum quae fiunt, inquantum fiunt; sed unumquodque perficitur et fit, inquantum accipit formam propriam et figuram. Non est ergo alteratio in acceptione figurae et formae. See also his commentary of II De Anima (417b2): Deinde cum dicit speculans enim manifestat, utrum quod educitur de potentia in actum scientiae patiatur. Et primo manifestat hoc circa id quod educitur de secunda potentia in actum purum. Secundo autem manifestat hoc circa id quod educitur de potentia prima in habitum, ibi, ex potentia autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod habens scientiam, id est habitualiter sciens, fit actu speculans. Sed hoc aut non est vere et proprie alterari et pati; quia, ut dictum est, non est proprie passio et alteratio, cum de potentia procedit in actum, sed cum aliquid de contrario mutatur in contrarium. Cum autem habitualiter sciens, fit speculans actu, non mutatur de contrario in contrarium, sed proficit in eo quod iam habet. Et hoc est quod dicit quod est additio in ipsum, et in actum. Additur enim ei perfectio secundum quod proficit

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seems that pleasure is not a passion. In the respondeo, we see that the middle term which makes pleasure to be a passion for Aquinas is the movement of a sensitive appetite proceeding from a sensitive apprehension.57 Aquinas places pleasure as a passion because of the mode of its process; its sensitivity makes it a passion. Aquinas refers to Aristotle's definition from the Rhetorics before he proceeds to explain this definition in detail: delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing. 58 He first explains the genus of delight, which is a movement of the soul that is caused by a constitution in the existing nature (constitutio in existententem naturam), which in other words, is the presence of a connatural good. By this phrase all at once, Aquinas points out that the event ought not to be taken insofar as it in constitui - (that it is coming to be established) but insofar as it is constituted - (in constitutum esse) as in the term of a movement. Here, Aquinas also explicitly contradicts Plato in that Aquinas posits delight not as a generation, but rather in a having-been-accomplished (magis consistit in factum esse). The all at once (totam simul) includes both the perfection and the movement of pleasure together, seeming to make the zenith of achievement to be pleasures paradigm. The text continues: this is the difference between animal and other natural things, that other natural things, when they are constituted in that which is convenient to them according
in actum. Aut si dicatur alterari et pati, erit aliud genus alterationis et passionis non proprie dictae. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum; dicens, quod non bene se habet, dicere sapientem habitualiter, cum sapiat actu, alterari, sicut neque dicimus aedificatorem alterari, cum aedificat. (De anima, lib. 2 l. l 1 n. 10). 57 Aquinas will deny the cogent presentation of pleasure as operation brought forward in the objections by noting (in the response to the first objection) that to say pleasure is an operation is to speak of it causally and not essentially. Cf. ST 1-2.31.1 ad 1. 58 Delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem. (ST 12.31.1)

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49 to nature, they do not sense this, but animals sense it.59 Here perception becomes the hinge making pleasure possible, in differentiation from a constitutio taken on its own. Aquinas prevents this perception from making the passion to be something cognitive by rooting it within a wider ontological context than that of an animal, that is, within the context of any nature which strains towards its own perfection. The significance of sensitive perception is necessary here because if perception was not included there would be nothing to show that a change is a passion of the soul (what makes a passion to be of the soul may seem elusive at this point; we will discover more what is the source when we discuss the reflexivity of a passion in the next chapter). The passion of pleasure seems to function similarly to a perfection. Insofar as pleasure is an appreciation following upon a perfection, this is a case of a perfection being perfected by a passion. Pleasures and movement: reading 31.2 The second article of question 31 is important for our purposes in that it negotiates between the finality and the passionate characteristic of pleasure of the fact that pleasure has the nature of an end and that its object can be changeable. Pleasures are not of themselves in time because they regard the good already gained, which is as a term of movement. However, insofar as the good which is gained is subject to change, pleasure will be in time accidentally. This has existential ramifications and repercussions for the passion of sorrow inasmuch as there is some pleasure that is not always complete (which in and of itself is not a cause for sorrow but can indicate the possibility of privation insofar as the good gained is subject to change and thus
59 Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. (ST 1-2.31.1).

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to loss). It is interesting because this passion of pleasure, which concerns perfection, can be per accidens affected by change. The significance of 31.2 concerns the fact that although pleasures possess the note of finality, there can be something passing associated with them the good can be structured according to movement and time. The placement of some goods of the human being as being changing goods shows that pleasure is likewise subject to movement and change on the part of its object.60 Pleasure as passion: reading 31.3 The significance that pleasure has as a passion specifically in our lives is seen in Aquinas distinction between pleasure and joy in 31.3. Aquinas formulates his distinction on the basis of natural and rational desires which follow upon natural desires and non-natural desires (which are with reason). Thus these two passions seem to be distinguished on the basis of their deployment; to pleasure would belong every kind of natural perfection that is achieved and sensed in the body, while to joy would belong everything else (and not only everything else, but extending also to natural pleasures). This is because joy, which has as its object that which we desire by reason (concupiscimus secundum rationem) can include under its objects any object of natural or sensitive desire, but not the other way around. That is to say, sensitive pleasure does not include the pleasure associated with something which is desired according to reason.

60 Aristotle argues against the idea that pleasures are in movement or coming-to-be, making a comparison between pleasures and seeing or a point or a unit and pleasure in this respect. (cf. X Ethics 1174b8). See also Aquinas' commentary: Neque enim potest dici quod generatio sit visionis, ita scilicet quod visio successive compleatur. Sic etiam non potest dici de puncto et unitate. Haec enim non generantur, sed consequuntur generationem quorumdam. Similiter non potest his attribui motus. Unde nec delectationi, quae etiam est quoddam totum, idest in indivisibili perfectionem habens. (Ethic. lib. 10 l. 5 n. 17).

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51 Pleasure more in bodily experiences than joy Although rational pleasure theoretically extends to more than natural pleasure as it can subsume for its object whatever falls under natural pleasure, Aquinas notes that joy does not always extend to all natural pleasures. The reason which he gives is that sometimes someone senses some pleasure according to the body, concerning which he does not necessarily rejoice according to reason. The case for this explanation becomes clear if we consider that every natural perfection is a cause of sensible pleasure, for in this case, merely being alive and having a body that achieves its functions moderately well ensures a continual reservoir of the realization of perfections which deploy pleasures. For Aquinas, pleasure is in these kinds of experiences more than joy; from our point of view, natural pleasures would be perpetually deployed because of the abundance of the occasions - pleasure would be a constant correlated experience of being a living, sensate being. Our interest in the commonality of pleasure is due to more than the frequency of bodily perfections. There are per accidens reasons why sensitive pleasure may be deployed as frequently as joy. Associations of sensitive pleasure with rational objects as particulars: reading 31.4 When Aquinas asks in article 4 whether there is pleasure in the intellective appetite this is not merely a repetition of the question in 31.3 concerning the distinction between pleasure and joy. In this article, Aquinas shows how joy is distinct from sensible pleasure, in terms of its originative desire the desiring according to reason of article 3 and as belonging to the intellective appetite. Insofar as pleasure is in the intellective appetite, it is not of itself a sensible

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pleasure, but a delight which is called joy. Pleasure and joy can be profoundly inter-related for per accidens reasons at the level of the phenomenon or their happening. Insofar as rational activity regards particulars, the sensitive appetite is also involved.61 In article 4, Aquinas does not so much argue for this involvement of the sensitive appetite in reasoning as acknowledge it: Upon the apprehension of reason, not only is the sensitive appetite moved through application to something particular, but also the intellective appetite, which is called the will. (emphasis my own).62 While human beings share in the pleasures of animals, we also have the capacity to partake of the pleasures of angels;63 both of these capacities can become intermingled especially when joy is directed to something particular. Thus, sensitive pleasures encompass more than animal perfections (or perfections experienced simply in virtue of being a living, sensate being). Sensitive pleasures can be deployed by intelligible good, in being directed to something particular. Not only does the human being live on familiar terms in a world filled with particular things, people, events which remain a continually renewable source of pleasure, but also, as we have seen, sensitive pleasure can be deployed concerning an intelligible good, either in considering it in some particular way

61 Aquinas asks whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason in a discussion concerning sensuality and whether it obeys reason (ST I.81.3). In the course of this discussion, Aquinas notes that the irascible and concupiscible powers are moved by the cogitative power or particular reason because this cogitative power compares individual intentions. Aquinas proceeds to note that this particular reason is moved and directed by universal reason, for particular conclusions result from syllogistic and universal propositions. Our interest in this article concerns the articulation of the way in which (particular) reason moves passions: Obediunt (irascibilis et concupiscibilis) rationi quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute, sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa, quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus . (ST I.81.3). 62 Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. 63 Cf. ST 1-2.31.4 ad 3.

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53 (or in another per accidens manner, by reason of a certain perfection64 or of overflow:65 this logic will appear in the remedies as we will see in reading 38.4 of Aquinas in chapter 5 of this work). Another principle which we recall from the previous chapter is that passion, properly speaking, requires something only a little active.66 Joy, though theoretically more universal, may perhaps not be so frequently deployed as pleasure, which concerns not only bodily pleasure but can be associated with rational joy. Commonality of pleasure from its sources or causes: from question 32 It is in keeping with this principle that pleasure can be deployed by anything particular that Aquinas presents a wide range of causes in question 32 which deploy pleasure. Eight in number, these articles show that pleasure follows upon operation, movement, hope and memory, sorrow, actions of others, doing good to others, likeness (similitudo), and wonder (admiratio). In fact, pleasure follows every kind of act of being, including operation, movement, passion, imagination, actions of others, and actions of ourselves in relation to others, unity (in terms of likeness or similitudo) and wonder as a kind of desire for knowledge accompanied with hope of knowing what one desires to know. This list indicates the packed anthropological, psychological and existential implications of these various modes of being for a human subject
64 Cf. ST 1-2.24.3: Ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum: secundum illudquod in Psalmo LXXXIII dicitur: Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo. 65 Cf. ST 1-2.38.4 ad 3: In viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitiigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu. 66 Cf. ST 1-2.22.3 ad 2 where Aquinas, speaking of the sensitive appetite, notes that the sensitive appetite is affected much (multum patiuntur) even by something only a little active (parvis activis).

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(in 32. 5 and 6, which regard the actions which others do and our own beneficence towards others, there are also interesting social or political implications). We focus on the most general point of these discoveries: the process or fact of every kind of act of being is seen as capable of producing pleasure. This points to a certain commonality, to the point of a normalcy of pleasure in view of the multitude of reasons for having sensible pleasure not only natural perfections of the body, but a much broader range of instances in virtue of being a living, sensing, wondering, social being.

Summary After having elaborated the significance of pleasure in our lives, in terms of its phenomenological elements as well as the wide variety and constant sources of its deployment, we can move forward to seeing how pain and sorrow enter this context of love and pleasure which each constitute a dimension of normal experiences in our lives.

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55 Chapter Three: Pain and Sorrow

Introduction We have discussed the passionate subject, the subjects passionate context of other passions which is the passion of love, and the passion of pleasure, which is deployed by natural perfections and by every kind of act of being or good. Love and pleasure together concern the natural orientation of the subject and what is normal both in terms of what the subject is inclined to by love and what enters in common experience. Now we come to the question of pain or sorrow, which becomes written within the context of a life oriented by love of good and marked by many experiences of pleasures. The more proper passions of sorrow and pain are experienced by a subject already scripted by the passions of love and pleasure, which contour the subject's relationships with the world along the modes of connaturality, enjoyment, and pursuit. In article 1, Aquinas initially enters pain and sorrow into the logic of pleasure (which we have already treated). Just as there is a conjunction and a perception present in pleasure, so is there a similar event in pain. The simplicity of this comparison belies the complexity of the differences between pleasure and pain or sorrow, a complexity which is slowly teased out in the process of question 35 and becomes more apparent in the discussion of the unique causes of sorrow. As question 35 progresses, Aquinas negotiates the relationships between pleasure and pain (3-6), between pain and sorrow (1, 2, 7) and between various kinds of sorrow (8). What

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emerges in this process is an existential background filled in by colorful descriptions of particular cases in which pleasure and pain work upon each other (significantly in the objections and responses of 35.3 and in 35.4 ad 3) or via more systematic descriptions of the relationships between pleasure and pain as proceeding from the same subject (1, 2) or oriented towards the same, different, or contrary objects. With respect to the subjective dimension, the mode of reflexivity which appears in 35.1 as that which is the source of both pleasure and pain reappears in article 7 to help negotiate between pain and sorrow as passions with conclusions such as (for example) that sorrow is greater than pain, because its repugnance is to the appetite itself, instead of occurring through the mediation of being repugnant to the body. The relationships between pain and pleasure as species of movements that regard related or opposed objects is treated of in articles 3-4 which enables us to envision an interdependency or a recurring cycle of pain and pleasure on each other; existentially, the presence of pain is notably reinforced in article 5 which aligns the greatest pleasure of contemplation with substantial or incidental sorrows. Life written in terms of being experiences of pleasures becomes modified by instances of pain and sorrow which become integrated within the experiences of the subject tending towards or experiencing pleasures. Pain and sorrow become entered into the world largely defined by love and pleasure, and can even become more significant to a subject in particular cases for per accidens reasons. Pain and sorrow acquire a kind of urgency given the significance of the object which is loved, given the fact that pain or sorrow increase love, and in the effect of sorrow that it hinders pleasures.

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57 We chose the somewhat belaboring fashion of moving through all eight of these articles in the same order in which Aquinas wrote them, because we wanted to show the logic of the question itself; the pedagogy of the question is very revealing. It is by advancing through these questions that we begin to see indications of the stakes which sorrow brings to life. The first two articles discuss whether pain is a passion of the soul and whether there is a distinction between pain and sorrow.

Whether pain is a passion of the soul: 35.1 The first objection to article 1 notes that pain can be in the body; the second objection considers that pain likewise appears to involve an apprehensive power rather than an appetitive one, while the third objection notes that pain would seem to belong rather to the natural appetite than to an animal one. Accordingly, here there is an opposite approach from that of the objections to pleasure: in the objections to 31.1 pleasure seemed beyond a passion, here pain seems below a passion of the soul. We can be better prepared to see the different trajectories which these two passions take from the strikingly different contexts in which each question is asked. Conjunction and perception: pleasure and pain Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and perception of this conjunction.67
67 See the Latin text (1-2.35.1):Sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio boni, et

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In the response, Aquinas bridges the experiential gap between the two passions of pleasure and pain in the simplest way possible; he incorporates conjunction and perception, which are the elements of pleasure, as likewise being the elements required for the passion of pain. Introducing pain or sorrow by comparing it with pleasure is the simplest approach from the conceptual point of view; it eases us into the logic of pain or sorrow via the workings of pleasure, which are easier to understand as pleasure is the passion which perfects the fundamental orientation of the subject by love (amor). Another implication of this approach to treating pain and sorrow by comparing with pleasure is to make the point obvious that pleasure and pain are located in the same subject; they face the same kind of conditions. The subject of pain or sorrow is the same as the subject of pleasure: it is the objects which differ: one being the conjoined good, while the other is an evil conjoined to oneself. Reflexivity of the appetite This analysis also draws attention to the interior workings of the appetite (whether sensitive or intellective) of which the activity is essentially reflexive: Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the aspect (ratio) of good or evil is the object of pleasure or pain.68
perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis; ita etiam ad dolorem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum); et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis. 68 See the original Latin: Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. The text continues: Bonum autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta

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59 In this selection, we see a conjunction causes passion in the soul because it has the aspect of good or evil: these values for the appetite are marked as such by the fact that they are related to the appetite in a way that causes pleasure or in a way that causes pain. This explication of passion is far more immediate and simple than the more extended account of causality which we have looked at in terms of love causing passion, the good, likeness, etc. Here what appears is how the appetite appears in its own right as a valuator, based on its own prior valuation. Even more, the relation of the appetite to itself is one of reflexivity as its own pleasure or pain is that which marks a conjunction as good or bad. This kind of activity enables the relationship of the subject to oneself via conjunction with an object (and thus through a relationship to the world), through the pleasure or pain which is already experienced in conjunction with particular objects. These reflexive movements belong either to the sensitive or the intellective appetite (the natural appetite does not have an apprehension of its own,69 whereas pleasure or pain concern reflexivity or the apprehension of the subject). At this point, Aquinas focuses on the sensitive appetite because as he makes clear, his interest is passion (which more properly belongs to the sensitive appetite) and chiefly those which smack of defect (qui in defectum sonant - 35.1). In responding to the objections, Aquinas answers the first in saying that pain of the body
appetitus. Unde patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent. 69 Aquinas inquires whether love is a concupiscible passion and in the response, distinguishes between love of the natural, the sensitive, and the intellective appetites on the basis of apprehension existing in the subject or from without (ST 1-2.26.1): Est enim quidam appetitus non consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed alterius; et huiusmodi dicitur appetitus natralis. Res enim naturales appetunt quod eis convenit secundum suam naturam, ut in I libro dictum est. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero. Et talis est ppetitus sensitivus in brutis, qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi. Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprheensionem appetentis secundum liberum iudicium. Et talis est appetitus rationalis sive intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. See also I.6.1 ad 2; I.103.1 ad 1 & 3.

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is suffered with some bodily harm, but the movement of pain (motus doloris) is always in the soul. The reply to the second objection likewise states that pain is of the sense inasmuch as sense is required for corporeal pain as for delight. The third notes that pain concerning the loss or sending away (amissione) of good shows the goodness of nature insofar as when that which nature tends toward (appetit) as good is sensed to be removed, the passion of pain results in the sensitive appetite. Together, these replies indicate that the pain which is said to be in the body happens by means of the act of the sensitive apprehensive power, which apprehensive power does not itself constitute pain. Pain is not simply a question of an action/reaction paradigm; or even of an ontological change of an object by a more powerful agent; it is not any bodily change in itself; it is a purely passive being-drawn-ness of the appetite (which is also a characteristic of the natural appetite)70: it is a question of a passion of the soul, which we identify not only by its correlation with a bodily movement, but by belonging to a reflexive subject. Up until this point in article 1, Aquinas has left undistinguished the relationships between pain as a passion of the intellectual appetite and the sensitive appetite. We recall that even in 22.2 he said that passion is more of the sensitive appetite than the intellective, not that it exclusively belongs to the sensitive appetite. Aquinas approach seems to have focused upon the sensitive appetite as being where passion more properly happens. In the next article (35.2) Aquinas tackles the distinction between pain (dolor) and sorrow (tristitia).

70 This essentially reflexive nature of the activity of the soul distinguishes a passion of the soul from a merely natural change (cf. ST 1-2.31.1 which notes that it is the perception of the event of a thing's being constituted according to its nature that is involved in pleasure). For us, this reflexive dimension constitutes a subject. It must belong to the intellectual or sensitive appetite, because in these appetites, the apprehension as well as the appetition occur within the same subject (cf. ST 1-2.26.1).

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61 Tristitia and Dolor: 35.2 Article 2 of 35 asks whether tristitia is the same thing as dolor. The objections emphasize the bodily location of pain, its immediacy and limitations, and the spiritual character of sorrow, which can extend throughout time and follow upon any of the senses. The first objection cites Augustine's statement that pain is said with respect to bodies. The second objection notes that pain concerns only present evil, whereas sorrow can also extend to past and future (in terms of repentance or anxiety). The third assigns the source of pain's deployment in the sense of touch; sorrow, on the other hand, can follow from any of the senses. Each objection attempts to delineate sharp differences between pain and sorrow. Aquinas suggests in the sed contra that pain and sorrow are the same, citing St. Paul. The answer distinguishes between the exterior apprehension of sense and the interior apprehension (interior apprehension here extending to intellect or the imagination). It is important to note that Aquinas cites the difference between pain and sorrow as based in the difference between exterior and interior apprehension, and not in the difference of appetition.71 Aquinas initially presents tristitia as a species of dolor, and thus qualifies it as being narrower than pain in some degree. His later comments reveal that a sharper distinction between sorrow and pain can be made on the basis of the more common use of dolor understood as limited to the corporeal experience.72
71 Here, Aquinas does not immediately assign sorrow to the intellective appetite (as he does for joy cf. ST 12.31.4). This may be because the sensitive appetite is the subject of both pain and sorrow, which would be the case if something bad were always particular (as a privation inhering in a particular good) which consequently moves the sensitive appetite, to which it belongs to be moved by the particular reason (cf. ST I.81.3). See: Quod autem provenit a primo et universali bono, non potest esse nisi bonum particulare tantum; sicut quod provenit a prima et universali causa essendi, est aliquod particulare ens. Omne ergo quod est aliquid in rebus, oportet quod sit aliquod particulare bonum; unde non potest secundum id quod est, bono opponi. Unde relinquitur quod malum, secundum quod est malum, non est aliquid in rebus, sed est alicuius particularis boni privatio, alicui particulari bono inhaerens. (De malo, 1.1). 72 Si dolor accipiatur prop corporali dolore, quod usitatius est, dolor ex opposito dividitur contra tristitiam,

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We may ask at this point in what way pain is of significance to the subject in differentiation from sorrow. Importance of pain for life Pain holds a tremendous significance in the life of the subject. The exterior sense which perceives pain is more material than the interior sense: the body provides a more passible point of entry than the interior appetite because of its concrete materiality. Thus the sensitive appetite is more uniquely attuned to the body's passion in a way which is different from the deployment of more interiorly-caused appetitive movements.73 Pain concerns a corruptive joined physically and involves a greater bodily change because it concerns a real, immediate subjection to bodily harm. We see accordingly that just as the bodily change of a passion is in proportion to the movements of the appetite, as matter to form,74 so also the movements of the appetite are proportioned to the passion of the body. Here we see a mutual relationship of influence between the disposition of the body and that of the sensitive appetite. Pain is a passion concerning a passion of the body (which contrasts with the experience of pleasure as a passion, deployed via love and desire, which perfects a perfection).75
secundum distinctionem apprehensio interioris et exterioris... (ST 1-2.35.2.ad 3) 73 Immutationes corporales magis causantur ex dolore exteriori, tum quia causa doloris exterioris est corrumpens coniunctum corporaliter, quod exigit apprehensio tactus. Tum etiam quia sensus exterior est magis corporalis quam sensus interior, sicut et appetitus sensitivus quam intellectivus. Et propter hoc, ut supra dictum est, ex motu appetitus sensitivi magis corpus immutatur. Et similiter ex dolore exteriori magis quam ex dolore interiori. (ST 1-2.35.7 ad 3) See also ST 1-2.22.3; 1-2.31.5. 74 Aquinas, in a discussion on anger, refers to the appetitive movement (motum appetivum) as the formal element in the passion in anger, and the swiftly driving commotion of heat which is the material in anger: A ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira. Sed perfectum iudicium rationis passio irae praeoccupat, quasi non perfecte rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae est materialis in ira. (emphasis my own) (ST 1-2.48.3 ad 1). 75 On the perfective characteristics of love, see for example where Aquinas discusses whether love is a passion that is harmful to the lover (ST.1-2.28.5) in which he notes that the love of a convenient good (boni convenientis) perfects and betters the lover (perfectivus et meliorativus amantis). Pleasure has the aspect of a perfection because it is a sensible appreciation super-added to a perfection that has been achieved.

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63 In the responses to the objections we see additional reasons showing the significance of pain, which may be read in terms of increasing complexity. The first notes that "pain", in terms of bodily pains, is more known to us than spiritual pains. The second notes that the interior cognitive power is able to perceive past, present, and future, whereas the exterior sense can only perceive the present. Here it seems that passion can be interpreted as being more paradigmatically represented by pain than sorrow (here meaning paradigmatic at the existential level and as a source of representation, because pleasure and joy are structurally more significant in terms of the orientation and contours of a subject deployed towards these passions by the primary passion of love) because it concerns present evil, which conveys a malum that is actually efficient. The third response concerns the distribution of pain and tristitia among the senses, with regard particularly to the sense of touch. This response remarks that the sensible objects of touch are painful not only because they exceed the capacity of the sensitive power, but also inasmuch as they can be contrary to nature which means, consequently, that they concern the subject's very existence. Sensible objects can cause sorrow in addition to pain, for unlike other animals, the human being is not limited to referring all the senses to the sense of touch, but can take pleasure or joy in them (and by extension sorrow over them), because the human being is more perfect in knowledge than other animals. Pain most properly a passion Pain serves as a paradigm of passion, in terms of being most properly a passion according to the definition given in 22.1 (namely, that passions which are for the worse and which involve a bodily change are more properly passionate). Pain concerns an unrepeatable and

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quintessentially present experience of a subject which has particular implications - not only physical ones, in terms of potential death which threatens the nature of the subject altogether, but of being itself an aegritudinem of the soul (cf. 35.1). In this way, pain draws attention to the unity of the subject for Aquinas, inasmuch as a harm to the body deploys a passion of the composite. Aquinas fully appreciates the consequences of experiencing bodily pain (of which we will see an example the extent to which pain can withdraw one from intellectual operations, as we will see in the following chapter in commenting upon 37.1). While duly commenting on the special significance of pain for Aquinas, we keep in mind the significance of tristitia as a passion; a point which we can further explore in article 7, where the importance of tristitia is pointed out as concerning a more perfect conjunction than that which happens in exterior pain). Before we reach that point, however, we move towards the intervening articles which help to reveal the existential stakes of pain and sorrow in terms of the commonality of their deployment, which is revealed through the interrelationships of pain or sorrow with pleasure. And this is a project for which articles 3-6 of question 35 are particularly helpful.

Pleasure and Sorrow or Pain: Sharing the Subjects Experience The relational logic of pleasure and sorrow or pain In the following articles (35.3 and 4) Aquinas discusses the relationships between pleasure and pain. In discussing pleasure and pain, we can distinguish two basic elements present in a passion the object of passion, which is the focal point of a discussion on specific 64

65 passions as it defines that passion as different from others, but there is also the subject in which a passion takes place. In these two articles, we see a relationship between pleasure and sorrow articulated in terms of contrariety. Contrariety of pleasure and sorrow or pain: 35.3 35.3 makes the fundamental point that pleasure and pain are contrary by reason of their opposite objects. The first objection to article 3 states that a contrary cannot cause its contrary, but that sorrow (the contrary of delight) can be the cause of delight. Here Aquinas cites Matthew Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.76 The second objection notes that pain can please, as is the case with spectacles (citing Augustine)77 and (again citing Augustine)78 that weeping is a bitter thing, and yet nevertheless sometimes it pleases. The third objection considers that one contrary is not the matter of another, because contraries cannot be at the same time, but that pain can be the matter of pleasure as Augustines words would seem to indicate when he says: let the penitent always grieve (doleat), and rejoice over his pain.79 Aquinas also cites Aristotle80 on the other hand, concerning the fact that the wicked person mourns concerning the fact that he took pleasure (malus dolet de eo quod delectatus est).

76 Matt.5:5. Taken from Challoner, Richard (ed). The Douay-Rheims Bible. Rockford: TAN, 1989. All other biblical citations in this text are derived from this edition, unless otherwise noted. 77 The citation is from II Conf. cap. 2 (PL 32, 683). 78 The translation from Aquinas' text is my own; the citation is from IV Conf. cap. 5 (PL 32, 697). 79 The citation is from De Poenitentia, cap. 13 (PL 40, 1124). The translation is my own from Aquinas' quotation. 80 IX Ethics (1166b23) See also Aquinas' commentary which interprets this sorrow of bad men in terms of their repentance in knowing the bad things which they have done, after the wave of malice or passion has subsided: Dicit ergo quod si non sit possibile quod homo pravus simul perfecte tristetur et delectetur, tamen parum post delectationem tristatur de hoc ipso quod delectatus est, et vellet quod huiusmodi delectabilia non recepisset. Homines enim pravi replentur poenitentia, quia videlicet impetu malitiae vel passionis cessante, quo mala faciunt, secundum rationem cognoscunt se mala egisse, et dolent. (Ethic., lib. 9 l. 4 n. 22).

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The sed contra is also from Augustine that joy (laetitia) is the will consenting in those things which we want (volumus); while sorrow is the will in dissension from those things which we do not will (nolumus).81 Just as consenting and dissenting are contraries, so also are joy and sorrow. The respondeo considers that since passions receive their form from their objects (and thus are distinguished thereby) pleasure and pain, which are concerned with the opposites of present good and present bad, are contrary (for contrariety is in respect of form82). While the respondeo distinguishes a fundamental contrariety between pleasure and pain as passions, the objections and answers to article 3 consider the subject of passion more, in negotiating relationships between pleasure and pain from the point of view of their common subject. For example, the reply to the first objection makes the point that experiencing sorrow at the absence of something can cause someone to seek more eagerly for something pleasant (as a thirsty man seeks more eagerly for the pleasure of a drink after the thirst that he suffers). Or else, that from a great desire for pleasure someone does not shrink from bearing some sorrows to arrive at that pleasure.83 Thus, although pleasure and pain are contraries, one is the cause of the other per accidens. The reply to the second objection notes that pain can also cause pleasure on account of some wonder conjoined to it (which is a cause of pleasure84) as in the case of spectacles, or by bringing to memory something which is loved, which makes one to perceive
81 The citation is from De Civit. Dei cap 6 (PL 41, 409). 82 Cf. V Metaphysics (1018a10-15). 83 In this reply to the first objection, Aquinas brings theological interests to the fore when he comments that either of these ways in which sorrow is experienced conduces to eternal life; for present grief (luctus) leads to the consolation of future life, for from the fact that a person mourns for sins or for the postponement of glory, he or she merits eternal life. Likewise a person also merits from the fact that he or she does not flee labors and narrow straits (angustias) in order to obtain (sustinere) it. One could take as synonyms for this specific aim of eternal glory any goods, values, goals, matters of importance, etc. 84 ST 1-2.32.8.

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67 his love, for the absence of which he is grieved (doletur). Here Aquinas formulates an important principle that since love is pleasurable, not only pain but everything which follows from love, inasmuch as love is sensed in it, is pleasurable. And this is the reason which Aquinas assigns to the pleasure in spectacles, because there is love sensed which is conceived for those who are represented (commemorantur) in the spectacles. The last reason which Aquinas gives (ad 3) is that pain can also cause pleasure (or vice versa) insofar as the will and reason reflects on its own acts (and here sorrow and pleasure are themselves considered under the aspect of good or evil). Whether every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure: 35.4 Article 4 of question 35 focuses on the fundamental contrariety of pleasures and pains with respect to their opposite objects, and negotiates other kinds of relationships between pleasures and pains on the basis of the contrariety of these objects. The first objection notes that what is contrary is universally opposed just as whiteness and blackness are universally opposed to each other. The second objection notes that medicines come about by way of contraries and that any (quamlibet) pleasure is a medicine against any sorrow.85 The third objection notes that contraries impede one another - and this is the case with any (quaelibet) sorrow against any pleasure, as is clear from Aristotle.86
85 The citation refers to VII Ethics (1154b13). Aquinas' unqualified use of pleasure that any (quamlibet) pleasure is a medicine against contrary sorrow, is qualified in his commentary on this section of the Metaphysics which adds Aristotle's caveat if it be strong (vehementi in Aquinas' terms). Cf. Metaphys. lib. 7 l. 14 n. 8: Dicit ergo primo, quod prima ratio quare delectationes corporales videantur esse magis eligibiles est quia expellunt tristitiam; et quia delectatio corporalis propter sui superabundantiam est medicina contra tristitiam. Non enim quacumque delectatione tristitia tollitur, sed vehementi, inde est quod homines quaerunt delectationem superabundantem et corporalem, cui tristitia contrariatur. (emphasis my own). 86 Cf. X Ethics 1175b16-23: Alien pleasures do pretty much what proper pains do, since activities are destroyed by their proper pains; e.g. if a man finds writing or doing sums unpleasant and painful, he does not write, or does not do sums, because the activity is painful. So an activity suffers contrary effects from its proper pleasures and pains, i.e. from those that supervene on it in virtue of its own nature. (Aristotle and William D. Ross (trans). Ethica Nicomachea. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York : Random House. 1941. All citations from the Ethics are taken from this English edition unless otherwise indicated). Aquinas comments upon this

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The sed contra works from the premise that contraries do not have the same cause, while yet noting that it proceeds from the same habit that one should rejoice about one thing and be saddened about its opposite (and Aquinas provides the example of charity according to which one does rejoice with the rejoicing and to weep with the weeping).87 In the respondeo, Aquinas notes that contrariety is in respect of form, but form can be divided into different kinds, both general and special, and yet again, between forms of something existing in itself (or an absolute form) and forms which are derived from something else, as is the case with movements and passions, which derive their forms from their objects. On the basis of these distinctions, Aquinas articulates a potential affinity between pleasures and pains. Pleasures and pains are movements which can have contrary objects. Because their objects are something extrinsic to them, as movements, these passions can have a kind of affinity with each other, insofar as they concern contrary relationships to contrary things (for example, to recede from white is in affinity to approaching to black). To take this principle into an example of passions concerning opposite objects, we can note that when someone withdraws from excessive cold which is painful, it is in affinity with a pleasurable warming of oneself. Here Aquinas also notes the possibility that passions can have objects which are simply disparate and Aquinas provides the example of being saddened over the death of a friend and taking pleasure in contemplation.
passage: Sic igitur circa operationes contrarium effectum habent delectationes propriae et tristitiae propriae, quae scilicet ex ipsis operationibus causantur, alienae autem sunt quae causantur ex aliis operationibus. Et dictum est, quod extraneae delectationes faciunt aliquid propinquum tristitiae propriae. Ex utraque enim parte corrumpitur operatio, non tamen similiter; sed magis per tristitiam propriam quae directe et secundum se delectationi contrariatur. Aliena vero delectatio contrariatur secundum aliud, scilicet secundum operationem. (Ethic. lib. 10 l. 7 n. 11). 87 Rom. 12:15

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69 Our own purpose in reading this article (and article 3 which preceded it) is to help clarify the relational logic of pleasures and sorrows in our life; that there is not only a contrariety in pleasure and pain, but there is also a certain affinity between some pleasures and pains. Generically, pleasure and pain are contrary movements directed at contrary objects (a good in the case of pleasure, a bad in the case of sorrow). Nevertheless, pleasures and pains proceed from the same source within us, that we avoid what is bad or inconvenient is a corollary of the fact that we seek what is good. Pleasures and pains can abound in our lives over a number of disparate things (we are never only hungry or even only saddened by our friend's death but are always at the same time taking pleasure in the warmth of the sun, taking delight in contemplation, or smelling an exquisite scent wafting in our direction). We are as if an intersection of many different experiences of pleasure and pain, simultaneously at work within us, affecting us while each one modifies the experience of the others. The fact that we experience this particular pleasure or pain, however, is correlated with the possibility of being able to be differently or contrarily affected by a state of affairs which is opposite to the one in which we delight or grieve. The relationships and affinities between passions based on being contrary movements to contrary objects seems to implicate a quasi-dependence between pleasure and pain: not an actual dependence, but a hypothetical dependence whereby the contrary of the object its loss, if it is present, or its presence, if its loss is concerned could entail a deployment of the opposite passion. Aquinas puts this logic to the test in the case of contemplation as we will see in the following article (which considers unique circumstances because contemplation contains

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contraries within itself). The response to the first objection notes that whiteness and blackness do not have their species from a relation to something external (as is the case with pleasure and sorrow). The reply to the second notes that the genus is taken from the matter.88 Now in accidents, the place of matter is the subject. And therefore in any (qualibet) sadness there is a contrary disposition of the subject to the disposition which is in any pleasure, for in any pleasure, the appetite holds itself as accepting that which it has, while in any sadness it has itself as fleeing (fugiens). And therefore on the part of the subject any delight is a medicine against any sadness, and any sadness impedes any delight, nevertheless especially (praecipue) when pleasure is contrary to sadness according to its species. The response to the third is also thereby clarified, for it must be said differently that although not every sadness is contrary to every delight according to species, nevertheless it is contrary as to the effect; for by one the animal nature is strengthened (confortatur) while the by the other, it is disturbed (molestatur). Whether contemplation has a contrary sorrow: 35.5 In article 5, the question is asked whether contemplation has any contrary sorrow (the phrasing of the question presupposes that there is pleasure in some contemplation).89 The first objection associates the sadness according to God named by Paul which works penance steadfast to salvation90 because regarding God concerns the higher reason, to which it belongs
88 Aquinas here makes reference to VIII Metaphysics (1043a5 & a19). 89 Some idea of the greatness of intellectual pleasures can be seen in ST.1-2.32.5 which compares spiritual and intelligible pleasures with bodily and sensible pleasures. In this article, Aquinas describes the ways in which intellectual pleasures greatly surpass (multo sunt maiores) sensible pleasures, while he also maintains the vehemence of sensible pleasures (sunt magis vehementes) with respect to us (quoad nos), one of the reasons being because they are desired as treatment for bodily defects and follow sadnesses arising from such defects. 90 Cf. II Cor. 7:10 The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation; but the sorrow of the world worketh death.

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71 to give itself to contemplation.91 The second objection notes that contraries are effects of contraries: thus if one thing is the cause of pleasure, its opposite will cause sorrow. Thus there will be a contrary sorrow to the pleasure of contemplation. The third objection notes contemplation can have the aspect (ratio) of the bad, citing Aristotle that it is unfitting to meditate on certain things.92 The fourth objection notes that any operation, insofar as it is unhindered, is a cause of delight,93 but that contemplation can be hindered in many ways (such that it be altogether prevented, or that it occurs with difficulty). The fifth objection notes that the affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow, and cites Ecclesiastes that frequent contemplation (meditatio) is affliction of the flesh.94 In these objections, we see that while the first objection associates sorrow with regarding God (respicere ad Deum), that the following four are not so theologically-oriented, but are drawn from every possible way that contemplation can be touched by sorrow: concerning its object (art. 2 and 3) concerning its operation (art. 4) and finally concerning its effects - the affliction of the flesh, so that the ultimate effect is that contemplation appears to be potentially bound on all sides with sorrows. The sed contra shakes off the sorrowful associations of contemplation advanced by the objections by citing Wisdom 8:16: Her conversation has no bitterness nor her company tedium,
91 Cf. XII De Trin. cap 3 (PL 42, 999) and cap 4 (PL 42, 1000). 92 Cf. XII Metaphysics (1074b32). 93 Cf. VII Ethics (1153a14; 1153b11). See also Aquinas' commentary Ponamus nos non impeditam, ut sit haec diffinitio delectationis: delectatio est operatio non impedita habitus qui est secundum naturam, idest qui naturae habentis congruit. Impedimentum autem operationis difficultatem causat in operando, quae delectationem excludit. (Ethic. 7 l. 12 n. 11) See also X Ethics (1174b20) and Aquinas' commentary: Et inter huiusmodi operationes sensus et intellectus illa est delectabilissima quae est perfectissima. Perfectissima autem operatio est quae est sensus vel intellectus bene dispositi in comparatione ad optimum eorum quae subiacent sensui vel intellectui. Si igitur operatio perfecta est delectabilis, perfectissima autem delectabilissima, consequens est quod operatio inquantum est perfecta, sit delectabilis. Delectatio ergo est operationis perfectio. (Ethic. lib. 10 l. 6 n. 5). 94 Eccles. 12:12. The full sentence reads as follows: Of making many books there is no end: and much study is an affliction of the flesh.

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but rejoicing and joy. At the beginning of the respondeo, Aquinas notes that the pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. One way, such that contemplation is the cause of delight, and not its object. In this case, pleasure would not be concerning contemplation itself but of the thing which is contemplated. In considering this point, there can be a contrary sorrow to contemplation, as contemplation can regard harmful and saddening things (just as it can concern convenient and pleasurable things). Thus from the beginning, Aquinas shows how contemplation can itself introduce literally harmful things to the subject. Contemplation can also cause pleasure in the way that the activity of contemplating itself is the object and cause of pleasure: one can take pleasure in the act of contemplating. In this way, the pleasure concerning contemplation exists outside the register of ordinary pleasures because contemplation includes contraries rather than being bound to the logic of one, for in contemplation, one contrary is the condition of knowing the other. Unlike bodily pleasures, which arise from remedying certain bodily defects, contemplation would be delightful in itself, existing according to the logic of a perfect operation.95 While Aquinas acknowledges that contemplation does not have a contrary sorrow per se when it is the object as well as the cause of pleasure, he devotes the latter part of the article to showing the per accidens ways in which it happens that pain and sorrow accompany contemplation, whether on the part of failing in understanding, on the part of a painful sensible, or in exceeding the capacity of the body by supporting this activity longer than the custom of
95 Delectatio enim contemplationis non causatur ex hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum seipsam delectabilis, non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam perfecta, ut dictum est. (ST 12.35.5)

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73 natural habit. The reply to the first objection notes how there is sorrow according to God concerning sin, which the mind considers in contemplating to be contrary to divine pleasure. The reply to the second objection notes that those things which are contrary in natural things, do not have contrariety in the mind (but one is the condition of knowing another).96 The reply to the third objection is important as a similar point returns in Aquinas' theory of remedies: contemplation per se never has the aspect of something bad because it is the consideration of the true which is a good of the human being, and naturally pleasurable.97 Nevertheless, there can be sorrow in that contemplating less worthy things hinders the contemplation of better things. The reply to the fourth rekindles the logic of affinity such that those sorrows which concern impediments to contemplation are actually akin to it (est ei affinis) to it. The reply to the fifth objection notes that the affliction of the flesh accompanies contemplation indirectly and per accidens. Contemplation, here understood generically (without the specification of contemplation of the truth which appears later when Aquinas discusses remedies in 38.4) provides a unique testing case. Existing as though in its own register, uniquely apart from the logic of natural pleasures which arise in a recurring rhythm of thirst to satisfaction, contemplation seems to embrace contrarieties in itself, and in fact to depend upon contraries co-existing (as knowing one contrariety is the condition of knowing the other). Thus, contemplation juxtaposes the contrarieties of the objects of pleasure and pain which was the focus of the past two articles, contemplation does not regard one opposite at a time, but rather holds opposites together at the
96 In conjunction with this point, see the principle that one science extends to contraries (cf. IV Metaphysics 1004a9). 97 Cf. also ST 1-2.38.4 ad 2.

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same time instead of in isolation. How does this affect the human beings susceptibility to passions which are contrary? Here contemplation serves an important structural purpose in that Aquinas shows the limitations of one of the greatest pleasures. In the case of contemplation, it is possible to exploit the versatility of the subject who, in the act of contemplation, is capable of holding contraries together. It seems that perhaps through this capacity, the subject may be spared from the ordinary progress of pleasure and pain, which each regard one contrary. In this litmus case of contemplation, however we see that there remains an incidental or accompanying interaction between pleasure and sorrow in the act of contemplation. Thus this article reaffirms, as it were, the existential in the experience of the subject, even as the author clarifies the per se significance of contemplation as introducing a different logic than the one which pleasure and pain have hitherto been confined; this article also at the same time reveals and demythologizes any attempt to propose pleasure or tranquility as the necessary - or at least the sole achievements of contemplation (as the most likely candidate to achieve pleasure untouched by pain or sorrow).

Prominence of fleeing pain over pursuing pleasure: 35.6 The sixth article asks whether sadness is to be fled more than pleasure is to be sought (appetenda). The intervening (art. 3-6) descriptions of the subjective and objective contrarieties, affinities, inter-relations between pleasure and pain or sorrow which describe them as both written in our experience have made it possible to now make a nuanced distinction between the acknowledged primacy of pleasure as a passion that is pursued by the subject and the increasing

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75 significance of pain to a subject in particular cases. The first objection argues from a point made by Augustine that There is no one that does not flee pain more than he desires pleasure (appetit voluptatem).98 Insofar as people commonly agree (consentiunt) in this behaviour, it seems to be natural and thus suitable that sadness be fled more than delight desired. The second objection argues that the flight from sadness is greater than the appetite for pleasure because it concerns a saddening contrary. Taking a cue from nature, this objection explores the greater intensity and speed which is added to movement from the action of contraries (a principle for which Aquinas provides the example that hot water freezes more quickly and harder than cold water).99 The third objection notes that when a person rejects a stronger passion, he is the more praiseworthy and virtuous, because virtue concerns the difficult and good.100 The strong person who resists the movement of fleeing pain, is more virtuous than the temperate person who resists the movement by which pleasure is desired; and here Aquinas cites Aristotle's statement that the strong and the just are most honored.101 Thus it seems that the movement of fleeing sorrow is stronger than the
98 This citation is from Octog. Trium Quaest. qu. 36 (PL 40, 25). 99 Aquinas references I Meteorology (348b36) concerning this point. Aquinas does not focus now on the Aristotelian theory as to why this happens (Aristotles theory, called antiperistasis; is defined as "the supposed increase in the intensity of a quality as a result of being surrounded by its contrary quality, for instance, the sudden heating of a warm body when surrounded by cold".) Cf. http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/hot_water.html Accessed October 22, 2009. 100 II Ethics (1105a9): Both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad. See also Aquinas' commentary: Ars autem et virtus est circa difficilius, in quo magis requiritur quod aliquis bene operetur, ad quod ordinatur ars et virtus; nam in facilibus quilibet potest bene operari. Sed bene operari in difficilibus est solum habentis virtutem et artem. Et ideo manifestum est ex praedictis, quod totum negotium virtutis et politicae, idest civilis conversationis, consistit circa delectationes et tristitias; quibus qui bene utitur, bonus erit; qui male autem utitur, erit malus. (Ethic., lib. 2 l. 3 n. 14). 101 II Rhetoric (1381a21).

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movement of desiring pleasure. The sed contra affirms that the good is stronger than the bad (citing Dionysius)102 thus making the point that the movement of pleasure, which concerns the good, is stronger than the flight of sorrow which concerns the bad. In the respondeo, we see that the inclination towards pleasure remains the more prominent per se, because the cause of pleasure is the convenient good, while the cause of pain or sorrow is some repugnant bad thing (malum). It happens that some good can be convenient without any dissonance, but nothing bad can be totally repugnant without anything suitable. Thus pleasure can be whole (integra) and perfect; while sorrow is always partial (semper secundum partem). Aquinas gives another reason - that the good is sought for itself, while the bad is fled inasmuch as it is the privation of good. From these opening remarks, Aquinas proceeds to note per accidens reasons, based in the subject, as to why it can happen that some sorrow may be more fled than pleasure is sought. The first is that it is more keenly felt through sorrow103; the second, that there can be a hierarchy of value in loves (whereby one object may be beloved more than another, as the well-being of the body is loved more than the pleasure of eating); or the third, because pain and sorrow, by way of effect, impede all pleasures. Each reason provides an instance whereby the movement to flee sorrow becomes more prominent than the inclination for pleasure in a specific case. The response to the first objection notes that when Augustine says that pain is more fled than pleasure (voluptas) is desired, that this is true per accidens but not per se. In Augustine's text, the example is provided that the most savage beasts abstain from the greatest pleasures for
102 The citation is from De Div. Nom. cap. IV (20 PG 3, 717). 103 Here Aquinas quotes Augustine: Amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. From De Trin. cap 12 (PL 42, 984). See also a similar point made in ST 1-2.35.3 ad 1.

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77 fear of pain;104 the reason for this, Aquinas notes, is that pain is contrary to life, which is loved more than pleasure. The reply to the second distinguishes between inside ab intrinseco) movement and movement originating from outside ab extrinseco). Movement from the interior tends towards what is suitable and to recede from what is contrary. Movement coming from the outside acquires a certain intensity (intenditur) from being contrary to the subject, because each thing strives to resist its contrary to preserve oneself. Thus while violent movement is intensified (intenditur) in the beginning, it slacks off (remittitur) towards the end.105 At this point, it is interesting to see how Aquinas negotiates between interior movement and exterior movement in the sensitive appetite. On the one hand, the movement of the appetite is from within, being from the soul toward things (ad res). On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive part is from the exterior, as being from things to the soul (a rebus ad animam). Because the movement of the sense is required for pleasure and for sadness, it happens per accidens that sorrow is fled more than pleasure is desired. The reply to the third objection notes that the strong person is not praised because he or she is not conquered by any sorrow or pain whatever, but from that which entails the danger of death. The sorrow concerning this is fled more than the pleasures of food or sex are desired (which are the matter of temperance) just as life is loved more than food or sex. The reason for the temperate person's being praised here is because he or she does not pursue the pleasures of
104 Octog. Trium Quaest. Q. 36 (PL 40, 25). 105 This is a principle here which may also be interesting to apply from the point of view of remedying sorrow, that the intensity of a contrary movement is at its height in the beginning but from then it begins to taper off, as it were (supposing that other per accidens factors do not intervene).

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touch more than that he or she does not flee the contrary sorrows.106

Interior sorrow greater than pain: 35.7 The objections to article 7 work from the presumption that pain or exterior pain is actually the paradigm of the passion. Objection one invokes the closeness of pain to the natural appetite; the second emphasizes the more real conjunction which takes place in pain;107 the third is likewise interesting: it draws attention to the fact that exterior pain has a stronger effect than interior pain (a man dies more easily from exterior pain than interior pain. This evokes the extremity of passion - the per se corruption of the subject). In contrast, interior pain seems at the end of these marshaled objections to be less significant. The answer first states the similarities between interior and exterior dolor; both are movements of the appetitive power. However, they differ according to the two things that are required for sorrow (tristitia) and pleasure. With respect to the cause, exterior pain concerns a conjoined evil that opposes the body, but interior pain concerns that which opposes the appetite. The former follows the apprehension of sense, the latter that of the interior
106 In support of this point, Aquinas cites Aristotle (III Ethics 1118b28). See Aquinas' commentary on this section: Temperatus non laudatur ex eo quod sustineat tristitias. Neque intemperatus vituperatur in hoc quod non sustineat eas, sicut vituperatur timidus. Sed vituperatur intemperatus de hoc quod magis tristatur quam oportet. Et est eius tristitia non ex aliquo laesivo imminenti, sicut est tristitia timidi; sed tristatur de hoc quod non adipiscitur delectabilia quae concupiscit. Et sic delectatio per suam absentiam causat in eo tristitiam. E contrario autem temperatus laudatur in hoc quod non tristatur in hoc quod abstinet a delectabilibus, sed promptus est a delectabilibus abstinere. Quia non multum ea concupiscit. Est autem potior effectus qui consequitur ex praesentia causae alicuius, quam qui consequitur ex absentia. Et ideo fortitudo principalius est circa tristitias quae consequuntur ex praesentia nocivorum, temperantia autem est secundario circa tristitias quae consequuntur ex absentia delectabilium, principaliter autem circa delectationes quae ex delectabilium praesentia consequuntur. (Ethic. lib. 3 l. 21 n. 1 and 2). 107 Here we can recall the influence of real things (res ipsas) which Aquinas wrote in 22.2, which focused the centre of passion more in the appetitive power than in the apprehensive power. This argument here is reminiscent of that appreciation of the influence of real things as it is argued that a real thing has a stronger effect than its likeness.

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79 apprehension, of the imagination or even of reason (vel etiam rationis). Here tristitia as interior pain concerns a more intense passion for Aquinas than exterior pain, even though exterior pain concerns a physical harm to the subject. We find that sorrow is worse than pain; because it is repugnant to the appetite itself and not to the appetite by way of the body. Without focusing on the object of sorrow or its proper causes, Aquinas focuses on the appetite itself - it is the mode of its repugnance that makes interior pain to be greater than exterior pain. Exterior pain concerns that which is repugnant to the body; interior pain concerns that which is repugnant to the appetite itself. Interior becomes the more common term because it concerns the proper cause of pain or sorrow (which makes the passion of the subject distinct from a simple corruption of a thing), that is, the reflexivity of the subject. This relationship between dolor and tristitia as concepts is more than that of a paradigm, parallel, or manner of speaking (more than the principle we saw in 22.3 ad 3 whereby the names of passions can denominate simple acts of the will). Interior and exterior are not species of pain for Aquinas (species in the sense that we will shortly see four species of sorrow); in both cases it is a question of pain. The significant question here, we discovered, is not whether the object of physical is more intense than interior pain, or vice versa, rather it concerns which mode of entry to the appetite is greater. This may have later significance for establishing a priority of sorrow for remedying. This way of distinguishing between pain and sorrow does not require an objective distinction between the two; it does not create two paradigms of pain (as for example, one for

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doctors to treat and one that is spiritual); the distinction has more to do with what is more interior and the core of the appetite, with what constitutes a subject as an appetitive center, as a passible, reflexive being. The stakes of tristitia particularly concern to what level an evil can be conjoined and perceived by a subject. In making this point concerning the different modes in which pain and sorrow are present to the same sensitive appetite, it is important to reiterate that sorrow as well as pain has a material element the bodily change. The differences between them can also be considered in terms of the fact that pain has a greater bodily change than interior pain, while interior pain is greater according to what formal in pain, on the part of the soul (cf. 35.1 ad 3). The fact that both exterior and interior pain have formal and material dimensions have implications in their effects, such that pain affects the spiritual activity of learning while sorrow affects the movement of the body108 (and we will see also in the remedies in which Aquinas recommends spiritual remedies such as contemplation to be addressed to pain, while the physical remedy of sleep and baths is addressed to sorrow).109 The response to the first objection notes that interior pain can also concern those things which are destructive of life. The reply to the second declares that interior pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness, but by the thing which the likeness represents (and here we can consider in a manner of speaking a certain perfection of the conjunction with something bad which is present in sorrow according to which the thing is more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as the likeness is more immaterial and abstract). The response to the third
108 We will see this in reading articles 1 and 4 of question 37, as 37.1 concerns the effect that dolor on learning (addiscere) while 37.4 concerns the effect of sorrow (tristitia) the movement of the body. 109 Cf. 38.4 and 38.5, respectively.

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81 objection notes a close relationship between bodily changes and the bodily conjoined corruptive because the exterior sense is more material than the interior (just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective). The result which is presented here is that a more perfect knowledge creates a more perfect passion, and thus begins to shift the kind of focus which we had observed concerning passion in chapter 1 on I.22.2 and 3, in which passion was negotiated as belonging more to the appetitive than to the apprehensive power and more to the sensitive than to the intellective powers. Here the heart of passion is something more interior: the focus is upon its following an apprehension, of imagination or even of reason vel imaginationis scilicet, vel etiam rationis.

Four species of sorrow: 35.8 The eighth article moves from the preeminence of sorrow established in article 7 to the elaboration of four species of sorrow. The objections to this article concern the assignation of four species to sorrow, which Aquinas characterizes as acedia, anxiety, mercy, and envy.110 The first objection puts into question the possibility of dividing sorrow into four species at all, as such a move is not made with respect to pleasure which is opposed to sorrow. The second objection notes that repentance (poenitentia), nemesis, and zeal are also certain species of sadness, which are not

110 Cf. Damascene II De Fide Orth. cap. 14 (PG 94, 932). Also see Nemesius: De Nat. Hom., cap. 19 (PG 40, 688). As an aside, the attribution by Thomas (and many others) to Gregory of Nyssa of the work cited is wrong; it is the work of Nemesius (written ca 400 A.D.): cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York, 1955: Random House, p. 60. The Ottawa edition of St. Thomass Summa Theologiae (which I use) rightly credits Nemesius in the footnotes.

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included here.111 The third objection criticizes the fact that none of these divisions are mutually exclusive - there is no contrariety among them, as can be seen from the descriptions which Gregory gives them: Acedia is a sadness which cuts off (amputans) the voice, anxiety is a burdening sorrow; envy is a sorrow concerning the goods of another; mercy is a sorrow concerning the evils of another. One can simultaneously be saddened about another's evils and another's goods, and at the same time be burdened more interiorly, and more exteriorly to lose one's voice. In the respondeo, Aquinas articulates the different ways that species can be constituted within a genus. Some species pertain to the genus per se and are virtually contained within it (as, for example, when rational is added to animal). Another way can be the addition of something having the status of something extraneous to the genus (quasi aliquid extraneum a ratione ipsius) as for example when white is added to animal. In this latter case, sometimes the species may be formed from something external on the part of the cause, the object, or the effect of the thing. The first results in a true species of a genus, whereas the other does not result in a true species of the genus as we generally use the words. Aquinas then proceeds to explain the way of speaking as seen in areas beyond the discussion of the passion, i.e. in the division of the mathematical sciences.

In the case of sorrow, the ordinary or proper object of sorrow is ones own conjoined evil (proprium malum). Sorrow, however, may take place concerning the evil of another (with the key stipulation that such sorrow for another takes place inasmuch as that evil thing is considered
111 See Aristotle: II Rhet. 1386b9, 1388a30. See also Aquinas' reflection in ST I1-2.36.3 ad 3.

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83 to be one's own as is the case with mercy).112 Another species of sorrow on the part of the object is envy; envy is also an inter-subjective sorrow, but it concerns the good of another, which the subject wants conjoined to oneself instead of to the other (the evil consists in that the good is joined to another instead). With regards to the effects of sorrow, the proper or normal effect of sorrow Aquinas says here consists in a certain flight of the appetite (fuga appetitus). The first difference which takes place in the effects of sorrow is the prevention or removal of (tollitur) of this flight. Thus anxiety burdens the spirit (animum) to a great degree, so that there does not appear any refuge. Aquinas associates anxiety with angustia or constrictedness. Aquinas notes a further degree of burdening or aggravation. The internal crippling of anxiety can progress such that the external bodily members are also immobilized from work. This headway of hindered sadness, in which the stress and constraint of the interior appetite makes a person senseless or stupefied (stupidus in seipso)113 and unable to move (which situation is called acedia). These two modes of extending sadness - in terms of the object and in terms of the effect resulting in four kinds of sadness are significant for existential, moral, and therapeutic or pastoral points of view. Three of the four appear as virtues and vices, two have both existential and caring imperatives. These four kinds of sorrow provide an indication of the breadth of intensities in the various experiences of sadness. After having briefly explored these four kinds of sorrow, it is possible to move into the effects of pain or sorrow, but not before we look at the answers to
112 We can see this in ways well explored by Nussbaum (Nussbaum, Martha. The therapy of desire: theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics. Princeton: 1994. ) 113 This phrase appears later in the text (ST 1-2.37.2, which asks whether sorrow or pain cause a burdening of the spirit.

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the objections. Aquinas' response to the first objection which points out that pleasure is not similarly divided into species because pleasure is caused by good, which is spoken of in one way (quod uno modo dicitur). The reply to the second objection assigns repentance to sorrow proper because it concerns one's own evil. Both zeal and nemesis can be related to envy.114 The reply to the third reiterates that the basis of this division is not on the opposition of the species, but from the diversity of the extraneous things which concern the notion of sorrow.

Summary In this chapter, we followed the progression of question 35. This lengthy and winding method followed the reading of the experiences of pain or sorrow as entering by means of the more normative or common experience of pleasure, as a way of announcing the description of pain and sorrow and introducing its interplay with pleasures in life. It is because pleasure exists that pain and sorrow enter as experiences in the course of life, that pleasures and pain or sorrow mutually depend upon and per accidens increase each other, and finally that the subject's shunning of sorrow can become per accidens more notable than the pursuit of pleasure (whether on the part of the object, in being highly valued and intimately connected with the well-being of the subject, or on the part of the subject in the sense that love is felt more, or that pleasures are hindered more in sorrow - cf. 35.6). Even the greatest pleasure of contemplation (35.5) which seems to subsume the logic of contrariety which in a way conditions the deployment of pleasures and pains, serves as a benchmark for the encroaching of pain and sorrow upon the pleasures of life - whether it is of harmful things, or for per accidens reasons, such as because of a failure
114 Cf. ST I1-2.36.2 and 36.3 ad 3.

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85 to comprehend what one wants to know, or because of the a painful sensible (which fall into a logic of sorrow in affinity with the pleasure of contemplation). Showing how interior pain is greater than exterior pain in article 7 revealed that the reflexivity at stake in pain and sorrow means that sorrow is more significant to the subject than even pain because it is repugnant to the appetite and not only to the appetite through the mediation of being repugnant to the body. Finally we looked at 35.8 which analyzes the four varieties of sorrow which shows the greater extent from which sorrow can be deployed, extending to a social scope in regarding the situation of others through compassion or through envy, or to a situation where the subject is weighed down in anxiety and acedia. After seeing in question 35 the necessary existential presences along with the differences between pain, sorrow and pleasure, how they are written in our lives, we move towards a discussion concerning what structures sorrow in a subject, as being the subjective conditions of sorrow, and what results from sorrow in a subject: we will look at questions 36 and 37 on the causes and effects of sorrow, respectively.

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Chapter Four: Causes and Effects

Introduction In the last chapter, we explored question 35 for the context of love and pleasure, the reflexive activity of pleasure and pain, and the existential background of experience in which pleasure, pain and sorrow interact. In 35 we saw the interweaving of pain or sorrow with the initially more prominent pattern of pleasure. Throughout the course of 35, we were gradually introduced to the possibility of a per accidens prominence of pain over pleasure, and of sorrow over pain. In the end we closed with Aquinas' description of four kinds of sorrow which each add something to the proper notion of sorrow (which may be cumulative, but not necessarily so). In this chapter we look at Aquinas exposition concerning the causes and effects of sadness, concerning questions 36 and 37 of the Prima Secundae. As is the case with other passions,115 the discussions on the causes and effects come after the discussion on the passion itself. In the discourse of question 35, in which the relations between pleasure and pain and sorrow were most prominent, we could have formed the impression that pain or sorrow are simply moments written seamlessly into a rhythmic and inclusive cycle of pleasure. If pain or sorrow is just a moment within a movement toward pleasure, what would constitute pain or sorrow as a passion distinct from pleasure or from desire? Elaborating specific causes of sorrow help in answering this question. The analysis on the effects of sorrow, on the other hand, help to reveal the stakes of sorrow within the subject, and also open up possibilities for remedies to be applied to the subject according to these same terms.
115 That is, love (ST 1-2.26-28); pleasure (ST 1-2.31-34); fear (ST 1-2.41-44) and anger (ST 1-2.46-48).

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The Causes of Sorrow Here we will follow the order of question 36 on the causes of sorrow. We will comment on all the articles (1-4) in this section. In article 3, which asks whether the desire for unity is a cause of sorrow, we also incorporate an analysis of I.48.4 and 5 in order to shed some light on the ways in which the unity of the subject can be undermined which consequently gives rise to sorrow. It is interesting to compare the discussion on the sorrow with the causes of pleasure (question 32). In question 32, after the initial presentation of the proper cause of pleasure as a kind of operation, each article provides a rationale how various kinds of acts of being elicit pleasure. In contrast to the first article of question 32 which focuses on the actuality of the subject116, while the following causes include explicit and concrete events (for example, the actions of others) we will see that the causes of sorrow seem to place more emphasis upon internal conditions of sorrow, in terms of how the object is present to the subject of sorrow, in terms of subject's prior love and desire for unity or perfection. At this point we will also discuss the ways in which evil can affect a subject as being united to it. While the logic of the articles in question 36 from 1-3 focuses primarily on internal elements within the subject (concerning the apprehension of the subject in 36.1, the love of the

116 This actuality is twofold: extending to both the fact that the subject has attained some good and that the subject is aware of it. In ST 1-2.32.1, in which Aquinas inquires whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure) Aquinas points out these two elements which are required for pleasure: Ad delectionem duo requiruntur: scilicet consecutio boni convenientis et cognitio huiusmodi adeptionis. Utrumque autem horum in quadam operatione consistit; nam actualis cognitio operatio est quaedam; similiter bonum conveniens adipiscimur aliqua operatione.

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subject for the good in 36.2 and the desire for unity of 36.3) when it comes to article 4, on the other hand, there is a shift towards the external element which is at the heart of the definitions of sorrow. This last article draws attention to the fact that something bad is conjoined to a subject. The aspects why something is bad to a subject are treated in articles 1-3, along the lines of clarifying the subject's mode of apprehension of what is bad, together with a description of how the subject is inclined by love for the good and the desire for his or her unity. This concerns what we might call the subjective elements of sorrow, and directs us towards an analysis of what kind of good or perfection the subject loves or desires the good or perfection which is lost, absent, or incomplete in the experience of sorrow. In article 4, however, the fact that the bad thing is conjoined to the subject is the emphasis: the reason why something is present to the subject which works against the inclination of that subject can only happen from the action of something stronger. The space between articles 1-3 and article 4 marks the difference between the subjective and objective dimensions of sorrow: the fact that something is bad can only be from the context of the tendencies of the subject towards his or her own good and proper perfection, while the fact that such a bad is conjoined can only mean that there is an external factor which figures in sorrow, thus interposing itself against the inclination of the subject. Sorrow is the result of the tension between the subject's inclination and real obstacles which act against the realization of this inclination.

Sorrows object: 36.1 The first article of 36 asks whether the object of sorrow or pain is a lost good or a present

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89 evil. If we compare this article with 1-2.32.1 on the cause of pleasure, which is operation, the contrast particularly highlights the more passionate aspect of sorrow, in terms of focusing on an object which acts upon the subject.117 The first objection cites Augustine118 saying that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods (thus implicating concrete objects with sorrow), and reasoning from this perspective that all sorrow is caused by a loss. The second objection points out that sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure119 has the same object as that of pleasure, but the object of pleasure is good (thus it seems that sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of the good). The third objection works from the fact that love is the cause of sorrow (as of other passions of the soul), and since the object of love is good, it seems that pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of a good more than for a present evil. In discussing an object of sorrow, it also becomes clear that sorrow has its own unique movement. Being deployed by its own object characterizes sorrow as a distinct passion with a different kind of movement from pleasure. Thus sorrow is not reducible to a movement towards pleasure, or subsumed under a kind of broader cycle of pleasure. Because the object of a passion is something that is valuated by a subject, the object of pain or sorrow, regardless of whether the conjoined evil concerns a loss of good or a presence of evil concerns some kind of entity with respect to the subject's perception. The evil which pain or sorrow regards is a being to be

117 In 32.1, operation could also be considered as an object of pleasure, but at the same time, operation functions as the workings inherent to pleasure itself. The subject's participation in having at least partially figured in bringing about the event of the passion is not prominent in Thomas' analysis of sorrow as it is in pleasure, for reasons which we shall see. 118 De octo Quaest. Dulc. Q. 1 (PL 40, 153). 119 Cf. ST 1-2.35.4.

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reckoned with (ens rationis). We see by the assignation of a unique object to sorrow that Aquinas does not reduce pleasure and pain to the same movement; it is important subjectively to keep them distinct. On the other hand, while it is necessary to emphasize the opposition between conjoined evil and the conjoined good as objects to the subject, so that the passions and respective movements of pleasure and pain remain distinct, nonetheless it is important to recognize the real dependency of evil on the good.120 Something bad is refused because of its opposition to something good.121 This points to the fact that the real appreciation of the subject is for the original good, or if that remains, instead for its unity, restoration, or perfection. Speaking at the level of passions, however, and to emphasize the point which is the particular emphasis of this article, it remains that however peripheral or even parasitical evil may be with respect to the good, to the saddened individual, this evil holds the focus of attention. This is made clear in the response to the first objection, which notes that losing the good itself is apprehended as something bad, and also mentions the reverse is the case that that the loss of an evil is also apprehended as a good (which would make it the object of pleasure).
120 In De malo, Aquinas distinguishes between bad that is said of a subject and bad said of itself as an accident. In the second sense, there is no bad as such, which Aquinas proves in three ways. Evil is not something on its own account; it does not proceed from the universal good, for only particular goods do so. Secondly, evil does not have the minimum ontological equipment in terms of being desiring or being an object of desire ('desire' translating 'appetenda' which is actually a broader term than a passion of the sensitive appetite). Aquinas also argues in terms of being itself as being most desirable and therefore good because evil is opposed to good it is also opposed to what is. 'Evil however exists insofar as it with reference to a subject in which it inheres, which relies on that particular subject intending its own good. Thus while to be blind is nothing, for someone to be blind is something. Something bad is always peripheral or even parasitical to something which is fundamentally good in that it opposes something which is of good in the subject. Cf. De malo, 1.1. 121 Cf. ST 1-2.25.2 on whether love is the primary concupiscible passion.

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91 The response to the second objection notes that pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object but under opposite aspects if the presence of a particular thing causes pleasure, the absence of that same thing causes sorrow. Because one contrary includes the privation of the other122 consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect. The reply to the third objection notes that when many movements arise from one cause it does not necessarily mean that they all chiefly regard what the cause concerns but only the first of them. Thus the many passions which result from love do not concern the good simply as does love. Each passion has its own object which is suited to it, or rather, which deploys it.

Love and desire in sorrow: 36.2 The second article inquires as to the interior principle of sorrow in terms of desire, a passion of movement towards the good. The first objection ascribes difficulty to desire as a cause of pain or sorrow, because sorrow regards evil (as we have just seen) and desire is a movement towards good; and movement towards one contrary does not cause movement towards the other. The second objection cites John Damascene123 concerning the fact that pain concerns something present while desire concerns something future. The third notes that what is pleasant is not a cause of pain, but desire is pleasant in itself (citing Aristotle)124.
122 X Metaphysics (1055b18). See also Aquinas' example in his commentary: Gravitas et velocitas habent aliquid commune in contrariis, quia scilicet in uno contrariorum invenitur alterum: nam grave est aliquo modo leve, et e converso; et velox est aliquo modo tardum. (emphasis my own) (Metaphys. lib. 10 l. 2 n. 6). 123 The citation is from II De Fide Orth. cap. 12 (PG 94, 929). 124 I Rhetoric (1370b15).

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In the beginning of article 2 Aquinas distinguishes between a cause that is the end, and one which is the principle of interior movement. In passion, the end corresponds with the object, while the principle of a passion corresponds with the first inclination towards the good, which is the passion of love (cf. 26.2), which leads consequentially towards rejecting the contrary evil. The question posed in the article, however, did not concern whether love is the cause of sorrow. The question was inspired by Augustine's wording, cited in the sed contra which made the claim that concupiscence causes sorrow.125 Here Aquinas integrates Augustines statement with his own approach by saying that since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love (which gives rise to the greatest pleasure)126; accordingly Augustine speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love: and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Aquinas also makes a space for concupiscence or desire properly speaking to be a cause of sorrow. We do sorrow for things that we desire, but more so for things which we have already enjoyed - that is, things we have lost (the specific phrasing of amissum bonum in the first article was not irrelevant). And here we begin to see the importance of Aquinas' point that desire is the effect of love which gives rise to the greatest pleasure; the fact that desire is the movement towards a future good already contains in its dynamics the greatest pleasure, which would proportionately diminish its sorrowful character. The reply to the first objection notes that the inclination of the appetite towards
125 The citation is from Enchiridion cap. 24 (PL 40, 244). 126 Cf. ST 1-2.32.6: Omnia enim quae facimus vel patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua causa delectationis est.

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93 possessing good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil. The reply to the second notes that what is desired, though really future, is nevertheless present, insofar as it is the object of hope. Here Aquinas also integrates pain within desire, inasmuch as desire of something future is faced with some impediment set before it (impedimentum praesentialiter apponitur) it causes pain. The reply to the third notes that desire gives pleasure so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired, which, when hope is removed, desire causes pain. While this article designated love for the good as a cause of sorrow, the next article explores more specifically the appetite which the subject has for his or her own unity. Appetite for unity (appetitus unitatis): 36.3 This article explores the way the desire (appetitus) for unity influences sorrow. For Aquinas, the desire for unity (or alternatively amor unitatis) is a cause of sorrow because unity extends to the whole perfection of the subject and opens up the scope in which sorrow can happen. For this article, we rely additionally on question 48 of the Prima Pars, articles 4 and 5 to help explain the unity which is at stake for the sorrowing subject in terms of the subjects substantial integrity or in terms of aptitude to some form or of operation. Aquinas negotiates between love and desire for unity as causes of passion such that love, which is broader and extends to those things which one has lost as well as those things towards which one is tended, for love is more properly a cause of sorrow than desire, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure. Aquinas choice of the term appetite for unity referring, in terms of unity, to all those things in which a subjects perfection consists is interesting. Unity includes perfection, insofar as it can refer to the integrity of a thing but it can have a wider application in terms of its modes

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of likeness or similarity as well as identity or integrity (we see similitudo as a cause both of pleasure and of love cf.1-2.27.3 and 1-2.32.7). Unity, like perfection, can concern introducing a certain aspect of measure. A unity is something which marks every kind of being, but it can also be an aim or a goal to be towards in terms of greater perfection. Aquinas thus inscribes this scope in which pain or sorrow can happen; in the actual, past and potential measure of the subject. Unity at stake whether evil can wholly corrupt good: 1.48.4 We can find a more explicit delineation of the kind of unity which is affected by evil by looking in question 48 in the Prima Pars. Question 48 which is the first question on the specific distinction of things (distinctione rerum in speciali) also concerns the distinction of good and bad. 48.1 determines whether evil is a nature, 48.2 inquires whether bad is found in things, and 48.3 concerns whether bad exists in good as its subject. Our own question concerns article 4 of question 48 which inquires whether evil can corrupt or consume good wholly. The article distinguishes between three dimensions of good; that which is affected or to which evil is opposed (and this is wholly destroyed by evil, as light by darkness or sight by blindness); that which is neither destroyed nor diminished by evil (and this is the subject which remains) and that which is diminished by evil but not wholly taken away. In this article, Aquinas focuses on the third good, which is the aptitude of the subject towards act (habilitas subiecti ad actum). Whereas the first good, that which the evil is directly opposed to is actually destroyed (as for example, light is destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness) and the second kind of good - the subject - remains relatively intact (as the air

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95 which is not injured by darkness), this third kind of good is subtly affected - not so much as that which is destroyed, and not so little as the subject which endures. This aptitude does not suffer literally quantifiable decrease so much as a remission or a diminution in qualities and forms.127 This aptitude, according to Aquinas, is intensified (intenditur) from the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality, which the more they are multiplied in the subject, the more the subject is fitted to receive its perfection and form. On the other hand, the subject receives a remission from form by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more the potentiality is remitted with regard to
127 The problem of intensio and remissio in forms has been characterized as a medieval challenge to the traditional doctrine of the invariability of form as seen, for example, in VIII Metaphysics (1044a 9-10) And as a number does not admit of more and less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter. In other words, form qua form does not have gradation (does not admit of the more and less) and so intensio et remissio can only relate to accidental forms, or qualifications. Stachowski, Ryszard. The Mathematical Soul: An Antique Prototype of the Modern Mathematisation of Psychology. Rodopi: 1992. 130. (47) One of the discussions that have come down to us concerning the 13th century debate on intension and remission was chronicled by Walter Burley, an English philosopher (1275-1344) who narrowly missed being contemporary with Aquinas (1225-1274). Shapiro sums up Burley's assessment of the debate as follows: One group, proponents of what we shall call the "addition" theory, insisted that qualitative augmentation comes about through the addition of new, real and distinct, specifically similar qualitative parts, which join the pre-existent parts to form a qualitative degree of determinate intensity. The second group, adherents of what we shall refer to as the "admixture" theory, argued that qualitative intension is to be regarded as a function of the degree of "freedom from admixture" with its contrary, enjoyed by any one member of a contrary qualitative pair. According to Shapiro, Burley incised this debate when he suggested that the addition theory is rooted in an elementary confusion: for its supporters tacitly assume for entities clearly categorizable as qualities, characteristics which are properly predicable only of quantities. Shapiro, Herman. "Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms.Speculum 34, 1959. p. 413-427. For Aquinas, intension and remission with respect to forms does not concern form itself which is not said to be more or less, but regards the participation of a subject in a form (not meaning thereby that form exists outside matter as its subject, but speaking according to the difference in considering form according to the aspect of its own species and according as it is participated in a subject - cf. ST 1-2.52.1). It seems that if Aquinas was aware of this debate, that he would not have considered the two explanations which were later cited by Burley to be mutually exclusive: his explanation seems to include both the multiplication of dispositions which conduce to perfection as pertaining to intension, and the multiplication of "contrary" dispositions as constituting remission (si igitur contrariae dispositiones in infinitum multiplicari, etc. ST I.48.4). Likewise, concerning the usage of speaking quantifiably about spiritual things, Aquinas explains this usage on account of the familiarity of our intellect with corporeal things when he asks whether habit can be increased (ST 1-2.52.1): Respondeo dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt.

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the actuality. The root of the aptitude can never be wholly taken away, because it concerns the substance of the subject which remains (for example, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which of its very nature is transparent). We are reminded of theological stakes in this article, as towards the end of the respondeo, Aquinas reflects on the addition of sins in the soul, which can be added to infinity, thus diminishing the aptitude of the soul to grace more and more (semper magis ac magis minuitur habilitas animae ad gratiam), but that the aptitude towards grace is never totally removed because it is consequent upon nature. This analysis may also prepares the stakes concerning the distinction which will be made in the following article (I.48.5) concerning the evil of penalty (poena) and that of fault (culpa). Our own interest here in 48.4, however, is based simply upon revealing the different ways in which the bad can enter into the personal space of a subject, as it were, as depriving the subject of his or her own perfection. The possibility of diminution of the subject's aptitude towards act is an interesting example of privation which does not concern an irretrievable loss (insofar as the subject remains and something of an aptitude remains) while there is potentially an infinite capacity for diminishment in this respect. This analysis of the subject's aptitude for act in terms of remissio and intensio with respect to qualities and forms conveys the dynamic milieu of changing dispositions in which the subject finds himself or herself.

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97 Thus when we discuss the unity of the subject which is at stake, it is important to know in what ways the subject can be affected; it can be in terms of a complete privation of something belonging to the subject, such as blindness which wholly takes away the capacity to see, or it may be more subtle, in terms of reducing the subject's aptitude for certain forms. Privation of form and privation of operation (evil of pain and evil of fault): 48.5 Aquinas speaks of the possibility of privation not only in terms of a property which is wholly destroyed (such as light or the capacity to see) or an aptitude towards form or act, but also concerning act itself. In I.48.5, Aquinas distinguishes between first and second act; the former concerns the form and integrity of a thing (forma et integritas rei) while the second refers to operation. In respect of form Aquinas speaks in terms of subtraction (subtractio). Subtraction was a word which Aquinas rejected in the previous article in speaking of intensio and remissio with respect to qualities and forms, but here substantial form and operation concern a more substantial kind of actuality than an aptitude which concerns a more potential mode of being. Subtraction with respect to the form and integrity of a thing seems to concern an irretrievable loss materially, as can be seen from Aquinas' examples of blindness or a missing limb. In terms of a lacking operation, the operation can be wholly absent, or else lack due mode and order. Our interest here, again, is not so much a question of value in determining which between culpa and poena is a worse scenario, but rather our purpose in using this point is simply to illustrate the possible scope of privations which can affect form or operation, leaving the question of value for another discussion. Our concern is not focused on distinguishing degrees of privation, either as a way of attempting to measure the intensity of sorrow in the subject (as

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they may not necessarily be correlated in any case), or in terms of exploring some unqualifiedly good operation or of evaluating the subject morally.128 Accordingly, our discussion very broadly extends to all kinds of operations which are associated more and less closely with the pleasure of the human being, considering that an individual human being is potentially the subject of many accidental forms, and as such, can also fail to actualize or exercise powers within his or her reach,129 which are a cause of pleasure and thus also, from the point of view of loss of the operation or hindrances in performing them, can cause sorrow (such a musician abandoning the performance of music, or a scholar ceasing to read and write). All these elements are to help explore to some extent what we interpret is at stake when Aquinas speaks of all those things which come together for the perfection of a thing; these can concern complex actualities or potentialities in terms of the aptitude or habilitude of a subject towards act or it can concern the substantial being or an actual operation of the subject. Relation between a subject's perfection and external things This analysis of the possible ways in which evil can affect a subject need not be limited only to actuality and potentiality which is based in the subject, but can also extend to things outside the subject which are nevertheless associated with the subject by a kind of likeness. To
128 Thus we put aside discussions concerning the definition of virtue as that which makes its possessor good and his operation good likewise. Cf. II Ethics (1106a15) and ST 1-2.55.2 sed contra. 129 In attempting to temporarily put aside the moral connotations of failing in operation, I do not mean to obfuscate the differences between simple negation of activity, potentiality for an activity, and privation of activity. Aquinas was at pains to point the differences between negatio and privatio and also between potentiality and privation in ST I.48.3. Our own intention here does not so much follow a commentary on the text per se as exploring existential interpretative extrapolations. Here we could approach the question from the point of view of potentialities being impeded from actuality by something presently facing the subject, in a situation in which such potentialities are known and there is a desire to actualize them. In such a situation there can be sorrow or pain depending on the kind of potentiality which is at stake. See, in relation to this point, the ways in which Aquinas associates sorrow with desire (ST 1-2.36.2 ad 2).

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99 see in which ways the good and what is considered to be necessary for the perfection of the subject extends outside the subject, we can look at the ways in which likeness or similitudo is a cause of love (27.3) and of pleasure (32.7). In 27.3, Aquinas distinguishes two modes of likeness. The first concerns when two things are actually one, in terms of both sharing the same form of whiteness. Another kind of likeness is by way of potentiality and a certain inclination towards which another has actually (and here the example which Aquinas gives is the relation of a heavy body which is outside of its place to a heavy body that is existing in its place). Likeness thus extends to something external to the subject in terms of actual similarity or potential; which draws the subject or produces pleasure by a certain conjunction with the similar thing. Excess of unity? In both the discussions on love and pleasure, there is the idea that too much unity can corrupt; in the discussion on love in 27.3, it is in respect of the fact that something sharing ones form impedes oneself from following the good that it becomes hateful, not because of the similarity, but from the hindering of ones own good. Aquinas gives the example of potters who hamper each other's business, or of a proud man thinking that another impedes his own desired excellence. In the discussion on pleasure in 32.7, an undesirable unity concerns the possibility not only of impeding one's own (proprium) good insofar as another's excellence may hinder one's own (as in the case with potters competing for business), but actually includes the possibility of the corrupting of one's own good by exceeding the measure of nature. This more drastic possible issue of corruption is involved because pleasure concerns a more intimate conjunction than love means generically. This possibility of excess which corrupts the proper good is spoken

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of chiefly in bodily terms, as bodily health consists in a certain measure. We may be curious as to the presence of this excess in love and pleasure; how does this excess enter in the experiences of love and pleasure? Is it a per accidens consideration, such that excess would not be of the nature of pleasure or love in themselves? Or does the subject actually tend towards good indefinitely, while on the other hand the limitations of the subject resist such a move? We could gain more insight on this point by referring to ST 1-2.30.4 which asks whether desire (concupiscentia) is infinite. The respondeo negotiates the question by distinguishing between natural and non-natural concupiscence. While Aquinas notes that natural desire cannot be actually infinite (because nature tends toward something definite and fixed) he says that there can be a potential infinity in terms of the succession of desire (as someone who eats food will desire food again because bodily goods do not remain, but diminish and require replenishing.) On the other hand, desire which is not natural is in every way (omnina) infinite, because it follows reason (to which it belongs to proceed to infinity, as Aquinas points out in 1-2.30.3). Additionally, Aquinas gives another reason (citing Aristotle) why some desires are finite and some infinite: desires of the end is infinite because the end is desired for itself (like health), but desire of that which is towards the end is not infinite but is desired in that measure that it can achieve the end. Objective requirements for perfection Accordingly, there is some measure to the unity required for perfection (and consequently pleasure) on the basis of the claims of nature, which is well-established according to determinate and fixed limits. On the other hand, the desire of the subject for perfection can be infinite insofar

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101 as it concerns a rational desire, for reason can proceed indefinitely or it can be infinite insofar as a perfection is desired as an end (as greater health is always desired), while the desire for the means towards the end is limited by what is convenient towards achieving such an end (the desire for exercise as a means to health, for example, is limited to what strengthens and perfects the body, and this desire does not extend to exercising to the point of exhausting or harming the body). The natural desire for unity and perfection can face obstacles not only by way of loss or defect, but also by excess; consequently perfection can require not only increasing whatever is necessary, but also tempering what is superfluous. In spiritual things, unity implies a much more complex qualitative measure130 with respect to oneself, one's own form (together with the virtues associable with such a form) and the operations which follow upon form. The good is spoken of with reference to one's own capacities and peculiar make-up; it is seen to be in a direct relationship toward one's own substantial form as well as to a range of possible accidental forms. Aquinas thereby also reveals the specificity of the subjects perfect being which is at issue: no matter what kind of an evil may be conjoined, each one prevents the whole perfection of the subject, of which the logic itself is all at once with regard to the paradigm of perfection as pleasures deployment (which we observed in reading 31.1 that pleasure was a totam simul event of the perfection which is perceived by the subject). When the subject experiences a glitch in ones desired being, aptitude, or activity, the perception of ones own situation is affected such that perfection is not the object of ones attention, but instead, the object is that which prevents
130 According to Aquinas, we speak of spiritual things in a quantitative manner because of the familiarity of our intellect with corporeal things (cf. ST 1-2.52).

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the realization of this perfection and the sensing thereof. Pain or sorrow is the result. Sorrow, in addition to being an indication of incompleteness, can also be considered as itself an obstacle to perfection inasmuch as pleasure, as a desired perfection, is impeded by sorrow: thus sorrow can have as its object not only the proper malum, but also sorrow itself. The role of appetite or love for unity within sorrow Together, these two articles (36.2 and 3) reveal a principle that would be well to keep in mind in addressing sorrows at an individual level: sorrows do not happen randomly to a subject. Sorrow can have an epistemic value with respect to (negatively) revealing the kind of perfection which the subject desires, requiring objects for perfection whether essentially or instrumentally (in terms of external goods)131 even if that person is unable to articulate it himself or herself (or even if it is not possible for that person to articulate due to an inadequate construal of his or her own being, operations, and desires). The differences in the kinds of potential perfections are potentially infinite because of individuality of each subject, accordingly these must be gauged at the level of the individual person.132 Consequently, our inquiry will focus not on how to resolve the object of each sorrow, but will instead concern the mitigation of sorrow through Aquinas' general remedies, which can also be appreciated as causes for pleasure, such as pleasure
131 Aquinas does have discussions on the importance of external goods for life, as we see in question 59 of the Prima Secundae where Aquinas asks whether sorrow can be with virtus. Cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquid bonum hominis est (...) unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest, et tristitiam moderatam inducere. (ST 1-2.59.3) See also ST 1-2.4.7, concerning whether any exterior goods are required for beatitude. In that place Aquinas responds that, with regards to the imperfect beatitude which is possible to have in this life, exterior goods are required, not as though constituting the essence of happiness, but as instrumentally serving beatitude, which consists in the operation of virtue. Concerning the relationship between happiness and virtue, cf. I Ethics (1102a5). 132 Nevertheless it is possible to point out general kinds of sources of sorrow, as for example Aquinas does when he asks whether one may be virtuous with sadness (cf. ST 1-2.59.3) In that article, he gives as examples those evils which are contrary to the good of conserving life, as well as one's own sins which one commits or has committed in the past, or for the sins of others.

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103 itself, weeping as a convenient activity, the love of friends, contemplating the truth, or achieving a good disposition of the body through pleasurably sensible means such as baths or sleep.

A greater power: 36.4 The fourth article serves to contextualize the previous articles in the sense that it clarifies that the reason why the subject is conjoined to a present evil, is not resting in what is congenial to it, is hindered in its appetite for unity, happens because something external stands to prevent it: Quod autem est contra inclinationem alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris. Aquinas speaks of the evil here in terms of inhaeret as well as conjoined - as something which literally dwells or has sunk its teeth in a subject. The inclination of the subject represented here is not without existential stakes. The power which cannot be resisted can in this contest succeed in transforming the inclination of the subject opposing it towards the agents own proper inclination, such that the resulting movement in the subject would be natural to it rather than repugnant. The power would have succeeded in changing the subject, in removing pain by changing the subjects nature which makes it to resist. Pain or sorrow would in that case turn to pleasure. A susceptibility or adaptability of the subject thus appears. This susceptibility or adaptability can be something positive or problematic, depending on the nature of the subjects inclination (the examples which Aquinas gives are from nature and do not have immediate moral or value-laden connotations, except insofar as violently changing nature such

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that what was natural now becomes opposite to the subject's inclination could have questionable connotations). The case of a heavy body receiving lightness can be read simply as a case where something changes and becomes connatural while what was natural before is no longer such. On the other hand, this could present interesting material for speculation from a moral perspective, both in terms of positive possibilities for change and also from the negative possibility that a subject may be corrupted in a more literal sense. In the meantime, pain or sorrow exists as a result of this tension in the subject against a force that cannot be resisted. The dynamics are illuminated (and likewise the possibility of a resolved stability in the changing of the subject by the irresistible power or situation). In this picture, we see also that the inclination of the subjects inclination is not the natural logic - it concerns resistance and being towards a contrary, whereas pursuit and enjoyment constitutes a more fundamental movement. If this tension (caused by the subjects resistance to that which the subject cannot change by resistance) does not result in the subject ceding and changing from sorrow to pleasure, or else being corrupted by the event, there is an inner frustration that takes its toll on the subject (this will come out more clearly in the effects of pain or sorrow). These kind of consequences, moreover, are particularly associable with the special cases of anxiety and acedia, insofar as anxiety in terms of being a constriction or sense of narrowing possibilities would result from a habituation to long or intense sorrow that does not allow for release and expansion, or acedia insofar as the subject loses the motivation to move exteriorly as well as interiorly.

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105 Contours of the subject revealed In an indirect way, this complex approach to the workings of pain or sorrow within these four articles reveals the individual although in a negative manner, as under pressure, at one's limits, as existing in the midst of loss, invasion, or harm by a stronger power. Pain or sorrow, in testing a subject, also reveals something of the inclination and nature of that subject. At the same time, it is a subject who is also under some pressure, which pressure may be to some extent diffused or balanced by the pleasures which remain accessible (and with which pain or sorrow mutually interact or even depend upon to a certain extent). On the other hand, if not diffused, these pressures have the possibilities of proceeding to sorrow's trajectories of anxiety or acedia, or even beyond these points towards a corruption or transformation of the subject towards pleasure in place of pain, which possibilities we do not have time to explore in greater depth here. From this discovery of pain or sorrow as sourced in a conflict between the subject, revealed with its love and intension through its resistance to something stronger, we see a movement towards the disadvantages and actual harms which result to the subject as the cost of this unwilled engagement. The stress of this engagement has its consequences on the subject which the effects of sorrow manifest and explore.

The Effects of Sorrow or Pain The effects of sorrow are four in number, beginning with the case that pain can hinder or even totally prevent the activity of learning something new (addiscere). The other three articles

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also explore the ways in which operations are hindered; article 2 settles upon burdening (aggravatio) as the generic metaphor of sorrow's effect because sorrow's primary effect is to hinder the activity of enjoyment in what the subject wants; sorrow takes place in the context of a tendency towards the activity of enjoyment whether in a particular sense of enjoying X which may be a piece of chocolate cake or a concert or at a meta-level whereby one wants brought together all the elements required for one's perfection (in terms of the discussion of 36.3). Aquinas next explores whether sorrow hinders every activity (37.3); and discovers that while sorrow necessarily hinders that which saddens one, it can improve activity directed at escaping sorrow. Finally in 37.4 Aquinas looks at the effect which sorrow has on the biological movement of the body: sorrow opposes this movement. The order of this question is interesting inasmuch as it opens by discussing the effect of pain on an intellectual activity, and ends with the impact of sorrow or interior pain on the life of the body.133 This order itself reveals the correlation between pain and the soul and sorrow and the body; the more physical passion affects the more spiritual activity, while the more interior passion affects the body.

Pain preventing learning: 37.1 When Aquinas speaks of the effects of pain or sorrow, he begins with the activity of learning. 134 Pain (dolor), caused by a physical harm, affects the spiritual activity of learning.
133 There is an interesting symmetry here when we consider that Aquinas, following Aristotle, holds intellect (particularly God's intellect) to be the highest degree of life. Cf. ST 1.18.3. 134 We cannot underestimate the significance of learning for Aquinas, which can be estimated from the importance which he accords to the desire for knowledge as a natural desire for the human being, that is intimately tied up with the end of the human being. See, for example, the following from Aquinas' commentary on the Metaphysics: Propria autem operatio hominis inquantum homo, est intelligere. Per hoc enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad sciendum. (Cf. Metaphys. lib. 1 l. 1 n. 3).

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107 The first two objections to this article derive their sources from the Old Testament. The first objection cites Isaiah twice: When thou shalt do thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice135 and In the tribulation of murmuring thy instruction was with them.136 The objector notes in these descriptions that the judgments of God and tribulation (which are here correlated with learning) are the cause of sorrow; thus it seems that sorrow should increase the power of learning. The second objection also draws from Isaiah: Whom shall he teach knowledge? and whom shall he make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts,"137 which the objector interprets to mean weaned from pleasures. Pain and sorrow take away pleasures above all, as the objector notes from Aristotle138 and Ecclesiasticus that the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great delights.139 From this, it seems that pain increases the faculty of learning rather than taking it away. The third objection considers a point (which we discussed regarding 35.7) that sorrow surpasses exterior pain. A person can learn while sorrowful; thus it seems a person can learn in the lesser case of pain. In the respondeo, Aquinas points out that of one soul there can only be one intention, such that, when the soul is vehemently drawn towards the operation of one power it withdraws from another. Aquinas also points out the significance of sensible pain (which we noted in commenting 35.1 and 2 in our previous chapter) by pointing out that it maximally draws the intention of the soul to itself, because the whole intention naturally tends toward repelling the
135 136 137 138 139 Is. 26:9. Is. 26:16. Is. 28:9. Cf. VII Ethics (1154a18; b6) and X Ethics (1175b24). Ecclesiast. 11:29.

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contrary.140 Learning likewise requires a great amount of effort (which Aquinas here notes requires studium, conatus, cum magna intentione) to take place. The thrust of Aquinas' article concerns the effect of sorrow on learning as an activity, but in that same process reveals the possibility that the activity of learning can destabilize the progress of pain. To the degree that the subject loves learning, the tendency towards learning works against the tendency of the soul to be wholly borne over to pain. Thus this article incidentally helps to elucidate the usefulness of the capacity for learning for moderating sorrow, which usefulness is a matter of degree of the love of learning or considering in that particular subject (a love which is nevertheless common to all human beings). Here we can see that the practical role which learning can play in pain is not primarily meant in terms of its content the useful insights or habits which a person can integrate in helping to guide and order his or her life, thus reducing the causes of pain which happen from ignorance and imprudence. Instead, the possibility of appears in terms of the activity only in terms of extending the intention of the soul141 in a way that effectively prevents the intention from being wholly borne over to pain (an important principle which returns in the logic of remedies for sorrow). Pain can obstruct learning such that only a great love for learning can prevent the intention from being wholly borne over. The reply to the first objection seems to be chiefly focused in the potentially disposative effect which moderate (an all-important qualifier here) sorrow can have to learning, with respect
140 Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. (ST 1-2.36.1) Cf. X Metaphysics (1054123). 141 We could also reflect along these lines concerning the pleasure of learning, but this does not seem to be the primary point here it is the exertion of the activity of learning something new (addiscere) which seems to be more implied.

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109 to focusing the mind (insofar as it prevents the mind from wandering) and chiefly with regards to those things through which one wants to be freed from sorrow. Aquinas notes that it is thus through tribulation that human beings accept teaching from God more. This reply to the second objection negotiates the comparison of the attention which delight142 and pain respectively draw within the soul with respect to learning - commenting upon Aristotle's phrase that it is impossible to think in sexual pleasures143 and stating that for all that, pain draws the intention of the soul more than pleasure, citing the natural example that the action of a natural body is more intense (intenditur) against its contrary, just as hot water is more passible (patitur) from cold, such that it freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can contribute per accidens to learning, inasmuch as it removes an overabundance of pleasures. But per se sorrow hinders, and if it be intense, it totally removes the capacity for learning. So the conclusion is that although sorrow of itself hinders learning (and can even take it away altogether), if it be moderate, it can per accidens assist learning particularly with respect to being freed from what causes sorrow. In the answer to the third objection Aquinas compares exterior pain and interior pain with respect to learning. Exterior pain, because it concerns a bodily harm, has more of a conjoined bodily change than interior pain (which is nevertheless greater with regard to what is formal in pain, on the part of the soul). It is thus that bodily pain hinders contemplation more than interior pain, as contemplation requires complete tranquility (omnimodam quietem). And nevertheless interior pain, if it is intense (multum intendatur) can draw the intention to the extent that a person cannot
142 See also the point that one pleasure may be hinder another in ST 1-2.31.8. 143 Impossibile est in ipsa delectatione venereorum aliquid intelligere. VII Ethics (1152b16) See also Aquinas' commentary: Delectatio venereorum, quae est maxima, intantum impedit rationem quod nullus in ipsa delectatione actuali potest aliquid actu intelligere; sed tota intentio animae trahitur ad delectationem. (Ethic. lib. 7 l. 11 n. 9)

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learn anything new (Aquinas emphasizes de novo in addition to the verb addiscere), and for this example, he cites the case of Gregory who left off his exposition of Ezechiel because of sadness (tristitiam). We will now turn to another point in article 2 in which the effect of sorrow shifts from occupying the point of the intention of the soul to a burdening of the desired activity of enjoyment.

Burdening: 37.2 In the second article, Aquinas settles on the metaphor of burdening (aggravatio) as the characteristic effect of sorrow or pain on the soul. The first objection cites Paul: "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation, etc.144 But, the objector notes, carefulness (solicitudo) and indignation pertains to a certain lifting up (erectio) of the soul, which is opposed to burdening. Therefore burdening is not an effect of sadness. The second objection considers that sadness is opposed to pleasure, and proposes constriction as the effect of sorrow because it is contrary to pleasure's effect of expansion (dilatatio). The third objection notes that it pertains to sadness to absorb (absorbere) citing St. Paul, "Lest perhaps such a one be swallowed up (absorbere) with overmuch sorrow.145 Burdening differs from absorption as it concerns being sunk under some heavy weight, while what is absorbed is included into the absorbing

144 II Cor. 7:11. 145 II Cor. 2:7.

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111 thing. In the respondeo, the significance of this image of burdening is considered with respect to operation; in this case, of the operation of enjoyment of what is desired. This metaphor is chosen in the respondeo over the other options of constriction or absorption which appear in the objections (in which we can recognize similarities to the descriptions of anxiety and acedia in 35.8, and which remain as effects of sorrow in the responses to the objections). This image of burdening indicates the first effect of sorrow; it reflects upon the tendency of the subject towards enjoyment it shows the dynamic subject moving towards his or her proper operation, which is to enjoy the good which is desired. The other metaphors of constriction and absorption concern a further progression, in terms of hindering the conditions of being open to external things at all. Here there is an entry of the term voluntas which is uncommon in this whole section from 35-38, in a context in which the will appears as the principle of action, particularly the action of enjoying what one wills. The answer to the first objection notes that the lifting up (erectio) of the soul comes from sadness which is according to God because of the conjoined hope of the remission (remissione) of sins. The second notes that inasmuch as it pertains to appetitive movement, the same thing is meant by constriction and burdening. When something is being burdened so that it cannot proceed freely to exterior things, but is drawn back into itself, this results in being constricted in itself. The third notes that sadness can absorb a person when the saddening power affects the soul so that it excludes every hope of evasion. And so also in the same way it burdens and absorbs, for these things follow when taken metaphorically which, when taken according to their 111

proper meaning, are incompatible with each other. Accordingly, Aquinas doesn't exclude the possibility of these other effects, here he simply names the one that seems to him to be the most descriptive of the basic principle: from the fact that someone is weighed down from enjoying what he or she wills, that person can become withdrawn into himself or herself, and when hope is lost, becomes wholly overtaken or swallowed up by sorrow. Impeding operation: 37.3 The question of burdening of operation in the last article is taken to a different level in article 3 when Aquinas asks whether sorrow or pain debilitate every operation. The first objection notes that solicitude (sollicitudo) or carefulness is caused from sorrow, and that such carefulness aids in working well (whence Paul says Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed (exhibere operarium inconfusibilem).146 Therefore sadness doesn't hinder operation but seems to help instead towards working well. The second notes that sadness causes desire in many cases,147 and that desire increases operation (ad intensionem operationis), thus implying that sorrow should also augment operation. The third notes that there are certain proper operations to being saddened just as there are to rejoicing, for example, mourning (lugere). This kind of operation would be increased by sorrow as being convenient to it. Aquinas' respondeo is nuanced: sorrow does not only so aggravate or absorb the soul so that it excludes every interior and exterior movement, but Aquinas notes that some movements at
146 II Tim 2: 15. 147 Cf. VII Ethic (1154b11) which notes how melancholics seek pleasures more, and also Aquinas' more general point in ST 1-2.35.3 ad 1.

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113 times are caused from sorrow itself. He distinguishes two ways an operation can be related to sorrow. If the operation itself regards something that saddens one, sorrow impedes that activity because we do not do something sadly so well as we do it with pleasure or without sorrow. Aquinas recalls the will here as the principle of activity, which means that, when the subject is sad about something, that operation is weakened as a result. On the other hand, if sorrow is the reason for operation, as the principle or cause of the operation, sorrow actually improves operation inasmuch as expelling sorrow provides a greater incentive or impetus towards the work. This increased activity takes place only, however, given the conditions that the irascible passion of hope is present, which regards a difficult good (which is in this case getting rid of what makes one sad) insofar as this is regarded to be possible.148

Sorrow most harmful to life: 37.4 The last article of 37 (article 4) is interesting because it asks whether sorrow of all the passions of the soul is the most harmful to life. The first objection notes that sorrow has a spiritual being in the soul, and the objector states that what has only spiritual being does not cause a bodily change (as for example, the intention of color in the air does not color any body). The second objection notes that some bodily harm does not happen unless there is a bodily change adjoined, but bodily changes accompany all the passions of the soul (thus it seems that sorrow would not be more harmful to life than any other passion of the soul). The third cites Aristotle149 that anger and desire cause a
148 Given this condition of hope, we can see how this can mean that sorrow in some conditions is actually useful in terms of providing an additional incentive to flee or repel something that is harmful or unpleasant (cf. ST 1-2.39.3). 149 VII Ethics (1147a15). See Aquinas' commentary: Videmus enim quod irae et concupiscentiae venereorum et

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certain insanity, which seems to be the most harmful (since reason is the most excellent in the human being). Despair also seems to be more harmful than sadness, since it is the cause of sadness. In this respondeo, what becomes clear is that it is the kind of movement which tristitia concerns that is at stake; speaking of tristitia rather than dolor serves to further highlight this point, because tristitia does not so immediately concern some prior excess or defect to sense as does dolor. Whereas other passions can cause harm because they concern excess or defect of measure of movement, sorrow on the other hand is most harmful because it proceeds against the movement of life itself. Here Aquinas reflects on the movement in which human life consists, which is diffused from the heart to the other members.150 This movement agrees with (convenit) human nature according to some determinate measure. This movement can proceed beyond the appropriate measure, in which case it will oppose human life according to the measure of quantity, but not according to the likeness of species. This movement is not restricted to quantitative alteration, but is opened to qualitative alteration in terms of the influence which sorrow, as something more than physiological, has on the body. At this point we see the harmfulness which sorrow brings, not only to the pursuit-and-embrace inclination of the appetite contoured by love towards
quaedam huiusmodi passiones manifeste transmutent et corpus exterius et non solum animales motus, puta cum ex his incalescit corpus; et quandoque tantum increscunt huiusmodi passiones quod quosdam in insanias deducunt. Et sic manifestum est quod incontinentes similiter disponuntur dormientibus, aut maniacis aut ebriosis, quod scilicet habent habitum scientiae practicae in singularibus ligatum. (Ethic. lib. 7 l. 3 n. 15). 150 For a more in-depth analysis of the role of the movement of the heart in human life and of the influence of affections on its movement, see De motu cordis, a smaller and later work among the rescripta of Aquinas written between 1270-1271, according to the dating of Torrell (following Weisheipl and Eschmann). Cf. Torrell, JeanPierre. St. Thomas: The person and his work, translated by Robert Royal. CUA Press, 2005 (214).

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115 pleasure which was our prior emphasis, but also in the cardiac movement. Passions like sorrow which concern an appetitive movement such as flight (or some withdrawal) are opposed to the species of the bodily movement, and these are simply harmful. Sorrow is the worst, however, because it burdens the soul as from a present evil, which creates a stronger impression than a future one. On the other hand, other passions such as love, joy, and desire, which concern movement related to pursuit are in harmony with the bodily movement they can help (iuvant) the nature of the body (unless by some excess they harm it). The answer to the first objection notes that because the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of a bodily change. The example of spiritual intentions does not apply here because these are not naturally ordered to moving a body. The second objection replies (as we have learned) that other passions have a bodily change conformed to the species of the vital movement, while sorrow imports a contrary movement. The answer to the third objection declares that a lighter cause impedes the use of reason than corrupts life, but that fear and anger are most harmful to the body because of their admixture with sadness, concerning the absence of that which is desired. Aquinas also avers that sorrow itself can take away reason, citing the case of those who on account of pain, fall into melancholy or mania.

From effects to remedies: towards the next chapter Aquinas presentation of the effects reveals the context of pleasures: the subject to whom remedies are directed as well as the kind of openings which are available from within the subject

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of pain and sorrow: for example, the strength of the love of learning which appears as a variable of the attention directed to pain in article 1; in article 2, the more fundamental operation of enjoyment towards which the subject is tended; in article 3 the hope of expelling sorrow which can actually make sorrow increase some activity, and finally in article 4, the bodily movement which sorrow opposes. These openings are taken advantage of in the remedies which appear in question 38. Pleasure is the first to be seized upon, followed closely by the connatural or convenient operation of tears, then by compassionate friends, the contemplation of the truth which also depends on the love which the subject has for wisdom (instead of the love for learning of 37.1), and lastly, of sleep and baths as restoring the proper bodily movement. We could read these effects in terms of laying out the exact scope of the reasons why remedies would be necessary, of presenting cases for the urgency to remedy. But to read urgency into the presentation of these effects would be an incomplete interpretation, because the description of each effect presents opportunities for remedies (as we have just pointed out) almost as much as limitations upon the subject. While sorrow can become intense in particular cases, even proceeding to the constriction and absorption of the subject (cf. 37.3 ad 2 and 3) which resemble the logic of anxiety and acedia (cf. 35.8) it is not always the case that sorrow is extreme. These cases involve a special imperative towards remedying, and may present impediments to experiencing pleasures which would not be so prominent in ordinary sorrow. Nevertheless, even in these cases, there is something of attraction towards and connaturality with pleasure that can never really be destroyed even by extreme sadness, because the love which is the cause of sorrow is

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117 fundamentally directed towards the good and the pleasure which accompanies it. This aptitude always remains, even if sorrow intensifies so as to habituate the person into the kind of postures which are imposed by anxiety or acedia. The following chapter, which deals with remedies, provides ways of mitigating pain or sorrow which are supported from within the movement of pain or sorrow itself and work at the level of the effects of pain or sorrow. Having explored the foundations of pain or sorrow in terms of its subjective conditions, and also having examined some of its effects, we now move towards re-integration of pleasure not only in its original context, but a different context than its original normalcy. Pleasure reappears as the remedy for sadness.

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Chapter Five: Remedies

Introduction Enter remedies. The objectives of remedies are to address the effects of pain or sorrow such that the subject can operate and enjoy using the very situations which pain and sorrow trigger as we have seen in the effects of pain and sorrow. The five remedies, each one in its own way, address something of the subjective demands which are amplified and increased by sorrow, and which accordingly lead to something positive and enduring - in terms of pleasure, in terms of the appropriate operation of tears, sighs, or words, in compassionate friends, in contemplating the truth (to the extent that one is a lover of wisdom) and of restoring the body to its proper movement. In having examined all the effects of sorrow (question 37) in the previous chapter, we saw the problems which sorrow presented in terms of preventing learning, in terms of burdening activity and its enjoyment, and in terms of opposing the natural bodily disposition. Sorrow concerns that which is repugnant to the appetite, so much so that insofar as pleasure is like a rest, sorrow is comparable to a fatigue in natural things when something against the natural tendency happens. Sorrow is an affliction (aegritudo) of the appetite. This is the reason why Aquinas places pleasure as the primary remedy in the first article, and integrates it within each of the following particular remedies.

Parts of this chapter The remedies present an interesting array, as has already been suggested by naming them

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119 in association with the effects listed above. In order, they appear as follows: Whether pain or sorrow are mitigated by every pleasure whatever (38.1); whether it is mitigated through weeping (38.2); whether it is mitigated through the compassion of friends (38.3); whether it is mitigated through the contemplation of the truth (38.4); whether it is mitigated through sleep and baths (38.5). This chapter will examine each of these articles of question 38 in order and close with a ethical reflection on the practice of remedies, taking bodily remedies as a particular point of departure, which share certain similarities with the usage of antidepressants and accordingly returns us to the stakes of the question with which we began our inquiry in the general introduction to this thesis.

Pleasure as remedy: 38.1 This first article of question 38 which asks whether every pleasure mitigates pain or sorrow plays an important role: it bridges the stakes of 36.4 which noted the tension between the subject and the agent and 37.4 in which the harmful effects of the movement of sorrow happens as contrary to life. The subject has already experienced movement contrary to its own inclination, in terms of the stronger power which we noted in 36.4 and in terms of the weighting which sorrow itself presents to the subject's movement of enjoyment in what is desired (36.2), as well as the correlated bodily movement which is opposed to the bodily movement of life. In making this bridge, this article introduces the logic of pleasure as being itself a remedy. Pleasure is here inscribed as a rest a rest understood both as the means to addressing fatigue created by sorrow, and as being the end in itself. This fundamental logic is so important that even

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when the following articles propose alternative explanations in terms of dispersing the intention (38.2) or restoring the bodily disposition (38.5) Aquinas always stresses in addition how each of these practices functions as a remedy in terms of each process being itself pleasurable or a cause of pleasure. The first objection to this article associates the logic of contrariety with remedies, which come about through opposites.151 It is not the case, however, that any (quaelibet) pleasure is contrary to any sorrow. The second notes that some pleasures actually cause sadness: the bad man is saddened because he was pleased (delectatus est).152 The third is more lengthy, recalling the relation of Augustine153 that he left his native land to avoid seeing the places where he used to see his friend who had died. In the respondeo, it is the logic of rest which comes to the fore; the place of pleasure as being the natural state is reasserted. The positivity of pleasure and the greater, original, and more primary affiliation of the subject with pleasure is reclaimed - pain or sorrow appears as what is unnatural to the thing. Rest comes into the logic of a return, a restoration in a situation in which the subject is otherwise being spent, for although love and desire for something natural is to some extent always accompanied by pleasure, sorrow may be more prominent in one's experience for per accidens reasons which we have seen (such as, for example, that love is sensed more from what is opposed to love).154 This takes place in the context in which pleasure has been hindered, adding to pleasure a dimension of remedy through being associated with a
151 152 153 154 II Ethics (1104b17). Cf. footnote 68, page 58. The citation is from IV Conf. cap 7 (PL 32, 698). Cf. ST.1-2.35.6.

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121 subject who has experienced sorrow. At the same time, there always remains a coexistence of pleasures with pain.155 The subject is always more fundamentally oriented towards pleasure as the end156 towards which the subject is tended by love and desire, and it is only in this context that pain or sorrow can take place. This is why Aquinas modulates the wording in which he quotes Aristotles proposal157. For Aquinas, it is not only contrary or strong pleasures which give this effect. Every pleasure is contrary to any pain or sadness on the part of the subjects disposition (according to the logic of the parallel of fatigue and rest). In accordance with the space for degrees of pleasure in that the pleasure does not necessarily have to be intense, Aquinas uses the softer term of mitigation rather than the stronger expel which is the Latin word he quotes from Aristotle. As this first article dealt with a more general principle of pleasure as the remedy for sadness, we see more particular approaches in the following articles. The reply to the first objection notes a contrariety between every pleasure and sorrow

155 This is not only because pleasures have almost constant opportunities for being deployed, but also because even the bad which is the object of pain is always inhering in a particular good. Hence the principle which we saw in ST 1-2.35.6 that no sorrow is so inconvenient that nothing of convenience remains. 156 At this point we may also remark upon the teleological aspect to pleasures in terms of their completeness or finality (cf. chapter 3 in which we discuss 25.2: For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above. See also 1-2.11.3 ad 3 in which Aquinas distinguishes in the one end concerning the thing itself (ipsa res) and the achievement of the thing (adeptio rei) which would belong to the enjoyment (fruitio) of the end. See also 1-2.2.7 in which Aquinas also refers to the end in two ways: as the ipsa res, and the use or achievement or possession of the thing (usus, seu adeptio vel possessio illius rei). One should also note that the pleasure or enjoyment, at least at the intellectual level, is neither the thing which is good nor the possessing of the good thing, but rest in the possessing. Cf. e.g. ST 1-2.4.2.ad 3. 157 Aquinas quotes Aristotle (7 Ethics 1154b13-14) as follows: expellit delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si sit fortis. (emphasis my own) See also Aquinas' commentary: (Ethic. lib. 7 l. 14 n. 8 ): Dicit ergo primo, quod prima ratio quare delectationes corporales videantur esse magis eligibiles est quia expellunt tristitiam; et quia delectatio corporalis propter sui superabundantiam est medicina contra tristitiam. Non enim quacumque delectatione tristitia tollitur, sed vehementi, inde est quod homines quaerunt delectationem superabundantem et corporalem, cui tristitia contrariatur. (emphasis my own). In the respondeo, we see that Aquinas does not insist on strong or vehementdelights.

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generically, such that on the part of the disposition of the subject any sorrow is mitigated by any pleasure. The response to the second notes that the pleasures of the wicked do not cause sorrow in the present, but in the future, inasmuch as they repent of the bad things over which they formerly rejoiced. The reply to the third negotiates between the kind of sorrow which regards the death or absence of a friend and the experience of present pleasure, and notes the contrariety of these two contrary movements such that one impedes the other, and each is diminished by the other. Aquinas further describes how the tendency wins which is stronger and of longer duration and thus pleasure in the present good eventually outweighs the sorrow of a friend's death or absence, because the sense of the present moves more than the memory of the past, and love of oneself is of longer standing than the love of another. Augustine's text also gives evidence of this as Augustine later says that his pain gave way to former pleasures.158

Tears flowing: 38.2 This article asks whether weeping mitigates sadness (mitigetur per fletum). The objections work to show that weeping does not diminish sorrow, firstly because it is an effect of sorrow, and no effect diminishes its cause. The second objection attempts a parallel with laughter and joy; as laughter does not diminish joy, neither should weeping diminish sorrow. The third notes that one is focusing on the saddening thing in crying (the object is represented to one's imagination in weeping), which likewise does not seem helpful towards diminishing sorrow. The reply is centred first in the relationship between the subject and the object - the
158 The citation is from IV Conf. cap. 8 (PL 32, 698).

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123 passionate relationship whereby the intention of the subject is wrapped in the object. Dispersing this intention is the object achieved by weeping, tears and sighs, and even words. In a way, weeping would be making sorrow to release its hold or fascination to relax the intention of the soul. This indirectly relieves the pressure and breaks up the power of the object, as it were. According to Aquinas, it is because of this that people in sorrows manifest their sorrow more exteriorly by tears, sighs, or even words - propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia. The actions of tears or sighing connote a natural kind of outpour spilling over from the build up of interior pressure, which tends to relieve sorrow through this very overflow.

Manifesting one's sorrow more exteriorly and even by words If we look carefully, however, we can glean another possible interpretation. Manifesting something more exteriorly could have potentially social or narrative subtexts: we manifest something to someone, whether to others or to ourselves.159 Another interesting point in this paragraph is the addition of the phrase even words (vel etiam verbo) in the remedies of pain or sorrow. Words connote more intelligibility than the more spontaneous outpouring of tears: words can engage something of activity of the subject, not only of the exterior word expressing the interior concept, but in terms of the subject initiating a
159 Others enter specifically in the following article (ST 1-2.38.3) which concerns the compassion of friends as a remedy for sorrow. In this case, it is perceiving the love which others manifest for us in sharing our pain that causes pleasure, rather than the event of our manifesting sorrow to them.

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narrative and thus beginning to situate himself or herself within a context that becomes more intelligible and for that reason, easier to bear (although not necessarily).160 These speculations concerning the term manifest and the inclusion of even words could provide a bridge to the next article, which concerns the fact that one's sorrow has already been manifested to friends, and that friends in turn manifest their love by commiserating in one's pain. These interpretations, however, seems far more complicated than the remedies which Aquinas perhaps intends to propose in this article. To construe this notion of manifesting sorrow and the addition of even words as referring to more complicated process of expressing sorrow could create a tension within the article itself, which appears to be more focused upon the spontaneous overflow of tears as a release of tension than on the possibility of more active, engaged, and complex forms of expression, which are edging towards communication and narrative. To avoid these tensions, we could consider words as a kind of lamenting without really yet turning it into a narrative (here understanding narrative as an intermediate between lament and argued reconstruction). In this case, the pleasure would arise simply from the activity of speaking. Significance of tears There would seem to be a greater significance of tears in this article merely from the
160 Making sorrow intelligible does not necessarily make it easier to bear (one can also think of harmful and saddening things - cf. ST 1-2.35.5) but insofar as such an activity regards the truth, it can bring pleasure with it, as we will see particularly in 1-2.38.4 ad 1. Here, however, in comparing a possible interpretation of article 2 to 12.38.4, I do not mean to imply that assigning the value of a remedy to a process of intelligibility is the chief point of 38.4. The chief part of 38.4 concerns (as we will see) contemplation of the truth as a remedy for pain, and in that article, while the process of approaching the truth is present in the objections and responses, the focus of the respondeo centres on the height of vision rather than the process of approaching it - in which Aquinas draws upon the paradigmatically Christian example of the martyr joyfully contemplating Christ even in the midst of his pain.

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125 frequency of the term (whereas even words enters only once, and is phrased like a concession vel etiam verbo). The explanation of the efficacy of this kind of remedy also lends itself to tears by the metaphor of dispersing the intention. We may ask whether Aquinas has a preference for tears because of the physicality of the remedy? While there are evidently physiological dimensions to tears, and there may be an intimate connection (in addition to a metaphorical one) between the dispersion of the intention and the literal dispersion of tears, Aquinas does not focus here on the physicality of tears or linger on possible mechanical metaphors of dispersion as the sole efficacy of tears161 in providing a release from the pressure which is built in sorrow concerning the present evil, but shifts the argument towards the sense of convenience which arises from tears. The suitability of tears arises from this natural efficacy of tears in relieving sorrow, in which the process of loosening up the intention is already pleasurable even before any more positive pleasure becomes the focus. Still prior to this is the fact that tears are an effect belonging to sorrow (as a kind of overflow of sorrow's pressure), which is for that reason convenient to it by a way of likeness. Here the picture is of the subject moving with the logic of pain or sorrow, rather than moving against it, which accordingly integrates such activities arising from pain or sorrow within the logic of convenience (which is again a logic of pleasure). The replies to the objections of this article concern the point that some effects of sorrow have the logic of convenience to the subject (and thus can result in an alleviation of sadness rather than its increase). The answer to the first objection notes that every effect is convenient to its cause, and consequently is pleasurable to it, while every saddening thing is contrary to the
161 Aquinas does not, however, leave the significance of bodily remedies untouched - he explores them specifically in 1-2.38.5.

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saddened individual. Therefore the effect of sadness has a contrary relation (habitudo) to the saddened person than that which saddens the person (in other words, weeping does not increase sadness, but instead it is convenient to the subject because it is an activity flowing from sadness, and thus works according to the logic of pleasure). To the second Aquinas replies concerning laughter and rejoicing that it is related as effect to cause, in both of which convenience is found. Because like increases its like, laughter and other effects of gladness increase gladness (unless there is some excess). To the third Aquinas replies that the imagination of a saddening thing of itself increases sadness, but in that a man imagines that he does something suitable for him according to his state, a certain pleasure rises (consurget) in him. This is one of the operations which sorrow actually increases (cf. 37 a. 3). While it may be argued that there is not much use in tears and sighs, it is useful insofar as it produces pleasure in the subject by a kind of activity, which is the means for the subject to be capable of other activities as well.

The compassion of friends: 38.3 Article 3 of question 38 asks whether the pain of sympathizing friends mitigates sorrow. This article works primarily from the logic of causing pleasure in the subject by means of the compassion of friends which reveals their love for oneself. The objections in this article - like those in the previous articles of this question - attempt to establish that this remedy increases rather than alleviates sorrow. How can multiplying sorrow (in terms of sharing it among ones friends) diminish it? The first objection compares sorrow with joy, which (citing Augustine162) far from being reduced by increase of persons, is
162 The citation is from VIII Conf. cap. 4 (PL 32, 752).

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127 inflamed when many rejoice, as each one is inflamed (inflammantur) by the fervor of another. The second objection speaks from the logic of an amiable kind of tit for tat which belongs to the nature of friendship - an exchange of love each returns (amoris vicem quis rependat - citing Augustine again163) whereby the pain of a friend who is sympathizing with oneself leads to another pain in the originally pained person for the fact that the friend is sorrowful; sorrow would rather be increased. The third objection notes that any evil to a friend is saddening just as one's own evil (for a friend is another self). Because the pain of the sympathizing friend is a kind of evil to that friend, so this would likewise be something bad for the original subject, insofar as he or she feels the pain of the friend as his or her own.164 Aquinas responds (as he did with weeping in the previous article) that naturally (naturaliter) a sympathetic friend is consoling. He puts forward two reasons, the first from Aristotle165, which pertains to the image of burdening and a metaphorical lifting of the weight when shared with others:

163 The citation is from IV Conf. cap. 9 (PL 32, 699). 164 This argument evokes a reminiscence of Aristotle's discussion in the Ethics: To see (a friend) pained at our misfortunes is painful; for everyone shuns being a cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally insensible to pain, such a man cannot stand the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners because he is not himself given to mourning; but women and womanly men enjoy sympathisers in their grief, and love them as friends and companions in sorrow. (IX Ethics 1171b5-11) See also Aquinas' commentary: Et nullo modo sustinent viriles homines, quod amici eorum propter eos contristentur nisi superexcedat auxilium, quod ab amicis sibi praebetur ad non contristandum tristitiam amicorum. Sustinent enim, quod per modicam amicorum tristitiam sua tristitia sublevetur. Et universaliter, virilibus hominibus non complacet habere comploratores, quia ipsi viriles homines non sunt plorativi. Sunt autem quidam viri muliebriter dispositi, qui delectantur in hoc, quod habeant aliquos simul secum angustiatos, et amant eos qui sibi condolent quasi amicos. Sed in hac diversitate hominum oportet imitari quantum ad omnia meliores, videlicet viriles. (Ethic., lib. 9 l. 13 n. 10 and 11). 165 The citation is from IX Ethics (1171a29) See also Aquinas' commentary: Secundo ibi, propter quod etc., inquirit, quae sit causa huius, quod dictum est. Et ponit duas causas sub dubitatione, quae earum potior sit. Quarum prima sumitur ex exemplo eorum, qui portant aliquod pondus grave; quorum unus alleviatur ex societate alterius onus illud secum sumentis. Et similiter videtur, quod onus tristitiae melius ferat unus amicorum, si alius secum idem onus tristitiae ferat. (Ethic. lib. 9 l. 13 n. 5).

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Now when someone sees others saddened by his sadness, it seems to him by a certain imagination that that he bears the burden with others, as though exerting themselves to alleviate the burden for him (quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviant) and therefore he bears the burden of sadness more lightly, just as it happens in carrying physical burdens.166 What is at stake in this imagination? Is it purely figurative, or does it signify an intuition or anticipation of a real correlation between the sympathy of others and their assistance towards an objective alleviation? This is one possible way of interpreting these stakes.167 Aquinas prefers the second rationale which he identifies in Aristotle as he writes that it is better (melior). For Aquinas, pain or sorrow is mitigated from the fact that the subject sees others to love himself, which is pleasurable. The subject values himself or herself being-loved as a kind of good which is worth the cost of sharing one's pain with others, of spreading pain around. Here again pleasure surges as the more fundamental moving principle insofar as the pleasure of being loved by others makes their sympathy to be something that restores a person rather than weighs one down. The efficacy of sympathy originates from seeing others as though

166 ST 1-2.35.3: translation my own. 167 Aristotle speaks (among other things) of the necessity of friends in adversity, in which case friends as useful may be desired: friendship () is more necessary in bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case. On the other hand, Aristotle notes that it is more noble to have friends in good fortune in order to share ones benefits with them, for which reason we seek out good men for our friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these and to live with these. See IX Ethics (1171a23-27), as well as Aquinas commentary: Deinde cum dicit necessarium magis etc., ponit solutionem quaestionis; concludens ex praemissis, quod habere amicos est homini magis necessarium in infortuniis, in quibus indiget auxilio, quod fit per amicos, ut dictum est. Et inde est, quod in tali statu homo habet opus amicis utilibus qui ei auxilium ferant. Sed in bonis fortunis est melius, idest magis honestum habere amicos. Et inde est, quod in hoc statu quaerunt homines amicos virtuosos. Quia eligibilius est talibus benefacere, et cum eis conversari. Deinde cum dicit est enim et praesentia etc., probat quod supposuerat; scilicet quod amicis in utraque fortuna sit opus. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod ipsa praesentia amicorum est delectabilis, tam in bonis fortunis quam in infortuniis. (Ethic., lib. 9 l. 13 n. 2-3)

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129 (quasi)168 they are exerting themselves to alleviate ones pain as a sign of their love; Aquinas does not mention any specific action of alleviation; the action lies in the appearance that others seem to exert themselves as though to mitigating the weight of sorrow. The subject thus senses himself or herself to be loved: it is this consequent perception of their love which alleviates sorrow. It is important to note Aquinas psychological acumen in this regard. The kind of pleasure which is derived from sympathy is what we may call today narcissistic (a term which we do not necessarily employ here in a derogatory sense). This kind of pleasure reveals the resilience of the sorrowing subject, who increases in strength from the stimulus of seeing himself or herself being-loved by friends. This remedy is a universally accessible one, which requires only a very basic participation from others, namely, seeming to share in the subjects own pain, by which means the subject senses himself or herself to be loved. Interpolating useful friends For my own part, I interpolate at this point concerning Aquinas' interest in the presence of friends by suggesting the ways in which sympathetic friends may help to alleviate sorrow. I think that it is also possible to find elements of a subjects anticipation or appreciation of more concrete activities aside from the desire for and appreciation of others' manifesting love for oneself by sympathy. Sorrow is not only a metaphorical burden; there are dynamic factors involved in causing sorrow (recall the greater power of 36.4) that may admit of adjustment and subsequent improvement for the subject. Having friends who are sympathetic to ones pain such
168 Fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod illud onus alii cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum (ST 1-2.38.3).

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that they are willing, in a manner of speaking, to share that pain (condolere) may indicate likewise that they may render other assistance to the subject in redressing or improving the sorrowful situation by whatever means. Even if the aid of friends remains only a possibility, the imagination that others are ready to help concretely may be a significant source of relief. To the subject rendered vulnerable, needy, and dismayed about his or her situation (particularly if sorrow is compounded with anxiety which so burdens the soul that there does not appear any refuge169) the readiness to aid which friends may render may be a significant factor in causing pleasure. There is not necessarily a mutual exclusion between Aquinas' explanation of pleasure in others' love for oneself and this interpolation which extends the subject's desire for others' interest in oneself to include the hope of concrete aid towards improving one's situation. However, it must be acknowledged that my own interpolation at this point has a limited applicability: it is not necessarily always the case that friends can help to concretely address the life circumstances which render a person sorrowful, and if this were the only purpose of sympathy, it would be pointless to share pain or sorrow with others unless they were empowered to help us to improve our situation. Another option to retain this interpretation could be to extend the definition of helpfulness from providing concrete and practical assistance aimed at improving one's prospects within the world to therapeutic or strategic dimensions of strengthening the subject through solidarity. However, such complex interpretations seem to tread far beyond what Aquinas' text warrants. For Aquinas, the effectiveness of the sympathy of friends is that it naturally
169 ST 1-2.35.8.

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131 mitigates sorrow (whatever strength or empowerment may comes to the subject through this experience is not immediately the point at issue). There are situations in which approaches such as cognitive therapy or other ways of co-creating meaning and intelligibility within sorrow are either unnecessary or simply do not help. But the sympathy of friends per se and always alleviates pain or sorrow and causes pleasure, and this is because the subject perceives himself or herself to be loved which is always pleasurable. We return from this reflection to Aquinas' text and look at the responses which he provides for the objections. The reply to the first objection notes that in friendship, both rejoicing with the rejoicing and sorrowing with the sorrowful (condolet dolenti) belongs to friendship; therefore each of them is rendered pleasurable because of their cause. The second notes that the pain of a friend is saddening, but the consideration of the love which causes it is more pleasurable.

Contemplation of the truth: 38.4 The fourth article of 38 enters to some degree in a different register from tears and compassionate friends in that it concerns an activity that does not per se arise from the nature of the experience of sorrow itself. To some extent, it also creates a new theme in the treatise on sorrow: although we have seen the appearance of contemplation in 35.5, and spoke of the activity of learning (addiscendum) in 38.1, Aquinas qualifies in this treatise contemplation which is of the truth.170
170 This is not to say there is any contemplation which is not of the truth (cf. 1-2.35.5 ad 2) Contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri but we draw attention to this textual point as a way of warming up to the references to explicit objects of contemplation which Aquinas will make in the body of the article (e.g. concerning

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The objections are interesting; the first objection points to an actual correlation between knowledge and sorrow, citing the passage from Ecclesiastes 1:18 that he who adds knowledge, adds pain also (Qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem). The second poses a difficulty concerning the influence of contemplation, as an operation of the speculative appetite, which does not move (citing III of Aristotle's De Anima); consequently it seems that since joy and pain are movements of the soul, that contemplation of the truth does not mitigate pain. The third protests a difference in location (for lack of a better word) asserting that the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails, but that while contemplation in the intellect, bodily pain is in the senses. The sed contra is still more interesting because it hearkens back to the more powerful logic of expelling or at least of blotting out pain or sorrow: Augustine is cited saying that "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me.171 We see in the respondeo that contemplation is spoken of as the greatest of all pleasures. Here Aquinas also brings in the term wisdom.172 There are also distinctly Christian tonalities to this remedy, as appears from Aquinas citing the contemplation of divine things and future beatitude as well as his giving the example of the martyr Tibertius as the par excellence model of present intense pain being turned to joy at the contemplation of Christ. The specificity of this
divine things and future beatitude). 171 This citation is from I Solil. cap. 12 (PL 32, 880). This translation is derived from Aquinas, Thomas and Kevin Knight (comp). Summa Theologiae. New Advent, 2008. Web. Aug. 2009 <http://www.newadvent.org/summa>. 172 Wisdom is a significant term for Aquinas. In the Prima Pars, the function of wisdom appears of ordering and judging, and judging the lower cause through the higher, for wisdom concerns the knowledge of the highest causes. (Cf. I.I.6, which asks whether the theological doctrine is wisdom, as well as Aquinas' commentary: In Metaphys. lib. 1 l. 1 n. 1; and lib. 1 l. 1 n. 23). See also ST 2-2.180.7, on the delight of contemplation.

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133 truth here entails the correlation of a certain disposition on the part of its subject; contemplation of the truth mitigates sorrow or pain more to the degree that one is a lover of wisdom. This is far more specific than the open-ended contemplation of 35.5, which Aquinas intertwined substantially with sorrow (in terms of objects which are literally saddening or harmful to think) and accidentally with attendant sorrows. Contemplation of the truth, on the other hand, to the degree that one is a lover of wisdom effectively works against pain or sorrow. According to this caveat, the degree of being a lover of wisdom makes the quality of the mitigation to vary, while nevertheless the pleasure of contemplating truth is an event that always mitigates pain. We see in the answer to the first objection that despite the fact that one may encounter pain from the obstacles to knowledge or at the content of truth as a person discovers many things contrary to his or her will (in this explanation we see the existential implications to this speculative activity) nevertheless there remains pleasure at contemplating the truth. The answer to the second objection adds to this point by noting that speculative mind moves on the part of contemplation itself which is mans good and naturally pleasant to him. The answer to the third objection addresses a different kind of difficulty regarding the different kinds of powers from which speculative thought and pain respectively proceed. Aquinas resolves this problem of different powers by remarking that in the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower (even to the point of mitigating the pain of the senses). It is interesting that here the contemplation of the truth comes closest to the logic of

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causing pain or sorrow to be no longer felt; not in terms of anaesthetizing pain, but by actually replacing pain with joy. The previous remedies we saw each worked as a kind of counterbalance to pain or sorrow stemming from the experience of pain or sorrow itself - in article 1, pleasure as a relief from the fatigue of sorrow towards its own more natural rest; in article 2, the natural relief from the outpouring of tears arising from pain or sorrow itself; in article 3, the natural relief of condolent friends who cause pleasure by sharing ones pain, by which occasion the subject perceives himself to be loved. Unlike these others, this remedy of contemplation of the truth does not originate from the experience of pain or sorrow itself following the logics of resting, releasing tension in unleashing tears, sighs or words, or easing the burden of the subject through the love of compassionate friends, but it concerns an experience of joy that spontaneously arises from another source altogether and is not bound to pain or sorrows logic and limitations; instead, it disrupts its logic altogether with its own. This leaves us with the logic of this third objection, which can only be that of overflow (redundantia).

Sleep and baths: 38.5 After this exposition of the influence which contemplation of the truth may have even to the body which is wracked with pain, we move to reflect more deeply upon the place of the body (which was treated in the answer to objection 3 of this article). We have just seen the influence of joy in spilling over to reduce bodily pain in 38.4, now it remains for us to see how the body can influence sorrow to turn it into pleasure. In the fifth article, the body appears, not as the subject of pain, but as the subject of the spiritual experience of sorrow, which sorrow modifies

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135 the disposition of its movement. Whereas we have just pointed out the overflow from the higher powers of the soul to the lower, here we are concerned with the beneficial effects of physical well being reflecting upon the subject for whom the good disposition of the body is a cause of pleasure. The fifth article asks whether pain and sorrow are alleviated through sleep and baths. The first objection puts forward the difference in location: sleep and baths pertain to the body, but sorrow comes about in the soul. The second objection is interesting in that it actually places a certain repugnance of bodily remedies towards helping sorrow, insofar as bodily remedies interfere with (repugnant) contemplation of the truth, which mitigates sadness (as we have just seen). The third objection considers the specific bodily element of sorrow or pain - which consists in a certain transmutation of the heart. The objection notes that these remedies seem to pertain more to the exterior senses and members rather than to a therapy of the heart (ad interior cordis dispositionem). Here the argument is that, insofar as sorrow and pain have a bodily element, these remedies do not affect that bodily dimension of sorrow directly. In the sed contra, Aquinas cites Augustine173 who notes that baths are named from their capacity to drive away anxiety, and also Augustine's testimony of sleep having greatly mitigated his pain. Citing from a later part in Augustine, Aquinas also cites a hymn by Ambrose on the restoration which repose brings. In the respondeo, Aquinas recalls the point which he had made earlier (37.4) that sorrow works against the species of the bodily movement which is necessary for life; instead of concerning merely the possibility of excess or defect, as is the case with other passions (or with
173 This citation is from IX Conf. cap 12 (PL 32 777).

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physical harm). Insofar as sorrow is repugnant to the vital motion of the body by reason of its species, whatever reforms the bodily nature to the proper state of motion opposes sorrow and mitigates it. Bodily remedies, such as baths, restore the body to its appropriate disposition of vital movement. Aquinas notes in addition that as such bodily remedies restore nature to its proper state, they cause pleasure. In this we can see the twofold efficacy of bodily remedies, which oppose sorrow first at the level of the bodily movement which is associated with sorrow, and additionally at the level of the appetite upon which result of a bodily therapy redounds. Per hoc etiam quod huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum causatur ex his delectatio; hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra dictum est.174 The reformation of the bodily motion moves up to the soul itself, serving as a direct therapy against sorrow and being a cause of pleasure in the very process of sensing the body to return to a more congenial disposition of movement. In the responses to the objections, Aquinas notes that the good disposition of the body inasmuch as it is sensed (an immensely significant point, which will be a chief focus of our conclusion) causes pleasure and thus mitigates sorrow. The emphasis is on the sensuality of the experience, in restoring the bodily movement from what it was, greater attention is drawn to the fact that one is able to sense and to appreciate sensing being in a good disposition of the body again. The second notes even if one delight impedes another, that every delight mitigates sadness. There is an uncompromising interest in every delight; Aquinas does not create a hierarchy among his remedies but is interested in each for whatever way it may contribute to
174 Cf. ST 1-2 31.1: "Delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem" (citing Aristotle) and further on: "Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio.

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137 bringing about the alleviation of sorrow. The third draws attention to the unity of the body which for Aquinas consists in that every bodily disposition redounds to the heart, as the principle and the end of bodily movement. The significance of bodily remedies The placement of this last article on bodily remedies is interesting. To a certain extent, it mirrors the order of the last article (37.4) on the effects of sorrow, in which the effect on the body also came last in the list, a place which could conceivably confer a certain prominence to these bodily remedies. Aquinas discusses elsewhere the reasons for the prominence of bodily pleasures (despite the per se greater intellectual pleasures). In 31.5, Aquinas notes bodily pleasures are sought because they are familiar and because they are remedies to contrary ills. In this statement, we see the accessibility of bodily pleasures in terms of being familiar, and their efficacy as remedying contrary ills. Even the person ridden by anxiety or stupefied175 by acedia (cf. 35.8) is still capable of being restored, partially at least, to the experience of pleasure in terms of warm baths, aromatherapy, music, massage, or even a nap. As we have seen in our discussion on passions generally, matter is more passible than form; it is more subject to change. Thus through the body, which does not hold contrary movements at once, it is easier to introduce pleasure. Addressing sorrow by causing pleasure in terms of reducing the disposition of the body is thus uniquely simple and efficacious.

175 Cf. the phrase stupidus in seipso from ST 1-2.37.2.

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Ethical Perspectives on the Remedying of Sorrow: Towards a Conclusion And so it is evident from what has been said that the whole activity of virtue and politics, that is, of the manner of life pertaining to a citizen, is indissociable from pleasures and sorrows. The one who uses them well will be virtuous; the one who uses them badly will be deficient.176 In acknowledging the usefulness and the ease which sleep, baths and other remedies of this kind confer in bringing about pleasure and mitigating pain, we recall ourselves to the original question which motivated this thesis: the practice of using antidepressants to manage sorrow. There is a kind of superficial similarity between Aquinas' bodily remedies and antidepressants inasmuch as both - generally speaking - are directed at correcting a bodily disposition, whereas the context and assumptions behind each widely differ. Whereas antidepressants purport to work at the neurochemical level, Aquinas' bodily treatment is not so specialized nor localized; it reflects an intertwined understanding of bodily well-being in which the stimulation given even to external limbs, to the surface of the body in a bath, for example, has implications for the whole body in restoring its proper movement which thus reverberates upon the appetite. In fact, when Aquinas addresses an objection in 38.5 that bodily remedies are addressed to the outer limbs rather than to the interior of the heart, he responds (ad 3) that every good disposition of the body somehow redounds to the heart, as the principle and end of bodily movement.177 Aquinas' bodily remedies, such as sleep and baths and things of the sort are
176 This is my translation of Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's Ethics: Et ideo manifestum est ex praedictis, quod totum negotium virtutis et politicae, idest civilis conversationis, consistit circa delectationes et tristitias; quibus qui bene utitur, bonus erit; qui male autem utitur, erit malus. (Ethic. lib. 2 l. 3 n. 14). 177 Aquinas also references book XI of Aristotle's De causa motu animalium (703b23).

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139 readily accessible from within the experience of pain or sorrow and do not require the professionalization of knowledge which produces both antidepressants and the knowledge of their use. Thus Aquinas' bodily remedies do not require the experimental stage which accompanies the practice of using antidepressants, in terms of finding the appropriate medication or dosage and monitoring its effectiveness, a process in which the subject becomes accustomed to becoming the object of his or her own biomedical gaze.178 The remedies (and pleasures) of sleep and baths presupposes the body as a condition of the totality of the passionate subject, which operates in sync with experiences that are accessible to the subject and open to interpretation and modulation from different access points of the human being, including but not restricted to the body. Aquinas' bodily remedies do not result in a splitting of the subject's narrative, because the body is not treated as the site of mysterious internal biological forces which can only be corrected by sophisticated neurochemical technologies, but rather there is an appreciation of the body engaged as a condition of the totality of the subject as a composite being. Pain, sorrow, mood, and affect all have the status of a lived experience a passion of the subject, which are not reducible to localized organs, but each affect the person in the whole unity of his or her being. The appreciation of any bodily change for the better as an inextricable dimension of subjectivity via the sensitive appetite helps to maintain a sense of subjective integrity according to which a human being interprets experiences of pain, sorrow, or other
178 In using antidepressants, the body-self is transformed from an expressive entity, caught up in webs of relationships with others (though oftentimes distressing, painful and overpowering) into an object of scrutiny and self-surveillance. The antidepressants provide individual freedom from depression and anxiety, but only at the cost of splitting parts of the self off from the realm of everyday understanding, and submitting those pathological elements to biomedical strategies of control and management. (emphasis my own) (Stepnisky 164).

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modes or moods in relationship with a network of experiences, sensible or intellectual perceptions thus facilitating open-ended associability between sensation, experience, passions, moods, and thought that allows a subject to discover meaning in an ongoing interpretative process. This associability made possible by positing a sensitive appetite as a heuristic device can likewise make possible the formulation of holistic remedies, meaning, for example, that one can posit the pleasurability of the deployment of bodily remedies as a chief part of their efficacy. On the one hand, the openness of the subject which is posited in the passibility of the subject via the body necessarily entails with it the vulnerability to harm. Likewise, this openness of ones experiences to interpretation also entails the possibility of disempowering, narrow, and constricting interpretations which can reduce the subject to being wholly at the mercy of his or her negative experiences. In between the postures of hapless vulnerability or of attempting to gain mastery over ones passibility, there may be the position of negotiation. Positing a negotiative ability to live as a passionate human being could be attainable through the acceptance of the challenge to a care of the self according to which sorrow and pleasure are recognized as constituting a significant part and content of the ethical project, and not only as constituting it or hindering it (according to which the ethical project consists rather in management or containment rather than acceptance, integration, and political179 persuasion). In accepting this kind of challenge, it is possible to open oneself to an ongoing process of interpretation, as one learns through experience to modulate the potentially harmful effects of passions - for example, by counterbalancing potentially harmful passions such as pain and sorrow with the
179 Cf. ST 1-2.17.7

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141 passions of pleasure and hope. Exploring the negotiative human being: complicating the passionate subject From this idea that the human being is negotiative with regard to passions of pleasure and sorrow, we can proceed to consider more complex factors within the subject. There are negotiations within the human being, not only in terms of the subject and the object, or of one passion with respect to another, but in respect of many inter-influential passions and intersections of other powers dynamically operating within the human being, some of which are approaching more to actuality and some of which are more potential. A Thomistic anthropology permits us to see these different subjective dimensions which allow the subject to be open to the world, while also equipping the subject with the power to interpret and integrate his or her experiences in relation to a wider world that includes other subjects and other resources for interpretation. If sorrow poses a challenge existentially in accepting and embracing one's vulnerability, it may also be the condition of preserving the ability to value objects appropriately, and even to preserve the strength of one's inclination towards one's own perfection. Sorrow may be the possibility of preserving and even of coming to know and realize hopes and desires for one's own happiness by a kind of negative way of discovering who one is and how one should live one's own life.

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Conclusion

As myths, antidepressant advertisements claim a totalizing knowledge of self and suffering. They participate in, and clarify, a kind of cosmology that offers a narrative framework for understanding the self and its suffering. This cosmology is made up of biological elements (neurotransmitters, synaptic gaps, brain structures, antidepressant medications), assertions about the relationships between those elements, and claims about the powers that inhere in those elements. It also transforms the character of the self, which, equipped with a new set of technologies and self-surveillance devices acquires a set of responsibilities in relationship to its biological material. (Stepnisky, 114)

The object of this thesis has been to point out the possibility of many intertwining layers of meaning combining in the passion of sorrow in Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, to indicate something of what may be lost by abandoning interest in sorrow on its own terms and with an ethical perspective for supposedly strict biomedical perspectives, which may obscure the claims of sorrow to further exploration from more diversely integrated perspectives. For the purposes of this thesis, my intention in reading Aquinas on passion and specifically on sorrow was to borrow from his development of the passion of sorrow (and pain) in order to open this human experience and particularly its remedies - to meaningful interpretations. Passions in Aquinas present an interesting account of the stakes of a human individual's being-subjected in a world, according to which one is always being-affected in ways

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143 extending from perfection to harm or corruption. The spirit in which I appropriated Aquinas' works for my own question was based on an existentialist interest in passions insofar as they present a unique claim upon us, by constituting part of our experience. This claim takes on the urgency of an ethical project which is made more complex by the fact that pain and sorrow can serve valuable critical functions on the one hand, but on the other hand, that pain and sorrow likewise potentially present serious limitations to integrated subjectivity (which were explored when we discuss the effects of sorrow from question 37 of the Prima Secundae). In the Thomistic lexicon, it could be said that sorrow can be an honourable good (bonum honestum) and even a useful one,180 but an extensive exploration of Aquinas' own ethical perspectives on sorrow was resisted in our project (at least until the initial stakes of sorrow are more clearly described). Sorrow is an undeniably complex experience of human life. From the point of view of our existentalist stakes professed in the introduction which is oriented towards a hermeneutics of facticity, it is irreplaceably valuable, while on the other hand, the harmful effects of pain and sorrow upon the subject can risk the very conditions of subjectivity which may be existentially prized in sorrow: by hindering learning, enjoyment, operation (except for operation which proceeds from it) and opposing the bodily movement which is necessary to life. However, if there is a way to gently nourish the seeds of an integrated subjectivity via a valuable acceptance of one's vulnerability, failures, and losses and pains as well as of one's successes, mastery, and enjoyment, it seems such a project may come about by means of the encouragement of pleasurable remedies such as Aquinas proposes.
180 Cf. ST 1-2.39.1, 2, and 3.

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The challenge and rewards which an engagement with passions offers (an engagement with all the passions, as inextricably connected) should not be lightly abandoned in favour of an exclusively neurochemical interpretation applied to sorrow and its therapy. Such an approach may possibly obscure the potentially valuable and useful dimensions to sorrow, accepted as a universal and inextricably human experience, and as creating the ethical demand for a care of the self, by subsuming these possible dimensions under the dominance of a biological myth which reduces sorrow to a neurochemical malfunction.

Limitations of this thesis Ethical explorations via sorrow in Aquinas This thesis focused upon Aquinas in relation to a certain existential question motivated by the prevalence of the usage of antidepressants; consequently, certain portions of Aquinas' work were appropriated and emphasized while others (which are also very important and more fundamental to understanding the Thomistic corpus) were passed over. Here I do not develop the broader horizons of Aquinas' philosophical anthropology which may have helped to shed some light on the wider context of passions within the context of the human being inclined towards beatitude and as the fully responsible ethical actor. For although I think that passions and particularly sorrow could present an interesting entry point towards an ethical inquiry with specifically Thomistic stakes, such a project entails a more substantial work than a master's thesis. For this reason that undertaking a wholesale approach to a Thomistic ethical perspective on sorrow was too large for my master's thesis topic, I likewise did not include Aquinas'

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145 discussion on the morality of pain or sorrow (which appears in question 1-2.39 following the treatment on remedies of sorrow in question 38) in this thesis. Associations between sorrow and existential inquiry In focusing on the everyday stakes of sorrow in Aquinas, I did not develop in depth the theme suggested in the introduction concerning a relationship between existentialist inquiry (or philosophy in general) and sorrow, although this is a hypothesis which I would like to see developed in another work of larger scope. In a Thomistic exploration, this could take the shape of studying the associations between tristitia and learning and contemplation.

Significance of pleasure A more complete work in terms of the stakes which I have articulated should integrate more profoundly the significance of pleasures for life. Because of the confines of this thesis, I did not fully explore the significance of pleasures within Aquinas, but focused upon pleasure as an entry and a comparison point for pain and sorrow. The normativity of pleasure here is not so much considered for its teleological content (which we merely touch upon) in terms of its place with regard to the ultimate end of the human being or even as a point or climax towards which the passion of love is tended as an end, but it concerns more the aspect of commonality in pleasure in the sense meaning that the subject is fundamentally related and relating to the world through experiences of pleasure. A more thorough exploration of pleasures in Aquinas, however, may yield very interesting results as pleasures indicate a way of being fulfilled that ring in a unique note; as circumscribing one's own perfections with its finality.

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The four species of sorrow Another limitation of this thesis was the fact that I did not pursue in greater depth the four species of sorrow in Aquinas, which are mercy, envy, anxiety, and acedia. I present these only briefly in commenting in my own chapter 3 upon Aquinas' question 35, article 8. Mercy, acedia, and envy reappear in the Secunda Secundae (questions 30, 35, and 36) as part of the discussion of charity. It would be interesting to explore further relationships between mercy (misericordia) or even penitence (poentitentia) and just acts in Thomas Aquinas, but that would have meant leaving the level of passion for that of action. A greater exploration of anxiety would have been relevant to our topic, as anxiety has been a condition defined and appropriated medically for some time. Anxiety holds particular relevance today with regards to an inquiry focused upon the prevalence of psychotrops, as historically, the marketing of tranquilizers directed at dealing with anxiety (understood in a medical sense) originally preceded the marketing of antidepressants aimed at treating depression. Anxiety as a philosophical subject has also been a common theme of existential philosophers.181 Acedia does not seem to have a parallel to match its richness in a contemporary lexicon, although there have been interests in reviving this concept.182 Exploring these species of sorrow would have helped to illuminate sorrows harmful effects, inter-subjective aspects, and potential connections with ethical acts.

181 See for example Kierkegaards text, Begrebet Angest, is a primary example (see Kierkegaard, Soren and Reidar Thomte (trans.) The Concept of Anxiety. Kierkegaard's Writings, Vol 8. New York: Princeton, 1981). 182 See, for example, Nault, Jean-Charles. La saveur de dieu: l'acdie dans le dynamisme de l'agir. Paris: Les ditions du Cerf, 2006.

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147 Gains of the thesis These limitations which we have just noted concerning this work can also be alternatively considered unique questions whose formulation was made possible by our own exploration of sorrow in Aquinas (as viewed with the existential interests which we have indicated). The path which we have taken in this thesis has established certain vantage points, one of which was a glimpse of the subject's relatedness to the world via the sensitive appetite, by which the subject is a participant affected by the world and reflexively engaged with it through experiences of loss or incompleteness, as well as pleasures and perfections. This work was intended to uncover more diverse and meaningful interpretations of the inextricably human experiences of pain and sorrow in order to shed more light on contemporary praxes with regard to experiences of sorrow or depression (particularly the use of antidepressants). In this regard, we negotiated between what we termed the experiential necessity of sorrow and its claims to existential value and the fact that sorrow or pain can itself present impediments to an integrated subjectivity. In light of these stakes, we noted that Aquinas' remedies particularly the bodily remedies - offer a unique accessibility, efficacy, and even more importantly, an associability to the subject, made possible by such bodily remedies engaging the whole subject via sensation and pleasure as a chief factor in their deployment. Ultimately, the vision which we have marked out in this work points to the possibility of a negotiative human subject, who lives passionately or almost by definition in the first person, and yet who embraces and accepts the existential challenge offered by being an impassioned human being, thus opening up these experiences still further to all those dimensions and possibilities understood in association with a care of the self.

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