Simulation Based on An Effective Defence Against Duplicate Node Attacks in Wireless Networks.
Mr. Selvam E1, Mr. A. Siles Balasingh2
1,2
Lecturer, Department of Computer Science and Engineering & St. Joseph College of Engineering and Technology, Tanzania
1 2
viswa.selvam@yahoo.com singh_bala@yahoo.co.in
Abstract To achieve an efficient and effective approach to find out the duplicate node attacks in the wireless sensor networks still must be a challenge. Attacker, he/she can capture the node form the network and compromise over the network. Attacker he captured any node from the network by using the tamper resistant hardwares. Adversary can injects fake data into the network with the help of that captured node. And also from the captured node he identifies its ID and key first of all. Then he/she can easily generate the duplicate copies of the captured node. Several detection schemes are available only for fixed sensor networks. But here we proposed a detection scheme called as Speed time Probability ratio test. And we also proposed the isolative method to remove the detected duplicate node from the network. We show analytically and simulation experiments that our schemes will achieve effective and efficient detection and isolation of duplicate node attacks in the wireless sensor networks. In this paper we mainly focused on the mobile sensor networks for sake of convenience. Keywords Adversary, Random way point mobility, Random- trip mobility, Communication overhead, Network disruptions, Simulation, Location claims.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile nodes, essentially small robots with sensing, wireless communications, & movement capabilities, are useful for tasks such as static sensor deployment, adaptive sampling, network repair, and event detection [4]. These advanced sensor network architectures could be used for a variety of applications including intruder detection, border monitoring, and military patrols. In potentially hostile environments, the security of un-attended mobile nodes is extremely critical. The attacker may be able to capture and compromise mobile nodes, and then use them to inject fake data, disrupt network operations,& eavesdrop on network communications. In which the adversary can capture node generate the duplicate copy of original one & attacks can be made. 278
Thus this types of attacks must be a dangerous and compromise over the network. This leads to the network disruptions over the network. Using that captured node the adversary takes the secret keying materials from a compromised node, gen- erates a large number of attacker-controlled replicas that share the compromised nodes keying materials and ID, and then spreads these replicas throughout the network. With a single captured node, an adversary can create as many replica nodes as he/she has the hardware to generate. The replica nodes are controlled by the adversary, but have keying materials that allow them to seem like authorized participants in the network. Protocols for secure sensor network communication would allow replica nodes to create pairwise shared keys with other nodes and the base station, thereby enabling the nodes to encrypt, decrypt, and authenticate all of their communications as if they were the original captured node. A more aggressive attacker could undermine common network protocols, including cluster formation, localization, and data aggregation, thereby causing continual disruption to network operations. Through these methods, an adversary with a large number of replica nodes can easily defeat the mission of the deployed network. A straightforward solution to stop replica node attacks is to prevent the adversary from extracting secret key materials from mobile nodes by equipping them with tamper-resistant hardware. We might expect such measures to be implemented in mobile nodes with security-critical missions. However, although tamper-resistant hardware can make it significantly harder and more time-consuming to extract keying materials from captured nodes, it may still be possible to bypass tamper resistance for a small number of nodes given enough time and attacker expertise.
2) Detection and Revocation: After receiving a location claim, the base station verifies the authenticity of the claim with the public key of node u and discards the claim if it is not authentic. If two nodes are moving with same speed means we can say that, there is a duplicate node found. Also we can tell that, any node moving with exceeds the system configured speed means that node must be a duplicate node. 3) Isolation of the Detected Node: We are used the symmetric encryption key algorithms like Advanced encryption system. In this we set the symmetric keys for all the nodes in the network and all the nodes having its own ID, here the ID must be encrypted. This algorithm never allow the injected node to capture ID of original node. Thus we can said this proposed system must be secure than the existing one. 281
INITIALIZATION: n = 0 , wn = 0 INPUT : location information L and Time information T OUTPUT : accept the hypothesis H0 or H1 Cur_loc = L Cur_ time = T If n>0 then Compute T0 (n) and T1(n) Compute speed 0 from cur_loc and prev_loc, cur_time And prev_time If 0>Vmax then wn = wn + 1 end if if wn > =T1(n) then accept the hypothesis H1 and terminate the test end if if wn<=T0(n) then initialize n and wn to 0 and accept the hypothesis H0 return: end if end if n = n+1 prev_loc = cur_ loc prev_ time = cur_time 282
In this section, we will describe the simulation environment and then discuss the simulation results. For each execution, we obtain each metric as the average of the results of STPRTs that are repeated. Note that STPRT will be terminated if it decides that the claim generator has been replicated. The average of the results of 1000 executions is presented. In the experiment, the average number of requests b was measured from 13 to 25 in accordance with Vmax . Finally shows the probability distribution of the number of claims in the case of replica_true_negative. For this distribution, we consider two cases of low and high mobility rates V max . A total of 70% and 75.7% of the cases fall in the range from 3 to 6 claims in the case of low and high mobility rates, respectively. This implies that in most cases, the number of claims is less than the average and thus STPRT detects duplicates in fewer than six claims in most cases.
6 4 2 0 10 20 30 40 50
Vmax (m/s)
FIGURE 2 AVERAGE NUMBER OF CLAIMS VS VMAX , WHEN V MAX = 40 M/S
When we analyze the above figures we can easily identified the results. First, there were no false positive or false negatives at all mobility rates. This implies that the replica was always detected with probability 1 and benign node was never misidentified as a replica at any mobility rate. From this observation, we see that STPRT works well against our random attacker model. Second, the results of the average number of claims are shown in Figure 2. We present the results of two cases. One is that the claim generator is a benign node and the STPRT by benign_true_positive in Figure 3. The other one is that the claim generators are compromised node and its replica node, and STPRT decides that these nodes are a compromised node and its replica. We denote this case by replica_true_negative.
100% 80% 60% replica_true _neagtive benign_true _positive
40%
20% 0% 10 20 30 40 50
Vmax (m/s)
FIGURE 1. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CLAIMS VS VMAX , WHEN V MAX = 20 M/S
Vmax (m/s)
FIGURE 3 AVERAGE NUMBER OF CLAIMS VS VMAX , WHEN V MAX = 60 M/S
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