Chapter 6: National Identity in Japan and China The Basics How many nations are there in the country

of Belgium? Setting aside some very small potential nations, there are two: the Dutch-speaking Flemish (approximately 59% of the population) and the French-speaking Walloons. Flanders and Wallonia are the two nations comprising the country Belgium. How many nations are there in Great Britain? Again, setting aside very small potential nations and national groups that no longer exist (e.g. Cornish), there are three: Scotland, England, and Wales. Is Great Britain a country? No. It is a region included within the country known officially as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, or more commonly as the United Kingdom or UK. As the official name indicates, the United Kingdom includes the three nations within Great Britain plus a portion of Ireland. Of those living in Northern Ireland, some regard their nationality as Irish, some consider it to be English, and others consider it to be Scottish (hence the terms Ulster-Scots and Scots-Irish, the latter also used by some citizens of the United States to describe some sort of personal identity). Is there any national holiday common to all of the United Kingdom? No. Each of its four nations recognizes their own national holidays. How many nationalities exist within the country of China? Many sources say the number is fifty-six(#example# #example#), although this figure leaves out the issue of native Taiwanese groups. How many nations or potential nations exist within the United States? Youll be counting for a long time: Cherokee, Makah, . . . and many others. Now, please answer this question: What is a nation? Isnt the answer obvious? Hardly. Turning to dictionary and encyclopedia definitions might be of some help, but there can be wide variation from one definition to another. In any case no two definitions seem to be exactly the same. Turning to the theoretical literature on nations and nationalism reveals literally hundreds of books and essays on the subject by scholars in a variety of disciplines. Before defining nations in a manner suitable for our purposes, we should clarify some basic terms. Perhaps the main reason that the term nation is confusing is that we use language loosely in daily life. Whether in casual chat or even on the evening news, we typically fail to distinguish between nations and countries. Countries are not the same as nations, although in a small number of cases, national boundaries are congruent with the boundaries of countries, causing the two entities to overlap nearly 100%. Another name for country is state. Indeed, state is the preferred technical term. Therefore, countries in which national and state boundaries are identical are properly called nation-states. Less than 10% of the worlds countries are nation-states. The other 90% of the worlds countries contain more than one nation or potential nation within their boundaries. (Often the term nation-state is used in a loose manner to include states in which the majority of citizens identify with a particular nation. Such a loose definition is both confusing and useless. Speaking in this casual manner, even the United States or Iraq could be called nation-states.) In some cases, one or more of the minority nations within various states are famous (or infamous, depending on your point of view). What about Canada? Quebec. What about Russia? Chechnya. What about Spain? The Basques. What about Iraq, Turkey and Iran? Kurdistan/The Kurds . . . and the list goes on and on. Notice also from these examples that the presence of more than one nation within a state is often a source of conflict. In the case of Belgium and Canadatodaythis conflict is typically managed through civil institutions and does not result in violence. In the case of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland has been the source of tremendous bloodshed. In Chechnya, the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and many other places around the world, the existence of minority nations within larger states is a constant source of deadly strife and human misery. There was once a mighty empire called the Soviet Union. It broke up along national boundaries (although not totally, since the Russian Federation includes a variety of nations) around 1990. There was once a country called Yugoslavia. It, too, broke up along national boundaries, resulting in a series of bloody wars and ethnic cleansing campaigns during the 1990s. The bottom line: nations and states (=countries) are two different entities, and they are rarely congruent. So what is a state? At its core, a state is an organization that maintains order through violence or the threat of violence. Typically, the state extracts resources (today, mainly in the form of monetary taxes) from its citizens, and, in return for forcing everyone to feed it, the state provides some degree (it varies) of security through such organizations as police, military forces, courts, prison systems, and so forth. Owing to contemporary political sensibilities, many people recoil at definitions of the state based on coercive force. One reason for such unease is that many states have long put a smiley face on the coercive core at their existence. Taxes, for example, become an opportunity to pay your fair share or membership fees (in the proposed politico-speak of GeorgeLakoff). Anyone so foolish as to withhold paying such membership fees (taxes), however, would soon find out about the states coercive core first hand. Moreover, we often like to pretend that human nature is so benevolent that coercion is unnecessary for social order. Despite such pretenses, however, it is rare indeed to find anyone seriously in favor of abolishing police or military forces. In his well-known book Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, Jared Diamond aptly characterizes states as Kleptocracies, a term derived from the Greek word for thief. Take a moment now to *read more on the specific details* ofkleptocracies, i.e., of states. Diamond is indeed correct to characterize states as kleptocracies (what else could they possibly be?). Nevertheless, a combination of unwillingness to acknowledge the coercive core of states combined with a self-

congratulatory tendency to regard our government as especially efficient and benevolent, results in a tendency in the United States to use the term kleptocracy as a pejorative term to characterize governments that are especially corrupt (#example#) as if the forced extraction of wealth from its citizens was somehow only a function of bad states. In fact, however, all states are kleptocracies. The only differenceand it is an important oneis of degree. Some states are greedier than others, and some states provide a higher return on the wealth they extract than others. There is, however, no clear line on a scale of these parameters that might realistically designate some states as legitimate versus others as criminal. Moreover, the security provided even by a thoroughly corrupt state is usually preferable to anarchy. Recent events in Iraq should provide food for thought on the vital role of the state as enforcer of order. When states become excessively greedy or ineffective, they run an increasing risk of being overthrown and replaced. Notice that states are potentially malleable. For one thing, their governments can be changed, often radically. Consider Japan. Between 1867 and 1877, a modern-style centralized state replaced the relatively decentralized, fragmentary bakuhan (bakufu + warlord domains) system. In China, the revolution of 1911-12 replaced the emperor-centered Qing dynasty with a republican form of government. This republican form of government proved untenable, and central authority soon moved into the hands of regional warlords, who created de facto states within the territories they controlled. Not only can state governments change, but state boundaries can also change. The boundaries of China varied significantly from one dynasty to the next. In modern China, Manchuria became part of China after 1912, then became a separate (puppet) state between 1931-1945, and then became part of China againawkwardly called the Northeast and now imagined by many Chinese always to have been an integral part of China. In modern Japan, something similar happened to the Ryukyu Islands. Until 1879, these islands were the Kingdom of Ryukyu . After 1879, they became part of Japan (by force). During the 1880s, China and Japan disputed Japans annexation of these islands, and at one point tentatively agreed that some of the islands should become part of China. Between 1945-1972, the United States administered these islands, and in 1972, the reverted to Japan. Today, many Japanese imagine that the Ryukyu Islands had long been an integral part of Japan, conveniently ignoring their long history as a separate kingdom. As for the United States, consider the major changes in its boundaries since 1776, including the Hawaiian Islands. States (countries) are political units of territory under the control (even if very weak) of a government. Typically, state boundaries include more than one ethnic or national group. These groups are often marked by religion (e.g., Northern Ireland), language (e.g., Canada or Belgium) or other cultural distinctiveness. Why not just arrange the world so that every distinctive cultural group has its own state? Even if someone possessed the god-like power to re-arrange state boundaries along this principle (this principle, by the way is called nationalism), it would not work. The reason is that states require a certain size to be viable (the precise size depends on many specific variables) and there exist many more nations and potential nations than there are viable states. For this reason alone, there will always be a substantial mismatch between nation and state boundaries. So, what is a nation? Nations are a particular type of figments of our imagination. Let us start with a short Wikipedia definition(as of 2-18-07) and then tweak it for better accuracy: A nation is a group of humans who are assumed to share a common identity, and to share a common language, religion, ideology, culture, and/or history. They are usually assumed to have a common origin, in the sense of ancestry, parentage or descent. This definition works well for our purposes and is in general agreement with most of the academic literature on nations and nationalism. There is only one problem with it: the vague passive-voice expression are assumed to. It begs the question by whom? In other words, who is doing the assuming? The answer is the key difference between a nation and an ethnic group (otherwise the two are nearly identical). Unlike ethnic groups, nations do not require any outside affirmation to exist. The only requirement is that a group of people believe that they are a nation. The belief need not be objectively verifiable, and outsiders need not agree with it or share it. In other words, if a group of people believe that they have certain important cultural characteristics in common and if they believe that they descend from common ancestors, then they are a nation. If people outside the group tend to agree with the members of this nation, then they are also an ethnic group. Some scholars use the term ethno-nation (or some variation) to describe such a situation. Notice that the nations of Belgium are marked by language and the nations in Northern Ireland are marked, to an extent, by religion (protestant vs. Roman Catholic). Language and religion are classic cultural attributes that groups of people have long used in distinguishing their own members from outsiders. Notice the key role of culture in the process of drawing national boundaries. At the risk of being repetitive, let me say again that national claims need not be objectively true. A belief in a common language or religion is usually fairly accurate because such things can be verified through daily experience. However, other alleged cultural attributes, and especially the belief in a common ancestry, are rarely so easy to verify. The belief in common ancestry, if closely investigated, usually turns out to be falsepeople have mixed around too often and for too long throughout history. Indeed, thanks to recent advances in genetics and other sciences, we now know that all modern humans (and onlymodern humans exist) share a common ancestry with a small band of humans, numbering roughly 100, that left Africa between 50,000 and 70,000 years ago. Their descendants eventually populated the entire earth, wiping out other types of humans (e.g., the Neanderthals) in the process. But this well-supported fact is meaningless in the face of belief that, for (the mythical Yellow Emperor). In the example, all Han Chinese (whatever that might mean) are descendants of Huangdi

case of nations, belief in descent from a common ancestor often resembles religious belief. Indeed, the believing process that has produced nations shares many similarities with religious belief. For how long have people been imagining themselves as members of nations? Today this mode of constructing our identity is nearly universal. Therefore, we tend to think of it as natural and as having always been present. In the span of human history, however, nations are quite recent. Some of the earliest proto-nations might have been visible as early as the seventeenth century here and there, but it was during the eighteenth century that modern-style nations emerged, and it was during the nineteenth century that these powerful figments of our imagination spread throughout the globe. In simple terms, when the majority of ordinary people (not elites or intellectuals) regard themselves as members of a nation in the manner described above, then a place can reasonably said to have become a nation. In Japan, for example, very few ordinary people would have consciously regarded themselves as Japanese in 1800. A century later, nearly all citizens of Japan self-consciously regarded themselves as Japanese and, moreover, attached considerable importance to this category of identity. Japan, in other words, became a nation (and also a nation-state) during the late nineteenth century. This process took place in China slightly later, between roughly 1890 1920. The anti-American boycott of 1905 is a good example of an early manifestation of Chinese nationalism. To characterize China as a nation-state at this time, however, is probably inaccurate. For the first half of the twentieth century, China did not function as a singular state. Moreover, a substantial number of citizens of China do not regard themselves as Han Chinese (recall the point made earlier about 56 nationalities in China). So lists of nation-states based on strict criteria usually include Japan, but not China. What is nationalism? Now that we know what nations and states are, the term nationalism becomes fairly easy to define. There are two basic definitions of nationalism, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is simply an attitude that favors ones nation. In this sense, nationalism and patriotism are approximately the same. Nationalism in this meaning can manifest itself as jingoism, militant patriotism. It can also manifest itself as a sense of love and devotion toward ones nation, including a willingness to die on its behalf. During times of war, states often try to encourage such sentiments if practical, that is, if there is a clearly dominant national group within the state. The second definition of nationalism, more common in academic literature, is the principle that all nations should have their own states. In other words, nationalism advocates a one-to-one correspondence between states and nations. In this sense, nationalism is much like Woodrow Wilsons idea of self-determination of nations. Recall, however, that there are many more nations and potential nations than there are viable states. Therefore, nationalism is often a source of violence and conflict. Nationalism broke up the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and several other large multi-national states. Even though (or perhapsbecause) nations are figments of our imagination, nationalism is a powerful force in human affairs. The term national identity simply means a self-conscious belief that one is a member of a particular nation. In other words, it means personal identification with a nation. The Development of National Identity in Japan In 1850, someone was to walk through rural areas of the Japanese Islands and ask people Are you Japanese? the most common response would have been puzzlement. Although elite members of society would likely have possessed a vague sense of identity with Japan (or at least they would have had a concept of Japan as a specific geographical entity), the situation among ordinary people was different. Some residents of cities had probably developed a vague sense of Japan owing to the popular press. In rural areas, however, Japan would have been unknown to most people in 1850. Because most people in the Japanese Islands at this time lived in rural areas, it would be accurate to say that most Japanese in 1850 did not know that they were Japanese. With what did they identify, if not Japan? People in rural areas would have identified mainly with their village. They would have been aware of other, nearby villages, and perhaps the castle town of their domain. People located near major arteries of travel would likely have had a broader outlook on the world, as would those who had been on a religious pilgrimage. Nevertheless, their personal identity would have been local in nature. Japan would have been too broad and abstract. A common term for the warlord (daimy ) domains was kuni , which today means country. In some circumstances, it can also mean nation. Not only were personal identities local, but so was culture. In 1850, cultural differences from one domain to another could be vast. The most obvious difference to a traveler at the time would have been linguistic. Each locality had its own language. Sometimes this language was similar to that of the adjacent domains and changed only gradually across geographical distances. In other cases, linguistic change could be abrupt. For example, the residents of the domain of Higo (modern-day Kumamoto Prefecture) would not have been able to understand the speech of the residents of the adjacent domain of Satsuma (modern-day Kagoshima Prefecture). And there were many other cultural differences throughout the Japanese islands besides language. The warlords had to live in Edo every other year and their families lived there year-round. Therefore, the warlords and their entourages all became acculturated to the ways of Edo. Indeed, some of them were unfamiliar with the culture of their own domains. Ordinary people, however, rarely left their local areas in 1850. Unless they lived near Kyoto, it is unlikely that ordinary people would have known that there was an emperor. They would have been more likely to have possessed a vague sense that

there was a sh gun, but the activities of this far-away figure meant little or nothing to most ordinary residents of the Japanese islands in 1850. Just for comparison, the situation in much of Europe at this time was similar to that of Japan. Italy, for example, became a state in 1860. It did not become a nation until later. Germany became a state even later than Italy. The German state then began a campaign to create a sense of national identity, which was largely successful by the start of the twentieth century. Japan became a state in 1868, and, much like the case of Italy and Germany, the leaders of the new Meiji state realized that they needed to inculcate a conscious sense of national identity in the new citizens of the newly-created Japan. At first, it was not easy to create this national identity, and the state made some false starts. For example, several leading government officials decided that Japan should create a national religion to serve as the centerpiece of national consciousness. But, in practice, the leading religious figures called together in a committee to create this national religion could not agree on anything. Religion did eventually become an important component of Japanese national identity, but not during the 1870s or 80s. Much more effective than religion in the early decades of the Meiji period was education. A state-run school system inculcated in the young both a consciousness of being Japanese and some basic points about what that identity meant. For example, schoolchildren developed a sense that they were part of a broader national family headed by an emperor. This sort of thing was still an abstraction, but coursework helped make it somewhat more concrete. Basic reading lessons, for example, included tales of bravery on the battlefield, in which ordinary Japanese gave their lives willingly to assist the emperor and thus the nation as a whole. By 1890, the Meiji state issued a formal statement of its educational ideology. This statement took the form of an imperial declaration (always called an "Imperial Rescript," or "chokugo" in Japanese). The resulting Imperial Rescript on Education (ky iku chokugo ) became one of the most important public documents in prewar Japan. The full text of the Rescript is as follows: Know ye our Subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only beOur good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue. (Quoted in RyusakuTsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, comps., Sources of Japanese Tradition, Volume 2 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1958], pp. 139-140.) First, notice the several aspects of national consciousness exhibited in this document. Especially important in the context of modern Japan is the emphasis on the emperor and his allegedly unbroken line of succession extending back before historical time. In modern ideology, he literally embodied the essence of Japan as a nation (kokutai , the "national body"). Some historians of modern Japan and other commentators tend to speak of the emperor and the modern emperor system as some sort of an anachronism, a holdover from a "feudal" past. On the contrary, however, Japan's Meiji-era emperor system was a modern institution par excellence. It was instrumental in the process of making Japan into a nation-state and its residents into Japanese. Once the text of the Rescript moves into specific virtues and behaviors, it seems relatively typical of the kinds of lofty pronouncements and rhetoric in which most modern states of the late nineteenth century frequently indulged. We should bear in mind, in other words, that schools systems everywhere in the industrialized world served to inculcate in students a sense of nation and a set of state-approved moral values. Indeed, education still functions in precisely this way. What is especially important and distinctive about the Imperial Rescript on Education was not so much its content, but the way in which the document itself came to function within Japanese life. Specifically, it soon became a fetish object. The central government sent copies of the Rescript, along with portraits (later photographs) of the emperor and empress to schools throughout the country. It soon became common practice to house the imperial image in a small shrine within the school grounds and to begin each day with a solemn recitation of the Rescript (which all students were required to memorize) and a group bow to the imperial images.

Teacher training also received considerable attention in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Teacher training courses began to , Japan's first Minister of Education, the government include military-style training and indoctrination. Under Mori Arinori declared teachers to be officers of the state and thus prohibited them from participating in political activities. Below is a list of major developments in the early educational system that had an effect on the development of national consciousness: Early 1890s: There is a general tendency at all levels of Japanese society to reject "western" culture, at least in many of its superficial aspects. For example, the lyrics to a popular song from the time go: This thoughtless imitation of the west . . . Not drinking Japanese sake But beer, brandy, and vermouth Stuffing your stomach with strange foreign foods . . . Somebody drinking coffee . . . how funny . . . 1888: Education Minister Mori declares that "What is to be done [in education] is not for the sake of pupils, but for the sake of the nation-state." Incidentally, a politically-motivated assassin murdered Mori for pursuing what the assassin regarded as excessively liberal policies (and, specifically, for allegedly showing disrespect to an important imperial shrine). 1889: Practice of sending imperial portraits to the schools begins 1890: Elementary school regulations specify the following priority of objectives: 1) moral training; 2) development of a distinctive national essence; 3) cultivation of skills and knowledge 1890: Imperial Rescript on Education is promulgated 1891: copies of the Rescript are sent to all schools, where it joined the imperial portraits as an object of veneration 1893: Controversy flares up between two well known intellectuals Uchimura Kanz and Inoue Tetsujir over the question "Is it possible for Christians to be truly patriotic?" Inoue concluded that Jesus was opposed to the principles of "loyalty and filial piety"(loyalty and filial piety had become a potent this rhetorical figure in Japanese self-definitions). Therefore, he argued, Christianity and Japanese education are in conflict. By 1900: The majority of Japanese have received formal education from the state. Completion of compulsory education becomes the norm. It is important to point out that the system of education described here did not make Japan and its people into a single-minded group, robot-like in their views and deeds. Perhaps some of the Meiji ideologues would have wanted such a result, but as powerful as state-directed indoctrination was, it was not powerful enough to do away with individual thought. The spread of basic literacy virtually assured that most Japanese would encounter views different from those sanctioned by the state. By 1900, however, virtually everyone in Japan thought of him- or herself as Japanese and regarded this identity as significant. On a practical level, the centralized education system promoted a basic common culture throughout the country, including the teaching of a standardized national language (kokugo ). This standardized language was derived from the speech of wellto-do residents of Tokyo. As a national language it was a somewhat artificial construct and lacked the flair and flavor of local dialects and languages. It was very effective, however, in promoting the efficient communications on which a modern society depends. Moreover, as Japanese from all walks of life and all parts of the country became able to communicate with each other, it became easier to imagine Japan as a nation with a common cultural identity. The other institution that was especially effective during the Meiji period for inculcating a strong sense of national identity was the military. Ordinary Japanese from many walks of life and from all parts of the country entered the army or navy for basic training, advanced training, and, sometimes, to fight battles. In such an environment, regional differences in culture and identity became less important than a sense of Japanese identity. In terms of an overall timeline, we can say that the first signs of national identity in Japan began to emerge in the 1850s. By the 1880s, most Japanese thought of themselves as Japanese and regarded this identity as personally significant. By 1900, a strong sense of national identity was nearly universal in Japan. The Development of National Identity in China National identity developed slightly later in China than in Japan. The situation in China was more complex than in Japan for several reasons. For example, the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty might be regarded as Chinese in some circumstances and as foreigners in others. By contrast, nobody ever regarded Japans Tokugawa bakufu as a foreign entity, even those who

disliked it. China was also much larger than Japan and was home to an even greater variety of cultures and languages. Simply for sheer logistical reasons, the inculcation of national consciousness in China was bound to take longer than in Japan. The long life of the Qing dynasty and the lack of a strong central government (or sometimes any central government) after the fall of the Qing were also factors that slowed the development of national consciousness in China. In a general way, the basic situation in nineteenth-century China resembled that of Japan. Elites (e.g. government officials, local gentry) possessed a consciousness of being Chinese, whereas the vast majority of the population did not. Other factors were specific to China. The presence of foreign imperialists generally was an aid to the formation of Chinese national consciousness. A good example would be anti-Manchu Han Chinese nationalism ca. 1900-1905 that also took on a strong anti-imperial tone and resulted, among other things, in the anti-American boycott of 1905. Indeed, a growing sense that the Qing dynasty was collaborating with the imperialists enabled many ordinary Chinese to begin to imagine themselves as distinctly Chinese, as opposed to Manchu, and, of course, Anglo-European. At the time of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894-5, national consciousness in China was minimal among ordinary people. Ten years later, it was fairly strong in the treaty ports and in other parts of the foreign spheres of influence. The Boxer Uprising of 1900 can also be regarded as, at least in part, an expression of Chinese nationalism. After Jiang Jieshiconsolidated his hold on power of large areas (but not all) of China in the late 1920s, Guomindang propaganda also contributed to a self-consciously Chinese identity. Mao Zedongs Peoples Republic of China (created in 1949) was especially effective in inculcating a very strong sense of national consciousness at the grass roots level. Today, national consciousness in China is intense. Let us focus on a development of national consciousness during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In general, fairly widespread literacy is a prerequisite for a strong sense of national consciousness among the masses of ordinary people. The reason is that mass media enables people to imagine the national community on a regular basis. National consciousness is, in part, a process of imagining. One must imagine a community of people s/he will never know or meettotal strangers. Mass media is the major means of facilitating this imagining process, and in 1900 or 1910, newspapers, popular novels, posters, and other printed materials were the main forms of this media. To consume mass media required literacy, and literacy was particularly difficult to attain in China owing to the complexity of the writing system. Of course, it was also difficult to attain in Japan, for the same reason. In Japan, however, the centralized school system and compulsory education ensured widespread literacy by the late nineteenth century (and literacy was also higher in Japan to begin with, prior to the modern period). In China, school systems were not usually run by a central state and did not reach as many people. Moreover, until the end of the nineteenth century, written Chinese was far removed from the spoken language. For centuries, scholars had written in classical language, which was fine when reading and writing was the exclusive domain of social elites. As ordinary people started going to school and learning to read, a major change was required for mass literacy to become a reality. That change was to write not in classical Chinese but in a manner that reflected the spoken language. Such vernacular writing is called baihua (literally white speech). Vernacular Chinese was fairly old. For example, the seventeenth-century novelist Jin Shengtan (1608-1661) is commonly regarded as the creator of this mode of writing. But vernacular writing was rare until the end of the nineteenth century. Between 1890 and 1920, the popularity of vernacular writing increased rapidly. From approximately 1920 onward nearly all newspapers, books, and official documents were written in vernacular. This change greatly facilitated general literacy, and, at the same time, it strengthened national consciousness. A major milestone in the development of national consciousness was the May Fourth Movement (wu si yun dong ). This movement began with mass protests, first by students, later by the general public, starting May 4, 1919. The protests were against the Treaty of Versailles, which formally ended the First World War. China entered the war on the side of the victorious Allies, but did not benefit from the treaty. Chinese representatives at the peace conference urged that the treaty eliminate or at least reduce imperialist prerogatives in China. The final treaty did no such thing, and, indeed, it transferred German territories in China (mainly the Shandong Peninsula) to Japan. Chinese intellectuals felt betrayed, particularly by Woodrow Wilsons loftysounding rhetoric about the self-determination of nations. On May 4, approximately 3,000 students marched in protest. As the weeks went by, the protests spread throughout many parts of China and included a wide variety of people. Among other things, the protesters demanded that Chinas official representatives not sign the treaty. The May Fourth Movement was both a reflection of growing national consciousness and a vehicle for furthering that consciousness. From this time on, mass protests would become an important means for expressing Chinese nationalism. By approximately 1920, national consciousness had become widespread in China, albeit not quite as thoroughly as in Japan. This development of national consciousness was a key element in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). Chinese resistance to Japan was much more tenacious than Japans experts had predicted, causing Japan to become bogged down in a quagmire. In 1894-5, during the First Sino-Japanese War, weak or non-existent national consciousness contributed to a Japanese victory. Just over 40 years later, the situation had changed, and strong national consciousness in China contributed to an eventual Japanese defeat.

Manuel Castells Manuel Castells is Professor of Sociology and Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley, where he was appointed in 1979 in the Department of City and Regional Planning. In 1994-98 he served as Chair of UC Berkeley's Center for Western European Studies. Between 1967 and 1979 he taught sociology at the University of Paris, first at the Nanterre Campus, then, since 1970, at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. He has also been professor and director of the Institute for Sociology of New Technologies, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Research Profesor at the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas in Barcelona, and a visiting professor at 15 universities in Europe, the United States, Canada, Asia, and Latin America. He has lectured at about 300 academic and professional institutions in 40 countries.

http://sociology.berkeley.edu/profiles/castells/

CHAPTER 9 GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: Managing Ethnicity and Cultural Pluralism in Malaysia
ZAWAWI IBRAHIM Introduction Globalization both homogenizes and fragments. On one hand, it allows nations and citizens of the world to share common events, values and knowledge, often instantaneously thanks to advances in telecommunications and information technology. Its proponents tout globalization as a vehicle for promoting certain universal goals of governance, economic cooperation and civil society. Ideally, globalization should be an arena for all kinds of flows and exchanges1 in which the local is synergized with the global and vice versa. In reality, of course, globalization has also fragmented identities and rekindled ethnic divisions once dormant under the control of nation-states. Ernest Gellner, an influential theorist on the cultural dimension of nationhood, once argued that for a given society to persist, it must be one in which its people can breathe and speak and producethe same culture.2 But now in the age of fragmentation of the world system,3 notions of culture that were once constructed on the basis of the national must be reviewed. This new crisis of identity4 affecting both the center and periphery of the world system, reflects the tenuous conception of a bounded notion of culture and the idea of a homogenizing national identitythe imagined oneness of the nation-state community5 and its rather static, elitist and conflated conception of identity. Globalization has also given a new fluidity to the bounded notion of cultural and national identity. http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/GrowthGovernance_files/Pub_Growth%20Governance/Pub_GrowthG overnancech9.pdf FORMAT
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