Philosophical Review

Cartesian Refutations of Spinoza Author(s): Albert G. A. Balz Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 46, No. 5 (Sep., 1937), pp. 461-484 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2180831 . Accessed: 27/06/2011 06:42
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Number .5 Volume XLVI

September,1937

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CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS I EARLY VIEWS CONCERNINGTHE RELATION OF SPINOZISM TO CARTESIANISM hisJFthe studentstrayfromthegreathighwayof philosophy's to tory, wanderin its 6pllateral byways,he may be sure of adventures.Quite possiblyhe will attain,here and there,a vantage point from which the highwayitself may be viewed in a new The highwayitselfand the world throughwhich it perspective. leads may be glimpsedfroma bypaththatin itselfleads nowhere. The relationbetweenthe doctrines Descartes and Spinoza is of of a matter continued The of re-interpretation. extremes opponent interpretations can be easily characterized.On the one hand, Spinozism is definedas a revisedand systematized Cartesianism. On the otherhand,the relation the former the lattermay be to of regardedas extrinsicratherthan essential; Spinoza, it may be in the urged,employed Cartesianism orderto facilitate expression of a radicallydifferent philosophical vision. These opposed views concerningthe relation of the two philosophiesemerged quite promptly afterSpinoza's worksbecame accessible.The settlement of the questionwas not a matter merely of academicand historical The exciting interest. was rathera matterof livingimportance. It controversial issues of the day borrowed weapons fromone or the otherphilosophy. The philosophic defenseof theology was at issue. Materialismwas in process of formulation. Empiricism was coming to thecontinent fromBritain.If thedoctrines Descartesand of Spinoza were essentially one in spirit,theycould be evaluated in a singleprocess.But,if similarity expression, to some extent and of
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of idea, masked a profound difference meaning,the controof versialsituation was doublycomplicated. The philosophic it defenseof theology, was remarked above,was involvedin the Descartes-Spinozaissue. The questionof the relaof tion of the later to the earlier philosophyreceived intensity treatment because of controversial associations.In the course of a centuryan extraordinary transformation occurred.The Cartein sian philosophy, a word,becamethe foundations therefutafor tion of Spinozism. To demonstrate the incompatibility the of two philosophieswas the firststep. The second, and important step,once this incompatibility been established, had was to employ Cartesiandoctrine the refutation Spinoza. To insistupon the for of essentialharmony the two philosophies, emphasizetheirkinof to ship, was to infectCartesianismwith the horrorsof Spinozism. In thatmeasureCartesianism was unavailableforthe purposesof apologetics.To separatethe philosophies was, then,the necessary preliminary. The second step,however,the basing of the refutationof Spinozismupon Cartesiandoctrine, itselfreflects trans-, in a formation effected the passing of decades. by Afterall, the earliestreactionsto Cartesianism were not wholly unlikethe earliestreactionsto Spinozism.The Cartesianphilosophyappeared as the doctrine a novateur.Here and thereit was of suspectedof a secretharmony withProtestantism. the whole, On and Catholictheologians however,Protestant alike were doubtful of Cartesianism'sutilityfor apologetical purposes. In the later case of Spinoza, the questionof apologeticalemployment scarcely arose. Occasionallythereappeareda defenseof Spinoza againstthe charge of atheism.In the main, however,the refutation him of became a favorite exercise of piety. The horror aroused by Spinozism is an historicalcommonplace.All fears born of new ideas, whatevertheirkind and origin,were concentrated upon it. Those who were alarmedby Deism pointedto Spinoza as its chief proponent. For theself-appointed guardiansof societyagainstmaterialismand atheism, Spinozism was recognized as the chief fortressof theenemy.A striking of evidenceof theemotional bit intensity involved-and it is perhapsalso evidenceof thepowerof Spinozism-is found in the belittling the enemy's doctrine. of

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he the philosophy is at such Gerdil astonishesus by disparaging pains to refute. The "absurdities" of this impie novateur are assertsthatthere sense; and Gerdilsolemnly said to shockcommon of is no philosophywhateverthat does not supply a sufficiency withwhichto combatthese absurdities.1 principles that any philosophywhateverwould serve Gerdil's statement, of for the refutation Spinozism,rendersall the more interesting fact for the selectionof Cartesianism the purpose.The significant of in the intervalbetween the dissemination Cartesian is that, had bedoctrineand the appearance of Spinozism,Cartesianism The arsenal of theology. come theally of pietyand theintellectual defenseof Descartes turnsout to be equivalentto the refutation of of Spinoza. At the same time,the refutation Spinoza is the Thus theearliernovateur and of overthrow 'atheism,' 'materialism'. becomesthebulwarkof defenseagainstthelaterand moredreaded once viewed so widely as a threat innovator.Cartesiandoctrine, and Protestant Catholicalike, interests, to religiousand theological Descartesbecomes had becomeadjusted to theuses of apologetics. the defenderof the faith.In the face of the new adversarythe oppositionto Descartes was liquidated.After all, as Gerdil indimustdepend eitherupon the cates,the defenseagainstinnovation betweenthe or Scholasticphilosophy upon Descartes. The enmity the simplified choice.The net however, School and the Cartesians, outcome,in brief,was this: the polemicagainst Deism, materialas musttake Cartesianism its and ethicalnaturalism, ism,atheism, at arsenal,or else therewould be no modernarmament all forthe polemic. of to Cousin has called attention thistransformation the role of In Cartesianism. I755, he writes,the French Academy discussed The essay thatwon theprize eulogizedDesl'espritphilosophique. the freeing cartes because of this twofoldserviceto philosophy, and fromthe yokeof Aristotle, his serviceto the cause of thought
1 vur Receuilde Dissertations quelquesprinCardinalGerdil (I7i8-i8o2): Par le R. P. Gerdil,Barnabite,Proet cipes de philosophic de religion, de fesseurde Theologie en la Royale Universite Turin,de l'Academiede & de l'Institut Bologne. A Paris, chez Hugues-DanielChaubert, Herissant the fourth MDCCLX. The volume containsfour Dissertations, Imprimeur, de des of whichbears the title: Sur l'incompatibilite principles Descartes& is de Spinosa. The reference to p. 228.

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It of Christianity. is perhapsworthwhileto quote a fewlines from selection givenby Cousin:2 thelengthy

les Disciple de la lumiere,au lieu d'interroger mortset les dieux de la 1'ecole,il ne consultaque les idees claires et distinctes, nature et il profondes, tira toutes les sciences Par des meditations 1'evidence. secours mutuelqu'elles doiventse prkter;il les enchaina toutes enles semble, eleva les unes sur les autres; et se plagantensuitesur cette hauteur,il marcha, avec toutes les forces de l'esprithumain ainsi de 'a rassemblees, la decouverte ces grandesveritesque d'autresplus heureuxsont venus enleverapres lui, mais en suivantles sentiersde lumiereque Descartesavoit traces.Ce futdonc le courageet la fierte d'un seul esprit qui causerentdans les sciences cette heureuse et dont nous gofitons ourdhui les avantages auj memorablerevolution, qui II avec une superbeingratitude. falloitaux sciencesun homme osat de les conjurertoutseul avec son geniecontre ancienstyrans la raison; qui osat fouleraux pieds ces idoles que tantde sieclesavoientadorees. dans le labyrinthavec tous les autres enferme Descartes se trouvoit ainsi des lui-meme ailes,et il s'envola,frayant mais il se fit philosophes; une routenouvellea la raison captive. Cousin then asks: "Qui pronongait en I755 ces fortes paroles?

le il du chaos,et par un coup de genieplus grandencore montra

et un fltait-ce professeurde l'Universitede Paris, devangant surRloge de Descartes? ou passant son confrereThomas dans son bienencorequelque ardentdisciplede l'Oratoireou de Port-Royal? Non: c'est un pere jesuite, le pere Antoine Guenard." Descartes' to efforts placate Jesuitoppositionwere not, afterall, unavailing. To Guenardand to others,Descartes had becomethe defenderof the faith. Because It is evidentthat the resultingsituationwas intricate. it withthe defenseof theology, of theassociationof Cartesianism of was necessaryto insistupon the diversity thetwo philosophies. The points of diversitymust be specified.On the other hand, of the of grantedthe diversity doctrine, refutation Spinozism by upon these pointswhichwere, must pivot means of Cartesianism diversity viewedas the pointsof greatest at one and the same time, In in and also as fundamental the Cartesianphilosophy. this way the essentialsof Cartesianism-at any rate the essentialsas comby definition the conby prehended the controversialists-receive deis troversialsituationitself and the controversy reciprocally
de Phil. pour servera l'histoire la phil.,5th.ed., 'V. Cousin,Fragments 2nd part,Paris, Didier et Cie., i866, pp. 4i8-42I.

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finedby determination what ideas in the earlierphilosophy of are essential.The refutations Spinozismby means of Cartesianism, of accordingly, reflect discoverieseffected the withinCartesianism by apologeticinterests. The pillorying Spinoza as atheistand maof terialistmay or may not be informing with respectto the spirit of and intention Spinozism;but it furnishes intothe specuinsight lative interests the age. The Cartesian refutations Spinoza of of are highlyrevealing.They express one way in which Cartesian doctrinebecame an historicalforce. They indicate,not, perhaps, what Descartes intendedto emphasize,but what some of his followersdiscoveredto be vital in his doctrine.
II GERDIL ON THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES AND SPINOZA

The worthyGerdil3may be selected,somewhatat random,to illustrate the firststep in the refutation Spinoza drawn from of Cartesian sources-namely, the demonstration the 'incompatiof bility'of the principles sponsoredby the one and the other.Gerdil is not unaware of the historyof the Cartesian movement. The system, admits,alarmed both the believerand the unbeliever. he Of the first is importance the factthatit had undermined older the supportof apologetics.The "School" had effected reconciliathe tion of philosophyand dogma. But Cartesianismoverthrew the veryprinciples upon whichthis pretended reconciliation had been based. From thisan erroneousconclusionhad been drawn,to wit, thatDescarteshimself would have noneof thesedogmas.This had arousedhostility towardsDescartes,and Gerdilstatesthata whole group of "ecrivains licensieux" had proceededto attack his philosophy. Interestingly enough,Gerdil states that this reactionto Descartes was intensified the belief that the philosophyof by Spinoza was the "funesteconsequence"of the Cartesianteaching. In contrast withthis group,Gerdiladmits,thereis anotherparty; thelatterregarded Cartesianprinciples in themselves the as favorable to the cause of religion.But even this sympathetic group are disturbedby the convictionthat Spinozism was somewhatmysteriously generatedby the Cartesiansystem. Gerdildoes not make 8 See note I.

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clear to us the source of this conviction. Perhaps the sympathetic of felt that Descartes had been recklessin his proclamation the of reason. Guenard,in the eulogyof the philosophical competence spiritreferred above, distinguished to two essentialaspects of the philosophical spirit, one a completeindependence everyauthe of the thority save thatof reason in the orderof philosophy, othera respectforfaithin the orderof supernatural truths;and Guenard, as Cousin states,citedCartesianism themodelof thephilosophias cal spirit so conceived.4 Complete independencein the order of philosophy, however,mightwell lead the spiritof libertinage a to neglectof the truthsof faith.The TractatusTheologico-Politicus is scarcelyto be compared with the Cartesian gesturestowards in dogma and homageto the Church.The Cartesianindependence the orderof philosophy, musthave appearedto some,might it well have generatedSpinozism,and thusthe Cartesianphilosophy, despiteits author'spiety, mayhave led to atheism. any case, Gerdil In recognizes a widespread fear that Cartesian principles,despite theirvalue for the cause of piety,were also manipulablein the interests atheism.5 the circumstances, of In Gerdilmustundertake to calmthe fearsof thosewho suspectthatCartesianteaching leads to Spinozism and atheism.This is all the more necessaryif the apologeticalemployment Cartesianideas is to be justified. of The incompatibility the two philosophiesmust be demonstrated.6 of Atheism, Gerdilinforms whether us, ancientor modern, always restsupon threeprinciples. The first the eternity movement; is of the second, the absolute or metaphysical necessityof existence, whetherof matteror of motion; and the third,the identity of and materialsubstance. Since he is quite convincedthat thinking Spinozismis atheism, may dependupon himto discover,somewe how, thesethreeprinciples Spinoza's system. accomplishhis in To purposehe must,in addition,prove thattheyare not discoverable
' Op. Cit. 4i8. ' Pp. 157-I6o; p. I98. Gerdil'sdissertation, shouldbe noted,is directed it againsta certain"new examination Spinozism," authorof whichhe of the does not mention name.The authorof this"examen," by however, guilty is of thisveryconfounding theprinciples Spinozismwiththose of Desof of cartes. The writerhas not been able to identify with certainty work the takenby Gerdilas the object of his attack. .Preface vi, vii. TPrefaceIII.

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the in the Cartesian system.These two tasks once accomplished, will have been demonstrated. of incompatibility the systems Of the three principlesthat have always definedan atheistic the thereis one, asserts Gerdil,which constitutes esphilosophy, But Cartesianismis sential "venom" of the Spinozisticsystem.8 will the Cartesiansystemlack the at not atheistic all. Not merely three principlesof atheism-it will comprisethe very antithesis ideas. This of the venomousprincipleas one of its fundamental antitheticalprinciple will indeed form a peculiarlybeneficient of This special opposition prinof property the Cartesiansystem. of ciple will be centralin showing the incompatibility the two What are these opponentprinciples?The venom in philosophies. or of Spinozismis the definition thought spiritas a mode of matshort,the denial of the Cartesian dualism of finitesubter-in stances. This is indeed somewhatstartling:the disentanglement is of Spinozism and Cartesianism based upon the body-souldocafterDescartes, of illustration the factthat, trine.This is a striking dualism. the pointof departureforapologeticsis the matter-spirit and of as In forsaking Scholasticism the reconciliation philosophy dualthe and dogma,Cartesianism, more specifically characteristic becomes the basis for a new procedureof ism of Cartesianism, reconciliation. or Gerdil'sclaim,thatSpinoza regardsthought spiritas merely the may astonishthe reader. It was evidently a mode of matter, thought of the task of Gerdilto manipulate doctrine theattributes, thoughtand and extension.The Spinozisticdoctrineconcerning so must be interpreted as to resultin the extensionas attributes is thatthought a mode the atheistic principle, venomousprinciple, of matter. Gerdil'sproposalis as follows: Spinoza's teachingconof withhis doctrine extencerningsubstancecannotbe reconciled If be and matter identified. thisidentification sion unlesssubstance is necessaryfor Spinozism,then Spinozism is, of course, a main features materialism its specific terialism. Moreover,Spinozistic to principles by willbe characterized its antithesis thecharacteristic withthelatter, In Spinozism, of the Cartesianphilosophy. contrast to mustreducethought a mode of its whatever verbal expression,
8P. 2I5.

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extensionor of matter.Spinozisticmaterialism of course, an is, atheism.But the Cartesiansystemis neither materialism an a nor atheism.Significantly, is neither, it preciselybecause the system as such is au fond a matter-spirit dualism. In thismannerthe incompatibility the two systems specifiof is cally defined. Gerdil's argumentin supportof his contention depends upon breaking down the Spinozistic distinctionbetween substanceand attribute. Spinoza has ascribedto the so-called attribute Extensioncertainessentialproperties. of But theseproperties are metaphysically ultimate.Gerdil does not call themtranscendental, it seems fairto regardthemin thisway. Extension, but accordingto Spinoza, is immutable, indivisible;it is one and infinite. But substancealone can possess these characters. They are indeed properties Absolute Being, or, in theologicalterms,of of God. It follows,accordingly, thatextensioncannotbe consistently defined an attribute substance, as of but is rathersubstanceitself. In Cartesianterms, we may translate if Gerdil'sthought, extension is the constitutive attribute matter;then,acceptingSpinoza's of characterization extensionat its face value, we must conclude of that matteris the supreme realityof the system.Spinozism is materialism. Whateverin thatsystem can be signified 'thought' by or 'spirit',at least this is true,that the terms signifymodes of matter. Thoughtis a derivative matter.9 of It is noteworthy Gerdilrepudiates notionthatSpinozism that the resultedfromthe reductionof Cartesian finite substancesto the status of attributes a single substance.Obviously,he must do of thisor he cannotmaintainhis contention the incompatibility of of the systems. He urges that, whatever others may think, the Spinozisticsystemcould not have been attainedby unitingin a single substance,in the form of attributes, two perfections the that Descartes kept independently real as the finitesubstances, Thoughtand Extension,Spiritand Matter.Whateverthemerits of Gerdil's argument, this much can be read betweenthe lines: the Cartesianontological dualismis, forGerdilas forotherCartesians, not an hypothesis a truth but established withfinality. The argumentis reinforced, accordingto Gerdil, by the fact
P. i9i and ff.GerdilexplainsthatSpinoza's atheismis the consequence of his threepositions:first, thattherecannotbe two substances differing in essence; second, thatone substance cannotbe producedby another;and,

third, substance infinite that is (2,5-2i6).

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that Descartes maintainedthe separation of force and matter. Spinoza did not do this. The consequenceis that Descartes can reaffirm argumentfrommotionto a prime mover,while his the successorcannot.This auxiliarypointindicatesthatGerdilbelieves Spinoza's view of extensionto be centralto the system.In technical expression,Gerdil's argument dependsupon the conceptof independence. This characterof independence, equally for Descartes and Spinoza, is the mark of substance.The problemis to determine whetherthe conceptsof independence the two phiin losophiesare identical.To estimatethe validityof the claim that Spinozismis a necessaryconsequenceof the earlierdoctrine, Gerdil urges thatwe mustexaminethe idea of independence terms in of thevariousmeanings thatexistence maypossess. Existencemay be per se, thatis, existencein thepropersense of the term,implying that all modes are determinations a single subject. Again, of by existencemay be intendedexistencea se, implying existence fromitselfin the sense of independence a productive of cause.10 Independence thus possesses two meaningsthatmustnot be confounded.Descartes' definition substancepreservesthe distincof tion of meanings.Substance as that which can be conceivedby itselfwithoutreference otherthingscomprisesonlythe idea of to an existenceproper to the nature of substance.It excludes the notion of the inherenceof substance in another subject. Independence,as the characterof substancefor Descartes, does not confuse independencea subjects inhaesioniswith independence ut a caucsaefficiente-a confusionof which Leibniz is guilty.11 Spinoza's failureto keep apart these two meaningsis responsible for his errors.
. Spinoza, en definissant substance, . . renferme la dans cettenotion, sous les termesequivoquesdont les sens se developpedans les consequences qu'il en tire, l'idee d'une existencenon-seulement propre, mais necessaire; exclutnon-seulement de 1'inherence la substance dans un autre sujet, mais aussi la dependence convient un effet qui 'a par rapport sa cause, & en un mottouteidee de relation a que la substance peut avoir a quelque autrechose que ce soit. Spinoza,par un sophisme qui ne pouvoitetre que l'effet d'une passion aveugle,conclutqu'une substance peut etreproduite une autresubstance'. . Une preuve ne par . certaineque Spinoza,dans sa definition la substance, de cachoit,sous des expressions un ambigues, sens bien different celui de Descartes; de c'est qu'apres avoir distingue 1'attribut la substance, entendpar de il 0P. i67. P. 177.

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par le mot de subce precisement que Descartes entendoit attribut stance. 12

possessed of the substancesof Descartes are genuinely The finite mark of substance,for theydo not inherein a subject. They are on non-dependence in not independent the second sense, implying cause. Gerdil thinksit is absurd to regard thingsas an efficient dependentin the sense that theyinhere in God as modifications. It would be equally absurd to suppose that souls and corporeal a thingsare independent se.13 These absurditiesare characteristic of Spinozismand follow fromthe confusionof the two meanings From this it appears that Spinoza, unlike Desof independence. impliesboththeper se and If cartes,is in a predicament. substance the a se, then to substancealone can be assigned unity,indivisiextension possess If, and infinity. further, bility,immutability, thesepredicates-and, accordingto Gerdil,thisis reallySpinoza's doctrine,extension itselfis a substance.Within the Spinozistic however,therecan be but a singlesubstance.The logical system, of impliestheidentification substance then, of structure Spinozism, and extension.All the "funestesconsequences"follow.Spinozism Spinoza, who said 'God or Substanceor Nature', is materialism. or shouldhave said 'God or Substance, Natureor Matter'. The defense of Descartes against the charge of fathering conceptionsof exSpinozism rests,in the end, upon contrasting tension. Descartes, Gerdil urges, did not identifyspace in the vulgar sense, or body, with extension.For him extensionnecesExtension and divisibility, mobility. sarilyimpliesimpenetrability, to vulgarlyregardedas belonging is thus clothedwith properties is body.'4Descartes' thought notthatbody can be reducedto three but ratherthat these threedimensionscannot obtain dimensions, Hence extension and impenetrability divisibility. without involving fund,of body. Accordingto the Caris the essence,the primitive are and tesan view, then,immutability indivisibility incompatible God and extension, identifies If withtheidea of extension. Spinoza of and this he must do if he accords to extensionthe properties
immutability and indivisibility, it follows that Spinoza is giving extension a meaning radically unlike that of Descartes.'5
14 P. I88. Pp. I77 and ff. dans le memesens pas est doncvisibleque Spinozane prend I'etenduE du aves les partisans vuide,qu'il au que Descartes; qu'il reconnoit contraire

15"II

Pp. i85-i86.

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pivotsuponthe concept of For Gerdil,the atheism Cartesianism who of There are students Descartes,Gerdilrecognizes, of matter. who fear that his admit that Descartes was not an atheist,but Gerdilurges,destroys But Cartesianism, lead to atheism. principles thatis, the denial of a distinction articleof atheism, a fundamental betweena primemotorand matter.In supportof his contention, Gerdil inviteshis reader to recall the state in which Descartes found"la Physique".
Toutes les puissancesque les corps ont d'agir les uns sur les autres, sensiblesetoientautant de vertus innees,symtoutes leurs qualities destiniesa proou expultrices retentrices, pathiquesou antipathiques, Descartes concutque ce pompeux duire chaque effeten particulier. dans la Physique,qu'a occultesne s'etoitintroduit etalage de qualities du la faveurde l'ignorance mechanism.II vit,ce que Boyle confirma que que depuis par mile experiences, la naturene fait jouer en effet en des oui la mechanism dans la production effets, l'on peut entrevoir de quelque sorte son procede.La simplicity ses voies le persuada que ce procede devoit etre uniforme.I1 ne balanqa donc pas a rejetter

& de & accidentelles l'flcole, a leursubstituer substantielles les formes

des le la mechaniques, grosseur,la figure, mouvement les affections Mais apres avoir rejettetout I'apd'une matierehomogene. particules qu'il ne pouvoit occultes,il comprit pareil des formes& des qualities dite. dans la matiereaucune vertuactiveproprement plus reconnoitre se venoient reuniraux pas . . . Ainsi les derniers de l'analysephysique pour depouillerla conclusions la synthese metaphysique, de dernieres qui de matiere toutesles proprietes ne peuventse deduirede l'etendue de & impenetrable; faire par consequent la matiereun etre purement en passif, incapablede contenir lui-memele principedu movement. d'un premiermoteurdistinguede la D'oui l'on voit que la necessity matiere,est comme le centre ou' vont se reunirtous les principes de de & physiques metaphysiques la Philosophie Descartes.16

of The Cartesianprincipleof the divisibility matterdestroysthe of reality material the of atheism Spinoza; forit disproves ultimate substance. inconsistency his to Gerdilattempts augment case by discovering
indiimmobile, a n'y a aucune repugnance admettreune etendueinfinie, la visible; & qu'apresavoir adopted notionde l'etendueetabliepar les parqui particuliere, est de l'aptisansde l'espacepur,il y ajofiteune absurdity Ainsi Spinosa ne peut etablirsa consequence pellerune etenduecorporelle. sur le qu'en renversant principe lequel Descartes a rejettele vuide, & fait l'imconsister1'essencedu corps dans l'etendue.Descartes n'a sofitenu que du possibilite vuide,qu'en sofitenant touteetendueest par la natureimsa qu'en supposant mobile.Spinoza n'etablit doctrine divisible, penetrable, La immobile. doctrinede Spinosa est que l'etenduepeut etre indivisible, de donc directment oppose aux principes Descartes." Pp. I9I-I92. 16Pp.I96-I98.

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withinSpinoza's materialism. He charges that Spinoza admitted theconception materialparticles corpuscles.But thisis hopeof or lesslyinconsistent withthe indivisibility extension.In any case, of for extensionis given the attributes Spinoza is a materialist, of ultimate reality. If, however, we overlook the inconsistency, Spinoza is an atomistand a fatalist.He mustbe includedwithin thegroupof the "New Epicureans". "Nothingis thenmorefitting for the destruction the Atheismof Spinoza and of Epicurus of thantheprinciples Descartes concerning essenceof matter." of the The divisibility matteroverthrows unityof substancethat of the formsthe basis of Spinoza's edifice.The establishment extenof sion as the essence of matterexcludes frommatterthe principles of movement, this destroysthe atheismof Epicurus. and The Cartesianconceptof matterenables Descartes to separate the finiteand the infinite, at least the indefinite or and the inin finite. The distinction and infinite betweenthe finite substances, Gerdil's Cartesianism, fundamental, is preciselyas the principle of a single substanceis basic for Spinozism.The latterdoctrine, of wereit made consistent givenconsistency expression, and would definematter-substance the supremereality.What Spinozism as describesas the"attribute" thought if the termbe allowed at of is, of all, an attribute matter. of Thought is a manifestation matter, a mode of extension.Gerdil's interpretation Spinoza presents of the system an epiphenomenalism. Cartesianconceptof matas The ter,distinguishing indefinite the infinite, moved from the and the the creativeprinciple motionand continuance existence, in of also excludedthought and spiritfrommatter. The Cartesianprinciples, then,accordingto Gerdil,providea new and ample basis for the defenseof religionand theology againstthe threat materialism, of and atomism. The destroyer Scholasticism atheism, becomesthe of defenderof the faith.
III THE REFUTATION OF SPINOZA: LAMY'S LE NOUVEL A TH.ISME RENVERSP2"

Gerdil's effort demonstrate incompatibility Cartesian to the of and Spinozistic doctrineis, of course, at the same time an at' du Frangois Lamy, Le nouvel AtheismeRenverse,ou Refutation sistemede Spinosa, Tiree pour la plu'part, la connoissance la naturede de de
17Pp. 209-210.

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of temptedrefutation the latter.It will be concededthatthe Carof tesian refutations Spinoza cannot be regardedas accurate reof flections his doctrine.They indicate,on the whole,what their needs as authorsunderstood Spinozism.Perhaps such a statement We may suspect,here and there,a deliberate some qualification. of misrepresentation Spinoza's teachingin order to facilitateits the refutahowever, this qualification, Even admitting refutation. of distortions Spinozistic tionsmustexpress,even in thedeliberate situation. the doctrine, positionof that doctrinein the intellectual Thus the criticsof Spinoza, howeverlittletheytell us of Spinoza, themselves-and of the groundsof tell us a greatdeal concerning theirallegianceto Descartes.What the criticof Spinoza regarded will expressboththe critic'sconception as a successfulrefutation asserts of Spinoza is ruined; for Spinoza, if it mean anything, withatheism. of implytheidentification thephilosophy refutations fact The is This, in itself,however, unimportant. moresignificant thatthisatheismis a new atheism.With is the critics'recognition that new groundsare necessaryfor the this goes the conviction of of refutation an atheismthat is new. The effort Lamy, which seeks to accomplishits deliberately of is the effort a Benedictine, purpose by bendingto this purposephilosophicalideas borrowed philosophers. fromrecent in surprising Lamy's assertion There can be, of course,nothing that,if Spinoza is not an atheist,he at least does not rise above the level of Deism. But after all, Spinoza is an atheist,for the fromthe toSpinozisticGod is a universalbeingindistinguishable
de de l'Homme.Par un ReligieuxBenedictin la Congregation Saint Maur. A Paris, Chez Jeande Nully,MDCXCVI. Lamy explainsin theAvertissement before orderwas written to according the geometrical thatthe refutation de of the publication his Traite de la Connoissance Soi-Meme, and his to Having been requested writea de Veritekvidente la ReligionCreftienne. he accordingto the "common"(or usual) method, issues this refutation The volumeappearedunder both formsof refutation. volumecontaining de by "approbations" Monseigneur Fenelon, auspices: it contains impressive de Duc de Cambray, Monseigneur Sillert,Eve'quede Soisby Archeveque, Directeur sons; by Hideux, Cure de Saints Innocens; and by M. Coulaw, of de la BibliotequeMazarine. It begins with a statement the "Idee du qu'on en fait". There followsthe Sisteme de Spinosa & de la refutation to according "la methode a First Treatise,containing refutation commune"; of concernedwith the possibility the the Second Treatise,a refutation la suivant methode and thentheThirdTreatise,a "Refutation Incarnation; the The workconcludes witha "Parallel" drawnbetween des Geometres". "& of and religion morality SpinozawiththeChristian, memeavec la lumiere naturelle".

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talityof nature,a being withoutliberty, non-providential, "sans but et sans fin, sans choix & sans election".That theconsequences of Spinozism are "funestes,"-that the young are being seduced by the doctrine,its adherentsincreasing, "les Libertins" finding in it-all of thisis to be expected.Our interest Lamy's support in efforts mustturnupon morespecific considerations. The Spinozisfor our Benedictine, characteristic the new tic philosophy, is of age; it supplies a capital expressionof everything that could be foundwrongwiththe world. For Lamy thinksthat Spinoza is no isolated phenomenon. This philosophyis a responseto the intellectual needs of mindsand temperaments revolt.Let us, therein fore,first inquireof our author: how and whydid the Spinozistic philosophyarise? We may then inquire what Lamy takes this philosophy be-the "Idlee generatedu sistemede Spinoza, & de to ses principales consequences"as thetitleof SectionII runs.From thispointwe are preparedto appreciate generalplan of Lamy's the refutation. Spinoza's doctrineeffects "bouleversement" merelyin rea not ligion and morality, but even in our conceptionsof nature.This is change,however, the consequenceof an effort give a systemto atic foundationfor the modernethical revolt.What Lamy finds in Spinozism may be described in one word: Naturalism.The metaphysics Spinoza is the ground for ethicalnaturalism:but of ethical naturalismis preciselywhat demanded the metaphysics. The modernage, at heart,demands the overthrowof Christian morality. The essential trait of Christianmorality its uncomis promising oppositionto naturalimpulse.It remains, Lamy, an for ethicsof renunciation. modernrevoltseeks a rational The justification for its aversionto Christianmorality and for its ethicaland To politicalnaturalism. accomplishthis,accordingto Lamy, philosophymust furnish metaphysical a groundfor an anti-Christian morality and politics.But it must do more-for it must provide an explanation the factthatthereis a Christian of Chrismorality. tianmorality mustbe explained-by explaining away. To explain it it away, as Lamy regards the effort, there arises a conceptual schemewhich the Eighteenth Centuryemployedagain and again in manyvariants.This is accomplished the doctrinewhich atby tributes rules and laws of Christianmorality a politicaland the to

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social plot.Those who possessedpower exploitedthe superstitions and fears of the masses, developingthe Christiancode, in order to insurethe subjectionof men to priestly and politicalauthority. This is the thesisof the naturalists. Lamy urges thatthe thesisis unsupportable long as ordinary so ideas concerning God and man and the world are retained.A set of new ideas is required.The naturalisticrevolt,having speciously explained away Christian morality institutions, and mustseek reinforcement a metaphysiby To cal foundation. do this,it must,on the negativeside, destroy the traditional ideas of the providential of governance the world, whichwill mean atheism, and mechanism nature.On in necessity, the positive side, it must definea point of view fromwhich the equivalence of rightand good, on the one hand, and the natural on the other,necessarily follows."' In the eyes of Lamy the Spinozisticphilosophy, withits speciousappearanceof compelling logical rigor,is the outstanding effort provideradicalismwith to rationaljustification. On the groundsthatwe mustfight withfire, refutation fire the must oppose metaphysics metaphysics, to reason to reason. It is important note that Lamy recognizesthe problemto be metato physical.The horrible consequences-in morality, politicallife, in in institutional conflicts-are symptomatic. The time has passed when anything can be accomplishedby appeal to dogma and to faith.What needs to 'be accomplishedcan and must be accomplishedby reason-"meme avec la lumierenaturelle". What are the principlesof this naturalistic that metaphysics must be overthrown? And where,if we are to depend upon the natural lightof reason, are we to findthe point d'appui of this refutation? The purposeof the refutation to reinstate is what this metaphysics threatens destroy. to The negationof the ethicaland religiousconsequencesdepends upon the refutation the metaof physicsdevisedto supportthistransvaluation values so characof of teristic themodern age. Now Lamy recognizes thatthe Spinozistic teaching is thoroughlyconsistentin its rejection of all ideas-in its designation the conceptions anthropomorphical of of a rewardingand punishing, providential a deity,and the ethical
" P. 84 and ff.

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principlescorrelatedtherewith, anthropomorphic. as Moreover, Spinoza's Biblical criticism, which deprivesHoly Writ of metaphysicalsignificance, a necessaryconsequenceof the naturalistic is metaphysics. traditional The conceptions Christian of theology, not to say the formulations its mysteries, Lamy recognizes, of so must necessarily forSpinoza a set of symbolic be expressions, possessing only an ellipticalvalue. Social serviceability the pragmatic is test of theirworth.Thus originalsin must be reducedby Spinoza to the level of fiction. Even good and beautycan have no objective significance.20 Lamy is convincedthatthe use by a Spinozistof a phrase such as 'The Love of God' is preposterous. The traditional languageof theology utterly is unfit theexpression Spinozisfor of tic ideas. When Spinoza declares that to admit miracles is to incurthe dangerof Atheism, Lamy can recordonlyastonishment. It is the paradox of an Atheistwho "gives preservatives against Atheism'".2' Lamy's real accusationis that Spinozism,by employing traditional verbiage,surreptiously seeks to make his doctrine appear to be in harmony withbeliefwhen,in fact,it is whollyinconsistentwith the faith. Spinoza would attribute values to his doctrinethat'it cannot possess, since these values follow only if traditional expressions convey the traditionalmeanings associated with them,and do not follow when the expressionshave only the significance metaphor, of which they must have in the Spinozisticcontext. The point of this situationis that, for Lamy, Spinozism is a doctrine devised to support anti-anthropomorphism; metathe of physicalprinciples providea foundation a mechanistic view of nature; this mechanisticscience of nature implies determinism; and accordinglyfree-willand associated theologicaland ethical ideas become mere projectionsof human impulse into objective nature.In return, this conclusionreflects back upon the natureof man equally at man, and resultsin Spinozisticviews concerning variance with tradition.Spinoza's attitudetowards the passions would have seemedto Lamy as expressedin his politicalthought consistent. Neitherto praise nor to dispraisethe pasthoroughly them-this is to take themnaturalistically. sions,butto understand in But takenin thisway, humannatureappears as an incident the
'2

Cf. p. 48, pp. 53-54.

21

Cf.p. 39,pp.34-35, 59. 55,

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systemof nature.It furnishes clues to a realitylyingbeyond. no Moreover,whateverlaws of morality this view of man may suggest,theselaws can have no value lyingbeyondtheirexpediency in The largerfishdevourthe smallerfishby supreme a social system. naturalright, and so withman conceivedas an incident withinthe systemof nature. With organized societycivil rightcomes into being.The validityof this right, however,is circumscribed the by life of society.The function religionmustthenbe the inculcaof of tionof piety.And theentiresystem religiousideas is essentially a set of symbolsfor a merelysocio-political Within the content. contextof Spinozism,as Lamy thinks, 'love of God' is either the an elaborate symbolfor social controlor it is nothing. 'Sin' may but have meaning a within givensocial system, notbeyondit. When such expressions the 'love of God' in his metaas Spinoza employs physicalcontext, phrasebecomesevasive.Its employment the may be due to deliberateartifice expressinga lack of courage. Either Spinoza seeks to deceive, or else he is pathetically incapable of recognizing the consequencesof his own doctrine. Spinozismis a 'new' atheism.It is a naturalism-but a naturalism thatis in some sense equallynew. Spinozismreflects modern a for context.What it denies with significance Lamy's defenseof religion,morality,and theology,is somethingalso modern. In brief,Lamy's zeal is not that of a Scholastic contending against he dissensionwithinthe modernity. the contrary, represents On of The refutation the new atheism contextof modernreflection. that is equally a productof must be providedby a metaphysics modernity. Lamy's refutation, then,is a Cartesian refutation. the crucial point in the refutation Within these conditions, of this lies Spinozism, withinthe natureof man. Lamy affirms again and again. The very titleof his book asserts that the refutation is drawn for the greaterpart, fromknowledgeof the natureof man. Knowledgeof man is "l'ecueildu Spinozisme",thereefupon which the wave of Spinozism is shattered.22 Spinoza may assert of the immortality man; but Spinozisticimmortality, whateverit whichpointsbackmay be, is at least in no sense an immortality ward to the natureof man as a clue to realityor forwardto the objective validity and metaphysicalimplications of morality.
22

Cf.

pp. 25-32, 83. p.

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Withinthenaturalistic system, Lamy in effect no insists, one thing possesses primacyover another,neitherthe living over the nonliving, man overtheremainder theanimateworld.Man may nor of be the most highlyevolved of things-but the adjectival phrase has no value significance. mustbe refuted arguments Spinoza, if he is to be overthrown, by drawnfromthenatureof man. With thiswe again come upon the central fact presented by the refutationsof Spinozism. The Spinozisticmetaphysics defines natureof the Spinozisticman. the From this definition the Spinozisticman flow all those conseof quences,in the contextof practicallife,that Lamy and otheropponentsdescribeas "funestes".Metaphysics, however,can be refutedby metaphysics alone. The Spinozisticmetaphysical man,so to speak, can be replaced successfullyonly by means of an opponent metaphysicalman. The opponent conception of man, however,cannot be drawn from Scholasticism-this would not be fighting with fire.The oppositionof ideas, to be effective fire continuously, must itself be definedby a common context.The refutation Spinoza mustbegin witha modernmetaphysics of that takesits departure fromthenatureof man. Lamy mustask: where is theresuch a metaphysics? his mind,thereis but one answer. To The Cartesianphilosophy meets the requirements. The Cartesian philosophy supplies, merely idea of thenatureof man,but a not an trueidea of his nature.In the context Cartesianism come to of we knowledge man.This philosophy, of indeed,is foundedupon truths concerning natureof man.Thus, according Lamy,theref the to utation of Spinoza depends upon a Cartesianstandpoint. More preit cisely, dependsupon theCartesianontological dualism.Descartes becomes the defenderof the faith,and can fulfillthis destiny because he affirms what Spinozism would deny-the real distinctionbetweensoul and body. As with Gerdil,so for Lamy, the first step is a demonstration of thecontrast betweenthephilosophies Descartesand Spinoza. of Lamy centers effort a disproof thepositionthatCartesianhis on of ism generated latersystem. the The exploitation Cartesianideas of as the basis for refutation implicitin the Second Treatise,the is "Refutationde l'erreurde Spinosa, sur la possibility l'Incarnade tion". It is also implicit the document in called the "Parallele de la

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Religion& de la Morale de Spinosa, avec la Religion& Morale de Jesus-Christ, memeavec la lumierenaturelle".But in a second & parallel the comparisonof the two philosophiesis made explicit. The firststage of the disproof of Cartesian responsibility for to Spinoza is formedby a reference the distinction substances. of
". . . Toute sa philosophic ne roule que sur la distinctionreelle qu'il

metentrela substance letendue la substancepensante;& qu'ainsi & il admitdans la natureplurality substances."Lamy adds that: des "nous venons de voir au contraireque la philosophicde Spinosa ne roule que sur la confusionqu'il fait de ces deux substances, & sur la supposition extravaganted'une seule substance dans la nature; le corps & l'espritdit-il, sont que la meme chose".23 ne In this fashion,Lamy interprets the Spinozistic dictumconcerning one and the same thing,viewed under different attributes. a In summaryof Cartesian doctrine,he enumeratessix principles, peculiar to the former,and denied severallyand collectively by Spinozism. The centralpoint is the Cartesian principlethat the soul is not a mode of being (une maniered'etre), eitherof God or of body, or of any otherthingwhatever.Thus the Cartesian isolationof the soul fromnature,and its definition substance, as undergoesa remarkableincrease in importance. The mind-body dualism was advanced by Cartesians as an irresistible truth.24 Descartes alone has revealed to philosophy both what the soul is and what is the nature of matter.In the earlierstages of debate between Cartesians and anti-Cartesians, the alleged irresistible truthencountered derision.Confronting new enemy,however, a the Cartesian offensive against atheismmust be launched from the body-mind dualism.The Cartesiansthemselves had acknowledged-with reluctance hereand there-the absorption the aniof mals withinthe single realm of mattersubstanceand mechanical law. Spinozism,as the opponents Spinoza viewed his doctrine, of would complete engulfing life within the of The refutation matter. of Spinozism,then,must begin with the positionthat in its conception of man Cartesianismstands in irreconcilable opposition to the doctrineof Spinoza. The verymeaningof the term'meta2 P. 486. Cf. "Louis de la Forge and the Critiqueof SubstantialForms,"Phil. Review XLI (November,I932).
24

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physics'reflects adoptionof Cartesianism:Lamy declaresthat this is metaphysics above all the science "qui nous fait connoitrela qu'il difference y a entreles esprits& les corps,qui nous decouvre de ce qui se peutconnoitre la naturede l'ame,& de son immortality; de la nature de Dieu, de son Existence, de sa Providence,de sa Puissance, etc. etc".25The refutation Spinoza, as the titleof of Lamy's First Treatise assures us, is accompaniedby pure reason, which finds in knowledge of the nature of man "l'ecueil" of Spinozismand the source of the dutiesof Christian The morality. first chapter, moreover, devotedto the "verities, dutieswhich is & of spring fromthe distinction spiritand body", to "the jjustesse of theirunion",and "to thecapacityby whichthe spirit knowsand loves". In the contextof controversy before us, Cartesianmetaphysicsis definitive principle. in Lamy stands squarely upon his dualistic basis of Cartesian origin.Effects,actions,express the nature of things.With man we find two wholly opposed seriesof actions.Therefore theremust be two principles the sourcesof the dissimilar as consequences. If, now, these principlesare substances,and man is a compositeof substances, Spinozismis in principle refuted.26 There are two substances for the reason that eithercan be conceived whollyindeof pendently the idea of the other.With this the "whole edifice" of Spinoza is ruined,for Spinozism,if it mean anything, asserts the existenceof but one substance,and this impliesthe reduction of all phenomena a common to denominator. The dissimilarities revealedin man's compositenatureare irreducible. Lamy even derives fromthis irreducibility argument an for the existenceof God. Only an infinitely wise and powerful beingcould be the authorof man, forsuch an orderof power and wisdomis necessary effect union,in one being,of substances to the so opposed.27 Thus the Cartesian dualism,affording first a argumentfortheexistence God, providesthe foundation of upon which may be reinstated arguments the fromdesign.The latterhad evidentlybecome an object of derision.For Lamy asserts that,despitethe ridiculeof his readers,one may establisha supremewisdom rulingthe world fromthe functionsof the human body.28
2"pp.
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With due attention his dual nature,then,man need not pass to beyondthatnaturein orderto establishthe existenceof God, i.e., of God in the sense in which Spinoza would rejectthe conception as anthropomorphic. pense, donc je suis, is no more evident Je thatJe suis, donc il y a un Dieu infiniment sage.29It is quite unnecessaryto burdenthe reader with the details of Lamy's arguments.It is sufficient notethatman's natureprovidesthe source to of two sets of arguments:the one, the argumentsfrom design drawn fromman's body; the other, arguments the fromthe native of ethicalendowment the soul. From theverydualityof man's naturean infinitely wise and powerfulauthoris demonstrated. Upon this foundation body serves to reinstatethe argumentsfrom the design,and the soul to give an objective realityto those ethical ideas that,for Spinozisticnaturalism(accordingto Lamy) cannot be morethanprojectionsof social experience. Moreover, superiority thesoul to thebodyis obvious from the of the fact thatthe soul is capable of thought while the body is not. From thisit followsthathumanexperience mustrevealtwo setsof values,the one superior theother.The soul's immortality, to which follows fromits indivisibility immateriality substance,exand of tendsthevalues of the soul fromthe finite the infinite to sphere.30 With this, the whole of Christianmorality,against which the naturalistsand free-thinkers secretlyin revolt,is of course, are reinstated. The spiritof this morality, Lamy has made clear, as is renunciatory; thus the Cartesiandualismhas servedto provide a metaphysical basis for an other-worldly morality. The depreciationof sense as a source of knowledge, accordingto the Cartesian doctrine, becomes in Lamy's hands an auxiliaryof this morality. Reflectionupon the nature of man, upon the conditionsof the union of soul and body, reinforces the anti-naturalistic point of view. Man is not naturally withoutdutiesand withoutlaw.3' The doctrine innateideas is thus transformed of into a doctrineof an originalethicalendowment. Correspondingly, doctrine the thatthe senses are the source of unclearand indistinct ideas takes an ethical turn.The union of soul and body subjects the formerto the impact of ideas from sense aroused within the soul upon the
29 P.

8 P.

io6.
i43

and ff.

' First Treatise,ch. iii, pp. 171ff.

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however,have process.The sense-ideas, occasion of theperceptual it upon the soul, turning towardsearthlythings. verybad effects of In thisway the corruption humannaturemay be explained; the situatedwith respectto the persoul is thus "disadvantageously" of of formance its chiefduties.Justas theobscurity the sense-idea, cannot be dispelledbut is incurable,in as a knowledgefunction, As cannotbe expurgated. Lamy thesame mannersense-experience duties are to flee fromsenseour indispensable statesthe matter, The soul and the body definetwo objects and sense-experience. born of the soul, exdissimilarsets of values: the first, utterly of of presses the immortality its nature; the second,the interests the body and this life, for the sake of which Spinoza wrote a it Cartesianism, Scholasticism, seems,is an othernot metaphysics. worldlyphilosophy! The Refutationof Spinoza, so far,has proceededaccordingto The the "Methode commune"-it is a treatisefor the generality. Refutationin the Third Treatise proceeds accordingto the geometricalmethod,and is the esotericdoctrine.The thirdtreatise book of the Ethics, for with the overis aimed solely at the first Lamy of throwof thisthewhole structure Spinozismis destroyed. in by proposedto conducthis enterprise accepting, the main,Spimode, of The noza s axioms and definitions. definitions substance, but not that of God. Lamy's own axand attribute, adopted, are ou la ioms begin with this,that la reality, verite,la bonte' la perinseparablefromBeing. These are fection& Unite are properties because theyare necessarilyfound in everycalled transcendent Lamy's second axiom asthingthat is trulyBeing. Significantly, He serts that thoughtis nobler than extension.32 seeks to establish that the idea of substancenecessarilyincludes the idea of involvesthenotionof substance, Being. The veryidea of attribute and thereforecannot be conceived by itself. This purpose, of course, is to maintainthat, from attributeswhich can be conwe of ceived independently otherattributes, must inferthe existence of diverse substances. Thus against Spinoza his refutation must maintainthe existenceof several, and not of one subhe stance; or, what forhim amountsto the same thing, musturge as thatindependence attribute impliessubstances diverseas the of
' Pp. 26-263.

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With this he establishesthe Cartesiandualism of subattributes. refutaupon whichthe geometrical stancesas thecentralprinciple At tionof Spinozismmustbe based.33 the same timehe deniesthat of are and thought extension equallyattributes God. For theessena tial attributeof God is thought,while extension constitutes fromGod, and excluded fromthe essence of being distinguished God.3' therefollow for Lamy the propositions So muchaccomplished, of as the whichrestore worldof extension a creation God, freedom subratherthan necessityfor God, and the existenceof thinking from God and outside of his stance, man, really distinguished essence. Cousin, examiningtwo obscure documentsconcerning the relationof Cartesianismand Spinozism,reaches this conclusion. la toute veriti:ce n'estpas tel ou tel Mais on peutdireaujourd'hui siecle, du meme dix-septieme qui,apres c'est cartesien, l'esprit principe aussi un c'est-a-dire spiritualisme judile avoirproduit cartesianisme, erreur versla double temps en l'entrainait meme cieuxque sublime, siecleest en effet Le et du spinozisme du jansenisme. dix-septieme et divine du neantdes imbude l'ideede la toute-puissance comme sur veritable la qu'un II 'a creatures. incline ne reconnaitre seulacteur Dieu. La' est l'unite une scenede ce monde, seulecause,un seuletre, l'unitide la philosophic comme siecle, de de la philosophic ce grand de l'ideede Dieu,et dansun est suivant dansl'affaiblissement du siecle a qui de outre sentiment des forces l'homme aboutit unesorted'apode theose l'humanite.95 of of If Cousin's characterization the inner tendency the Sevenof be accepted,the importance the CartesiandualteenthCentury Descartes' ism in the Refutationof Spinoza may be reaffirmed. substancewas shaky. and finite betweeninfinite own distinction Deny its validity,and it could be argued that Spinozism is genin to according themanner whichthe erated-or threeSpinozisms, as Spinozismas a spiritualism; a materialresultsare interpreted. ism; or as a doctrinein which thoughtand extension,defined of would be merelyattributes substance. In any as attributes, it such a result, mightimply case, as Gerdiland Lamy would view of the nothingness the creature.A conclusionof this order, for could scarcelybe tolerable. priest, the Cardinaland theBenedictine
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"Op. cit.I 295.

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The Cartesian dualism of finitesubstances-that is, a concept betweeninfinite and finite a of substancepermitting distinction interfor substance-was of criticalsignificance the controversial docest of Lamy and Gerdil. If the Spinozisticsingle-substance refutation trine could be construedas a materialism, mightbe In facilitated. the finalanalysis,however,it was of greaterimbetweenGod and creature. portanceto maintaina real distinction The Cartesiandualism alone, as Gerdil and Lamy implicitly feel, will provide for the realityof man, the realityof nature,while preventing both the absorptionof man in physicalnature and in the God, and finally preventing identification God withnature's of substance.If Scholasticismbe regardedas overthrown, then on the Cartesianbasis alone, Lamy evidently believes,can atheismbe avoided and the revoltagainst Christianmorality defeated. be ALBERT G. A. BALZ
THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA