Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No.

RTJ-10-2242 August 6, 2010 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3149-RTJ] ATTY. RAUL L. CORREA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA, Respondent. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: Before us is a Verified-Complaint dated February 20, 2009 filed by complainant Atty. Raul L. Correa charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of the Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled "Intestate Estate of Hector Tan." He revealed that during the hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report covering the said estate, and immediately ruled that they should be disallowed. Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants. Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he was asked by respondent Judge Belen to stand up while the latter dictated his order on their Administrators Report. Respondent Judge Belen even rebuked him for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding that it is regrettable "because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar Topnotcher at that." Complainant regrets the actuations and statements of respondent Judge Belen, especially because the remark was uncalled for, a left-handed compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma Mater. Worse, respondent Judge Belen ousted complainant as co-administrator of the estate of Hector Tan. On June 18, 2008, respondent Judge Belen issued an Order citing complainant for indirect contempt, allegedly with administrator Rose Ang Tee, for surreptitiously and unlawfully withdrawing from and emptying the account of the estate of Hector Tan. The June 18, 2008 Order contained snide remarks, viz x x x. The action of Rose Tee and Atty. Raul Correa is contumacious and direct challenge to lawful orders, and judicial process of this [c]ourt and malicious assault to the orderly administration of justice, more specifically abhorrent the act and deed of Atty. Raul Correa, a U.P. Law alumnus and Bar Topnotcher, who as a lawyer knows very well and fully understands that such action violates his oath of office which the Court cannot countenance. x x x Lastly, complainant insisted that he should not have been cited for indirect contempt because he had fully explained to the court that he had done his part as co-administrator in good faith, and that, through his efforts, the estate was able to meet the deadline for the latest Tax Amnesty Program of the government, consequently saving the estate the amount of no less than P35 Million. In his Comment dated August 18, 2009, respondent Judge Belen argued that a judge, having the heavy burden to always conduct himself in accordance with the ethical tenets of honesty, probity and integrity, is duty bound to remind counsel of their duties to the court, to their clients, to the adverse party, and to the opposing counsel. Respondent Judge Belen claimed that the conduct of complainant in handling the settlement of the estate of Hector Tan violated and breached the tenets and standards of the legal profession and of the Lawyers Oath. He alleged that, despite the clear tenor of a lawyer-client relationship, complainant associated himself as corresponding counsel a\nd member of the Ongkiko Law Office, the counsel of the opposing party in the settlement proceedings. Respondent Judge Belen further alleged that complainant, in connivance with Rose Ang Tee, surreptitiously released millions of pesos for the now deceased Purification Tee Tan

and to themselves, in clear violation of complainants legal and fiduciary relationship and responsibilities as court-appointed co-administrator. Both the Verified-Complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In its Report dated March 10, 2010, the OCA found respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for his use of intemperate language and inappropriate actions in dealing with counsels, such as complainant, appearing in his sala. The OCA said that respondent Judge Belen should have just ruled on the motion filed by complainant instead of opting for a conceited display of arrogance. The OCA also noted that the incidents subject of this administrative matter were not the first time that respondent Judge Belen had uttered intemperate remarks towards lawyers appearing before him. It noted that in Mane v. Belen,1 the Court found respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and was reprimanded for engaging in a supercilious legal and personal discourse. Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent Judge Belen be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent Judge Belen be fined in the amount ofP10,000.00 for conduct unbecoming of a judge, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The findings and the recommendations of the OCA are well taken and, thus, should be upheld. Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 mandates CANON 4 PROPRIETY Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. xxx SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts. More specifically, Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality provides SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties. We join the OCA in noting that the incidents narrated by complainant were never denied by respondent Judge Belen, who merely offered his justification and asserted counter accusations against complainant. Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system.2 A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belens insulting statements, tending to project complainants ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue that members of the bench should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always called for.1avvphi1

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning. Inasmuch as this is not respondent Judge Belens first offense, the penalty of fine of P10,000.00 is deemed appropriate. WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 5835 August 10, 2010 CARLOS REYES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.C. No. 6051 CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.C. No. 6441 VIOLETA TAHAW, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.C. No. 6955 MAR YUSON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, Respondent RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: This refers to the undated Petition filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on July 28, 2009 by Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, praying that he be reinstated as member in good standing of the Philippine Bar and be allowed to resume the practice of law, claiming that he had already served the penalty of suspension imposed on him, and that he is now reformed. As background, four (4) administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In the first case, A.C. No. 6441, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on October 21, 2004,1Atty. Vitan was suspended forsix (6)months, effective immediately upon receipt of the Decision. He was further ordered to return the amount ofP30,000 to complainant for legal services he did not render. The records disclose that respondent received the Decision on November 12, 2004 and the period of suspension would have ended on May 12, 2005.

In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 15, 2005,2 Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. Per records, the Courts decision was received by him on May 13, 2005, and his suspension would have ended on November 13, 2005. In A.C. No. 6955 (Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on July 27, 2006,3 respondent was found liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount of P100,000.00. Upon investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) imposed the penalty of Suspension for two (2) years. This was modified by the Court after finding that there was partial payment of the loan, and the penalty was reduced to six (6) months suspension with warning, effective upon receipt of the Decision. In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the decision, asserting that there was full payment of the loan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007. In this connection, the OBC noted respondents shrewdness by moving out of his given address to evade receipt of the copy of the decision/resolutions of the Court. After diligent efforts at searching for respondents correct address proved unavailing, the Court in its Resolution dated July 17, 2007, considered the March 6, 2007 Resolution as having been served on respondent. In the decision in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 2, 2007,4 respondent was found to have failed to render the legal services sought after he had received the amount of P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern warning. The Decision was received on April 18, 2007, so the suspension period should have lapsed on April 18, 2008. Upon the recommendation of the OBC, the four administrative cases were consolidated.5 In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been repeatedly suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 years. Accordingly, respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to the Courts resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled "Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong," where the Court clearly stated that "in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served successively by the erring respondent."6 It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from the practice of law for a period of at least 2 years.1avvphi1 The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios,7 issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public. Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondents Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively; 2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any court during the periods of suspension, as follows: (a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13, 2005; (b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008; (c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12, 2005; and (d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated July 27, 2006. 3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof: (a) In A.C. No. 5835 the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned; and

(b) In A.C. No. 6441 the amount of P30,000. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn Statement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the Respondent under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-09-2211 August 12, 2010 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2752-RTJ) EVANGELINE VERA CRUZ, Complainant, vs. JUDGE WINSTON M. VILLEGAS, Respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve in this Decision the verified complaint, dated November 26, 2007,1 of Evangeline Vera Cruz against Judge Winston M. Villegas, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Tanjay City, Negros Oriental. Evangeline charged Judge Villegas with undue delay in rendering a decision or order; for fraternizing with litigants with a pending case in his court in relation to Civil Case No. 192 (entitled Evangeline Vera Cruz v. Lorenzo Vera Cruz, et al., for declaration of nullity of marriage); and, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Evangeline alleged that on September 11, 2007, she went to Dumaguete City to verify the status of the annulment of marriage case she had filed; she wanted to know the reason why it had not moved for more than a year. She went to the court to look at the case folder, but Atty. Jaime Jasmin, the clerk of court, could not find it. After a while, he said that the case record is in the house of Judge Villegas and he is willing to accompany her to the place. When they reached the judges residence, she got the shock of her life when she discovered that Judge Villegas and Dra. Carmelita Vera Cruz, co-defendant in the civil case, are practically neighbors, living in the samebarangay. She explained that only the Archbishops palace separates Judge Villegas house and that of Carmelita; Carmelitas house is situated in a compound across the street fronting the Archbishops palace; whereas, Judge Villegas residence is at the back of the palace. Evangeline further alleged that although she did not want to speculate on the relationship between the judge and Carmelita, she hated to think that something fishy was going on; the delay in the disposition of the case was to Carmelitas benefit and at her expense, a situation too much for her to bear. On January 31, 2008, Evangeline filed a petition for change of venue of the case2 from the sala of Judge Villegas in Dumaguete City to Manila claiming that she is a stranger to Dumaguete City as she works and lives in Makati City. She expressed apprehension on the outcome of Civil Case No. 192, uncertain that she would receive a fair hearing from Judge Villegas after she filed an administrative complaint against him. She lamented the slow pace the case was taking, pointing out that she filed it on March 6, 2003, and for

almost five (5) years since, it was still on pre-trial; it had not moved for more than a year, the last hearing having been held on July 6, 2006.3 As required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Judge Villegas submitted, on March 14, 2008, his comment (dated January 31, 2008)4 on the complaint. Judge Villegas explained that Evangeline did not disclose in the administrative complaint, as well as in Civil Case No. 192, that her marriage with Lorenzo Vera Cruz on June 17, 1981 was declared null and void, in a decision dated March 24, 1986, by the RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City,5and it became final and executory on June 19, 1986.6 Lorenzo, the defendant in Civil Case No. 192, moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Evangeline did not present a cause of action in view of the final and executory decision of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 94. Nonetheless, he had already denied Lorenzos motion to dismiss as a prohibited pleading.7 Judge Villegas denied that he and Carmelita are neighbors or that he is fraternizing with her; his house is about 250 meters from Carmelitas house.8 On the charge of delay in the disposition of the case, Judge Villegas reasoned out that he has to hear no fewer than ten (10) to twelve (12) cases a day with very little time and energy for him to attend to pending incidents, not to mention that the performance of his duties was adversely affected when the power service in the court was cut off due to nonpayment of electric bills. He expressed the commitment to dispose of the case after the hearing scheduled in his order dated December 27, 2007.9 In her reply filed on January 28, 2008,10 Evangeline insisted that the houses of Judge Villegas and Carmelita are proximate to each other, their residences being a few minutes walking distance from one to the other. She bewailed being kept in the dark on the reasons for the delay in the disposition of her case; despite her long distance calls from Makati to inquire about the case, she only got negative answers from the clerk of court. She denied that her marriage with Lorenzo had been annulled, as certified by the Civil Registry of Manila11 and the National Statistics Office (NSO).12 The purported annulment had been fabricated and this was the reason why no annulment was registered with the Civil Registry of Manila and with the NSO. She claimed that she had not been given a fair treatment by Judge Villegas. She pleaded that her case be released from the sala of Judge Villegas and be transferred to Manila. On April 28, 2008, Evangeline filed a Manifestation13 claiming that in February 2008, when she asked for a copy of her marriage contract from the NSO, she discovered to her surprise that the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lorenzo, pursuant to the decision of Judge Filemon H. Mendoza, RTC, National Capital Region, Branch XCIV, Quezon City, rendered on March 24, 1986, had been annotated on the copy she obtained.14 With the declaration of nullity having been registered only on November 15, 2006, or twenty (20) years after the fact, Evangeline could not help but speculate that there had been connivance in the belated submission to the NSO, which happened while Civil Case No. 192 was pending and hardly moving in the sala of Judge Villegas. She pointed to Judge Villegas himself, Lorenzo and his lawyer, Atty. Ramon Orfanel, and her former counsel, Atty. Richard Enojo, as the possible actors in the connivance. The OCA Report In a Memorandum dated October 1, 2009,15 the OCA advised the Court that it found Judge Villegas guilty of undue delay in resolving Lorenzos Motion to Dismiss and failing to make progress in the case beyond the pre-trial stage, after almost five (5) years since it was filed in 2003. It recommended that Judge Villegas be finedP5,000.00, the offense charged being his first. The OCA, however, recommended that the charges of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and fraternizing with a litigant be dismissed for lack of evidence. The OCA further recommended that Evangelines petition for change of venue be denied; the reasons she advanced were not sufficiently compelling and weighty to justify a change of venue. On November 23, 2009, at the OCAs suggestion, the Court resolved to: 1. re-docket the present administrative complaint as a regular administrative matter against Judge Villegas;

2. require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the records; and 3. deny the request for change of venue for lack of merit.16 Evangeline and Judge Villegas submitted the case for resolution on February 4, 201017 and March 16, 2010,18respectively. The Courts Ruling Except for the sanction to be imposed on Judge Villegas, we find the OCA recommendations in order. First. The charges of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and fraternizing with litigants must fail.1avvphi1 As the OCA correctly concluded, Evangeline failed to adduce substantial evidence to support Judge Villegas guilt. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.19 Second. Judge Villegas is liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order. The following discussion from the OCA report20 clearly establishes the judges guilt: Records show that Civil Case No. 192 was filed on March 6, 2003. The complainant alleges that their last hearing was held on July 6, 2006 as evidenced by the Order issued by the respondent judge granting, among other things, her request to secure the services of another lawyer and to file the corresponding opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Lorenzo Vera Cruz. It was only on December 27, 2007, or after more than one (1) year, that the respondent judge issued another Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for pre-trial on February 7, 2008. Hence, it is clear that the respondent judge was guilty of undue delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss filed by Lorenzo Vera Cruz. The said motion was resolved beyond the 90-day period required by law. Further, it was not refuted that the case was filed in 2003, and after almost five (5) years[,] it remains in the pre-trial stage. Respondents contentions that he had to hear 10 to 12 cases a day and that the electricity of the court was cut off in September 2007 are untenable to justify delay in the trial and resolution of pending incidents filed before him. Indeed, Judge Villegas had fallen short of the standards of efficiency and promptness of action required of an administrator of justice. He had become deaf, in this particular case, to the age-old maxim "justice delayed is justice denied." As we stressed in an earlier administrative matter,21 "Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. The delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable."22 Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case is classified as a less serious charge.23 If the respondent is found guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.24 In determining the penalty to be imposed, we take into account the surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, we have to consider that this is Judge Villegas first offense of this nature. Thus, a fine, rather than the heavier penalty of suspension, is more appropriate. The amount of the fine, on the other hand, has to take into account the extent of the delay. The complainants case Civil Case No. 192 was still on pre-trial as of February 7, 2008, or almost five years since it was filed on March 6, 2003. This delay cannot but be substantial delay given the time that has passed and the status of the case. Thus, a fine in the midrange of the imposable penalty, or P15,000.00 is in order. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Winston M. Villegas is found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 192. Accordingly, he is fined P15,000.00, with a STERN WARNING against the commission of a similar offense. The charges of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and of fraternizing with a litigant are DISMISSED for lack of evidence. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

RE: REQUEST OF JUDGE A.M. No. 07-1-05-RTC SALVADOR M. IBARRETA, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Present: BRANCH 8, DAVAO CITY, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO DECIDE CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, CIVIL CASE NOS. 30,410-04, 30,998-05, BRION, 7286-03 AND 8278-5. BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated:

August 23, 2010 x-------------------------------- --------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.: For failure to render decision in at least three cases within the reglementary period, as extended, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that Judge Salvador M. Ibarreta, Jr. (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 8 of the Davao City Regional Trial Court, be fined in the amount of P15,000. By letter-request of October 26, 2006,[1] respondent requested for a 90-day extension of time to resolve four cases Civil Case No. 30, 410-04 which was due on November 2, 2006; Civil Case No. 30,998-05 which was due on November 5, 2006;Civil Case No. 7286-03 which was due on November 8, 2006; and Civil Case No. 827805 which was due on November 8, 2006. The ground given in his request was heavy caseload. Pending resolution of his October 26, 2006 letter-request, respondent, by another letterrequest of December 22, 2006,[2]requested a 90-day extension, due to heavy case load, to resolve the therein listed 24 cases which included Civil Case Nos. 30,998-05 and 30,410-04, the first two of the four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request. By another letter-request of January 2, 2007,[3] respondent sought another extension of 90 days within which to decide Civil Case Nos. 7286-03 and 8278-05, the last two of four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request. By Resolution of February 12, 2007,[4] the Court granted respondents October 26, 2006 letter-request. By letter-request of April 23, 2007,[5] respondent requested an extension of 90 days within which to decide 13 cases including Civil Case Nos. 30,410-04, 7286-03, and 8278-05, the first, third and fourth of the four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request. On May 2, 2007, the OCA received a copy of respondents decision in Civil Case No. 30, 998-05, the second of the four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request, which was promulgated on January 2, 2007. Again, by letter-request of June 8, 2007, respondent requested, due to heavy case load and considering further that [respondent was] on sick leave since January 15, 2007 up to the present, another 90-day extension to decide 16 cases including Civil Case No. cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request. 30,410-4, the first of the four Before the Court could act on respondents June 8, 2007 letter-request, respondent, by another letter-request of July 4, 2007,[6] requested for another extension of 90 days within which to decide 11 cases including Civil Case No. 7286-03, the third of the four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request (fourth extension) and Civil Case No. 827805, the fourth of the four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request (fourth extension).

By Resolution of July 11, 2007,[7] the Court noted respondents submission of a copy of his decision in Civil Case No. 30, 998-2005 (the second of the four cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request) which, as earlier stated, was received by the OCA on May 2, 2007, as partial compliance. By the same Resolution, the Court granted respondents request for extension of 90 days within which to decide Civil Cases Nos. 30,410-04, 7286-03 and 8278-05, the first, third and fourth cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request, reckoned from their respective due dates, per respondents letterrequests of December 22, 2006 and January 2, 2007. Respondent was, however, reminded to indicate in his future requests . . . the number of times such requests have been made. By Resolution of September 26, 2007,[8] the Court noted and granted respondents letterrequests dated April 23, 2007, June 8, 2007 and July 4, 2007, again with a reminder to indicate in his future request the number of times such request has been made. Respondent was further directed to furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of each of his decisions in Civil Case Nos. 30,410-04, 7286-03, and 8278-05, the first, third and fourth of the four cases subject of his letter-request of October 26, 2006, within ten days from rendition of the decision. By MEMORANDUM of January 27, 2010,[9] the OCA informed the Court that despite the lapse of more than two years, respondent had not yet furnished the Court copies of his decisions in the three cases subject of his October 26, 2006 letter-request.[10] The OCA thus recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P15,000 for failure to decide these three cases, and that he be directed to decide them within 15 days from notice, cum warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. By failing to submit a copy of each of the decisions on the three cases which respondent was expected to decide within the period, as extended, the presumption is that he failed to decide them. In any event, he failed to heed this Courts Resolutions bearing on them. To ensure the strict observance of the constitutional mandate for all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within the reglementary period, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-87 which reads: x xxx 3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. x x x (underscoring supplied) And the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004 expressly requires judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.[11] Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct[12] also echoes the mandate to decide or resolve cases or matters within the reglementary period by requiring judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide or resolve cases or matters within the required periods. Heavy workload per se is not an excuse in not observing the reglementary period of deciding cases. An appointment to the Judiciary is an honor burdened with a heavy responsibility. When respondent accepted the appointment, he also accepted the heavy workload that comes with it.

In Buenaflor v. Judge Ibaretta, Jr.,[13] the Court found respondent liable for inefficiency and failure to decide the therein complainants case on time and imposed on him a fine of P3,000, the same having occurred before the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on October 1, 2001. Under Sections 9 and 11 (B) of the Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, undue delay in rendering decision is classified as a less serious charge penalized by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. Under the facts of the case, the recommended penalty should be increased to P20,000. WHEREFORE, Judge Salvador M. Ibarreta, Jr. is, for undue delay in rendering decisions, FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000) Pesos. He is directed to decide Civil Cases Nos. 30,410-04; 7286-03 and 8278-05 within fifteen days from notice, and to immediately furnish the Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, a copy of each of the decisions therein. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Baguio City EN BANC ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, Complainant, A. M. No. 08-19-SB-J Present: CORONA, Chief Justice, CARPIO CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

- versus -

JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated: April 12, 2011 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RESOLUTION BERSAMIN, J.: We resolve: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed by respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of the complainant. Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010, albeit on different grounds. Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable for simple misconduct, and disposed against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), as follows: 1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of 15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely; 2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and 3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.[1]

A brief account of the factual antecedents is first given. The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandezs making the

following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in September 2006), to wit: (a) We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.[2]; (b) You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing nothing.[3]; (c) Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother[4]; and (d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs) own alma mater.

and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that Criminal Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the criminal case had never been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the dismissal order being signed by all three respondents). In the Decision of August 24, 2010, we explained as follows: A. Respondents Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan xxx xxx xxx We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law. Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets. They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these

circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces. Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz: Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases. xxx xxx xxx What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the primordial necessity of order in the social life.

Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices signing of the orders issued during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense. B. Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no evidence supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them. A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the complainants charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they

bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared them. Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court. Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that: Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties. In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method. C. Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible

error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez make it clear that they: [A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the Honorable Courts finding that the proceedings they had adopted in their provincial hearings fell short of what the provisions of the law and rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong and Hernandez can only express their regret and apology. Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending that they are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the simple reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they have not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces; their actions were not willful in character or motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose; or even if their actions might be irregular, wrongful, or improper, such could not be characterized as simple misconduct necessitating administrative sanction. Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable for unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools of origin of the counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries,per se, did not justify a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they thereby never derided any law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis of their school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on theiralma mater. In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made equal to that meted on Justice Hernandez. He implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court, and in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all administrative charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be increased to be commensurate to their infractions. Ruling Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with and discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised by her, we deny her Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September). We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration, considering what we held in the Decision, which we reiterate hereunder, as follows: Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division in the trial anddetermination of a case or cases assigned thereto. The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of

the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him. Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts,PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all). In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court delved on the nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled: First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.

The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings. As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Courts finding of unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in the Decision of August 24, 2010. We hold to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon him be similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez. The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their Division compel the differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the Chairperson, was the head of the Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, being the most senior Member, and, as such, he possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings of the Division. This circumstance alone provided sufficient justification to treat Justice Ong differently from the other respondents. Moreover, we have noted in the Decision that in the exercise powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an of his

unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to guarantee that proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada did not direct and control how the proceedings of the Division were to be conducted. Their not being responsible for the direction and control of the running of the Division and their having relied without malice on the Justice Ongs direction and control should not be reproved as much as Justice Ongs misconduct. Hence, their responsibility and liability as Members of the Division were properly diminished. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for Reconsiderationdated September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez are denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila THIRD DIVISION

PO2 PATRICK MEJIA GABRIEL, Complainant,

A. M. No. P-10-2837 (formerly OCA I.P.I No. 07-2613-P) Present:

- versus

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ.

WILLIAM JOSE R. RAMOS, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 166, PASIG CITY, Respondents. --

Promulgated: August 25, 2010 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x D E C I S I O N BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the present administrative complaint for grave misconduct filed, on July 13, 2007,[1] by PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel, (Gabriel) with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against William Jose R. Ramos, (Ramos), Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City. Acting on the complaint, the OCA required Ramos to comment.[2] Ramos complied and filed his comment on September 6, 2007. Thereafter, the OCA submitted a Report (dated August 28, 2008)[3] to the Court, whose relevant portions provide: Complainant states that he is presently a member of the Philippine National Police and designated as Chief Investigator assigned at San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro. According to the complainant on 10 May 2007 at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon at Barangay Calsapa, Municipality of San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro said respondent together with several persons, in conspiracy and on agreement with former Municipal Mayor Manuel Roxas Bae, entered the house of Ms. Adelaida Caeg Hael. Soon thereafter, two (2) pieces of Five Hundred (P500.00) bills were handed to Adelaida and Ariel Hael to vote for Mayoralty Candidate Homer Roxas Alumisin and other candidates listed in the yellow pages. The said vote buying incident was reported by Adelaida and Ariel Hael to San Teodoro Municipal Police Station, who both executed their respective Sworn Statements enclosed as Annexes A and B hereof. A case for Violation of Article 22, Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines was also filed against respondent together with his co-conspirators docketed as I.S. No. 07-12386 before the Prosecutors Office of Oriental Mindoro attached as Annex C. In a COMMENT dated 9 August 2007, respondent alleges that the charges in the complaint are utterly false, malicious and intended to intimidate him from prosecuting cases of robbery as well as administrative charges against several policemen, including herein complainant for openly campaigning for a certain candidate during the election period. Respondent admits that on the date stated in the complaint he was indeed at Barangay Calsapa, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro to buy charcoal which he sells for a profit to augment his income. Respondent adds that he was with Manuel Roxas Bae and that he

was able to talk with Ariel [Caeg] Hael but their discussion has nothing to do with politics. He insists that he was not financially capable to buy two (2) votes at P500.00 each. He is aware that as a government employee he cannot campaign, much less take part in partisan politics. He points out that buying votes several days before election is incongruous because the voters could change their mind on election day. EVALUATION: The issue for resolution is whether Mr. Ramos may be held liable for Grave Misconduct. Respondent explained that he was indeed at Barangay Calsapa, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro on 10 May 2007 but only to buy charcoal. In the Affidavit dated May 10 and 11, 2007 of Ms. Adelaida and Ariel Hael, both categorically pointed to respondent and Manuel Bae as the persons who handed them a sample ballot and two (2) P500.00 bills and uttered ITO PO AY INYO BASTA ITO LAMANG ANG INYONG IBOBOTO, AT ITONG SI HOMER ALUMISIN NA ANG IBOTO NYO MAYOR. Both claimed that respondent and Mr. Bae were leaders for the party of mayoralty candidate Homer Alumisin. The conflicting versions of both parties present a factual issue which could not be resolved based only on the pleadings submitted before us. A formal investigation is necessary to thresh out the truth and also to afford herein respondent the chance to face his accusers. RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court recommending that the instant case be REFERRED to the Executive Judge of RTC, Pasig City, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. The Court took note of the OCA report and referred the case to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Pasig City, for investigation.[4] Accordingly, the OCA forwarded the case record to Executive Judge Amelia C. Manalastas, RTC, Pasig City.[5] In a report submitted on January 26, 2009,[6] Judge Manalastas recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence. The report states: 1) On November 24, 2008, this Office notified all the parties for conference/hearing with directive to submit their respective sworn statements on December 8 and 15, 2008, both at 10:00 oclock in the morning; 2) On both dates, only respondent and his counsel appeared while respondent who was notified via LBC failed to appear despite due notice; 3) In the conduct of the investigation, respondent vehemently denied all the charges against him. The evidence submitted to this Office reveals that the filing of the instant administrative case appears to be a mere leverage and stemmed from a case filed by herein respondent against the complainant for Robbery. (Formal Offer; Exhibits A and B; TSN dated December 15, 2008); 4) From the evidence adduced, complainant failed to establish the allegations of grave misconduct against herein respondent. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the act complained of rests on the complainant (Gotgotao versus Millora, 459 SCRA 340). 5) With no hard evidence except unconfirmed self serving assertions to back up the complaint, this Office has no choice but to recommend dismissal of the present complaint.

We find Judge Manalastas recommendation to be in order. Indeed, PO2 Gabriel failed to prove his complaint against Sheriff Ramos. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel against Sheriff IV William Jose R. Ramos, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig City, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila THIRD DIVISION PRESENTATION V. ANOTA, Complainant, A.M. No. P-06-2132 Present: - versus CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ.

AGERICO P. BALLES, CLERK OF COURT IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MTCC, TACLOBAN CITY, LEYTE, Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 25, 2010 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION BRION, J.: This administrative matter arose from a letter complaint[1] of Presentation V. Anota, dated June 23, 2004, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. In her letter, Mrs. Anota stated that her husband, Felicisimo G. Anota, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)-Branch I Clerk of Court, Tacloban City, died without enjoying his retirement benefits because Atty. Agerico P. Balles, Clerk of Court IV of the Tacloban City MTCC, unjustly refused to issue the clearance necessary for the release of her husbands retirement benefits. She alleged that her husband was forced to retire from the government at 63 years of age because of kidney problems traceable to diabetes; that he had to undergo amputation and had dialysis twice a week for 19 months, before he died on June 21, 2004; and that he filed all the necessary documents for his retirement, and the only missing document was the clearance from Atty. Balles. Atty. Balles refused to issue the clearance despite his knowledge that Mr. Anota had been cleared of money and property accountability and had no administrative case pending against him. In his comment[2] to the 1st Endorsement of Mrs. Anotas complaint, Atty. Balles asserted that he could not issue the clearance because Presiding Judge Marino Buban believed that Mr. Anota still had to answer for some missing court records, among others.

We referred the matter to the Tacloban City Regional Trial Court executive judge for investigation, report and recommendation, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).[3] The investigating judge conducted several hearings, and based on his conclusion, the OCA, in its Memorandum,[4] ruled that Atty. Balles acts amounted to oppression. There was no missing court record in Tacloban City MTCCBranch 1 according to the Court Management Office-OCAs judicial audits in June 2000 and August 2003, and the incumbent MTCC Clerk of Court testified that Mr. Anota had fully accounted for all the money and property under his custody. Thus, the OCA found Atty. Balles refusal to issue the clearance grossly unjust because Mr. Anota could have used his retirement benefits for his medicine and hospital expenses during his confinement. We concur with the OCAs findings, and would have fully concurred with its recommended sanctions against Atty. Balles, except that: First, on March 28, 2006, Atty. Balles submitted to us a certification that Felicisimo Anota had been cleared of money and property accountabilities;[5] and Second, in 2009, we dismissed Atty. Balles from the service in A.M. No. P-05-2065, entitled Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Mr. Agerico P. Balles, MTCC-OCC, Tacloban City.[6] Our Decision in this administrative matter partly reads: Hence, for the delay in the remittance of cash collections in violation of Supreme Court Circulars No. 5-93 and No. 13-92 and for his failure to keep proper records of all collections and remittances, Balles is found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty punishable, even for the first offense, by dismissal. WHEREFORE, Agerico P. Balles is hereby found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and is ordered DISMISSED from the service. Except for leave credits already earned, his retirement benefits are FORFEITED, with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency, including government-owned and controlled corporations. The Civil Service Commission is ordered to cancel his civil service eligibility, if any, in accordance with Section 9, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.[7]

Atty. Balles dismissal from the service has now been implemented, thus rendering the adjudication of the present administrative matter an exercise in futility; no administrative penalty can be imposed after his dismissal from the service, the forfeiture of all his employment benefits except for accrued leave credits, and his disqualification from future employment with any government agency. We thus have no option left but to dismiss the present administrative matter for being moot and academic. WHEREFORE, we hereby ORDER the dismissal of the present administrative matter for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila THIRD DIVISION SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2353-RTJ EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, Petitioner, Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, DEL CASTILLO,* ABAD, ** VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: September 6, 2010 x------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Subject of the present Resolution is the second Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution issued on April 28, 2008 reading: The Court resolves to ADOPT and APPROVE the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, Court of Appeals, in the attached Sealed Report and Recommendation dated 31 March 2008 (Annex A). Accordingly, the Court (1) REPRIMANDS respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles for her unauthorized absences for failing to file the necessary leave on 3 May

- versus -

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Respondent.

2005 and 3 August 2005, when there were no subpoenas requiring her court attendance at the RTC of Manila, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely, and (2) DISMISSES the complaint against Judge Adoracion G. Angeles for falsification of certificates of service for lack of merit.[1] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Respondent, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Caloocan Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121 (until her retirement on May 23, 2010), was charged by then Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (petitioner) with violation of Supreme Court Circulars, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically for unauthorized practice of law, unauthorized absences and falsification of certificate of service. Per the evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator[2] the charge of illegal practice of law was deemed without merit, hence, the Courts Third Division by Resolution of June 5, 2006[3] noted the recommendation and referred the complaint, viz: . . . resolve[d] to REFER this case to a Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records of this case.[4]

The case was raffled to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon for investigation, report and recommendation. By petitioners allegation, respondent actively participated in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 04-230908, for libel, which was, on her complaint, filed against him before the Manila RTC, she appearing at Branch 26 thereof (to which the case was raffled) without her filing leaves of absence on the following dates February 2, 2005, May 3 and 19, 2005, June 14, 15, 22 and 30, 2005, July 12-13, 2005 and August 3 and 11, 2005. Petitioner thus concluded that when respondent indicated in her Certificates of Service that she had rendered service during the questioned dates, she is guilty of falsification and of violation of Canons 3 and 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 3, 7, 22 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[5] After concluding his investigation, the Investigating Justice considering only the remaining issues of falsification and incurring unauthorized absences, reported that respondent is guilty of unauthorized absences on May 3 and August 3, 2005. With respect to the rest of the questioned dates, he held that respondents absence thereon was legally justified as she merely complied with the subpoenas issued by the trial court. On her appearance at the trial court for the May 3, 2005 hearing, respondent asserted, however, that that date was merely an offshoot of an earlier postponed hearing which was covered by a subpoena. She thus concluded that a subpoena was not required for her to attend the hearing on May 3, 2005. As for her appearance at the trial court on August 3, 2005, respondent explained that she went there lunch time on her honest belief that a hearing was set that day, only to be told that it was not, hence, she immediately returned to her office at the Caloocan City RTC and reduced into writing the orders she gave in open court in the cases which were calendared/heard in the morning. The Investigating Justice brushed aside respondents explanation-justifications as lame. He concluded that by not filing any leave of absence to cover such fraction of her official time devoted to other activities outside of her functions as a Judge, she

committed absences that are unauthorized, hence, is guilty of violating Canons 3, 7 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, as well as Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. On the charge of falsification of respondents Certificates of Service, the Investigating Justice dismissed the same as it was never shown, much less proven, that respondent judges failure to indicate in her Certificates of Service the fact of her attendance at the court hearings amounted to an obstinate refusal to disclose, or a deliberate concealment of such fact. The Investigating Justice thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for her unauthorized absences on May 3, 2005 and August 3, 2005 and that the charge of falsification be dismissed. As reflected early on, the Court, in its above-quoted Resolution of June 5, 2006, adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice and approved his Recommendation. Respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which was denied by Resolution[6] of February 22, 2010 of the Court in this wise: Considering the Report and Recommendation dated 4 January 2010 of Investigating Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, Court of Appeals, Manila, on respondents motion for partial reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 April 2008, and it appearing that the lone issue raised by respondent in her motion for partial reconsideration is whether she incurred unauthorized absences during her attendance at the hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on 3 May 2005 (where her attendance thereat as a private complainant was without subpoena which resulted in her unjustified absence from her own court) and on 3 August 2005 (where respondent failed to file a leave of absence rationalizing that she was out only for a few minutes which she compensated by staying in the office and working beyond office hours and the forfeiture of her leave credits in the name of public service); that since her attendance at the hearing at the RTC of Manila was not in connection with her judicial functions at the RTC of Caloocan, the same should not be considered as an extension of her judicial duties but done in her personal capacity necessitating the filing of leave of absence, and considering further the case of Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Delia H. Panganiban (A.M. No. RTJ-961350, 18 August 1997), where the Court held that neither good faith nor long, unblemished and above average service in the judiciary can fully justify respondents lapses, and that as an officer of the Court, respondent should conduct herself strictly in accordance with the highest standards of ethics, the Court resolves to DENY respondents motion for partial reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 April 2008. Hence, the present second Motion for Partial Reconsideration.[7] While as a general rule the Court does not give due course to second motions for reconsideration,[8] this is not without exceptions, as when there is an extraordinarily persuasive reason and after an express leave has been obtained, both of which are present in this case. In denying respondents first motion for partial reconsideration, the Court in its February 22, 2010 Resolution, applied the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Delia H. Panganiban where it was held that a Judges unblemished record will not justify her lapses. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in her second motion for partial reconsideration, said case should not have been applied, as it presupposes that respondent indeed committed lapses which her long service and unblemished reputation would not justify while she has always maintained that she had not committed the act complained of, that is, the non-filing of the leaves of absence for May 3 and August 3, 2005 because she did not have to. Indeed, if respondent committed

no lapse or violation, then the Courts denial of her first motion for partial reconsideration on the basis of the Panganiban decision deserves to be reviewed. After a considered, hard look at the case, the Court finds respondents second Motion for Partial Reconsideration to be impressed with merit. Respecting respondents presence at the trial court on May 3, 2005, while admittedly no subpoena was served on her to appear on said date, that was a re-scheduled date of hearing, the earlier-scheduled hearing having been postponed. There was thus no absolute need for her to be subpoenaed for the purpose. As to the Investigating Judges observation that assuming that respondents attendance in the May 3, 2005 hearing was covered by subpoena, she still needed to secure a Certificate of Service because she was the private complainant: The Court notes that this is merely a matter of practice for government employees who need such certification to show to their superiors that they indeed attended the hearing. In any case, the minutes of a hearing show the parties who are present, hence, such certification becomes a mere surplusage. Respecting respondents going to the trial court on August 3, 2005, the same did not require the filing of a leave of absence. The Investigating Justice himself noted that her absence involved only a fraction of her official time. Section 28 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave [Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292] promulgated by the Civil Service Commission on May, 2008, which reiterates earlier rules governing leaves, provides: Sec. 28. Actual service defined. The term actual service refers to the period of continuous service since the appointment of the official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously approved leave with pay. Leave of absence without pay for any reason other than illness shall not be counted as part of the actual service rendered: Provided, that in computing the length of service of an employee paid on the daily wage basis, Saturdays, Sundays or holidays occurring within a period of service shall be considered as service although he did not receive pay on those days inasmuch as his service was not then required. A fraction of one-fourth or more but less than three-fourth shall be considered as one-half day and a fraction of three-fourths or more shall be counted as one full day for purposes of granting leave of absence (amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998). (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

For a civil servant to thus be required to file a leave of absence, he/she should have been absent for a fraction of three-fourths or more of a full day. In the present case, complainant failed to prove that respondent was away from her office for at least six hours (3/4 of 8 hours working) on August 3, 2005. Upon the other hand, respondent reported for work in the morning, as shown by copies of orders which she issued in open court on cases calendared for consideration in the morning of August 3, 2005. AT ALL EVENTS, at most, respondents absence on August 3, 2005 amounted to halfday or undertime under the aforementioned CSC rule which does not require the filing of a leave of absence, albeit it is deductible against vacation leave credits.[9] WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Partial Reconsideration of respondent, who in the meantime retired last May 23, 2010, is GRANTED. The Resolutions of April 28, 2008 and February 22, 2010 are SET ASIDE and another is rendered dismissing the complaint against respondent.

SO ORDERED. EN BANC

LOURDES ESCALONA,

S. A.M. No. P-10-2785 Complainant, Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, - versus BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ. CONSOLACION S. PADILLO, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated: Branch 260, Paraaque City, Respondent. September 21, 2010 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION PER CURIAM:

Complainant Lourdes S. Escalona (Escalona) filed on 22 January 2007 a complaint[1] charging respondent Consolacion S. Padillo (Padillo), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Branch 260, Paraaque City with Grave Misconduct. Escalona claimed that she approached Jun Limcaco (Limcaco), the president of their homeowners association, regarding her problem with Loresette Dalit (Dalit). Limcaco referred her to Padillo to help facilitate the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillo allegedly promised to prepare the necessary documents and asked for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona requested that the amount be reduced to P15,000. Padillo received the P15,000 at the Little Quiapo Branch Better Living Subdivision. Thereafter, Escalona received a text message from Padillo informing her that the prosecutor was not amenable to the reduced amount of P15,000. After two weeks, Escalona gave the balance of P5,000 to Padillo allegedly for the service of the warrant of arrest. Escalona was also asked to submit a barangay clearance and to first take an oath before Prosecutor Antonio Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, subsequent verification from the Prosecutors Office showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money. Padillo reneged on her promise. Hence, this complaint. Meanwhile, Escalona withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a Sworn Affidavit of Desistance dated 10 July 2007[2] alleging that Padillo already returned to her

the P20,000. This notwithstanding, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock sent two notices to Padillo requiring her to submit her comment to the complaint of Escalona. Despite the registry return receipts showing that she received the communications sent to her, Padillo failed to comment on the complaint. On 15 September 2008, this Court required Padillo to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for her failure to submit the required comment and reiterated the directive on Padillo to submit her comment to Escalonas complaint. A copy of the resolution sent to Padillo at the RTC, Branch 260, Paraaque City was returned unserved with the notation no longer connected. The parties were likewise required to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Copies of the resolution sent to Escalona at B17-L36 Barnabas St., Annex 35, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City and to Padillo at 651 San Francisco St., Las Pias City were returned unserved with the notation moved, left no address. The Court Administrator,[3] in his Memorandum dated 8 December 2009, found Padillo guilty of grave misconduct for soliciting money from Escalona in exchange for facilitating the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillos act of soliciting money from Escalona is an offense which merited the grave penalty of dismissal from the service. However, considering that Padillo tendered her resignation on 18 February 2007, a month after the complaint was filed but did not and has not filed any claim relative to the benefits due her, the Court Administrator recommended that all benefits due her, except accrued leave credits, be forfeited and that she be disqualified from reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

We agree with the Court Administrator that this Court could no longer impose the penalty of dismissal from the service because Padillo resigned a month after the filing of the administrative complaint. However, her resignation did not render the complaint against her moot. Resignation is not and should not be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.[4] There is no doubt that Padillo received from Escalona P20,000 purportedly for fiscal & judge and for warrant officer and this amount was intended to facilitate the case against Dalit. This is shown in the receipt[5] signed by Padillo herself. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel[6] provides that (C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Section 52 (A)(11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service also provides that dismissal is the penalty for improper solicitation even if it is the first offense. Section 58(a) of the same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. Escalona submitted an Affidavit of Desistance alleging that the P20,000 was refunded to her and this she voluntarily accepted in the presence of Florante Gaerlan, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 119, Pasay City and Erlinda Dineros, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 260, Paraaque City. However, even Escalonas affidavit of desistance will not absolve Padillo from administrative liability. We have always held that the withdrawal of the complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint. This Court has an interest in the conduct and behavior of its officials and employees and in ensuring at all times the proper delivery of justice to the people. No affidavit of desistance can divest this Court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against erring

officials and employees of the judiciary. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts.[7] Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainants whims. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel.[8] The people, whose faith and confidence in their government and its instrumentalities need to be maintained, should not be made to depend upon the whims and caprices of complainants who, in a real sense, are only witnesses.[9] Administrative actions are not made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. Such unilateral act does not bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power.[10] WHEREFORE, we find respondent Consolacion S. Padillo GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, her retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED. Her civil service eligibility is CANCELLED and she isPERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED for reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

SUSAN O. REYES, Complainant, Present: CORONA, C.J.,

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136

CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, - versus -

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, Promulgated: Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Pias City, Respondent. September 21, 2010 x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Facts In her Verified Complaint, Susan O. Reyes (Reyes) charged respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque (Judge Duque) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Pias City (RTC-Branch 197), with Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a party-in-intervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled In re: Petition of Philippine Savings Bank for Issuance of a Writ of Possession under Act No. 3135 over Properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172 and T-84847 filed by the Philippine Savings Bank (bank) against the spouses Carolyn Choi and Nak San Choi (spouses Choi). In a Decision dated 6 November 2006, Judge Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank and ordered the spouses Choi and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T84848, and T-84847 situated in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Pias. On 13 August 2007, Reyes filed an Urgent Petition for Lifting and Setting Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate claiming that she bought the subject property covered by TCT No. T-85172 from the spouses Choi and that she was in actual possession of the property with full knowledge of the bank. At the hearing of Reyes petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., (Atty. Ubana) the lawyer of Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with the bank. Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the first week of December 2007, Reyes allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed Reyes to go to his house and bring some money in order that he can deny the pending motion to break open. As she did not have the money yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see him the following day as her allotment might arrive by that time. The following day, when her allotment arrived, Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to withdraw P20,000. She, her secretary, and driver went to the house of Judge Duque at No. 9 CRM Corazon, BF Almanza, Las Pias. The son of Judge Duque opened the gate. At his house, Judge Duque demanded P100,000. Reyes gave him P20,000 and she asked for time to give him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her that Judge Duque was asking for her and waiting for the balance he demanded. On 21 December 2007, Reyes went to the house of Judge Duque with P18,000 on hand. Judge Duque allegedly scolded her for not bringing the whole amount of P80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty raising the amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his house and asked Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque pointed to a calendar posted on the wall and pointed to December 26 as the

date when she should complete the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes, embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque raised her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked her breasts. He touched her private parts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for help but the TV was too loud. As a desperate move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako sayo. Judge Duque suddenly stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair. In his Comment,[1] Judge Duque averred that since the complaint of Reyes was filed after he retired on 21 February 2008, he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He denied the charges hurled against him and claimed the allegations were fabricated, false and malicious. In its Report dated 26 June 2008,[2] the OCA found that Reyes actually filed four identical complaints. First, Reyes filed a complaint dated 16 January 2008 duly subscribed on 23 January 2008. Reyes was directed to comply with the requirement of verification and she complied by filing on 20 February 2008 verified complaints with the Office of the Chief Justice and the OCA. On 12 March 2008, Reyes filed for the third time another verified complaint with the OCA which was a mere reiteration of her previous complaints. The OCA opined that the jurisdiction of the Court at the time of the filing of the complaint was not lost by the mere fact that Judge Duque had ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case. Thus, as recommended by the OCA, the case was referred to a Court of Appeals Justice[3] for investigation, report and recommendation per Resolution dated 6 August 2008.[4] Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice On the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes presented photocopies of P1,000 bills to prove that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. The Investigating Justice, however, found no compelling evidence to corroborate Reyes accusation as it was doubtful whether these were the same bills used to pay off Judge Duque.[5] On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the Investigating Justice opined that the act of Judge Duque in embracing and kissing Reyes, sucking her breasts and touching her most intimate parts were certainly acts of lewdness that were downright obscene, detestable, and unwelcome. These acts were established by substantial evidence. The Investigating Justice, however, stated that Reyes description of the sexual assault could not be deemed as attempted rape.[6] The Investigating Justice found Judge Duque guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended the imposition of fine of P40,000 which should be deducted from the retirement benefits of Judge Duque. Report of the Court Administrator In his Memorandum,[7] the Court Administrator[8] confirmed that Judge Duque compulsorily retired from the judiciary on 21 February 2008. He opined that the conduct of Judge Duque bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. The actions of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. Judge Duque failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. The Court Administrator recommended that a P40,000 fine be imposed on Judge Duque which should be deducted from his retirement benefits. The Courts Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA for the imposition of a fine of P40,000 on Judge Duque. First, on the question of jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a member of the judiciary having retired from the service on 21 February 2008, the records show that Reyes filed four similar complaints against Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18 January 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by the OCA on 20 February 2008[9] and by the Office of the Chief Justice also on 20 February 2008,[10] or one day before the date of retirement of Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by the OCA on 12 March 2008.[11] An identical complaint addressed to the OCA and subscribed on 23 January 2008 was filed and received by the OCA on 25 January 2008.[12] As pointed out by the OCA, Judge Duque was inadvertently sent a copy of the complaint that was filed and received on 12 March 2008.[13] The filing of similar and identical complaints on different dates was due to the directive of the OCA requiring that the complaint be verified or that the original copy of the verified complaint be filed.[14] Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that Reyes filed her intended complaint before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the Court no doubt has jurisdiction over this administrative case. On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient evidence to sustain Reyes allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being unsubstantiated. On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and after a thorough investigation conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge Duque admitted, that Reyes went to his house.[15] Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duques liability for impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes.[16] There is no need to detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The Investigating Justices narration was sufficient and thorough. The Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted to destroy the credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute or one whose moral value is at its lowest level. However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from a woman of loose morals.[17] In Tan v. Pacuribot,[18] this Court further stressed: We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.[19] Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.[20] Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.[21]

The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the law and of justice,[22] he is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duques conduct indubitably bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Duque GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and GROSS We FINE him P40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits. SO ORDERED. Manuel N. MISCONDUCT.

EN BANC RE: FAILURE OF VARIOUS EMPLOYEES TO REGISTER THEIR TIME OF ARRIVAL AND/OR DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE IN THE CHRONOLOG MACHINE A.M. No. 2005-21-SC Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated: September 28, 2010 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Facts

This administrative case arose from a Report of the Leave Division of the Supreme Court to the Complaints and Investigation Division of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS).[1] The Report referred to the failure of various Supreme Court employees to register their time of arrival to and/or departure from office in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine (CTRM) for the first semester of 2005. Charged were the following: 1. Noemi B. Adriano, Development Management Officer V, Program Management Office (PMO), for various dates from January to June 2. Dennis Russell D. Baldago, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, PMO, for various dates from January to June 3. June Edilberto A. Davis, Director IV, PMO, for various dates from January to

4. Atty. Catherine Joy T. Comandante, Court Attorney V, PMO, for various dates in February and from April to June 5. Jonathan Riche G. Mozar, Bookkeeper I, PMO, for various dates from January to June 6. Mariles M. Sales, Executive Assistant IV, PMO, for various dates from January to June 7. Virginia B. Ciudadano, Court Stenographer IV, Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for various dates from March to June 8. Pia Claire C. Bernal, Clerk IV, Legal Office, OCA for various dates in January and from March to June 9. Teresita M. Anion, Human Resource Management Officer I, Leave Division, OAS, OCA, for various dates from January to March

10. Honradez M. Sanchez, Human Resource Management Assistant, Leave Division, OAS, OCA, for various dates in the months of February, March, and May 11. Samuel R. Ruez, Jr., Cashier III, Checks Disbursement Division, FMO, OCA, for various dates from January to March and in the month of May 12. Arturo G. Ramos, Engineering Aide A Casual, Committee on Hall of Justice, for various dates from January to March, and from May to June

13. Zosimo D. Labro, Administrative Officer II, Property Division, OAS, OCA, for various dates from March to June 14. Leonarda Jazmin M. Sevilla, Clerk IV, Legal Office, OCA, for various dates from February to June 15. Ariel Conrad A. Azurin, Messenger, Finance Division, FMO, OCA, for various dates from January to June In its Memorandum dated 2 September 2005,[2] the OAS directed respondent employees to explain why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against them for their infraction. In compliance with the directive, respondent employees submitted the following comments/explanations: 1. Ma. Noemi B. Adriano offered the following reasons: (1) domestic and office concerns, (2) long travel time, (3) forgetfulness, and (4) malfunctioning CTRM. She pointed out her diligence in logging her attendance in the Daily Report of Absences and Tardiness (RAT) of their office. 2. Dennis Russell D. Baldago claimed that on several occasions he had meetings and activities outside the Court. In other instances, he admitted his neglect. He also faulted his ID for his failure to register in the CTRM and claimed consulting with the Management Information System Office (MISO) for the replacement of his ID. 3. Edilberto A. Davis asserted he never failed to register in the CTRM and in their office logbook. He admitted, however, that there were instances when he forgot his ID at home or when he forgot to register due to office meetings. He wondered how it appeared that he had not registered in the CTRM on the other dates stated in the Memorandum. 4. Atty. Catherine T. Comandante declared she was on official business on several occasions while on a few instances, she inadvertently failed to register in the CTRM. 5. Jonathan Riche G. Mozar reasoned that as Bookkeeper I in the PMO, there were times that he was tasked to perform other jobs requiring him to go out of the office. For this reason, he found it inconvenient and inappropriate to still drop by the office just to register in the CTRM. 6. Mariles M. Sales claimed that the CTRM malfunction on certain dates, while on the other dates specified in the Memorandum, she either forgot to bring her ID or was rushing home.

7. Virginia B. Ciudadano stated that she had religiously swiped her ID upon her arrival to and departure from office. However, for the month of March 2005, she admitted failing to register in the CTRM because she could not locate her ID. She did not bother to use the Bundy Clock Machine because she thought that her signature in their office logbook is sufficient to consider her attendance. 8. Pia Claire C. Bernal claimed that she regularly registered her daily attendance both in the CTRM and in their office logbook and was surprised to receive the Memorandum. She believed her ID was already defective, thus she requested for a new ID. On 26 April 2005, she did not register in the CTRM due to an official business outside the Court.

9. Teresita M. Anion admitted her absence on 14 and half day work on 19 January 2005, which were both approved by her superior. However, such leave application did not reach the Leave Division. On 18 March 2005, she claimed she swiped her ID but it appeared that the CTRM did not register her attendance, leading her to conclude that her ID was already defective. On the other dates, she forgot her ID at home. Nonetheless, she claimed that she never failed to register in their office logbook. 10. Honradez M. Sanchez blamed his failure to swipe his ID on his forgetfulness to bring the same. He claimed that on the dates mentioned in the Memorandum, he visited his parents house in Fairview and still had to go home in Laguna. On 11 and 14 February, he alleged his ID was misplaced and was only found later.

11. Mr. Samuel R. Ruez, Jr. claimed that he never failed to register during the period covered in the Memorandum. He maintained that his Monthly and Daily RAT for the months of January, February, March and April 2005 showed his attendance for the period. He faulted his ID for not being read by the CTRM, and averred that he already applied for a new ID. 12. Mr. Arturo G. Ramos alleged he regularly swiped his ID card in the CTRM. He attached copies of the RAT of their office for the months of January, February, March, May and June to prove his attendance on the questioned dates. He attributed his failure to register in the CTRM either to the malfunctioning CTRM or defective ID. He intended to coordinate with the MISO to remedy this and also request for a new ID. 13. Zosimo D. Labro, Jr. stated that his failure was due to his defective three-year old ID, and thus, he would apply for a new ID. 14. Ariel Conrad A. Azurin claimed that he was surprised to receive the Memorandum as he always made sure to hear a confirmation tone whenever he registered in the CTRM. He presented copies of the RAT of his office to support his attendance on the dates mentioned in the Memorandum. He surmised that his failure to register in the CTRM was due to his worn out ID. He also presented an official receipt to prove his request for a new ID. 15. Leonarda Jazmin M. Sevilla denied that she failed to register in the CTRM. However, she claimed that she continued to use her old ID despite the fact that she had already secured a new one. She submitted copies of the RAT of her Office to prove her attendance. The Recommendation of the OAS The OAS classified the reasons proffered in the comments as (1) personal, including household or domestic needs, workload, nature of office, distant travel, traffic, and forgetfulness, (2) malfunctioning CTRM, (3) misplaced, worn out, or defective ID cards, or (4) official business. In ruling against respondent employees, the OAS cited the Courts ruling in Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec. I and Angelita C. Esmerio, Clerk III, Off. Clerk of Court,[3] an administrative case for dishonesty filed against two employees of this Court, where the Court held that domestic concerns and other personal reasons cannot justify nor exonerate ones culpability for committing violation of such offense. With respect to Leonarda Jazmin M. Sevilla, the OAS found her guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for maintaining two ID cards. Sevilla used her

old ID alternately with her new ID, that was why there were no entries [when] the old ID was used. Insofar as Ariel Conrad A. Azurin is concerned, the OAS found that his omission to register in the CTRM constitutes dishonesty. According to the OAS, Azurin deliberately did not swipe on the aforementioned dates and made it appear on the said dates that he reported on time to escape administrative liability for habitual tardiness for the 3rd time which is already punishable with the penalty of dismissal. The OAS recommended that respondent employees, except Azurin, to be sternly warned for Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office respectfully recommends the following: 1. Finding Ms. Noemi B. Adriano, Mr. Dennis Russell D. Baldago, Mr. Edilberto A. Davis, Atty. Catherine Joy T. Comandante, Mr. Jonathan Riche G. Mozar, Ms. Mariles M. Sales, Ms. Virginia B. Ciudadano, Ms. Pia Claire C. Bernal, Ms. Teresita M. Anion, Mr. Honradez M. Sanchez, Mr. Samuel R. Ruez, Jr., Mr. Arturo G. Ramos, Mr. Zosimo D. Labro, GUILTY of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that this is their first violation, that they be STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with severely. For the officials and employees of the PMO who attend meetings and/or seminars outside the Courts premises, appropriate office orders should be submitted to the Leave Division, this Office for proper recording in their office attendance files. 2. Finding Ms. Leonarda Jazmin M. Sevilla, GUILTY of Violating Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, not for her failure to swipe her ID card in the CTRM but for maintaining and using two (2) ID cards within the period from January to June 2005, that she be (a) STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with severely; and (b) directed to immediately surrender her old ID card to this Office; and 3. Finding the acts of Mr. Ariel Conrad A. Azurin as constituting Dishonesty, that he be directed by the Court to explain why he should not be held administratively liable for Dishonesty.[4]

The Courts Ruling The recommendations of the OAS are well taken, except as to Sevilla who is not guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. I. Respondent employees are guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations Administrative Circular No. 36-2001[5] requires all employees (whether regular, coterminous or casual) to register their daily attendance, in the CTRM and in the logbook of their respective offices. In Re: Failure of Jose Dante E. Guerrero to Register his Time In and Out in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine on Several Dates,[6] the Court emphasized the importance of attendance registration via CTRM, to wit: The CTRM registration is not being imposed as a tedious and empty requirement. The registration of attendance in office by public employees is an attestation to the

taxpaying public of their basic entitlement to a portion of the public funds. Verily, the registration requirement stands as the first defense to any attempt to defraud the people of the services they help sustain. This requirement finds its underpinnings in the constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust. Inherent in this mandate is the observance and efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.[7] In that case, the Court found Guerreros explanations for his failure to register his time of arrival and departure in the CTRM, namely, a defective ID and a malfunctioning CTRM, unbelievable. The Court affirmed Atty. Eden T. Candelarias finding that Guerrero deliberately avoided registering via the CTRM to make it appear that he had reported on time, thereby avoiding the ultimate penalty of dismissal for his habitual tardiness. In Re: Supreme Court Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the 2nd Semester of 2005,[8] which involved a charge of habitual tardiness where the justifications offered by respondent employees therein were similar to the reasons given in this case, the Court found the respondent employees explanations untenable. The Court stated: Except for the claims of respondents Davis, Labro, Jr., Adriano and Benologa, all the reasons given by the other respondents for their tardiness fall under the following categories: illness, moral obligation to family and relatives, performance of household chores, traffic and health or physical condition. These justifications are neither novel nor persuasive and hardly evokes sympathy. Moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness. If at all, they would mitigate, but not exempt them from the infraction.[9] Considering the various justifications proffered by respondent employees for failure to register their time of arrival and departure in the CTRM, the Court finds no error in the recommendation of the OAS finding them guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, more specifically Administrative Circular No. 36-2001. As stated by the OAS, rules and regulations are [issued] to attain harmony, smooth operation, maximize efficiency and productivity, with the ultimate objective of realizing the functions of particular offices and agencies of the government.[10] Thus, any breach of such rules and regulations cannot be countenanced. Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Violation of Reasonable Rules and Regulations is a light offense punishable with the penalty of Reprimand for the first offense. Adopting the recommendation of the OAS, we find that a stern warning against a repetition of the same or similar infraction is proper since this is the first violation of respondent employees, except for Azurin, II. Sevilla is not guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulation Insofar as Sevilla is concerned, the OAS stated: On the other hand, we also treat the case of Ms. Sevilla differently from the others. Ms. Sevilla used her old ID alternately with her new ID that was why there were no entries if the old ID was used. Her DTRS, particularly for the months of May and June were completely without entries while the rest lacked entries on various dates as reflected on the Memorandum of this Office. Based on her own admission, she has two (2) IDs. Nevertheless, one was allegedly lost so she requested for a replacement. After a while, the alleged lost ID was found but she never presented nor informed this Office about it.

This Office verified with the MISO whether her DTRs on the reported dates she allegedly failed to swipe have generated data thereon. Consistent with her claim, it was confirmed that her DTRs reflected regular attendance which also showed her being punctual.[11] (Emphasis supplied) The OAS recommended that Sevilla be sternly warned for Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations for maintaining and using two (2) ID cards within the period from January to June 2005. We disagree with the recommendation of the OAS considering that the OAS failed to cite any specific office rule or regulation which Sevilla allegedly violated. It must be pointed out that Sevilla was charged with Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations for failure to register in the CTRM. Since the OAS confirmed that she indeed swiped her ID card, albeit the old one, on those dates specified in the Memorandum, Sevilla cannot be found guilty of failing to register in the CTRM. In fact, the OAS even found, upon verification with the MISO, that Sevillas DTRs reflected regular attendance which also showed her being punctual. Nevertheless, Sevilla must immediately cease using her old ID card, and instead use her new ID card exclusively in registering in the CTRM to avoid any confusion regarding her attendance and time of arrival and departure in the office. III. Azurin is guilty of dishonesty In Azurins case, the OAS found that his omission to register in the CTRM constitutes dishonesty. The OAS stated: x x x Azurin deliberately did not swipe on the aforementioned dates and made it appear on the said dates that he reported on time to escape administrative liability for habitual tardiness for the 3rd time which is already punishable with the penalty of dismissal. The RATs he submitted x x x have raised doubts on the correctness of his entries thereon. It is noted that almost all his time-ins were not entered in accordance with the chronological order of time reflective of correct and true arrival in office. Logically, it can be deduced that his failure to swipe was to cover-up the actual time of his arrival to his workstation.[12] The records reveal that Azurin has previously been suspended twice for habitual tardiness. In 2001, Azurin was suspended for one month and then for three months for having been found habitually tardy for 1999 and 2000, and for the first semester of 2001. In his Comment, Azurin did not specifically deny that he failed to swipe his ID in the CTRM. Instead, he blamed the CTRM for not registering his entries thereon, and added that such problem might also be caused by his ID. In Esmerio and Ting,[13] where the employees similarly blamed the CTRM and their ID cards for their infraction, the Court disbelieved such justification, thus: More importantly, the respondents have asserted that the machines and their bar coded IDs are partly to blame for their failure to swipe their ID cards. This assertion, however, is belied by the report of Atty. Ivan Uy, Chief of the Supreme Court Management Information Systems Office. In his report, Atty. Uy avowed that, contrary to the claims of the respondents, the machines were working properly during the date and time of the incidents subject of the cases at bar. His report was backed up by verifiable evidence as well as the expertise of the division. Machines, unlike humans have no selfinterest to protect. Hence, the data collected from them deserve great weight. Besides, if, as claimed by the respondents, the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine truly refused to record their IDs bar codes, repeatedly, then they should have had them replaced at the soonest possible time or at the very least, complained about them to the MISO or, again, had their supervisor countersign their logbook entries. Respondents did nothing to rectify the matter until they were made to explain their delinquency.

The respondents made use of the alleged failure of their ID cards and the Chronolog Time Recorder machines as their proverbial scapegoat. Instead of being their salvation, said objects only proved the respondents propensity or disposition to lie. In fine, respondents conducts clearly show lack of forthrightness and straightforwardness in their dealings with the Court amounting to dishonesty. x x x.[14]

In Azurins case, which is essentially identical to the case of Esmerio and Ting,[15] there is substantial evidence that he intentionally did not register in the CTRM to conceal his tardiness to avoid dismissal from service. First, Azurin did not deny that he failed to swipe his ID in the CTRM on the dates mentioned in the Memorandum. Second, the correctness of the entries in the RATs he presented is doubtful since the times of his arrival were not entered in accordance with the chronological order of time. Third, there is no proof that the CTRM malfunctioned on those dates specified in the Memorandum. Azurins act of deliberately not registering in the CTRM to hide his habitual tardiness for the third time, which is punishable by dismissal, constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty refers to a persons disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[16] By repeatedly making it appear that he has consistently rendered a full days service, when he had actually been tardy, Azurin defrauded the public and betrayed the trust reposed in him as an employee of the highest Court. Azurins dishonesty definitely falls short of the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.[17] Once again, we remind every Court employee that their conduct should, at all times, be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the Court,[18] for the image of this Court is mirrored in the conduct, not only of the Justices, but of every man and woman working thereat.[19]

Rule IV of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 provides: Section 52. Classification of Offenses. -- Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave, or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service. A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding 1. Dishonesty 1st offense Dismissal penalties:

Hence, dishonesty, being a grave offense, warrants the harshest penalty of dismissal from service, even upon the commission of only the first offense. However, Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[20] grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. As recommended by Edwin B. Andrada, Officer-in-Charge, OAS,[21] and consistent with jurisprudence,[22] we consider as mitigating circumstances Azurins length of service in the Court, pleas for compassion, and firm resolve to be more cautious in the performance of his duties and responsibilities. Accordingly, we impose upon Azurin the penalty of suspension of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, we find Noemi B. Adriano, Dennis Russell D. Baldago, Edilberto A. Davis, Atty. Catherine Joy T. Comandante, Jonathan Riche G. Mozar, Mariles M. Sales, Virginia B. Ciudadano, Pia Claire C. Bernal, Teresita M. Anion, Honradez M.

Sanchez, Samuel R. Ruez, Jr., Arturo G. Ramos, Zosimo D. Labro, Jr., GUILTY of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and STERNLY WARN them that a repetition of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. We find Ariel Conrad A. Azurin GUILTY of Dishonesty and SUSPEND him for six (6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. We ABSOLVE Leonarda Jazmin M. Sevilla from the charge of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila EN BANC RE: COMPLAINT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, BAGUIO CITY against RITA S. CHULYAO, CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTBARLIG, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE. A.M. No. P-07-2292 [Formerly A.M. No. 06-6-206-MCTC] Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,

BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR. PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: September 28, 2010 x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM: Before us is an administrative complaint against Rita S. Chulyao, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Barlig, Mountain Province, for Dishonesty.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: On December 9, 2004, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Examination Division received an Anonymous Complaint, which alleged an examination irregularity involving Rita S. Chulyao (Chulyao), Clerk of Court II, MCTC of Barlig, Mountain Province. The complaint averred that Chulyao employed her sister, Raquel S. Pangowon (Pangowon), a school teacher of Barlig National High School, to take for and in her behalf the July 31, 1988 Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) conducted in Baguio City. Upon verification from the examination records of the CSC-Region 1 and CSCIntegrated Records Management Office, it appeared that one Rita S. Chulyao actually took the CSPE on July 31, 1988 in Baguio City. Upon further verification from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court, it revealed that per employment records of Chulyao, she passed the CSPE held in Baguio City on July 31, 1988 with a rating of 72%. Thus, for purposes of comparison, the employment records of Pangowon were requested from the CSC-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR), Mountain Province Field Office. From Pangowon's personal data sheets, it was found that the picture attached therein was that of the same person who took the CSPE on July 31, 1988 based on the picture attached in the picture seat plan. These gave the impression that the actual person who took the CSPE was Raquel Pangowon instead of the supposed examinee Rita Chulyao. Subsequently, the CSC directed both Chulyao and Pangowon to submit their Comments on the complaint. Chulyao moved for the summary dismissal of the complaint and manifested that the same was filed by scrupulous people motivated by revenge and envy.

In an Order dated February 15, 2005, Chulyao and Pangowon were directed to appear before the CSC-CAR for preliminary investigation on March 3, 2005. Both respondents failed to appear. Again, in an Order dated July 21, 2005, Pangowon was directed to appear before the CSC-CAR for preliminary investigation. By special appearance, Pangowon appeared for preliminary investigation on September 6, 2005. Chulyao, on the other hand, was again directed to appear for a preliminary investigation on August 29, 2005. However, despite notice, Chulyao failed to show up. Subsequently, the CSC-CAR issued a formal charge against Pangowon for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for applying and taking the July 31, 1988 CSPE for and in behalf of her sister, Rita S. Chulyao.[1] However, the CSC-CAR, in Decision No. CAR-06-057DC, dated May 4, 2006, the complaint against Chulyao was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the latter is a court employee.[2] On June 14, 2006, the Decision of the CSC-CAR, dated May 4, 2006, was forwarded to the OCA for proper action. On June 23, 2006, the OCA directed Chulyao to submit her Comment on the CSC-CAR Decision against her.[3] In her Comment[4] dated July 14, 2006, Chulyao denied anew the allegations contained in the CSC Decision. She denied that she committed any examination irregularity in the CSPE conducted in Baguio City on July 31, 1988. She narrated that the week before she went to Baguio City for the examination, her sister, Pangowon, gave her certain photo negatives for developing. On July 30, 1988, Chulyao narrated that she and her townmates who are taking the CSC examinations arrived in Baguio City late in the afternoon. Since she was not familiar with the place, she asked her sister-in-law to go to the photo studio to have her photo negative, as well as that of her sister's, developed. Her sister-in-law told her that the photos will be claimed the following day. In the early morning of July 31, 1988, she and her sister-in-law went to the photo studio to claim the photos, but the studio was still closed. Chulyao claimed that they were able to redeem the photos only after 8:00 a.m. and she was already late for the examination. She said that because she was already late, the proctor assisted her and asked for her identification (I.D.) picture for the seat plan. Chulyao further claimed that she took the I.D. picture from the small envelope and gave it to the proctor. Later, after a week or two, Chulyao alleged that she received a note from her sister inquiring about the photos she asked her to have developed. Chulyao claimed that she counted her I.D. pictures and there were six (6) copies, while the number of copies her sister had was only five instead of six. She said that she was alarmed about what happened, but she never had the courage to report the same to the CSC.[5] On December 6, 2006, the OCA recommended to this Court the re-docketing of the complaint against Chulyao as a regular administrative matter. It also found Chulyao guilty of dishonesty, thus, recommended that Chulyao be dismissed from service.[6] On January 30, 2007, the Court resolved to re-docket the subject complaint as A.M. No. P-07-2292 (Civil Service Commission, C.A.R., Baguio City v. Rita S. Chulyao, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Barlig, Mountain Province) and further required Chulyao to file her Comment thereon.[7]

In her Comment[8] dated March 27, 2007, Chulyao, as in her previous Comment, reiterated that the irregularity were merely due to inadvertence when she submitted her sister's photo instead of her's to the proctor during the CSPE. She claimed to be unaware that the photo she gave was that of her sister's. Chulyao refuted the allegation that it was her sister, Pangowon, who took the examination for and in her behalf on July 31, 1988 by reasoning that her sister was in Kadaclan, Barlig, Mountain Province, as it was planting season at that time in their ricefield, and she was also working there as a teacher. She claimed that they are lookalikes and that they have the same facial features which she insinuated where the confusion started. She submitted the Affidavit of one Diosdado F. Foyagan,[9] her seatmate at the time of the examination, who attested that he saw Chulyao inside the examination room on July 31, 1988. Chulyao also submitted a document showing that her sister was never absent in her class during said date, thus, she claimed that it was impossible for her sister to be in Baguio City, since it will take two to three days to travel from Barlig to Baguio City and vice- versa. Likewise, Chulyao submitted the Personal Data Sheet of Pangowon to prove that she never took the Civil Service Examination on July 31, 1988. On June 17, 2008, the Court referred the instant matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. Meanwhile, on July 7, 2008, the CSC, in Resolution No. 081285,[10] affirmed the dismissal of Raquel S. Pangowon from service for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. In compliance, on July 22, 2009, in a Memorandum to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the OCA recommended that Chulyao be dismissed from service having found to be guilty of Dishonesty. In its Report, the OCA, adopting the CSC findings, noted that indeed the photo appearing on the picture seat plan over the name and signature of Chulyao was that of her sister, Pangowon. Chulyao even categorically admitted this fact, but denied it was intentional. Likewise, it also found substantial dissimilarity between the signature appearing in Chulyao's personal data sheet and the signature appearing on the picture seat plan. The OCA noted that while Chulyao insisted that the name and signature appearing below the alleged photo of Raquel Pangowon was hers and not of Raquel Pangowon, she, however, failed to present any evidence to prove that the signature appearing on the picture seat plan was really her own. Thus, the OCA concluded that the unexplained discrepancy which is clear to the naked eye is proof enough that indeed another person took the examination for and in behalf of Chulyao. The OCA gave no credence to the documents submitted by Chulyao to prove that her sister was never absent from her classes; thus, she cannot be the one who took the examination. The document presented was merely Pangowon's service record which does not contain any specific log of Pangowon's daily time-in and time-out. The document, therefore, cannot prove that Pangowon was not in Baguio City on July 31, 1988. Likewise, the Affidavit of Foyagan was given scant consideration, since the affidavit was found to be lacking the requisite community tax certificate number and its place and date of issue. Hence, the identity of Foyagan was questionable. Over-all, the OCA found Chulyao's defense as merely an alibi unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence of non-culpability. We adopt the recommendation of the OCA.

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception of fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is also understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[11] In the instant case, respondent Chulyao would like us to believe that she is not liable for dishonesty as the alleged irregularities imputed against her occurred due to mere inadvertence or negligence; thus, in effect raising good faith as her defense for the discrepancies discovered during the CSPE on July 31, 1988. The evidence on record, however, is overwhelming to support the findings that Chulyao employed her sister, Pangowon, to take the July 31, 1988 CSPE conducted in Baguio City for her and in her behalf and claimed the result thereof as her own in her personal data sheet accomplished on April 23, 2007. As observed by the CSC, there was a significant difference in the signature of the examinee Chulyao and that of the true Rita Chulyao. It noted that the true Rita Chulyao spells vividly the letter R and the letter S overlapping each other, while the examinee Rita Chulyao was not able to spell these letters as vividly and vibrantly as that of the true Rita Chulyao. The CSC added that despite the obvious effort on the part of the examinee Rita Chulyao to imitate the signature of the true Rita Chulyao, the former failed to successfully reproduce a signature as that of the true Rita Chulyao. The difference in the loops, lines, slant, pressure, fineness, contours and style revealed that the signatures belong to two different persons. The improbability of Chulyao's claim that the irregularity was due to mere inadvertence when she gave the picture of her sister instead of her own picture for the picture seat plan was clearly explained by the CSC. The CSC ratiocinated, and we quote: The CSC has devised methods and strategies in the conduct of any civil service exam to ensure the integrity of the civil service examination. The procedure in taking any civil service exam is very rigid, stiff and taut. With the well established procedure in administering the Civil Service Exams, it could not and never happen that the I.D. Picture of another person be pasted in the picture seat plan instead of the picture of the actual examinee.This is so because before the I.D. Picture of the examinee is pasted in the seat plan, the proctor will validate if the I.D. Picture submitted by the examinee is the examinee's picture. The proctor will see to it that the I.D. Picture being submitted by the examinee is his or her own picture. After the I.D. is pasted, the examinee will be required to sign below said I.D. and the signature is again validated by the proctor if the said signature is the same as the signature appearing in the application form. Hence, it would be highly improbable that the I.D. picture of another person would be pasted in the PSP.[12]

The CSC maintained that the person who actually took the examination was respondent's sister, Pangowon. The existence of impersonation was all the more established when Chulyao in her comments admitted that the picture appearing on the picture seat plan of the examination room was that of her sister's. The CSC stressed that the impersonation started right from the time of the filling-up of the application form until the actual examination, it was Chulyao's sister who performed all the acts of impersonation using the name of the person impersonated Rita Chulyao. The truth was unveiled only when the result thereof was utilized by the respondent in her employment in the government service. When Chulyao filled up her personal data sheet and attached her photo thereon

and eventually the picture in the personal data sheet was compared to the picture on the picture seat plan, it was only then that the impersonation was discovered, because the person appearing on the picture seat plan was different from the person whose picture was attached to the personal data sheet. No amount of good faith can be attributed to Chulyao. Good faith necessitates honesty of intention, free from any knowledge of circumstances that ought to have prompted him to undertake an inquiry.[13] Chulyao admitted that she discovered after a week or two, from the day of examination, that she had given the picture of her sister to the proctor on July 31, 1988 and yet she did not immediately report and correct said error. When the CSC called her twice to appear before the investigation being conducted regarding the incident, Chulyao failed to appear. An innocent person caught in a like situation would more likely immediately profess his innocence rather than evade an investigation which could shed light on the controversy. A truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.[14] Thus, Chulyao's protestation of good faith and inadvertence are too incredible to be given weight. To our mind, Chulyao acted with malicious intent to perpetrate a fraud. Furthermore, it has been a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the duly accomplished form of the Civil Service is an official document of the Commission, which, by its very nature is considered in the same category as that of a public document, admissible in evidence without need of further proof. As an official document, the contents/entries therein made in the course of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[15] Indeed, Chulyao's act of using for her benefit the fake or spurious civil service eligibility not only amounted to violation of the Civil Service Examinations, but it also resulted to the prejudice of the government and the public in general. Under the Qualification Standards (QS) of the Civil Service Commission, the eligibility needed for the position of Clerk of Court II is Career Service (Professional) Second Level Eligibility. Thus, it is clear that Chulyao was able to get her appointment as Clerk of Court II at the MCTC, Barlig, Mountain Province, by using the obtained result of the July 31, 1988 Career Service Professional Eligibility Examination. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to what are clearly transgressions of the law. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have no place in the Judiciary. Under Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.[16] WHEREFORE, the Court finds RITA S. CHULYAO, Clerk of Court II, of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Barlig, Mountain Province, GUILTY of DISHONESTY and orders her DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations SO ORDERED.

EN BANC RE: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most Recent Apppointments to the Position of Associate

A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC Present:

Justices of the Court of Appeals. CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: September 28, 2010 x-------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION CORONA, C.J.: On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the Supreme Court the appointments of Court Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. Their respective appointment papers were attached to the transmittal letter which read: HON. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Supreme Court of the Philippines Manila Re: Sir: I am pleased to transmit the appointment papers of the following: Appointees xxx Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela Hon. Myra G. Fernandez Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando xxx Positions xxx Associate Justice, CA Associate Justice, CA Associate Justice, CA Associate Justice, CA xxx Appointments to the Judiciary

xxx 5 6 7 8 xxx

March 10, 2010. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) LEANDRO R. MENDOZA

The respective appointment papers of Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela bore the following dates and bar code numbers:

Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment Bar Code No. Justice Fernandez February 16, 2010 55466 Justice Peralta, Jr. February 16, 2010 55467 Justice Hernando February 16, 2010 55468 Justice Antonio-Valenzuela February 24, 2010 55465 All four newly appointed CA Justices took their oath before then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Renato C. Corona on March 10, 2010. After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010 submitted by the members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. According to the CA Committee on Rules, there appears to be a conflict between certain provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA). In particular, Section 1, Rule I thereof provides: RULE I THE COURT, ITS ORGANIZATION AND OFFICIALS SECTION 1. Composition of the Court of Appeals. Unless otherwiseprovided by law, the Court of Appeals is composed of a Presiding Justice and sixty-eight (68) Associate Justices. It sits en banc, or in twenty-three (23) Divisions of three (3) Justices each. The members of the Court are classified into three groups according to the order of their seniority. The date and sequence of the appointment of the Justices determine their seniority courtwide. When a senior member is designated to act as Chairperson of a Division, he/she shall be designated as an Acting Chairperson. In like manner, a junior member designated to act as senior member of a Division shall be an Acting Senior Member. (Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, Section 1, Rule II thereof states: RULE II RULE ON PRECEDENCE AND PROTOCOL SECTION 1. Concept. The Presiding Justice enjoys precedence over all the other members of the Court in all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments as officially transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied) The CA Committee on Rules opined: As between the foregoing provisions, it may be conceded that Section 1, Rule II should prevail over Section 1, Rule I pursuant to the basic rule of statutory construction that gives premium to a specific provision over a general one. However, reckoned alongside the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the above-named Associate Justices, it is our considered view that any conflict between or confusion engendered by the abovequoted provisions should be resolved in accordance with Republic Act No. 8246, entitled An Act Creating Additional Divisions in the Court of Appeals, Increasing the Number of Court of Appeals Justices from Fifty-One (51) to Sixty-Nine (69), Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1990, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Section of said lawcategorically states: Section 1. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and sixty-eight (68) Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President.[1] Evident from the foregoing provision is a clear legislative intent to determine the order of precedence seniority of this Courts Justices according to the dates of their respective appointments. In addition to the general rule of construction that applicable legal provisions should, as far as practicable, always be harmonized with each other, the spirit and intent behind Republic Act No. 8246 should be given precedence if only because it is the enabling law to which the IRCA should conform. Moreover, given its clarity, it also goes without saying that Section 1 of the law should be applied according to its literal tenor, without equivocation and further need of extended ratiocination from the Committee. Applying Section 1, Rule I and Section I, Rule II of the IRCA vis-a-vis Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8246, the order of precedence/seniority among Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr. and Hernando should be determined according to the chronological order indicated in the March 10, 2010 letter of transmittal from Hon. Executive secretary Leandro R. Mendozaand the barcodes accompanying their respective appointment papers. On the other hand, having been appointed on February 16, 2010, it logically follows that said Justices collectively have precedence/seniority over Justice Valenzuela who, despite the placement of her name in said transmittal letter before the names of the other three new justices of the Court of Appeals and the lower bar code number accompanying her appointed, was appointed only on February 24, 2010. xxx xxx xxx

While obviously intended to authenticate the appointment papers under consideration, the mechanically-stamped barcode cannot prevail over the date of appointment indicated in the Presidents own handwriting. Having been personally signed and dated by the President who is the appointing authority, the practical and legal import of said appointment papers of the Justices concerned should be upheld over that of the March 10, 2010 transmittal letter from the Executive Secretary. It should, however, be pointed out that the foregoing interpretation of the Rule on precedence and seniority should only apply to the above named Associate Justices, in view of the peculiar circumstances which attended the issuance/transmission of their appointment papers.[2] Justice Antonio-Valenzuela disagreed with the interpretation of the CA Committee on Rules, insisting that she is the most senior among the four newly appointed CA Associate Justices pursuant to Section 1, Rule 2 of the 2009 IRCA which provides that seniority of the Associate Justices shall be determined according to the order of their appointments as transmitted to the Supreme Court. She argued that the final act in the process of appointing a member of the Judiciary is the transmittal of the appointment to the Supreme Court. She also took serious exception to the statement of the CA Committee on Rules that the foregoing interpretation of the Rule on precedence and seniority should only apply to the above named Associate Justices, in view of the peculiar circumstances which attended the issuance/transmission of their appointment papers. According to her, there was nothing novel or peculiar about the circumstances attending the issuance and transmission of the four newly appointed members of the CA.

The matter was referred to the CA en banc for appropriate action. After deliberation, the CA en banc adopted the opinion of the CA Rules Committee. This was approved by this Court in a resolution dated July 20, 2010. Justice Antonio-Valenzuela now seeks reconsideration of this Courts resolution dated July 20, 2010. She insists that all four CA Associate Justices whose seniority is involved in this matter were appointed on March 10, 2010, the day that their appointments were transmitted by the Office of the President to this Court. We disagree.

An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.[3] Where the power of appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once.[4] The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with.[5] In Valencia v. Peralta,[6] the Court ruled that a written memorial that can render title to public office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the commission. For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the appointee.[7] Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the appointment but only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the appointees receipt and acceptance thereof. For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. In view of the foregoing, the CA en banc acted correctly when it adopted the view of the CA Rules Committee insofar as the reckoning of the seniority of CA Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., Hernando and Antonio-Valenzuela is concerned but erred when it declared that the CA Rules Committees interpretation applies only to the case of the four aforementioned Justices. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of CA Justice Antonio-Valenzuela is hereby DENIED with finality. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Complainant, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248* Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, PEREZ,** and MENDOZA, JJ.

- versus -

JUDGE MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 225, Respondent.

Promulgated: September 29, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary service filed by complainant Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (Judge Angeles) against respondent Hon. Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Judge Sempio Diy), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225, which stemmed from consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 entitled People of the Philippines v. Proclyn Pacay and People of the Philippines v. P/Insp. Roberto Ganias, respectively. Judge Angeles charges respondent Judge Sempio Diy with Violations of Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; Section 2, Canon 2 and Section 5 Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Number 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics; Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Section 4 paragraph b of Republic Act No. 6713 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Falsification of Official Documents; and Dishonesty. Complainant urges the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the respondent and to make an assessment if, indeed, she is still worthy to wear the judicial robe or, if her continued presence on the bench would unduly tarnish the image of the judiciary.[1]

In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge Sempio Diy vehemently denies the material allegations in the complaint. She claims that complainants charges are harsh, rash and baseless, calculated merely to harass and destroy the reputation of a younger sister in the profession.[3] As synthesized by the OCA in its Report[4] dated May 7, 2010, the facts of the case are as follows: Complainant Judge Angeles alleges that she is the private complainant in the abovementioned cases which, by order of respondent Judge Sempio-Diy dated 20 June 2008, were submitted for decision, and the promulgation of judgment was set for 11 September 2008. In a subsequent Order dated 8 September 2008, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy moved the promulgation of judgment to 17 September 2008, for the reason that she had a previously scheduled medical consultation concerning a neck ailment. Thereafter, the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 was cancelled and reset to 17 October 2008, with respondent Judge Sempio-Diy citing voluminous case records and health problems as grounds to support her request before the Court of a thirty (30)day extension.

On 17 October 2008, the promulgation of judgment was once again cancelled and reset to 14 November 2008 on account of a second request for extension of time based on the ground that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy had just recently arrived from a trip to the United States where she attended a symposium on religious freedom. Following a third request for extension of time, the promulgation of judgment was reset for the last time to 12 December 2008. Finally, the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was promulgated on 12 December 2008, wherein all the accused, except for accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, were acquitted. To complainant Judge Angeles, the said Decision was belatedly rendered because there was a lapse of six (6) months from the time it was submitted for resolution to the time it was promulgated. She further avers that her personal examination of the case records revealed that no requests for extension of time to decide the subject cases were made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. Likewise, she notes that the case records do not show that requests for extension of time, if any had indeed been made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy, were granted by the Supreme Court. It is her opinion that such requests and Resolutions of the Supreme Court granting the same should be made integral parts of the case records. As for the reasons proffered by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy for the repeated cancellation and resetting of the dates for promulgation of judgment, complainant Judge Angeles argues that: (1) respondent Judge Sempio-Diys medical check-up could have been done on any other day that would not conflict with the scheduled promulgation; (2) the neck ailment was not as serious as it was made to appear because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy was able to travel abroad to attend a symposium; and(3) the claim that she needed time to study the voluminous case records is not a valid excuse because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy found time to travel abroad instead of attending to her pending cases. In fine, complainant Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where respondent Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay. As it happened, convicted accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino assailed the Joint Decision by filing an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on 5 January 2009, which the prosecution countered in its Opposition filed on 14 January 2009. However, it was not until 30 July

2009, or more than six (6) months later, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued an Order submitting the incident for resolution, it appearing that the accused through counsel has failed to file the necessary pleading despite the period given by the Court. Less than a month later, or on 24 August 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy resolved the pending matter by denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Despite the denial of the said Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, things did not sit well for complainant Judge Angeles. For her, the Resolution dated 24 August 2009 was belatedly issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. First and foremost, she contends that the incident should have been submitted for resolution upon the filing of the prosecutions Opposition on 14 January 2009. And yet, it was more than six (6) months later, or only on 30 July 2009, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued the Order submitting the said incident for resolution. Secondly, complainant Judge Angeles asserts that there was no basis for the trial court to have to wait for more than six (6) months before submitting the motion for resolution considering that there exists no order in the case records directing the accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, through counsel, to file the necessary pleading. Asserting that there was no basis for submitting the incident for resolution only after the lapse of six (6) months, complainant Judge Angeles further contends that the Resolution issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy on 24 August 2009 denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise delayed for a total of more than seven (7) months. To support her assertions, complainant Judge Angeles attached to her COMPLAINT a Certification issued by Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 225, Quezon City, wherein the latter attested that, based on the record of People vs. Proclyn Pacay, et al., Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, it appears that there is no order from the Court directing the defense to file a reply to the Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for Reconsideration) filed by the prosecution on January 14, 2009. She also points out that there appears to be an irregularity in the face of the Order submitting the incident for resolution. In particular, she refers to the date of its issuance July 30, 2009which is written in a different font when compared to the rest of the contents of the said Order. She, therefore, contends that the said date was merely typewritten in lieu of another date which was snowpaked. By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration within the period mandated by law and jurisprudence, as well as in falsifying official documents, complainant Judge Angeles now stresses, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. For her part, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy belies the accusations hurled at her by complainant Judge Angeles in the latters COMPLAINT. In her COMMENT dated 2 December 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy counters that she decided the subject cases in due time and within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court. She maintains that the orders resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good faith and in the interest of full transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the subject cases expeditiously.

For starters, she notes that she merely inherited the subject cases which had already been previously handled by three (3) other judges from the time they were filed in 1995. Thus, the case records were voluminous. For another, the first resetting of the promulgation of judgment from 11 September to 17 September 2008 was occasioned by her illness, which assertion she substantiated by way

of a Medical Certificate. She points out that the setting of the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 is still within the Constitutionally-prescribed 90-day period for deciding the subject cases. As for the three (3) subsequent re-settings, she avers that she timely asked for extensions of the period, all of which were granted by the Supreme Court. To support her claim that she did not incur delay in the promulgation of judgment, she appended to her COMMENT certified true copies of her first and second letters/requests addressed to the then Assistant Court Administrator, Jesus Edwin A. Villasor (now Deputy Court Administrator) and other related documents. These requests were favorably considered by the Court and she was granted an extension of a total of ninety (90) days from 18 September 2008. She likewise attached to her COMMENT a copy of her third letter/request to prove that this was filed prior to the lapse of the original 90-day extended period granted to her. In fine, she insists that there was no unjustified delay when the Joint Decision was finally promulgated on 12 December 2008 as the same was still within the original 90-day extended period reckoned from 18 September 2008. The Courts granting of her third request for an additional thirty (30) days in a Resolution dated 16 February 2009 had, by then, become moot and academic. While she admits that her letters/requests for extension and the Supreme Court Resolutions granting the same were not attached to the voluminous records of the subject cases, she nevertheless manifests that these were kept in a separate folder. With regard to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, she points out that the delay was inadvertently incurred in good faith. During the hearing of the said motion on 29 January 2009, the request of the defense for time to file the necessary pleadings was granted, for which reason, she says, the said motion could not yet be submitted for resolution. She deemed it prudent to give the parties a reasonable period of time within which to submit their adversarial pleadings. To substantiate this contention, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy attached to her COMMENT the transcript of stenographic notes taken on that day and the Minutes of the proceedings of the same day. In the light of the foregoing, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy discredits the import of the Certification issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, by arguing that, while there is no order appearing in the case records directing accused SPO1 Carino to file his Reply to the prosecutions Comment to his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the said directive appears in the Minutes of the hearing conducted on 29 January 2009. She likewise notes that during the said hearing, the said Branch Clerk of Court was not present. Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy likewise attributes the inadvertent delay to the unfortunate crises that befell her, her mother, and the courts personnel sometime in May to July of 2009. She reported to the Office of the Court Administrator that they received a series of death threats which caused, among others, disorientation. Thus, it was only on 30 July 2009, after the semi-annual inventory, that an Order submitting the matter for resolution was issued. She stresses that the incident was resolved within thirty (30) days from its submission. As for the snowpaked correction of the date of the said Order, she avers that this was simply due to a typographical error.[5]

Complainant Judge Angeles filed her Reply to respondents Comment and, thereafter, respondent Judge Sempio Diy filed her Rejoinder in amplification of their respective claims. Later, complainant filed her Sur-Rejoinder on February 9, 2010 while respondent filed her Reply to the Sur-Rejoinder on February 18, 2010.

In its evaluation, the OCA found that Judge Sempio Diy cannot be held guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering the Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 given her seasonably-filed requests for extension of time. The requests were all granted by this Court in the November 24, 2008 Resolution, giving respondent a total extension period of ninety (90) days from September 18, 2008. The OCA, however, opined that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for incurring delay in the resolution of accused Carinos Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against Judge Sempio Diy and that she be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for her delayed action on a motion for reconsideration with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.[6] After a judicious review of the records of the case, this Court determines that the findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, We modify the recommended disposition in light of the circumstances of the case. The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge Sempio Diy in rendering the Joint Decision in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q95-62690. It is the stance of the complainant that Judge Sempio Diy merely sat on the cases for an unreasonable length of time and failed to resolve them within the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. This constituted gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. Judge Angeles accuses respondent of concocting requests for extension and making it appear that these requests were granted by this Court. Complainant avers that she perused the records of the consolidated criminal cases but respondents alleged requests for extension and the Courts Resolutions allowing them were nowhere to be found. Complainants contentions fail. Records reveal that Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions[7] of the period to decide the consolidated criminal cases. All requests were favorably considered by this Court.[8] Respondent was granted a total extension period of ninety (90) days to be reckoned from September 18, 2008 or until December 18, 2008. So, the promulgation of Joint Decision on December 12, 2008 was made well within the 90-day extension period. Complainant should have first verified the veracity and accuracy of her allegations from the records of Branch 225, this Court and the OCA, before hurling accusations of dishonesty and slothful conduct against respondent. Truly, respondent was charged with a litany of imagined sins relative to her alleged undue delay in deciding the subject consolidated criminal cases without sufficient proof. We hold, however, that there was indeed delay in resolving accused Carinos Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 5, 2009. Respondent Judge Sempio Diy claims that the delay in submitting accuseds motion for reconsideration was due to inadvertence and without bad faith on her part. She explains that she opted to wait for the defense to file its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration because the offense of which accused was convicted was serious and his liberty was at stake. She adds that the death threats she and the members of her judicial staff received from May to July 2009, caused them disorientation and contributed further to the delay in the resolution of the subject motion. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual inventory that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were considered submitted for resolution in the July 30, 2009 Order. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct[9] admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15

(1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.[10] This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, requiring judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.[11] A careful perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes[12] and the Minutes[13] of the hearing held on January 29, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-9562690, would clearly show that respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to submit its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter, she would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. As correctly observed by the OCA, the reglementary period to resolve the motion in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten days from January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment.[14] Judge Sempio Diy, having been a member of the judiciary for several years, should not have any trouble disposing the courts business and resolving motions for reconsideration within the required period. Otherwise, she should formally request this Court for an extension of the deadline to avoid administrative liability. Unfortunately, she failed to do that in these cases. Delay in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the law cannot be excused or condoned.[15] Respondents claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not constitute a valid excuse for her inaction. After all, as member of the judiciary, she must display diligence and competence amid all adversities to live up to her oath of office. Besides, when said threats were received from May to July 2009, the three-month mandatory period for resolving the motion had already expired. Accordingly, respondent cannot rely on said predicament to exonerate her from administrative liability for incurring undue delay in resolving the subject motion. Although it is true that Judge Sempio Diy finally issued a resolution[16] denying accused Carinos motion for reconsideration on August 24, 2009 or within 30 days from the time the incident was submitted for resolution on July 30, 2009, her inaction on the motion for more than 6 months is not excused. It appears that respondent has simply forgotten about the pending motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases became inactive due to the failure of the defense to submit its reply. The realization of the blunder came only during the semi-annual inventory of the courts cases. This situation could have been avoided had respondent adopted an effective system of record management and organization of dockets to monitor the flow of cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of the courts business. Elementary court management practice requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases pending before her sala, especially those that are pending for more than 90 days, so that she can act on them promptly and without delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista,[17] the Court declared: A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.

The Court reminds the respondent of her duty to closely supervise and monitor the monthly docket inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently, the Court held in Gordon v. Judge Lilagan:[18] The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious dispensation of justice. Although this responsibility primarily rests in the presiding judge, it is shared with the court staff. This Court has consistently required Judges for a continuous inventory of cases on a monthly basis so that a trial judge is aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of the branch clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared indicating the steps to be taken to keep the cases moving. In Juan v. Arias [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court underscored the importance of this physical inventory stressing it is only by this that the judge can keep himself abreast of the status of the pending cases and informed that everything is in order in his court. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[19] this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against her as a member of the bar.[20] Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1[21] and 12[22] as well as Rules 1.03[23] and 12.04[24] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In determining the sanction to be imposed on errant magistrates, the Court considers the factual milieu of each case, the offending acts or omissions of the judges, as well as previous transgressions, if any. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive that could have compelled respondent to delay the resolution of the subject motion. In fact, when respondent found out about the unresolved subject motion in the consolidated cases, she immediately ordered its submission for resolution on July 30, 2009. In the absence of malice, the delay could only be due to inadvertence. It is significant to note that respondent resolved the motion within thirty days from its submission date which clearly showed her effort to zealously attend to her duties. Lastly, it appears that this is her first infraction and the first time for her to face an administrative complaint of this kind. Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However, considering that this is her first infraction due to inadvertence, We believe that admonition will suffice. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy is found to have been in delay in the rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 and is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary period for disposing of motions. SO ORDERED.