Interview with Massimo Cacciari: I am many, says Europe.

We have to be capable of being many Text Josep Casals | Alicia Garca Ruiz cacciari 2699 Foto: Eva Guillamet nyc23305 David Alan Harvey / Magnum Photos The philosopher Massimo Cacciari, as Mayor of Venice, visited Barcelona to participate in a series of talks at the Institut dEstudis Catalans around the theme Identity, Europe, Mediterranean. The title of his talk, Identit e differenze nel Mediterraneo contemporaneo, was redolent of aspects of his work that indicate the breadth of his vision, with reflections on contemporary Europe coexisting with profound incursions into philosophy and poetry from Ulysses and Plato onwards (see, for example, El archipilago. Figuras del otro en Occidente, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1999). It is equally characteristic of Cacciari that he recognises affinities but also has a finely nuanced sense of their limits, includes both points of intersection or embracing, and is also determined to correctly separate (as Engelmann said of Wittgenstein). This is reflected, for example, in The Necessary Angel (State University of New York Press, 1994), in which Cacciari examines questions associated with representation and the metamorphosis between that which is visible and that which is invisible. But it can also be seen in his constellation of posthumous men (Posthumous People: Vienna at the Turning Point, Stanford University Press, 1997), as in his other descriptions of the serious Viennese apocalypse. The fact that Cacciari changed the adjective H. Broch used to describe turn of the century Vienna (the cheerful apocalypse) demonstrates his belligerent dismissal of that which threatens to become a commonplace. According to his own definition, in Dellinizio (Adelphi, Miln, 1990), he offers theological-philosophical thought that challenges both the inertia that rests immovably on the founding texts and the chatter of perpetual exodus that becomes refuge. Thus, shifting back and forth between one epoch and another, or between philosophy and art, Cacciari demonstrates the fecundity of searching out gestures of thought from distant regions (Icone della Legge, Adelphi, Miln, 1985, 3 ed.). And, as a result, he has not only focussed on negative thought in Krisis. Ensayo sobre el pensamiento negativo de Nietzsche a Wittgenstein (Siglo XXI, Mxico, 1982) and other works, but also, and from the perspective of that radical criticism that was Dialectics of the negative in the age of the metropolis in De la vanguardia a la metrpoli (Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1972), he has associated the devaluation of pensiero negativo in the metropolis as a space of contradictions that are irreducible to synthesis. All of which brings us into the realm of this magazine - one that has close affinities with the criticism of the aura of style and design that Cacciari developed in Oikos. Da Loos a Wittgenstein (with F. Amendolagine, Officina Edizione, Roma, 1975) and in Adolf Loos e il suo angelo (Electa, Miln, 1992). Cacciari left the office of Mayor in March. At this point, then, we begin our conversation: relating the rigour that brings out the persistence of contradictions to aspects of politics that may perhaps lead to the attempt to conceal these contradictions. Josep Casals (JC): You have evaluated the importance of attention and evoked Simone Weil, who, developing an idea of Paul Valrys, said that the more attentive the thought, the fuller of being the object appears. However, Weil did not fail to appreciate an opposition between the realm of the quantitative and the conditions of the attention. As did Robert Musil (who appears in several of your texts) when he counterposed the "realm of spiritual needs" to that of "political needs." I would like to ask you about the possible conflict that may exist between such considerations and your political activity, that is, as someone who is embedded in a hard-skinned structure, in a system of mediations and calculated effects, and not one governed by the tenets of intellectual life... The only thing I can say is that throughout the whole philosophical tradition of Western

Europe, discourse has also been praxis. It was not only Marx who said that the object of thought is to change the world. There is no thinker whose philosophy has not been oriented towards the world, and therefore to transforming it in some way. Verum et factum cum verbo convertuntur. The truth lies in operating, in acting... Philosophy has been a political activity since its very beginning; it developed in the agora, with theatre... In general, I think it is impossible to think philosophically without at the same time thinking practically. Then, you can remain with the thought, someone else can become a member of parliament, and another person can take on the role of mayor. But these are situations that life brings us. The point is that you can not establish a separation, a Trennung, between philosophy and praxis; it is only a Scheidung, a distinction, not a Trennung. Now, if you are asking me specifically why I took on the role of mayor, my answer must be that sincerely I do not know. In fact, it is nothing more than a contingency, it is no more important than that.

J.C.: In terms of this, what do you think of Musils phrase which, if I am not mistaken, appears in his diaries and which says Politicians who are too attentive to the spirit are dangerous? Yes, it is true. Politicians become very dangerous when they think that their ideas must necessarily be put into practice, despite everything and everyone. Politicians are dangerous when they think that their ideas can be automatically transformed into policies. When they think they can impose them, as they are, on politics. Because, then, their ideas become ideology and a totalising ideology. Anyone who thinks that their own ideas are the truth, beyond any possibility of dialogue, and further, that they can be imposed, is a very bad philosopher and, because they ignore the distinction that we were talking about, they become very dangerous politicians. In contrast, a politician who has a political vocation within the terms and limitations mentioned, does not even contemplate the possibility of basing their work on values of a transcendent nature.

J.C.: In an essay about this distinction between simple reason and the space of values, Musil says Europe, in its free time, is a Luna Park. Perhaps today we would say a theme park an expression that has sometimes been used to allude to a tendency that is noticeable in Barcelona, but which forms part of a more general trend: the touristification of the world. Given that Venice has also experienced the effects of mass tourism, how has the city dealt with this danger of amorphism? Tourism is the biggest industry in the world. In the past, the cities had factories; today we have hotels and restaurants. These are two different industries. What, then, is the problem? The problem is how to manage things so that these industries coexist with the maintenance and protection of cities, that the environment is not spoilt, that cities are not razed or destroyed, but transformed and inhabited as far as is possible. Because it is clear that in a city that attracts many tourists, property prices rise, the cost of living increases and, therefore, it is difficult for working class people to continue living there. But we are talking about pragmatic issues. It is necessary to control and regulate tourism by carrying out restoration and by developing other non-tourism related activities. This means having access to the necessary financial resources and having adequate plans to protect the urban landscape, architectural protection, urban protection... It is necessary to maintain our cities and, at the same time, to transform them. This means historic buildings being adapted for new uses, and not just as hotels. It's about being thoughtful and intelligent. But it is absurd to demonise tourism. It is not the tourists who are destroying our cities; perhaps it is we who fail to produce architectural, development or mobility plans that can cope with these flows. Just as before cities had to be prepared for large industry, now they have to adapt and respond to these

influxes.

J.C.: On the other hand, the city itself is a place of encounters between highly heterogeneous elements. Of course, and we must try to combine tourism with higher cultural activities, and the promotion of study and research. Our cities have a vocation as cultural centres, research centres, universities... It is necessary to promote these activities alongside tourism. But I repeat: what really damages our cities is not tourism, but bad tourism policies.

J.C.: You have spoken about European dis-inclinations and have always been prepared to confront new political situations that go beyond the typical clichs. In this sense, you received the 2007 International Essay Prize of the Crculo de Bellas Artes for Europa o la filosofa [Alicia Garca Ruiz (A.G.R.) joins the conversation]: Europe is a question you have addressed in many of your works. Europe is a laboratory for philosophical experimentation. European thought, and thought about Europe, is, today, as much of a philosophical problem as it is an intellectual cartography. You have defined the problem of the starting point, of the search for a single initial constant, as a central problem of philosophy, and it might also be considered a political problem in relation to the idea of the origin of Europe. Is the origin of Europe a problem of the starting point for political thought, that is, is the origin of Europe an identity or a plurality? Europe has been a difficult problem to define from the very outset. One need only think of the mythological figure of Europe. Europe was a woman who came from the other side of the Mediterranean, the modern Lebanon, which was Phoenicia. The very name Europe is not of Indo-European or Indo-Germanic origin. It probably has a Mesopotamian, Sumerian or Semitic origin. Europe has been from its very beginnings a melting pot of energies, identities and differences. Just think of the Greeks. They felt they were one family but, in fact, they were cities that were at war with each other from dawn to dusk, and yet, they really felt they were a family. Olympia, Delphi... were common places (with common gods), but totally autonomous one from the other. Where does it begin and where does it end? Europe has always engendered itself. Europe is a task. Europe is a problem. Europe always declines itself in the future tense. Europe will be, will be and will be. This means that Europe is lived like this: as a task, a mission. We must always be building Europe. And it can be built with hegemonic intentions, as we have seen throughout European history: Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon, Hitler they all attempted to exercise hegemonic power over Europe. But every time someone has tried it, Europe has got rid of them, she has not wanted anyone who wanted one Europe. Europe is not one, they are many. Like us, like you, like me ... That is what Europe is like: "I am many," says Europe. We must be able to make of ourselves many. And today more than ever, Europe must be able to make of herself many. For alongside the traditional European families, there are in Europe today families that until a generation ago were not here. Or perhaps they had been in Europe many centuries ago. This is the case of Islam which, in Spain, was European but, from the late 15th century onwards, ceased to be so. And now it is European again, but in a form that is completely different from that of six or seven centuries ago. But Europe today must understand that her origins are many and she should be able to make of herself many once again; in a peaceful way, not in the controversial way that happened so often down the centuries. This peaceful form would be the confederation, the union, of the European peoples, but also with the new people who come to Europe. In just fifteen years, in my region, in Veneto, the population with non-European origins has gone from zero to 15%. Therefore, we must learn to make of ourselves many. But this is nothing new, Europe has thought of herself in this way since her origins.

A.G.R.: Nevertheless, we are living a difficult time. Right now it is proving very difficult to draw up a European constitution. You say, referring to St Augustine, that the search for an unattainable ideal makes sense, in that we learn to love that which is sought even as we pursue it. Can Europe learn to appreciate a constitution of its own? If by constitution we understand a Magna Carta like that of Italy, Spain, etc., I think that it is virtually impossible, as recent experiences have shown. The problem is not a European Constitution; the problem is a European culture. A European culture that matures, throughout our schooldays and our working lives, the awareness that today, more than ever, we must be make of ourselves many.

J.C.: You have devoted a lot of time to studying the Mitteleuropean culture. Mitteleurope was a space defined more by culture than by geopolitical frontiers: it was also difficult to determine exactly where it began and where it ended To what extent has your interest in this world favoured your work and your ideas with respect to the question we were just speaking about? Mitteleuropean Europe was a Europe in which in some way or another different languages and traditions coexisted. This is the basic idea. While my interest in Mitteleurope has been eminently intellectual, philosophical and literary, I believe that it was precisely for this political and cultural configuration that the Mitteleuropean archipelago produced the thing that Musil valued so highly: irony, in all senses of the word. Irony means investigating, not being satisfied, questioning with a critical spirit, but it also means laughing at oneself. For if anyone reads Kafka or Musil without laughing, then they have understood nothing. In all these affinities, dialogue matured, an idea that is very closely connected to this plural diverse world of ours, in which it was even difficult to recognise yourself, it was difficult to develop bonds of affection. In Prague, for example, the German community lived a very isolated existence; but, at the same time, this community was Jewish and non-Jewish, and members of the community would go and watch Yiddish theatre, and some of them, perhaps, would have Slav girlfriends Contexts like these produce, necessarily, irony. And irony is Europes greatest asset.

J.C.: Hence, the authors you have studied whether they be from the philosophical or the artistic worlds precisely because everything is connected, might favour certain critical attitudes. For example Wittgenstein Its true. Europe is a tension between polarities. Without someone to contradict, Europe does not exist. In the early 20th century, science was transformed through its connection with critical philosophy: Mach, Wittgenstein, Einstein... Where did Einstein come from, if not out of the foundational crisis? The new form of rationality in physics and mathematics is related to critical philosophy. Who do Pauli or Heisenberg cite? Schopenhauer, Nietzsche... In a reciprocal way, philosophy cannot limit itself to criticism from the outside; it must enter into, and form part of, the scientific project. There is the philosopher who criticises from outside, and there is Wittgenstein.

J.C.: Another illustrious mayor in the Italian intellectual world, Giulio Carlo Argan, alluded

to Wittgenstein in a piece he wrote in 1969, when Wittgenstein was not yet much spoken of in the Mediterranean world. The problem said Argan, consists of giving the city an elasticity, the possibility of flexion that a linguistic system has. And, he added: In this, Wittgenstein could teach us a lot. Exactly. I must say that Argan was an enormously cultivated person; he was one of my teachers and with him I had the chance to discuss this on several occasions. It is Wittgensteins great metaphor: language as city. And the reverse: just like a language, the city organises itself, it makes itself legible. But beware of those who set out to transform it into an order! The city must grow and transform itself just as a language does. We are not even aware of it, but each and every one of us, in speaking, is transforming our language. And the same thing should happen with the city. However, if you pay no heed to order, then it will be impossible for you to be understood.

J.C.: There is a hardened element, with the character of a rule, and a flowing element, which you have always remarked on We all respect the rules of the game as we should but, when we play, we transform the game. And the same thing happens with the city: the city must have its order, but this is itself subject to transformation by the actors themselves. The city ends up being like the stage in a theatre. On the stage, the actor does not merely repeat the text, he or she interprets it. I do not merely repeat others in my use of the language, I interpret it. As a politician and administrator of a city, I am not the custodian of this city, but the person who interprets that role, and in interpreting it, I transform the city. But for the game to make sense, it is essential that we always respect the rules. And Wittgenstein said that there is nothing that demands a greater respect for the rules than the game itself.

J.C.: In this sense Argan was speaking about urban situations that were open to differentiated interpretations and relating these possibilities of variation to those that every language presents that go beyond the most institutionalised meanings. Yes, thats right.

J.C.: And he also referred to a figure you have studied, that of Paul Klee, when he said that Klee did not plan houses, or furniture, or objects, but that he was the master of the planners in that he showed them how to take into account life in all its strata and levels. With respect to this, I would like to propose another theme that is sometimes related to cities like Barcelona or Milan (where you founded a Faculty of Philosophy): the question of design; the danger, perhaps, of a city that is excessively designed; the idea of design as an imposition of stylistic form, as Loos criticised it. Yes, exactly. You have answered the question yourself. Nothing is further from architecture than this sense of design. Architecture is about forming spaces, not designing them or drawing them. Prioritising the latter leads to Potemkin cities cities that are mere faades, stage set cities like those of the cinematographic Far West. Architecture is about imagining spaces and seeing how they construct themselves as the work progresses. Loos drawings are horrible, but you have to imagine the spaces; the spaces with their combinations and materials. Relations, dimensions, materials... Architecture is the capacity to measure and find the rhythm of spaces. Design is two-dimensional; architecture is... four-dimensional! Because

time also plays its part. The time of those who live within the building, as Loos put it. Architecture has to be thought of in terms of the time that will inhabit it. This is what the architect should do.

A.G.R.: The city is a laboratory for both aesthetic and political experiences, experiences that arise as a function of the physical proximity of the population. This is a fact. How do you view the question of the foreigner in this space-laboratory? What is the role of hospitality and solidarity in this keeping to the rules of the shared game you mentioned before? Faced with this situation, either the city closes in on itself and becomes a walled city and walled cities no longer exist or else it continues to be an open city and, in that case, it must be aware that, whatever happens, foreigners, outsiders, will enter. The question is whether the city faces this problem with a welcoming predisposition, in the sense that in its order which, remember, is a set of rules that govern the game that must be played and that in being played will be transformed it also conceives of the possibility of the outsider, or not. The city should contemplate the possibility of the outsider. It should be a city that takes in, that welcomes, but not so much out of goodness as out of the recognition that a city is a game that transforms itself, that does not wish immobility for itself, for the order of immobility is the order of death. And given that what is desired is a living city, in which the order of the city is transformable, it is inevitable that it is also transformed by the entry of outsiders. The question is: with this outsider, this foreigner, do you wish to play, or to wage war? War is also a game, the cruellest game, but a game when alls said and done. The other option is: lets talk, lets transform ourselves talking and lets see where that talking takes us. The end is something that no-one can foresee. Before, we used to talk about identity, but the new identity of a city is not something we can describe just like that. You might say: the identity I have inherited is such and such. This identity reaches you through various conduits and it is the product of a dialogue between cultures and many other things. For this reason, I want to continue in the same way and I want my identity to be an identity forged through dialogue, because thats what happened in the past and I want it to continue being like that with new dialogues with these new outsiders who are arriving. I want to dialogue with them. But I cannot know what will come out of these dialogues; it is impossible to know. It is unpredictable and, in fact, this is exactly what is most wonderful about history: that it is unpredictable.

A.G.R.: Unconditional hospitality? No, no. Not unconditional, not at all. Because, in fact, an order must exist. The city needs to be conditioned by an order because otherwise it would be anarchy, it would cease to be a game. What game are we playing? This question is essential. Do you want to play with me? And then: what game are we playing? It cant be unconditional because if it was, the other would always be able to say whatever he wanted: if I dont understand his language and he doesnt understand mine, then, what is this game, what are we playing at? We have to agree on something. Its essential that we reach an agreement about the game we are playing together. However, we also have to be fully aware that, by playing together, this game will be transformed. We will be transformed. From this will come something new, but I, here and now, sitting, writing or talking at this table, I cannot establish what that new thing will be. In the same way that I never had any guarantee what city would appear when I interacted with it.

J.C.: You said in Soledad acogedora (Abada Editores, Madrid, 2007) that it is proper to

mankind to convert into image and memory the totality of things. Now images are being rained down on us, we are subjected to a veritable torrent of images. There are more and more screens in our cities. Everything is screened, somebody said: screened in both senses of the word. And, similarly, this has been the object of criticism. But the iconoclasms are staged images, for it is the condition of our times. I believe you said this in Dellinizio and in the passage in Soledad acogedora: The diverse images may be illusions but the faculty to imagine is no illusion; on the contrary, () it is our very reality. Of course; we live in a civilisation of images to the extent that we even think that the Divine Being made himself man, became historical, touchable Yes, our civilisation is one of images, ab imis fundamentis. So, what is the problem? Well, that the image, now, seems no longer to re-veal, that is to re-veil Careful: I am saying re-veal in the sense that the image reveals, that is, it shows, it unveils, but at the same time it re-veils, it places the veil once more over things.

J.C.: The problem is when there is no veil Thats right. When the image sets out to be pure manifestation, it is obscene. And the obscene is when images do not re-veil. A good image is one that shows while also re-veiling; one which displays while saying remember, what I am showing you is not all that there is to be shown.

J.C.: That is what Walter Benjamin says Exactly; when the image is intended simply to be an unveiling, a laying bare, this is obscene. And the image of today is an obscene, pornographic image, because it has ceased to re-veil. Then, critical philosophy says: be careful, we are a civilisation of images, but of images that re-veil, for in the re-veiling is the game. I show this image but, at the same time, I tell you this image is of my search for reality, it is not of reality unveiled. And then I can play with you, because this is my image and you can show me yours. But if I tell you all truth is here, I produce an obscene work, and you must remain silent and submit to the imposition of my violence.

J.C.: The image never refers to an essence, for what the image shows is not there. It is an indication, a sign...

J.C.: So, would you agree that thought in which images play a key role, as in the work of Benjamin or Wittgenstein, cannot be anything other than anti-essentialist thought? Certainly, all contemporary philosophy is anti-essentialist, from Benjamin to Derrida. It is a common trait of all the important critical philosophies of the 20th century.

A.G.R.: In relation to this anti-essentialist impulse and since you have already raised the question of referring to the divine you recognise the importance of religion to Europes

past; however, you also defend the idea of not inserting it into public education. Should we then expel the gods from the city and simply adore them in private? No. The idea of a private religion is totally unreal. Perhaps there might exist a private feeling, but religion is always a communal reality. Whoever says your faith is a private matter is someone who understands nothing of what faith is, or of what religion is. Religion is a communal reality and, as such, must have, and indeed necessarily does have, a political relevance. And anyone who argues that this should not be so is a stupid slave to the Enlightenment.

A.G.R.: But a religion always considers itself as desiring or claiming the truth. As I said, religion has always been community based. Faith is always something that is communicated within, and gives life to, communities. What should we try to do about this in our cities? The religious community, as such, does not aspire to impose its values since they are values that in and of themselves demand to be taken as absolute - on the rest of the city. That is, they have no pretensions to superimposing their values on those contingent signs we have been speaking about. The difficulty is that the religious man believes that his own values have their foundations in the absolute. The religious man lives immersed in this contradiction. And lives it in a more painful way than, for example, I do as a non-religious man. For while I know full well that the book I write, that the ideas I advocate, are signs, they are conjectures about a reality that I do not believe will ever arrive and that, in addition, I do not believe is achievable, the religious man has been called to something that he feels to be the truth. And, therefore, he is led almost naturally to express it as the truth that others must also accept, though he should not do so. The solution is not to legislate on this question: the secular person must accept that religion is not simply a private matter of the heart, and the religious person must accept that faith that can not be imposed politically. If this question is not dealt with in all its complexity as a cultural reality, the confusion that currently exists in Spain, Italy and elsewhere will always remain.

J.C.: To finish, and going back to where we started, you have written that politicians cannot promise happiness or pax aeterna Freedom and disappointment are synonymous, you said in El archipilago. Yes. Politicians should recognise that political values are all historically limited values, unlike religious values; and religious leaders should know that they must live and coexist in the in hoc seculo city with these historically determined values. No one can judge their own values as absolute, nor can they set out to make the law according to their own values. You can judge the positions of those around you - no one forbids it - but you can not set out to make laws on the basis of these transcendent values, because laws are historically determined and, as such, they can not directly represent, or reveal, absolute truths. http://www.barcelonametropolis.cat/en/page.asp?id=21&ui=400