Jiabs 2-2

THE JOURNAL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A. K. Narain
University oj Wisconsin, Madison, USA
EDITORS
Heinz Bechert
Universitiit Gottingen, FRG
Leon Hurvitz
Lewis Lancaster
University ofCalifomia, Berkeley, USA
B. J. Stavisky
WNIIR, Moscow, USSR
UBC, Vancouver, Canada
Alexander W. MacDonald
Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France
Alex Wayman
Columbia University, New York, USA
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
. Stephen Beyer
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Volume 2 1979 Number 2
THE JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and
scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various
disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art,
archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABS is published twice
yearly in the Spring and Fall.
The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views
expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related
publications.
Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should
be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief,JIABS, Department of South
Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.
The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the Journal and
reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication
and is not obliged to give reasons therefor.
Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot
guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to
the senders.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Andre Bareau (France) JosephM. Kitagawa (USA)
John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland)
M.N. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura (japan)
R. Card (USA) John Rosenfield (USA)
B.C. Cokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA)
P.S.Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)
J. W. de Jong (Australia) . E. Zurcher (Netherlands)
Copyright cThe International Association of Buddhist Studies 1979
ISSN: 0193-600X
Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, and the Anonymous Fund of the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin, U.S.A.
CONTENTS
I. ARTICLES
1. Dharmasri on the Sixteen Degrees of Comprehension
by Leon Hurvitz 7
2. Indrabhiiti's 'Confession of Errors in the Fundamental
Teachings of the Vajrayana', A Critical Edition, English
Translation and Discussion, by Nathan Katz 31
3. Non-duality of the Two Truths in Sinitic Madhyamika: Origin
of the 'Third Truth', by Whalen Lai 45
4. Transpersonal Psychological Observations on Theravada
Buddhist Meditative Practices, byJames Santucci 66
5. Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpretations
of the Two Truths in the Prasangika Madhyamika
by Michael Sweet 79
II. SHORT PAPER
1. Some Buddhist Poems in Tamil, by C. Vijayavenugopal 93
III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
Reviews:
1. The Prajnaparamita Literature, by Edward Conze 99
2. Two Ways to Perfection: Buddhist and Christian
by Shanta Ratnayaka 103
3. An Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems
by F. D. Lessing and A. Wayman 104
4. Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia;
Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka;
Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos
and Burma, by Bardwell Smith 107
5. Studies in Pali and Buddhism, Edited by A. K. Narain 109
Notices:
1. Buddhist Wisdom. The mystery of the self, by George Grimm III
2. Buddhism. A select biography, by Satyaprakash 112
3. Living Buddhist Masters, by Jack Kornfield 112
4. Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, by Steven T. Katz 112
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
1. On Buddhist Research Information (B.R.I.)
of the Institute for Advanced Studies
of World Religions (IASWR), New York
OBITUARY
LIST OF lABS MEMBERS
113
116
117
The Editor-in-Chief wishes to express thanks to Roger Jackson
and Rena Crispin for their assistance in the production of this issue.
3rd Conflrence i f t h ~
International Association
if 'Buddhist Studies
We are pleased to announce that the 3rd Conference of the
International Association of Buddhist Studies is proposed to be
held at Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, jointly with the XIVth
Congress of the International Association for the History of
Religions. The dates for the latter are from the 17th to the 21st of
August, 1980. Some of our panels and programs will be
organized under the joint auspices of the IAHR and the lABS
during this period. In addition, we will have one day, the 22nd of
August, devoted exclusively to the lABS meeting. We will let you
know more about our program and other necessary information
in our 2nd circular, hopefully sometime in March, 1980, after the
2nd Conference of the lABS at Nalanda (India) is over.
Professor L.S. Kawamura, Dept. of Religion, University of
Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, T2N 1N4, will be the Local
Coordinator for the panels which are being organized under the
joint auspices of the IAHR and the lABS. Please contact him
immediately for details concerning those panels. The deadline
for receiving proposals for papers and programs outside the joint
meetings is the 31st of March, 1980.
It will help us if we receive your responses and suggestions
by February 21,1980.
Dharmasri on the Sixteen Degrees
of Com prehension
by Leon Hurvitz
What is to follow constitutes one portion of a larger study of the path
towards arhattva as described in Abhidharma works that now survive
only in Chinese, one that does, however, take into account the Sanskrit
(Abhidharmakosa and vyakhya) and, to a lesser extent, Piili work on the
subject. The study directly preceding this one had to do with the four
'aids to penetration' (catvari nirvedhabharfiyani). The present study, like
the one just preceding it, is based on a work bearing he title A-p'i-t'an
hsin lun f'J tt. i 'c tifT, ascribed to one F a-sheng In 1975 there
appeared in Brussels a complete English translation of the work by Mr.
Charles Willemen. In view of this, one might wish to know how the
work that follows can defend itself against the charge of superfluity.!
The work in question survives in three Chinese translations, by
(assisted by Hui-yuan of Lu-shan fil J., M. ii- ), by Naren-
drayasas and by Though the third named, the longest by
far of the three, is dearly swollen by commentary, no commentator is
named, while the second identifies its commentator as Upasiinta. Mr.
Willemenseldom indicates how the versions differ, nor does he para-
phrase them, contenting himself with a translation so literal as to be not
infrequently puzzling. On the other hand, within the limits of possibility
he meticulously restores the technical terms to Sanskrit. Since the
methods here pursued differ radically from his, one ventures to say
that there is room for what follows. Where Mr. Willemen's findings
have been of help, they shall be gratefully acknowledged.
As indicated, the 'aids to penetration' are followed by sixteen
degrees of comprehension (abhisamaya) , bearing on the Four Noble
Truths. For each truth there are four steps, viz., (a) acceptance on faith
(b) understanding (jiiana) , both for the Sphere of Desire
(kamadhatu), then (c) acceptance on faith of an analogue (anvayak?anti)
7
and (d) understanding of the analogue (anvayajiliina) , the latter two
having to do with the Spheres of Form (rupaO) and of Formlessness
(arupyadhatu). For information, cf. L VP 6.179-83, where much will be
found that does not appear below but which does not conflict with it. As
Mr. Willemen says on p. 231, n. 56, of his work, the Noble Path
(aryamarga) is divided into two, one of the learners yu hsueh tao
Jjf '* it ), i.e., of those below arhattva, and one of the 'non-learners'
(asaiksamarga, wu #; hsueh tao), of the arhantah, who have nothing more
to learn. The former, in turn, is subdivided into a 'path of vision'
(darsanamarga, chien tao tit) and one of 'realization' (bhavanamarga,
hsiu 1ft tao). All eight acts of acquiescence, of acceptance on faith (ksZlnti)
and the first seven of the eight acts of understanding (jiiana) belong to
'vision', the last jnana alone to 'realization'. (The same note has a chart
giving a birds'-eye view of the issue.) The approach to be followed will
be to restate what SaII?-ghadeva and Narendrayasas have to say, which
happens to be nearly the same, then to reserve for Comment the remarks
of Samghadeva, which, to my knowledge, have no precise analogue.
The presentation begins with verses, which deal only with categories (a)
and (b) regarding the first of the Four Noble Truths.
The supreme worldly dharmas next in order
Invariably raise up (another form of) dharma-acquiescence.
The acquiescence in its own turn produces gnosis, and
Both together regard the lowest woe.
2
This 'acquiescence' is qualitatively different from the 'patience'
just dealt with in the passage preceding what is being dealt with here,
i.e., the four aids to penetration (catvari nirvedhabharfiyani), the differ-
ence being that the present one is without outflows or, in other words,
does not conduce to rebirth in the world. It indicates a willingness, even
an eagerness, to see a truth that one has never seen before.
3
Finally, to the question as to the object of these acquiescences and
gnoses, the answer is the Truth of Woe as it affects the Kamadhatu.
Comment
SaII?--ghavarman comments that the supreme worldly dharmas,
without moving,4 shake off wrong deeds (hsieh yeh'tr t,
bad destinies (hsieh durgati) and wrong views (hsieh chien'ir t,
8
By 'wrong deeds' are meant the five enormous offenses
(paiicanantaryakarmaii:i), viz., a. matricide (mat!ghata), b. parricide
(pit!ghata) , c. murder of an arhant (arhadghata) , d. introduction of
disunity into the councils of the Order (sa",!ghabheda) , e. striking a
Buddha with malicious intent and with such force as to draw blood
(tathagatasyantike By 'wrong views' are meant
the five wrong views, (cf. n. 3, a.-e.).
Also, the supreme wordly dharma divides acquiescence in the
dharma of the Truth of Woe in such a way as to produce five certainties.
These are, namely, the certainties of a. ground, b. aspects (?), c. object,
d. (moment of time), e. immediate condition. These are then
explained. a. The ground (ti , bhumi?) on which a person attained the
supreme worldly dharma is the same as that on which he attains to
acquiescence in the dharma of woe. b. The same is true for aspects
(hsing it, ahara?) and objects, as also for the last named in the
sense that the moment that he turns his back on the one is the moment
in which the other is produced. e. Finally, the immediate (pre)condi-
tion of the acquiescence in question is the supreme worldly dharma,
without which the said acquiescence would not come into being.
s
The fifth of Safi!.ghabhadra's five 'equalities' is treated in
Mahavibha0a 5 (T27.22ab). Here too the meaning is that laukiha-
gradharma is a samanantarapratyaya to that nothing
can obstruct or hinder the passage from the one to the other.
Interestingly enough, at the end of the paragraph in question (22b) is a
sentence that reads, 'In the moment immediately following the
supreme worldly dharma (?shihtiyifawuchiench'a-na-t!t 10 - ;1; M 1:'J 'iF,
acquiescence in the knowledge of the
dharma of woe' (k'u fa chih jen :t- If,; l.,
invariably and evidently comes to the fore. For this reason this dharma
is a certainty, never turning back. (shih ku tz'u fa chueh ting pu t'ui
-;t -/;1 ;t ;f-. 7t 4' i1-, ata evai0a dharmo niyatavinivartaniyaf??).
In the two systems, in other words, a. and e. are shared, while
akara (b.c.) and alambana (c.d.), present in both; occupy respectively
different positions. Each, finally, has one that is missing in the other,
viz., (d. in Safi!.ghadeva's system) and indriya (if indeed that is the
meaning of ken, b. in the catalogue given in the
All the same, the presentation mentions specifically,
which may well mean that the notion of an uninterrupted moment of
time is included there in that of an immediate and necessary
precondition.
9
There follows a puzzling statement: 'Inferior patience' (hsia jen
-r- applies to the Truth of Suffering and its four aspects
with respect to all three spheres. 'Middle patience' (chung t jen,
applies only to the Sphere of Desire; namely, the same
Truth of Suffering and its four aspects. 'Superior patience' (shang J:.
jen, consists of looking at each and everyone of the Four
Noble Truths, then narrowing one's view to the 'continuity of woe' in
the Sphere of Desire (? yii chiehk'uhsianghsii {t f !f ;Nl kamaptadulfhas-
a'l7ftana?), finally reducing even that to the thought of a single moment
of woe in the same sphere (yii chiehk'u yi ch'a-na ssu wei f f - 40J .fp t{1.,
From there one proceeds to the
supreme worldly dharma, from there to acquiescence in the truth of
woe, from that to knowledge of the same truth.
Willemen 72 reads as follows:
After the highest worldly dharma (laukikagradharma) one is
certain to produce a patient acceptance of dharma
after the highest worldly dharma one produces a pure (anasrava)
patient acceptance of dharma, called patient acceptance of
dharma in relation to suffering Because
that which has not yet been realized is patiently accepted when
now realized, they call it patient acceptance. It is, namely, the first
pure (anasrava) immediate path (anantaryamarga).
After patient acceptance one produces knowledge: after that,
one produces the knowledge of dharma in relation to suffering
dharmajiianam),1 the path of deliverance (vimuktimarga) , in
the same range experiencing true nature.
Question: What is the object (alambana) of that patient
acceptance and of knowledge"?
Answer: Both realize lower suffering.
Lower suffering: the suffering of the realm of desire is taken as
object by both.
All three versions now have a quatrain saying virtually the same
thing, in addition to which the. wording itself in the versions of
N arendrayasas and of is almost identical.
verses say that 'upper woe' (shang k'u J:. t), i.e., the contemplation of
the first of the Four Noble Truths with regard to the spheres of Form
and of Formlessness, may be described, mutatis mutandis, in the same
terms as for the Sphere of Desire, and that the same may be said for the
three other truths as well; that, finally, this 'proper' view of the
dharmas (cheng kuan chu fa ,J j dharmasamyagdarsana?
lO
is called the 'sixteen pure (states of) mind' (shih liu
ching hsin -t .f; "1 'G', for To this, the other two identify
this process with the 'uninterrupted' (anantaryamarga; the wording, in
both cases, is tz'u fa we chien teng Ji'f:; f#. M 't, lit. etaddharmasa7(lanantaram).
The prose commentary also says the same thing, with some varia-
tion. SaTf!.ghadeva, whose treatment is, as usual, the tersest, identifies
the sixteen abhisamayas by specifying that each of the Four Noble
Truths becomes the object first of acquiescence, then of understanding,
both with regard to the Sphere of Desire, then of acquiescence and of
understanding by analogy, both for the two upper spheres. The
'acquiescence' (Jen f1c.- , k:janti) he identifies with the 'uninterrupted path'
(wu ai tao 11.-. *iL i.e., anantaryamarga) , the 'understanding' (chih If:: ,
jiiana) with the 'path of deliverance' (chieh t'o tao M Ri iL, vimuktimarga).
Finally, he identifies these sixteen with 'viewing the dharmas' (chienfa
!L ,t i.e., darsanamarga, although, strictly speaking, it is only the first
fifteen of which this may be said).
N arendrayasas says the same thing, except that he does specify
that darsanamarga applies only to the first fifteen of the abhisamayas,
while the last of them belongs to bhavanamarga. The latter extends from
that point up to and including the 'concentration likened to diamond'
(chin kangyii ting of.!1.., vajropamasamadhz), from which point on the
practitioner is known as one who has 'already done what was to be
done' (so tso yi pan i>r 11 "-'1IJhkr:takaran:zya). The stages of practice are
grouped collectively under three headings, those of the 'ground of
view' (chien ti t -l't, i.e., darsanamarga), the 'ground of cultivation' (hsiu
1+ ti, i.e., bhavanamarga) and the 'ground (of them who have) nothing
(left to) learn' (wu hsiieh ti, i.e., aSaik:jarnarga). Narendrayasas concludes
by saying that, now that he has described the 'grounds', he will go on to
describe the persons (jen J... ,pudgala) who occupy them.
Comment
Abhidharrnakosa 6.28 reads as follows:
anantaryamuktimarga yathakramam/
tatra pancadasa
(Note ananiaryaO for anantaryao.) LVP 6.190 sq. renders this as follows:
et jiianas sont, dans l'ordre, anantaryarnarga et virnuktirnarga.
11
Parce qu'ils se produisent chez quelqu'un qui voit ce qui n'a pas vu,
quinze moments sont chemin de la vue.' The basic text is Kosa 6.28b,
accompanied by the commentaries (Dwarikadas 930 ff., L VP 6.191 sqq.).
One will now attempt to explain as much of the commentary to
the above verses as is relevant to. the matter at hand. First, however, one
must review three sets of categories.
a. Each of the Four Noble Truths has four aspects. Thus, 1) Woe
has a) anitya (,impermanent'), b) (,douloureux'), c)
sunya ('vide'), d) anatmaka ('impersonnel'); 2) the origin of Woe
(samudaya) has e) hetu ('cause'), ) samudaya ('origine'), g) prabhava
(,causation successive'), h) pratyaya ('en tant que realisant un effet en
causation conjuguee, abhin4Padanayogena); 3) the suppression of woe
(nirodha) has i) nirodha ('destruction'), j) santa (,calme'), k) pra,,!zta
(,excellent'), 1) (,salvifique'); 4) the Path that leads to the
suppression of woe (pratipad, marga) has m) marga (,chemin'), n) nyaya
('raisonnable ou pratique'), 0) pratipad (,obtention'), p) nairya,,!ika
('sortie definitive').
b. At each stage of his development, the practitioner rids himself
of his defilements in nine stages, the defilements being of three
degrees of intensity, viz., extreme (adhimatra), middling (madhya) and
slight (mr:du), each of which is similarly divided into extreme, middling
and slight. Each act of self-liberation consists of two steps, anataryamarga,
or 'path of immediacy', and vimuktimarga, or 'path of deliverance'. L VP
6.278 says this about them: 'Le ... chemin qui ne peut etre
empeche ... est Ie chemin par lequel est abandonne un obstacle ... Le
... chemin de delivrance ... est Ie premier chemin qui naisse deIivre
de l'obstacle abandonne au moyen de l'anantaryamarga.'
There follow a quatrain and a brief commentary that are virtually
the same in all versions: Anyone who, during the first fifteen moments
of the sixteen abhisamayas, was of comparatively dull faculties is called
one who 'acts in accordance with faith' (sui hsin hsing filft 1j, ts'ung tft
hsin hsing, i.e., sraddhanusarin), because he has gained his insight in
keeping with the predications of a person whom he trusted, while the
person of sharp faculties is called one who 'acts in accordance with the
Dharma' (suifa ,1;. hsing, tS'ungfa hsing, i.e., dharmanusarin), because his
understanding is based on a direct intuition of the Doctrine.
It will be recalled that the 'path of deliverance' (vimuktimarga, chieh
t' 0 tao Rt:i!) has nine stages. next quatrain says that a
person who has not yet separated himself from the passions of the
Sphere of the Desire is moving in the direction of the First Fruit
12
(srota'apattiphala), while the one who has separated himself from the six
lowest ones is moving towards the Second (sak!dagamiphala); he who
has freed himself from all, towards the Third (anagamiphala).
Narendrayasas's quatrain says the same in only slightly different
language. Sarr:.ghadeva's prose commentary specifies the nine categories
and the words srota'apanna and sak!dagamin, both in transcription, but
does not add anything significant. N arendrayasas's commentary is
somewhat more specific. It identifies the person still in the Sphere of
Desire as one 'totally bound by all bonds' (chii yi ch'i fo 1-Hi . ~ f sakala-
bandhana). It goes on to say that, when such a person 'reaches a fixed
portion' (chih chiieh ting fen f Jt: 1- /Ji" niyamabhaga'fl'! prapya?), then he
faces the fruit of the srota'apanna (srota'apattiphalapratipannako bhavati?).
As in the case of Sarr:.ghadeva, so here too the commentary specifies the
nine degrees, going on to say that, once the lowest six have been
abandoned, the person 'enters certainty' (ju chiieh ting A- 1': j'.., niyamam
avakramati?), which means that he now faces the fruit of the sak!dagamin
(sakrdagamiphalapratipannako bhavati,).8 One who has abandoned all
nine, finally, again 'enters certainty' in the sense that he faces the fruit
of the anagamin (anagamiphalapratipannako bhavati?).
Sarr:.ghavarman has two quatrains where the other two have only
one, and his commentary is, correspondingly, longer (11 Taisho lines
as against 6 for Sarr:.ghadeva and 17 1/2 for Narendrayasas). He
specifies that, if the sraddhanusarin or dharmanusarin has not yet freed
himself from the Kamadhatu, or even if he has, but only of one of the
first five categories of bonds, then he is a srota'apattiphalapratipannaka, a
candidate for the First Fruit.
9
A person who has not freed himself at all
from the bonds of the Sphere of Desire is a sakalabandhana, while one
who has freed himself from the lowest of them is an asakalabandhana
(pu chii fo ;:r. -! , ~ ' ) . SaJ1lghavarman proceeds to say something of whose
meaning I am not quite certain. To the extent that I have understood it,
it is as follows: Once a person has freed himself of the five lowest
categories of bonds, in one jump he escapes rebirth (? ch'ao sheng lisheng
kL 11- ~ ~ 1.). One who, with respect to the 'view of woe to be cut off in the
Sphere of Desire', severs the five lowest categories of bonds attains the
dharma -gnosis touching the dharma of woe and bears direct witness to
deliverance. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, all along the line up to
and including the same with respect to the 'view of the Path'. Finally,
when one has severed the five lowest categories of bonds to be severed
on the 'path of cultivation', one attains the fruit of the sakr;dagamin and
bears direct witness to deliverance. 10
13
The second quatrain says that anyone who severs from six
through eight of the bonds just mentioned 'faces the second fruit' (i.e.,
is a sakr:dagamiphalapratipannaka), while one who leaves the 'eighth
grom;ld' is one 'facing the third (fruit', i.e., an anagamiphalapratipannaka).
The prose commentary simply says the same thing in different words,
but it is worthy of note that the second couplet is interpreted to mean
that anyone from the Sphere of Desire up to and including the top of
the Sphere of Formlessness is-under these circumstances, presumably
-headed for the fruit of the anagamin (i.e., an anagamiphalapratipannaka).
The next quatrain, as well as the prose commentary accompanying
it, is, except for differences in wording, virtually the same in all three
versions. It says that, upon attainment ofthe sixteenth abhisamaya, the
candidate is a firm occupant of the Fruit in question, the one of 'soft
views' (juan chien t, being called 'liberated by faith' (hsin
chieh t'01t i/If Hit, sraddhavimukta), the one of 'sharp views' (Ii chien :1:'1 t, so
Sarr:ghadeva and or of 'pure views' (ching chien 1 t,
so Narendrayasas, but both standing, presumably, for or
being called 'arrived at insight' (chien tao t J:.,
The commentary, specifically, says that the sixteenth abhisamaya
corresponds to marganvayajnana, that one who has not left the Sphere
of Desire becomes a srota'apanna, one who has abandoned the sixth
category of bonds a sakr:dagamin, one who has abandoned all nine an
anagamin. It goes on to say that one of 'dull faculties' (tun ken U Hz, i.e.,
mr:dvindriya), the hitherto sraddhanusarin, is now a sraddhavimukta, while
the one of 'sharp faculties' (Ii ken :t,) 1k, is now a
Comment
The above statement is based princiaplly on
Beyond saying that 'pure view' means 'sharp view', N arendrayasas says
the same thing in words only slightly different. begins
virtually the same way, but ends quite differently. He says that one of
slight insight who enters the darsanamarga is called asraddhanusarin and
that, when he comes to rest in the Third Fruit, he is known as a
sraddhavimukta, while the one of sharp insight, called dharmanusarin
upon entry into the darsanamarga, is now known as a
concludes by saying that the dr:Hiprapta, whose faith
(hsin 1t , sraddha) is actually stronger than that of the sraddhavimukta,
has a faith 'perfumed by wisdom' (hui so hsun 1. ,t i, prajnavasita?),
which accounts for his name.
14
Two points seem to merit comment. First, the 'passions to be
abandoned by meditation' are the ten sa1[tyojanas (the five mentioned
in n. 10 as well as rUparaga, attachment to the Sphere of Form;
arupyaraga, attachment to the Sphere of Formlessness; auddhatya, agita-
tion; mana,. pride; moha, delusion); all deeds that, while not unwhole-
some, do not conduce to leaving the world (kuSalasasrava) and those
that, while placing no obstacle in the path of salvation, are morally
neutral (anivrtavyakrta); impure avijiiapti. 11 The second point worthy of
comment is that arhattva is not achieved by the 16 abhisamayas, that
arhattvaphalapratipatti is as high as one can go. Cf. L VP 6.196.
has another quatrain peculiar to his version,
followed by rather an extensive prose commentary. The whole
passage, in sum, makes a statement so surprising, in the light of what I
know from elsewhere in the Abhidharma, that I am not certain of
having understood it correctly. Since, moreover, this particular text is
peculiar to I have no analogue against which to verify
the accuracy of my interpretation. For what it is worth, I present it
here.
By severing the eighty-eight 'bonds' (chieh H , sa'/Tfyojana) appli-
cable to the path of vision (chien tao No;t.; darsanamarga) , 12 the practi-
tioner achieves srota'apattiphala. And so on up to the person on
anagamya,13 who dwells in the Fruit of the srota'apanna. A person who,
by some means or other (? fang pien 7i 1t, representing upayena?), over-
comes the strongest (shang shang.l: .l:, i.e., or adhimatra-
dhimatra) of the obstacles to deliverance is called a sak:dagamiphalaprati-
pannaka. Here says something that reminds one a bit of
what he said above. From the point just specified up to that of the
person who, having severed the five lowest categories of bonds and
escaped rebirth, produces marganvayajiiana, one has to do with a srota-
'appana. He is not a sakrdagamiphalapratipannaka, since the path of the
latter has not presented itself to him for a single moment
(? j.:.( f.J .f: It t - 1: <.t 1i if:., yasmat tatphalapratipannakamarga
apy asmai na pratipannas tasmat? cna
Q. There are many bonds to sever. Why did the Blessed One speak
only of three? 14
A. The ten anusayas
15
are basic, namely, the five views in addition to
doubt, lust, anger, pride and inclarity.16 On the path of view (chien tao
t ft, darsanamarga) one severs six of these, namely, the five views and
doubt. When this has been done, then they are severed permanently.
Three of the anufayas are prime movers, three secondary. 17
15
In the absence of any definition of 'mental cogmtIOn to be
abandoned by realization' (bhcwanapraha,tavyarrt manovijnanam iii.
above), I conclude that the reference is to mental cognition having to
do with passions to be banished by realization/meditation. 'Pure
thought' is thought having niroana as its object. That is, the view of a
substantial person (shen shien t, is a prime mover
(pravqrtaka), while the extreme views of eternity and of absolute finality
(pien chien &. t j are secondary movers (anuvartaka); the
willful choice of one's own style of religious life (s"ilavrataparamarsa) is a
prime mover, while the willful choice of views is a
secondary mover; doubt (vicikitsa) is a prime mover, while false views
specifically the denial of the truth of dependent origina-
tion, pratltyasamutpada) are secondary movers.
What treats next in a single sloka, and with less than 7
lines of commentary (in the Taisho edition), N arendrayahs enunciates
in the same amount of verse and about twice as much prose (15 lines),
while has about twice as much material as Narendra-
yasas, viz., two slokas and 31 lines of commentary. What we shall do here
is, for our immediate purposes, reproduce version, then
use as Comment, followed by the Abhidharmakosa and
the in the same sense. Since Narendrayasas falls
somewhere between the other two, there shall be no mention of his
verSIOn.
SaII).ghadeva's sloka, more or less literally translated, would be
about as follows:
One by whom cogitation has not yet been completely severed
Is limited to birth in birth-and-death seven (times).
The house-to-house (wanderer), having had three, is finished.
Both are situated in the Fruit of the Path.
Making no attempt at versification, one might venture the following
restoration: / / acchinnabhavanaheyah: saptakr:. tparamo jayate kularrtkulas tu
ubhau ca margaphale vartete/ / 'Cogitation' renders ssu wei
;<J.. tit, which here clearly stands for bhavana, 'realization', about which
more below. commentary might be summarized as
follows: The first ardhassloka means that the saddhavimukta and the
not yet free of the klesas to be abandoned by bhavana (wei Ii yii
chieh ssu wei so tuan fan nao i tt Jf- 2. 'tf! it Mf t:Ii ,going back to a pre-
sumable acchinnakilmavatarabhavanaheyaklesaf?), shall be reborn and die seven
16
times, i.e., seven times each (?) among gods and men, but no more. The
third pada means that a kular(tkula is one who has eliminated the three
grossest kle'sas, i.e., adhirniltradhirniltra, adhirniltramadhya and adhirniltramr:di
(shang wei shang chung shang shang 1: {it 10 t .1. 1: ). He shall be reborn into
twO clans. (kula) or three, among gods and men, then achieve
parinirvaT?a. The last pada means that saptakr:tparama and kular(tkula shall
both dwell in srota'apatti(phala?).
Comment
One who has not exhausted the seeds (? varieties? chung 11 ) of
the path of cultivation (hsiu tao 1tft)
Receives birth among those who are born and die seven times.
It is to be known that what is meant by that
Is that, when the term is full (chi man t )1., the person in question
is a) srota'apanna.
SaII?-ghavarman's prose:
When the srota'apanna has not yet exhausted the varieties of the
path of cultivation (hsiu tao chung, representing a probable bhavana-
margavidhayalf) know that his absolute term is seven existences, that is,
seven births each among (jen chien,,- rJJ), in antarabhava (chung
yin'1 rt), in upapattibhava (sheng yin 1:. and among kamadhatudevas (yii
chieh t'ien 1.1- J:...). 'Seven' means, in every case, no more than seven, as,
for example, in the case of the 'seven-leaved tree' (ch'i yeh shu-l:. -{ ;fij-,

Q. Why just seven, neither more nor less?
A. It is like one bitten by a 'seven-step serpent': the victim's mahabhutas
(physical elements) let him take seven steps, but the poison will not let
him take an eighth. In the same way, the force of deeds makes for seven
rebirths, but no more than that is possible, thanks to the might of the
Path (tao li ili- 11, margabalena? margava'sena?). When the practitioner
dwells in (if is indeed the meaning of
tseng shang jen {'f J: fl, lit. 'super-tolerance' or '-acquiescence'), except
for seven rebirths in the Sphere of Desire, apratisar(tkhyrmirodha keeps
him from being reborn.
In view of the external evidence, the next statement must mean
that one born among men is reborn there seven times, as is, mutatis
17
mutandis, one born among gods. The difficulty is the wording, for the
latter certainly seems to refer to transcending both groups, the words
usec;l being ch'ao ,k , 'to outpass', and li , 'to leave'. They mean that,
in order to get beyond the and devaloka, respectively, the
being must be reborn seven times in the sphere in question. At any rate,
if in the course of either the Holy Path (sheng tao It, representing a
presumable aryamarga) makes it appearance, then, thanks to the 'hold
of the power of deeds' <:yeh li ch'ih -t 11 #-, karmabaladh,r:tya?) , the
practitioner in question does not experience pariniva1Ja.
Q. If at the end of seven rebirths there appears no Buddha in the
world, then how does the practitioner get arhattva?
A. There are two views. 1. He gets it as a layman, but, once having got
it, does not retain his secular status (representing a possible
sann evarhattva'f[l prapnoti prapya tu na grhe t4thate?). 2. He leaves the
household without undergoing any change in form. This seems to repre-
sent rupa'f[l na vikaryaiva pravrajyate, possibly in the sense that he
becomes a religieux by nature without having to assume the outward
appearance of one. The reasons given number eight. a. The practitioner
in question achieves unassailable purity. b. His hopes have been fulfilled.
c. He sees the errors in misconduct. For these three reasons he does not
fall from srota'apatti into durgati. Also, d. he is not born into the Buddha-
kula, e. the fire of his gnosis (chih huo If-J K, representing jnanagni?)
is bright and pure, f. he sees the deceptions (? kuo ;&, lit. 'transgres-
sions') in and dhatu, g. his acquiescence and insight are perfect
(representing a possible samathavipaSyane asya
h. he has been 'perfumed' by the medicinal herbs of the Noble Path
(aryamargaU.'fadhya vasitatvena?). He is like a crown prince, like a man whose
inner fire is enhanced (? ju nei huo tseng jen -to <F; :k l-- ), like an agile
fish (ju ch'iao pien yii -9;0 t5 it .st.,). This is why the srota'apanna does not fall
into durgati. (Neither do some p-:thagjanas, to be sure, but their number
is small, and the escape is not certain; hence no mention ofthem here.
The srota'apanna, on the other hand, is a member of a destined group-
niyatavarga?-, destined, that is, for nirvan:a, for perfect enlightened
intuition-chii cheng chiieh JE. ,tt, samyaksa'f[lbodhigatika?) . ... Not all
srota'apannas must necessarily go through seven rebirths.
SaII?-ghavarman goes on to the kularl!kula.
I
If one severs three or four varieties (of bonds),
Achieving their counteragents,
Leaving only two rebirths or three,
18
One is called (a wanderer from) family to family (chia chia
kularrtkula).
There are three reasons for positing the kularykula, viz., 1. his 'sever-
ance of the agonies' (jan nao f$!itT, i.e., his abandonment of the
defilements, kle'sapraha7fa, 2. his perfection of his faculties (ch'eng chiu
ken ft.. tt: , indriyasiddhi? siddhendriyatva?), 3. his 'receipt of birth' (? shou
sheng ,t ;J:, representingjatyadana or upapattyadana?). 1. refers to those
defilements on the plain of the Sphere of Desire that are to be removed
by realization (bhavana, as opposed to 'view', darsana, of which more
below, i.e., to kamadhatukle'sabhavanaprahija) or, to be specific, to three
or four varieties thereof, for beyond that the kularykula ends, the
abandonment of the fifth leading automatically to the sixth and to
sakr:dagamiphala, the step immediately following srota'apatti. 2. means
that the practitioner gets the counteragents and faculties free of
outflows (if that indeed is the meaning of pi te tui chih su lou chu ken
it 11lt 3; $. ;1) 1ft, which may represent something such as
sravendriyapraptya). 3. means that in some cases there are more rebirths
in the Sphere of Desire, at times two, at times three. Unless all three
conditions are met, one is not a kularykula. There are two kinds of
kulaTrfkula, viz., 1. devao, which means two or three rebirths as a god in
the Sphere of Desire, whether in one devaloka or in two or three;
2. which may mean in one world (? t'ien hsia f- 1-, or
two or three, or in one clan (chia, for kula?), or two or three.
Q. What does kularykula mean?
A. Proceeding from clan to clan, then on to parinirviiTfa, it is the highest
rank of srota'apanna (cf. Willemen, 74 f.).
Before going on to consider what is said in the Kosa and the
it would be well to mention that the 88 anwayas mentioned
above are all to be eliminated by 'view' (darsanaprahiitavya, darsanaheya,
dr:ggheya). To them are added 10 that are to be eliminated by 'realiza-
tion' (meditation, 'development', bhiivaniiprahiitavya, bhiivaniiheya), viz.,
raga, moha and mana on the level of the Sphere of Desire, these
four less on the level of the two upper spheres. The
deals with the saptakr:tparama in T27.240b-241b. A summary now
follows.
The number 7 does not refer to a total of seven births, but rather
to a maximum of seven births (upapattibhava) in each of two spheres,
devaloka and as well as in the intermediate existences
(antarabhava) preceding them. Several reasons are given for the
19
maximal number 7, not all of which are understood to me, but which I
reproduce here forwhat they are worth, at times in my own words, at
others in those of M. Louis de La Vallee-Poussin.
20
1. Si plus (de sept), si moins, on produirait doute; qu'il naisse
dans sept existences ne contredit pas Ie dharmalaksana, c' est-a.-dire
Ia nature des chases, et n'est pas critiquable. .
2.The vipakahetu has the power of generating only so many
vipakaphalani, no more.
3. En outre, par la force de l'acte, il prend sept existences; par
la force du Chemin il n'en prend pas une huitieme. De meme que
l'homme mordu par Ie serpent-des-sept-pas fait sept pas par la
force des grands elements et, par la force du poison, n'en fait pas
un huitieme. En outre, s'il prenait huit existences, il ne posse de-
rait pas Ie Chemin dans sa huitieme naissance, car la nature dli
Chemin est qu'il ne peut s'appuyer sur un huitieme corps du
Kimadhatu. If there were no aryadharma from this putative
eighth rebirth onwards, then there would be no sa.tyadarsana
(beyond the first?), nor any aryaphalaprapti or abhisamaya, and
after the achievement of aryatva one would revert to pr:thagjanata.
Since none of this is true, there is no eighth rebirth.
4. If there were an eighth rebirth, one would outpass the
trailokya, gain arhatsamyaksa7!fbuddhadharmavinaya (?) exceeding
the number of Ganges's sands and no longer be of the Buddha's
company, just as beyond the seventh degree of kinship there are
no relations.
5. At the time of tseng shang jen (dulfkhanirodhagaminya7!f
pratipadi apart from seven rebirths as deva
and mamqya in the Sphere of Desire and one rebirth in each of the
two upper spheres, one can gain apratisa7!fkhyanirodha in any
A dharma subjected to apratisamkhyanirodha no longer
makes its appearance, hence only seven rebirths.
6. There are only seven sthanas (ch'u Ie. ) in the Sphere of
Desire, viz., that of humans (mamqyaloka) and six of gods
(devaloka), hence 'seven births' means one in each.
7. There are limits to the force of the nine classes of klesa,
hence only seven rebirths. (?)
8. In the course of seven rebirths one perfects the seven
sa7[lbodhyangas (limbs of enlightenment); no more than seven are
required. 18
9. In the course of seven rebirths one perfects seven asrayani-
yamas and seven aryamargas.
19
10. In the course of seven rebirths, one thoroughly counter-
acts seven anufayas.
20
-The number 7 is a maximal number; there may be seven each
among gods and men, or there may be uneven numbers, i.e., one less in
one sphere than in the other, anywhere from 6:7 or 7:6 to 1:2 or 2:l.
Q. Where does the paripuTr!asrota'apattika (? yuan man yu liu',l)
fulfIll his seven rebirths? Is it among gods or men that he completes his
seventh rebirth and experiences parinirvana?
A. There is a conflict of theories.
1. The birth in the course of which one attains srata'apattiphala
counts as one of the seven. In other words, if it is birth as a god,
one still has to go through seven as a human, and vice versa.
2. The birth in question is not reckoned into the total. A god
must come back for seven rebirths as a god, a man as a man.
The first view is mistaken. (This is followed by arguments in refutation.)
Q. If one fulfills the seven rebirths in a Buddha-less age, does one
attain arhattva as a (lay) householder (gr:hastha)? -
A. Again, there is a conflict of two views.
1. It is impossible to attain to arhattva as a householder.
2. One may attain arhattva as a householder, then go on to join
the Order, for one may be a disciple of the Buddha in terms of the
Dharma (? fa erh Fa ti tzu;1 ,1iJ fi/J #> f, dharmata Buddhas4yalf?) The
case is like that of the five hundred rsis who cultivated the Path on
Mount at bottom sravakas in:a Buddha-less age, who later
imitated an ape that had appeared before them in the guise of a
disciple of the Buddha. By imitating the ape, they attained to
pratyekabadhi, 21 'because, being adepts, they were not the
recipients of the signs of non-believers'. (This is followed by some
discussion of transmigration under the term liu chuan wang lai
;tc. # 1i *- ).
There is more on the kulaT(lkula in Abhidharmamahavibhasa 53
(T27.274b-277a). It is paraphrased belqw.
There are cases in which the fetters (of sensation, notion, consti-
tuents and cognition, vedanasaT(lskaravijiianabandhanani?) are 'not
unsevered', i.e., those of the kulamkula, of the sakrdagamin and of the
ekavzcin.
22
Between the one who severs the sharp-middle defilements
among those which, belonging to the Sphere of Desire, are to be
eliminated by realization and the one who severs the slight defilements
of sensation, etc., on the same level is found the kulamkula, who has
severed the first three or four on the level of the Sphere of Desire, as
21
well as the sensations, notions, constituents and cognition that go with
them. In other words, the kulaJ!Lkula remains subject to the remaining
five or six. The sakrdagamin severs six, is left with three. The ekav"icin
severs seven or eight, is left with one or two. This is the meaning of ' not
unsevered' .
As to visible matter, the anagamin already free of attachment
thereto, free of its fetters on the fifth bhumi (i.e., ort the lowest of the
arupyas?), is also free of attachment to the third dhyana, but not to the
fourth. So it goes down to the third bhumi (the third dhyand?), where the
anagamin is free of attachment to the first dhyana, but not to the second.
One free of the fetters of visible matter on the second bhumi (the second
dhyana?) is not yet free of the taints (jan'#; , meaning the obstacles,
n"ivaraTfa?) of the first dhyana.
Q. If the sensations, etc., are severed, have the fetters thereof thereby
been removed?
A. Both are true of the arhant with respect to sensations, etc.,
removable whether by view or by realization in all three spheres (those
of Desire, of Form and of Formlessness).
2. The anagamin free of attachment to akiJ!Lcanyayatana (second-
highest stage in the Sphere of Formlessness) is free of the fetters of
sensation, etc., on all levels. And so on down to the one not yet free of
attachment to the first dhyana, who is free of the fetters of sensation,
etc., to be eliminated by view in all three spheres and by realization on
the first bhumi (i.e., the first dhyana?).
3. The one free of attac;hment to vijiiananantyayatana (the second
stage in the Sphere of Formlessness) but not to akiJ!Lcanyayatana is free
also of the fetters of sensation, etc., to be eliminated by view in all three
spheres and by realization on the first seven bhumis (i.e., everything
from the first dhyana up to and including naivasaJ!Ljiianasa1!l:iiiayatana or
bhavagra).
4. And so on down to the one who has not severed his attachment
to the first dhyana but who has severed the fetters of sensation, etc., to
be eliminated by view of all three spheres and by realization on the
lowest bhumi (i.e., the first dhyana?).
5. The srota'apanna and the sakrdagamin have severed the fetters of
sensation, etc., to be eliminated by view in all three spheres.
6. There are some who have severed the fetters of sensation, etc.,
but who still have not rid themselves of their fetters, viz., a. kulaJ!Lkula,
b. sakrdagamin, c. ekav"icika. (The above is repeated about their respective
levels.) This is what is meant by 'having severed the fetters but being
22
not yet rid of them' (yi tuan fei Ii hsi (', 1(. chinnavztasa7[Lyojana?).
Q. We are dealing with one who rids himself of one degree or two of
defilements and of the sensations, etc., that go with them. Why is he not
listed under srota'apanna? Why single out the kula7[Lkula, sakrdagamin
and ekavlcika who are not yet rid of their fetters, whether they have
severed them or not?
A. Where the srota'apanna is concerned, the statement does not apply
to the sakalabandhana ('Ie saint qui n'a pas coupe une des passions a
couper par Ie chemin mondain'), but it does apply to all the other three,
since the former is not necessarily destined for destruction of the said
passions (aniyatavinasabhimukhya?), while the latter are destined not to
destroy them (niyatavinasabhimukhya?).
Also, the srota'apanna, in the case of the severance of one or two
classes of klesa (defilement, affliction), experiences no interruption by
death and rebirth (cyutyupapatti). One who has severed five classes of
defilements is called a yogacarya; once he has attained to srota'apattiphala,
he makes a great effort to eliminate his defilements on the level of the
Sphere of Desire, that are to be eliminated by realization, for he can
have no cyutyupapatti before eliminating the major (?) class of defile-
ments. If he has severed five classes of defilements, there can be
absolutely no cyutyupapatti for him until he has severed the sixth class as
well. Since the three types, beginning with the kula7[Lkula, invariably
have cyutyupapatti, they are mentioned apart from the srota'apanna . ...
The kulal[l-kula is one kind of srota'apanna, the ekavlcika one kind of
sakrdagamin. There are two kinds of kula7[Lkula, those born into two
kulas and those born into three. The former has severed the first four
classes of defilements in the Sphere of Desire, and has the seeds of only
two left; the latter, having severed the first three, has three left.
Q. Why is there no kula7[Lkula who has severed five classes of defilements?
A. Anyone who has severed five has automatically severed six, and is
thereby a sakrdagamin. The sixth class is weak and cannot resist the
sakrdagamin, just as a thin thread is not enough to pull an elephant. The
ekavlcika is one who has severed seven or eight ....
23
For the KoSa's position, cf. L VP 6.200,206.
next sloka reads as follows:
When six are complete, he is the one who once goes and comes,
While one separated from eight is said to be of One Seed.
When all nine have been annihilated, he is a non-returner,
For he has already left the cesspool of desire.
The commentary is as follows: The first foot means that upon
exhaustion of six varieties of defilements, to wit, the three sharp ones
and the three middling ones, he is a sakrdagamin. To him are left one
birth above the heavens and one birth among men.' When he has once
gone and come back, he shall achieve parinirvarJa. This is why he is
called sakrdagamin. The second foot means that upon the exhaustion of
eight varieties he is an ekabZjin. To him is left but one birth, which is why
he is called ekabZjin ('of one seed'). The third foot means that upon the
exhaustion of all nine he is called anagamin. He is called that because he
does not come back to the Sphere of Desire. The reason is that he is
finally out of the cesspool (quagmire) of desire.
N arendrayasas has verses that say in effect the same thing as those
of Samghadeva, as well as a commentary that begins and ends virtually
the same way. His commentary to the second foot, however, is different
enough to merit separate treatment. 'One separated from eight is of
one seed' he explains by saying that 'one seed' (ekaT[l bZjam) means the
seed of one birth (yi sheng chung tzu - 1. 11 f:, ekasya jater bZjam?). 'Such a
man has but one remaining birth, whether among gods or among men.'
The last expression (jo jen jo t'ien :,; J... '?J :R.., representing manu:;yesu va
devesu va?) is followed by the expression yi chungyi chung tzu - it - # -t,
which, if not a copyist's error, is tautological. The first yi has the variant
reading erh =- , 'two', which may simply be a clumsy way of saying that
there are two kinds of rebirth, one among gods, one among men, erh
chung=- -ti standing for something such as dvayor vidhyoh. If that is the
reading then the yi chung tzu that follows begins the next sentence,
which reads, '''One seed" means one seed among men, one seed among
gods.' The next sentence is also a bit opaque, for it reads huo fan nao ch'a
pieh mingyi chung tzu:A ~ 1: f 7i'J 3; - {-1. -t, which I take to be a literal trans-
lation of something such as atha va kle'saviSe:;a ekaliijam ity ucyate, signifying,
possibly, that there is one particular kind of defilement-or, rather,
residue of defilement-called 'one seed'. That is followed by something
even more opaque: tang chih ssu-t'o-han kuo chang sheng tao she
l;t }011 If, 4'- -* 'f tIt t4, which may represent the following: srota'apatti-
phalena:ryamargaf?, sa'f!lgrhyata iti jiiatavyam. Again, if I am right, the text is
saying what there seems to be no need to say, namely, that the srota-
'apanna belongs to the aryamarga, i.e., that he is no longer of the world.
As already stated, the remainder of Narendrayasas's commentary is
more or less the same as Samghadeva's.
SaqJ.ghavarman, as already indicated, expresses the same idea in
three'slokas, each followed by its own commentary_ The first reads thus:
24
-One who has severed six classes of defilements
And who, on the path of view, has severed all
Is called a sakrdagamin,
Which means that he has not yet gone forward (?).
The commentary says, in effect, the following: If one has severed, on
the plane of the Sphere of Desire, the 'upper three and the middle
three' (i.e., adhimatra and madhya) among the defilements t.o be
eliminated by realization, as well as all of the defilements to be
eliminated by view, if one resides in the Fruit in question without going
forward (?), one is called a sakrdagamin.
Q. What does that word mean?
A. It means that, when his life has come to an end, he is born as a god in
the Sphere of Desire, then returns once to the world of men, after
which he experiences parinirvana.
The next sloka reads as follows:
If, having severed seven or eight classes,
One achieves faculties that counteract them,
Then, for the rest, one shall experience but one rebirth,
And shall be called a person of 'one seed'.
-
Commentary: Anyone who has severed, within the Sphere of Desire,
seven or eight classes of those defilements to be eliminated through
realization, as well as all of those to be eliminated through view, thereby
gains the faculties free of outflows (sraddha, vzrya, smrti, samadhi, prajfia,
anajiiiitam ajiiasyami, ajiia, ajiiatavi, known collectively as anasravendriyar:i
wu lou ken '4 #J that. counteract them. Anyone destined for a single
rebirth is called a person of 'one seed' (yi chung tzu - it -t, ekab1jin).
There are three contributing causes, no one of which may be missing if
a person is to be an ekab1jin.
23
A devaikabljin is born once as a god and
then achieves parinirvana. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of a
He is called ekab1jin because he bears the seed of but
one birth more.
Q. Why is a person an ekab1jin for severing eight classes of defilements
while one who has severed five is not a kularrtkula?
A. Even if one who severed six classes of defilements were a kulamkula,
he would still be reborn in the Sphere of Desire, which means that the
karmakleSas of that sphere are no obstacle (to the achievement within
that sphere of the status of a kularrtkula).24 The ekab1jin, on the other
hand, an ekab1jin who had eliminated all nine classes of defilements,
25
would be born in the Sphere of Form, which means that the karmakld
as
of the Sphere of Desire would definitely be an obstacle (to rebirth in
that sphere).25 The ekabljin is a superior sakrdagamin.
The third sloka reads as follows:
One who has eliminated nine classes is a non-returner.
It is to be known that there are many kinds,
Whether five, or seven, or eight,
While some say that they are more numerous yet.
This leads to the topic of the anagamin proper, a subject to which a
separate study has been devoted.
NOTES:
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada.
1. Charles Willemen, The Essence ojMetaphysics. Bruxelles: Publications de I'Institut
des Hautes Etudes Bouddhiques, serie "Etudes et Textes," 1975. In this translation, Mr.
Willemen gives, and defends, Abhidharmah!daya for the title and Dharmalii for the
author's name.
2. Willemen 71 (104) translates as follows: 'Afterthe highest worldly dharma one
is certain to produce a patient acceptance of dharma. After the patient acceptance one
produces the knowledge. Both realize the lower suffering.' While Mr. Willemen's inter-
pretation, at the beginning, makes more sense, my own is, I believe, defended by the
three commentaries, all of which gloss tz'u :j: with tz'u ti r,.
3. Narendrayasas and Sarpghavarman mention that, by seeing the supreme
worldly dharmas in the Sphere of Desire, one severs ten defilements (anuSaya), to wit, a.
the false view of a substantial personality b. the views of the two extremes
viz., those of the impossibility of self-extrication from the worldly round,
lasvatavada, and of the denial of reincarnation, ucchedavada), c. the false view that one's
deeds have no bearing on one's destiny d: the equally false view that one may
pick and choose one's beliefs at will e. the no less false view that one may
attain to deliverance by the religious practices and rituals of one's own choice (s"ilavrata-
paramarsa) , f. lust (for the unwholesome, raga), g. malice (towards the wholesome,
pratigha), h. delusion (as to the object of f. and g. moha), i. pride (as to one's own imagined
religious attainment, mana), j. doubt (as to the validity of the Buddha's teachings,
vicikitsa). In this context, shih if, usually kle'sa, here represents, rather, anu'saya.
4. If this, indeed, is the meaning of pu tso pu !!siang pu !!sing ;f. it ;f. ("} ;r. H .
5. The word 'certainties' in the first sentence renders ting :t. , which is, without
much doubt, niyama or niyama. What this seems to mean is that, given a certain condition
in the laukikagradharma, a certain fixed condition must also obtain with respect to
duqkhadharmaksanti, and that there is no room for uncertainty or for any alternative.
26
The only analogue I can find is in Abhidharmamahavibh{4a 3 (T27.13c), whose
contents might be paraphrased as follows: Laukikagradharma and
have four points at which they coincide (ssu shih teng'19 catasraq. samataq.?), namely,
a. Equality of ground (ti teng"rIL bhumisamata?). By this is meant that, whatever
the ground on which one attains that is also the ground on which one
attained laukikagraharma.
b. Equality of base (ken teng, asrayasamata?). Whatever the base(s) connected
(hsiang ying fa JJIJ., samprayukta) with they are .also the ones
connected with laukikagradharma. (If one wonders what is the difference between bhumi
and asraya, it is more than possible that ken, here as elsewhere, represents indriya after
all, but in the broader, rather than in the narrower, sense.)
c. Hsing 11- teng. Here, however, as in the case of Saf!1ghabhadra, the context does
not indicate the meaning of the first syllable, a many-faceted word. The difficulty is
compounded by the commentary, in which hsing hsiangh fBis used as a verb. Hsing hsiang
is, to be sure, used in Hsiian-tsang's translations, but it seldom is an exact equivalent for a
Sanskrit term. The cases that I have been able to verify use the word to represent praklira
and akara, respe.;:tively. The meaning appears to be the manner in which -----
behaves or appears to behave. Here, however, it is being used as a verb, which makes it
difficult to construe, May it possibly represent akarayati, used in the sense of marking or
of characterizing an aspect?
d. 'Equality of object' (so yuan Fi ftcteng, seems to mean that what
was the object (ching <t, v4aya) of one's attention in the one case iflikewise so in the other.
6. I am not certain of having fully understood what has been rephrased above.
The 'puzzling' statement is endorsed by the AbhidharmakoSa. Cf. L VP 6.166.
7. Mr. Willemen refers to p. 84 of his own work, where one reads, 'These three
knowledges (dharmajiiana, anvayaO, sa7(!vrtijiiana) comprise all knowledges. Among them,
knowledge of dharma is called the pure knowledge that takes as its range suffering,
origination, cessation and the path within the realm of desire. Because in its range one
experiences for the first time the characteristics of dharma, it is called knowledge of
dharma.' I have taken some liberties with Mr. Willemen's English, which is occasionally
less than it should be.
8. Chueh ting'?'; ;[almost certainly stands for niyama or niyama. Cf. L VP 6.180. IfI
have understood correctly; niyama is nirva,,!a, while niyama is the quality of having nirva,,!a
as one's sole object. L VP has, in the notes to 6.180-3, a great deal of additional
information induding material on niyama niyama nyama, a word of obviously uncertain
etymology tht has given rise to much fanciful speculation.
9. The avarabhag'iyasa7(!yojanani are the mistaken view of a substantial personality
the mistaken view that the religious observances of one's own choice
(Brahmanical ones are meant) will conduce to salvation (Szlavrataparamarsa), doubt as to
the validity of the Buddha's Doctrine (vicikitsa) , lustful attachment to the Sphere of
Desire (specifically sexual desire, kamacchanda) and malice (vyapada).
10. The chief difficulty is that one is here dealing with the sixteenth abhisamaya, by
which time the darSanamarga has presumably been left .behind. That, at least, is the
position of the Kosa, a position with which the present text appears to disagree. The nine
categories of bonds, mentioned above on all levels, that of the Sphere of Desire, of the
four dhyanas and of the four arupyas.
27
II. Best explained in LVP 4.3 sq., no. 2: "Lorsqu'un homme ordonne un
assassinat, il n'accomplit pas Ie geste par lequelle meurtre est perpetre; l'ordre qu'il
donne est seulement un preparatif de meurtre; il n'est pas coupable de "l'information
corporelle de meurtre". Mais, (4) au moment ou meurt l'assasine, une "non-informa_
tion" de meurtre nait en lui: il est, de ce fait, coupablede meurtre.' 'Non-information' is
L VP's equivalent for avijnapti.
12. This refers to a of the ten basic anulayas among the Three Spheres.
The ten are a) satkaydrHi, the view either that the death of the body is all-final, i.e., a denial
of reincarnation, or that a termination of reincarnation is impossible, i.e., a denial of
niTTJa"f!a, c) 'false view' specifically the view that the moral (or immoral) quality
of one's acts will have no effect on one's next incarnation, d) drefiparamarsa, the notion
that one may have what views one pleases, with no significant effects, d) Silavratapharamarsa,
arbitrary choice of disciplinary codes and of vows, specifically of Brahmanical vows and
practices, with a mistaken belief in their efficacy, f) raga, desire for the unwholesome,
g) abhorrence of the wholesome, h) moha, inability to distinguish between the two,
i) mana, pride, specifically the false ascription to oneself of specific degrees of enlighten-
ment and/or saintliness,j) vicikitsa, doubt as to the truth of the Buddha's teachings. In the
Sphere of Desire, all alike have to do with the First Noble Truth (10); all but a), b) and d)
with t.he Second (7) and Third (7); all but a) and b) with the Fourth (8). In the two upper
spheres the situation is the same, except for the total absence of g). Thus, in the Sphere of
Desire one has 32, in the Sphere of Form 28 and in the Sphere of Formlessness 28,
yielding a total of 88.
13. Anagamya, as already indicated, is the stage preparatory to the First Dhyana.
In the context, srota'apattiphala can refer only to pratipatti, while 'dwells .. .' refers to the
phala itself. Anagamya is my rendition of wei chi hsing t #.- 11, meaningless on the face of it,
but where I read chin 1Ii for chi, on the basis both of the verse and of a variant reading. If
I have understood this correctly, it means that a srota'apattiphalapratipannaka is one who
has rid himself of all eighty-eight anulanamarga, while srota'apanna is one who has
reached anagamya. This is possible, of course, only if one assumes that there is ahsiang{OJ
missing before hsu-t'o-huan kuo It ii f. .
14. Ch. sanchieh .:: it. I do not know the basis of this question, but see below.
15. The Chinese word used here is shih {t, whose literal meaning, in the present
context, is 'something that sends one about on errands', in this case fruitless, even
harmful, ones.
16. 'Inclarity' renders wu in, usually the equivalent of avidya, but here
plainly standing for moha, 'delusion', specifically the inability to distinguish the whole-
some from the unwholesome. The 'five views' are the first five anulayas. 'Lust' here
renders ai 'f: , the usual equivalent of lit. 'thirst', but here standing for raga. 'Anger'
renders yi,! one of the equivalents of Although the Skt. word and unmistakeably
means 'hatred', all Ch. versions, withoutexception, render it with 'anger'. Plainly, there is
something at work he're that we do not fully understand;
17. 'Prime mover' renders chuan t,f., representing pravartaka, while 'secondary
mover' renders sui chuan /;1 ft, which, in turn, represents anuvartaka. Cf. L VP 4.35-40.
18. The seven are those of a. mindfulness (smrti
c
, nien chueh chih lJ, b. dharma
selection (i.e., the sorting out of the wholesome and of the unwholesome, dharmapravicayaO,
tse fa :tf;J,), c. exertion (v'iryaO, ching chin iff ilL ), d. zest (piiti, hsi .t-), e. relaxedness
28
(prasrabdht, ch'ing an'! f. concentration (samadhio, ting ;.;t), g. equanimity
saT[Lbodhyanga, she chueh chih tt ,'1; J. ).
19. It is impossible to say whether ch'i yi ting -!:" #.if. represents or
sapta In either case, I do not" know what is meant. As for aryamarga, "I
presume it to-refer to seven members of the Noble Eightfold Path, but I do not know which.
20. Again, which seven?
21. Cf. Divyavadana, p. 349 f.; Mulasarvastivadavinayavastu (Gilgit mss, vol. 3, pt. 1,
Srinagar, 1947), p. 4, 1. 17 ff.; Scripture of King Asoka (A-yu wang ching N 1 :.!.! )
6 (T50.149c); Scripture of the Life of King Asoka (A-yii wangchuan if- ching) 3 (T50.111c);
Sarvastivadavinayabha4ajyavastu 9 (T42.24a); Scripture of the Wise Man and the Fool
(Hsien yu ching 13 (T4.443c); 30 (T27.156b); Abhidharmakosa 12
(T29 .64b); Shun cheng Ii lun !'Ii if 11 (T29 .524a). For additional information, cf. L VP
3.195, particularly n. 2.
22. For the position of the Kosa, see below. A summary of the Theraviida view of
this whole question will be found in Puggalapannatti 15 f.
One destined for a maximum of seven births is one who has become a stream-
winner after eliminating three categories of passions and thus being destined for
perfect enlightened intuition. After traversing the world of gods and men seven
times, he puts an end to his woe.
It will have been noticed that the matter of 'seven births' is ambiguous. Does it mean a
total of7, or does it mean 7 each, i.e., 14? With the substitution of2 or 3 for 7, the proposi-
tion applies to the Kolarp.kola. The ekabijin (ekavzcin, ekavlcika) experiences one human
rebirth, then 'puts an end to woe'. Having severed the same defilements, this practitioner
is characterized even more than the previous ones by 'thinness of lust, hatred and
delusion', and is thus destined to put an end to his woe after but one return to this world.
23. To repeat the formulation given in LVP 6.209,
a. Parce qu'iJ abandonne sept ou huit categories de passions.
b. Parce qu'il acquiert les facultes opposees a ces passions.
c. Parce qu'il n'a plus a renaitre qu'une fois.
24. The Kosa, it will be recalled, merely says that the kulaT[Lkula abandons no more
than four classes of defilements, 'parce que, lorsque la cinquieme categorie est
abandonnee, la sixieme l'est certainement aussi, et Ie saint devient donc SakJ;diigamin'.
Presumably, he still remains in the Sphere of Desire.
25. This (corresponding to a statement in LVP 6.209) is followed by another
statement, that seems to mean the following: 'This is why it is stated that the deeds of
beings in three places (san ch'u chung sheng yeh3E- It If<. Ii. f., traisthanikanaT[L sattvanaT[L
karmaTfi?) are "extremely disturbing" (chi tso nao luan 1'-} 111:;' ,L). The "three places" shall
be explained below.'
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE
The author humbly and apologetically calls to the reader's attention a serious error in
interpretation towards the end of the second paragraph on p. 13. Gh'ao sheng Ii sheng is a
literal rendition, as a noun, of niyamakranti; as a verb. of niyamam avakTamati. The Chinese
expression literally means jumping (ava-), rises (kTamti) t6 separation (ni-) from rawness
29
(ama)', interpreting niyama as if it were nirama, i.e., ni + rama. For more on this somewhat
puzzling word, cf. n. 8 and the literature cited there. The same comment applies to the
paragraph bestriding pp. 17 and 18. N. 8 mentionschueh ting, a more rational equivalent
of niyama (niyama, nyama). It is unlikely that, at the time these tr<y!slations were made, the
Chinese knew, or even suspected, that chueh ting and li sheng represented the same
original. The whole expression refers to the attainment of certainty.
30
Indrabhiiti's "Confession of Errors in the
Roots and Branches of the Vajrayana":
.A Critical Edition, English Translation
and Discussion *
by Nathan Katz
Introduction
1. The Text
The VajraycLna mula:ngapatti desana (Tibetan: rDo rje thegpa'i rtsa ba
dangyan lag gi ltung ba'i bshags pa), or Confession of Errors in the Roots and
Branches of the Bajrayana, by the tantric master Indrabhiiti' (also
known as Indrabodhi), is found in two editions of the bsTan 'gyur,
namely the sNar thang and Peking editions. To the best of our
information,l it is absent in the Co ne and sDe rge editions. We have
found neither commentary nor specific reference to it in other tantric
writings, although the issues involved in tantric confessions have been
discussed by such authors as Kong sprul,
2
the Sa skya Paqdita,
3
the
Seventh Dalai Lama
4
and Tsong kha pa,s and we shall employ some of
their observations in our discussion of themes in the present text.
Our text is quite short. In the sN ar thang edition it covers fascicles
114b-115b of volume Pu, and in the Peking edition it is found from
fascicle l16b to lISa of volume Pu. The Otani catalogue numbers it
4626, and it is not found in the Tohuku catalogue.
Our critical edition is made from a comparison of the Peking and
sN ar thang texts. Almost all divergences seem to involve errors in
transcription alone, although there seems t.o be one significant differ-
ence
6
where the Peking edition makes reference to the dkyil 'khor
(mar!4ala) and the sNar thang edition is of ambiguous reference.
31
II. The Author of the Text
The present text was written by one Indrabhuti or Indrabodhi,
an eighth-century tantric author from Urgyen (currently Swat state of
Pakistan). According to his hagiography,7 he was king of his region and
an extremely accomplished tantric master. At some point during his
reign, Indrabhuti became inspired by the commitment to Buddhist
practice by his sister, Lakshminkara, another in the traditional listing
of the eighty-four grub chen (mahasiddhas). Feeling a life dedicated
merely to one's own self-aggrandizement not to be worthwhile, Indra-
bhuti handed the government over to his son and began practicing
Buddhism seriously but secretively. Having attained phyags chen
(mahamudra) after twelve years' arduous practice, Indrabhuti appeared
in the sky to his subjects, who attained the first bhumi on seeing this
miracle. Remaining in the sky for seven days, he preached about the
inaccessibility of Dharma to mundane thought. His hagiography (rnam
thaT) concludes with the attainment of religious ecstacy by his audience,
expressed through the metaphor of sky-walking (mkha' spyod).
In the Tibetan tradition, especially the rNying rna and bKa'
brgyud lineages, Indrabhuti's importance exceeds that of many of the
other of the eighty-four grub chen. He is paid great homage by the
tradition, which ascribes to him the role of teacher of Nagarjuna (kLu
sgrub), and that of foster-parent of 8 Probably for
these reasons, B. Bhattacharyya
9
claims he was the very founder of the
Vajrayana itself, a claim we find exaggerated although not totally
without support.
Several of Indrabhuti's works have been included in bsTan 'gyUT,
including some sadhana and commentorial writings.
III. Analysis of the Text
As the title indicates, our text is concerned with a confession
(desana; bshags pa) of errors (apatti; ltung ba) in tantric Buddhist practice.
This is significant for any understanding of Vajrayana Buddhism,
since a clear notion of what is taken to be an error in practice would
suggest a great deal about the tantric Weltanschauung in general. In
order to get a clear picture of the tantric usages of "error" and "vow"
(sdom pa), we propose to compare them with similar structures found in
the Theravada and Mahayana Buddhist traditions, in particular the
32
Theravada Patmokkha (or savakayana-pratimok:ja, as it would be known
in Mahayana texts) and the BodhisattvaPratimok:ja Sidra. By so doing, we
should be able to get some notion as to the continuities and divergences
among these three styles (yana; theg pa) of Buddhism.
A traditional Vajrayana hermeneutical device has been to speak
about these three yanas in terms of body, speech and mind, and we wish
to employ this indigenous tool to assist in clarifying the issues involved
in these three types of vows-a topic about which we find a good deal of
secondary literature from the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. We offer
that the savakayana pratimok:ja, as found in the Pali Patimokkha texts,
contains vows regarding the body, especially when 'body' (kaya; sku) is
taken in the sense of intentionality or embodiment of volitions; that the
bodhisattva deals essentially with vows about speech, when
'speech' (vaca; ngag) is taken in the sense of our communicative abilities
in terms of teaching others, the major concern of the bodhisattvayana in
general; and that tantric vows, the type found in our present text, deal
with the mind (citta; sems) , especially that mind which indulges in
conceptualizations (vikalpa; rtogs pa) as a style of avoiding what is
actually given in a situation (dngos po).
The Tibetan commentorial tradition generally sees restraint
from misdeeds as the distinguishing feature (mtshan gzhi) of the
srcLVakayana pratimok:ja, and in reading through the Bhikkhupatimokkha 10
one sees that all of the apatti or errors involve certain behaviors under-
stood as misdeeds, and that the vows undertaken by a bhikkhu are
essentially restraints against these misdeeds. Citing the Abhidharmakosa-
{ika, Kong spruIll gives this etymology for sravakayana "As it
restrains body and speech (from misdeeds), thus it is called
vows or restraints."
Although the Sa skya PaDdita, in his sDom gsum, 12 tells us that all
three types of vows are harmonized in the tantric path, and that these
three vows are likened to the three jewels, nevertheless the restraining
character of the sravakayana is understood as being at a lower
level than the bodhisattva or tantric (vidyadhara) vows, and it is
potentially subject to abrogation by these vows understood as higher.
Similarly, Kong sprul
13
says that the distinguishing feature of the
sravakayana is: " ... morality which is not merely aspiring for
the refuge of protection from fear and the wish for something good,
but the thought of gaining peace for oneself (rang nyid shi ba) and
developing a strong feeling of disgust (nges par 'byung pa) for the whole
cycle of samsara." Of course, in Tibetan Mahayana literature the idea of
33
rang shi or 'self-pacification' is thought to be of a much lower order than
the noble aspiration <pranidhana) of the bodhisattva to save all sentient
beings, so the nature of the sravakayrma is understood as
lower than that of the bodhisattva.
The vows undertaken by the bodhisattva chiefly deal with the
cultivation and maintainence of bodhicitta, which is thought of attaining
complete enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings. The
B odhisattva Sutra 14 rather self-consciously distinguishes itself
from the sr(wakay(ma It says that the distinguishing feature
of the bodhisattva is that the bodhisattva works for the good
(artha; don) of all sentient beings, while the 'savaka, who need not do so,
is basically concerned with his own goal.
Kong sprul
15
tells us that the bodhisattva vows involve four aspects:
"(I) a special objective, namely being motivated by the attitude of
acquiring samyaksambodhi (rdzogs pa'i byang chub) for the benefit of
others; (2) trying to practice the factors conducive to samyaksambodhi
(mthun phyogs); (3) abandoning all vulgar behaviors (nyes spyod) which
are adverse to samyaksambodhi; and (4) morality of renunciation (nges
'byung), together with a mind in accord with all of the above." Thus,
according to both Kong sprul and the Bodhisattva Sutra, what
is essentially different about the bodhisattva vows is a concern for
others, and it is in this sense that we maintain the relevance of the
speech-communicativeness metaphor for the bodhisattva vows. That
this concern is higher than the concerns of the sravaka is indicated by
the Sa skya Pandita's maintaining
16
that the Sravaka vows are binding
only for a single lifetime, while the bodhisattva vows carry from pirth to
birth.
The tantric or vidyadhara vows deal with obscurations of mind
(/iieyavaran:a; shes sgrib). Kong spruP7 tells us that the nature (ngo bo) of
tantric vows is: " ... to be restrained (sdom) from the preconceptions of
subject/object with its instincts ('pho ba'i bag chags) , and to resolve to hold
the wisdom (ye shes; jiiana) of great bliss (mahasukha; bde chen) which
restrains, and the mind which trains itself by this method." He also
gives this etymology for 'vidyadhara vows' (rig 'dzin sdom): 18 Vidya means
"the excellent wisdom of the non-duality of subject/object, called 'the
wisdom of the great bliss'''; dhara means "though this vidya is unborn,
we re-call it" (slar gsal gtap pa); and vow means "the method of re-calling
it through the aspect of the deity (lha'i rnam par), or by being blessed
byin rlabs)."
Our text begins with a dedication to the vajraca'rya, the tantric guru,
34
to the vzra and vzra, embodiments of the heroic deeds of one striving for
enlightenment, and to the lord of the practice of yoga. There are then
fourteen specific confessions, followed by three verses of entreaty
which serve both to summarize the fourteen specific confessions and to
pray for the accomplishment of siddhi. It is to the fourteen specific
confessions that we wish to call attention.
Of these fourteen errors, eleven are dearly problems 'of conceptu-
alization. Of the remaining three, two deal with vows of secrecy
involved in tantric training, and one deals generally with the breaking
of vows. To summarize, the eleven errors of conceptualization are:
(1) undervaluing the guru; (2) disregarding Buddhist doctrines; (3)
not adequately respecting the intimacy of the 'tantric family' or
, teaching situation; (4) not generating sufficient loving thought (,byams
sems) for all beings who are potential Buddhas; (5) losing bodhicitta by
indulging in such conceptions as 'relative' and 'absolute'; (6)
insufficiently regarding the integrity of all philosophic systems
(siddhanta; grub mtha'), whether Buddhist or not; (7) regarding the five
skandhas as problematic, whereas in reality they are the five wisdoms;
(8) the prejudice of imposing affirmation or negation and moral judge-
ments onto one's experience; (9) infatuation with those who are
opposed to the Vajrayana; (10) imposing one's own personal affirma-
tion or negation onto the wisdom of sunyata; and (11) because of the
kleSa, not sufficiently regarding one's own insight into the Buddhist
path.
Clearly, then, the predominant notion of an 'error' in Indrabhuti's
texts involves the conceptualizing mind, and perhaps the harmony of
these three vows which the Sa skya P a ~ d i t a maintains is that of the
harmony of body, speech and mind, a harmony which is the goal of all
Buddhist practice.
35
English Translation
HUII?- Vajracarya, the one who is peerless
in the fundamentals of the mandala
to the vzra and the vzra, 1
the Yogesvara
2
and so forth,
I beg you to think of me compassionately.
I beg forgiveness from the trikiiya of the gurus
3
because, being intoxicated by the great disease of arrogance,
I have, by my recklessness, held the Vajraclrya,
who is the root of all siddhi, in contempt.
I sincerely declare and confess
having transgressed and disregarded,
by underestimating its worth,
the speeches from the holy mouths
of the indescribable Dharmakaya, the Sambhogakaya and
which exist for the benefit of others.
being anrgy with and rebuking the tantric family,4
which by one vows is conjoined
of one guru, one wisdom consort
6
and one man:qala,
especially in other times.
I sincerely declare and confess,
because I have been unskillful and totally influenced by hatred,
the giving up of all beneficial and loving thought?
for all sentient beings, who are endowed with Buddhagarbha, 8
the ability to become the holy, exalted offsprings of the Jina.
9
I sincerely declare and confess,
by having sucumbed to the influence of mundane preconceptions, 10
the abandonment of the blissful bodhicitta,
which is the nature of all phenomena,
beyond the ideas of relative and ultimate. 11
abusing the philosophic systems
I2
of outsiders, 13 sravakas, 14 pratyekabuddhas, 15 mahayanists
l6
and peerless secret mantrayanists,
those either seeking or having already entered the path. I?
the promulgation of secret mantras, mudras, signs, mantra,
profound secrets and so forth, to improper containers,
those degenerated from the rituals, immature and
not suitable receptacles for the profound mantrayana.
36
killing, hindering, bashing, mortifying, abusing and
regarding as inferior,
the five skandhas, 18
which are in reality the five Buddha-families
which are of the nature of the five wisdoms. 19
to the stainless Dharmadhatu
20
my prejudices which prevented me from realizing
that, although all phenomena are by nature pure,
they are labelled into two as 'yes/no' and 'good/evil'.
I sincerely declare and confess to the guru,
the triratna,21 my failure to convert,
in fact, my infatuation with, the people who abuse,
cast aspersions upon and disregard
the secret mantra and Vajrayana.
the labelling as 'yes' and 'no'
the great wisdom of the vacuity of constructed thought,22
in which there is not the least predicament
as all names are merely projections.
23
to those who are the devoted ones
and who follow the transmission
my being responsible 'for the loss of faith
of those who possess the initial disposition,
who are childlike,
by disclosing the profound words and tantric practices.
with a mind filled with extreme regret,
my not keeping by belittling
all branches of the vows
which should be known, safeguarded, engaged in and kept,
despite my knowing better.
to the common and special peerless wisdom consort
abusing and seeing the shortcomings and faults
of the holy insight
25
into the external, internal and
secret (levels), 26
having been motivated by the defilements.
27
Though confession and what is to be confessed
are non-objectifiable,
in order to eliminate the instinctive thought-constructs,
37
as I sincerely confess to the exalted object of the holy vows,
so may I have happiness.
Please grant forgiveness, 0 compassionate protector!
(I have) cultivated the wisdom-consort which has no vow,
argued in the offering-circle
28
and so forth,
taken the elixir
29
and the inferior wisdom-consort,
not preached to the right containers who aspire to the secret Dharma,
and misled the faithful ones with non-Dharmic talks, .
passed more than seven days among the sravakas, 30
claimed to be a tantrika only in name,
and wrongly disclosed mantra to improper containers,
contradicted and made mistakes in meditation and recitation
and committed errors of impure views and practice.
Please grant the siddhi of Brahma
31
quickly.
I declare and confess the degeneration of the vows of body.
I declare and confess the degeneration of the vows of speech.
I declare and confess the degeneration of the vows of mind.
I declare and confess the degeneration of the root vows.
I declare and confess the degeneration of the branch vows.
I declare, declare, declare to the wisdom deity.32
I confess, confess, confess to the assembly of the 1akinls33 of the vows.
By offering this declaration and confession,
please grant me the siddhi of Brahma.
38
Critical Edition
r Do rje theg pa'i rtsa ba dang yan lag gi ltung ba'i bshags pa
by Indrabhuti (Indrabodhi)
sNar thang edition: sNgags, vol. Pu, fascs. 114b-115b.
Peking edition: rGyud 'greI, vol. Pu, fascs. 116b-1l8a.
Otani number: 4626. "
hung rdo rje slob dpon rig mar mtshungs
1
pa dang
rtsa ba dkyil 'khor2 la bla na med
3
pa dang
dpa' bo dpa' mo mal 'byor dbang phyug sogs
mkha' 'gro'i tshogs rnams brtse bas dgongs su gsol
dngos sgrub rtsa ba rdo rje slob dpon la
nga rgyal mthon po'i nad kyis bdag gzer te
bag med tshul gyis bmyas pa gang bgyis pa
bla rna rnam gsum sku la bzod par gsol
chos sku
4
spros dang bral bde nyid la
longs spyod rdzogs dang sprul skus gzhan don mdzad
de yi5 zhal nas gsungs pa'i bka' mains las
'das shing khyad du bsad pa 'thollobshags
bla rna gcig dang rig rna gcig hyid dang
dkyil 'khor gcig dang bye brag dus gzhan du
dam tshig gcig gis bsdus pa'i spun mams la
khros shing nyis par brjod par6 'thollo bshags
sems can thams sangs rgyas snying po can
rgyal ba'i sras mchog dam par gyur pa la
bdag ni mi mkhas zhe sdad dbang du
7
gyur te
byams sems phan bde spangs pa mthollo bshags
chos "rnams thams cad byang chub sems yin
8
te
kun rdzob don dam cha lam rten cing
Jig rten mam rtog dbang du gyur pa yis
bde chen byang sems spangs pa 'thollo bshags
phyi rol pa dang nyan thos rang rgyal dang
theg pa che dang gsang sngags bla na med
lam tshol
9
ba dang de bzhin lam chen zhugs
grub pa'i mtha' mams smad pa 'thollo bshags
smod min chog nyams dang rna smin dang
zab mo gsang ba'i smod du mi rung
10
la
gsang sngags phyag rgya brda dang sngags la sogs
zab mo gsang ba bsgrags pa 'thollo bshags
39
phung po lnga ni rgyal ba rigs Inga'i dngos
ye shes lnga yi rang bzhin yin pa la
gsad bead bngeg dang dkar thub bsnyung ba sags
smad cing dam na par brtags pa mthollo bshags
chos rnams kun gyi rang bzhin dag pa la
yin dang min dang bzad Il gnyis su btags
rang bzhin dag pa'i 12 chos kyi dbyings nyid la
the tshom som nyi zos pa 'tholio bshags
bla ma dang ni dkon mchog gsum rnams dang
gsang sngags rdo rje theg la mi mos zhing
smod cing bkur pa 'debs pa'i mi rnams la
tshar 13 ma bead cing byams bgyis 'thol 10 bshags
ming rnams thams cad rnam par rtog
14
pa ste
15
rtog pas stong pa'i ye shes chen po nyid
'de Ie zug rdu rdul tsam med pa la
yin dang min 16 du btags pa 'thollo bshags
dang po'i las can gyis pa'i dang tshul can
dang ldan lung gi rjes su 'brang rnams la
zab mo'i tshig brjod brtul zhugs spyod bstan pas
pha ral sems sun phyung ba 'thollo bshags
mi spings spyad cing bsrung bar bya ba dang
shes par bya ba'i dam tshig yan lag bcas
shes bzhin khyad de gsang nas mi rten pa
rab tu 'gyod pa'i sems kyis 'thollo bshags
phyin ngag sang ba'i shes rab dam pa dang
thun mongs gyad par rig rna bla med la
skyon dang nyes pa'i sgo nas smad gyur pa
nyon mongs kun nas blad ba 'thollo bshags
bshags dang bshags par bya ba migs kyang
mam par rtog pa'i bag chags sbyan dya'i phyir
rje btsun dam pa yul gyi 'diog mams la
rab tu bshags pas bde ba thob gyur cig
dam tshig mi ldan rig ma brten pa dang
tshogs 'khor la sogs nad du bread pa dang
rig ma dman la 'dud rtsi blangs pa dang
gsang chos 'dod pa'i smod la rna bshags
dang ldan chos min gtam la sbyar ba dang
nyan thos nad du zhag bdun 'das pa dang
ming tsam la rten sngags pa yin smra dang
smod min pa la sngags bshad nyes pa dang
sgom bzlas la sogs 'gal 'khrul gyur pa dang
Ita sbyod la sogs ma dag nyes pa mams
mgon po thugs rje
17
can la bzod par gsol
40
tshangs pa'i dngas grub myur du stsal du gsal
sku'i dam tshig nyams pa 'thalIa bshags
gsung gi dam tshig nyams pa'thalla bshags
thugs kyi dam tshig nyams pa 'thaP
8
la bshags
rtsa ba'i dam tshig nyams pa 'thalIa bshags
yan lag dam tshig nyams pa 'thalIa bshags
19
'thaI 10 'thalIa ye shes lha la 'thaI bshags sa bshags sa
20
dam can mkha'
'gra tshigs
'thol bshags phul nas tshangs pa'i dngas grub stsal
zhes bshags sa
rda rje theg pa'i rtsa ba yan laggi21 ltung ba'i bshags pa
slab dpan in dra ba dhis mdzang pa rdzogs sa
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts
* A paper presented to International SemiJ;lar on Tibetan Studies, St. John's
College, Oxford University, July 1-7, 1979.
1. Personal communication 'from Professor Lewis Lancaster, University of
California at Berkeley, dated October 26, 1978.
2. Kong sprul, Theg pa'i sgo kun las btus pa gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod bslab pa gsum
legs par ston pa'i bstan bcos shesbya kun khyab (Shes bya kun khyab), ed. Lokesh Chandra, intro.
E. Gene Smith, Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Culture, Parts I-III, New Dellii:
International Academy ofIndian Culture, Series, Vol. 80, 1970.
3. Sa skya PaI'!-dita, Rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po'i lam gyi cha lag sdom pa gsum rnam
par nges pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos bzhugs so, n.p.: The Press of the Indestructable Sacred
Word, n.d.
4. dGe slong bLo bzang bskal bzang rgya mtsho (the Seventh Dalai Lama), gSang
chen rdo rje theg pa'i smin byed kyi dbang rjes gnang sogs kyi sngon 'gro'i ehes kyi gtam do bya ba
gzhan phan ra ster bzhugs, Tibetan wood-block text, Library of Tibetan Works and
Archives accession no. 1081.
5. Tsong Kha pa, sN gags Tim chen mo, in The ColleeteiWorks ofTsong kha pa, Peking
ed., Otani no. 6210. Partially translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, et. aI., Tantra in Tibet: The
Great Exposition on the Secret Mantra, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977.
6. See note 2 to the critical edition.
7. bLa ma chen po Mi Jigs pasbyin padpal, 'Phagsyulgrubchen bTgyadcurtsa bzhi'i
byin Tlabs skoT lus/ 10 rgyus rnam par thar pa rnams bzhugs so, Varanasi: E. Kalsang, 1972,
translated by Nathan Katz, "A Translation of the Biography of the Mahasiddha
Indrabhiiti with Notes," Gangtok: Bulletin ofTibetology, XII, 1, 1975.
8. W.Y. Evans-Wentz (ed.), The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, London and
New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
41
9. B. Bhattacharyya, The Indian Buddhist Iconography, Calcutta: Firma K.L.
Mukhopad 3rd edition, 1968, p. 57f.
10. Thera, ed. & tr., The Pa!imokkha: The Rule for Buddhist Monks,
Bangkok: King Maha Makuta's Academy, 1969.
11. Kong sprul, op. cit., 'grel, II: 38. Ius ngag sdom pa'i phyir so so thar pa'i sdom
pa shes bya'o. .
12. Sa skya op. cit., fasc. 55a.
13. Kong sprul, op. cit., 'grel, II: 37.
14. Nalinaksha Dutt, ed. & tr., "Bodhisattva Sutra," Indian Historical
Quarterly, VII, 1931, pp. 259-286, p. 278.
15. Kong sprul, op. cit., 'grel, II: 101.
16. Sa skya op. cit., fase. 2b.
17. Kong sprul, op. cit., 'grel, II: 136-137.
18. ibid., 'grel; II: 137.
NOTESTO THE TRANSLATION
1. Vira and vzra = dpa' bo dPa' mo, literally "hero" and "heroine," or the heroic
quality of striving for enlightenment, as indicated by the Tibetan translation of
'bodhisattva' by byang chub sems dpa'.
2. The 'lord of yoga' = yogelvara = mal 'byordbangphyug.
3. The 'trikaya of the gurus' = bla ma rnam gsum sku.
4. Tantric family' means vajrabandhu, or that which is joined in the Vajrayana.
In this case, the vajrabandhu is composed of one guru, one wisdom-consort (rigma) and
one mandala, brought together by the very nature of the vows, which are always described
as binding between the guru and disciple. '
5. 'Vow' in this instance is our translation of dam tshig or samaya.
6. The 'wisdom-consort' or rig ma (prajna) is the embodiment of the wisdom
principle in a feminine form. Of course, this symbol is found repeatedly in tantric
literature and iconography, and some dimensions of its usage are explored in my essay,
"Anima and mKha' 'gro rna: A Critical, Comparative Study of Jung and Tibetan
Buddhism," Dharamsala: The Tibet journal, II, 3,1977, pp. 13-43. .
7. 'Loving thought' is 'byams sems or maitri, which Kong sprul Cgrel, II: 101) says is
"the root of all virtue".
8 .Buddhagarbha or sangs rgyas snying po is the potentiality for awakening in all
sentient beings.
9. Jina or rGyal ba means 'the conqueror', an epithet of the Buddha and of the
highest Tibetan lamas, such as the Dalai Lama and the leaders of the other three lineages.
10. 'Mundane preconceptions', 'jig rten rnam rtog or vikalpa, are conceptual
devices employed by ego to avoid confronting its own insubstantiality.
11. B odhicitta, accoiding to bodhisattvayana texts, is said to be either relative or
ultimate. Aryadeva, in his bZhi rgya pa, chapter five, tells us that this distinction is based on
whether or note the individual's bodhicitta is suffused by the pure perception of sunyata
(ngon sum dll mi byed pa).
12. The philosophic systems (siddhanta; grub mtha') are summarized in Herbert V.
Guenther, tr. and ann., Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice, Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1972.
42
'13. 'Outsiders' = phyi 1'01 pa, or non-Buddhists.
14. The 'iravakas', or nyan thos, are literally the 'hearers' of the Buddha's teachings.
The term lravakayana (theg pa'i nyan thos) is generally an equivalent to the derisive
'hlnayana'. On the use of this term in Maayana literature, see my doctoral dissertation,
"The Concept of the Arahant in the Sutta Pitaka, with Reference to the Bodhisattva anq
t,he Mahasiddha," Temple University, 1978, esp. pp. 448-479.
15. The pratyekabuddha, rang rgyal or rang sangs rgyas, originally was one who,
according to the Buddha, was able to resolve the multi-lemma of smnsara outside of the
Buddist system. Gradually this term carne to be used rather vaguely to discuss a type of
Buddhist practicioner. A fine discussion of its original use in the Pali texts is M.A.G.T.
K1oppenborg, The Paccekabuddha, Leiden: E.]. Brill, 1974.
16, Mahayanists (theg pa chen po) are followers of the bodhisattva method.
17. "Those either seeking or having already entered the path" indicates the tradi-
tional notion that each stage of spiritual growth has both a generative and resultant
aspect. The earliest use of this type of idea is found in the Pali Buddhist notion of the four
paths and the four fruitions (magga and phalani); in the bodhisattvayana it gets expressed
through the ideas of wishing and engaging types of bodhicitta vows (smon pasems bskyed kyi
sdom pa and 'jug pa sems bskyed kyi sdom pal; and in the Vajrayana it is expressed as the
general classification oftantras into causal and resultant, and which has been discussed
by Tsong kha pa in his sNgags rim chen mo.
IS. The five skandhas or phung po are the aggregates of form, sensation, recogni-
tion, volition and consciousness which make up what we call the 'individual'. These are
often expressed as the 'five aggregates of clinging' (upandanakkhanda) and are seen in Pali
Buddhism as essentially problematic. Tantric Buddhism tends toward an intrinsic valua-
tion of the person, and thus the five skandhas are here said to be of the nature of the five
wisdoms.
19. See note 18. According to tantric Buddhism, the five wisdoms are none other
than the five skandhas transmuted.
20. The Dharmadhatu (chos kyi dbyings nyid) or 'realm of Dharma' is none other than
one's ordinary experiencing without conceptualizations.
21. The triratna or dkon mchog gsum means the Buddha', Dharma and Sangha, and
is identical with the triple refuge of Buddhism.
22. 'Constructed thought' (rtog pa; vikalpa) has been discussed in note 10 above.
23. See note 10 above; 'projections' is an alternate translation of the same term.
24. 'Practices' is our translation of the difficult term, spyod or carya, which could
alternatively be rendered as 'behavior', 'carrying-out', 'coursing', etc.
25. 'Insight' = shes rab or prajiia.
26. The 'external, internal and secret (levels), is one way of talking about the three
yanas.
27. The 'defilements' (klela, sgrib) are ignorance, aversion and attraction;
essentially, that which keeps one from enlightenment.
2S. 'Offering-circle' = gar:acakra = ishogs 'khor.
29. 'Elixir' = bdud rtsi = amrta.
30. Passing seven days a m ~ ; ' ; g the lravakas is understood in the bodhisattvayana as
one of the potential causes for losing bodhicitta. According to sGam po pa (jewel Ornament
of Liberation, tr. H. V. Guenther, Berkeley: Shambhala, 1971, p. 4), the lravaka mentality is
characterized by: (1) fear of samsara; (2) desire for nirvar:a; and (3) interest in one's
43
welfare alone. Insofar as Buddhism is not merely a device for avoiding unpleasantness,
such an attitude would be. equally deleterious to one practicing the Theravada as for one
engaging in the bodhisattvaycLna or tantrayana.
31. The 'siddhi or Brahma' is tshangs pa'i dngos grub, a way of saying 'the highest
siddhi', I am grateful to Professor David L. Snellgrove, University of London, for
clarifying this reference.
32. The 'wisdom deitY' (ye shes lha) is, according to Tsong kha pa, the distinguishing
characteristic of the tantric path. In his sN gags rim chen mo (op. cit., p. 142) he says that the
practices of visualization associated with this deity are the most direct method for the
attainment of a Buddha-body or Buddha-intentionality. The Seventh Dalai Lama (op.
cit., fasc. 8b) characterizes the Vajrayana simply as a 'short way' (myur lam) for actualizing
the principles of the bodhisattvayana.
33. See note 6.
NOTES TO THE EDITION
1. sNar thang: mchungs
2. sNar thang: 'de in place of dkyil 'khor
3. Peking: mad
4. sNar thang: sku'i
5. sNar thang: Ii
6. Peking: pa
7. sNar thang: "du" is absent
8. Both texts are unclear; "yin" is a conjecture.
9: sNar thang: chol
10. Both texts are nearly illegible; "rung" is a conjecture.
11. Both texts are unclear, but "bzad" seems appropriate.
12-. Peking: pi'
13. sNar thang: char
14. sNar thang: rtag
15. sNar thang: sta
16. sNar thang: men
17. Both texts read rji, but rje is preferrable.
18. sNar thang: thol
19. sNar thang: gshangs
20. sNar thang: bshagso
21. sNar thang: lagi
AUTHOR'S NOTE
My appreciations to: Mr. Lozang Gyaltshan of the Library of Tibetan Works and
Archives, Dharamsala, for previewing this text with me; Mr. Sherab Ebin, Lecturer in
Sanskrit at Naropa Institute, for checking over my critical edition; and Dr. Mark]. Tatz,
University of British Columbia, for making available to me a copy of the Sa skya PaI?-dita's
text.
44
N onduality of the Two Truths
in Sinitic Madhyamika:
. Origin of the 'Third Truth'
by Whalen W. Lai
. The teaching of the Buddha concerning Reality has recourse to Two
Truths: the Mundane and the Highest Truth.
Without the knowledge of the distinction between the two, one
does not know the profound point in the Teaching.
The Highest Truth cannot be taught apart from the Mundane, but
w ~ t h _ o u t understanding the former, one does not apprehend
nzruana.
Madhyamika-kO;rika XXIV, 8-10.
The distinction of the Two Truths is central to Nagarjuna's
Madhyamika. It grew out of necessity in his attack on his opponents,
the Sarvastivadins. Simply put, the Sarvastivadins were rationalists who
assumed a natural correspondence between idea, eidos, and reality,
logos. For them, reality could be analyzed into a finite number of
entities, dharmas, each with its own discrete mison d'etre (svabhava, "self-
nature"). Nagarjuna opposed this assumption and succeeded in
showing the antinomies innate to such reasoning. Reality, dha'rmata,
being in flux, cannot be frozen into such neat categories. In so
disputing the symmetry between reason and reality, Nagarjuna set up
the distinction of the Two Truths: the nondiscutsive Highest Truth
and the everyday, expedient Mundane Truth. Since the Buddha
cannot stay forever in silence concerning the former, he must have
recourse to the latter to evoke it. However, the two perspectives-the
intuitive and the analytical-being different, there should not be any
confusion.
Chinese masters of the Two Truths theory, however, thought that
the Two Truths should be united in a Third Truth. This postulation of
45
a Third Truth was the result of the need to go beyond the perceived
dichotomy of Two Truths. The dichotomy was so perceived because the
Chinese mistook the Two Truths to be two realities paralleling nirvanic
Emptiness and samsaric being. Since the sutras dearly stated that
nirva,,!a is sarTfSara andsarTfSara is ni'rva,,!a, the Chinese felt justified in
saying that the Higher Truth is the Mundane Truth and the Mundane
Truth is the Higher Truth. How that happened historically is the
object of the present investigation.
The interest in a third truth that would synthesize the Two Truths
came probably from within the Ch'eng-shih circle. This circle of
southern scholars in the fifth and sixth century specialized in the
Ch'eng-shih-lun
a
(Satyasiddhi?) of Harivarman. The Ch'eng-shih-lun was
declared Hinayanist in the Sui Dynasty, and the school as such
eventually disintegrated. However, it left behind the heritage of a
Three Truths system to all the major schools. The Three Truths
appeared in T'ien-t'ai
b
as "The Three Truths ofthe One Mind" (san-ti
i-hsin), C in San-lund as "The Threefold Two Truths" (san-chung e-rh-ti)e
and in Hua-yen
f
as "The Inseparable Three Truths" (san-hsingpu-li).g
However, since none of the schools would have liked to acknowledge
its debt to a Hinayanist school, they helped to obscure the historical
continuity. T'ien-t'ai justified its theory with reference to obscure
sut-ras; San-lun accused Ch'eng-shih of stealing its theory; Hua-yen
based itself on the AwakeningqfFaith. There is no reason to believe that
Ch'eng-shih stole the Three Truths from San-lun, even though Hirai
Shun'ei
h
defended this charge.! The Three Truths were native to
Ch'eng.:shih. It had also nothing to do with the trisvabhava (Three
Truths or Natures) in Indic Yogacara. Even Fa-tsang'si t-risvabhava
theory was structured according to the native set. To understand truly
what happened in history, we must accept the Ch'eng-shih contribu-
tion to Chinese speculation on the Two Truths.
2
Poetic License in the Sinitic Two Truths
The Chinese innovation was not without cause. China learned
Madhyamika from Kumarajiva's translation of Nagarjuna.
3
The
Chinese were told that "sarTfSara is nirva,,!a; form is emptiness." Now
they were being shown the Higher Truth and the Mundane Truth.It
was natural that they drew a correlation. There are enough vague
passages in the ,sutras and the 'siistras to suggest that Emptiness pertained
46
to the Higher Truth while forms pertained to samsanc realities.
Furthermore, it was said that the Buddha (in nirviir;,a) knows the Higher
Truth and common people (in sa,"!siira) know only the Mundane
Truth.
4
The Two Truths appeared so much like the personal property
of two types of beings, a theme that resonated with the native Taoist
tradition and its interest in "subjectiveness" (shutaiseiJ in J apanese
S
).
The Sage Truth looks from the perspective of the Tao (ictao yen-chih)k;
the Common Truth looks at the same thing from the perspective of
differentiated realities themselves (i-wu yen-chih)Z.6 Such unconscious
blending with Taoist outlooks was not necessarily flawed. The danger
lay rather in the easy confusion of the Two Truths with the two realities
of sa,"!siira and nirvii1!a, or forms and emptiness. If so, then since the two
realities are identical, the Chinese would assume that the Higher and
the Mundane Truth too had to be identical. In short, that was the
mistake made by the Ch'eng-shih masters.
We must empathize with their situation and what was thrown
before them at 'the time. Buddhist philosophy had come a long way
since the unsystematic discourses of the Buddha in the sutras. First, the
abhidharma philosophers codified the dharmas (teachings of the
Buddha) into their "superior teaching," abhidharma and higher truth,
paramartha. Then the Emptiness sutras came to empty all the
abhidharmic distinctions so made. Then Nagarjuna came to codify the
Emptiness philosophy and rationally show the limits of conceptualized
(abhidharma) thinking practised by the Sarvastivadins. Here are four
levels of reflection, each reflecting upon the predecessor. It takes some
sorting out even for the modern intellectual historian. The Chinese
Buddhists did not have a solid native tradition of ontology, epistemology
and critical philosophy. The last persons really to delve into the
structure of human knowledge had been the Mohists. The Chinese
were given these Buddhist traditions in a batch, at random, with little
logical sequence, and they had to struggle with the many levels of
discourse without knowing their differences at all well. The result was a
repeated relapse into more primitive modes of discourse while
supposedly pursuing Nagarjuna's Madhyamika philosophy.
Without a solid Abhidharma background, the gentry Buddhists
jumped into the Prajiiii-piiramitii sutras, because the Emptiness doctrine
reminded them so much of Wang Pi'sffi "nonbeing," wu. The line "form
is emptiness" was read easily in terms of Wang Pi's "Being comes from
nonbeing." The former was directed originally at voiding the
conceptualism of the abhidharmist; the latter was simple ontological
47
nihilism, a celebration of the mystery of the void. The fact that Chih
Chien n often used the term pen-wu 0 ("original, basic nothingness") to
render sunyata did not help matters much.? Fortunately, Kumarjiva
had, more recently, settled on chi-kungP ("as such empty") instead. He
even intentionally interpolated shiM ("concrete," as in shih-hsiang
r
for
dharmata) to safeguard the implication of this philosophy.
Slowly, the Chinese came to recognize that both being and non-being
are likewise empty (yu-wu chieh-k'ung
8
),S that k'ung has nothing to do
with the Taoist hsii ("vacuity" as in T'aihsii, t "the great empty space"9)
and that emptiness is none other than the real form of the various
realities, elm-fa shih-hsiang. U
Indian causative analysis posed an even greater handicap. When
Seng Chao v read that "Dharmas do not come from anywhere nor go
anywhere," he could easily mistake that to mean that "things do not
move." That would be an ontological reading. The original meaning,
however, is that "coming" and "going" as concepts (for realities) are
unreal. Causality as a system is itself full of antinomies. The Emptiness
philosophy strives to liberate us from the confines of such language
conventions. (As we shall see, even Seng Chao was not too clear on this.)
Things do come and go. Their impermanence was what the Buddha
saw. To prove this impermanence to a rationalist's satisfaction, the
abhidharmist tried to dissect reality into discrete but changing
components, the dharmas. In so doing, he created his own downfall, for
Nagarjuna would dialectically demonstrate the inner contradictions
involved in any ontological attempt to freeze the flux of transient
phenomena. Neither the Buddha, nor the Sarvastivadin, nor the
.sunyavadin thought that things do not move. The Buddha saw that
they did; the Sarvastivadin proved how fleetingly they did; the
.sunyavadin showed the futility of such presumptuous proofs. It is
concepts that are emptied as mere constructs, vikalpa. It was the
abhidharmist assumption of a symmetry between ideas and reality
which was faulted. The vikalpa constructs are precisely what prevent us
from seeing dharmata, the nature of things. If we do not see the
facade of words, we can never attain the wisdom necessary for
"com prehending nirva'YJa." Failing to see the full import of N agarjuna's
philosophy, even Seng Chao fell short in his attempt to refute the thesis
that things moved.
After Seng Chao, there was an even more obvious confusion of
the various issues. The Two Truths were regarded as two realities
descriptive of an objectifiable principle, Ii, W in the object itself. The Ii
48
had to be justly paradoxical, because the mystery of the coincidence of
opposites (sa'fl!Sara is was embedded in it. By aligning being
with the Mundane Truth and nonbeing with the Higher Truth, the
Chinese had to postulate some still Higher Truth where being would
be immediately nonbeing. Such piling up of being and nonbeing snow-
balled, until some of the serial negations in the writings of these
masters appear like tongue-twisters. Feijeijei-yu
X
(literally,
not-being) reads "Not that is not being" etc. sounds like
Madhyamika dialectics, but I suspect its more direct ancestor is
chapter two of Chuang-tzu, Y where there are endless' paradoxical
speculations on the origin of origins of origins. 10 In short, the Indic
interest in the epistemological was short-changed .in the Chinese
delight in cosmogony. The Chinese liberal use of the logic of identity
would raise many an Indian eyebrow, for it puts all kinds of
incompatable opposites together in the same space. Being is nonbeing;
part is whole; Higher Truth is Mundane Truth, etc.
The Chinese would not have ventured into speculations on a Third
Truth had they heeded the distinction made later by Chi-tsangYz
Chi-tsang knew that the Two Truths were not meant to be descriptive
of li, principle; the Two Truths were only two ways of discourse,
chiao. 12 aa The Chinese should also have stayed with the reticence of
Seng Chao:
Therefore the scriptl.lre says: "Are the Higher and Mundane
Truth different? The answer is no." The sidra elucidates the
Higher Truth directly to show that things are not existent, and the
Mundane Truth likewise to show how they are.not nonexistent.
Does it mean to say that because there are two levels of Truths,
there are two realities?13
The Source of Innovation: Seng Chao on Motion and Rest
There are Two Truths (perspectives) but only one reality; so said
Seng Chao. However, even his prudence could not stop a curiosity: if
there is only one reality, why are there two different pictures of it? The
proper answer would have been that one is true and unclouded by
thought-constructs, and the other is simply the false convention
necessary for our daily life. Seng Chao, however, felt compelled to
locate the concurrence of the two opposite views in the paradoxicalli,
principle, out there in the "object" itself. He attempted to prove this in
the most controversial of his essays, "Things do not move." 14
49
This essay has usually been judged as a misunderstanding or
malapplication of the Madhyamika dialectics. Without denying the
fallacies involved, I would nonetheless show how Seng Chao's real
intention was not to show that "things do not move;' but how
"movement and passivity are the same." Futhermore, Seng Chao
located this paradox in the pair of negations found in the karika:
"(things) neither come nor go." He hoped that with this, he could
account for how the Common Truth (of commoners) saw movement
when the Sage Truth (of he himself) could recognize the opposite. This
essay of his is a classic demonstration of a limited prasangika. Because the
people in China commonly thought that things moved, Seng Chao was
justified to show only how things could not possibly move.
Indeed, Seng Chao has so defined the problem from the start:
That all things move on like a current is the ordinary belief of men.
But I [representing the higher perspective] think this is not the
case .... There is no dharma that goes or comes, or moves or
changes its position. 15
Movement is thus given as the Common Truth and immutability the
Higher Truth. However, Seng Chao recognizes that the latter does not
mean the old Taoist passivity: escaping from change to the changeless. 16
No, rest must be sought right in motion. As rest must be sought in
motion, therefore there is eternal rest in spite of motion; and as
motion is not to be cast aside in order to seek rest, therefore
although there is rest, it is never separate from motion. This being
the case, motion and rest are from the beginning not different.
Only deluded people consider them to be dissimilarY
As sarTfSrua is nirva,,!a, or form is emptiness, so-argues Seng Chao-
motion is rest. His thesis is not that things do not move; it is rather that
moving things are at rest. "The raging storm is tranquil; the rushing
water is still; the toppling heaven is at rest;" so he eulogizes. There the
nouns (storm, water, heaven) are accidental; the contrasting adjectives
are the key. All movements are as such nonmovement.
Seng Chao then wants to demonstrate how this coincidence of
opposites can rationally be accounted for. He finds his clue in an
analysis of the principle that "(things) neither come nor go." The
following passage combines two sections in the original text:
50
What people mean by motion is that because past things do not
reach the present, things are said to have moved and are not at rest.
What I mean by rest is that, precisely (so), things are at rest and have
not moved. [Why do we differ?]
(In their case); things have moved and are not still because things
have not come down to the present. [Time moves but things
themselves do not.] (In my case,) things are still and have not
moved because they have not gone. [Going off would constitute
movement.] The phenomenon (we look at) is the same, but our
prespectives are different. 18
The phenomenon in question is "Things do not come and do not go."
The common people have seen the "not coming"; Seng Chao has seen
the "not going." Thus, there are two perspectives (Truths) but one
common reality.
By sophistry, Seng Chao thought he had accounted for the
seeming paradox and somehow united the Two Truths. This is the
mistake that would inspire the Ch'eng-shih masters to come. This is
taking the Two Truths as pertaining to an objective principle, li.
However, in all fairness, Seng Chao was also cognizant of the Two
Truths simply as chiao, teaching. "The tathagata (Buddha) exercises his
true mind that transcends all dualities
l9
.. and preaches in upaya
different doctrines in consideration of the audience's capacities."2o
Therefore, when the Sage said that things go, he did not mean
that they really go; he merely wanted to prevent ordinary
thoughts. And when he said things remain in the same state, he
did not mean that they really remain; he merely wanted to discard
what ordinary people call the passing of things.
21
... (Contrary
teachings so given) are intended to lead the common folk to
enlightenment. The two different teachings aim at the same
reality. Shall we say that just because they differ in language, they
are contrary in objective?22
In this manner did Seng Chao guard from ontologizing the
Two Truths.
The Origin of the Three Truths: Chou Yungab
After Seng Chao, the Chinese looked for more leads to under-
standing the Two Truths. In their confusion, they turned to a confused
51
"i
I
'i;
!
:, I'
"
, I
" '
.I'll.
, I
,
! i
I
authority, Harivarman's Ch'eng-shih-lun. How seemingly elucidating is
this neat distinction in Harivarman!
There are two gates: the Mundane Truth and the Higher Truth.
The former establishes the truth of being, the latter the truth of
absence of the self. Therein lies the Middle Path.
23
The Ch'eng-shih-lun is, however, a Hinayanist work co-opting
Madhyamika. It is structured according to the Four Noble Truths, but
it selects out the third, nirodha, to be the One Truth of nirva1fa that
transcends sarr:sara. Just by coincidence, the Mahayana sutra loved by
the southerners-the Mahaparinirva1fa sutra-also endorsed a One
Truth which is the mahanirvana of the eternal Buddha-nature.
24
Blending these two separate traditions together, the Ch'eng-shih qua
Nirva1fa sutra masters felt justified in finding a One Truth (above the
Two Truths). In their rather complicated reinterpretation of the
karika, they arbitrarily selected out the first pair of the standard Eight
Negations-"neither born nor destroyed" (pu-shengpu-miehaC)-as the
so-called Middle Path of the Higher Truth. The other three-pairs were
considered to be the Middle Path of the Lower Truth. This is because
pu-sheng pu-mieh happened to read like the permanence of Buddha-
nature and the opposite of sheng-mieh ad ("born-destroyed, life-death"),
one standard term to render sa1?lSara! So, unknowingly, the Ch'eng-shih
tradition re-introduced an ontological distinction between sarr:sara and
nirva1fa, misapplied this to the Two Truths (samsaric being and
nirvanic nonbeing) and was misled into seeking out a still higher One
Truth in which sa1?lSara could be nirvaTfa, being could be nonbeing.
There were several schools of Two Truths then, and a critical"
observer, Chou Yung, recorded their positions in terms of san-tsung, ae
three major school-lineages. All three tried to handle the ambivalence
of how reality could be simultaneously being (mundane truth) and
nonbeing (higher truth). Since I have reconstructed this treatise of
Chou Yung elsewhere, I would simply report the basic findings:
52
1. The first school "did not negate provisional reality": it
assumed an inner/outer distinction. Reality is at heart empty
but in appearance real (provisionally real). This position is
compared to a chestnut gnawed by a rodent: seemingly a solid
chestnut but, in fact, there is nothing inside.
2. The second school did "negate provisional reality": it applied a
causative analysis, as it were, to the chestnut in toto (with no
inner/outer) sophistry. Reality is caused, therefore it is not
urireal. Causes, however, are impermanent and will disperse;
therefore, reality is not real either. This position is criticized as
"bobbing a melon in water," i.e. pushing the melon (reality) in
and out of the liquid. One moment, it is there; the next, it is
gone. Although more clever, this school still left behind two
temporally separate and different impressions.
3. The third school is neatly labelled the "provisional reality is as
such empty" school: simply, it identified the real as the empty.
Being is nonbeing. Sa,"!sara is nirvan:a. This is the preferred
final, if somewhat dogmatic, position on the Two Truths.
Is it not necessary to trace these three back to India and then judge
their relative validity.25 To the Chinese, the third one was the best.
Later, Chi-tsang suggested his own series, using similar clever punning
in the Chinese language that cannot be rendered into English or
Sanskrit without doing violence to the language on both sides.
(However, for interest, his three are: k'ung-pen-hsingaf or "emptying the
svahbava"; pen-hsing-k'ungag or "svabhava-simya"; and hsing-pen-k'ungah
which is something like "svabhcwa qua sunyata." For what it is worth, the
third was again the best.)
Chou Yung probably did not intend his own criticism of the three
schools to become another stepping stone to further Ch'eng-shih
speculations, but that was the fate in store for his treatise. This is
because he was remembered precisely for so setting up a new sequence:
Chou Yung (observing his contemporaries) thereby authored the
San-tsung-lun, setting up, first, the "Not negating provisional
reality" school. Then, to negate that, he enlisted the "Negating
provisional reality" school. Then, to undermine both, he posited
the "Provisional reality self-negates" school. 26
In this so-called third school or position is the germ of the Third Truth.
The question is whether the third school or position or truth
synthesized the two previous options or whether it simply negated and
transcended them. The Ch'eng-shih mister Chih-tsang took the
former as his guide.
The Synthetical Third Middle Path: Chih-tsang
ai
Who started using the "Three Truths" category remams a
mystery. Chou Yung did not use the term, but, by the Liang dynasty, it
53
was commonly assumed. Prince Chao-mingaj recorded that there were
"some people" who then thought that the Mundane Truth was "two"
(dualistic) and the Higher Truth was "one" (monistic). Together, "two"
and "one" made "three." However, even this layman prince disputed
the use of a Three Truths system.
27
The first person we know for Sure
who used a "Threefold Middle Path" was Chih-tsang, a contemporary
of the prince. Later San-Iun CMadhyamika) spokesmen charged Chih-
tsang with the theft of this idea from their camp. The San-lun masters
Seng-Iang
ak
and Seng-ch'uan
a1
might have reintroduced the proper
understanding of the Middle Path (as a non affirmative Neither/Nor)
and thereby challenged the improper-often compartmentalized-use
of being and non being among the Ch'eng-shih group (more interested
in the Both/And). However, I still see no proof that Chih-tsang stole a
San-Iun doctrine, for the scheme of the Three Truths was already
suggested by Chou Yung's classification of the Three Schools.
Chih-tsang followed Chou Yung's suggestion and found a
synthetical third Middle Path between the Mundane and Higher
Truth:
As the various dharmas are produced, that means they are not in
tune with dharmata [the UnproducedJ. Yet, precisely so, they exist
[individually]. However, their being is deluded being, for truly
they are empty. This constitutes the Mundane Truth.
(Now,) since they are said to be in substance vacuous (empty), that
means that they are without form. (Since) formlessness is an
attribute of the (absolute) Truth, therefore (this aspect) is the
Higher Truth.
The Real (Higher) Truth is characterized by the nonbeing of
"neither being nor nonbeing," because it is not deluded being
(like the mundane). The Mundane Truth is the being of "neither
being nor nonbeing," because it is only provisionally real. (In
other words,) reality is in toto Real because it is not being, and in
toto Mundane because it is not nonexistent either. This constitutes
the Middle Path of the Mundane and the Real Truth (synthesized
as one).
The Real Truth is formless and therefore is also "neither being
nor nonbeing"; this is the Middle Path of the Real Truth.
Mundane Truth is caused by the false, and as cause is not result, it
has no being. Yet as cause is not without the power to create a
result, therefore it is not nonbeing. This ("being and nonbeing")
constitutes the Middle Path of the Mundane Truth. 28
Chih-tsang was "bobbing the melon" here: reality.is both real and
unreal in toto. By juggling with the ambiguous terms "real" and "unreal,"
54
could come up with a Higher Truth which is "Real yet
Empty," and a Mundane Truth which is "empty yet real." (He was
using the same terms in 'capitalized' and 'uncapitalized' form all too
freely.) Each of these two paradoxes constitutes one Middle Path.
Where they meet is the Middle Path uniting the Two Truths. This third
unites the Real and the Mundane.
Chih-tsang was only following Chou Yung. Chou Yt.mg named
three schools-the realist, the nihilist and the "real is nil" school. The
third school postulated the unity of emptiness and provisional reality.
Likewise, then, Chih-tsang postulated the unity of the Higher and the
Mundane Truths in his "Third Truth." If we want to go further back,
then the seminal form was present already in Seng Chao. Seng Chao
identified the common view as movement, the sage view as rest. Seng
Chao even assumed one paradox called "seeing rest in motion" (the
Taoist) and another paradox of "seeing motion in rest" (his own). All
these perspecti-yes finally met in the supreme paradox: rest is motion, for
ultimately things neither come nor go. If we simply substitute for the
rest/motion categories those of nonbeing/being, we will find that Seng
Chao too endorsed a union of the Two Truths (of rest and motion) in a
Third Middle Path (rest is motion). Seng Chao, however, was prudent
to posit Two Truths and One Reality. The Ch'eng-shih masters were
less careful, for when they openly confused the Two Truths with two
realities, they were forced to call the One Reality the Third Truth.
The confusion of the Two Truths with two realities created
problems. In the first place, it led to a violation of Nagarjuna's
insistence that the distinction between the Two Truths was crucial to
the Buddha's teachings. It is legitimate to saythatsarrl:sara is niroa1l:a, but
it is not legitimate to say that the Higher Truth is .the Mundane Truth.
The latter, however, did appear sometimes as license iri the sutras, and,
later, the Shih-lun hsuan-i
am
would have to add this rider: "To say that
the Two Truths are identical is being extravagant; to say that form is
emptiness and vice versa is precise."29 The Ch'eng-shih masters lacked
this precision. There was also the additional logical problem: if
indeed the Two Truths were two realities, how should their 'substance'
(t'i)an be conceived? Seng-fang,aO a student, faulted Chih-tsang for so
identifying one substance for the Two Truths:
55
If (they are the same), then to burn (harm) the Mundane is to
harm the Higher Truth, and changes in the Mundane (sarrl:sara)
would affect nirvana . ... Surely, this polluted world is not the
Pure Land.
39
Seng-fang offered his own solution: the interdependence of the Two
Truths with different substances. It was still a mistake, because the Two
Truths were never things with substances in the first place. If anything
is to be regarded as the substance of reality, it would have to be the
Middle Path or emptiness itself. (That is Chi-tsang's position.)
The Mundane Truth is no yinap and the Higher Truth is no
yangaq and they should not have come together as orie (Taoist)
harmony. However, since the mistake was made and was a fait accompli,
the task of a true prasangika dialectician was not to introduce an alien
Indian or pristine system, but to supply the necessary critique on the
bases provided by the misguided thinkers themselves. This, I hold, was
the genius of Chi-tsang.
The Non-thetical Three Truths: Chi-tsang
The aim of the Emptiness philosophy, says Chi-tsang, is not to
affirm but to reveal the true by a systematic destruction of the false.
The true can ultimately never be spoken of, but it may be pointed to
indirectly as a finger points to the moon. Chih-tsang had followed
Chou Yung in positing a third synthetical Truth reuniting the Real and
'the Mundane. Chi-tsang however followed Chou Yung in another,
more orthodox, direction, namely to "posit a third position only in
order to negate the first two." Since Chih-tsang had set up the
Threefold Middle Path, would now use the very same
vocabulary but turn it against the user (Chih-tsang) himself.
The three kinds of Two Truths represent the principle of serial
negation, like building a scaffold from the ground up. As the
ordinary people think that reality is seemingly real, not knowing
that it is not, the Buddha propounded the doctrine that reality is
essentially empty. That reality is real is the common opinion; this
is the Mundane Truth, the Common Truth. The sage knows that
it is empty; this is the Higher Truth, the Sage Truth. This (first)
set is taught in order that men would advance from the mundane
to the transmundane, and renounce the common in order to
embrace the sage wisdom. This is the first level of the Two Truths.
A common person might hear this and, touched, would strive for
liberation. However, in so doing, he might easily be misled into
thinking that there is a distinct from sa17!sara. He might think
56
that being and nonbeing are real and final categories pertaining to
samsaric reality and nirvanic emptiness. If so, Chi-tsang would remind
him thus:
Next: being and nonbeing now constitute the Mundane Truth.
Neither being nor nonbeing is the new Higher Truth. This is
because people, when given "being" and "nonbeing," imperma-
nence and permanence, san!,sara and nirva1!a, regard them as
opposites on two ends. Because they so regard the Mundane and
the Higher Truth (as) sa",!sara and nirva1!a, it is necessary to set up
the nonduality, the Middle Path (avoiding both extremes) of
"neither the Mundane nor the Higher, neither samsara nor
nirva1!a" as the new Higher Truth.
A person may, however, be trapped in the poetics of ideas; therefore,
as a final step, Shi-tsang further insists:
Next: in the third level, both duality and nonduality would be set
up as the Mundane Truth, while "neither duality nor nonduality"
will be seen as the Higher Truth.
31
In this way Chi-tsang sought to liberate the Ch'eng-shih masters from
their obsession with words and paradoxes, by trying to get them to
leave the "language game" they played. There is no synthesis of Two
Truths in Chi-tsang,just a nagging reminder that words are just words
and the Truth forever lies beyond. In his threefold Two Truths, the
first level liberates man from fixation with being, the second frees him
from a leftover dualism ("nirva1!a is not sa"'!sara") and the third asks him
to drop even such "dualities and nondualities."
Chi-tsang was, in the end, too foreign for most Chinese, and his
warnings went often unheeded. A far more influential figure was his
contemporary, the T'ien-t'ai master Chih-i,ar whose Three Truths
theory combined the best of the two worlds-India and China.
The Three Truths in Perfect Harmony: Chih-i
Chih-i derived his theory of the Three Truths from his reading of
the kaxika:
57
The realities produced by causes and conditions
Is what I mean by Emptiness
Also known as Provisional Reality
The same as the meaning of the Middle Path
(= Reality)
(= Empty)
(= Real)
(= Middle)
Chih-i's unique reading for the four lines means: "Reality / is Empty /
yet Real; (Empty yet Real) is the Middle." Sectarian legends tell of this
as a new insight; T'ien-t'ai scholarship justifies it on the basis of an
obscure line in the Ying-lo-ching
32aS
and a One Truth doctrine in the
Ta-chih-tu-lun. at From where we stand, it is not difficult to see his
synthetical Middle-uniting the Empty and the Real-as continuous
with Chih-tsang and Chou Yung.
33
Chih-i, however, was a superb dialectician who well guarded his
position. For him; it is not that the "Empty" and the "Real" meet
in the "Middle" unilaterally. The three are yiing-yiian at; in total
harmony. Everything is immediately empty, immediately real,
and immediately middle (chi k'ung, chi chia, chi chungavy, in a perfect
circle that knows no beginning and no end. The "pyramidal" is super-
seded by this "round" teaching. Although Chih-i did assume the Three
Truths to be aspects of reality, i.e., pertaining to li, he built a system
called the correlation between the Three Aspects and the One Mind (i-hsin
san-ti) that effectively guarded itself against being labelled as subjective
idealist or as objective realist. "The chiliocosm (3,000 words) is replete in
the mind (i-hsin a,,)," says Chih-i. But:
Are the 3,000 born of the passing away (mieh)aX of a thought
(nien)ay? A perishing thought cannot even give rise to one dharma.
How can it give rise to 3,000? Are the 3,000 then born out the
perishing and nonperishing mind? Perishing and nonperishing
are opposites like fire and water, that contradict one another.
How can such conflicting substance give rise to 3,000? Is it the
"neither perishing nor nonperishing" mind that gives birth to the
3,000? But such an entity cannot be the actor-subject nor the
object-acted-upon. How can it give rise to the 3,000?34
The mind and reality, citta and rupa, cross and re-cross one another in a
warp and woof fashion in T'ien-t'ai ideology. However, in the end, that
harmonious matrix defies all words.
58
The doctrine of the 3,000 (in one moment of thought) cannot be
attained by the cross nor the re-cross, or by neither the cross nor
the re-cross. Words end abruptly. The mind suddenly comes to a
stand still. That is the realm ofthe incomprehensible (mystery).35
Pushed to explain what this mystery is, Chih-i would resort to a favorite
Taoist phrase: miao-yu chen-k'ung. az It is mysteriously something
though truly. empty and vice versa.
36
And it is best leEt as such,
undefined.
The Merging ofYogacara Trisvabhava and Three Truths: Fa-tsang
The interest in a Third Truth in China was promoted by internal
necessity and originally had nothing to do with the forthcoming
trisvabha.va of Y ogacara. The trisvabhava (san-hsing or san-ti) pertains to
the three perspectives toward reality: p a r i n i ~ p a n n a or the appreception
of reality-as-it-is (suchness, tathata); paratantra or the normal subject-
object consciousness that discriminates; and parikalpita or misguided
perception due to deluded thought-coverings. Seeing a rope as empty
is the first or enlightened consciousness; seeing a rope as a rope is the
everyday consciousness; mistaking a rope for a snake is the third,
deluded, consciousness.
Hui-yuan,ba an early student of the Yogacara system in China,
was influenced by the Ti-lun
bb
(Dasabhumika) and the She-lun
bc
(Sarl1:graha) traditions; he blended this trisvabhava idea with the
natively-developed Three Truths system. Following the yin-yang logic
implicit in the latter, Hui-yuan defines the p a r i n i ~ p a n n a as the pure
consciousness, the pure essence in itself; it is by itself passive and
uncontaminable. The paratantra is a mixed consciousness, pure and
impure, able to generate the "revolving" consciousness within itself.
The parikalpita is the impure or discriminatory consciousness, trapped
in a foolish monologue; it has forsaken the true altogether. In other
words, there is a yin and a yang consciousness, and a third which is a
union of yin and yang. This third, the paratantra, is the most dynamic,
for everything comes out of it (chen-wang yiian-ch'i,bd causality due to
interaction between the true and the false). The picture one gets is that
of the Taoist yin-yang intercourse giving birth to the myriad things.
However, Hui-yuan interpreted the paratantra consciousness-called
"dependent upon others," i-ta-hsingbe-as a consciousness dependent
59
(i), not on illusions in our subject-object mind (the standard interpreta_
tion), but on the Trlle itself, the tathata or the The True
evolves or revolves within the mixed consciousness, reacting with the
deluded to create all things.37
The trisvabhava doctrine says that all three natures are empty.38 It
also states that the three consciousnesses are intimately related:
parin4panna is just parantantra minus parikalpita. Enlightened conscious-
ness is only our everyday consciousness when the superimposed
misconceptions are removed. This originally Indian idea was inter-
preted in a Chinese framework by Hui-yuan and later by Fa-tsang. Fa-
tsang called it the "inseparable Three Truths" (san-hsingpu-li). A classic
defense of this involves a prototype of the yin-yang circles. 39
Miraculously, the logic then becomes self-explanatory:
D
() paratantra
D 40
The paratantra, being a combination of the pure and the impure, will be
itself once the impure parikalpita is removed (see
above)The explanation seems ingeniously simple and faithful to the
original Indian intentions. \
However, the structure of the trisvabhava above was already
anticipated by Chih-tsang. The structure is the old Three Truths, with
the third mediating the Higher Truth and the Mundane Truth. The
labels had been changed; the attributes were "pure", "deluded" and
the mixed "pure yet deluded," instead of the earlier "nonbeing,"
"being" and "paradoxically being yet nonbeing."
f Higher Truth (parinispanna), True
Middle (paratantra) 41 _____________________________________ _
tMundane Truth (parikalpita), False
Hua-yen philosopher Fa-tsang justified his scheme upon the
Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (itself a China-fabricated text). When
we break down his understanding of the Three Natures (trisvabhava),
we will find, however, only another elaboration of yin-yang-esque
logic. 42 The following diagram is a standard one used within the
Hua-yen tradition.
60
Fa-tsang's Demonstration' of the Mind/N atures Unity
THE THREE NATURES
I

I
paratantra
(b)
I
parikalpita
(a)
perfect, complete
real
aroused depending
on others
(c)
lost in
discriminations
I .
I
(+) (-)

substance of mind
the subsisting origin that
would not disrupt the
end-results (phenomena)
I
I
I
;>-
....
'"
0...

t::
a
Q.) .9
Q.)
...
....
Q.)
;>-
0
-a
a
bo Q.) '0
t::
0
t::
.
.... c
Q.)

0...
Q.) Q.)
.S
'"
...
(+)
B)
function of mind
the dynamic end-results
that do not distract
(anything) from the origin
I
THE ONE MlND
43
What the above summary shows is that the Three Natures are
correlates of the Mind, just as Chih-i stated for his own case ("The
Three Truths are of the Mind"). The three are (a) the perfect, (b).the
relative and (c) the biased, each having two sub-aspects (listed above).
The substance of the mind (A) monopolizes the positive (+) aspects:
the unchanging suchness, the emptiness of the relative and the ontic
illusion of the biased. The function of the mind (B) takes hold of the
remaining negative (-) three: the suchness misled into created reality,
the seeming appearance of things, and the emotional attachments to
non-realities. The schema is not without some lndic precedences,44 but
the Sinitic elements are decidedly stronger. The Hua-yen doctrine of
the trisvabhava, upon scrutiny, is Chih-tsang's paradoxical Three
Truths resurrected.
45
61
Conclusion: Sinitic Three Truths
The Sinicization of Madhyamika in China was crucial to the
doctrinal independence of the various schools. In'the above analysis,
we saw how Nagarjuna originally intended the Two Truths to be two
distinct ways of knowledge. In China, however, because of short-
handed understanding, the Two Truths were confused with Two
Realities. Seng Chao was, as a whole, cautious, but his attempt to
provide a rationale as to why the Commoner and the Sage could see
differently initiated the search for an objective principle, li, in reality
itself. The Ch'eng-shih masters, as I argued, were an indispensable link
in the chain of Sinitic Two Truths speculations. Mistaking the Two
Truths to be Two Realities and working on the assumptions that (a)
there is a principle out there to account for it, and (b) there must be a
union of the Two Truths alias sarTfSara and nirvana [sic], they produced
a Third Truth. Chou Yung, the critic, typed Three.Schools as the Real,
the Empty and the Middle. This triad then influenced all subsequent
thinking. Chih-tsang produced a Third Middle Path that would unite
the Mundane and the Real, but he was faulted by Chi-tsang for
mistaking the Two Truths to be referring to li. Chi-tsang himself
revived the emphasis on the Two Truths as chiao, didactics and ways of
knowledge. He set up a Threefold Two Truths to undermine the
biases of the ontologists. Chi-tsang was, however, not popular among
the Chinese. Instead, the system of Chih-i that emphasized the
harmony of the Three Truths and the dialectics of mind (knowing) and
object (known) won popular approval. A contemporary of Chih-i,
Hui-yuan, utilized a yin-yang scheme to interpret the trisvabhava
doctrine in Yogacara. This scheme, along with Chih-i's, was inherited
by Fa-tsang. Fa-tsang then fashioned the final synthesis, bringing
Madhyamika and Yogacara in their Sinitic form together and
providing the most stable solution to the long Two Truths controversy
in China.
62
CHINESE GLOSSARY
a
'f-tifi
t
:t:&
am
t1!7
b
x.
u

an

e .=.
V
i' f
ao
-ia
Jb f
d .:.. ti;
w
ap
rt-
e
=-i.::.tI/i"
x
11
aq

f
'$:
Y
ar *; ,j
g ;. tl :r-
z
til,
as

h
if" -#- f
aa

at
"*
;iit
ab
%H!
au
,*lk tID
J
i 1f 11:.
ae av
ep f"p 1J1 t
k it i" .:t.. ad 't irA, aw

I .I').1w t i:..
ae
.:.. ';f. lt$;) ax
;/i,
m 565
af ;f..{i.
ay
n
t $"*
ag if. 11 az
t'1 11 t 'Z
0 ah ba
p
:0
al
'*:11<. bb 1-1!!. ti1
q aJ
gR
be
r
,t 18 ak
1" in
bd
s f t
al it be
,f;/(.1t..{!f.
63
NOTES
University of California at Davis.
1. Chugoku hanya shisoshi kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1976), part II-I.
2. Following "Sinitic Development of the Two Truth Theory: Ontological
Gnosticism in the Thoughts of Prince Chao-ming," and "Further Development ... :
Toward a Reconstruction of Chou Yung's San-tsung-lun," in Philosophy East and West, 28,
no. 3 (1978) and forthcoming, ibid.
3. An early classic, Richard Robinson, Early l'vladhyamika in India and China
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977).
4. See my first essay cited in 2, from the Prince's Erh-ti-lun.
5. Kajiyama Yuichi, 'Joron ni okeru Chudo shiso," in Tsukamoto Zenryii ed.Joron
kenkyu (Kyoto: Jimbun kagaku kenkyusho, 1955).
6. From the perspective of things, things are different; from the perspective of
the Tao, all differences vanish.
7. Thus we read, "Buddhas are pen-wu (originally nothing)." Chi Chien used
k'ung sometimes and prefered tzujan for tathata.
8. Said to be made by Yao Hsing to the approval of Kumarajiva.
9. T'ai-hsii is one of the Origins in Chinese cosmology.
10. Chuang-tzu, ch. 2, on the origin of being ad infinitum.
11. El'h-ti-chang (T. 45, p. 15a).
12. Like the finger pointing to the moon; this metaphor was first used by Tao-
liang alias Liang fa-shih of Canton (Zokuzo, 12.2.3.260 upper left). It was passed on to
Chi-tsang and later Ch'an.
13. Chao-lun, T. 45, pp. 152-53. "Emptiness of the Unreal."
14. See Walter Liebenthal, Chao-lun: The Treatise ofSeng Chao (rev.; Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University, 1968).
15. T. 45, p. 151; based on Wing-tsit Ch'an, A SOU1'Ce Book of Chinese Philosophy
(Princeton: Princeton, 1963), pp. 344f. With some changes.
16. Ibid.; the Taoist is implied.
17. Ibid.
18. Chan trans., pp. 346, 350. Synthesis mine.
19. My trans., with interpolation; see Chan, pp. 346 and 349.
20. This is the "Highest" management of the Two Truths.
21. Ch'an trans., p. 347; slight modifications.
22. Ibid., pp. 347-8; bracketted portion added.
23. T. 23, p. 248a. For an interesting introduction, see C. D. C. Priestley,
"Emptiness in the Satyasiddhi, " Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1 (1970), pp. 30-39.
24. See note 1 above.
25. Leon Hurvitz's analysis shows the poetic license of the third, see his "The First
Systematization of Buddhist Thought in China," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2, no. 4
(Sept., 1975), pp. 361-88; see 1 above.
26. Nan Chi shu account, after corrections made by Tang Yung-t'ung; see 1.
27. See note 1 above; I overlooked this point in my original analysis.
28. From the Ta-ch'eng hsiian-lun as cited by Sakaino Kayo in his 'Jojitsu Daijogi,"
in Tokiwa Daijo kanreki kinenshu (Tokyo, 1933), p. 129.
29. See Hirai, op. cit.; translation mine from Chinese in footnote 22 on p. 588
64
(Zokuzo, 1.1.74.1.27, upper left). Chi-tsang, according to Hirai (ibid.) made a similar
charge against the extravagant Mahaparinirvo:r}a sutra, but for saying the Mundane is the
Highest and not vice versa.
30. Sakaino, op. cit., ibid.
31. Erh-ti-chang, T. 45, pp. 90-91; see Ch'an's trans., p. 360.
32. Yirl:g-lo-ching, T. 24, p. 1014b; alsojen-wang-ching, T. 8, pp. 829b, 833b.
33. The sectarian lore of how the san-kuan was transmitted is analyzed in Ocho
Enchi, Hokke shiso no kenkyu (Kyoto; Heirakuji, 1972).
34. Mo-ho-shih-kuan, T. 46, p. Mb.
35. ibid.
36. Term also used by Chi-tsang though.
37. Ta-ch'eng i-chang, T. 44, p. 528a; On Three Truths, section 2:l.a,i.
38. Illusions are empty; phenomena are also empty; tathata too is empty.
39. Diagram of a later date than Fa-tsang, who did not resort to either pictures or
graphs; the practice began with Tsung-mi.
40. The diagram should be self-explanatory. The () circle is akin to () the
yin-yang (alias li-kan) circle used to depict the "revolving" psyche.
41. Paratantra is in the middle of the Real (parin4panna in the sense of the
ultimate chen-ti, Real Truth) and the Empty (paTikalpita in the sense of the illusory
Common Truth).
42. See Whalen Lai, "The i Ching and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy,"
forthcoming,joumal of Chinese Philosophy.
43. See qualification in 39; diagram taken from Ishii K yod6, Kegon kyogaku seiritsu
kenkyu (K:yoto: 1956), p. 387. I do think this Fa-tsang scheme was indirectly a defense of
Chih-i's i-hsin san-ti which has nothing to do with the Yogiicarin understanding of the
alayavijiLana.
44. Closer to Vediinta's Three Truths, I think. There, the Vediintin also uses a
middle Truth as a compromise between Reality and maya.
45. For an example of the mentality involved in the solution of seeming
contradictions, see Y oshito S. Hakeda trans. The Awakening of Faith (New York: Columbia,
1967), p. 76, interpolated comments citing Fa-tsang's commentary.
65
Transpersonal Psychological Observations on
Theravada Buddhist Meditative Practices!
by] ames A. Santucci
I
Manovijja and Transpersonal Psychology
Theravada Buddhism, like all major religions, may be studied
from two general perspectives:
(a) that which is predominantly descriptive and discursive, such
as anthropology, archeology, economics, history, philosophy,
and ritual; and
(b) that which is predominantly apologetic and critical, that is, a
discussion which is primarily concerned with proving the
religion's
(1) validity, worth, and inspiratioI.J., or .
(2) lack of (1).
The second perspective (b) has received the attention of the late
Richard Robinson, who, in a series of articles appearing in World
Buddhism (1970-1972), raises the provocative
2
question concerning the
possible responses and changes that Buddhism will undergo when it
comes to terms with the "human sciences." He observes that Buddhism
became spiritually dogmatic, although it originally accepted the
expendability of its doctrines,3-a position in complete agreement with
the assumption of the sciences that knowledge has a non-finality about
it (Ibid., pp. 205, 235). Because "dogmatic apologetic is largely evasive
and serves no good purpose" (p. 235), Buddhism must purify itself
from the "dotage of the ages"4 (Ibid., p. 205) and move on to new
discoveries. This final observation made by Robinson fits into the
context of this paper but in a way that does not presume that "Science"
has the answers to which Buddhism must respond and adjust.
Buddhist 'psychology' (manovijja) provides a highly developed analysis
66
of meditation and the special conSCIousness that anses from the
practice. Western-orientated psychology has only recently begun
investigating this phenomenon, and readily admits its deficiencies in
this area. Therefore, in light of Robinson's observations, the
psychologies are more like equal rather than unequal partners. But
there is also, on the one hand, a certain inertia on the part of the
Buddhist faced with the challenge of investigating empirically what
Tart calls the "discrete altered state of consciousness" (1977: 14) of the
meditative experience, and, on the other, the assumption of the
Western-oriented psychologist of the incompatability between science
and "mysticism." The inertia of the Buddhist applies to manovijja as
well.
There can be no doubt that the last significant advance in this
field lay in the development and analysis of the perceptual process
(citta-vlthi) , a development which first appears in the works of
Buddhaghosa, but most likely based upon the earlier post-Abhidhamma
commentaries.
s
As a result of this stagnation, modern Buddhist
authors who devote themselves to the study of n:tanovijja take a
primarily fundamentalist approach.6 The reason for this change of
attitude from active observation to consolidation is, I would suppose,
one of satisfaction with the findings contained therein. These findings
center around the acceptance of the perfectibility of man and the
means by which this can be accomplished (Piyadassi Thera, 1964:5-6).
This is, of course, contrary to the prevailing Western view of the
open-endedness of knowledge and the inability of man to completely
capture it (Polanyi, 1961; reprinted in Ornstein, 1973: 23-24). Despite
this contradiction in opinion on man's potentiality of achieving an
ultimate goal, there has developed in recent years a movement in
psychology which approaches the Buddhist view half-way. This
movement is known as Transpersonal Psychology and it is defined as
an area of research concerned with
67
... those ultimate human capacities and potentialities that have
no systematic place in positivistic or behavioristic theory ("first
force"), classical psycho-analytic theory ("second force"), or
humanistic psychology ("third force"). The emerging Trans-
personal Psychology ("fourth force") is concerned specifically
with the empirical scientific study of, and responsible implementa-
tion of the findings relevant to, becoming, individual and species-
wide meta-needs, ultimate values, unitive consciousness, peak
experiences, B-values, ecstasy, mystical experience, ... maximal
sensory awareness, responsiveness and expression, and related.
concepts, experiences, and activities. (Tart, 1977:2)
The development of such a psychology is necessary if the "whole
human being" is to be understood (Tart, 1972:7). Furthermore, the
outcome ~ f the numerous works on discrete altered states of conscious-
ness published in the field
7
has led to a recognition that a clash in
paradigms need not end in irresolvable conflict and mutual rejection
(Tart, 1971 :95-97), but rather to an expansion of our concept of what is
possible in man (Ornstein, 1972:95-101). This is significant because
meditation is now presented in a new light. Previously, the investigator
of meditative practice and literature was only equipped to accept or
reject the efficacy of such a practice on faith alone, or simply suspend
judgment on it. Psychological investigations have now demonstrated
that meditation does produce verifiable physiological alterations
resulting in altered states of consciousness. In Theravada Buddhist
meditation, two qualitative changes in awareness occur: (1) restriction
of input processing or awareness, and (2) opening-up awareness of the
external environment (Ornstein, 1971: 144f; 1972:192). The first
phenomenon is produced by that method of meditation known as
'cultivation of calm' (samatha ,bhavana); the second is produced by
mindfulness (sati) of varying types-the four foundations of mindful-
ness (sati-pa??hana) and those detailed in Vm 7 and 8-and by 'cultiva-
tion of insight' (vipassana-bhavana). The opening-up awareness, known
as 'penetrative knowledge' (panna) or sometimes 'perfect knowledge'
(anna), proceeds from mindfulness and/or calm (Vm 19-22). Because of
limitations of space it will not be possible to include a discussion of
Theravada meditative practice.
8
Only the empirical observations of
this practice will be outlined in the next section.
II
Empirical Observations on the Meditative Experience
Although the scientific study of the meditative experience is still
in the infant stage, some important observations have been established
from the purely physiological level to the neuro-physiological and
cognitive levels. The effects of meditation on the physiological make-
up of the individual have been summarized by Wallace and Benson
(1972: 125f.) to include reduction in oxygen consumption, carbon
68
dioxide elimination, and respiration; an increase in the acidity of the
arterial blood; a decrease in the blood-lactate level (blood-lactate levels
rise under stress); a reduction in theheart-beat rate; and an increase in
the resistance of the skin to an electrical current.
9
These findings
suggest little resemblance with either sleep or hypnosis. Either the rate
of physiological change will be different or the reactions will be directly
at odds. For instance, oxygen consumption only decreases significantly
after a period of several hours of sleep. In the hypnotized state the
heart beat, respiration, and other metabolic patterns are subject to the
operator's desires and instructions on the subject (Ibid. 130).
These differences also exist in the functionings of brain-wave
activity. EEG (electroencephalogram) recordings have revealed the
presence of alpha rhythms with occasional theta-activity during
transcendental meditation (Ibid. 130).10 Kasamatsu and Hirai (1966:505),
in the EEG studies of Zen meditators, have observed four stages in the
meditation episode:
1. Slight alpha activity in spite of opened eyes; 11
2. Increase in the amplitude of persistent alpha waves;
3. Decrease of alpha frequency;
4. Appearance of a rhythmical theta train sometimes occurs
during this final stage.
Wallace and Benson (1972:130) suggest little resemblance of
meditation with hypnosis from either a physiological or neurological
standpoint. Kasamatsu and Hirai (1966:513) on the other hand do
observe some similarity between the first three stages of Zen medita-
tion and the hypnagogic state (transition and borderline period from
wakefulness to sleep) and hypnotic trance, but the differences seem to
be more significant than the similarities (Kasamatsu and Hirai: 506f.).
Prominent alpha activity has been observed in yogins practicing
absorptive meditation (samadhi), but, unlike the Zen practitioners, they
were oblivious of all external stimuli (Anand, Chhina, and Singh,
1961 :516-517).
Because of the similarity of Zen meditation with sati and vipassana
practice, and the practice of samadhi with Buddhist samatha cultivation,
we could presume similar results, that is, prominent alpha activity and
possibly theta activity at the access or threshold (upacara) and
absorbtive (appana) levels of concentration. 12
A related observation on alpha activity in meditation has been that
of a significant reduction in alpha blocking. Anand, Chhina, and Singh
(1961: 51 7) report no blocking at all in the- meditating yogins, and
69
Kasamatsu and Hirai (1966:507) report a reduction in the Zen medita-
tors. Alpha blocking involves an interruption of the alpha rhythm by
means of an external stimulus, such as a loud noise. In normal non-
meditating subjects restoration of alpha activity will occur in approxi-
mately seven seconds (Burns, 1966:63). Kasamatsu and Hirai,
however, have recorded only two to three seconds of alpha blocking on
the part of the Zen meditators employed in their experiment. Further-
more, the authors have demonstrated that although the amount of
time required to restore alpha activity in non-meditating subjects
decreased rapidly when the same stimuli were repeated at regular
intervals, the length of time required to overcome blocking remained
constant in the Zen meditators (Kasamatsu and Hirai, 1966:507). This
observation has led to the conclusion that the perception that is
developed in meditation is different than normal perception in the
sense that one (the former) is deautomatized while the other is
habitualized. Habituation refers to the adapting process of cognition
that filters or tunes out awareness of a repetitive stimulus or object.
Automatization or habituation of the perceptual or thinking process is
merely an extension of the observations of Harmann (1958) on motor
behavior. Just as learning a motor skill (such as driving a car or
engaging in a sport) requires the appropriate actions to be automatized,
hence not in the sphere of consciousness, so too the same constant
stimulus will cause the nervous system to tune it down or out from our
consciousness (Ornstein, 1971:178f.; 1972:29-30,130-131).
Normal states of consciousness, that is, the normal patternings of
consciousness in the waking state (Tart, 1977:14-15) perform a
selective or filtering function as much as they do a gathering function.
C. D. Broad states:
70
that we should do well to consider much more seriously than we
have hitherto been inclined to do the type of theory which
Bergson put forward in connection with memory and sense
perception. The suggestion is that the function of the brain and
nervous system and sense organs is in the main eliminative and not
productive. Each person is at each moment capable of
remembering all that has ever happened to him and of perceiving
everything that is happening everywhere in the universe. The
function of the brain and nervous system is to protect us from
being overwhelmed and confused by the mass of largely useless
and irrelevant knowledge, by shutting out most of what we should
otherwise perceive or remember at any moment, and leaving only
that very small and special selection which is likely to be practically
useful. (quoted in Huxley, 1954:22-23)
This "data reduction" has been demonstrated in an experiment
on the visual range of a frog by Lettvin, Maturana, McCullock, and
Pitts, of MiT (Ornstein, 1972:21-23). In thIs experiment, only four
messages were responded to by the frog out of the potentially
thousands of visual pattern stimuli: the general outline of the environ-
ment (sustained contrast detectors), sudden decrease in light (net
dimming detectors), and small dark objects coming within the visual
field (net convexity detectors).
Other experiments in perception demonstrate not only the
selective function of the brain and nervous sytem, but also the presence
of such factors as past experience, action and probability, which
contribute to the reification of the perceptual stimulus. This was
demonstrated by Ittelson and Kilpatrick (1951:50f.) by setting up a
number of visual patternings that cause so-called optical illusions.
A similar line of investigation appears in the work of the trans-
actionalist psychologist George Kelly (1955), who argued that each
person views his world through transparent patterns or personal
constructs. By these constructs man is able to formulate a behavioral
pattern which is "explicitly formulated or implicitly acted out, verbally
expressed or utterly inarticulate, consistent with other courses of
behavior or inconsistent with them, intellectually reasoned or
vegetatively sensed" (1955:1:9).
Contrary to this "normal" state of consciousness is the deautoma-
tized state of consciousness produced in the meditative state. Deauto-
matization
is an undoing of the automatizations of the apparatuses-both
means and goal structures-directed toward the environment.
Deautomatization is, as it were, a shakeup which can be followed
by an advance or a retreat in the level of organization .... Some
manipulation of the attention directed toward the functioning of
an apparatus is necessary if it is to be deautomatized. (Gill and
Brenman, 1959: 178)
This phenomenon neutralizes the automatization process by reinvesting
such actions, thoughts, and sensations with attention (Deikman,
1966:33; Van Nuys, 1971: 127). Attention, needless to say, serves as the
underpinning of all meditative techniques. 13 This becomes clear in the
71
Buddhist context when we read that superficial attention (ayoniso
manasikara) is the nourishment (ahara) for the hindrances (n"ivarana)
and that, conversely, deep or thorough attention (yoniso-manasikara)
completely destroys them (SN 5. 64-65 and 102-L03). Buddhaghosa
(Sv 3.778) remarks that yoniso-manasikara is "expedient (upaya) atten-
tion, attention focused on the Path, the type of attention that views
impermanence in impermanence, disharmony in disharmony,
unsubstantiality in unsubstantiality, the foul in the foul." And else-
where (Vm 4.53) he writes that it is concerned with the wholesome
(kusala), that it is penetration (pa?ivedha) of the general (samanna)
characteristics and of individual states.
Attention leads to meditation, and in the sati-pa??hana exercises
the process that brings this about is the investigation and recollection of
every appropriate action to which mindfulness is directed.
14
This
particularized "witnessing" of the processes causes a deautomatization
of what otherwise were automatic processes organizing stimuli. Thus,
in one example cited by Deikman (1963:212), the subject viewed the
stimuli in a wholly unorganized way suggesting that they were
\
"clamoring" for his attention, having "no way oflooking at the whole or
any individual part." He (1963:214) also observes that this visual
experience of an untrained-sensate 15 resembles the quality of visual
experience in cataract patients as observed by von Send en (1960).
It is not in the untrained-sensate, however, that the higher
mystical experiences so often described by both Eastern and Western
mystics are found, but rather in the "trained - transcendent"
(Deikman, 1966:26). Nor are unusual percepts like rapture, brilliant
lights, etc., the mystic experience that the Buddhist ultimately strives
after (Vm 20.1 05f.; Sobhana, 1965: 10-13). In fact, such experiences as
listed under the corruptions of insight, the presence of rapture (p"iti)
and ease of bliss (sukha) in the jhanic stages, and even the possible
existence of such feelings as confidence (saddha) and serenity
(passaddhi), as well as rapture and ease experienced after reviewing the
first Path and its Fruition (Sobhana, 1965: 23 and 56), must be
overcome if progress along the Path is to be maintained. The whole
thrust of meditative cultivation is to achieve a vision never seen
before (Vm 22.101), to see things as they really are, and to directly
perceive and realize them wholly and completely. 16 The cognition that
is present after the Path would seem to indicate a "comprehensive
Gestalt or intuition" Qohansson, 1969: 23), judging from Buddhaghosa's
account (Vm 22.5f. and 92f.).
72
If the development of insight was designed to effect a clarifying,
comprehensive intuition into the "real processes," where then is the
source of such an insight? Is there a neuro-physiological basis to it? If
so, where in the brain or nervous system does it reside?
The answers to these questions were inadvertandy given over
2,000 years ago in a medical observation by Hippocrates: "The human
brain, as in the case of all other animals, is double". Yet, it has only been
in the last quarter century that the full implication of such an observa-
tion has been realized, namely, that a double brain means a double
mind or consciousness. The foreshadowers of this now-scientific fact
go as far back as A. L. Wigan in 1844, who held the opinion that the
"mind is essentially dual, like the organs by which it is exercised"
(Bogan, 1969:113). Wigan believed that both hemispheres, however,
possessed rational thought, and justified the belief by appealing to the
observation of the existence of two simultaneous and opposing trains
of thought (Ibid.). But neurological evidence accumulated to the point
where it was recognized that differences in function in fact did exist
between the two hemispheres of the brain. Thus, HughlingsJackson, a
neurologist of the nineteenth century, suggested tht the left hemi-
sphere was the seat of the "faculty of expression" and the right
hemisphere was the seat of the perception (Ibid:102). This was based
upon the observation of a patient with a tumor in the right hemisphere
who, as a result of this condition, did not recognize objects, persons,
and places (Ibid.).
The next significant advance came with Myers' and Sperry's early
1950's experiment involving the severing of the corpus callosum (the
nerve tissue connecting the two hemispheres), and the optic chiasm
(the crossover of the optic nerves), resulting in visual input entering the
left eye going to the left hemisphere, and input entering the right eye
going to the right hemisphere (Gazzaniga, 1967: 119). The outcome of
the experiment was that each half of the brain had visually to learn
what was required of it separately when the training was undertaken
with the other eye covered (Ibid.). This experiment, conducted on a cat,
led to the severing of the corpus callosum - commissurotomy-'-in
humans in order to control epileptic seizures. Subsequent experiments
on these patients, in addition to the continuing study of individuals
with either left or right hemispheric lesions, have helped to identify
many areas of the brain with specific functions. But it was the subsequent
tests carried out on split-brain patients thatled to the full realization of
Hippocrates' o1;>servation on different functions of the hemispheres.
73
The left hemisphere was observed to be associated with language,
mathematics, and analytic knowledge; the right hemisphere with
visual-spatial functions, music, arts, crafts, orientation in space,
synthetic or holistic knowledge, and even perhaps'dreams and those
phenomena termed "mystical." The left hemisphere ratiocinates, or
breaks things down into parts; the right hemisphere builds things up
and so organizes and patterns them Gaynes, 1976:118; Ornstein,
1972:53-54). Furthermore, the right hemisphere is a far quicker
processor of information, and so operates in a nearly spontaneous
manner (Ornstein, 1972:61). The tentative conclusion, therefore, is
that Gestalt or holistic intuitive knowledge originates in the right
hemisphere. If it is to be "perfected" in the Buddhist sense of the term,
it must be nurtured by meditative techniques (Ornstein, 1976:34-35).
No psychologist is prepared to venture an opinion whether the
ultimate experience in Buddhism, or, for that matter, other meditative
or mystical religions does indeed mirror "reality," as it were, in an
"objective" or empirical manner, but from the individual's own
perspective it is an experience that is intensely real, especially when
compared to normal states of awareness. Perhaps the words of Huxley
(1954:23-24) most aptly fit this view:
That which, in the language of religion, is called 'this world' is the
universe of reduced awareness, expressed, and, as it were,
petrified by language. The various 'other worlds' with which
human bt;!ings erratically make contact areso many elements in
the totality of the awareness belonging to mind at large.
NOTES
California State University, Fullerton
1. The present essay is an abbreviated version of a paper presented to the
National Endowment of the Humanities Seminar "'Other World' and 'This World' in
Theravada Buddhism" Gune, 1977).
2. The articles were certainly so to the editors of World Buddhism, who preface
each of the seven parts with the statement that they do not "agree with some of the views"
of the author.
3. This is asserted in the Parable of the Raft: Alagaddupama Sutta of MN 1. 130f.
4. A typical Theravada Buddhist response to "Science" is made by U Chan
Htoon (1961).
1972).
74
5. On the possible origins ofthis process see Nal"!-amoli, 1964: 131-132, note 13.
6. Examples are Jayasuriya (1963), Dharmasena (1963), and Piyadassi Thera
7. Tart (1977: 14) defines it as "a radical alteration of the overall patterning of
consciousness (compared to some reference d-SoC) .... " A bibliography of such articles
and books on meditation in particular appears in Timmons and Kamiya (1970) and
Timmons and Kanellakos (1974).
8. For an outline of such practice see Goleman (1972).
. 9. These observations were made on subjects during the practice of transcen-
dental meditation. See pages 127-130.
10. There are four brain waves:
1. alpha - 8-13 cycles per second: associated with relaxation, calm, passivity, and
distortion of time and space.
2. beta-14+ cycles per second: associated with the waking state.
3. delta-l/2 to 6 cycles per second: associated with sleep.
4. theta - 4-7 cycles per second: associated with creative hallucinations and
sometimes anxiety. It is often associated with a "drowsy Kafkaesque state"
(Karlins and Andrews, 1972:63). See Ibid., 62-63 and Walter, 1954:4f.
11. Alpha rhythms are prominent from the back of the head, i.e., the visual
cortex, which is sensitive to signals sentto it from the eye (Walter, 1954:5). Thus when the
eyes are shut and the thought process stops, a turning down of brain activity occurs with
the alpha rhythm becoming more prominent (Ibid.). Hypofunctioning of the brain is
already with the Zen meditators despite the fact that the eyes are open.
12. Golemann (1972:32) suggests that alpha activity in thejhiina levels may give
way to theta activity, the latter being especially active at the higher jhiina-s and later stages of
insight. He also suggests that delta activity may be present in the higher jhiina-s and
For an explanation of access and absorbtive concentration see Vm 4.31-33 and 4.79f.
13. See, for instance, Vm 3.26; 4.58-59; 8.4-5,61-79. A description of attention
(manasikara) appears in 14.152. See Van Nuys, 1971:127-128.
14. For these exercises seeDN II. 290f.;MN 1. 55f.; SN 5.3.1-10: 141-196; Ps497f.:
3.8,1-2; Vbh 193f.
15. He defmes such an individual as one not regularly engaged in meditation or
other exercises which aim at achieving a religious experience (1966:26).
16. Guenther, 1976:69f.;johansson, 1969:21.; Swearer, 1972:370; Nyanaponika,
1968:47.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Primary Sources
. Digha Nikaya (DN)
Rhys Davids, T.W. and]. Estlin Carpenter, editors. The DighaNikaya. Three volumes.
London: Luzac and Company, 1890-1911 (1960-1967).
Rhys Davids, T.W. and Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, translators. Dialogues of the Buddha.
Three volumes. London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1899-1921 (1965-1969) (Sacred
Books of the Buddhists, vols. II-IV).
Majjhima-Nikaya (MN)
Trenckner, V. and Lord Chalmers, editors. The Majjhima-Nikaya. Three volumes.
London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1888-1899 (1960-1964).
75
Horner, LB., translator. The Collection oj Middle Length Sayings.
Three volumes.
London: Luazc and Company, Ltd., 1954-1959 (1967-1970).
Patisambhidii-magga (Ps) (S
.. .. . _ Bihar tate): Pali
Kashyap, Bhlkkhu, J., general edItor. The Patlsambhlda-magg
a
.
Publication Board, 1960.
Samyutta-Nikiiya (SN) d C
M. Leon, editor. Sarr:yutta-Nikiiya. Five volumes. London: Luzac an ompany,
Ltd., 1884-1898 (1960-1975).
. - . d FL. Woodward
Rhys DavIds, Mrs. G.A.F., SUrIyagoda Sumangala Thera, an d '
. .. k - ) or Groupe Suttas.
translators and edItors. The Book of the Kzndred Sayzngs (Sanyutta-Nl aya -r,
Five volumes. London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1917-1930 (1950-
19b
::J).
Sumangala-viliisinz (Sv) - I . - . _
. . Th Sumanga a-vzliisznl
Rhys DavIds, T.W.,]. Esther Carpenter, and W. Stede, edItors. e . . L '
, -. - dedItiOn. ondon:
Buddhaghosa s Commentary on the Dlgha Nlkaya. Three volumes, seco
n
Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1968-1971.
Vibhanga (Vbh) d 9
Rhys Davids, Mrs. C.A.F., editor, The Vibhanga. London: H. Frowde, Lt ., 1 04.
Visuddhi-magga (Vm) I
. ... h a Two vo urnes.
Rhys, DavIds, Mrs. C.A.F., edItor, Vlsuddhl-magga of Buddhag os .
London: Humphrey Milford, 1920-1921.
. . Visuddhimagga oj
Warren, Henry Clarke and Dharmananda KosambI, edItors.
Buddhaghosiicariya. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
Nyar.ramoli, Bhikkhu, translator (1964). See below.
II. Secondary Sources
. ." Aspects of Electro-
Anand, B.K., C.S. Chhma, and B. Balder Smgh (1961). some h . I
h I h
S d . I I h d CInical Neurop yslO ogy,
encep a ograp lC tu Ies m YOgIS". E ectroencepha ograp yan ! .
Vol. 13 (1961): 452-456. Reprinted in Tart (1972): 515-518.
. A positional Mind".
Bogen, Joseph E. (1969). "The Other Side of the Bram: An p l -9): 135-162
Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Societies, Vol. 34, no. 3 (July 19b ,
reprinted in Ornstein (1973): 101-125. d . B ddh
I I gy
Kan y. u 1St
Burns, Douglas M. (1966). Buddhist Meditation and Depth Ps)'c W 0 .
Publication Society (Wheel, no. 88-89). . P bl" .
Chan Htoon, U. (1961). Buddhism and the Age of Science. Kandy: BuddhIst u IcatIOn
Society (Wheel, no. 36-37). d " I
. .. ." I if'len'ous an dlenta
Delkman, Arthur]. (1963). "ExperImental MedItatIOn .Jouma.o 1
Disease, Vol. 136: 329-373. Reprinted in Tart (1972): 203-223. . V I 29
" . . .. "p<whzatry, o.
---- (1966). DeautomatIzatIon and the MystIC Expenence .. ,
(1966): 324-338. Reprinted in Tart (1972): 25-46. h P bl"
Dharmasena, C.B. (1963). Aids to the AbhidharmaPhilosophy. Kandy: Budd 1st u Ica-
tion Society (Wheel, no. 63-64).. V I 217
Cazzaniga, Michael S. (1967). "The Split Brain in Man". 0 .
(no. 2) (Aug. 1967): 24-29. Reprinted in Readings from ScientijicAmerJcoll (1
9
.
76
Gill, M.M.and M. Brenman (1959). Hypnosis and related states: psychoanalytic studies in
regression. New York: International Universities Press.
Goleman, Daniel (1972). "The Buddha on Meditation and States of Consciousness.
Part I: The Teachings". Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1972 (no. 1): 1-44.
Guenther, Herbert V. (1976). Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma. Berkeley:
Shambhala.
Hartmann, H. (1958). Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. New York. Inter-
national Universities Press.
Huxley, Aldous (1954). The Doors of Perception. New York: Harper and Row
Publishers, Inc.
Ittelson, W.H. and F.P. Kilpatrick (1951). "Experiments in Perception". Scientific
American, Vol. 185 (Aug. 1951): 50-55. Reprinted in Ornstein, 1973: 171-184.
Jayasuriya, W.F. (1963). The Psychology and Philosophy of Buddhism. Colombo:
Y.M.B.A. Press.
Jaynes, Julian (1976). The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
Johansson, Rune E.A. (1969). The Psychology of Nirvana . London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd.
Karlins, Marvin and Lewis M. Andrews (1972). Biofeedback. New York: Warner
Paperback Library.
Kasamatsu, Akira and Tomio Hirai (1966). "An Electroencephalographic Study on
Zen Meditation (Zazan)". Folia Psychiatria et Neurologia Japonica, Vol. 20 (1966)': 315-336.
Reprinted in Tart (1972): 497-514.
Kelly, George (1955). Psychology of Personal Constructs. Two volumes. New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.
Bhikkhu, translator (1964). The Path of Purification (Visuddhi-
magga). Colombo: A. Semage.
Nyanaponika Thera (1968). The Power of Minfulness. Kandy: Buddhist Publication
Society (Wheel, no. 121-122).
Ornstein, Robert E. and Claudio Naranjo (1971). On the Psychology of Meditation.
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.
---- (1972). The Psychology of Consciousness. San Francisco: W.H.
Freemand and Company.
---- ----, editor (1973). The Nature of Human Consciousness. San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman and Company.
---- ----(1976) The ivlind Field, New York: Grossman Publishers.
Piyadassi Thera (1964). The Buddha's Ancient Path. Rider and Co.
Polanyi, Michael (1961). The Study of Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reprinted in Ornstein (1973).
Readings from Scientijic American: Altered States of Awareness (1972). San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman and Company.
Robinson, Richard (1970-1972). "Implications of Human Sciences for Buddhism",
World Buddhism, Vol. XX: 59-60, 90-92, 117-119, 146-147, 179-181,205-207, and 224, 233-236.
Sobhana, V. (1965). The Progress of Insight through the Stages of Purification. Text with
translation by Nyanaponika Thera. Ceylon: The Forest Hermitage.
Swearer, Donald K. (1972). "Two types of saving knowledge in P:ili Suttas". Philosophy
East and West, Vol. 22 (no. 4): 355-371.
77
Tart, Charles T. (1971). "Scientific Foundations for the Study of Altered States of
Consciousness". Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1971 (no. 2): 93-124.
----, editor (1972). AlteTed States of Consciousness. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books.
----, editor (1977). TranspersonalPsychologies. New York: Harper Colophon Books.
Timmons, Beverly and Joe Kamiya (1970). "The Psychology and Physiology of
Meditation and Related Phenomena: A Bibliography". Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology, 1970 (no. 1): 41-59.
---- and Demetri Kanellakos (1974). "The Psychology and Physiology of
Meditation and Related Phenomena". Bibliography II. Journal of TranspeTsonal
Psychology, 1974 (no. 1): 32-38.
Van Nuys, David (1971). "A Novel Technique for Studying Attention during
Meditation". Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1971 (no. 2): 125-133.
von Senden, M. (1960). Space and Sight. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
Wallace, Robert Keith and Herbert Benson (1972). "The Physiology of Meditation".
Scientijic American, Vol. 226 (no. 2), Feb. 1972: 84-90. (Readings from Scientific American
[1972]: 125-131).
Walter, W. Grey (1954). "The Electrical Activity of the Brain". Scientijic AmeTican,
Vol. 190 (no. 6), June 1954: 54-63. (Readings from Scientijic American [1972]: 4-13).
78
B odhicaryavatara 9: 2 As A F ocus For
Tibetan Interpretations of the Two Truths
. In thePrasangika Madhyamika 1
by Michael]. Sweet
1.
The two truths (satyadvaya) have always been viewed by the
Madhyamlkas as vital for an accurate understanding of their schooI;2
significant differences in ontology, epistemology and religious practice
rest on the definition of this concept. The controversy among Tibetan
scholiasts revolving around the interpretation of the second verse in
the ninth chapter (prajiiaparamitaparicclfeda) of Santideva's Eodhicarya-
vatara (EGA) brings some basic divergences in their exegesis of the two 'i
truths into sharp relief. This verse reads as follows:
paramarthasca satyadvayam idarv matam/
buddheragocarastattvarv buddhih
"The conventional (sa'f(tvrtilf) and the ultimate-
these are accepted as the two truths. Reality
(tattvam) is beyond the sphere of the intellect;
intellect is called 'concealing' (sa'f(tvrtilf)."
The Geluk view, exemplified by Gyaltshap (Rgyal Tshab) and Tsgonkhapa,
holds that the second half of this stanza should not be taken in its literal
sense, because if ultimate truth were not the object of some type of
intellectual understanding, it would be unknowable, and it would
therefore follow that all religious practice aiming at the realization of
the ultimate would be in vain.
3
The earlier Sakya and later Nyingma
commentators dissented from this line of interpretation, arguing that
ultimate truth "cannot be objectified by the mind because it transcends
all discursiveness (prapaiica)",4 although these commentators do affirm
79
a non-intellectual intuition of the ultimate. This conflict of opinion is
grounded in a difference of emphasis between Geulk and non-Geluk
approaches to religious knowledge, which may be roughly designated
as "scholastic" versus "yogic", or cognitive versus experiential. In the
present endeavor to clarify this question we will deal with differing
Madhyamika definitions of the two truths, its treatment in the BCA, the
texts and arguements most often utilized by Tibetan scholars on this
point and the historical context of this controversy.
II.
The Madhymika assertion of two truths should not lead one to
assume that this school accepts two different levels or degrees of
reality; from earliest times Buddhist texts have denied that there is a
multiplicity of truths,S and the Madhyamika is in accord with this.
Sal(lV1:tisatya is usually translated semantically as "conventional truth"
(= vyavaharasatya)6 but from a strictly etymological point of view it
should be explicated as "truth for a concealing [cognition]"; it is "that
through which the comprehension of reality is concealed and blocked."7
Even though the Prasangika Madhyamika distinguishes between a "true
conventional" (tathyasal(lvrJift), defined as the ordinary perception of
any object by an inimpaired sense organ
8
, and a "false conventional"
(mithyasal(lv'(tift) comprising illusions, mirages and the like
9
, both
aspects of conventional truth are regarded as "false from the stand-
point of the ultimate", that is, from the viewpoint of the true vision of
the Saints.!O Although conventional truth is thus actually false from the
perspective of the ultimate, it retains its utility as a means of pointing
the way towards the ultimate.!! The Prasangika Madhyamika "strives
only to prove that it [i.e. conventional truth] is not valid from the point
of view of the absolute."!2
Critics of the Madhyamika such as Kumarila have argued that the
Madhyamika cannot validly claim to have a dual truth since its
conventional truth is "a euphemism for untruth (mithya) or unreality."!3
Madhyamika thinkers were always on the alert to avoid this objection;
Nagarjuna replies to an accusation of nihilism by stating that "things like
a cart, a pot, a cloth etc., though devoid of own-being because of being
dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions,
e.g. carrying ... containing ... protecting from the cold."!4 It is not the
empirical fact which is rejectedas false, but the intellect's interpretation
80
of it; a con ventional truth is defined onrologically as any phenomenon
which arises in dependence of another IS-clearly not an assertion of
non-existence .
. Santideva as well treats the same problem at 9:lOSc-l06b: an
opponent objects that on Madhyamika premises "the conventional
does not exist-how can there be two truths?" The reply is by no means
clear, as its meaning is disputed by various commentators, perhaps
reflecting the dilemma which the Madhyamika faces on this score. The
main thrust of Santideva's argument appears to be that the causal
efficiency of phenomena is unaffected by their epistemological status
as conventional truths: "that which is definitely subsequent exists"
(9: 107 c), that is, a dependently produced conventional object can be
empirically determined to exist subsequent to its production, although
production and cessation are, in the final analysis, imaginative
constructs. It must always be borne in mind that the two truths have
both an epistemological and ontological character; from the latter
viewpoint conventional truth is defined as "that object which is found
by conventional means of valid knowledge" 16 the object itself, as well as
the non-analytical unimpaired sense consciousness by which it is
ascertained, are reckoned as conventional truths. Such an object is not
a mere fiction, although the mode in which it is perceived is
inextricably bound up with false reification.
17
The ambiguities of this problem have contributed to an uneasy
tension within the Prasangika Madhyamika between more substantial-
istic and more negativistic views of the conventional. If Candrakirti's
interpretation be taken as normative for this school then its
predominant tendency seems to be negativistic. For Candraklrti,
conventional truth is just the object of those who have false vision
(mr:0adarSana) 18; it is an artificially constructed (kr:trimam) truth, and it is
equated with delusion (moha). 19 The difficulties that this view gives rise
to were recognized by Bhavaviveka and other Svatantrika Madhyamikas,
who subdivided conventional truth on the basis of its empirical
efficiency or non-efficiency. However, such a distinction can only be
made if one accepts the Svatantrika claim that the conventionally
existent exists in its own right (rang.ngo.nas.grub.pa.)20 and thus is
amenable to verification (tsad.mas.grub.pa). That the conventional is
endowed with such an independent existence is emphatically denied by
the Prasangikas, and Santideva concurs in this (9: 108, Ill-lIS); his
equation of the conventional with intellect (buddhi), i.e., with ignorance
and error,21 is completely in line with the Prasangika view that the
81
conventional is wholly false from the standpoint of its mode of
perception.
Tibetan scholars in the Geluk tradition have given a different
emphasis to their explication of the conventional. It was an innovation
of Tsongkhapa, the founder of this school, "to present the conventional
valid existence of all phenomena, detailing the acceptability of the
certification of the conventional existence of all phenomena by vaiid
cognizers." 22 According to Tsongkhapa and subsequent Geluk
scholars the task of the Prasangika Madhyamika is not only to refute
false notions which obscure the nature of ultimate reality; it must also
definitely validate all the phenomena comprising sa'f[lSara and
nirva'Y!a.23 This leads to the assertion that conventional phenomena are
established by a conventional means of valid knowledge which certifies
their causal efficiency. This position has been extensively criticized by
Sakya and Nyingma scholars for being more in harmony with the
logical methods of Dharmakirti, who establishes the ultimate existence
of phenomena using the same criterion.
24
III
Aside from their disagreement over whether or not conventional
truth can be verified, the fundamental problems raised by Tibetan
scholars in connection with BGA 9:2 have dealt with the nature of the
ultimate. Their point of departure is 9:2c: "Reality is not within the
sphere of the intellect." Here again we find Sakya and Nyingma inter-
pretations raised against those of the Geluks, in this case over the
crucial issue of whether an ultimate truth can be an object of cognition
(jneya). Since Santideva has clearly stated that ultimate truth is not
within the range of the intellect, the Tibetan debate has centered
around the question of whether or not such a denial is logically and
scripturally justifiable, and hence whether Santideva's statement is to
be taken literally or requires interpretation.
The transcendent and inexpressible nature of the ultimate is a
recurrent theme in the Prajiiaparamitii siitras: "it cannot be grasped, it
cannot be talked about, it is neither a dharma nor a non-dharma."25 The
which is cited by Prajiiakaramati and many of
the Tibetan commentators as well, states this viewpoint with great
clarity:
82
"If, Devaputra, the ultimate truth should be the object of body,
speech and mind in an ultimate sense (paramarthatalf) it would not
be reckoned an 'ultimate truth'; it would be a conventional truth.
But, Devaputra, ultimate truth entirely transcends all conven-
. tional usage; it is without distinctions, non-arisen and non-ceasing,
free from designatum and designation, object of cognition and
cognition, even as far as transcending being an object of the
gnosis of the omniscience which is endowed with the best. of all
modes."26
Similarly, Nagarjuna observes that "the character of reality is non-
dependent, quiescent, non-discursive, non-constructive, non-dual."27
Candraklrti as well holds that "ultimate truth is not an object of
cognition." 28
The bulk of scriptural and authoritative Indian commentarial
evidence appears to support a literal reading of BGA 9:2; such a view is
upheld by all of the Indian commentators on this passage, including
the most important ones, Prajiiakaramati and Vibhuticandra. According
to the latter, the ultimate is not an object of any constructive
cognition,29 nor is it within the operational sphere even of sarvakara-
jiiana.
30
However, despite this seemingly comprehensive denial, he
does not entirely rule out the possibility of some type of apprehension
of the ultimate, stating that it is the object of "the partless adamantine
meditative absorption."3l The literal reading of BGA 9:2 is followed by
Sakya and Nyingma commentators.
32
On whan then does the Geluk school base its idiosyncratic
position that Santideva's words cannot be taken on their face value in
this instance? The scriptural passage most frequently cited by them in
this connection
33
is drawn from the Pitrputrasamagamasutra, and is
found in the
"This much is what is to be known, the conventional and the
ultimate. Since the Blessed One sees and knows and experiences
these as Emptiness, he is called 'The Omniscient'."34
This passage does indeed seem to establish that ultimate truth is an
object of cognition, at least for a Buddha. However, the sutra goes on to
say that "furthermore, that which is the ultimate is inexpressible,
incomprehensible, uncognizable, unexplained, undeclared .... "35 a
seemingly unambiguous denial of the inaccessibility of the ultimate,
which, significantly, goes unquoted by Geluk authors.
83
: I
I
There appears to be a paradox in the Prasangika Madhyamika
treatment of the ultimate. It is ineffable and non-conceptual, but at the
same time "it is rational in the sense that it is developed through a
rational procedure"36 i.e. through the Madhyamika critique. Conse-
quently, there must be "a kind of unexplained leap from the dialectic to
the acquisition of insight." 37 No Madhyamika denies that the ultimate
is intuited in some manner or other. According to Candrakirti, for
example, it is "the object of right vision of the saints who know
reality."38 The difficulty lies in determining by what means an
apparently unknowable ultimate can be apprehended. The more
logically oriented of the Madhyamika thinkers could not be satisfied
with a mysterious leap beyond conceptualization, and a compromise
developed within the Madhyamika which seemed to render the
ultimate more accessible. This was effected by Bhavaviveka, founder of
the Svatantrika Madhyamika, who bifurcated ultimate truth into actual
(aparyaya) and analogous (paryaya) aspects. The actual ultimate is equi-
valent to the ultimate of the Prasangikas; it is transcendent, and its
intuition is free of discursiveness (ni:jprapaiica). The analogous aspect
merely accords with the ultimate, and its perception involves
discursiveness.
39
IV
It is unquestionable that the Svatantrika position had a profound
effect on Tibetan Buddhism during its period of initial growth and
development. The initiator of Tibetan monastic Buddhism, according
to Tibetan historiography, was the great Svatantrika scholar
according to Tibetan accounts his pupil Kamalasila upheld the
Svatantrika position at a debate held at Samye monastery at the end of
the eighth century under the auspices of King Trisongdetsen, at which
one of the main questions at issue was the immanence or transcendence
of ultimate knowledge. Although doubt has been cast on the occurence
of an actual face-to-face debate between Indian and Chinese Buddhists
at Samye, there was, in any case, a significant controversy between
advocates of Indian and Chinese Buddhist doctrines extending over a
number of years during the last decades of the eighth century.40
According to the tradition universally accepted by the Tibetans the
Chinese Ch'an master Hoshang Mahayana advocated a radical "leap"
theory of enlightenment:
84
He who has no thoughts and inclinations at all, can be fully
delivered from Phenomenal Life. The absence of any thought,
search or investigation brings about the non perception
[anupalabdha] of the reality of seperate entities. In such a manner
one can attain [Buddhahood] at once.
41
This viewpoint is identical to that ascribed to Hui-neng in the Platform
Sutra
42
, and it can be justified by reference to much Indian Buddhist
material as wel1.
43
Nevertheless such an approach appeared heretical
to Indian teachers like Kamalasila, who advocated a progressive path
of ethical and intellectual practice
44
which became the predominant
orientation for religious training in the Tibetan monastic tradition.
The Geluk interpretation of Santideva's formulation of the two
truths, although from a professedly Prasangika point of view, seems to
have been influenced by the Svatantrika position. Gyaltshap argues
that Santideva's assertion of the inaccessibility of reality to the intellect
refers only to an intellect endowed with dualistic perception (giiis snang
gi blo); he maintains that Emptiness does become the object of direct
non-dualistic means of valid knowledge.
45
Tsongkhapa also observes
that "without the concept (don.spyi) of the object of negation (dgag.bya),
i.e. true existence, it is impossible to ascertain true non existence."46
This view posits the necessity for a positive cognition to lead one to the
inexpressible actuality of the ultimate; this would seem similar in
content and function to the analogous ultimate of the Svatantrika.
There is little foundation for this view in the BCA itself; Santideva
makes it clear that the apprehension of non-substantiality is a non-
apprehension:
"When imagined entities are not contacted, their non-existence is
not contracted, since if an entity is false it is clear that its non-
existence is false." 9: 139
In 9:47c-48 he rejects the notion that liberation can be obtained while
any conception, regardless of how elevated, remains in the mind:
"A mind with an object must remain fixed somewhere. Without
[an understanding of] Emptiness a fettered mind will be
produced again ... Therefore Emptiness should be contemplated."
Moreover, in the verse which tradition declares was the occasion for his
levitating out of the sight of his audience during the first recitation of
85
the EGA, Santideva states that one who has truly attained a realization
of the ultimate has not done so through a process of cognition, but
rather through the extirpation of all views:
"When neither existence nor non-existence remains before the
mind as there is no other condition, it is pacified." 9:34
Thus, there may be some substance to the Nyingma claim that the
Geulks are actually following the Svatantrika in their explication of
Santideva's position on ultimate truth.
47
An accurate determination of
the validity of this charge is, however, beyond the scope of the present
article, as it would require a full examination of .e long, drawn-out
polemics between Geluks and non-Geluks on this subject.
48
Even if the
Nyingma characterization were accurate, it may indicate a difference
in pedagogic method, rather than a real disagreement over the final
nature of the ultimate. What the Geluks advocate is an intermediate
conceptual state of cognition preceding the final non-dual appreh('!n-
sion'of the actual, inexpressible ultimate; this accords with Nagarjuna's
statement that "Without reliance on convention the ultimate cannot be
expressed."49 All major Tibetan authorities accept that Emptiness is a
pure negation (prasajyaprat4edha), and according to Bu.ston there is no
difference between the Svatantrika and the Prasangika regarding the
true nature of the ultimate;50 their apparent differences are merely
propaedeutic. The Svatantrika, like the Geluk, recommends that there
first be meditation upon an ultimate which can be understood
conventionally, through an image, while the Prasangika, like the
Nyingma, advocates from the outset a direct intuition of Emptiness
which is free fromthe four extremes (catu:jkoti) and thereby not within
the sphere of word or thought.
51
Few Tibetan Buddhists would go as
far as the Ch'an masters in denying any usefulness to ratiocination, at
least as a preliminary aid to the realization of the ultimate, nor would
the Geluk claim that in the final analysis the ultimate is within the realm
of thought. 52
Santideva, with exemplary Madhyamika even-handedness, takes a
middle of the road position on this problem; he affirms that "all investi-
gation is expressed through recourse [to conventional designations] as
they are known [in the world)" (9: 108), but he does not concede that
this will necessitate an infinite regress of investigations; Madhyamika
analysis has an inherent "self-destruct mechanism", since that analysis
is itself included among the phenomena which are determined to be
86
without substance. Thus, through the use of an admittedly conventional
analysis, one reaches a perception of the ultimate which is characterized
by the absence of clinging or non-clinging objects, i.e., a transcendence
of affirmation and negation, "and everywhere there is non-activity
(nirvyapa,ra) and peace."53 Both Geluks and non-Geluks could accept
such a position, and indeed the twentieth century Geluk scholar
Ngulchu Thogmay (Ngul.chu Thogs.merf) propounds such a compromise
view in his commentary on the ECA, 54 which is held in high regard by
Tibetan scholars of all schools.
NOTES
Department of Religion, Williams College, Williamstown, MA 01267.
1. The material in this article appears in a different form in my doctoral disserta-
tion, Santideva and the Madhyarnika: The Prajiiapararnita-pariccheda of the Bodhicaryavatara
(University of Wisconsin, 1977). The Sanskrit text that I have relied on in making my transla-
tion ofthe ninth chapter of the BCA (and forthose verses translated in the present article)
is that of P.L. Vaidya, Bodhicaryavatara of Santideva (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960).
2. See e.g. Nagarjuna, Mularnadhyarnakakarika (MMK) 24:9, "ye 'nayoma
vijananti vibhagarp satyayordvayo4. / te tattvarp na vijananti gambhirarn buddhasasane/I".
3. See translation of Gyaltshap's Byang.chub.serns.pai.spyod.pa.la.)ug.pa'i.marn.
bshad.rgyaL.sras.)ug.ngogs in Sweet, op. cit., p.206-207.
4. Mipham, Sher.'greL.nor.bu.ke.ta.ka (Varanasi: Tarthang Tulku, 1966), p.9.
5. e.g. "ekarp hi saccarn na dutiyam atthi," Suttanipata, quoted in K.N. Jayatilleke,
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), p.353.
6. Prajiiakaramati, Bodhicaryavatara-Paiijika (BCAP) in Vaidya, op. cit., p. 17 1.4-5.
7. BCAP, p. 170.29. Also see Candrakirti, Prasannapada: "ajiiana
rn
hi samantat
sarvapadarthatattvacchadanat ityucyate" quoted in T.V.R. Murti, The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), p.245, f.n. 1.
S. Candrakirti, Nladhyamakavatara 6:5, quoted in BCAP p. 171.15-1S. Also ibid.,
p.I71.4-19.
9. Lac. cit.
10. Ibid., p.171.20.
11. See Madhyamakavatara 6:S0 in BCAP, p.179.26.
12. J. May, "Kant et Ie Madhyamika", Indo-IranianJoumal, V.3, 1959, p.l07.
13. Kumarila in Slokavarttika, Niralambanavada v.6-S, quoted in B.K. Matilal,
Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague: Mouton,
1971), p.153.
14. Nagarjuna, Vigraha-vyavartanl, V.22.
15. "Paras para- sambhavana
rn
va anyonyasrayeJ?,etyarthal)", Prasanna-
pada, quoted in Murti, op. cit., p.245, f.n. l.
16. Lcang.skya Hu.thog.thu Ye.shes.bstan.pa'i.sgron.me, Grub.mtha'i. mam.par.
bzhag.pa.gsal.bar.bshad.pa. thub.bstan.hun.po'i.dmzes.rgyan (Samath: Lama Guru Deva,
1970), p.353.
87
17. See Gyaltshap, op. cit., p.218.
18. Madhyamakavatara 6:13, quoted BCAP, p.174.26-29.
19. Ibid., p.171.15-i8.
20. G. Sopa and E. Jones, "The Two Truths in the Svatantrika Madhyamika"
(unpub!' paper, n.d.), pp.15, 22. .
21. BCAP, p. 170.30, commenting on 9:2.
22. J. Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, Ph.D. thesis (University of Wisconsin,
1973), p.211. Emphasis mine.
23. Ibid., p.235.
24. Ibid., pp. 235-44 and Mipham, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
25. Vajracchedika, translated in E. Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1958), p.36.
26. BCAP, p.I77.9-12.
27. MMK, 18:9.
28."See the commentary to Madhyamakavatara 6:28 in Dbu Ma La Hjug Pa
(Dharamsala: Council of Cultural and Religious Affairs, 1968), p.88.
29. Vibhiiticandra, Byang.chub.kyi. spyod.pa.la. jug.pa'i. dgongs.pa'i.grel.pa.khyad.
paT.gsal.byed (his own translation of PT 5282, vo!' 100. f. 307a.7:
"rtog.bcas .kyiji.siiad. pa'i. yu!.ma. yin.zhing".
30. Ibid., f. 307b.4.
31. Loc. cit.
32. For example in Bsod.nams Rgya!.mtshan, Spyod.jug.rnam.bshad (New Delhi:
N. Topgay, 1970), pp.306-307; Bu.ston Rin.chen. grub Byang. chub. kyi.sems.gsal. bar. byed.
pa 'i. od.zer, Vo!' 19 (dza) of The Collected Works of Bu-Ston, ed. Lokesh Chandra (N ew Delhi:
International Academy ofIndian Culture, 1971), pp.502.4-504.5; Mipham, op. cit., p.8:
"dngos.po'i.gnas.tshu!.don.dam.pa.ni.yod.pa.dang.med.pa.dang.giiis.ka dang/
giiis.min.gyi.mth' .kun. dang.bra!.bas.na.blo. yi.spyod. yu!.min".
33. For example in Tsongkhapa Dbu.ma.dgongs.pa.rab.gsal, PT vo!' 154, p.176,
Gyaltshap, op. cit., p.208.
34. I!fSantideva, ed. by P.L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute,
1961), p.136.26-27.
35. Ibid., p.136.29-30.
36. K. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1963), p.238.
37. Ibid., p.239.
38. In BCAP, p.174.22-23.
39. Sopa and Jones, op. cit., p.13.
40. See Y. Imaeda, "Documents Tibetains de Touen-Houeng Concernant Ie
Concile de Tibet" in Journal Asiatique, 1975, pp. 125-141.
41. Bu.ston, History of Buddhism (Chos. 'byung), trans. by E. Obermiller, 2 vols.,
1931-32 rpt. (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1965), p.193.
42. Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, trans. by P. Yampolsky (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 137-139.
43. Candrakirti himself expresses the view that "the stopping of conceptions-
the sages say that this is the fruit of criticism. Ordinary people are bound by conceptions-
the ascetic who does not conceive goes to deliverance" in Madhyamakavatara, Tibetan
translation, Chapter 6, p.117. This is echoed by Abhayakara: "He who does not conceive
88
anything is liberated in this life", quoted in A. Wayman, "Contributions to the
Madhyamika School of Buddhism", JAOS v.89, n.l. p.151. Also see the citations from
scripture utilized to defend this position by the Chinese side in P. Demieville, Le Concile de
Lhasa (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1952), pp. 53-63, 95-107.
44. Bu.ston, History of Buddhism, v.2, pp. 194-195 and Kamaiasila, Bhcwanakrama,
translated byG. Sopa and E. Jones (unpub!' ms., n.d.), pp. 52-82.
45. In Sweet, op. cit., p.175.
46. Tsongkhapa, op. cit., p.129.
47. Mipham, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
48. For a full discussion of the works produced by this controversy, many of
which are not yet available in the West, see the introduction by Gene Smith to Mipham's
Rab.lan (Gangtok: Sonam Kazi, 1969), pp. 8-11.
49. "vyavaharamanasritya paramartho na deSyate", MMK 24: lOab.
50. Tsongkhapa, op. cit., p.149; Mipham, Sher.'grel.nor.bu.ke.ta.ka, p.4.9-10. On
prasajya-prat4edha see Matilal, op. cit., pp. 162-164.
51. Mipham, op. cit., pp. 6-8.
52. Since the type of non-dualistic intellect that comprehends the ultimate,
according to Gyaltshap, op. cit., p.175, completely transcends discursiveness.
53. BCAP, p.250.1-2.
54. See pp. 197-198 of his Byang. chub.sems.pa'i.spyod.pa.la jug.pa'i. grel.pa.legs.par.
bshad.pa'i.rgya.mtsho (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974).
89
Some Buddhist Poems in Tamil*
by G. V &ayavenugopal
Introduction
Viracoliyam is a grammatical treatise in Tamil written by Puttamittiran
Skt. Buddhamitra) in the 11th century A.D., during the reign of the
Cola king Virarajendra. 1 In his introductory verse Puttamittiran claims
himself as 'the ruler of Ponpa.!:!"i' which is identified as the present
Ponpetti village in Tanjore district.
2
Again the title 'ruler' may imply
that he got an assignment on the revenues of Ponpetti from the Cola
ruler.'3 This grammar, based on the Sanskrit model, explains, though
rather briefly, the structure of the Tamil language, including that used
in inscriptions. For instance, it mentions -icci as one of the feminine
gender suffIxes (which is not mentioned by Tolkappiyam, the earliest
Tamil grammar, written around 3rd century B.C.), which is used in
one of the inscriptions of Sundaraco!a (of 10th century A.D.).4 This
grammar, being written by a Buddhist, was widely used in the Buddhist
monasteries by those who learnt Tamil and, according to Godakumbura,
the Sinhalese grammatical work, viz. Sidada Sailkara, is based on
this.
There is a commentary for this grammar, written by one
Peruntevanar, was is also a pupil of Puttamittiran, in which we find a
number of stray Buddhist verses quoted as examples for various
grammatical rules. Since the commentator has not given the name of
the authors of the works to which they belong, nothing can be said
about the origin of these verses. Further, except for c a s u ~ l references,
nothing has been said about these verses in modern studies of
Buddhism in Tamilnadu. However, these poems throw some light on
the religious conditions, especially on the status of Buddhism, in the
Tamil country during the lOth century A.D.
, 93
Avalokiteswara cult and Buddha bhakti tradition:
Puttamittiran mentions Avalokiteswara in two verses. First in his
introductory verse
6
he mentions that Agastya learnt Tamil under
A valokiteswara and later spread it to the world. Secondly in the
penultimate verse in the chapter, viz. Kiriya-pata-p-patalam, he
states: 'the true Tamil of Avalokiteswara whose fame shines in several
thousand ways.' According to the Saivite tradition of Tamilnadu, Siva
explains Tamil to Agastya and the hill Potikai/Potiyil is the residence of
Agastya. For our purpose the mentioning 'of Avalokiteswara is
important. According to the Buddhist tradition this Mount Potikaiis
the seat of Bodhisattva Avalokiteswara. Taranath
7
mentions that
Potala is a mythical mountain in the South and is the seat of
Avalokiteswara. Hien-Tsiang, the Chinese traveller, also mentions one
Mo-Io-kiu-ch'a. Beal and Hultzsch have identified both Taranath's
Potalaand Hien-Tsiangs's Mo-Io-kiu-ch'a (= Malaiyam) as Potikai and
Hultzsch states that Hieun-Tsiang or his Buddhist informants seem to
have transformed Agastya, who is supposed to reside ori Podigai, into
the Bodhisattva Avalokiteswara.
8
But, as pointed out above, according
to Puttamittiran, Agastya is the disciple of Avalokiteswara. Thus it is
clear that the Buddhist tradition of Tamilnadu has identified Potikai,
the seat of Agastya, as also the seat of A valokiteswa:ra and made
Agastya his disciple. One of the meanings of the name Avalokiteswara
is 'the Lord who looks from on high (i.e. from the mountains, where he
lives, like Siva)'9 and probably this meaning might be responsible for the
Tamil Buddhist tradition. What is important here is the popularity of
the Avalokiteswara cult in the Tamil country. It attained much
significance when. Mahayanism became very popular.
It is very unfortunate that no systematic study has been done so
far with reference to the origin, development, and fall of Buddhism in
Tamilnadu. The only complete Buddhist literary work in Tamil
available now is Mal].imekalai (generally assigned to 2nd century A.D.,
but it could have been written around 4th century A.D.) which contains
not only literal translations (though partial) from the I canto of
Mahavagga of Vinayapitaka, 10 but also refers to the Paramitas.
11
It is
not clear whether these paramitas refer to the six kinds of paramitas of
the Hinayana doctrine or the extended paramitas (i.e. ten paramitas) of
the Mahayana doctrine, though the learned editor interprets it to mean
the ten paramitas. But the verses quoted in Viracoliyam commentary
definitely belong to Mahayanism. According to Har Dayal, 'the
94
bodhisattva doctrine may be said to have been inevitable outcome
of the tendency towards bhakti and the new conception of Buddha-
hood.'12 Conditions before the 11th century in Tamilnadu reveal that
there was prevalent a strong Buddha bhakti tradition and idol worship
should have been very popular. The period between 650 A.D. and 950
A.D. is considered to be the period ofbhakti movement which saw the
revival of Hinduism and the gradual weakening of the influence of
both Buddhism andJainism. The A!vars and Nayanmars spearheaded
this movement and as a result a large number of Siva and
temples were built by the kings who adopted these religions.
times some of the Buddhist temples might have been changed into
Hindu temples.
13
But at the same time these kings patronised other
religions like Buddhism and Jainism, too, by making liberal donations,
endowments, etc. to the viharas and panis (of theJains). The verses
praising Buddha or Bodhisattva -Avalokiteswara quoted by the
commentator of Viraco!iyam reveal the Buddha bhakti tradition to
have been quite similar to Siva bhakti or bhakti traditions.
Now the question is, which was the model? Did the Buddhists and
Jains follow the Hindu bhakti movement and compose poetry on those
lines, or vice versa? There are two things involved here. One is the
bhakti movement itself and the other is the bhakti poetry resulting
from this movement. Har Dayal claims that 'the idea of bhakti
originated among the Buddhists and was adopted in self defence by the
Hindus.' ' ... [The] ideal of bhakti arose and flourished among the
Buddhists.'14 However, he also points out that the new sects of the
Hindus 'exercised a profound influence on the further development
of Buddhism.' 15 There are counter claims too. For instance Aiyaswami
Sastri, quoting Kimura and Radhakrishnan, states that 'the evolution
of the original atheistic Buddhism into theistic Mahayanism was a
result of the religious fervour of its adherents under the dominating
influence of theistic Hinduism through the centuries.'16 The same
thing could be said about the development in Tamilnadu also. It is
possible that the Tamil poet Cekki!ar who wrote the famous Saivite
hagiology called PeriyapuraJ1.am, 'the big PuraJ1.a,' might have gotten
some inspiration from the Buddhist Jataka stories in modelling the
biographies of the Saivite saints. Or this could have been done even
before him, at least in oral tradition, since Cekki!ar is only giving a
poetic form to these stories.
But the verses quoted in Viraco!iyam show the influence of Siva/
bhakti poetry. Some of the verses are definitely modelled after
95
''f
i,
Paripata1, an anthology of poems following the old cankam tradition,
composed ca. 2nd century A.D. Verses quoted on p. 140 and 142 are in
the old poetic forms called vaI).I).aka otta!icai-k-kalippa and ampotaranka
ottalicai-k-kalippa (old poetic metres). The verse 'quoted on p. 157
follows the poetic form adopted in Tirukku!,aL an ancient Tamil
ethical work. Similarly verses quoted on p. 161 follow other old metres
like ta!icai and aciriyattalicai. Thus we find an interesting interaction
between these religious movements; as a result we see some are taken
from the Buddhist/Jain tradition and some are borrowed from the
Tamil bhakti tradition. At least the verses quoted in the commentary of
Viraco!iyam reveal the influence of Tamil bhakti poetry on Buddhist
literary activity. One of the characteristic features of the Tamil bhakti
poetry is the praising of the Lord, eulogising His qualities. For
example, Siva is associated with the banyan tree in the Tamil bhakti
poems. In the same way, the verses which praise the qualities of the
always mention him as the one who sits under the bodhi
tree and showers His Grace. As are mentioned by various
names, the Bodhisattva is referred to as Matavar (p. 124) 'the great
medicant,' Punniyan (p. 125, 159) 'the One who does good,'
(p. 125) 'benefactor,' (p. 126) 'one who knows everything,'
Vaman (p. 125), kotila a!am pakarnta kon (p. 127) 'the king who told
the dharma which is flawless,' Punitan (p. 157), 'the pure one,' Atinata
(p. 161) 'the ancient Lord,' coti (p. 183) 'the light,' Ni!aivar (p. 188) 'the
full one,' aintotankor miinra!utta natan (p. 127) 'the Lord
who cut the eight faults.' Similarly the verse quoted on p. 140 states that
the bodhisattva has told the 32 kalas and 89 siddhis, and the verse on p.
142 mentions him as the yogi who accompanies all the souls in their
births and deaths.
Another characteristic feature of Tamil bhakti poetry is the use of
mythologies of In the Buddha bhakti verses quoted one
sees a number of mythologies associated with the bodhisattva. Thus
there is the story of weighing his flesh (p. 140), the story of offering his
body to a hungry tiger (p. 114, 140, 142), the conquering of Mara (p.
141,142), the story of becoming a fish and becoming one with truth (p.
141), the story of becoming a deer and revealing the divine qualities (p.
141), the story of preaching the dharma to five rakshasas (p. 144), the
story of removing the sufferings of the Nagas (p. 141), the story of
giving eyes to Indra at the latter's request (p. 125, 165). Another
feature of the Tamil bhakti poetry is the praising of the sacred place/
town of Similarly, we find one verse (p. 188) wherein the
96
city Turitapuram is mentioned as the abode of Niraivar, 'the
full one.'
Two verses which were quoted partially reveal the influence of
Tantric Buddhism. One verse (p. 171) states that 'I will wander around
and play until the exhaustion of the desires before the swung top stops.'
The metaphor vlcina pamparam, 'the swung top' refers to the soul and
its birth. The other verse (p. 171) runs like this: '1 will wander and play
before the built palace collapses.' Here the metaphor used is erutta
maram, 'the built palace,' suggesting the soul in a new body. Thus these
poems reveal the Buddha bhakti tradition in during the
10th/11th centuries A.D. as similar to the Tamil bhakti
tradition.
NOTES
Madurai Kamaraj University and University of Wisconsin
* I wish to thank Prof. A.K. Narain for encouraging me to write this paper and
Ms. Abbie Ziffren for typing it.
1. Kovintaraca Mutaliyar, Ka. Ra., ed., Viracoliyam, 1st ed. (1942: rpt. Madras:
SSPS, May 1970), verse 7. All page numbers are given according to this edition.
2. Annual Reports on Epigraphy, 1899, paragraph 50.
3. Nilakanta Sastri, K.A., Colas (1955, University of Madras), p. 683.
4. Srinivasan, K. R. 'A l")ote on other Buddhist vestiges in Tamilnad,' in Story of
Buddhism with special reference to South India, eds. Aiyappan, A. and Srinivasan, P.R. (1960,
Dept. of Information and Publicity, Govt. of Madras), p. 160.
5. The Dravidian element in Sinhalese' in Bulletin of the Oriental and African
Studies, Vol. XI (1943-46), pp. 837-841.
6. Op. cit., p. 2, Verse 2.
7. Schiefner (tr.) From Tibetan to German (1869, St. Petersberg), quoted by
Hultzsch. See footnote 8.
8. The country of Malakota,' in The Indian Antiquary (August 1889), p. 240.
9. Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature (1932, Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London), p. 47.
10. Sini, Mayilai, Pauttamum TamiJum (1964, SISSBPS, Madras),
pp. 13-14.
11. Aiyar, V.V. Manimekalai (6th ed., 1965, Publication of
Tiyakaraca Vilacam, Madras), ch. 26:45, 29:26.
12. Op. cit., p. 35.
13. Venkatacami, op. cit., p. 59.
14. Op. cit., p. 34.
15. Ibid., p. 36.
16. 'Later modifications of Buddhism,' in 2500 Years of Buddhism, ed. P.V. Bapat
(1959, the Publications Division, Govt. of India), p. 349.
97
Professor Conze's Autobiography
THE MEMOIRS OF '
A MODERN GNOSTIC
In his old age Dr. Conze has often been asked to tell-
the story of his life. At last he has complied. The few
close friends who have seen the result found it
interesting, entertaining and instructive. Commercial
publishers have, however, reacted with a mixture of
horror and embarrassment. A SAMIZDA T publication
is therefore indicated.
The entire work has been divided into Three Parts.
The first two are now being printed in a very limited
edition. They can be bought separately, at 6.00 for
each Part. Copies of Part 1 are expected May 15, copies
of Part II later in the year.
The First Part, called 'Life and Letters', surveys Dr.
Conze's life and writings from 1904 to 1977. A few
themes are further developed in Part II, 'Politics,
People and Places'. Most of Part III, aptly named,
'Forbidden Thoughts and Banished Topics', will
remain hidden from view until the year 2000 A.D.
Then it will become obvious how much in the late
Seventies the freedom of speech had been curtailed in
our crumbling 'nanny state', even for scholars. A few
chapers may be released as Supplements when
circumstances permit.
Copies can be obtained from:
The Buddhist Society, 58 Eccleston Square, London
SWIV IPH -
The Bookshop Manager, The London Buddhist
Centre, 51 Roman Road, London E2 OHU
Luzac & Co. Ltd., 46 Great Russell Street, London
WC1B 3PE
J. M. Watkins, 21 Cecil Court, London W.C.2
Booklore, 2 Hound Street, Sherborne, Dorset
Ad Orientem Ltd., 2 Cumberland Gardens,
St. Leonards-on-Sea, Sussex
Trade Enquiries to any of the above addresses.
III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
The Prajiiaparamita Literature, by Edward Conze. Tokyo: The Reiyukai,
1978. 138 pp.
This review was written before Professor Conze's passing on September 24,
j 979. For a brief obituary, please tum to page 116.
Edward Conze's Prajiiaparamita Literature has until now been a
much sought after work, having been out of print for a number of years.
It was originally published in 1960 by Mouton & Co., and Buddhist
scholars are fortunate once again to have this valuable reference work
available to them. Hopefully it will help to rekindle scholarly interest in
this crucial aspect of Buddhist studies. To quote Conze: "The most
outstanding feature of contemporary Prajiiaparamita studies is the
disproportion between the few persons willing to work in this field and
the colossal number of documents extant in Sanskrit, Chinese and
Tibetan." (The Large Siltra on Perfect Wisdom, p. x)
Like most of Conze's sixty-one other books and articles connected
with the subjects and philosophy of the Prajiiaparamita-sutras, this one is
written in a style t.hat is both succinct and easy to read. This work,
however, is written for an audience which is presumed to have already a
rather specialized and sophisticated knowledge of Buddhist studies.
This second edition is essentially the same as the first with the
noteworthy addition of a complete bibliography of Conze's works on this
subject by the book's editor, A. Yuyama. It contains Conze's reconstruc-
tion of the history of the development of the various recensions of the
sutras in India, and the interpretations of these in China, Nepal, Siam,
Cambodia, Tibet, Japan and Europe. Also included is an annotated
bibliography of these recensions with a list of the commentaries on them
in India and Tibet, and a list of the Chinese commentators on the sutras.
Conze gives greatest emphasis to the commentary by Maitreya called the
Abhisamayalar(lkara, and the sub-commentaries on it in India and Tibet.
His list of the Tibetan sub commentaries is useful, but it cannot be
regarded as complete, since it includes just forty titles. A more complete
listing of these Tibetan works can be found in Lokesh Chandra's
Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature, Pt. 2 (New Delhi, 1963) which
contains more than two hundred titles.
Professor Conze's main purpose in this work is to provide a
historical sketch of the development of the P.P. literature as well as a
(partially) annotated bibliography of the root scriptures and their
commentaries, which have formed the bases for the classical study of
Mahayana Buddhism, particularly in India and Tibet. His effort has
greatly facilitated further critical scholarship on the various controversial
99
OpInIOnS held among major Indian commentators about the actual
meaning and method of the P.P. scriptures. As it is in the light of this
lively commentarial tradition that Professor Conze's own interpreta-
tions will have to be finally analysed, it might be the place here.to simply
mention two of his opinions, which would be the subjects of an
interesting debate with the followers of the commentarial tradition
begun by Maitreya's Abhisamdyala1(!kara and followed by Haribhadra
and the Tibetan scholars Tsong-kha-pa and Sera rJe-btsun-pa. Two of
Professor Conze's debatable interpretations are briefly mentioned
below. They are: 1. his opinions regarding the repetitive style of the
scriptures; 2. his interpretation of the meaning of the P.P.'s final
ontological viewpoint.
1. Prof. Conze's opinion that the larger P.P. scriptures are
composed of "masses and masses of monotonous repetitions which
interrupt and obscure the trend of the arguments" (p. 10) would be
a point of contention for these classical scholars. Haribhadra's tradition,
for example, tends to see these apparent repetitions as discrete sets of
meditative-antidotal procedures which thoroughly eliminate the obstacles
to Buddhahood. For example, folios 153a4 through 170a4 of the
of the Paiicavimsatisahasrikaprajiiaparamita (sde_dge edition) are (according
to Maitreya's Abhisamayala1(!kara and Haribhadra's Sputartha) devoted to
a description of the Path of Cultivation (skt. bhavanamarga, tib. sgom lam).
A fult translation of this section of the P.P. would require about thirty-
five English pages, but Professor Conze's translation reduces it to a half
page. He rationalizes his condensation by claiming that all the contents
of these pages are just "masses and masses of monotonous repetitions
which interrupt and obscure ... ". Haribhadra, on the other hand, sees
these contents of the P.P. as systematically designed meditative antidotal
procedures for eliminating the so-called 'spontaneous obstacles' (tib.
spang-bya-lhan-skyes) to enlightenment. In his Short Commentary (skt
Sputartha, tib. 'Crel-pa-don-gsalor 'grel chun), Haribhadra comments on
the contents of these seventeen folios of the PaiiccivimSatisahasrikaprajiia-
paramita with the following: "(These scriptural words instruct by way of
the means of) meditating just the actual antidote of (the spontaneous
obstacles) to be abandoned." Tib. (mdo tshig gi chos can) span by'a (lhan skyes
kyi) dnos poi giien po iii du rnam par sgom par byed (tshul gyis'doms pai yin pa,
phyir). (Quoted from Sera r J e-btsum-pa's Rol mtsho ... skaps dang poi spy
don. p. 113b7-134al, Sera New Edition. The parentheses enclose Ser,
rJe-btsun-pa's interpretive comments.) The lengthy and seemingl:
repetitious instructions in these pages are understood to be an antidota
formula which redefines the Path of Cultivation according to the P.P.'
new Madhyamika ontology. According to Haribhaci"ra's tradition, th
seemingly repetitious antidotal procedures of this entire section of th
100
scripture are to be understood and actualized in order for the results of
the Path of Cultivation (i.e. enlightenment) to be achieved. Therefore,
Professor Conze's opinion that the P.P. is largely composed of 'inter-
rupting and obscuring monotonous repetitions' would be heartily
rejected by Haribhadra as a misunderstanding ,of the purpose of the
P.P.'s thorough and detailed antidotal procedures.
2. While recognizing that the primary purpose of the P.P. is to
teach the absolute truth of emptiness, Professor Conze's opinion
regarding the nature of emptiness seems to differ from the opinions of
Maitreya, Haribhadra, Tsong-kha-pa, etc. We can find an illustration of
Conze's opinion in his translation of the title of Maitreya's commentary
on the P.P., the Abhisamayala7[Lkara, a work which he considers to be a
valid interpreter of the structure and method of the P.P. He translates
this title: "Treatise on Re-Union with-the Absolute". (Serie Orientale Roma,
Vol. VI, Roma, 1954). He justifies this translation by recourse to the
following etymological analysis: "Etymologically derived from abhi + sam
+ the root ("to go") i-re), abhisamaya can be translated as "coming
together", or "reunion", or "communion". The true reality outside me
comes together with the true reality inside me-that is the idea" (p. 104). '
Perhaps Prof. Conze's etymology is strongly influenced by his apparent
opinion that this school of Mahayana Buddhism claims that the absolute
truth and the final soteriological goal are one and the same. He does say
that the P.P. asserts as much when he says: "Here it is taught that ...
there is no such multiplicity, because all is one" (p.7), and when he says
that the final truth of the P.P. "is based on the equivalence of the self and
the absolute" (p. 6). The term "emptiness" for Prof. Conze, therefore,
seems to signify an absolute truth in which phenomenal reality is
negated by a oneness of individual selves and the undifferentiated
whole, as is implied by his translation of abhisamaya as "Re-Union with the
Absolute". With this opinion in mind, it is easier for us to understand his
translation of such phrases as "a Bodhisattva, a great being, who courses
in the perfection of wisdom, should not apprehend all dharmas ...
should not apprehend a Bodhisattva" (Large Sutra, p. 94). Based on this
translation, which interprets yan dag par rjes su mi mthon (skt. asamanu-
pashyati) as not apprehending a Bodhisattva or dharma at all, Prof.
Conze explains that the purpose of the P .P. is to presentthe practitioner
with contradictory facts which are meant to enhance a Bodhisattva's
progress toward the final goal. He says: "All the many thousand lines of
this Sutra can be summed up in two sentences: 1. ... 2. There is no such
thing as a Bodhisattva or all knowledge, or a "being" or the perfection of
wisdom, or attainment. The solution of this dilemma lies in nothing else
than the fearless acceptance of both contradictory facts" (Large Sutra,
p. 5). Prof. Conze's view of the P.P.'s ontology and will be
101
briefly contrasted below with the interpretations of Haribhadra,
Tsong-kha-pa and Sera rJe-btsun-pa.
The Tibetan translation of Abhisamaya is Mngon-par-rtogs-pa, which
is defined as "complete understanding" of all the elements of Mahayana
Buddhist practice and goals. In the Tibetan commentaries of the afore-
mentioned authors, there is no mention of a "re-unification with the
absolute", presumably because the progress toward Buddhahood is .
regarded by them as linear rather than circular. Moreover, the Buddha
himself is not understood as identical with the absolute truth. The
absolute truth, i.e., emptiness, is considered to imply that all existents
are "empty of true existence" (skt. satyasiddhi, tib. bden-par-grub-pa); that
is, empty of the ability to exist independently, irrespective of being an
object of consciousness. Buddhahood, the state of compassionate
omniscience, is also empty of "true existence"; but it is not emptiness
(i.e., the absolute truth) itself. This interpretation leads the aforemen-
tioned commentators to interpret the above passage from the P.P. in the
following way: "a great-minded Bodhisattva, who courses in the perfec-
tion of wisdom, should not apprehend as 'truly existing' all dharmas ...
should not apprehend as 'truly existing' a Bodhisattva." Based on this
ontological interpretation, the term yan dag par rjes su mi mthong ba (skt.
asamanupashyatz) takes on a special meaning. Here, yan dag par (skt.
samanu) is taken as an adverb meaning "perfectly", "absolutely", "truly";
hence the translation, "not apprehended as 'truly existent"', or not
"truly apprehended".
Therefore, in contrast to Prof. Conze's interpretation and transla-
tion, these commentators do not see the P.P. as presenting a dilemma
solved by "nothing else than the fearless acceptance of both contradic-
tory facts"; nor do they see the A.A. as a "Treatise on Re-Union with the
Absolute".
As it is not the place here to go into any of these complex issues in
the detail they deserve, they are only mentioned as a prelude to future
critical scholarship on the various interpretive exegeses of the P .P. by
Indian and Tibetan scholars: This type of critical scholarship on the
commentaries of the P.P. has been greatly enchanced by Prof. Conze's
The Prajnaparamita Literature, which (along with his sixty-one other
important books and articles) has provided us with a firm foundation
for such future endeavors. Western Buddhologists and/or Buddhists
will forever be in his debt.
Edward W. Bastian
102
Two Ways of Perfection: Buddhist and Christian, by Shanta Ratnayaka.
Colombo, Sri Lanka: Lake House Publishers, 1978. 180 pp.
In I87S Theravada Buddhist monks and Christian ministers met
in a series of great public debates at Panadura, Ceylon. These debates-
won by the Buddhists, according to most observers-set in motion a
process of dialogue between these two traditions. The present volume
can be said to mark the latest development resulting from this process of
dialogue and is a significant work in many respects. The author, Shanta
Ratnayaka, is a former Theravada monk, who, at the urging of his
teachers and superiors in the Sangha, came to America to pursue
graduate study in comparative religions. In this book, the fruition of his
graduate study, Dr. Ratnayaka develops a comparison of Theravada
Buddhism and'Christianity based upon the motif of the "Way ofPerfec-
tion" in each tradition, and in carrying out this task, he provides
valuable insights into his own Theravada tradition.
The book divides into three parts. Part One surveys the "Way of
Perfection" set out in Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, Part Two explores
the notion of "Perfection" or "Sanctification" in the Protestant
Christianity of John Wesley, and Part Three provides a direct
comparison of these two similar, but different, systems of "Perfection."
Parts One and Three are likely to be of most interest to readers of this
journal, but Part Two may constitute the most noteworthy section
because here we have a scholarly attempt by a Theravadin to compre-
hend thoroughly the concepts and intention of Christianity.
In Part One, the author explains the seven stages of purification
(visuddhi) that constitute the essence of the V isuddhimagga. He shows that
the path of purification is a gradual process wherein one begins with the
latent "wisdom-seed" in oneself and progresses toward the supra-
mundane stage of knowledge and wisdom. Summarizing and elucidating
the meanings of these seven stages, Ratnayaka clarifies Buddhaghosa's
exposition in much the same way that Buddhaghosa clarified the
commentarial tradition. Among the most important insights into the
Theravada tradition given here are the author's explanation of the
relation between the concentration (samadhi) path to wisdom and. the
insight (sati) path, and his detailed analysis of the seventeen facets of
"mentality" or a "thought moment." Both of these issues have intrigued
Western scholars who will appreciate the clarity the author brings to
these subjects in particular, and to the technical, abhidhammic
psychology of meditation in general.
Part Three of the book not only constitutes a good comparison of
the Buddhism of Buddhaghosa and the Christianity of Wesley, but also
103
I,
I
represents a model for Buddhist-Christian dialogue. Having given
detailed and accurate descriptions of each tradition, the author
impartially compares the major ideas of the two traditions with no
attempt to advocate the superiority of his own tradition. The
comparison of the two traditions is effective because it focuses upon one
specific representative from each tradition. Too often in Buddhist-
Christian dialogue the two traditions have been seen as monoliths rather
than as cumulative traditions having multiple and varied
When interpreters have failed to recognize the pluralism within the
tradition, they usually have ended up comparing sophisticated under-
standings of their own tradition with caricatures of the other tradition,
while missing significant points of commonality in various schools or
figures of the two traditions.
By taking Buddhaghosa and Wesley the author is able to compare
both the overall intention of their religious systems and the specific
elements within the systems. He finds some important similarities, for
example, in the way they understood the human predicament and in
their belief that the way to perfection represented the solution to the
predic?-ment. But he is also able to show that significant differences
become manifest when we examine their understandings of concepts
like faith and wisdom. So that in the end we must see that "The Ways of
Perfection they offer seem to be two different Ways which lead to two
different Goals."
This book would be important even if it were only an explanation
of the Theravadin understanding of the Visuddhimagga. But because it is
that as well as a solid comparison of the Visuddhimagga's viewpoint with a
major Christian viewpoint, it is doubly important. Readers with varying
interests in Buddhist studies, as well as in Comparative Religions, will
find this book useful.
George Bond
An Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems, tr. F.D. Lessing and A.
Wayman. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.
We have, with the recent republication of Fundamentals of the
Buddhist Tantras, the second edition of a very worthwhile work at a much
more affordable price. The original publication of the work by Mouton
and Co. in 1960 was a welcome addition to the all-too-small corpus of
literature in the field of the Buddhist Tantras, and this second edition,
recently brought out by the Indological publishing firm of Motilal
Banarsidass and Co., has all of the advantages of the original 1960
publication.
104
The translation of mKhas Grub :r:Te's rGyud sDe sPyi'i rNam, the
main focus of the work, is found on the opposite page of an edited and
transliterated version of the Tibetan text, a true asset to the Tibetologist.
The translation having been completed by Drs. Lessing and Wayman in
the lQ50's, it was compiled and footnoted by Dr. Wayman after the
untimely passing away of his co-author.
The present edition is identical in all respects to that previous one,
with the exception of the addition of a new introduction. In it, Dr.
Wayman sheds new light on several of the questions he left open in the
earlier edition; tracing, for example, many ofmKhas Grub rJe's sources
to the works of Bu sTon Rin Po Che (b. 1290). He also briefly discusses
some of the relationships between the Tantra and the Buddhist philoso-
phical tenet schools. It is a great pleasure to see treatment of this point,
too often overlooked or ignored in other discussions of this subject.
There is however one point on which I would beg to differ with
Dr. Wayman. In his discussion of initiation (abh4eka), he states that Atisa
prohibits the Secret (guhya) and Wisdom (prajiia) Initiations to ordained
monks, because they contain material which would bring complete loss
of the vows (skt.ji, tib. pham pa).l Though this is certainly true, I would
not concur with the reason given by Dr. Wayman, viz. that "only the
pure life (a monk's life) is consistent with the Buddha's dharma, while
these two initiations violate the pure life: and he adds that there is no
fault in knowing the situation".2 Now AtlSa, (and I would mention that
Tsong-kha-pa is essentially in agreement on this point) considered
concrete consort practise (the main violation incurred by receiving these
two intiations) to be a sine-qua-non for enlightenment. If that is true, it
would imply that such a practise is not only consistent with, but in fact is
a necessary aspect of the Buddhist path. How can this be justified in light
of the remarks of Dr. Wayman cited above? It appears that if we take the
line "there is no fault in knowing the situation" in a different context, we
can resolve the situation. This latter line seems to be an English
rendering of the final line of the Bodhipathapradipa:
De nyid rig la nyes pa med'
If so, if might best be translated: "There is no fault when knowing
thatness (de nyid)." This reading is in fact confirmed by Atisa himself in
his autocommentary where he states:
105
As for the holy ones, whose eyes cognize all
dharmas as illusions, for these yogins who
know the 'thatness' of these (dharmas),
no fault whatsoever will be incurred.
Dam pa la la'i zhal nas chos thams cad sgyu mar shes shing
de'i de kho na nyid rig pa'i mal 'byor pa las nyes par 'gyur pa
gang yang med de.
5
Thus we see in fact that consort practise is permissible, according to
Atisa, after the practitioner has obtained some realization of emptiness,
that is, after the attainment of the state of an Aryan.
6
Therefore, while
prohibiting such practices in the case of non-Aryan monks, and
discouraging them among non-Aryan lay men and women, it is by no
means meant to be an unqualified prohibition.
As for Dr. Wayman's work itself, it is fair to say that the transla-
tion, if difficult at points, only reflects problematic areas in the actual
Tibetan text. It is on the whole very accurate and faithful to the original
and it is for this very reason that the novice may find some difficulty in
using this work to introduce himself or herself to the study of Tantric
Buddhism. One should realize of course that even within the dGe-Lugs
tradition, the text is considered rather concise and terse.
Be that as it may, it is clear that by any set of standards, the republi-
cation of this classic work must be heartily welcomed. It is, after all, one
of the most valuable sourcebooks in an all-too-neglected area of study:
the Buddhist Tantras.
Jose Cabezon
NOTES
1. Viz. they involve breaking the vow of celibacy, which is a parajika offense.
2. Lessing, F.D. and Wayman, A., An Introduction to the Buddhist Tantrica
Systems, p. 3, (my insertion).
3. In his famous sNgagrim chen mo Tsong-kha-pa says "The method (for
attaining enlightenment) is a blissful binding" and that "binding is the bliss of the
union of the two organs (which is limited to the Highest Yoga Tantra)" [Hopkins
translation, pp. 119-121].
4. Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma, from a personal manuscript published in
India, p. 76.
5. Byang chub lam gyi sgron me dang de'i dka grel. Council of Religious &
Cultural Affairs, Dharmasala, India, 1969, p. 23l.
6. Atisa also brings up the point that others hold that such practices can
begin as early as the "weak stage of patience". R.F. Sherburne, A Study ofAtlsa's
Commentmy an His Lamp afthe Enlightenment Path, 1976, p. 445.
106
107
Bardwell L. Smith (Ed), Religion and the L'lgitimation of Power in South
Asia. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978. 186+Xpp.;
Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka. Chambersburg, Pa.:
Anima Books, 1978. 244+ix pp.;
Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos and Burma. Chambers-
burg, Pa.: Anima Books, 1978. 231+ix pp.
These three volumes have a total of thirty-six essays written by as
many as twenty-seven scholars. Of the thirty-six essays, nine are
contributed by three authors (Reynolds 4, Bechert 3 and Smith 2). The
idea behind these volumes is "to present together several reflections on a
common theme" which is described by the Editor as "how political
leaders or a politicized group with a specific religious tradition and
membership ... made use of 'religious' beliefs, practices and institu-
tions to provide cohesiveness to the realm and legitimacy to the holding
of power." The two major religious traditions so examined are those of
Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism, for only one essay (McDonough
in the South Asia Volume) deals with Islam.
In a review of this kind it is not possible to deal in detail with each
contribution and its special virtues. Each volume deals with two separate
themes, namely the nature and structure of the religions tradition on the
one hand and the nature and structure of political power in the south
and southeast Asian countries dealt with. The term religious tradition is
broadly understood as covering the whole range of religious thinking
and practice, from a unitary conceptualization of complex and long
systems of beliefs and practices such as Hinduism and Buddhism to
specifics such as single leaders, (Rajaji and Nehur), sects, (the Aiyappan
sect), movements, (the Mahar movement), pieces of legislation, (the
Archaka legislation of Tamil N adu). While this contributes a richness of
variety to the contents of the volumes it also makes for a degree of
diffuseness, which is inevitable in collections of this kind.
The South Asia volume has nine essays of which four (Clothey,
Spencer, Waghorne and Presler) deal with south Indian themes, two
(Larsen, McDonough) treat of religion and politics in norhtern India,
one (Baird) focusses on Nehru's ideas on a secular state, one (Zelliot) is
concerned with the religious content of the Mahar movement in western
India and another (Goonetileke) is bibliographical essay on the Sri
Lanka Insurrection of 1971, which should have been a part of the
volume on Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lanka volume of thirteen essays has two broad themes,
historiography and history. As many as five (Bechert, Greenwald,
Clifford, Smith, Obeyesekere) essays are concerned with Ceylonese
Buddhist perceptions of the dhamma, samgha and political power, four
(Smith, Guanwardana, Kiribamune, Senaviratne) treat of relevant
aspects of various periods of the Ceylonese past-from Anuradhapura
to Kandy-as related to the theme of religion and legitimation, two
(Bechert, Kemper) are concerned with modern Sri Lankan politics,
while two others (Smith, Bechert) are extensive and interpretative
bibliographical essays.
The southeast Asian volume is largely focused on Thailand. It is
in two parts, of which the first is entitled the dynamics of legitimation
and the second, ritual, symbolism and patterns of legitimation. Of the
ten essays of the first part, eight (Watson, Andaya, Swearer, Premchit,
Butt, Kirsch, Reynolds, Tambiah, Reynold,s, and Keyes) cover the entire
spectrum of Thai history, from the Sukhodaya kingdom to contemporary
Thailand, while two (Fergusson and Sarkisyanz) deal with aspects of
Burmese religious and political history. The second part has four essays,
of which three are by Reynolds and one by Eisenstadt. Reynolds
discusses aspects of traditional religion in Laos and Thailand while
Eisenstadt examines the conceptual and practical implications of
elements in the dynamics of traditions, such as rituals and symbols.
The co"ntributors to these volumes are scholars eminent in their
own special fields and their perceptions greatly contribute to our under-
standing of the complexities of interactions between religion and power
in south and southeast Asia. Not all of the material is new nor can a few
essays be described as anything more than descriptive ventures. But
such criticism does not detract from the value of these volumes, fdr
together they form a substantial contribution to a theme which is both
challenging and difficult. They fulfill a definite need, as they bring
together material which otherwise would be scattered through a
number of divergent works and journals. The discussions on key
concepts, such as the nature of power, its contents, patterns of its exercise
and means of legitimation, presented in these volumes will stimulate
further debate. Professor Smith has accomplished a remarkable feat in
editing and publishing these volumes and our thanks are due to him.
B.G. Gokhale
108
Studies in Pali and Buddhism (A homage volume to the memory of Bhikkhu
Jagdish Kashyap), edited by A.K. Narain and Asst. Editor L. Zwilling.
Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1979; pp. xxxii + 422, index. Price
Rs. 180, $36.00.
The volume under review, Studies in Pali and Buddhism, edited by
Professor A.K. Narain of Wisconsin, has been brought out as a
memorial to his well-known uncle, a rare Indian Buddhist monk from
Bihar, BikkhuJagdish Kashyap. The Bhikkhu passed away at Rajgir at
the age of sixty-eight (1908-1976), after a distinguished and colorful life
marked by achievements in many fields. Soon after the news of his
nirva'Yfa, the editor, in collaboration with an international editorial
board, invited contributions to a commemorative volum.e. "The result is
this volume of 37 articles on a wide range of topics in Pali and Buddhist
Studies written by scholars from various parts of the world" (preface).
The volume starts with a brief and lively biography of Bhikkhu
Jagdish Kashyap by the editor (pp. xv-xxxii), which recounts his
influential Kayastha family background and early education in Bihar.
He continued his studies at Banaras Hindu University, earning Masters
degrees in Sanskrit and Philosophy. He was an inquisitive and restless
student and had become "an ardent Arya Samaji" while at High School.
Due to his to social service and the nationalist movement,
he decided to remain a brahmacanand never married. His interest in
Buddhist philosophy and doctoral research took him to Sri Lanka,
where he not only mastered. his subject, but also converted to Buddhism
and became a monk in 1934. Bihhku Kashyap, along with Dharmanand
Kosambi, Rahula Sankrityayana, and Anand Kausalyayana, did much to
revive Buddhism in India. Their activities fbrm a major part in what
they preferred to call the "Buddhist movement" of India (see also
Zelliot, pp. 389-406). Bhikkhu Kashyap was a scholar of Pali and
Buddhism, and taught these subjects at B.H. U., the Sanskrit University,
and at Nalanda. He was largely responsible for founding and directing
the Nalanda Institute. A pioneer of Buddhist studies in India, he was
also a great propagator of Buddhism throughout much of Asia. This
volume is a fitting tribute to a multi-faceted monk of tireless energy and
dynamism.
The introduction is followed by thirty-seven papers by scholars
from different disciplines in Asia and the West. They vary in quality and
size-the longest being fifty pages (121-170) on "the eight deliverances"
written by Leon Hurvitz; the smallest is two pages (381-382) on the
etymology of the Pali Gotrabhu by O.H. de A. Wijesekera. Both equally
exhibit a high level of scholarly subtlety and sophistication. The papers
109
110
embrace various disciplines of religion, philosophy, logic, language,
literature, art, history, and historiography. A number of "leaders" in the
field of Pali and Buddhist studies are represented here-viz., A.C.
Banerjee, Heinz Bechert, B.G. Gokhale, Herbert Guenther, LB.
Horner, Leon Hurvitz, P.S. jaini, Hajime Nakamura, K.R. Norman,
Charles Prebish, Walpola Rahula, and Alex Wayman.
The papers on religion, art, and history-areas of my Own
research-deal with the content of the Buddha's teaching and the
spread of Buddhism, and were especially enjoyable and rewarding to
read. Significant papers on the history of Buddhism are those by
Professor Nakamura, "A process of the origination of Buddhist medita-
tions in connection with the life of the Buddha" (pp. 269-277) and Dr.
C.S. Upasak, "The role ofUruvela Kassapa in the spread of Buddhism"
(pp. 369-374). Nakamura skillfully analyses the teachings of the
hermits Kalama and U ddaka Ramaputta on meditation as well as
the Buddha's encouriter with them. He concludes that though these
teachings are almost unidentifiable today, however, as "none of the
Buddha's biographers could eliminate these two men, there is no doubt
that prior-to his Enlightenment, Gotama Buddha visited them and was
profoundly influenced by them" (p. 276). Upasak ably reconstructs
Buddha's meeting with Uruvela Kassapa, the leader of the matted-
haired, fire-worshipping Brahmanical sect of the Uruvela's
conversion resulted in the quick and early spread of Buddhism in Bihar.
U pasak goes on to suggest that, while the conversion of King Bimbisara
must certainly have created a favorable atmosphere for the spread of
Buddhism, it was "not to the same extent as that of Uruvela Kassapa"
(p. 373).
Two other papers, by Trevor Ling and Eleanor Zelliot, treat the
"Buddhist residual" and the "Buddhist movement" in more recent
times. Ling writes on "Buddhism in India: Residual and resurgent"
(pp. 229-241). He briefly surveys the survivals of Buddhism. in
Northeast and Northwest India and then describes the resurgence in
contemporary India. He feels that, despite examples of some unworthy
Buddhist teachers (monks) and the lack of state patronage, Buddhism
still has a future in India. Zelliot's "The Indian rediscovery of
Buddhism, 1855-1956" (pp. 389-406), along with the biography of
Bhikkhu Kashyap, is the most interesting paper in the collection. She
presents a well-balanced account of the Buddhist revival and "Buddhist
movement" in India. Despite the attempts of scholars such as
Coomaraswamy, Radhakrishnan, and others, to minimize the distinc-
tions between Buddhism and Hinduism, the awareness of Buddha's
distinctive teachings is being increasingly recognized today. "A hundred
years of scholarship," writes Zelliot, "of writing for the general public on
Buddhism and the Buddha, of participation on the part of a few in the
institutions of Buddhism out of profound personal conviction, of
developing the idea that those who were Buddhists once could be
Buddhists again-in those hundred years the ground was prepared for
an acut.al as well as an intellectual rediscovery of Buddhism" (p. 403).
The standard and variety of papers in this collection is admirable.
While none lacked scholarly apparatus, at least one cried Olit for greater
editorial assistance ("Dharmapadas of various Buddhist Schools," pp.
255-267). The alphabetic presentation of papers, without regard for
chronology or topics treated, is rather disconcerting. Two writers still
refer to the Buddha as Prince Siddhartha (pp. xxv; 200), when it is now
well-established that he hailed from a republican state, was the son of a
republican, and founder of a most democratic order of ascetics and
layfolk. The volume is neatly printed, beautifully bound on good quality
paper, and has a servicable index. It is remarkably free of misprints. I
strongly recommend it as an invaluable volume to all scholars and
students of Buddhist Studies.
J agdish P. Sharma
NOTICES
Buddhist Wisdom. The mystery of the self, by George Grimm. Translated by
Carroll Aikins. Edited by M. Keller-Grimm. 2nd revised and enlarged
Edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978. 70 pp. Rs. 25.
Grimm (1868-1945) was, we are told, considered "Bavaria's most
benevolent judge," apparently as a result of his commitment to
Buddhism. Of greater interest to his readers, perhaps, is the fact that he
was an avid student of Schopenhauer: this brief introduction to
Buddhist views on the suffering and deliverance of the self (gleaned
mostly from the Pali tradition) is colored by a considerabie emphasis on
"the will," a term for which no Pali equivalent ever is supplied. NirvaI}a,
for Grimm, is "the bliss of non-willing," an immortal sphere beyond the
flux of Becoming, to be reached by a process sounding suspiciously like
Sarp.khyan subtraction. Grimm's account is coherent, but only occasionally
buttressed by textual citations, and clearly is based on his own selective
arrangement of Buddhist wisdom rather than any arrangement made
by the Buddhists themselves.
111
Buddhism. A select bibliography, compiled and edited by Satyaprakash.
Gurgaon/New Delhi: Indian Documentation Service, 1976. 172 pp. $10.
This reasonably useful bibliography covers articles published in
eighty-four Indianjournals between 1962 and 1976. It also represents,
spottily, monographs published during the same period. It is arranged
in one alphabetical list that includes both author and subject headings.
One wishes that the accounting of monographs were more complete,
and that the book's scope had been expanded at least to embrace such
Ceylonese publications as World Buddhism, but within its limitations, it is
a clear and handy bibliography.
Living Buddhist Masters, by Jack Kornfield. Santa Cruz: Unity Press,
1977.322 pp. $6.95.
Among the spate of recent books that purport to explain one or
another type of Buddhist meditation to Westerners, Living Buddhist
Masters is of singular value because, rather than filtering Buddhist
traditions through Western "matching concepts," it gives us the
explanations of Asian Buddhists themselves-in this case, interviews
with and discourses by such masters of the "Burmese school" of medita-
tion as Achaan Chaa, Mahasi Sayadaw and U Ba Khin. Kornfield's style
is refreshingly clear; refreshing, too, is the variety of differing views he
is willing to expose. The book should prove useful both to meditators
and to scholars interested in the Burmese schoo!.
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, edited by Steven T. Katz. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978.264 pp. $3.95.
Although only one essay in this collection-Robert M. Gimello's
incisive "Mysticism and Meditation"-is devoted solely to Buddhism,
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis should be of interest to many
Buddhologists (not to mention Buddhists), particularly those who are
concerned with the interplay in Buddhism between reason and religious
experience. The contributors-who include Donald MacKinnon,
Nelson Pike, Ninian Smart and Frederick Streng-are generally careful
and rigorous, and their studies challenge trite but heretofore pervasive
assumptions about the unity, ineffability, authoritativeness and episte-
mological purity of mystical experience. In the words of the editor,
"Anyone who hereafter wishes to work seriously in the garden of
mystical delight will have to consider fully the position advanced in this
volume and respond accordingly."
112
Roger Jackson
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
On Buddhist Research Information (B.R.I.)
of the Institute for Advanced Studies
of World Religions (IASWR), New York
We published a communication from Mr. Richard A. Card, Director rifthe Institute
Services for the Institute for Advanced Studies rif World Religions, about the periodical
Buddhist Text Information (BTl) in ourfirstissue of Volume 1, 1978,pages87-90. We
are now pleased to publish the following communication from the Institute about their new
project BRI, which we are sure our readers will find useful. For further information the
Director of Institute Services may be contacted.
Dear Colleague in Buddhist Studies,
Do you and your students need information on Buddhist research which is
planned, in progress, or completed but not yet published? Such information, in
various languages and issued periodically, could usefully supplement that
contained in published bibliographies: Hanayama, Bibliography on Buddhism;
Bibliographie Bouddhique; sections in the annual AAS Bibliography rif Asian Studies; etc.
Please see the attached sheets which brIefly describe a new Buddhist biblio-
graphic periodical, BUDDHIST RESEARCH INFORMATION (BRI), which I
proposed in The Journal of the International Association rif Buddhist Studies (Madison,
Wisconsin), Volume 1, Number 1 (1978), pp. 87-90, where it was initially called
Buddhist Studies Survey.
In order to establish the BRI as an information service to those engaged in
Buddhist studies, I need your help in three ways: (1) subscriptions to Buddhist
Research Information GO US$4.00 per year postpaid by yourself, college libraries,
and other interested individuals and institutions [see verso of attached BRI front
cover]; (2) author entries which report your Buddhist research planned, in
progress, or completed but not yet published [see attached BRI Author Entry/
Research Request Form]; and (3) information requested entries in which you
inquire about current research on Buddhist topics (activities, sources of informa-
tion, available data, etc.) [see attached Bm Author Entry/Research Request Form].
Your comments and suggestions, as well as your subscription and completed
Bm Author Entry/Research Request Form, for developing the BUDDHIST
RESEARCH INFORMATION project will be most timely and appreciated.
Sincerely,
Richard A. Gard
Director of Institute Services
The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions
Melville Memorial Library
State University of New York at Stony Brook
Stony Brook, New York 11794, U.S.A.
Telephone: (516) 246-8362
113
OBITUARY
Edward Conze
Edward Conze has been for contemporary Western scholars of
Buddhism what Tibetan Buddhists have respectfully called certain scholars,
"a great translator" (tib.lo tsa wa chen po) of the Buddhist religion. His prolific
and insightful writings and translations have immeasurably helped to open
Buddhism to our language and culture. With his passing away on September
24, 1979, we are reminded of his enormous contribution; grateful for his
presence, we are saddened by his departure .
.Professor Conze published more than 250 books and articles on
Buddhism, sixty-one of which deal with his special area of interest, the litera-
ture of the Perfection of Wisdom Scriptures (skt. prajiiapoxamitasutra). His
translations of many recensions of these scriptures have provided a basis for
critical analysis and his lucid explanations of their doctrines have opened the
door to scholars and non-scholars alike to probe more deeply than ever before
into their meanings.
Born in London on March 18, 1904, Dr. Conze lived in Germany from
1905 until 1943. Receiving his doctorate from Cologne in 1928, he soon after
published his first book on Marxist dialectics (On the Principle of Contradiction).
His active interest in Communism forced his departure to London where he
held the position of lecturer from 1934 to 1962 at the University of London.
At the age of forty-one, stimulated by the writings of Suzuki, Professor
Conze took up the study of Buddhism. Never holding a permanent teaching
position he served as distinguished Professor at the University of Wisconsin,
1963-64, and the University of Washington, 1966-67, and at the University of
California-Berkeley, 1971-73. He also served as a research fellow at Oxford
University and Manchester College.
His memoirs, entitled A Modem Gnostic, have been recently published by
Asian Humanities Press. The next volume of the Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies will contain a detailed account of his l i f ~ and
works. (We are grateful to Professor Lewis Lancaster for providing informa-
tion for this brief notice.)
Edward W. Bastian
116
117
International Association of
Buddhist Studies
GENERAL MEMBERSHIP, SUMMER 1979
(F) - Founder; (H) - Honorary Fellow; (A) - Associate; . (S) - Student
No designation - Full Member. Unless otherwise indicated, the
country is U.S.A.
Mr. Jim Anderson, R.R. #1, Hawkestone, Ontario LOL ITO,
CANADA
Prof. J.G. Arapura, Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster
University, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4Kl CANADA
Prof. Harvey B. Aronson, Dept. of Religious Studies, Cocke Hall,
Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903
Lie. Lydia Azikri, Acoyote 498, 7 dto 7, Capital Federal,
ARGENTINA
Prof. Em. Archie J. Bahm, Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131
Sir Harold W. Bailey (H), Queens College, Cambridge CB3 9ET,
ENGLAND
Prof. Shiva G. Bajpai, Dept. of History, California State Univ.,
Northridge, CA 91324
Dr. Ashok Darshan Bajracharya, 2166 Mathews Ave., Apt. 4C,
Bronx, NY 10462
Venerable Richard D. Baker-roshi, 300 Page St., San Francisco,
CA 94102
Prof. P.V. Bapat (H), Svadhyaya, 772 Shivajinagar, Poona4, INDIA
. Mr.John F. Bardisban, 23447 Riverside Drive, Southfield, MI48034
Prof. Andre Bareau (F), College de France, 15 bd.Colbert, 92330
Sceaux, FRANCE
Mr. Frank Barone (S), Vijayanagar Bhavan, B20/41 Bhelupura,
Varanasi, U.P. 221001, INDIA
Prof. A.L. Basham, Head, Dept. of Asian Civilizations, Australian
National Univ., Box 4, P.O., Canberra, A.C.T. 2600,
AUSTRALIA
Prof. Daniel E. Bassuk (A), Dept. of Religion, Univ. of South
Florida, Tampa, Florida 33620
Prof. Wendell C. Beane, 337 Graham St., Highland Park, NJ 08904
Prof. Dr. Heinz Bechert, Seminar Fuer Indoligie und Buddhis-
muskunde, der Universitaet Goettingen, Hainbundstrasse
21, D-3400 Goettingen, F.R.G.
lIS
Mr. Michael Benjamin Bement (S), 643 E. Johnson St., Apt. #12,
Madison, WI 53703
Mr. Stephen Gerard Berry, 474 West 238th St., Apt. 2F, Bronx,
NY 10463
Mr. Thomas Berry, 5801 Palisade Ave., Riverdale, NY 10471
Prof. Stephan Beyer, 1230 Van Hise Hall, Dept. of South Asian
Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.
Mr. Carl Bielefeldt, Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of Virginia,
Charlottesville, VA 22903
Prof. Raoul Birnbaum, 10 Park Ave., New York, NY 10016
Prof. Fritz Blackwell, Dept. of Foreign Languages & Literatures,
Washington State Univ., Pullman, WA 99164
Prof. Alfred Bloom, Dept. of Religion, 2530 Dole St., Univ. of
Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822
Prof. Robert T. Bobilin, Chairman, Religion Dept., Univ. of
Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822
Prof. George D. Bond, Dept. of Religions, Northwestern Univ.,
1940 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, ILL 60201
Prof. James W. Boyd (A), Dept. of Philosophy, Colorado State
Univ., Fort Collins, CO 80523
Mr. J ens Braarvig, Religionshistorisk Institutt, U niversitetet i
Oslo, Boks 1010 Blindern, Oslo, NORWAY
Prof. Donald Allen Braue, 2564 Boyd Ave., Fort Worth, Texas 76109
Mr. William 1. Brown (S), no forwarding address given
Prof. Robert Bruce, 510 Hillside Ave., Prescott, AZ 86301
Dr. Harry M. Buck, 1053 Wilson Ave., Chambersburg, PA 17201
Ms. Joanna Bull (S), 20285 Croyden Lane, Topanga, CA 90290
Ms. Bonnie S. Busick, no forwarding address given
Prof. Em. Grace E. Cairns, 2940 Tipperary Drive, Tallahassee,
FL 32308
Prof. John Ross Carter, Dept. ofPhiIosophy and Religion, Chapel
House, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY 13346
Ms. Martha Limbach Carter, 325 Lakewood Blvd., Madison, WI 53704
Mr. Saeng Chan-ngarm, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai
University, Chiang Mai, THAILAND
Dr. Lokesh Chandra, International Academy of Indian Culture,
J22 Hauzkhas Enclave New Delhi 16, INDIA
Prof. Chi-chiin Chang, 3, Lane 5, Ching-Tien Street, Taipei,
Taiwan, Rep. of CHINA
Prof. Rev. Sheng-Yen Chang, (FDR), 40-30 68th St., Woodside,
NY 11377
Mr. Shong-Te Chang,#8 4F Bldg. 65, Sheeng Hi Dist., Wai Shung
Hi, Taipei, T AIVVAN
119
Prof. David W. Chappell, Dept. of Religion, Univ. of Hawaii, 344
George Hall, 2560 Campus Rd., Honolulu, HI 96822
Prof. Kenneth Ch'en (H), 3457-C Bahia Blanca West, Languna
Hills, CA 92653
Prof. Richard S.Y. Chi, 3650 E. Will Sowders Rd., Bloomington,
IN 47401
Prof. Thomas B. Coburn, Dept. of Religious Studies, St.,
Lawrence Univ., Canton, NY 13617 .
Mr. Donald]. Colucci (S), 316 H.B. Crouse Hall, Syracuse Univ.,
Syracuse, NY 13210
Prof. Edward Conze (H), Foxwell, Marston Rd., Sherbourne,
Dorset DT 9 4BN ENGLAND
Prof. Francis H. Cook, 'Program in Religious Studies, Univ. of
California, Riverside, CA 92502
Prof. Harry F. Corbin, Box 73, Wichita State Univ., Wichita, KS 67208
Prof. Roger Corless, P.O. Box 4735, Duke Station, Durham, NC 27706
Ms. Rena Crispin (S), 321 Wisconsin Ave., Apt. 9, Madison, WI 53703
Mr. Carl D'Amato (S), c/o S.N. Upadhyaya, Head, Dept. of
Foreign Languages, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi -5,
U.P., INDIA
Prof. A.H. Dani, Dept. of History, P.O. Box 1090, University of
Islamabad, Islamabad, P AKIST AN
Lic. Liliana Garda Daris, Av. Libertador 2300,6 "C", Olivos, Provo
de Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA
Dr. Eva K. Dargyay, Karl-Witthalm-Str. 11, D-8000 Munich 70,
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Prof. Terence P. Day, Dept. of Religion, Univ. of Manitoba,
Winnipeg R3T 2N2, Manitoba, CANADA
Prof. Douglas Daye, Dept. of Philosophy, Bowling Green Univ.,
Bowling Green OH 43403
Prof. William Theodore De Bary, 205 Low Library, Columbia
Univ., New York, NY 10027.
Mr. David]. Dell, South Asian Institute, Columbia Univ., New
York, NY 10024
Mr. John W. DeLuca, 31132 Hathaway, Livonia, MI 48150
Prof. M.C. Subhadradis Diskul (F), Faculty of Archaeology,
Silpakorn Univ., Bangkok, THAILAND
Ms. Barbara P. Dills, 1337 Jenifer St., Madison, WI 53703
Prof. Margaret H. Dornish, Dept. of Religion, Pomoma College,
Claremont, CA 91711
Prof. Thomas L. Dowling, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion,
Bates College, Lewiston, ME 04240
!.
I
r'
120
Ms. Kathleen E. Downs (S), Vijayanagar Bhavan, B20/41,
Varanasi, U.P. 221001, INDIA
Prof. Carmen Dragonetti, Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas
CIF, Minones 2073 1428 Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA
Prof. Em. Mark]. Dresden, 380 E. Rose Tree Road, Media, PA 19063
Prof. Em. Henrich Dumoulin, Sophia University, 7 Kioicho,
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, ]APAN
Ms. Janice Leoshko Dundon (S), 2822 Kensington Place East,
Columbus, OH 43202
Ms. Jacqueline Miller Dunnington (S), 1133 Park Ave., New York,
NY 10028
Prof. Mayeda Egaku, No. 56, Mayeda,Tomita-cho, N akagawa-ku,
Nagoya 454 JAPAN
Prof. George R. Elder, 828 West End Ave., ll-F, New York, NY 10025
Mr. Edward Todd Fenner, P.O. Box 881, Madison, WI 53701
Mr .. Peter Greenock Fenner (S), 50 Chiswick Road, Bardon,
Queensland 4065, AUSTRALIA
Ms. Nancy Ferro (S), 4824 Tate Rd., Rockford, IL 61103
Mr. Ryugen Fisher, P.O. Box 1061, Rhinelander, WI 54501
.Prof. Robert Edwin FLorida, Dept. of Religion, Brandon Univ.,
Brandon, Manitoba R7A 6A9 CANADA
Dr. Walter A. Frank, University of Bonn, Seminar for Central
Asia, Mavia Paci's Weg T D 5300 Bonn, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Mr. Ashok K. Gangadean, Gest Center, Haverford College,
Haverford, P A 19041
Dr. Richard A. Gard, Director of Institute Services, The Inst. for
Advanced Studies of World Religions, Melville Memorial
Library, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony
Brook, NY 11794
Prof. Walter Gardini, Paso 791, Capital Federal, ARGENTINA
Mr. Wayne Gelfman (S), 254 Shadeland Ave., Drexel Hill, PA 19026
Prof. Robert M. Gimello, Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of
California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Prof. B.G. Gokhale (F), Asian Studies Program, Wake Forest
University, Box 7545, Winston-Salem, NC 27109
Prof. V.V. Gokhale (H), 39/1415 Prabhat Rd., 9th Lane, Poona 5
Maharashtra 411004 INDIA
Prof. Richard Gombrich (F), Oriental Institute, The University of
Oxford, Pusey Lane, Oxford OX1 2LE ENGLAND
Prof. Luis Gomez, Dept. of Far Eastern Languages and Litera-
tures, Frieze Bldg., The University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan 48104
121
Prof. Thomas E. Graham, Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of
Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3a ZE9, CANADA
Prof. Phyllis E. Granoff, Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster
University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4Kl, CANADA
. ~ r . PeterN. Gregory, 933 South NormandieAve.,#4, Los Angeles,
CA 90006
Ms. Mia Emlen Grosjean, 123 East 75th St., New York, NY 10021
Ms. Judy F. Haines, 290 Potter Place, Weehawken:NJ 07087
Dr. Yoshito Hakeda, 408 Dent, Columbia University, New York,
NY 10027
Mr. James Patrick Hamilton (S), 1506 S. Boots St., Marion, IN 46952
Prof. Ki-Doo Han, Won Kwang University, Iri City, Chollapuk-do
5lO-11, REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Mr. Mervin Hanson, Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of British
Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, CANADA
Mr. A. W. Hanson-Barber, 544 W. Wilson St., Madison, WI 53703
Ms. Collett C. Harris, c/o Benjamin G. Cox, 914 South Center St.,
Terre Haute, IN 47807
Mr. Paul M. Harrison (S),. Dept. of South Asian and Buddhist
Studies, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National
University, P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600 AUSTRALIA
Mr. Steven Heine (S), 335 S. 18th St., Philadelphia, PA 19103
Alaka Vasant Hejib, Lecturer, Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill
University, 3520 University Street, Montreal, Quebec
H2X lW4, CANADA
Prof. Helmut Hoffmann, Dept. of Uralic and Altaic Studies,
Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomihgton, IN 47401
Prof. John Clifford Holt, Dept. of Religion, Bowdoin College,
Brunswick, Maine 04011
Prof. Jeffrey Hopkins, Dept. of Religious Studies, Cocke Hall,
Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903
Ms. LB. Horner (H), 62 South Lodge, Circus Road, London
NW8 9ET, ENGLAND
Prof. John C. Huntington, Dept. of the History of Art, Ohio State
Univ., Columbus, OH 432lO
Prof. Leon Hurvitz (F), The Univ. of British Columbia, 2075
Wesbrook Place, Vancouver, B.C. V6T lW5, CANADA
Prof. Hisao Inagaki, Lecturer, 83 Leeside Crescent, London,
NWll OJL, ENGLAND
Prof. Taijun Inokuchi, Shinfuyacho-Sanjo, Kyoto, 606, JAPAN
Prof. Yoneo Ishii, 6-4 Yamabana, Morimoto-cho, Sakyo-ku,
Tokyo, JAPAN
122
Prof. Herbert C. Jackson, Dept. of Religious Studies, Michigan
State Univ., ".E:ast Lansing, Michigan 48824
Mr. Roger Jackson (S), 4466-D Hillcrest Dr., Madison, WI 53705
Prof. Em. Nolan P. Jacobson, 1612 Clarendon Place" Rock Hill,
South Carolina 29730
Prof. Sechin Jagchid, Dept. of History, 230MRSB, Brigham
Young University, Provo, UT 84602
Prof. Padmanabh S. Jaini, Dept. of South and Southeast Asian
Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720
Mr. Lozang Jamspal, Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America,
Box 306 A, Rd. 1, Washington, NJ 07882
Prof. Jan Yun-hua (F), Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster
Univ., 1280 Main St. West, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4K1,
CANADA
Prof. Yuichi Kajiyama (F), Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Kyoto Univ.,
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, JAPAN
Dr. A.D.P. Kalansuriya, Philosophy Dept., Univ. of Peradeniya,
Peradeniya, SRI LANKA
Prof. Shigeo H. Kanda, Dept. of Religious Studies, California
State Univ., Chico, CA 95926
Mr. Kun-Ki Kang, 340 E. 34th St., if9H, New York, NY 10016
Prof. Thomas P. Kasulis, c/o Mellon Faculty Fellowships, Harvard
University, Lamont Library, Cambridge, MA 02138
Prof. Nathan, Katz, Dept. of Religion, Williams College,
Williamstown, MA 01267
Prof. Leslie S. Kawamura, Religious Studies, The Univ. of Calgary,
2920-24th Ave. N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, CANADA
Dr. Hee-sung Keel, Dept. of Religion, St. Olaf College, Northfield,
MN 55057
Prof. Charles F. Keyes, Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of
Washington, Seattle, WA 98195
Prof. Christine Mullikin Keyt, 12032 36th Ave., N.W., Seattle,
WA 98125
Prof. Hee-Jin Kim, Dept. of Religious Studies, University of
Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403
Ven. Sam-Woo Kim, 46 Gwynne Ave., Toronto, Ontario M6K 2C3,
CANADA
Ms. Sallie Behn King (S), Dept. of Religion, Temple Univ.,
Philadelphia, PA 19122
Prof. Winston L. King, 518 Caldy Place, Madison, WI 53711
Prof. James A. Kirk, Dept. of Religious Studies, The University of
Denver, Denver, CO 80208
123
Mr. William D. Kirtz (S), 104F Eagle Heights, Madison, WI 53705
Dean Joseph M. Kitagawa, The Divinity School, The Univ. of
Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637
Prof. Minoru Kiyota, c/o Kozen-ji, Oizu, Imadate-cho, Fukui-ken,
915-02, JAPAN
Prof. Takashi J. Kodera, Dept. of Religion, Wellesley College,
Wellesley, MA 02181
Mr. Richard Kohn (S), 916 E. Gorham St., Madison, WI 53703
Mr. David Ross Komito (S), Office of the Dean of Studies, Mount
Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA 01075
Prof. Aaron K. Koseki, Program in Religious Studies, 4016 Foreign
Languages Building, Univ. of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61820
Mr. Y. Krishan, C 11/55 Dr. Zakir Hussain Marg, Bapa Nagar,
New Delhi 110003 INDIA
Ms. Kathy (Cheng-mei) Ku (S), 124 Fidelio St., Opera Estate,
Singapore 1545 .
Prof. Tsugunari Kubo, President, The Reiyukai, 1-7-8 Azabudai,
Minato-ku, Tokyo 106, JAPAN
Mr. Hallvard K. Kuloy (F), UNICEF Box #1187, Kathmandu, NEPAL
Ms. Susan S. Kurtze (S), no forwarding address given
Prof. Per Kvaerne, Religionshistorisk Institutt, Postboks 1010,
Blindern, Oslo 3, NORWAY
Prof. Etienne Lamotte (H), Place du Roi Vainqueur, 15-Bte. 10,
B-1040 Bruxelles BELGIUM
Prof. Lewis Lancaster, Chairman, Dept. of Oriental Languages,
University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720
Ms. Karan Christina Lang, 4059 8th Ave., NE,#B, Seattle, WA 98105
Prof. Delmar Langbauer, Dept. of Religion, Univ. ofPugetSound,
Tacoma, WA 98416
Prof. Emil F. Lange, Dept. of Religion & Culture, Wilfrid Laurier
Univ., Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, CANADA
Dr. Cyrus Lee, no forwarding address given, Taipei, TAIWAN
Ms. Nancy R. Lethcoe, 4592 Morland, R.R. #1, Victoria, B.C.,
V8X 3X2, CANADA
Prof. G.M. Bongard-Levin, Armyandkiy Per 2, Instut Vosdokoved
AN SSSR Moscow, USSR
Mr. Todd Lewis, c/o USGF - Nepal, Box 380, Kathmandu, NEPAL
Prof. Louis Ligeti (H), V. Belgrad rakp.26, 1056 Budapest,
HUNGARY
Dr. Likhit Likhitanonta, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai
Univ., Chiang Mai THAILAND
Prof. Trevor O. Ling (F), Dept. of Comparative Religion, The
University, Manchester M13 9PL, ENGLAND
124
Mr. John K. Locke, St. Xavier's School, G.P.O. Box 50, Kathmandu,
NEPAL
Prof. Alexarider W. Macdonald (F), Laboratoire D'ethnologie et
de Sociologie Comparative, Facultedes Lettres, Univ. de
Paris X, 92001 Nanterre, FRANCE
Prof. Joanna Rogers.Macy, c/o Sarvodaya, Meth Medura, 77 de
SoysiaRd., Moratuwa, SRI LANKA
Mr. Douglas E. Mapou, 31-65 138th St., Flushing, NY 11354
Prof. Jacques May, 66 Ave. de Rumine, CH. 1005 Lausanne,
Univ. of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024
Ms. Deborah Lynn Marchand, 5210 Hedden Circle, Middleton,
WI 53562
Ms. Michele Martin, Chikamatsukata, Nishisendo-cho 232,
Murasakino, Kita-ku, Kyoto 603, JAPAN
Prof. Richard B. Martin, Area Collections Dept., Univ. of Virginia
Library, Charlottesville, VA 22901
Prof. Paul V. Martinson, 2303 Doswell Ave., St. Paul, MN 55108
Mr. Hisashi Matsumura (S), Dept. of South Asian & Buddhist
Studies, Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National
l[niv., P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA
Dr. Natalie Maxwell, Box 125, Rte. 1, Port Murray, NJ 07865
Prof. Jaques May, 66 Ave. de Rumine, Ch. 1005 Lausanne,
SWITZERLAND
Prof. John R.A. Mayer, Dept. of Philosophy, Brock Univ., St.
Catharines, Ontario, CANADA
Prof. Larry McClung, Dept. of Religion, Moravian College,
Bethlehem, PA 18018
Prof. Park McGinty, Dept. of Religious Studies, 324A Maginnes
Hall#9, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015
-Prof. Neil F. McMullin, 157 Shelbourne Rd., Rochester, NY 14620
Prof. Carol Jean Meadows, 276 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10025
Mr. Philip Melzer, 4000 Thornalple St., Chevy Chase, MD 20015
Dr. Edward Michael Mendelson, 96A New Street, New Hope, PA 18958
Prof. Esho Mikogami, c/o Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Ryukou Univ.,
Shichijo Omiya, Kyoto 600 JAPAN
Dr. Beatrice Miller (F), 1227 Sweet Briar Rd., Madison, WI 53705
Dr. Robert]. Miller (F), 1227 Sweet Briar Rd., Madison, WI 53705
Mr. Stephen Miller, 145 E. 15th St., Apt. #4-V, New York, NY 10003
Dr. Shoson Miyamoto (H), Prof. Em., Univ. of Tokyo, 17-21
Gocho-me, Seijo-machi Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 157,JAPAN
Prof. Mokusen Miyuki, 1508 Westmoreland Drive, Montebello,
CA 90640
Ms. Yeiko Pat Mizuhara, 1548 Tarrytown St., San Mateo, CA 94402
125
Ms. Janina W. Morgalla, 906 S. Brooks St., Madison, WI 53715
Prof. Kenneth W. Morgan, 52 Henry Ave., Princeton, NJ 08540
Mr. Terry C. Muck, 7626 N. Kildare, Skokie, IL 60076
Prof. Gadjin M. Nagao (F), 1 Sennyuji-sannai, Higashiyama,
Kyoto 605, JAPAN
Prof. Hajime Nakamura, The Eastern Institute, Meiko Bldg.,
Soto-kanda 2-12-4 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN
Prof. A.K. Narain (F), t242 Van Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin,
Madison, WI 53706
Ms. Janice J. Natteir, 15 Pleasent Ave., Somerville, MA 02143
Prof. Niels C. Nielsen, Jr., Rice University, Dept. of Religious
Studies, Houston, TX 77001
Prof. Kenneth Roy Norman (F), Faculty of Oriental .Studies,
Sidgwick Ave., Cambridge CB3 9DA ENGLAND
Prof. Daniel John O'Hanlon, The Jesuit School of Theology at
Berkeley, 1735 Le Roy Ave., Berkeley, CA 94709
Lie. Juan Carlos Pacagnini, Juramento 5564, Capital Federal,
ARGENTINA
Prof. Spencer J. Palmer, 156 JSB Religious Studies Center,
Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT 84602
Prof. Sung-Bae Park, Program in Religious Studies, 105 Old
Physics, State Univ. of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794
Prof. Howard L. Parsons, Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Bridgeport,
Bridgeport, Conn 06602
Prof. Diana Paul, Dept. of Religious Studies, Stanford Univ.,
Stanford, CA 94305
Prof. Else Pauly (F), Byskellet 8, DK 2960 Rungsted Kyst, DANMARK
Mr. Richard K. Payne, 2523 Ridge Rd.,#214, Berkeley, CA 94709
Ms. LindaL. Penkower(S), 535 W.llOSt.,#l4F,NewYork,NY 10025.
Mr. Larry G. Peters, no forwarding address given
Prof. Richard B. Pilgrim, Dept. of Religion, 316 H.B.C., Syracuse
Univ., Syracuse, NY 13210
Prof. Nicholas Poppe (H), 3220 NE 80th St., Seattle, WA 98115
Prof. Kark H. Potter, Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Washington,
Seattle, WA 98195
Prof. Charles S. Prebish, 855 Liberty Ave., El Cerrito, CA 94530
Prof. K. Dad Prithipaul, Dept. of Religious Studies, The Univ. of
Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2E6, CANADA
Rev. Dr. Ismael Quiles S.]., Escusla Estudios Orientales, Univ. del
Salvador, Callao 966, Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA
Ms. Joan A. Raducha, c/o Charles Boewe, United States Educa-
tional Foundation, 511 Ramna (6/4), 84th St., Atturk Ave.,
P.O. Box 1128, Islamabad, 'PAKISTAN
126
Mr. Rajagopala Rao (A), Dept. of Philosophy, Andhra Christian
College, Guntur, A.P. INDIA
Mr. Douglas]. Rasmussen, 610-1 Eagle Heights, Univ. of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53705
Prof. Shanta Ratnayaka, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, Univ.
of Georgia, Athens,Georgia 30602
Prof. Reginald Alden Ray, Naropa Institute, 1111 Pearl St:reet,
Boulder, CO 80302
Ms. Muriel Reeves (S), 1244 N. Yale Ave., Claremont, CA 91711
Prof. Theodore Riccardi,J r., Dept. of Middle East Languages and
Cultures, Columbia Univ., 624 Kent Hall, New York, NY 10027
Ms. Hannah G. Robinson, Institute for Advanced Studies of
World Religions, 5001 Main Library, S.U.N.Y. at Stony
Brook, NY 11789
Prof. James B. Robinson, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, Univ.
of N. Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa 50613
Prof. Braulio Gonzalez Romero, Pedro Goyena 1507, Capital
Federal, ARGENTINA
Dr. Gustav Roth, Brandenburgerstr. 12, D-3406 Bovenden 1
(Lenglern), W. GERMANY
Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Dept. of Asian Languages and Literature,
Gowen Hall DO-21, Univ. of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195
Prof. N.H. Samtani, Buddha Kuti, Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi-5 (U.P.) INDIA
Prof. J ames A. Santucci, Dept. of Linguistics & Religious Studies,
California State University, 1800 North College Blvd.,
Fullerton, CA 92634
Prof. Kalyan K. Sarkar, Purva Palli, Santiniketl!l P.O., West
Bengal 731235 INDIA
Prof. Ryojun Sato, 4-12-8 Koishikawa, Bunkyoru, Tokyo,JAPAN
Prof. Dr. L. Schmithausen, Universitat Hamburg, Seminar fur
Kultur und Geschichte Indiens, Grindelallee 53, D-2000
Hamburg 13, WEST GERMANY
Mr. Gregory Schopen (S), c/o Dr. V.C. Thorpe, 106 S. Sumner St.,
New Castle, Wyoming 82701
Prof. Nancy Schuster, Dept. of Religion, Wesleyan Univ.,
Middletown, Conn. 06457
Prof. Robert Lloyd Shafter, Dept. of English, Western Michigan
University, Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008
Prof. Arvind Sharma, Studies in Religion, Univ. of Queensland,
Brisbane 4067 AUSTRALIA
Prof. Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Dept. of History, Sakamaki Hall,
2530 Dole St., Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822
127
Ms. Patricia Sharpe (S), 5728 S. Slackstone St., Apt. 103, Chicago,
IL 60637
Mr. Timothy W. Shaw (S), 13 N. Ingersoll, Madison, WI 53703
Prof. Richard Sherburne, Loyola Hall, Seattle Univ., Seattle, WA 98122
Prof. Hui-Wan Shig, Prajna-dhyana, Sangharama, No. 22 Lane 110,
Yang-te Rd. Sec 2, III shih-Lin, Taiwan, REPUBUC OF CHINA
Prof. Eiichi Shimomisse, Dept. of Philosophy, Ca\ifornia State
University, Dominquez Hills, Carson, CA 90747
Prof. Bhagwan Bax Singh, Philosophy Dept., University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154
Prof. Braj Mohan Sinha, Dept. of Religious Studies, The College
of Wooster, Wooster, OH 44691
Mr. David Sloss (S), 4505 28th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008
Mr. Ellis Gene Smith, LC New Delhi, Dept. of State, Washington,
D.C. 20521
Prof. Bardwell Smith (F), Asian Studies Program, Carleton
College, Northfield, MN 55057
Mr. Bill Smith, Box 912, Sta. 2, Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002
Ms. Jeanette Marie Snyder, c/o Midori Snyder, 2924 Harvey St.,
Apt. #SF, Madison, WI 53705
Prof. Geshe Sopa (F), Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1250 Van Hise
Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706
Ms. Katheryn A. Soule, 2248 Alta Vista Dr., Vista, CA 92083
Rev. Joseph]. Spae, CICM, 32 Geldmuntstraat, B-8000 Brugge,
BELGIUM
Prof. John W. Spellman, Institute of Asian Cultures, Univ. of
Windsor, Windsor, N9B 3P4 Ontario, CANADA
Prof. Melford E. Spiro, Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of
California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92037
Prof. Mervyn Sprung, Dept. of Philosophy, Brock Univ.,
St. Catherines, Ontario, CANADA
Prof. William Stablein, 5253 15th N.E., Seattle, WA 98105
Ms. Susan C. Stalker (S), 318 S. 42nd St., Philadelphia, PA 19104
Prof. B.J. Stavisky, WNIIR, 10, Krestyansaya PI., J-172, Moscow,
109172, USSR
Prof. Ernst Steinkellner (S), Reisnerstrasse 6/14, A-1030 Wein,
AUSTRIA
Prof. Frederick J. Streng, Dept. of Religious Studies, Southern
Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX 75275
Mr. Bradford R. Sumner (S), no forwarding address g i v e ~
Prof. Donald K. Swearer, Dept. of Religion, Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, P A 19081
128
Prof. Shoko Takeuchi, 2-59, Hamadacho, Amagasaki-shi, Hyogo,
660, JAPAN
Prof. S.]. Tambiah, Harvard University, Dept. of Anthropology,
William James Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138
Prof. George J. Tanabe, Jr., 66-851 Haleiwa Rd., Haleiwa, HI 96712
Mr. Kenneth Kenichi Tanaka (S), 1117 B. 6th St.,#37, Albany,
CA 94710
Prof. Nathmal Tatia, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, P.O. Nalanda
803 Ill, Bihar, INDIA
Prof. Shunsho Terakawa (F), Shin Buddhist Studies Dept., Otani
University, 22 Koyama-Kamifusa-cho, Kita-ku, Kyoto,JAPAN
Dr. U. Aung Thaw, Director, Archaeological Survey of Burma,
Rangoon, BURMA
Prof. Lin-Yun Thomas, Yale-in-China Language Center, 6 Faem
Rd., Room 685, Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Kowloon, HONG KONG
Mr. Kirill O. Thompson (S), no forwarding address given
Ms. Mary V. Thorell (S), 8421 Carnegie Ave., Westminster, CA 92683
Prof. Robert A.F. Thurman, Amherst College, Dept. of Philosophy
& Religion, Amherst, MA 01002
Prof. Thomas T. Tominaga, Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of
Nevada, 4505 Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, NV 89154
Prof. Giuseppe Tucci (H), ISMEO, Via Meurlana, 248, 00185
Roma, ITALY
Prof. Frederic Bradley Underwood, 626 Kent Hall, Columbia
University, New York, NY 10027
Prof. Taitetsu Unno, Dept. of Religion, Smith College,
Northampton, MA 01063
Prof. K.N. Upadhyaya, Dept. of Philosophy, 121 George Hall,
2460 Campus Rd., Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822
Mr. Brian A. Victoria (S), 928 South New Hampshire, Los Angeles,
CA 90006
Dr. Ernst Waldschmidt (H), Professor Emeritus ofIndology, Univ.
of G6ttingen, Hainbundstrasse 21, D-34 G6ttingen, F.R.G ..
Mr. StephenB. Walker, 1111 Maxwell Ave., #112, Boulder, CO 80302
Prof. Paul B. Watt, 1212 6th Ave., Grinnell, IA 50112
Prof. Alex Wayman, Dept. of Middle East Languages & Cultures,
Columbia Univ., 603 Kent Hall, New York, NY 10027
Prof. Sheila Weiner, 93 Ivy Street, Brookline, Mass. 02146
Prof. Stanley Weinstein, Dept. of Religion, Yale University,
New Haven, CT 06520
129
Prof. Frank F. Wekerle, Director, Institute of Religion & Social
Science, Dept. of Philosophy, Hofstra Univ., Hempstead,
NY 11550
Prof. G.R. Welbon, Dept. of Religious Thought, Box 36, College
Hall, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, FA 19104
Prof. Holmes Hinkley Welch, Box 287, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA 01451
Ms. Leslie C. Welty, 1315 NE 47th, Apt. F, Seattle, WA 98105
Prof.O.H. de A. Wijesekera (H), 613 High Level Rd., Nugegoda,
SRI LANKA
Mr. Christopher Wilkinson, no forwarding address given
Mr. Bruce Charles Williams, no forwarding address given
Prof. Janice D. Willis, Dept. of Religion, Welsleyan Univ.,
Middleton, CT 06457
Prof. Frances Wilson, Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1242 Van
Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706
Mr.Joe Bransford Wilson,Jr. (S), 3427 Sunset Dr., Madison, WI 53705
Mr. Edward H. Worcester (S), 2159 Middleton Beach Rd.,
Middleton, WI 53562
Dr. Edward C. Wortz, 580 Prospect Blvd., Pasadena, CA 91103
Mr. B.S. Yadav, Dept. of Religion, Temple Univ., Philadelphia,
PA 19122
Prof. Isshi Yamada, Dept. of Religion, Northwestern Univ., 1940
Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201
Lie. Orlada Yokohama, Luis Maria Campos 1126, Capital Federal,
ARGENTINA
Prof. Katherine Kidd Young, William and Henry Rirks Bldg.,
3520 University St., Montreal, Quebec H3A 2A7 CANADA
Ms. Serinity Young, 99 Claremont Ave., New York, NY 10027
Prof. Akira Yuyama, Director, The Reiyukai Library, 5-3-23
Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, JAPAN
Prof. Elanor Zelliot (F), Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057
Prof. Erik Zurcher (F), Director, Sinologisch Institutt, Le Binnen-
vestgracht 33, Leiden, THE NETHERLANDS
Dr. Leonard Zwilling, 1704 E. Kenwood Blvd., Milwaukee, WI 53211
Mr. Kenneth Zysk (S), Dept. of Asian Civilizations, P.O. Box 4,
Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA
INSTITUTIONS SUBSCRIBING TO JOURNAL, JABS
(1) - Member Institution
Alphabetical order according to sponsoring college when applicable.
National Library of Australia (1), Canberra, A.CT., 2600, AUSTRALIA
130
The Australian National Univ. (I), The Library, Institute of
Advanced Studies, Box 4, P.O. Canberra, A.C.T. 2600,
AUSTRALIA
Institut Belge Des Hautes Etudes Bouddhiques (1), Pierre Beautrix,
Chaussee de Louvain, 696, B-I030 Bruxelles BELGIUM
Bishops, Periodicals Dept., University Library, Lennoxville,
Quebec, JIM lZ7, CANADA
Univ. of British Columbia (I), Serials, Library Processing Centre,
2075 Wesbrook PI., Vancouver B.C. V6T lW5, CANADA
Bibliotheques de L'University Concordia, Service des acquisitions,
1455 ousst, boulevard de Maisonneuve, Montreal, P.
Quebec H3G IM8, CANADA
British Library (I), Accessions Dept., Lending Division, Boston
Spa, Wetherby Yorkshire LS23 7BQ ENGLAND
The University of Calgary (I), Dept. of Religious Studies, 2920
24th Ave., N.W., Calgary, Alberta, T2N IN4 CANADA
University of California (I), Serials Dept., Main Library, Berkeley,
CA 94720
Carleton College Library (I), Periodicals Dept., Northfield, MN 55057
East Asiatic Library, 300 Kent Hall, Columbia University,
New York, NY lO027
Columbia University (1), NDEA Center for South Asian Studies,
1133 lAB, New York, NY 10025
Cornell University Library (I), Serials Dept., Ithaca, NY 14853
Baker Library (I), Ser 79003026, Dartmouth College, Hanover,
NH 03755
Univ. of Florida Library, Serials Dept., Gainesville, FL 32611
University of Georgia, Libraries (1), Periodicals Desk - LT,
Athens, GA 30602
Grad Theological Union, Library Serials Dept., 2451 Ridge Rd.,
Berkeley, CA 94709
Mesee Guimet (I), F. Macouin, Bibliothecaire, 6, Place d'lena,
75116 Paris FRANCE
Harvard College Library (I), Serial Records Dividion, Cambridge;
MA 02138
of Hawaii Library (I), Asia Collection, Serials Dept.,
2550 The Mall, Honolulu, HI 96822
1ndo-1ransk Inst. (I), US'S BIBL. TJ. JF, Boks lO09 Blindern,
MN-OSLO 3, NORWAY
University of Iowa (I), Libraries, Serials Dept., Iowa City,IA 52242
UniverSity of Kansas Libraries, Periodicals Dept., Lawrence, KA 60044
131
Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Comparadas
Oriente-Occidente, Callao 966, 1023 Capital Federal,
ARGENTINA
School of Oriental and African Studies, The Library, University
of London, Malet Street, London, WC IE 7HP, ENGLAND
McGill University, Religious Studies Library, 3620 University St.,
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2A7, CANADA
University of Michigan (I), General Library, 1307352 234, Ann
Arbor, MI 48109
Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Munchen (I), Erwerbungsabt,
Ludwigstrasse 16,8 Munchen 34, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY
Natopa Institute (I), III Pearl Street, Boulder, CO 80302
Auchmuth Library, Serials Dept., University of Newcastle, New
South Wales 2308 AUSTRALIA
Memorial University of Newfoundland (I), Education Library, St.
Johns Newfoundland AIC 557 CANADA
The New York Public Library (I), Div. 0, Grand Central Station,
P.O. Box 2231, New York, NY 10017
Indian Institute Library, Dept. of the Bodleian Library, Oxford
University, Oxford OXL 3BG ENGLAND
Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 11 A. Potsdamer 5tr.
33, D-I000, W. Berlin 30, Postfach 1047, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
University of Oregon (I), Library, Serials Section, Eugene, OR 97403
University of Pennsylvania Libraries (I), Serials Dept. Ch, 3420
Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104
The Reiyukai Library (I), 5-3-23 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo
105,JAPAN
The Institute of Sino-Buddhist Studies (I), No. 22, Lane 110, 2
Section, Yant Te Road, Shih Lin, Taipei, REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
University of Toronto Library, Serials Dept., Tomoto, Ontario
M5S1A5CANADA
University of Tubingen (I), Universitatsbibliothek, Wilhelm-
strasse 32, Postfach 2620, 7400 Bubingen 1, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
University of Virginia (I), Alderman Library, Serials/periodicals,
Charlottesville, VA 22901
Wilfrid Laurier University (I), Library, Periodicals Dept.,
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 4C5 CANADA
Williams College Library, Williamstown, MA 01267
132
University of Wisconsin, Memorial Library, Serials Dept., 728
State Street, Madison, WI 53706
Akademie der Wissenschaften (I), Kommission fur Buddhistische
Studien, Hainbundstrasse 21, D-3400 G6ttingen, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Yale University Library (I), Acquisitions Dept., New Haven, CT 06520
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES
CHAIRPERSON
A. L. Basham
Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, Australia
VICE CHAIRPERSONS
A. Bareau
College de France
92330 Sceaux, France
H. Nakamura
The Eastern Institute
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo,japan
GENERAL SECRETARY
A. K. Narain
Department of South Asian Studies, University oJWisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin, 53706, U.S.A.
(Asia)
A. Yuyama
The Reiyukai Library
Tokyo 105,japan
SECRETARIES
(Europe)
Erik Zurcher
W armund, Netherlands
ASSOCIATE SECRETARY
Charles F. Prebish
(Americas)
Bardwell L. Smith
Carleton College
Northfield, Minnesota
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, U.S.A .
. JOINT LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AND THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Gq,djin M. Nagao (Japan); A.L. Basham (Australia); Louis Ligeti (Hungary);
O.H. de A. Wijesekera (Sri Lanka); Beatrice D. Miller (U.S.A.); A.K. Narain (U.S.A.);
YuichiKajiyama (Japan); BardwellL. Smith (U.S.A.); Erik Zurcher (The Netherlands);
Heinz Bechert (West Germany); A. W. MacDonald (France); M.C. SubhadradisDiskul
(Thailand);Jan Yun-hua (Canada); Richard Gombrich (United Kingdom); Charles F.
Prebish (U.S.A.); Leon Hurvitz (U.S.A.); Padmanabh S. Jaini (U.S.A.); Alex
Wayman (U.S.A.); Lokesh Chandra (India); A.H. Dani (Pakistan); Ismael Quiles
(Argentina); Theodore Riccardi (U.S.A.); U. Aung Thaw (Burma).
HONORARY FELLOWS
P. V. Bapat (India); Sir Harold W. Bailey (United Kingdom); Kenneth D.S. Ch'en
(U.S.A.); Edward Conze (United Kingdom); Paul Demieville (France); V.V. Gokhale
(India); Ms. I.B. Horner (United Kingdom); Louis Ligeti (Hungary); E. Lamotte
(Belgium); N. Poppe (U.S.A.); S. Miyamoto (Japan); Guiseppe Tucci (Italy);
P.L. Vaidya (India); E. Waldschmidt (Germany); S. Yamaguichi (Japan)

Jiabs 2-2

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Jiabs 2-2

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

Anda mungkin juga menyukai