Plaintiff's Sixth Amended Petition in Parsons v. DuPont, ConocoPhillips, Baron & Budd, Windle Turley, Greenberg and Motsenbocker

No. 017-217971-06 ROGER K. PARSONS.
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF ESTHER ANN KARTSOTIS PARSONS.
Plaintiff, VS. ROBERT M. GREENBERG; LEGAL SERVICES P.C . ROBERT M. GREENBERG. ATTORNEY; ROBERT E. MOTSENBOCKER; SHAFER. DAVIS. 0 'LEARY & STOKER. INC. flkla SHAFER. DAVIS. MCCOLLUM. ASHLEY. O'LEARY & STOKER. INC.; LISA A. BLUE BARON AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK M. BARON; BARON & BUDD. P.C.; E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; CONOCOPHILLIPS f/kla CONOCO. INC.; RONALD WINDLE TURLEY; AND LAW OFFICES OF WINDLE TURLEY. P.C . a/kla TURLEY LAW FIRM. P.C.; Defendants,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
TARRANT COUNTY. TEXAS
17th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION TO THE HONORABLE TARRANT COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE: ROGER K. PARSONS. INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF ESTHER ANN KARTSOTIS PARSONS ("Parsons" or "Plaintiff"). files this amended petition complaining of ROBERT M. GREENBERG; LEGAL SERVICES P.C . ROBERT M. GREENBERG. ATTORNEY;
PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION
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ROBERT E. MOTSENBOCKER; SHAFER DAVIS, O'LEARY & STOKER, INC. flkla SHAFER, DAVIS, MCCOLLUM, ASHLEY, O'LEARY & STOKER, INC.; LISA A. BLUE BARON AS THE EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK M. BARON; BARON & BUDD, P.C.; E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; CONOCOPHILLIPS
f/kla CONOCO, INC.; RONALD WINDLE TURLEY; AND LAW OFFICES OF WINDLE
TURLEY, P.C., a/kla TURLEY LAW FIRM, P.C., Defendants herein, and would respectfully show the Court as follows:
I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
1.01
This case is Discovery Control Plan Level 3.

II. PARTIES AND SERVICE
2.01
Roger K. Parsons ("Parsons") is an individual resident of Dallas, Dallas
County, Texas. He is the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons ("Ann Parsons"). 2.02 Defendant Robert M. Greenberg ("Greenberg") is an individual resident of
Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.03 Defendant Legal Services P.C. Robert M. Greenberg, Attorney ("Legal
Services") is a professional corporation formed and operating under the laws of the State of Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.04 Defendant Robert E. Motsenbocker ("Motsenbocker") is an individual
resident of Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.05 Defendant Shafer Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc. f/kla Shafer, Davis,
McCollum, Ashley, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc. ("SDO&S") is a professional corporation
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formed and operating under the laws of the State of Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.06 Defendant, Lisa A. Blue Baron ("Blue") as the Executrix of the Estate of
Frederick M. Baron ("Baron") as was duly created in the Probate Court and is before this court for all purposes. 2.07 Defendant Baron & Budd, P .C. ("B&B") is a professional corporation
formed and operating under the laws of the State of Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.08 Defendant E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company ("DuPont") is a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.09 Defendant ConocoPhillips ("Conoco") is a foreign corporation that is
licensed to do business in Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.10 Defendant Ronald Windle Turley ("Turley") is an individual resident of
Texas and is before this court for all purposes. 2.11 Defendant Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. ("LOWT") a/kla Turley Law
Firm, P.C., is a professional corporation formed and operating under the laws of the State of Texas and is before this court for all purposes. III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3.01 This court has jurisdiction over this dispute, the amount in question being
in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this Court. Venue is proper in Tarrant County because it is the county where Legal Services P.C., Robert M. Greenberg, Attorney had its principal office at times relevant to this complaint.
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IV DEFINITIONS
4.01
In the following, the phrase "the DuPont/Conoco Defendants" refers to
DuPont and Conoco collectively. 4.02 In the following, the phrase "the Turley Defendants" refers to Turley and
LOwr collectively. 4.03 In the following, the phrase "the Baron Defendants" refers to Baron and
B&B collectively. 4.04 In the following, the phrase "the Greenberg Defendants" refers to
Greenberg and Legal Services collectively. 4.05 In the following, the phrase "the Motsenbocker Defendants" refers to
Motsenbocker and SDO&S collectively. 4.06 In the following the phrase "the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants"
refers to Greenberg and Motsenbocker collectively. 4.07 In the following the phrase "the Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker
Defendants" refers to Baron and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants collectively.

V. FACTS
A. The investigation in anticipation of the Parsons v. Turlev litigation
5.01
In September 1991, Ann Parsons died in the crash of a corporate jet that
was owned by DuPont; operated by Conoco, a DuPont subsidiary and the Parsons' employer; and piloted by Kenneth R. Fox ("Fox"), a DuPont employee who was under contract to and the supervision of the jet operator, Conoco. Collectively, the Parsons served Conoco as management-professionals for more than twenty-five years.
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5.02
In July 1996, on Baron's referral and recommendation, Parsons hired
Greenberg, the Barons' friend and lawyer, and corporate and/or captive counsel of B&B, to investigate and prosecute claims of fraud, breach of duty and trust, and legal negligence and gross negligence against the Turley Defendants; and conspiracy to defraud and fraud upon a federal court against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants; the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' aviation liability insurer and the Turley Defendants' professional liability insurer, American International Group, Inc. ("AIG"); and Gardere & Wynne, LLP ("G&W') partner Martin E. Rose ("Rose"), who has represented the DuPont/C9noco Defendants and AIG continuously in all matters relating to the 1991 jet crash. Parsons instructed Greenberg to investigate and otherwise prepare to prosecute the Turley Defendants and the DuPont/Conoco Defendants for conspiracy to defraud Parsons of his damages rights in Parsons v. DuPont1 and Parsons v. Conoco2
I
two
cases that the Turley Defendants handled as Parsons' trial lawyers from November 1991 until June 1997.
1 On February 18,1992, Turley filed PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL PETITION AND JURY DEMAND in Roger K. Parsons, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons, deceased, and Vasilios and Sofia Kartsotis, Individually v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company th (Cause No. 92-004801) in the 189 District Court of Harris County, Texas. The case was removed under diversity jurisdiction to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division (Civil Action No. H-92-788) and assigned to U.S. District Court Chief Judge Norman W. Black ("Black"). Parsons unsuccessfully appealed two trial court decisions in Parsons v. DuPont to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Mandate in the first appeal (No. 94-20756) was issued on July 18, 1996; and mandate in the second appeal (No. 98-20219) was issued on December 31,1998. 2 On September 2, 1993, Turley filed PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL PETITION AND JURY DEMAND in Roger K. Parsons, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons, deceased, and Vasilios and Sofia Kartsotis, Individually v. Linda L. Fox, as Executrix of the Estate of Kenneth R. Fox, deceased; Linda L. Johnston, as Executrix of the Estate of Gary Gene Johnston, deceased; and Conoco, Inc (Cause No. 93-046091) in the 80th District Court of Harris County, Texas. Parsons appealed the trial court summary judgment in Parsons v. Conoco to the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas at Houston (14-95-00984-CV); however, because Turley had failed to file a timely notice of appeal, this appeal was dismissed and mandate was issued on November 27, 1995.
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5.03
Parsons accepted Greenberg's recommendations that Parsons contract
the Motsenbocker Defendants as Greenberg's co-counsel and Corporate Intelligence, Inc. investigator F. Clifton Cameron ("Cameron") for investigation services that the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants needed to develop all of Parsons' legal claims. 5.04 The Turley Defendants' pleadings in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation and
the Parsons v. Conoco litigation, and Greenberg's subsequent representations in a settlement negotiation with Lynn, lead Parsons to believe that the conspiracy to defraud him had caused Parsons damages of at least $29 million (1998-dollars) in unrecovered claims pled by the Turley Defendants in Parsons v. DuPont and Parsons v. Conoco, and that were indemnified under a $100 million AIG aviation liability policy held by the DuPontlConoco Defendants. 3 Parsons' negligence and gross negligence claims against the Turley Defendants were indemnified under a $5 million AIG professional liability policy that was in continuous effect almost throughout the Turley Defendants' engagement as Parsons' triallawyers. 4
3 In his pleadings the Turley Defendants explicitly stated the amounts of damages Parsons was justified in demanding from DuPont and Conoco - $19 million in compensatory damages, and $10 million each (severally) in punitive damages. The liability and damages claims the Turley Defendants pled against DuPont and Conoco was within the terms and limits of the $100 million aviation liability policy issued and brokered to the DuPont/Conoco Defendants by two wholly owned subsidiaries of AIG National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania and AIG Aviation, Inc., herein collectively referred to herein as "AIG". AIG assigned the insurers' retained counsel Rose to defend the companies under the AIG policy against Parsons' claims.
4 On March 4, 1992, shortly after filing the original complaint in Parsons v. DuPont, Turley accepted a profeSSional liability insurance contract with AIG. AIG renewed Turley's so-called "claimsmade" policy each year until April 27, 1997, when Turley switched to Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (CCIC) after learning Baron had recommended that Parsons to hire Greenberg to investigate and prosecute the Turley Defendants for aiding and abetting the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' conspiracy to defraud Parsons of his legal rights. To obtain the new CCIC claims-made policy, Turley knowingly misrepresented on the CCIC policy application form that he had no reasons to believe that Parsons would file claims against Turley within the CCIC policy period that arose from errors or omissions that occurred prior to the beginning of CCIC policy period on April 27, 1997. On July 21, 1998, while attending an extrajudicial negotiation meeting that had been set-up by Greenberg and the Turley Defendants' lawyer, Barbara M. G. Lynn ("Lynn"), Parsons learned for the first time that Lynn knew she was being paid to defend the Turley Defendants under a CCIC claims-made policy that Turley had obtained through
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5.05
Between late 1996 and late 1997, Greenberg and Cameron identified
several witnesses who Turley intentionally did not take their testimony as evidence and who stated that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had actual subjective awareness before the jet crash about the dangers in ordering Fox to plan and fly the complex, nineteen-day, around-the-world trip that ended tragically in on September 4, 1991. The testimony of these witnesses and corroborating documentary evidence that was readily available to but intentionally not used by the Turley Defendants included the following. (1) The testimony Allen Duane Catterson ("Catterson"), a contract physician (servant) of Conoco, who had conducted a thorough medical examination of DuPont employee-pilot (servant) Fox a few weeks before Fox left Houston on the fatal aroundthe-world trip and who had provided Conoco and Fox the results of Fox's blood test that showed that Fox suffered from "alcoholism."s The DuPont/Conoco Defendants had therefore received actual notice that Fox was legally unqualified to pilot any aircraft at the time he flew the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' jet into the ground in Malaysia killing himself and the eleven other people onboard on September 4, 1991. The knowledge the DuPont's and Conoco's servants, Fox and Catterson, regarding Fox's alcoholism is imputed to these servants' masters, Conoco and DuPont. (2) The testimony of Frank I. Cardamone ("Cardamone"), a retired senior check pilot who had been employed by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants for thirty years, and
Turley's fraudulent representations to CCIC. Lynn opened herself to extortion threats from those who knew she was accepting money as fees obtained through Turley's insurance fraud against CCIC while she was being vetted for a federal judgeship she wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI").
5 As defined by the 1991 Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 67, Subpart A, 67.13 (d)(1)(i)(c), 67.15 (d)(1)(i)(c), and 67.17 (d)(1)(i)(c): "As used in this section, "alcoholism" means a condition in which a person's intake of alcohol is great enough to damage physical health or personal or social functioning, or when alcohol has become a prerequisite to normal functioning."
as a matter of federal regulations that had effect of law, PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION Page 7 of91
who had written numerous letters in the two (2) years prior to the jet crash in Malaysia to the companies' senior managers, including DuPont Chairman and Conoco CoChairman Edgar S. Woolard, Jr. ("Woolard"), stating that unless the DuPontlConoco Defendants' senior managers took immediate action to correct the gross
mismanagement of the DuPontlConoco Defendants' aviation operations, employees and their families would be killed in a predictable jet crash. 5.06 Other evidence showed that the DuPontlConoco Defendants had
conspired to cover up the underlying causes for the jet crash by destroying (1) all of Fox's remains recovered from the crash site by the Royal Malaysian Police; (2) the original cockpit voice recorder ("CVR") recording recovered from the crash site by the Malaysian Department of Civil Aviation; and (3) the parts of Fox's medical file containing the Catterson's report to the DuPontlConoco Defendants showing that by August 1991, Fox's long-term excessive consumption of alcohol had caused measureable damage to Fox's liver establishing pursuant to the 1991 FAR that Fox suffered from alcoholism and was thereby legally unqualified to pilot any aircraft. 5.07 When Parsons interviewed Turley in November 1991, he asked Turley if
he had any conflicts with AIG that Parsons believed had bribed Malaysian government officials to cover-up the causes for the jet crash for which AIG had indemnified the DuPontlConoco Defendants' liability. Turley stated he did not have a conflict with AIG. That representation was false because Turley was previously covered by AIG and was in the process of negotiating new coverage with AIG in this timeframe. Turley knew at the time the representation was false. However, a month after Turley filed the original complaint in Parsons v. DuPont, he obtained a $5 million professional liability policy
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from AIG. Turley and Rose knew from Parsons' second deposition for Parsons v.
DuPont, in October 1993, that Parsons had conducted interviews on his most recent trip
to Malaysia to investigate the jet crash that lead Parsons to believe that AIG was violating the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by influencing Malaysian government officials responsible for investigating the jet crash into aiding and abetting AIG's and the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' cover-up of the gross mismanagement of the
DuPont/Conoco Defendants' aviation operations. Consequently, AIG, Rose, the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants knew that if Parsons learned about the Turley Defendants' conflict of interests with AIG, Parsons would fire the Turley Defendants and retain new lawyers. 6 5.08 Turley knew that Conoco President and DuPont Executive Vice President Constantine S. Nicandros had offered Parsons up to $8 million to release the DuPont/Conoco Defendants from liability for the wrongful death of Ann Parsons in October 1991. Turley therefore believed that he if he breached fiduciary duties he owed Parsons by withholding critical evidence available to him showing that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' were guilty of gross negligence, that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants would supplement whatever his insurer, AIG, would agree to pay on the claims for a sizable settlement from which Turley could extract his contingency fee. However, Parsons, concerned with the safety of his friends and colleagues who continued to work at his former employer, insisted that Turley introduce the evidence at trial in the federal court showing that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' were guilty of gross negligence. However, Turley refused to do as Parsons had instructed, and
6 Parsons first learned of the Turley Defendants' conflict of interest with AIG in 1999, during discovery for Parsons v. Turley.
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choose to aid and abet the AIG and DuPont/Conoco conspiracy to intentionally defraud the federal court of the critical evidence it needed to arrive at an equitable judgment. 5.09 Consequently, although the Turley Defendants knew that the
DuPont/Conoco Defendants had conspired to defraud Parsons of the evidence the Turley Defendants needed to prove Parsons' legal claims, the Turley Defendants, despite Parsons' explicit instructions, intentionally did not file any motion with the courts handling Parsons v. DuPont or Parsons v. Conoeo seeking (1) a spoliation instruction, or (2) a finding of fraud upon the federal court to have the judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV') in Parsons v. DuPont set aside. Through their actions and inactions, the Turley Defendants were knowingly aiding and betting the conspiracy organized by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, and the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' and the Turley Defendants' insurer, AIG, to defraud Parsons of his legal rights to the evidence that the conspirators were concealing, or to have the court instruct the jury on how to understand the evidence that the conspirators could be shown to have destroyed. 5.10 In December 1996, Parsons requested copies of the files that had been generated by the Turley Defendants for Parsons' cases. Parsons provided the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants with all of the documents showing that the Turley Defendants had intentionally not used the evidence proving the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' spoliation and gross negligence liability. In the discovery process for the
Parsons v. Turley litigation two years later, a more complete version of the Turley
Defendants' files was produced revealing that the Turley Defendants had knowingly aided and betted a conspiracy organized by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and AIG, the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' and the Turley Defendants' insurer, to defraud Parsons
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of his legal right to show the jury evidence the conspirators had concealed in discovery, or a ruling by the court that the DuPontlConoco Defendants had engaged in spoliation of evidence to cover up Fox's alcoholism and conceal Cardamone's warning letters.
5.11
On October 29, 1997, Greenberg filed a motion to perpetuate the
testimony of four fact witnesses that the Turley Defendants had intentionally avoided deposing in Parsons v. DuPont and Parsons v. Conoco. 7
5.12
By January 13, 1998, Barbara M. G. Lynn ("Lynn"), a partner in
Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P. ("CCS&B"), a close friend of Baron, Blue and Greenberg, and a casual social acquaintance of Parsons, notified Greenberg that she would represent the Turley Defendants in the ancillary litigation that Greenberg had initiated in anticipation of filing a suit against the Turley Defendants. In February and March 1998, Greenberg took the four depositions that he had been authorized to take; and Lynn represented the Turley Defendants in these depositions.
5.13
By May 1998, when Laynn appeared as Greenberg's co-counsel in the
Texas Fourth Court of Appeals mandamus action discussed below in the footnote relating to the B&B Memo Scandal;8 Lynn knew that Greenberg's investigation had
7 On October 29,1997, Greenberg filed VERIFIED PETITION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING DEPOSITIONS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY in In Re: Roger K. Parsons, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons, deceased (Cause No. 97-9749-M) in the th 298 District Court of Dallas County, Texas - District Judge Adolph P. Canales, presiding.
B&B Memo Scandal While Parsons was paying Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants to prepare Parsons' lawsuit against Turley, they were embroiled in doing damage control in a scandal for B&B. The "Baron & Budd Memo Scandal" shall refer to the allegations arising from the discovery that Baron and B&B officers had conspired to defraud defendant companies and the courts overseeing B&B prosecution of its clients' asbestos personal injury claims against the defendant companies through the subornation of false testimony from B&B clients. The B&B Memo Scandal first came to the attention of the non-lawyer public through a series of articles published by the Dallas Observer, including, but not limited to: "The control freak" on August 13, 1998; "Toxic Justice" on August 13, 1998; "No-energy investigation" on September 3, 1998; and "Homefryin' with Fred Baron" on March 29, 2001. According to these articles, and the pleadings and judicial findings in the litigation that these articles reference, on August 27, 1997, a B&B
8
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client, Willie Roy Reathy ("Reathy"), appeared to give his deposition for a case pending in Nueces County, Texas. Counsel for one of the defendants asked Reathy about the documents that were before him at the deposition. Reathy answered that he brought the documents from his home. When the attorney asked whether she could see the documents, Reathy's B&B attorney handed the documents to her. The document handed to the defendant's attorney was entitled Preparing for Your Deposition/Attorney Work Product" ("B&B Memo"). The defendant companies suspected that the B&B Memo was evidence that Baron, in his capacity as President of B&B, had implemented a corporate policy and/or business strategy to create false memories in and/or illicit false testimony from B&B clients to unjustly enrich Baron and B&B through the 40% contingency fee that B&B extracted from the defendants' payments on the settlement or judgment debts that were thereby fraudulently obtained by B&B in the names of B&B's unwitting clients. Acting upon on their suspicions, the defendant companies in B&B cases in Cause No. 93-10952 th in the 98 District Court of Travis County before District Judge K. Dietz ("Dietz" and in Cause No. 94-CIth 10078 in the 285 District Court of Bexar County District Judge Michael P. Peden ("Peden") moved for temporary injunctions to prevent B&B and their clients from destroying any materials exchanged between them and to stay the discovery in all B&B cases except for discovery relating to the B&B Memo. Dietz and Peden granted the defendant companies' motions finding that their arguments that the B&B Memo fell within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege rule that would otherwise allow B&B to withhold the materials exchanged between B&B and the firms' clients as attorney work-product because it was evidence of a scheme to commit a fraud. On October 13, 1997, Baron and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants petitioned the Texas Third Court of Appeals at Austin for mandamus relief from Dietz's rulings; and on January 8, 1998, the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants and CCS&B lawyers petitioned the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals at San Antonio for mandamus relief from Peden's order. The Third Court of Appeals at Austin conditionally granted the petition for mandamus relief from Dietz's order in Cause Number 03-97-00609CV styled /n re Beverly Jean Brown, et al. (Cause No. 93-10952); In re Kenneth Shirley, et al.; In re Jimmy Leon Smathers, et a/. on April 30, 1998. By February 1998, Baron's counterattacks against the defendants' immediate victories in the Travis County and Bexar County courts were extended to the flings of motions seeking sanctions against an officer of one of the defendant companies for criminal or punitive contempt in twelve B&B cases before th Texas 116 District Court Judge Martin E. Richter ("Richter") in Dallas County, where Baron's large political contributions had long established Baron's influence with almost all politician-judges and politician-justices in the courts of Texas Fifth Judicial District. On April 30, 1998, Richter granted the B&B's motion. On September 7, 1999, the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals of Dallas denied the petition for mandamus relief from Richter's order in Cause No. 05-98-01965-CV, styled In Re James F. Cobb arising from twelve cases before Richter: Cause Nos. 94-04691, 94-05172, 96-06046, 96-00932, 94-04685, 9708803,96-07554,96-06853, 96-11832, 96-10846, 94-07869, and 94-05119. In February 1998, Texas 14th District Court Judge John M. Marshall, appalled by Baron's tactics, asked Dallas County District Attorney John Vance ("Vance") to investigate Baron and B&B. In response, Baron and Baron's lawyers at CCS&B used its political influence with Vance to have CCS&B partner Luke Madole - ... a bright young attorney who had recently joined John Vance's staff after a very successful career with a large law firm .. : - assigned as the assistant district attorney to "handle" the grand jury's he investigation. At Madole's first meeting with the members of the grand jury that Madole claimed that had considerable contact from Baron & Budd representatives wanting to know what... " the grand jury was doing. Subsequently, the grand jury's scheduled for meeting on May 20, 1998, was cancelled and the grand jury term was allowed to expire on June 30, 1998, despite Madole's representations to the members of the grand jury that the case would require that the term be extended for an additional 90 days. The day the grand jury was scheduled to meet; Lynn announced her appearance as Greenberg's co-counsel in the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals mandamus action arising from the B&B Memo scandal.
II
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The Dallas Observer reported that in February 1998, Baron had a complaint against Marshall filed with the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Dallas Observer also reported that Baron used his considerable influence that generous political contributions had bought him with the trial judges and the appellate justices of the Texas Fifth Judicial District to block the defendant companies' attempts to make the B&B Memo a fraud issue in the B&B cases being adjudicated in Dallas County courts. The Texas Fifth Court of Appeals at Dallas denied defendants petition for mandamus relief on April 1, 1999 from an th order by Texas 68 District Court Judge Gary Hall ("Hall") finding that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege rule did not apply to the discovery of the documents related to the B&B Memo. In Re All Plaintiffs in Asbestos Litigation with Pending Sanctions Motions against F. Cobb (Case No. 05-9900400-CV) was the mandamus action against Hall in seventy-one cases. Baron used Lynn to leverage CCS&B's influence with the Texas Third and Fourth Judicial Districts to gain favorable rulings there, and soon after Baron had quashed the criminal investigation and the civil actions arising from the B&B Memo Scandal in the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, Greenberg and Lynn succeeded in having the Texas Third and Fourth Courts of Appeals grant B&B's mandamus request blocking the defendant companies from unearthing any additional evidence that could be used to prove that Baron and B&B were engaging in a fraud. The Texas Third and Fourth Courts of Appeals ruled that because there was no evidence that the B&B clients had knowledge of the B&B conspiracy, that the attorney-client privilege was a bar to the defendant companies using the B&B Memo and the related documents in their cases. The appellate justices writing the opinions make no mention that the purpose of the attomey-client privilege is protect the clients' interests, not the lawyers' interests in concealing from their clients the lawyers' liability for legal malpractice, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Although the appellate justices' erroneous opinion could have been reversed by appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, the defendant companies' lawyers choose to use the treat of an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas to extort Baron and B&B into inducing the B&B clients into signing below fair-value settlement agreements for their legal claims. The defendant companies, Baron and B&B had entered into a conspiracy to use B&B position of trust to fraudulently induce B&B clients into below fair-value settlement agreements that unjustly enriched the defendant companies, by evading payment of a fair-value for the injuries they had caused, and B&B, by the extraction of the B&B 40% contingency fee from the firm's clients' low-ball settlements. The B&B Memo Scandal had initially only created potential legal malpractice claims against B&B by a few of the firm's clients, but the conspiracy to fraudulently induce B&B clients into lowball settlement agreements gave rise to new legal claims of conspiracy to commit fraud and breach of fiduciary duty that no B&B clients have yet asserted. Although the Dallas Observer and legal-profession media outlets reported on the controversy arising from the B&B Memo, the reporting focused on the impact that the B&B Memo Scandal had on the business and career interests of the defendant companies, celebrity plaintiffs' lawyers like Baron and/or Texas politician-judges that Baron had allegedly succeeded or failed in influencing with promises of political contributions laundered through B&B and other Texas law firms controlled by lawyers whose interests were aligned with Baron's interests. At the time, few of the Judges or Justices in the Fifth JUdicial District faced opposition in elections for their political-judicial offices. Consequently, there was no legitimate use for the tens of thousands of dollars in political contributions that flowed to these Justices. In Texas, neither law academics nor practitioners commented publically about Baron's and B&B's breach of the firm's fiduciary duty to its clients to seek the firms' clients' informed consent for B&B to continuing to represent them in cases that had been damaged by the revelations of the B&B Memo Scandal, and to advise them that it may be in the clients' best interests to retain new lawyers to pursue fair-value recovery on their legal claims. By the beginning of 2001, Baron's, the Greenberg Defendants' and Lynn's efforts to keep B&B clients ignorant of their legal claims against B&B had been very successful - except for two cases that threatened to expose evidence that Baron had been extorted by the defendant companies into
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unearthed evidence that the DuPontlConoco Defendants had received actual written notice of Fox's alcoholism well before the jet crash, and had concealed all evidence that could have been used to prove Fox's alcoholism or that Fox's physical/mental competence was ever in question as the probable proximate cause for the jet crash. 5.14 However, the Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants failed to warn
Parsons that the Baron Defendants had conflicting interests with Parsons in managing Lynn's and the Greenberg Defendants' work on cases that threatened to bankrupt the Baron Defendants, while simultaneously ordering the Greenberg Defendants to accommodate Lynn's "busy schedule" until after Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker
fraudulently inducing B&B clients into accepting the defendant companies' lowball settlement offers. The first case, G-I Holdings v. Baron was filed by one of the defendant companies that had been financially exhausted through the irrational rulings of Texas' politician-judges who appeared to be more concerned with Baron's business interests than they were with the interests of the Texas citizens who had elected them to administer justice under Texas law. G-I Holdings brought claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") (18 U.S.C. 1961), in federal court in New York that continues to this day. On January 10, 2001, G/-Holdings, Inc. v. Barron & Budd, et al (Case No. 01-CV-0216) was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York at New York City. The case is now pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Case No 06-0174-CV). In Texas, Baron fought associated legal skirmishes to block G-I Holdings' investigation of the fraud claims asserted by the company in G-I Holdings v. Baron & Budd, et al., e.g. Baron & Budd, P.C. Kroll Associates, Inc., Unda Butterfield, and Misty Hillis (Cause No. 01-00852-G/K) in the 1341h/192"d Judicial Districts of Dallas County, Texas and Baron & Budd, P.C. v Kroll Associates, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas at Dallas (Cause No. 3-01-CV-0239-D). The second case, Karin Jacobs, Patria Jacobs and JoeAnn Frost v. William Tapscott v. Baron & Budd,(Jacobs v Baron & Budd) was filed by three B&B clients who realized they had been induced into Signing releases for their claims for an amount that was far less than B&B had represented to them they would receive. In this case, the Greenberg Defendants defended B&B against these claims. The case, Cause No. 3:04-cv-01968, was assigned to U.S. District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, like Lynn, a long-time political ally of Baron and Greenberg. Judge Fitzwater granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims of negligence, gross negligence, misrepresentation, breach of contract and attorneys' fees, leaving the plaintiffs with only claims of breach of fiduciary duty and disgorgement of the 40% contingency fee B&B extracted from the low-ball settlement the plaintiffs were induced to accept In a trial on the remaining issues, the jury found that B&B lawyer William K. Tapscott, Jr. (at the time of trial, through the political support of Baron had been recently elected as a Dallas County court of law judge) had lied to the Jacobs and caused them $129,000 in damages through his breach of fiduciary duty. However, Judge Fitzwater granted the defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) thereby nUllifying the jury's verdict and denying the Jacobs recovery of any damages from B&B. Mandate on Jacobs' unsuccessful appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (No. 07-10588) was issued on June 2, 2008, and the United States Supreme Court denied their writ of certiorari (No, 080160) on October 6, 2008. PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION Page 14 of91
Defendants and Lynn were (erroneously) confident that the statute of limitations, at least Parsons legal malpractice claims, had expired. 5.15 In February 1999, after Parsons had reviewed the professional liability
insurance contracts that Turley had produced in Parsons v. Turley, Parsons told the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants that the insurance contracts between the Turley Defendants and AIG, that were in effect between 1992 and 1997, was evidence that the Turley Defendants had had a conflict of interest with AIG throughout the Turley Defendants' representation of Parsons. Furthermore, AIG and AIG insureds, the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants, knew that if Parsons discovered the Turley Defendants' conflict of interest with AIG, Parsons would immediately fire the Turley Defendants. 9 5.16 Lynn represented the Turley Defendants in the depositions taken in
anticipation of filing suit against the Turley Defendants under a CCIC professional liability policy that Turley had obtained in April 1997, after the Turley Defendants learned Parsons had hired the Greenberg Defendants and Cameron to investigate Parsons' claims against him. 5.17 To obtain the benefits of the CCIC policy for the Turley Defendants, Turley
had made material misrepresentations on the CCIC insurance application form by falsely stating that he had no reason to suspect that a legal claim would be filed against
9 In April 1993 Parsons made a public statement at the annual meeting of DuPont/Conoco shareholders summarizing a letter he had written that month to DuPont directors warning that AIG had used its substantial political influence with Malaysian government to derail the jet crash investigation to for obvious reasons of minimizing its liability under the $100 million AIG aviation liability policy sold to the DuPont/Conoco Defendants. Parsons asked the DuPont/Conoco board to investigate the underlying causes for the jet crash and not to rely upon AIG to discover the safety problems that. because of their continuing neglect. still threaten the lives of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' employees.
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the CCIC policy within the proposed coverage period (April 1997 to April 1998) for errors or omissions that had occurred before the coverage period began. 1o 5.18 Lynn and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants knew that Lynn's fees
were being paid under the CCIC professional liability policy that Turley had obtained by fraud against CCIC. However, Lynn surprisingly continued to represent the Turley Defendants and survived vetting as a federal judicial appointee, even after Turley's fraud against CCIC had been made obvious by documents produced by Lynn on behalf of the Turley Defendants. Later, Lynn and Turley fraudulently induced the Greenberg Defendants into delaying service of citation upon the Turley Defendants. Lynn and Turley then used the Greenberg Defendants inducement into breaching fiduciary duties owed to Parsons by the late service as an affirmative defense in obtaining summary judgment against Parsons' legal malpractice claims. However to aid and abet Lynn's and the Turley Defendants' conspiracy to defraud Parsons of his legal rights, the Greenberg Defendants intentionally did not use the evidence showing that the fraudulent inducement of the Greenberg Defendants was part of a conspiracy cover up the Lynn's and Turley Defendants' conspiracy to defraud CCIC of the Lynn's fees.
B. The Parsons v. Turley litigation

5.19 On June 12, 1998, the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants filed the
original petition in Parsons v. Turley that had been anticipated by the ancillary litigation to perpetuate testimony in which Lynn had represented the Turley Defendants since February 1998. The same day, the Greenberg Defendants faxed a file-stamped copy of the original petition to Lynn with a cover letter stating if Turley, Lynn and a
10 LOwr lawyer Michael G. Sawicki testified in his deposition for this case (Parsons v. Greenberg, et a/.) that Turley had told him before the Parsons v. DuPont trial in July 1994, that Turley expected Parsons to sue the Turley Defendants for legal malpractice.
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representative from each of the Turley Defendants' insurers, including excess insurers would meet with Parsons and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants to discuss the case, then the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants would withhold service of process on the Turley Defendants. 5.20 The Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants told Parsons that because the
original petition in Parsons v. Turley had been timely filed, there was no harm in participating the meeting. In the eight years Parsons employed them, the
Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants never advised Parsons that to timely perfect Parsons' claims in Parsons v. Turley, Texas law required that either Turley be served with a citation within the statute of limitations, even if the Turley Defendants' lawyer in the ancillary litigation to perpetuate testimony in anticipation of filing the same lawsuit had acknowledged receiving a file-stamped copy of the timely filed original petition; or that there be an enforceable agreement, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, agreeing to forego the assertion of a limitations defense for late service of process upon the Turley Defendants in exchange for Parsons meeting with the Turley Defendants, and the Turley Defendants' lawyers and insurers, to discuss the early settlement of Parsons' claims before the Turley, a world-famous aviation trial lawyer, suffered adverse publicity. 5.21 The case was reassigned to Texas 116th District Court of Dallas County
Judge Martin E. Richter ("Richter") rather than to Texas 101 st District Court of Dallas County Judge Adolph P. Canales ("Canales") who had handled the ancillary litigation in anticipation of filing the lawsuit and who should have retained control over the case, Parsons v. Turley. However, Parsons would later learn that Richter had also granted the
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Baron Defendants a summary judgment in a long-running battle with an out-of-state lawyer over referral fees that the Baron Defendants had refused to pay her. The Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' representations lead Parsons to believe that in Richter's eyes, the Baron Defendants and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants, were "friends of the court." Parsons would also later learn that the reciprocity for
Richter's favorable ruling in the Baron Defendants' cases was traceable to the large political contributions that Richter received either directly from the Baron Defendants or from members of the large network of politically influential lawyers in Texas who were aligned with the Baron Defendants' business interests and who would encourage Richter to side with Turley's interests. In what was likely a reward for helping the Baron Defendants and the Greenberg Defendants with damage control in the B&B Memo Scandal, the Baron Defendants used their significant political influence to help Lynn gain the nomination as a federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, because Lynn would be scrutinized by a Republican-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee who could expose her knowing participation in the Turley Defendants' fraud against CCIC, the Baron Defendants also needed to provide Lynn with an exit from her responsibilities in Parsons' anticipated suit against the Turley Defendants. To accomplish this objective, the Baron Defendants used their corporate counsel and/or captive counsel, the Greenberg Defendants, who controlled Motsenbocker, to create what the Baron Defendants, Lynn and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants (erroneously) believed was a viable limitations defense for Lynn to use in an unjustified motion for summary judgment based upon a
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limitations defense that Lynn and the Turley Defendants had fraudulently induced the Greenberg Defendants into creating for them. 5.22 On February 19, 1998, Sidney K. Powell with Powell & Associates
("Powell"), who served as Parsons' federal appellate counsel, filed a notice of appeal in the second appeal in Parsons v. DuPont. While working on the second appeal in
Parsons v. DuPont, because of her familiarity with the underlying cases, Parsons also
had Powell do legal research on the Texas statutes of limitation for Parsons' anticipated claims of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims against the Turley Defendants. Based upon her research, Powell advised the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants that to protect Parsons' legal rights to timely sue the Turley Defendants for all of Parsons' anticipated claims, Parsons v. Turley had to be perfected on or before July 18, 1998. 5.23 The Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants knew that Parsons was
ignorant of the details of Texas law and that Parsons would rely upon their advice. Specifically Parsons would not know that to timely perfect a lawsuit under Texas law (1) the suit had to be timely filed and the defendants timely served with citation; and (2) any agreement between the parties' lawyers to waive a right to timely service of citation could not rely upon the mandate by the Supreme Court of Texas through the Texas Lawyers Creed ("My word is my bond.") and would be enforceable by Parsons if and only if the agreement was memorialized in writing and filed with the court in accordance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11. The Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants intentionally and knowingly used Parsons' ignorance of this peculiarity of Texas law to give Lynn the basis for the statute of limitations defense that she would
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assert in her motion for summary judgment seeking to defeat all of Parsons claims against the Turley Defendants. 11 5.24 Parsons has reason to believe that the Baron Defendants and their
lawyers, the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants and Lynn, conspired to create the limitations defense for Lynn to use for her motion for summary judgment against all of Parsons' claims in Parsons v. Turley. The Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants and Lynn knew that Parsons knew Lynn and Lynn's husband, Michael P. Lynn, from social and business meetings respectively, and they knew that Parsons believed that the Lynns, both lawyers, were honorable people whose word was their bond. However, the lawyers used their special knowledge and inside information, and Parsons' naivete to create in Parsons the false belief that Richter would look favorably upon Parsons' case if Parsons acted "reasonably" by agreeing to meet with the Turley Defendants, Lynn and the Turley Defendants' insurers' representatives before having the Turley Defendants served with citation, creating adverse publicity for Turley and many other Texas personal injury trial lawyers. Parsons has reason to believe that the Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants, in concert with Lynn, abused Parsons' trust and confidence in them to lead Parsons to believe that Greenberg's and Lynn's repeated postponement of the meeting that they had induced Parsons into attending,
11 The evidence was substantial that Turley and Lynn had fraudulently induced Greenberg and Motsenbocker into breaching their fiduciary duties to Parsons by delaying the service of citation upon Turley until after they believe that a limitations defense had been created for Parsons' claims having a two-year statute of limitations, that they mistakenly believed started running on the day mandate was issued in the first of the two appeals in Parsons v. DuPont, on July 18, 1996. However, on appeal Greenberg and Motsenbocker intentionally ignored Parsons' instructions to plead that Turley and Lynn had fraudulently induced them into delaying service of citation; that Parsons' fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Turley were not barred by a two-year statute of limitations; and that limitations did not start running on the day mandate was issued in the first of the two appeals in Parsons v. DuPont, on July 18, 1996, but rather on the day mandate was issued in the second of the two appeals in Parsons v. DuPont, on December 31, 1998 - more than three months after Turley had been sued and served.
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was a common lawyer-to-Iawyer professional courtesy to purportedly accommodate Lynn's "busy schedule." Parsons has reason to believe that the
Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants conspired to withhold warnings to Parsons delaying the service of citation upon the Turley Defendants until after July 18, 1998, would jeopardize what the Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants knew to be Parsons' lawful objectives of either securing a just settlement agreement with the Turley Defendants' insurers or securing a judgment debt that Parsons could enforce against the Turley Defendants. 5.25 After repeated delays, the meeting took place on July 21, 1998; three days
after Lynn 12 believed that she had secured a limitations defense for the Turley Defendants. Lynn failed to bring her client, Turley, or anyone else with settlement authority as she had promised, and Lynn failed to bring any representative from Turley's excess insurance carrier. After Greenberg presented a summary of the basis for the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentations, negligence and gross negligence claims against the Turley Defendants, Lynn stated that she would need time to consult
12 In December 1998, Texas 24th Congressional District Representative J. Martin Frost, a friend of both Baron and Greenberg, recommended Lynn for nomination as judge on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Frost's decision was apparently an emergency move, because Frost had already recommended that U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas Paul Coggins be the nominee. Nevertheless, Coggan's name was withdrawn and Lynn's name was substituted. (See "The man who would be judge" in the Dallas Observer December 31, 1998.) On March 25, 1999, President Clinton nominated Lynn as a federal judge as Frost had recommended. On November 17, 1999, the Senate confirmed Lynn as a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas at Dallas. Next, Baron used his influence with Richter to get Lynn's motion for summary judgment quickly granted.
On July 9, 1999, Richter announced his intention to seek a higher political-judicial office as a justice on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial District of Texas, alongside his friend Justice David L. Bridges ("Bridges") who would write the opinions sustaining Richter's order granting the summary judgment in Parsons v. Turley. However, on September 18,2000, the resigning Texas governor, George W. Bush, appointed Richter to the political-judicial office for which Richer had planned to run unopposed. Governor Bush appointed Carlos Lopez ("Lopez") as district judge on the 116th District Court of Dallas County, Texas who, on February 9, 2001, would grant Greenberg's motion for summary judgment on Baron's behalf in Woodrow v. Baron. On March 28, 2003, Baron would give Lopez a job as Special Counsel" at B&B. PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION Page 21 of91
with the Turley Defendants before she could respond to Greenberg's $29 million settlement demand. However, Lynn never responded to Greenberg's demand and refused to accept service of citation on behalf of the Turley Defendants. Subsequently, on August 13, 1998, Greenberg tried to have Turley served personally and as the register agent for LOWT. The Turley Defendants repeatedly evaded service, and service was only accomplished after the court granted a motion for substitute service on September 22, 1998. 5.26 On March 17, 1999, Lynn filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that Parsons' legal claims for legal malpractice were barred by the statute of limitations. Lynn argued that (1) Parsons fired the Turley Defendants when he hired Powell on December 5, 1994, to work on the first appeal in Parsons v. DuPont, and that the twoyear limitations on Parsons' legal malpractice claims had therefore expired on December 5, 1997. [Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1996)]; or in the alternative, (2) Parsons v. DuPont ended with the issuance of mandate in the first federal appeal on July 18, 1996, and that the two-year limitations on Parsons' legal malpractice claims therefore expired on July 18, 1998. 13 [Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins,
821 S.W2d 154 (Tex. 1991)]
5.27
Lynn argued that Parsons would had to have served process on the
Turley Defendants no later than July 18, 1998, and that although suit against the Turley Defendants was filed on June 12, 1998, the Turley Defendants were not served until September 22, 1998. Lynn's 34-page motion and supporting brief begins with the false
13 When she took Parsons' deposition in Parsons v. Turley, on February 1, 1999, Lynn was informed that the second appeal in Parsons v. DuPont had been pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit until mandate was issued on December 31, 1998 - more than three months after Turley had been sued and served.
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assertion that Parsons v. Turley is a " ... time-barred malpractice action ... " and Lynn nowhere provides any argument to justify sweeping the claims pled and provable against the Turley Defendants for fraud and breach of duty into a summary judgment relying upon the two-year statute of limitations that she knew could only be applied to Parsons' legal malpractice claims. 5.28 On August 16, 1999, Richter, without a written explanation, issued his
order granting Lynn's motion for summary judgment on all claims that were asserted in
Parsons v. Turley, including Parsons' fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Parsons
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial District of Texas at Dallas. 5.29 On August 11, 2000, Justice David L. Bridges ("Bridges") issued an
opinion in Parsons v. Turley sustaining Richter's summary judgment in favor of Turley. Parsons appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that in Texas Hughes was the law controlling the tolling of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases.
C. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins and Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin

5.30 On June 19, 2001, the Supreme Court of Texas issued its opinion in
Parsons v. Turley, 109 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 2003, pet. den.) and remanded
the case back to the Texas Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial District with instructions to follow the bright-line rule established in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991) and reasserted in Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. 2001). The so-called Hughes rule states that the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim is tolled until all appeals on the underlying case are exhausted or the litigation is otherwise concluded. In Apex, the Supreme Court of Texas instructed lower courts as follows.
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"We conclude that Murphy did not modify the rule we announced in Hughes, and today we reaffirm that rule: When an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on a malpractice claim against that attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted or the litigation is otherwise finally concluded." "We continue to believe, however, that in the area of limitations, bright-lines rules generally represent the better approach, and that the policy reasons underlying the Hughes rule appropriately balance the competing concerns of the need to bar stale claims and avoid prejudice to defendants yet preserve a reasonable opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue legitimate claims." "[W]ithout re-examining whether the policy reasons behind the tolling rule apply in each legal-malpractice case matching the Hughes paradigm, courts should simply apply the Hughes tolling rule to the category of legalmalpractice cases encompassed within its definition." 5.31 In late February 2003, more than twenty-one months after Bridges opinion
in Parsons v. Turley sustaining Richter's order granting Turley summary judgment in

Parsons v. Turley was overturned by the Supreme Court of Texas and remanded back
to the Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals, at Parsons request, Greenberg called the clerk's office for the Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals to ask about the status of Parsons' case. An assistant clerk told Greenberg that for some reason unknown to her,
Parsons v. Turley was never submitted to the appellate panel for post-remand review.
5.32
The next day, the Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals docket sheet for
Parsons v. Turley indicated that the case had been resubmitted on September 11, 2003
- obviously an erroneous entry since it was not even June 2003. Subsequently, the docket sheet modified again, this time to falsely indicate that Parsons v. Turley had been submitted on September 11, 2001. Bridges finally issued his post-remand opinion in Parsons v. Turley on June 23, 2003.
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5.33
In Bridges' opinion on remand, he recites the facts in the case before him
as follows (underline emphasis added). "In appealing the federal court's judgment, Parsons argued the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's gross negligence finding. On June 12. 1996. the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal court's judgment. and mandate issued on July 18. 1996." "Subsequently, at DuPont's request, Turley sent a letter to DuPont's counsel calculating the principal, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest on the federal judgment against DuPont. Parsons disagreed with Turley's calculations in that they failed to compound prejudgment interest. Parsons' counsel submitted different calculations to DuPont. DuPont refused to compound prejudgment interest, and the federal court also denied Parsons' request to compound prejudgment interest. Parsons appealed and the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the federal court." 5.34 Although Bridges recites the fact that the second appeal in the underlying
litigation occurred sometime after the date that mandate was issued in the first appeal in the underlying litigation on July 18, 1996, Bridges fails to state the date most relevant to the legal issue that the Supreme Court of Texas instructed him to resolve - the date that mandate was issued in the second and final appeal, December 31, 1998. 5.35 Bridges recites the law that the Supreme Court of Texas instructed him to
base his post-remand reconsideration of the limitations defense that Richter had accepted as the basis for granting Turley total summary judgment in Parsons v. Turley. Excluding Bridges' cites to legal authority not directly related to the remand instructions given him by the Supreme Court of Texas, Bridges writes as follows. "When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of limitations, he assumes the burden of showing as a matter of law that the suit is barred by limitations." "The question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law for the court." "When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the non movant." "When, as here, a defendant moves for summary judgment on more than one ground, and the
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judgment does not specify the grounds upon which the trial court relied, we must determine if any of the theories advanced by the parties is meritorious." "A cause of action for legal malpractice is in the nature of a tort and, thus, is governed by the two-year limitations statute." "Limitations generally begin to run when the cause of action accrues: when facts have come into existence that authorizes a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. 2001). However, when an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on a malpractice claim against that attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted or the litigation is otherwise finally concluded. Id. at 119. "All appeals on this claim were not exhausted until July 18, 1996; thus, under Apex Towing, the statute of limitations on Parsons' malpractice claims was tolled until that date. See Apex Towing, 41 S.W.3d at 119. We sustain Parsons' argument that the accrual of his claims for legal malpractice was tolled until all appeals were exhausted in the underlying litigation. 5.36 The first sentence of the last quoted paragraph above is the kernel of
Bridges' misrepresentation to the Supreme Court of Texas. Bridges' representations in previous paragraphs show that Bridges understood the facts in the case and the law that the Supreme Court of Texas had told him to apply to the facts. Bridges added the italicized emphasis in "All appeals" demonstrating that he knew that there was a subsequent appeal in the underlying litigation that had only been concluded by the mandate issued on December 31, 1998 - more than three months after the Parsons v.
Turley litigation had been perfected by service of citation upon Turley.
5.37
Bridges misrepresents to the Supreme Court of Texas that the Turley
Defendants were not timely served on September 22, 1998, because this date was more than two years after mandate was issued in the first of the two appeals in the underlying wrongful death case. Bridges willfully concealed from the Supreme Court of Texas that the Turley Defendants had been timely served on September 22, 1998, because that date was more than three months before limitations had even begun to
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run on December 31, 1998, when mandate was issued in the second of the two appeals in the underlying litigation. 5.38 Bridges' misrepresentations, upon which he knew that the Supreme Court
of Texas would rely, were brought to Bridges' attention through Parsons' motion for a rehearing, but Bridges denied Parsons' motion without consulting with the other justices on the appellate panel. 14
D. Baron & Budd and Gardere & Wynne Political Contributions to Bridges
5.39
Bridges' Campaign Contribution and Expenditure filings with the Texas
Ethics Commission show that prior to Parsons v. Turley being remanded back to him, Bridges never received any campaign contributions. Furthermore, prior to 2008 election cycle, Bridges never faced any opposition in his bids for election or reelection. However, on June 25, 2001, Bridges accepted a $2,500 political contribution from B&B, and on June 28, 2001, Bridges accepted a $5,000 political contribution from G&W. The two political contributions made up more than half of the $14,300 shown in the first report of any political contributions ever made to Bridges since he began reporting to the Texas Ethics Commission in 1996. 5.40 Bridges' July through December 2007, report to the Texas Ethics Commission, shows that Bridges received $46,900 in total political contributions. The report also shows that Bridges spent the money to pay for personal expenses, such as gasoline, Cinemark and Target gift cards, restaurants, and mobile telephone bills.
14 In the opinion on remand authored by Bridges on or about June 23, 2003, he includes two footnotes. Footnote 1: "Justice Ed Kinkeade participated in the original submission of this case. Since submission Justice Kinkeade has retired from this Court. Chief Justice Linda Thomas has reviewed the record and the briefs in this case." Footnote 2: "Justice John Roach participated in the original submission of this case. Since submission, Justice Roach has retired from this Court. Justice Molly Francis has reviewed the record and the briefs in this case. n However, there is no evidence that any other justices actually read Parsons August 8,2003, motion for rehearing before Bridges denied it on August 15, 2003.
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E. Investigation in anticipation of filing an independent action in federal court against DuPont and Conoco for fraud upon a federal court in Parsons v. DuPont
5.41 While Parsons v. Turley was on appeal, the Greenberg/Motsenbocker
Defendants advised Parsons that the evidence that had been uncovered in discovery for Parsons v. Turley showed that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had willfully destroyed evidence in anticipation of the Parsons v. DuPont litigation, and that these acts gave rise to new legal claims to pursue the recovery of the majority of the damages caused by what the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants now had reason to believe was a conspiracy by AIG and AIG insured's, the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants, to defraud the federal trial court handling Parsons v. DuPont. The object of the conspiracy to defraud was to prevent Parsons from exercising his legal right to recover his fairly adjudicated judgment debt from the $100 million AIG aviation liability policy held by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants for purposes of paying on settlement or judgment debts owed families of the victims of the jet crash. 5.42 The Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants advised Parsons that Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) provided Parsons a legal remedy through an independent action in a federal court for the frauds upon the federal court that had been carried out in Parsons v. DuPont by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, Rose and the Turley Defendants to obtain the federal court's ruling granting Rose's motion on behalf of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV') against the jury verdict for Parsons in Parsons v. DuPont. 15
15 An "independent action for fraud upon a federal court" refers to a legal action in federal court for relief from judgment or order, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), because of "(b) ... ... Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
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5.43
The Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants recommended that Parsons
formally investigate the anticipated fraud upon a federal court claims by filing a motion in a Texas district court to perpetuate the testimony of some key witnesses, pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 202. Parsons accepted and relied upon the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' recommendation; and on June 6, 2000, Parsons' lawyers filed PETITION FOR RULE 202 ORDER in In re: Roger K.
Parsons,
Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons, Deceased ("In re: Roger K. Parsons") in the 101 st District Court of Dallas County, Texas,
(Cause No. 00-4180-E). 5.44 The case was transferred to the 289th District Court of Dallas County,
Texas, (Cause No. 00-4180-M). Because In re: Roger K. Parsons was ancillary litigation in anticipation of filing a fraud upon a federal court action against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, Greenberg notified the DuPont/Conoco Defendants of the legal action by U.S. Certified Mail on July 14, 2000. 5.45 On August 2, 2000, Rose, who had resigned from Gardere in July 1999, to
form Rose-Walker, L.L.P. ("R-W'), filed a response on behalf of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants to the petition in In re: Roger K. Parsons. 16 Rose was a key fact witness to the alleged fraud against a federal court being investigated in In re: Roger K. Parsons, and Parsons told the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants that he believed that Rose
adverse party ... This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding ...... or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. [T]he procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be ...... by an independent action. n
16 In Parsons v. Turley, Rose represented Conoco President and DuPont Executive Vice President Constantine S. Nicandros in delaying Nicandros' deposition until Nicandros died on August 23, 1999. In Parsons v. Greenberg, et al., Rose represented Conoco Senior Counsel Walter L. Brignon in Brignon's deposition on December 16, 2008.
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would only want to defend the DuPont/Conoco Defendants against Parsons' fraud allegations so that Rose would be in a position to deflect the obvious derivative claims that Rose, Rose's most influential client, AIG, and AIG's client, the Turley Defendants, were coconspirators with the investigation target, the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, in the conspiracy to defraud the federal court in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation. 17 5.46 On August 4, 2000, Parsons' motion in In re: Roger K. Parsons was
granted authorizing the depositions of 1) Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Bross ("Bross"), legal counsel at the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology ("AFIP") and 2) Colonel William T. Gormley ("Gormley") with the AFIP who had headed the 12-person federal government forensic team that was sent to Malaysia at Conoco's request and expense ten days after the jet crash. 5.47 From responses to the subpoena duces tecum and testimony obtained in
the depositions of Bross and Gormley; the manager of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' aviation operations, DuPont Vice President Frank E. Petersen, Jr. (Petersen"), and Conoco's contract physician Lyndon E. Laminack ("Laminack"); Parsons had testimony and documentary evidence for the first time showing that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had gained control of Fox's remains on the morning of September 10, 1991, when Fox's remains were removed from the site of the jet crash by the Royal Malaysian Police and delivered to the Kota Kinabalu Queen Elizabeth Hospital into the custody of
17 Federal court records for Rose's cases show that Rose continued to work for AIG and AIG subsidiaries after he left Gardere.
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Laminack, who was reporting to Conoco Indonesia Vice President Sidney S. Smith ("Smith") 18 and/or Conoco Indonesia General Counsel Walter L. Brignon (''''Brig non"). 5.48 Parsons also learned that by September 15, 1991, when Gormley's team
arrived on the scene, Conoco representatives who controlled which remains Gormley's team could see, concealed the two bags of remains that had been delivered to the hospital morgue on September 10, 1991. 19 In his capacity as the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' corporate representative in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation, Petersen had lied under oath about his knowledge of the whereabouts of Fox's remains and had concealed in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation the written warnings DuPont had received from Cardamone prior to the jet crash warning of the life-threatening safety problems that had been created by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' senior management's failure to do anything about the practice of using unhealthy and undertrained pilots to fly complex overseas missions. 5.49 Based upon the information that the Malaysian federal police provided the
Malaysian medical examiner on number of torsos that the Malaysian federal police team had recovered from the crash site and delivered to the Kota Kinabalu Hospital, the Malaysian medical examiner issued twelve death certificates, one for each of the
18 In his deposition taken by the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants in Parsons v. Turley on August 3, 1999, Petersen testified Smith was responsible for securing the jet crash victim's remains including Fox's, but that Smith was untrustworthy because he suffered from alcoholism. Q. Okay. You mentioned a little bit ago that you wanted to have as little as possible to do with Sid Smith. Why was that? A. He's an alcoholic. Q. So alcoholism was a problem with Conoco employees? A. No. It was a problem with Smith. And he was interfering with my investigation, so I made it a point to avoid him as much as possible. 19 On the second of his two trips to Malaysia on Parsons' behalf, Cameron determined from the morgue personnel that the first two body-bags, labeled "M-1" and "M-2" by the Criminal Investigation Division ("ClOD) team of the Royal Malaysian Police, weighed approximately 50 kilograms apiece.
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individuals that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' representatives sent to Malaysia had represented to her were onboard the jet when it crashed, including one for the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' pilot, Fox. Fox's Malaysian death certificate shows that Fox was bought in dead to the hospital morgue and had died of multiple blunt-force injuries sustained in the jet crash.2o 5.50 The new evidence, together with the evidence discovered in discovery for
the Parsons v. Turley litigation showing that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants destroyed the original cockpit voice recorder ("CVR") recording and key portions of Fox's medical
20
In his deposition by Turley in Parsons v. DuPont on August 19, 1992, Petersen testified:
Q. Okay. Now, was there any drug testing conducted on the remains ofthe crew members.
A. That I'm not aware of. I can't answer that question. Q. It is ordinary policy at Du Pont, is it not, that any time there is an industrial accident that
the parties involved are drug-tested? A. It's not only a policy but also in any accident investigation - I sadly must inform you, sir, the bodies of the pilot, the co-pilot and the crew chief were not recovered. Q. No portions of the remains? A. As I understand it, there was a portion of the crew chief. I do not know the specifics of quantity that was recovered. Q. Had you requested that drug testing be done if there was sufficient recovery? A. Yes, I had requested assistance from several sources to do drug testing, body identification. But that is also a part of any formal accident investigation that would have been conducted by both the Malaysian Government and the National Transportation Safety Board. Q. But you specifically had intended to have that done if they could possibly do it? A. Oh, absolutely. In his deposition by Greenberg in Parsons v. Turley on August 3, 1999, Petersen testified:
Q. Well, you were in charge of the investigation?
A. That's true.
Q. And there's a team of pathologist from the military... . .. that arrives on the scene, and you know nothing about how - why they're there or how come they got there? A. The scope - to answer you question, yes, that is correct. The scope of my investigation was to determine the cause of the accident. Anything associated with body recovery or body identification, I had absolutely nothing to do with that. Q. Who was in charge ofthat? A. I have no idea. Q. So as far as you know, the department of aviation at DuPont wasn't in charge of that? A. We were not - as I just stated, we were not in charge of anything having to do with body identification. And in pOint of fact, I think Sid Smith was charged with that responsibility. Q. Okay. My question to you is, is one of the first things that you tried to investigate in an airplane crash is the toxicological conditions of the pilots? A. Yes. Q. Was that done in this case? A. No.
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records, convinced the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants that Parsons had a very good claim against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants for fraud upon a federal court with the objective of deceiving the federal judgect in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), the new evidence that Parsons had unearthed showing the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' spoliation of evidence, and fraud against several federal agencies of Malaysia and the United States to derail their investigations of the jet crash could be used to convince a federal judge to set aside the prior judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in Parsons v. DuPont and conduct a new trial in which all of the evidence could be presented to the court, including evidence showing of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' spoliation. Parsons agreed to hire additional lawyers who the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants could identify as having experience in handling complex cases against large corporations such as the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, to assist them. 5.51 Greenberg told Parsons he had contacted several lawyers in Texas, New
York and Washington, D.C. However, Greenberg told Parsons that none of these lawyers were interested in the case. Parsons repeatedly asked Greenberg to ask Baron and Blue if they knew lawyers who could take on the complex case. Finally, Parsons encouraged Greenberg to ask Baron if he would help. Parsons never heard back from Greenberg. 5.52 On January 14, 2005, after not hearing from the Greenberg/Motsenbocker
Defendants for more than two months, Parsons requested all of the files that the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants had maintained on his cases. After Parsons took custody of the files on his cases from Greenberg's offices in Arlington, Texas on
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January 24, 2005, Parsons never heard from the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants again until they responded through their attorneys to Parsons' original petition in this case. 5.53 The original petition in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et a/. litigation was filed
on May 17, 2006, however the attorney who filed suit was in the process of going into semi-retirement and turned the case over to his associate MarJoe D. Bigbee ("Bigbee"). After Bigbee announced that she would move out of state on or about May 16, 2007, she helped Parsons identify and interview lawyers who would be willing and able to handle Parsons' complex case. On May 17, 2007, Parsons signed a fee agreement with M. Kevin Queenan ("Queenan"), and, on June 19, 2007, Fred W. Davis, Judge of the 1ih District Court ("Judge Davis") granted Queenan's motion to substitute as Parsons' counsel in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et a/. litigation.
F. The two overlapping continuing conspiracies to defraud Parsons
5.54
In discovery for this case in 2008, Parsons uncovered evidence giving him
reason to believe that the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants had been fraudulently induced into, and aided and abetted in committing the alleged frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty against Parsons through acts of extortion and/or fiduciary bribery to further two overlapping conspiracies to defraud Parsons of his rights to recover damages against several AIG insurance policies. 5.55 The first conspiracy had the objective of defrauding Parsons of his rights
to recover legal damages against the $100 million AIG aviation liability policy held by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants. The first conspiracy succeeded in derailing Parsons' lawful investigation and prosecution to recover his legal damages covered by this policy
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through Parsons v. DuPont (1992-1998); and the Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b) case anticipated by the ancillary Tex. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 202 action, In Re: Roger K. Parsons, against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants (2000-2006). The conspirators in the first
conspiracy to defraud Parsons included Rose; Rose's client, AIG; and the AIG insured's who were the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants. 5.56 The second conspiracy had the objective of defrauding Parsons of his
rights to recover legal damages against a series of five $5 million AIG professional liability policies held by the Turley Defendants. The second conspiracy succeeded in derailing Parsons lawful investigation and prosecution to recover his legal damages by these policies through Parsons v. Turley (1997-2004), the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice case against the Turley Defendants. The conspirators in the second conspiracy included the AIG; AIG insured, the Turley Defendants; Lynn; the Baron Defendants; Richter; Bridges; and Greenberg and Motsenbocker. 5.57 After discovering the conspiracies to defraud him in 2008, Parsons
realized that the claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants were part of a larger cause of action that included the conspiracies and the unjust enrichment of additional defendants, including the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants. 5.58 In the summer of 2008, Parsons discovered that Texas law provided remedy for recovering the damages Parsons would have recovered, pursuant to the terms of liability insurance policies held by and covering the claims pled in the underlying cases against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants, but for the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty.
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The remedy that Parsons discovered was the equitable imposition of a constructive trust over the liability insurance policies that would have paid Parsons' justifiable damages in the underlying cases that the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants brought against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants. Because, it is inequitable for the Baron Defendants, the Turley Defendants and the DuPont/Conoco Defendants to be unjustly enriched by the frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty that they conspired to induce the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants into carrying out, Parsons wanted to plead for the equitable imposition of constructive trust over the insurance policies that covered his lost damages in the underlying cases, but that had unjustly enriched others.
5.59 The res for imposition of the constructive trust have been identified as the
DuPont/Conoco Defendants' Policy No. GM 539 2666 (January 1, 1990 - January 1,
1993) issued by AIG subsidiary, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania ("NUFICPP"); and the Turley Defendants' Policy No. LPL 7054808 (April
4,1992 -April 27, 1997) issued by NUFICPP, and Policy No. 9213882 (April 27, 1997April 27, 1998) issued by Carolina Casualty Insurance Company.21
G. Conspiracies to defraud Parsons continued into the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation
5.60 On February 14, 2008, former B&B officers, Baron and Blue " ... of the firm
Baron and Blue ... ,,22 entered their appearance as attorneys for Greenberg. On March
18, 2008, another former B&B corporate officer, Charla M. G. Aldous ("Aldous") " ... of
21 The Turley Defendants had associated excess policies AIG arranged through Lloyd's of London: 551/U5E0265 (April 1, 1992 - April 1, 1993); 551/U4E0286 (April 27, 1994 - April 27, 1995); 551/U5E0273, (April 27. 1995 -April 27. 1996); and U7E0278 (April 27. 1997 -April 27. 1998).
22 The Texas Secretary of State has no record that a professional corporation has ever been formed or existed having named "Baron & Blue" or "Baron and Blue". Baron and Blue have organized a charitable. nonprofit foundation named "Baron and Blue Foundation" but this organization has no authorization to function as a law firm in the state of Texas.
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the Aldous Law Firm ... ,,23 entered her appearance as attorneys for Legal Services. Neither Baron, Blue nor Aldous have ever handled the defense of a legal malpractice claims against an attorney.
5.61
On March 28, 2008, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, L.L.P. ("SGR&M")
partners Ruben H. Wallace ("Wallace") and Joseph W. Spence ("Spence,,)24 filed a motion for partial summary judgment in Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. The motion sought to deny Parsons recovery of any quantum of "lost punitive damages" that the jury seated for the
Parsons
v.
Greenberg,
et
al.
trial
would
determine
the
Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants would likely have recovered in the Parsons v.
Turley litigation, but for the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' legal malpractice

against Parsons.
6.62 To obtain the benefits of the law that Wallace and Spence told Judge
Davis should be applied to factual circumstances of the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation, the lawyers had to make two material misrepresentations in the pleadings that they believed Judge Davis would rely upon without question because of the lawyers had gained Judge Davis' confidence through years of friendship. These misrepresentations were that: 1. Parsons' only liability claims in the Parsons v. Turley litigation were against the Turley Defendants for legal malpractice; and
23 The Texas Secretary of State has no record that a professional corporation has ever been organized or existed named "the Aldous Law Firm."
24 While Spence and Rose were G&W partners, Spence participated in the conspiracy to defraud Parsons by refusing to pay Parsons more than $53,000 in taxable court costs Spence's clients owed Parsons under the final judgment in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation.
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2.
Parsons only liability claims in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation were against the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants for legal
malpractice. 5.63 Relying upon the misrepresentations that Wallace and Spence had made
in their pleadings and undoubtedly influenced by the almost simultaneous parroting of identical misrepresentations in pleadings filed by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' and the Turley Defendants' lawyers seeking protective orders blocking Parsons' discovery,25 on June 6, 2008, Judge Davis signed an order granting the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment. 5.64 However, Judge Davis' order did not deny Parsons recovery of any
quantum of "lost punitive damages" that the jury seated for the Parsons
v. Greenberg, et
al. trial would determine the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants would likely have
recovered through a timely prosecution of Parsons' FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) claims for fraud upon the federal court against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants, but for the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' intentional frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty against Parsons. Consequently, Parsons instructed Queenan to focus discovery efforts on identifying admissible evidence that could be used to convince Judge Davis or the appellate courts that Wallace's and Spence's pleadings were fictitious as to the facts surrounding Parsons' claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary
25 Before being identified as defendants in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation in Plaintiffs Third Amended Petition filed on December 22, 2008, LOWT filed Turley's First Motion for Protection and First Motion for Sanctions for Abuse of Discovery Against Plaintiff Roger K. Parsons and His Attorney Queen Law Firm on April 18, 2008, and Rose's firm, RW, filed Third-Party E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. 's Motion for Protective Order and Objections to Discovery Subpoena, April 28, 2008. Both pleadings contain the same fictitious recitation of facts in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation that the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants and their employer-lawyers the Baron Defendants had used in the motion for partial summary judgment that was pending Judge Davis' ruling.
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duty and fraudulent concealment Queenan plead in Plaintiffs First Amended Petition, on October 4, 2007, and in Plaintiffs Second Amended Petition, on July 11, 2008.
5.65 However, Queenan's efforts to use the testimony of the expert witnesses
Parsons had retained and obtain the testimony of fact witnesses that Parsons needed to prove that there was a continuing conspiracy to defraud him were blocked by further fictitious pleadings that misrepresented the scope of Judge Davis' order granting the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment. Relying upon Wallace's and Spence's repeated fictitious pleadings misrepresenting the scope of his own ruling on the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment, Judge Davis approved most of the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants motions oppressing Parsons' rights to conduct discovery of evidence needed to prove the legal claims asserted in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation.
5.66 Throughout Summer and Fall of 2008, Parsons instructed Queenan to

seek sanctions, pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 13, for filing the fictitious pleadings and/or to seek mandamus relief for Judge Davis' abuse of his discretion in granting the motions oppressing Parsons' rights to discover of the admissible evidence that Parsons needed and knew was available, or that would have been available,26 but for the conspiracy to fraudulently conceal it under the color of law through erroneous rulings in the Parsons v.
Greenberg, et al. litigation. Parsons also advised Queenan of the evidence Parsons had
26 Using discovery fraud in litigation to defeat legal claims against them is nothing new to the DuPonUConoco Defendants or their lawyers. Citing a pattern of concealment and misrepresentation", U.S. District Judge J. Robert Elliott ordered record-breaking sanctions against DuPont (see DuPont Fined $101 Million by Judge For Withholding Data In Benlate Case; p. 82, Wall Street Joumal, August 23, 1995). Judge Elliott stated in his opinion: "It is clear that DuPont continues to evidence an attitude of contempt for the court's orders and processes and to view itself as not subject to the rules and orders affecting all other litigants. Put in layman's terms, DuPont cheated. And it cheated consciously, deliberately and with purpose. DuPont committed a fraud in this court, and this court concludes that DuPont should be, and must be severely sanctioned if the integrity of the court system is to be preserved."
U
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uncovered showing that Judge Davis had extrajudicial business relationships that could be used to have Judge Davis recused from further involvement in the Parsons v.
Greenberg, et a/. litigation.
5.67
Parsons also instructed Queenan to amend the petition to include claims
for unjust enrichment against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants; and to include claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against the Baron Defendants, who Parsons had evidence showing had induced, through fiduciary or commercial bribery, the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants into carrying out the intentional frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty that had caused Parsons legal injury by derailing Parsons legal claims for fraud upon the against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants. 5.68 By December 17, 1998, Parsons realized that Queenan would not follow
his instructions, and on December 22, 2008, Parsons filed pro se Plaintiff's Third Amended Petition in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et a/. litigation. VI. DISCOVERY RULE/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT RULE 6.01 Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of the above paragraphs and
affirmatively pleads the discovery rule and/or the fraudulent concealment rule where applicable as a plea in avoidance. VII. UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF DUPONT AND CONOCO, et al 7.01 Incorporating the above paragraphs, Plaintiff would show that Texas courts recognize unjust enrichment as a viable cause of action and theory of recovery. 7.02 Incorporating the above paragraphs, Plaintiff would show that funds,
assets and/or claims which were rightfully due him were wrongfully lost because of the
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breach of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or the actual frauds committed by the Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants and/or the continuing frauds of such other entity or person(s) that Plaintiff may demonstrate at trial. Retention of Plaintiff's funds, assets and/or legitimate claims that were wrongfully denied him would be unconscionable; thus Plaintiff asserts that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants (and the Turley Defendants) were unjustly enriched through the breach of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or the actual fraud(s) of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker or such other entity or person(s) that Plaintiff may demonstrate at trial, and Plaintiff seeks the equitable imposition of constructive trusts upon those entities that were have benefited from the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual fraud(s) by Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, or such other entity or person(s) that Plaintiff may demonstrate at trial. 7.03 Incorporating the above paragraphs, a constructive trust on the funds,
assets and/or claims in question is the only remedy that will adequately compensate the Plaintiff and prevent the unjust enrichment of DuPont and Conoco, and the Turley Defendants, one or more, at the Plaintiff's expense. 7.04 Incorporating the above paragraphs, Plaintiff seeks the equitable
imposition of constructive trusts upon the funds, assets and/or claims within any Defendant's care, custody and control, as well as the care, custody and control of other entities and/or person(s) that have benefited from the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual frauds by Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker. These funds, assets and/or claims should have been rightfully paid to Plaintiff to the extent of Plaintiff's damages. To avoid further unjust enrichment of the DuPont, Conoco
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and Turley, or such other entity or person(s) that Plaintiff may demonstrate at trial, a constructive trust should be imposed upon those defendants or such other entity or person(s) that Plaintiff may demonstrate that benefited from the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual frauds of the Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker. A constructive trust on these funds, assets and/or claims is the only remedy that will adequately compensate Plaintiff and prevent any further unjust enrichment of any Defendants at Plaintiff's expense. 7.05 Plaintiff seeks the equitable imposition of constructive trusts upon the
funds, assets and/or claims within the DuPont's care, custody and control in an amount the DuPont was unjustly enriched by avoiding payment on the judgment debt that would have been accessed in the anticipated fraud upon the court action against DuPont, but for the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual frauds of Baron Baron/Greenberg/Motsenbocker. A constructive trust on these funds, assets and/or
claims is the only remedy that will adequately compensate Plaintiff and prevent any further unjust enrichment of Defendants at Plaintiff's expense. 7.06 Plaintiff seeks the equitable imposition of constructive trusts upon the
funds, assets and/or claims within Conoco's care, custody and control in an amount DuPont was unjustly enriched by avoiding payment on the judgment debt that would have been accessed in the anticipated fraud upon the court action against Conoco, but for the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker. A constructive trust on these funds, assets and/or
claims is the only remedy that will adequately compensate Plaintiff and prevent any further unjust enrichment of Defendants at Plaintiffs expense.
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7.07
Plaintiff seeks the equitable imposition of constructive trusts upon the
funds, assets and/or claims within Turley's care, custody and control in an amount DuPont was unjustly enriched by avoiding payment on the judgment debt that would have been accessed in Parsons v. Turley against Turley, but for the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker. A constructive trust on these funds, assets and/or claims is the only remedy that will adequately compensate Plaintiff and prevent any further unjust enrichment of Defendants at Plaintiff's expense. 7.08 Plaintiff seeks the equitable imposition of constructive trusts upon the
funds, assets and/or claims within LOWT's care, custody and control in an amount LOWT was unjustly enriched by avoiding payment on the judgment debt that would have been accessed in Parsons v. Turley against LOWT, but for the breaches of a special trust, fiduciary relationship, and/or actual frauds of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker. A constructive trust on these funds, assets and/or claims is the only remedy that will adequately compensate Plaintiff and prevent any further unjust enrichment of Defendants at Plaintiff's expense. 7.09 The res for imposition of the constructive trust have been identified as the
DuPont/Conoco Defendants' Policy No. GM 539 2666 (January 1, 1990 - January 1, 1993) issued by AIG subsidiary, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ("NUFICPP"), as well as any amendments; and the Turley Defendants' Policy No. LPL 7054808 (April 4, 1992 -April 27, 1997) issued by NUFICPP, and Policy No. 9213882 (April 27, 1997 - April 27, 1998) issued by Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, as well as any amendments.
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7.10
Finally Plaintiff would ask the court to apply the discovery rule to all
applicable claims. Additionally, Plaintiff hereby pleads the Hughes rule, as cited by the Texas Supreme Court in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991) and the Apex rule, as cited by Texas Supreme Court, is Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. 2001). Under the Hughes and Apex doctrines, the statute of limitation is tolled until Plaintiff has exhausted all litigation and appeals. Until then, the cause of action does not accrue. Plaintiff hereby asserts these limitations tolling rules in support of Plaintiff's assertion that the original petition in this matter was timely filed. VIII. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD PARSONSITHE ESTATE OF ANN PARSONS 8.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations made in the above
paragraphs, as if fully set out at length herein. 8.02 Incorporating the above paragraphs, Defendants combined in a civil
conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff and the Estate of Ann Parsons of legal rights and property of Defendants. Incorporating the above paragraphs, Defendants acting together acted singularly and in concert in various overt illegal acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. As a direct result, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the court and Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. 8.03 Incorporating the above paragraphs, Defendants knowingly made material
representations to the Plaintiff that were false, with the intent that the Plaintiff would rely on such misrepresentations and act upon them. The Plaintiff did rely upon and act upon the misrepresentations. As a direct result, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the court and Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
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8.04
Plaintiff indentifies
the
following
actions
by
the
DuPont/Conoco
Defendants committed as part of or in furtherance of any conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff and/or the courts and other government agencies upon which Plaintiff depended for the equitable determination of the judgment debts he would be eventually be entitled to collect from the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants for their fraud upon a federal court and the federal regulatory and investigative agencies upon which the federal court relied for admissible evidence.
1)
Frauds against the federal government a) Fraudulent applications for Fox's 1990 and 1991 FAA Medical Certificates i) Elements of the fraud: (1) DuPont servant Fox omitted mandatory responses to questions on his 1990 application for a FAA First Class Medical Certificate regarding driving offenses. (2) DuPont and Conoco servant Catterson, an FAA Aviation Medical Examiner (AME) contracted from Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, discovered that Fox suffered from alcoholism no later than August 14, 1991 but breached his duty to the FAA in not immediately grounding Fox. (3) Conoco servant Larry Anglin, manager of Conoco Medical Division, signed a mandatory Conoco medical report stating that Fox had no health problems that limited his ability to perform his job responsibilities piloting the aircraft Conoco operated despite Anglin's office having all of the medical evidence from the examinations of Conoco servant Catterson showing that Fox suffered from alcoholism. ii) Federal government agencies and agents targeted by the fraud: (1) FAA Airman Medical Certification Division, United States Flight Surgeon iii) Entities conspiring in the fraud: (1) DuPont servants Fox and Catterson (2) Conoco servant Anglin and Catterson iv) Motives for the fraud
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(1) To gain FAA medical license necessary for Fox to fly aircraft that were entrusted to him by the aircraft owner, DuPont, and carrying passengers entrusted to him by the aircraft operator, Conoco. v) Damages caused by fraud: (1) Twelve US citizens were killed in the September 4, 1991, crash of N204C, including Ann Parsons, Plaintiff's wife, that was owned by DuPont and operated by Conoco, while Fox was manipulating the aircraft controls as pilot-in-command. b) Theft of the N204C CVR recording from the custody of the NTSB i) Elements of the fraud: (1) NTSB servant Benzon, the NTSB's designated US Accredited Representative to the N204C crash investigation, took the N204C CVR from the custody of the DCA under the false pretense that he would deliver it to the NTSB CVR laboratory for spectral analysis. (2) Benzon, without generating any chain-of-custody documentation, checking the N204C CVR recording into the NTSB CVR laboratory, or seeking NTSB approval; gave the N204C CVR recording to DuPont. ii) Federal government agencies and agents targeted by the fraud: (1) NTSB (2) FAA
iii) Entities conspiring in the fraud:
(1) NTSB - Benzon (2) FAA - Scannevin and Richards (3) DuPont - Petersen (4) Conoco - Nicandros and Rudge iv) Motives for the fraud: (1) By late 1990, the DuPonUConoco Defendants' in-house lawyers knew that the NTSB CVR laboratory had used digital signal processing technology on recordings of USTS Exxon Valdez Captain Joseph J. Hazelwood voice to prove that Hazelwood, was intoxicated when USTS Exxon Valdez went aground on March 24, 1989. Within a day of the N204C crash, the DuPonUConoco Defendants' in-house lawyers reviewed Fox's medical records that showed the companies' prior knowledge of Fox's alcoholism
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and would have realized the enormity of civil and criminal liabilities arising from the N204C crash. The DuPontlConoco Defendants' in-house lawyers knew that if the NTSB CVR laboratory performed a similar analysis on the N204C CVR recording of Fox's voice, then there was a high probability that even if all of Fox's remains could be destroyed before Malaysian and US federal investigators could conduct forensic toxicological analysis, the CVR recording could reveal that the N204C crash had been caused by Fox's mental and/or physical incapacitation caused by his excessive drinking. The DuPontlConoco Defendants' in-house lawyers knew that the contents of the CVR recording would probably lead to an investigation by the FAA and NTSB to scrutinize the reports generated from Catterson's last medical examination of Fox in August 1991, and the uncovering of the willful frauds against the FAA described in 1) a) above. v) Damages caused by fraud: (1) Obstructed the Malaysian (DCA) and U.S. (NTSB) federal government investigations to prevent discovery that Fox had been incapacitated by his alcoholism and was, as a matter of law, physically/mentally unqualified to fly any aircraft on September 4, 1991; and that the DuPontlConoco Defendants' senior management had been repeatedly forewarned that their gross mismanagement of the companies' aviation operations would lead to the loss of life by allowing unqualified pilots like Fox to fly aircraft. The DuPontlConoco Defendants thereby evaded the enforcement of the FAR that long-standing public policy requires to prevent industrial disasters like the N204C crash from reoccurring. (2) Denied the DuPontlConoco Defendants' employees, including Parsons, and the public at large any warning of the dangers that continue to threaten public safety that the DuPontlConoco Defendants' senior management and in-house lawyers knew about more than fifteen years ago, but kept secret through spoliation of evidence, discovery fraud and false assertions of attorney-client privilege. c) Theft of Fox's remains from the custody of the DOS i) Elements of the fraud: (1) The DuPontlConoco Defendants stole Fox's remains from the custody of the Department of State (DOS) between September 10, 1991 and September 14,1991. (2) The DuPontlConoco Defendants falsely represented to U.S. federal investigators with the DOS and the AFIP that all of the N204C crash victims' remains that the CID transferred to the Kaestner's and Laminack's custody at the Kota Kinabalu Queen Elizabeth Hospital ("QEH") morgue between September 10, 1991 and September 14, 1991 were turned over to the AFIP forensic pathology team on September 15, 1991. Using their
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control of "security" at the QEH morgue, the DuPontlConoco Defendants concealed the first two body bags that the CID had brought to the morgue on September 10, 1991, containing the remains of Fox and Johnston (weighing -50 Kg each) from the AFIP investigators. ii) Federal government agencies and agents targeted by fraud: (1) DOS - Keastner, Suter, Lee Smith, Cooke, Butcher, Hession and McDermott (2) AFIP - Gormley, Rodriguez, Sledzik, McClain, Reiber, Canik, Veasey, Juniper, Knotts, Kessler and Pemble (3) FBI - Ridgley (4) NTSB - Benzon (5) FAA - Scannevin and Richards iii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud: (1) DuPont - Nicandros, Rudge and Petersen (2) Conoco - Nicandros, Rudge, Brignon and Smith (3) AIG - Savage, Wong and Needham (4) NTSB - Benzon iv) Motives for the fraud: (1) To obstruct discovery of the DuPontlConoco Defendants conspiracy to use fraud against the FAA to obtain Fox's August 1991 FAA temporary medical certificate so that Fox could continue to fly the companies' jets. (2) To obstruct discovery that the DuPontlConoco Defendants had engaged in willful misconduct that had caused the deaths of twelve people and evade prosecution for federal criminal sanctions against the senior officers who had ignored Cardamone's repeated warnings that a disaster like the N204C crash would predictably occur unless they took action to correct their gross mismanagement of the companies' aviation operations. v) Damages caused by the fraud: (1) Obstructed the Malaysian (DCA) and U.S. (NTSB) federal government investigations to prevent discovery that Fox had been incapacitated by his alcoholism and was, as a matter of law, physically/mentally unqualified to fly any aircraft on September 4, 1991; and that the DuPontlConoco Defendants' senior management had been repeatedly forewarned that their gross mismanagement of the companies' aviation operations would
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lead to the loss of life by allowing unqualified pilots like Fox to fly aircraft. The DuPont/Conoco Defendants thereby evaded the enforcement of the FAR that long-standing public policy requires to prevent industrial disasters like the N204C crash from reoccurring. (2) Denied the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' employees, including Parsons, and the public at large any warning of the dangers that continue to threaten public safety that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' senior management and in-house lawyers knew about more than fifteen years ago, but kept secret through spoliation of evidence, discovery fraud and false assertions of attorney-client privilege. 2) Frauds against the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas a) Obstructed the NTSB, FAA and DCA investigations of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' violations of FAR i) Elements of the fraud: (1) Obstruction of the NTSB/DCA investigation of the N204C crash by stealing the N204C CVR recording. (2) Obstruction of the AFIP/FBI investigation of the N204C crash by stealing N204C pilot Fox's remains. (3) Obstruction of the NTSB/DCA investigation of the N204C crash by concealing Fox's medical records. ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud: (1) DuPont - Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge, Gordon and Petersen (2) Conoco - Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge, Brignon, Smith (3) AIG - O'Brien, Leonard, Savage, Wong and Needham (4) G&W - Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier (5) LOWT - Turley
iii) Motives for the fraud:
(1) Knowing that the federal courts would rely upon the evidence discovered through the investigations of these U.S. federal agencies, the DuPont/Conoco Defendants conspired to obstruct these investigations to block the discovery of the evidence that the companies' knew would justify severe sanctions against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the officers who had failed to act upon warnings received prior to the N204C crash. Because the damages that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants would have to
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pay the families of the N204C crash victims were covered by a $100 million AIG aviation liability policy (Policy No. GM 539 2666), AIG's motive was avoidance of its responsibilities to, in good-faith, investigate the N204C crash and pay the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' employees' families fair compensation for the damages that had been caused by AIG's grossly negligent insured. iv) Damages caused by the fraud: (1) The Parsons and the other families of the N204C crash victims were denied information that would have been timely discovered and reported by the Malaysian and U.S. government agencies, but for the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' frauds upon the federal court in anticipation and in the course of the Parsons v. DuPont litigation. Specifically the evidence that was denied Parsons showed clearly and convincingly that the federal judge overseeing the trial in Parsons v. DuPont litigation should have: (a) granted Parsons' motion to join Conoco in Parsons v. DuPont, and (b) denied G&W lawyers' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV') by the jury that found that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' gross negligence was responsible Fox's failure to maintain his situational awareness on September 4, 1991, and the consequential wrongful death of Ann Parsons. (2) Obstruction of justice in the enforcement of FAR to maintain public safety. b) Obstructed the NTSB spectral analysis investigation of N204C CVR recording i) Elements of the fraud: (1) Concealed from the federal court an accurate facsimile of the original N204C CVR recording. One of the three channels that the FAA mandated recording (area microphone) was omitted entirely and the other two channels were filtered to conceal evidence of Fox's intoxication using the same spectral analysis techniques used by the NTSB in investigating the USTS Exxon Valdes disaster. (2) In collaboration with Benzon, obstructed the NTSB from retaining an accurate facsimile of the original N204C CVR recording (all three channels) upon which speech stress analysis on Fox's voice would have been done as in the case of USTS Exxon Valdez Captain Hazelwood who also suffered from alcoholism.
ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud:
(1) DuPont - Nicandros, Rudge and Petersen

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION Page 50 of 91
(2) Conoco - Nicandros and Rudge (3) G&W - Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier (4) LOwr - Turley iii) Motives for the fraud: (1) The DuPontlConoco Defendants knew that if there was any legal claim made asserting that Fox had been physically or mentally incapacitated, then Plaintiffs discovery would seek Fox's complete medical records revealing Fox's alcoholism and the DuPontlConoco Defendants' knowledge of Fox's alcoholism. The court's investigation of the plaintiffs subsequent claims that the DuPontlConoco Defendants had taken the CVR recording and Fox's remains from government custody, would undoubtedly lead the court to refer these criminal acts of fraud to the Department of Justice for investigation and prosecution. (2) Full disclosure would lead to a public relations disaster similar to the one arising from the USTS Exxon Valdez disaster. (3) Full disclosure would lead to a criminal investigation of the DuPontlConoco Defendants' law department would expose an umbrella conspiracy to cheat thousands hundreds of Benlate litigants out of more than $2 billion in claims and cheat tens of thousands of the DuPontlConoco Defendants' stockholders of information regarding the companies' true legal liabilities. iv) Damages caused by the fraud: (1) The Parsons and the other families of the N204C crash victims were denied information that would have been timely discovered and reported by the Malaysian and U.S. government agencies, but for the DuPontlConoco Defendants' frauds upon the federal court in anticipation and in the course of the Parsons v. DuPont litigation. Specifically the evidence that was denied Parsons showed clearly and convincingly that the federal judge overseeing the trial in Parsons v. DuPont litigation should have: (a) granted Parsons' motion to join Conoco in Parsons v. DuPont, and (b) denied G&W lawyers' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV') by the jury that found that the DuPontlConoco Defendants' gross negligence was responsible Fox's failure to maintain his situational awareness on September 4, 1991, and the consequential wrongful death of Ann Parsons. (2) Obstruction of justice in the enforcement of FAR to maintain public safety.
c) Obstructed AFIP-NTSB toxicological investigation of Fox's remains i) Elements of the fraud: (1) Stole Fox's remains while they were in the official custody of the DOS in Malaysia. To minimize the suspicion caused by the disappearance of only one set of remains for the twelve people onboard, the remains of Fox's copilot Johnston were also stolen. ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud: (1) DuPont - Nicandros, Rudge, Gordon and Petersen (2) Conoco - Nicandros, Rudge, Brignon and Smith (3) G&W -- Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier (4) LOWT - Turley iii) Motives for the fraud: (1) The DuPont/Conoco Defendants knew that if there was any legal claim made asserting that Fox had been physically or mentally incapacitated, then Plaintiffs discovery would seek Fox's complete medical records revealing Fox's alcoholism and the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' knowledge of Fox's alcoholism. The court's investigation of the plaintiffs subsequent claims that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had taken the CVR recording and Fox's remains from government custody, would undoubtedly lead the court to refer these criminal acts of fraud to the Department of Justice for investigation and prosecution. (2) Fear of a public relations disaster similar to the one arising from the USTS Exxon Valdez disaster. (3) Fear that a criminal investigation of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' law department would expose an umbrella conspiracy to cheat thousands hundreds of Benlate litigants out of more than $2 billion in claims and cheat tens of thousands of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' stockholders of information regarding the companies' true legal liabilities. iv) Damages caused by the fraud: (1) The Parsons and the other families of the N204C crash victims were denied information that would have been discovered and reported by the investigating US and Malaysian government agencies, but for this fraud upon the court in anticipation and in the course of the Parsons v. DuPont, litigation the court would have: (a) granted Parsons' motion to join Conoco in Parsons v. DuPont, and
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(b) denied DuPont's motion for JNOV regarding gross negligence in Parsons v. DuPont. (2) Obstruction of justice in the enforcement of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). d) Obstructed discovery of medical records pertaining to Fox's alcoholism i) Elements of the fraud: (1) DuPont and Conoco failed to produce in discovery for Parsons v. DuPont medical records that they held establishing Fox's alcoholism and the companies' prior knowledge of Fox's alcoholism. ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud (1) DuPont- Nicandros, Rudge, Gordon and Petersen (2) Conoco - Nicandros, Rudge, Anglin and Catterson (3) G&W -- Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier (4) LOWT - Turley iii) Motives for the fraud: (1) The DuPont/Conoco Defendants knew that if there was any legal claim made asserting that Fox had been physically or mentally incapacitated, then Plaintiffs discovery would seek Fox's complete medical records revealing Fox's alcoholism and the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' knowledge of Fox's alcoholism. The court's investigation of the plaintiffs subsequent claims that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had taken the CVR recording and Fox's remains from government custody, would undoubtedly lead the court to refer these criminal acts of fraud to the Department of Justice for investigation and prosecution. (2) Fear of a public relations disaster similar to the one arising from the USTS Exxon Valdez disaster. (3) Fear that a criminal investigation of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' law department would expose an umbrella conspiracy to cheat thousands hundreds of Benlate litigants out of more than $2 billion in claims and cheat tens of thousands of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' stockholders of information regarding the companies' true legal liabilities. iv) Damages caused by the fraud: (1) The Parsons and the other families of the N204C crash victims were denied information that would have been discovered and reported by the
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investigating US and Malaysian government agencies, but for this fraud upon the court in anticipation and in the course of the Parsons v. DuPont, litigation the court would have: (a) granted Parsons' motion to join Conoco in Parsons v. DuPont, and (b) denied DuPont's motion for JNOV regarding gross negligence in Parsons v. DuPont. (2) Obstruction of justice in the enforcement of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). e) Obstructed discovery of the DuPontlConoco Defendants' retired Senior Pilot Cardamone's correspondence and testimony i) Elements of the fraud: (1) Despite Turley's access to Cardamone's documents and testimony and Parsons insistence that Turley use Cardamone as a witness to the DuPontlConoco Defendants' gross mismanagement of the companies' aviation operations, Turley did not follow Parsons' instructions to depose Cardamone, introduced Cardamone's correspondence as evidence and call Cardamone as a witness at the trial of Parsons v. DuPont. ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud: (1) DuPont - Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge, Gordon and Petersen (2) Conoco - Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge, Brignon and Smith (3) G&W -- Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier (4) LOwr - Turley iii) Motives for the fraud: (1) Cardamone's correspondence to DuPont executive management warns of the safety problems caused by DuPont CEO Woolard's decision to allow DuPont Executive Vice President and Concoo President Nicandros oversee DuPont aviation operations. DuPont lawyers intentionally concealed this evidence to: (a) Conceal Conoco's involvement in the management of DuPont Aviation (b) Conceal evidence of DuPont's forewarning of an deadly aviation disaster iv) Damages caused by the fraud:
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(1) The Parsons and the other families of the N204C crash victims were denied information that would have been discovered and reported by the investigating U.S. and Malaysian government agencies. But for this fraud upon the court in anticipation and in the course of Parsons v. DuPont, the court would have: (a) granted Parsons' motion to join Conoco in Parsons v. DuPont, and (b) denied DuPont's motion for JNOV regarding gross negligence in Parsons v. DuPont. (2) Obstruction of justice in the enforcement of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).
f) Extortion of Turley to gain his complicity in the conspiracy to defraud the federal court and Parsons.
i)
Elements of the extortion: (1) Turley, Rose and AIG knew no later than April 1993 that Parsons believed that DuPont/Conoco Defendants' and the Turley Defendants' insurer, AIG, was violating the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in Malaysia to obstruct the CID and DCA investigations of the N204C crash. (2) Turley, Rose and AIG knew that AIG covered the DuPont/Conoco Defendants for $100 million on legal claims arising from the N204C crash and that AIG covered the Turley Defendants for only $5 million on legal claims arising from the Turley Defendants' legal malpractice, if they were caught mishandling legal claims. (3) Turley, Rose and AIG knew that if and when Parsons learned about the AIG-Turley conflict of interest, Parsons would immediately fire Turley for concealing his conflict of interest with AIG. (4) Under treat of having the AIG-Turley conflict of interest revealed to Parsons, Rose extorted Turley's silence in his duty to warn Parsons that the DuPont/Conoco Defendants and their lawyers were fraudulently concealing in discovery evidence that Turley had obtained or could have easily obtained from other sources showing that Fox suffered from alcoholism and that Cardamone had forewarned the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' senior officers of a disaster like the N204C crash occurring because of the gross mismanagement of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' aviation operations.
ii) Organizations and individuals benefiting from the extortion: (1) AIG - O'Brien and Leonard (2) DuPont -- Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge and Gordon
(3) Conoco - Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge and Gordon (4) G&W - Rose, Hollingsworth and Spence (5) LOWT - Turley iii) Motives for the extortion of Turley: (1) To defeat Parsons' legal claims in Parsons v. DuPont by gaining Turley's complicity in the DuPont/Conoco Defendants', G&Ws and AIG's conspiracy to defraud the federal court of evidence that the conspirators believed would exhaust the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' $100 million AIG aviation liability policy. iv) Damages by Turley's response to the extortion by intentionally breaching fiduciary duties owed to Parsons: (1) The Parsons and the other families of the N204C crash victims were denied information that Parsons discovered and instructed Turley to use in the prosecution of Parsons v. DuPont, but Turley, for this fraud upon the court in anticipation and in the course of Parsons v. DuPont, the court would have: (a) granted Parsons' motion to join Conoco in Parsons v. DuPont, and (b) denied DuPont's motion for JNOV regarding gross negligence in Parsons v. DuPont. g) Destruction of other evidence from the N204C crash scene i) Elements of the fraud: (1) DuPont -- destroyed Petersen's videotape of the crash scene that would impeach Petersen's planned "expert" testimony as the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' N204C crash investigator that the passengers died instantly when jet first contacted trees on top of the ridge. (2) Conoco - destroyed Laminack's videotape of the N204C crash victims' remains that would impeach the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' claims that no remains of Fox or Johnston were ever recovered from the crash site. (3) Conoco, DuPont - destroyed AFIP reports, videotapes and photographs of N204C crash victims' autopsies. (4) DuPont, Conoco, AIG - destroyed CID videotape and photographs of N204C crash victims' recovery. ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the fraud: (1) DuPont - Petersen
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(2) Conoco - Nicandros, Rudge, Gordon, Brignon and Smith (3) G&W - Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier (4) AIG - O'Brien, Leonard, Savage, Wong and Needham iii) Motives for the fraud: (1) To destroy any evidence that would show that the RMP had recovered the torsos of two men in pilot-harnesses at the N204C crash site and, on September 10, 1991, while Petersen was at the crash site, the RMP took the two bags to the QEH and turned their custody over to the DOS and Conoco. The two body bags were stolen from the QEH morgue while in the custody of the DOS and Conoco before the OAFME team arrived on September 14, 1991 and took custody of the remains of the other bags of remains taken to QEH on September 15,1991. iv) Damages caused by the fraud: (1) Cover-up of the frauds against the NTSB, FAA, DOD and DCA described above to prevent discovery of Fox's alcoholism through mandatory forensic toxicological testing of Fox's remains. 3) Conspiracy to defeat Parsons v. Turley and the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) claims a) Bribery of Texas 5th Court of Appeals Justice David L. Bridges i) Elements of bribery: (1) Received: (a) Campaign contributions illegally used to acquire goods and services for personal enrichment. (b) Lucrative employment protected from political opposition in the primary or general elections. (2) Gave: (a) After the Texas Supreme Court overturned Bridges opinion in Parsons v. Turley, the "submission" of post-remand briefing in Parsons v. Turley was delayed for more than 21 months. When Parsons v. Turley was finally submitted all justices on the panel deciding the first appeal had left the court except for Bridges. (b) Bridges authored and issued a fraudulent opinion in Parsons v. Turley in which he willfully disobeyed the mandate of the Supreme Court of Texas, and denied Parsons motion for reconsideration pointing out Bridges blatant and, apparently intentional, error.
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(3) Organizations and individuals participating in the bribery a. G&W - Rose, Hollingsworth and Spence b. Lynn, Tillotson & Pinker - Michael Lynn c. B&B - Baron 2. Motives for the bribery a. Continuing conspiracy to defraud Parsons of evidence that could be used to prove the frauds against the federal government and court as described above. 3. Damages caused by the bribery: a. Public confidence in the integrity of Texas courts in uniformly applying the law as interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court. b. Perpetuating the continuing fraud against Parsons to deny Parsons his legal right to recover damages lost in the underlying cases as allowed by Texas law. b) Extortion, and commercial or fiduciary bribery of Greenberg and/or Motsenbocker to delay Parsons' prosecution his fraud upon the federal court claims against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, the Turley Defendants, and others i) Elements of extortion, and commercial or fiduciary bribery: (1) The Greenberg Defendants were dependants upon the friendship and connections to the Baron Defendants for work (2) The Motsenbocker Defendants depended upon the Greenberg Defendants to manage and gainfully employ Motsenbocker in work given them by the Baron Defendants (3) AIG was a major client to and the professional liability insurer for the Motsenbocker Defendants during the time the Greenberg Defendants acted as supervising contractor to the Motsenbocker Defendants in overseeing Motsenbocker's work for B&B and Parsons in prosecuting Parsons v. Turley and preparing to prosecute the fraud upon the court case against the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, the Turley Defendants and others. ii) Organizations and individuals participating in the bribery (1) The Baron Defendants - Baron, Blue (2) R-W -- Rose
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4. Motives for the bribery a. Continuing conspiracy to defraud Parsons of evidence that could be used to prove the frauds against the federal government and court described above. 5. Damages caused by the fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty induced by extortion, and commercial and fiduciary bribery: a. Perpetuating the continuing conspiracy to defraud Parsons of his legal right to recover the damages he lost in the underlying cases and the expenses he incurred in years of fruitless litigation. 4) Plaintiff further indentifies the following actions by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants committed "as part of' or "in furtherance of any conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff" and/or the courts upon which Plaintiff depended for the equitable determination of the judgment debts he would be entitled to collect from the DuPont/Conoco Defendants by two or more of Woolard, Nicandros, Rudge, Gordon, Petersen, Smith and Bringon. a) Attempted to induce Parsons into signing a release from liability for the wrongful death of Ann Parsons. (October 1991) b) Threatened Parsons with loosing his job unless he stopped his investigation into the causes of the wrongful death of Ann Parsons. (October-November 1991) c) Attempted to induce Parsons into hiring a personal injury lawyer over whom they could influence through the lawyer's family and friends into agreeing to file only a "friendly lawsuit". (October-November 1991) d) Spoliation or fraudulent concealment of the portions of Fox's medical records showing that Fox suffered from alcoholism. (September 4, 1991 - December 31, 1998) e) Spoliation and/or fraudulent concealment of Fox's remains in Malaysia. (September 10,1991 - December 31,1998) f) Spoliation and/of fraudulent concealment of the original cockpit voice recorder ("CVR") recording. (September 10,1991 - December 31,1998) g) Destruction and/or fraudulent concealment of Petersen's videotape of what he saw on his visit to the jet crash site. (September 10, 1991 - December 31, 1998) h) Destruction and/or fraudulent concealment of Laminack's reports, photographs and videotapes of what he observed in his role as the coordinator for the AFIP team the DuPont/Conoco Defendants paid to come to Malaysia to conduct the
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autopsies of the victims of the jet crash. (September 20, 1991 - December 31, 1998) i) Destruction and/or fraudulent concealment of the AFIP reports, photographs, and videotapes available to the DuPont/Conoco Defendants through political channels in the United States and because Conoco paid to for the AFIP's work. (September 10,1991 - December 31,1998) Destruction and/or fraudulent concealment of the DCA reports, photographs, and videotapes available to the DuPont/Conoco Defendants. (September 10, 1991 December 31, 1998)
j)
k) Destruction and/or fraudulent concealment of the CID reports, photographs, and videotapes available to the DuPont/Conoco Defendants through political channels in the United States and because the DuPont/Conoco Defendants paid through the AIG indemnification agreement for the CID's work. (September 10, 1991 - December 31, 1998) I) Spoliation and/or of Cardamone's letters to Woolard and other senior DuPont and Conoco officers. (September 10, 1991 - December 31,1998) m) Extortion and/or bribery of the DuPont/Conoco Defendants employee-pilots that were fired just after the N204C crash, offering "early retirement incentives" conditioned upon them keeping their silent about what they knew about the forewarnings the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had received prior to the jet crash, including any knowledge they had about Cardamone's numerous warning letters that had been sent for almost two years prior to and up to a month before the N204C crash, to DuPont and Conoco officers and directors, including DuPont Chairman and Conoco Co-Chairman Woolard. 5) Plaintiff further indentifies the following actions by the DuPont/Conoco Defendants committed "as part of' or "in furtherance of any conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff' and/or the courts upon which Plaintiff depended for the equitable determination of the judgment debts he would be entitled to collect from the DuPont/Conoco Defendants, through two or more of Rose, Hollingsworth, Spence and Meier filing . the following fictitious pleadings in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation, the Parsons v. Conoco litigation, the Parsons v. Turley litigation, the DuPont/Conoco TRCP Rule 202 litigation, and the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation to delay trials for the Plaintiffs causes. a) Plaintiffs discovery requests in Parsons v. DuPont and Parsons v. Conoco: i) April 9, 1992, Defendant E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company's Objections to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production and Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories;
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ii) April 20, 1992, Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Defendant E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company's Response to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production; iii) September 14, 1993, Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint; iv) April 18, 1994, Defendant's Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories; and v) July 19, 1994, Trial Memorandum - Accidental Destruction of Evidence. b) In July 1993, Rose attempted to defraud the Malaysian government by seeking Malaysian court orders through letters rogatory of Malaysian government officials who Rose's employer, AIG, would later sue under AIG's indemnification rights on the DuPontlConoco Defendants $100 million aviation liability policy. Rose willfully did not identify to the Malaysian federal court that the deponents were Malaysian government officials whose testimony could be used as evidence in AIG's suit against the government of Malaysia in 1994. c) On March 3, 1994, Rose filed "DuPont's Motion for Protective Order" in Parsons v. DuPont to block Parsons' efforts to warn DuPont's directors and shareholders of the continuing willful blindness to DuPont's and Conoco's gross mismanagement of the their aviation operations, and to encourage other DuPont and Conoco employees to come forward with any information, as Cardamone had, that could be used to force the companies' managers into conducting a good faith investigation to determine the causes for the jet crash and then implement the necessary corrective measures to prevent a future industrial accidents, including corporate jet crashes. Rose's misrepresentations in this pleading caused Black to issue an order on April 19, 1994, although denying Rose's motion for a protective order, threatened that unless Parsons limited his investigation of the jet crash to having " ... future communications between litigants... '" through counsel...; [Parsons' activities] could prove prejudicial." After the jury agreed with Parsons that gross negligence by DuPont and Conoco were responsible for the wrongful death of Ann Parsons, Black delivered on his earlier bias treat by granting Rose's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict before the jury was allowed to make a determination as to the quantum of punitive damages that should be paid. At the DuPont shareholders' meeting in April 1995, while Parsons v. DuPont was on appeal Woolard and Rudge would conspire to have Parsons bodily removed from the DuPont shareholders' meeting to deny Parsons his right as a DuPont shareholder to speak for two minutes pursuant to the rules for the meeting. d) March 14, 1994, Rose filed a motion for summary judgment in Parsons v. Conoco falsely asserting that Conoco had listed Ann Parsons as a covered employee under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act. Rose's action was in
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furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud Parsons, under the color of law, of Parsons legal rights to sue DuPont and Conoco jointly for his compensatory damages. When a total summary judgment was granted in Parsons v. Conoco, on April 25, 1995, Turley refused Parsons instructions to file a notice of appeal, and lied to Parsons about how much time Parsons had to file a notice of appeal pro se. Consequently, Parsons' pro se notice of appeal was untimely and Parsons' appeal was dismissed because the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the case. e) On July 12, 1994, Turley and Rose conspired to not forward the good-faith settlement demand that Parsons made upon DuPont in Parsons v. DuPont through Turley (on the personal instructions to Parsons from the trial court judge, Norman W. Black) for $27.5 million.
f) Between July 12-21, 1994, in the trial of Parsons v. DuPont, Rose suborned the following perjury from Petersen: .
i)
Petersen denied any knowledge of forewarning of the dangers of using pilots like Fox and copilots like Johnston to fly the jets under his supervision, despite admitting in his deposition testimony on August 3-4, 1999, that he had been given Cardamone's letters by Woolard when he had assumed his position as Aviation Director in January 1991.
ii) Petersen stated emphatically that Ann Parsons had been killed instantly in the jet crash and had suffered no pain and suffering in the 10 seconds of free-fall that Petersen knew he had no basis for claiming.
iii) Petersen stated that he accidentally destroyed the videotape he had taken of what he, the only employee of the DuPontiConoco Defendants, other than Parsons, to go to the jet crash site. The videotape was critical to checking the veracity of the authoritative statements made by Petersen, including ii) above.
g) On July 21, 1995, Hollingsworth and Spence filed ICDu Pont's Response to Parsons's Motion to Supplement the Reco'rd" in Parsons v. DuPont then before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Hollingsworth's and Spence's action furthered the conspiracy to conceal from the appellate court the only one of Cardamone's many letters that Turley had included on his list of trial exhibits showing that senior officers of DuPont and Conoco had been forewarned in writing of the risks in continuing to use unqualified pilots like Fox to operate its corporate jets. h) From June 1996, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit issued the first opinion, but not the mandate, in Parsons v. DuPont, Rose, and September 1996, Hollingsworth, Spence (ICAIG lawyers") and Turley conspired to induce Parsons into signing a release from the judgment Parsons had obtained in Parsons v. DuPont by falsely stating that the checks AIG had delivered to
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Turley would not be negotiable until Parsons signed a full release from the judgment debt owed by DuPont and/or DuPont's surety, AIG. When Parsons refused to submit to AIG lawyers' deceit, Hollingsworth fraudulently induced Parsons' lawyer Powell into believing that the checks were unconditional tenders and that she should advise Parsons to meet with Turley, to whom Hollingsworth had delivered the checks and the release from judgment she wanted Parsons to sign, to receive Parsons' portion of the tenders on the judgment debt. On Powell's recommendation, a few hours after Hollingsworth falsely represented to Powell that the AIG checks were unconditional tenders on the judgment debt, Parsons met with Turley and endorsed the two AIG checks. Turley also endorsed the two AIG checks and handed them to his banker for deposit in his account. However, Turley withheld the check his banker had prepared for Parsons stating that Hollingsworth had instructed him not to give Parsons any money until Parsons signed her release from judgment. Parsons told Turley that Hollingsworth had told Powell that the tender was unconditional, and that he should call Hollingsworth to find out to which of Parsons' lawyers she had lied. Turley put the call on the speakerphone, but failed to notify Hollingsworth when she answered the telephone that Parsons was a party to the conversation. Turley told Hollingsworth that Parsons refused to sign the release from judgment because he understood that the tender was unconditional. Hollingsworth responded: "Windle, your client gets no money until he signs the release." When Parsons interjected: "That's not what you told Sidney Powell a few hours ago." Hollingsworth sharply instructed Turley: "Windle, don't want to talk to your client." Parsons immediately left the meeting without signing Hollingsworth's release from judgment and without his money. i) Between September 1996 and May 21, 1997, Hollingsworth refused to communicate with Powell about the shortfall in the tenders from the judgment debt amounts that had been calculated by DuPont and AIG, and approved by the Black, Rose and Turley in the two AIG supersedes bonds that AIG used secure the judgment debt owed Parsons during the pending appeal. Although Turley represented to Parsons that Parsons would recover an additional $53,780.94 in taxable costs owed Parsons under the final jUdgment, Turley did not advise Parsons that Turley and the AIG lawyers had entered into a verbal agreement, unenforceable by Parsons, to negotiate the taxable costs that Parsons would be paid without Turley having to file the required bill of costs.
j) On May 21, 1997, the AIG lawyers filed a motion for release from judgment in Parsons v. DuPont. Parsons demanded that Turley provide him copies of the correspondence between Turley and the AIG lawyers that Turley had concealed from Parsons for more than five months showing that Turley had conspired with the AIG lawyers in denying Parsons' right to recover all of the judgment debt. When Parsons discovered the secret deal between Turley and the AIG lawyers, Parsons immediately instructed Turley to accept the last offer Spence made as payment on Parsons' taxable costs ($23,624.60). However, Spence delayed responding to Powell's inquiry on Parsons acceptance of Spence's last offer until
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July 1, 1997, at which time he stated that because Parsons had fired Turley on June 12, 1997, and Spence's offer had been under the secret agreement between Turley and the AIG lawyers, Spence would not pay Parsons anything. k) On March 16, 1999, at a hearing in the Master's Court assigned by Richter to handle discovery disputes in Parsons v. Turley, Rose misrepresented to the court what Nicandros' involvement in the DuPont and Conoco investigation of the causes for the jet crash as a means of defeating Parsons' motion to compel Nicandros' deposition in Parsons v. Turley. After Parsons' succeeded in obtaining the court's order compelling Nicandros' deposition, Rose repeatedly delayed the proceedings until Nicandros died on August 23, 1999. I) On August 2, 2000, Rose filed "Response to Petition for Rule 202 Order" in which he knowingly misrepresented to the court the factual basis for the anticipated lawsuit against DuPont and Conoco. m) By August 26, 1999, Turley retained the DuPont/Conoco Defendants' law firm, G&W, to block Parsons from discovering evidence in the Parsons ~ v. Turley litigation, under the ruse of an attorney-client privilege to concealment, that could prove that Turley had conspired with DuPont, Conoco, AIG and the companies' G&W lawyers to defraud Parsons of his legal rights. n) On June 28, 2001, just two months after the Supreme Court of Texas announced in Parsons v. Turley that Turley had been timely served with process for Parsons' legal malpractice claims, G&W lawyers paid Bridges $5000 as quid pro quo to delay the case from being immediately remanded to the trial court where Parsons could resume discovery of their conspiracy with Turley. Although the money was laundered as a campaign contribution, it was a bribe, contemporaneous with one of the same amount given by the Baron Defendants, to induce Bridges into using official oppression under the color of law to derail Parsons' lawful purpose to prosecute Parsons' legal claims against DuPont/Conoco Defendants and the Turley Defendants. The "Political Expenditures" section of Bridges' 2001 filing of the "Judicial Candidate/Officeholder Campaign Finance Reports," shows that Bridges used the G&W and the Baron Defendants money to buy things of value for Bridges' personal enrichment.
0) In 2001, RW lawyers misrepresented to the AFIP General Counsel Bross that RW represented Fox's estate and that the Fox's family wanted to block, under the privacy exception, Parsons' Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for the AFIP file on the work the DuPont/Conoco Defendants had paid the federal agency to do and that had been fraudulently concealed in the Parsons v. DuPont litigation.
p) From March to May 2009, Rose's former partner at G&W, Spence, now employed as the Motsenbocker Defendants' lawyer at SGR&M authored, filed and argued for "Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs
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Claim for 'Lost Punitive Damages'" misrepresenting the facts and the Texas law that should be applied to the facts in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation. On April 28, 2008, Rose filed "Third-Party ConocoPhillips Company's Motion for Protective Order and Objections to Discovery Subpoena" misrepresenting the facts and the Texas law that should be applied to the facts in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation. On October 14, 2008, Rose filed "Non-Party Walter Brignon's Motion for Protective Order" misrepresenting the facts and the Texas law that should be applied to the facts in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation. On June 17, 2009, Rose filed "Defendants' Special to Plaintiffs Fifth Amended Petition and Motion to Dismiss" misrepresenting to block discovery in this case, Parsons v. Greenberg, et al., misrepresenting the facts and the law that should be allied to the facts in the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation. Relying upon Spence's and Rose's persistent misrepresentations about factual and legal basis giving rise to the Parsons v. Greenberg, et al. litigation, the trial judge has signed the following orders to quash depositions and exclude expert testimony Parsons requires to prove his legal claims, thereby continuing the same discovery fraud under the color of law that Parsons has been victimized by in both the state and federal courts of Texas for more than 17 years. i) On June 6, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order on Defendants Robert Motsenbocker's and Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, P.C.'s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment". ii) On June 6, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order on Defendants Robert Motsenbocker's and Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, P.C.'s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Diane Vinson Devasto". iii) On July 11, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order Granting McNown's Motion for Protective Order" iv) On August 11, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order Granting, In Part, Defendants' Motion to Quash" v) On August 11, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order" excluding Parsons' expert witnesses: Sifford, Unterberg, Rigler, Needham and Quinn" vi) On September 20, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order Granting, In Part, Defendants' Multiple Motions to Quash" quashing the depositions of: Rudge, Laminack, Pemble, Gormley, Petersen, Bross, Peck, Kessler, McNease, Woolard, Gulfstream, Juniper, Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, Richards, Rose, Yap, Lynn, Knotts, Conoco, DuPont, Cardamone and Laboratory Corporation of America. vii) On September 30, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order Denying Plaintiffs Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice" of the trial transcript
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and pleadings in Parsons v. DuPont (H-92-788 and 94-20756) and Parsons v. Turley (DV98-4593-F). viii)On September 30, 2008, Spence and his partners obtained "Order Denying Plaintiffs Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence" denying Parsons' objections to the evidence Spence used to gain ix) On June 5, 2009, Rose and his partners obtained "Amended Order Sustaining Defendant's Special Exceptions".
IX. MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD

9.01 9.02 Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing herein as if copied verbatim at length. Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, one or more,
represented to Plaintiff, as more specifically set out herein, that competent legal services would be rendered to Plaintiff. The misrepresentations of these defendants to Plaintiff were material because such misrepresentations induced Plaintiff to hire, retain and continue to pay these defendants enormous amounts of legal fees, to rely on their counsel, advice and their representation. 9.03 The Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker Defendants made
representations to Plaintiff that were false. Moreover, such representations were a false promise of future performance and such conduct amounted to false representations to Plaintiff. 9.04 Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker made the false
representations knowing they were false. At the time the representations were made, these defendants either owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff (Greenberg/Motsenmocker) or aided and abetted a breach of a fiduciary duty. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker intended for Plaintiff to rely upon the false representations and in fact, Plaintiff relied upon the false representations when acquiescing in the failure to immediately serve
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Turley and LOWT, and to file suit in an independent action in a federal court asserting Parsons' claims against DuPont and Conoco for the companies' fraud upon the federal court in Parsons v. DuPont. 9.05 Additionally, Plaintiff relied upon the fraudulent representations of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker that Parsons' legal rights would be protected although these defendants acted to (1) only serve Turley in Parsons v. Turley after they believed that the inaction had created a limitations defense for Turley in Parsons v. Turley, (2) exclude from post-remand pleadings in Parsons v. Turley the statement of fact that the basis for Parsons' victory in Parsons v. Turley before the Supreme Court of Texas was the limitations-tolling second appeal in Parsons v. DuPont, and (3) delay filing suit against DuPont and Conoco for Parsons' fraud upon the federal court claims until more than four years after Parsons had discovered evidence that the claims were viable in the Tex. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 202 deposition of Col. William T. Gormley. 9.06 The false misrepresentations by Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker
directly and proximately caused injuries to Plaintiff, which resulted in Plaintiff's claims against Turley and LOWT, and DuPont and Conoco being time barred. 9.07 By delaying service upon Turley, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker
failed to disclose that the statute of limitations might later bar Plaintiff's claims and failed to act diligently to obtain service on Turley. 9.08 Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, likewise, failed to disclose that
there was no enforceable Rule 11 agreement between counsel related to this issue and, in fact, none had even been requested. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker by
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delaying service upon Turley, deprived Plaintiff of his legal right and remedies and a trial by jury. 9.09 After failing to disclose that the statute of limitations might later bar
Plaintiff's claims and or take appropriate action to obtain service upon Turley, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker continued to intentionally misrepresent to Plaintiff, through four years of appeals, that they had exercised due diligence, where as a matter of law they had not. This misrepresentation was material. 9.10 Plaintiff will demonstrate 1) defendants made representations to the
Plaintiff; 2) those representations were material; 3) those representations were false; 4) when the defendants made the representations, the defendants knew the
representations were false or made their representations recklessly as a positive assertion without knowledge of the truth; 5) the defendants made the representations with the intent that the plaintiff rely on it; 6) Plaintiff reiied on the representations; 7) the representations caused the Plaintiff injury. Thus, Plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages within the jurisdictional limits of this court arising out of this conduct for common law fraud.
x. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES

10.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations made in the above paragraphs, as if fully set out at length herein. 10.02. Plaintiff hired Greenberg and Motsenbocker on Baron's recommendation. Plaintiff was owed a duty of candor, loyalty, trust, fidelity and full disclosure. The duty is one that is imposed by the special relationship of trust and confidence. As such,
Plaintiff entrusted Greenberg and Motsenbocker on Baron's recommendation with the at
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issue legal matters, including specifically, legal matters involving the claims against Turley and LOWT, and DuPont and Conoco. Greenberg and Motsenbocker owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty. Baron aided and abetted the Greenberg/Mostenbocker Defendants in breaching their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. 10.03 A special relationship existed in which Baron, Greenberg and
Motsenbocker held themselves out as professionals in the area of law in which they practiced. Plaintiff relied upon their representations and counsel. A fiduciary
relationship exists between an attorney and a client and a resulting fiduciary duty and disclosure obligations. As a fiduciary, an attorney is obligated to render a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the representation. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, as attorneys, had a duty of absolute perfect candor, openness and honesty and the absence of any concealment or deception towards Plaintiff as their client. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker had the duty to act fairly, honestly and equitably with regard to Plaintiff. However, Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached their fiduciary
duty to Plaintiff, and Baron failed to act in good faith by using the Plaintiffs confidences improperly and taking advantage of his trust, by making misrepresentations and by aiding and abetting Greenberg and Motsenbocker in a breach of their fiduciary duties all of which proximately caused damages, resulting in the Plaintiffs damages. 10.04 At no time during this period of time did Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker deny that they owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, or aided in a breach of a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. At no time during this time period did Greenberg,
Motsenbocker and Baron take the position that they did not have an attorney/client relationship with Plaintiff. At no time did Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker take the
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position that they were not assisting or were unable to assist on any of the legal matters or render advice regarding Parsons' claims and/or litigation against Turley and LOWT, or DuPont and Conoco. To the contrary, during this period of time, Greenberg and Motsenbocker represented to Plaintiff that they were qualified, that they were representing the Plaintiff, that they had an attorney/client relationship with Plaintiff, that they were content and happy to work upon Plaintiffs legal matters, that they were able to do so, and that they had an ongoing attorney/client relationship with Plaintiff involving the claims and/or litigation against Turley and LOWT, and DuPont and Conoco and that they had an ongoing relationship with B & B who would assist Greenberg and Motsenbocker if needed. The total billing of Defendants, including the recommended consultants, experts and investigators, approximated one million dollars
($1,000,000.00). Plaintiff paid those sums as requested. A formal fiduciary duty arises
as a matter of law in an attorney/client relationship. Restatement section 52 describes this fiduciary duty as a duty to exercise 'the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances." A fiduciary relationship often will arise from a 'special relationship' involving trust and confidence such as the relationship Plaintiff had with the referring attorney Baron and that, at a minimum imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Baron, however, took advantage of Plaintiff and his conduct in aiding and abetting G & M's breach of fiduciary duty was tantamount to actual fraud upon Parsons and the Estate of Ann Parsons.
10:05 In particular, Plaintiff asserts the following non-exclusive conduct was a

breach of the fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff: a. Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached their duty of undivided loyalty to the client by intentionally being loyal to persons other than the client in
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connection with the legal matters at issue; and Baron either breached a duty of undivided loyalty or aided and abetted Greenberg and Motsenbocker in breaching their duty of undivided loyalty by being loyal other persons, other than Parsons. b. Greenberg and Motsenbocker intentionally put their financial interest ahead of the client; and Baron put his own social and political interest ahead of the client, by being loyal to other persons, other than Parsons in connection with the legal matters at issue; and he intentionally aided and abetted Greenberg's breaches of fiduciary duty and the ongoing deception. Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached their duty of undivided loyalty owed to the client by intentionally not making a full explanation of all of the risks and implications of the actions and/or inactions that they were contemplating in connection with the case, and in connection with the Turley litigation and the DuPont and Conoco litigation; and they had more than the traditional obligation not to make any material misrepresentations; they had an affirmative duty to make a full and fair disclosure and confession of mistakes and of any facts that were material to the client's representation which they failed to do. The breach of this duty to disclose is tantamount to concealment. Baron in his capacity as a consultant and as the referring attorney, with whom Greenberg and Motsenbocker frequently conferred with, aided and abetted Greenberg and Motsenbocker's breach of fiduciary duty. Greenberg and Motsenbocker failed in their duty of full disclosure in connection with the Turley litigation, in that they intentionally did not fully disclose to the client all of the risks, consequences and implications of the actions/inactions they were contemplating, nor did they disclose what the risks and options were for the client in connection with their actions/inactions; and Baron intentionally aided and abetted them in this misconduct. Parsons relied on Greenberg and Motsenbocker for this information and was harmed thereby. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker intentionally failed to disclose the conflicts of interest presented, including but not limited to the actual conflict of pursuing an appeal caused by Greenberg's and Motsenbocker's failure to timely procure citations and serve Turley and LOwr, and by employing Turley's lawyer, Lynn, to serve Baron's interests in the litigation arising from the B&B Memo Scandal; and Parsons relied on Greenberg and Motsenbocker for this information and was harmed thereby. Greenberg and Motsenbocker intentionally continued to bill Plaintiff and accept payments from Plaintiff after not timely serving the Turley and LOwr in the Turley litigation thereby putting their own financial interest
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c.
d.
e.
f.
ahead of the client's interest. Parsons relied on Greenberg and Motsenbocker to put his financial interests foremost and was harmed thereby. g. Importantly, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were induced by Baron to intentionally and fraudulently conceal material facts, upon which Parsons relied, regarding his claims, and Baron knowingly participated in Greenberg and Motsenbocker's breach of fiduciary duty; and thus, Baron is a joint tortfeasor.
As a result of such breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff has been harmed by Baron particularly in light of his position of trust and confidence with respect to this client. Also, just as significantly, Greenberg and Motsenbocker are not entitled to any compensation previously paid because they breached the fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff and they did not properly perform the legal services contemplated. The injury is palpable. On Baron's referral and recommendation, Greenberg and Motsenbocker
were retained to bring suit against the Turley Defendants as well as Dupont and Conoco for actual fraud. 10.06 Plaintiff shall demonstrate that 1) he had a fiduciary relationship with Defendants, 2) the misconduct complained of was a clear and serious breach of fiduciary duty, 3) that the breach resulted in injury to the Plaintiff and benefit to the Defendants which are considerations (which at a minimum constitutes constructive fraud) (although actual fraud is also alleged herein and pled) to be weighed in viewing the remedies, including disgorgement that should be applied in this case. 10.7 With respect to the duty to disclose all information, an attorney has a duty to take appropriate action to ensure the client has information so that remedial action can be taken. With respect to this duty, the Attorney/Defendants intentionally and knowingly failed to disclose material facts to their Client; this deception and
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concealment shows that their duties as lawyers were not carried out in good faith, that they were carried out in bad faith, due to self dealing, and impermissible conflicts of interests and in furtherance of a conspiracy to achieve an unlawful purpose, to wit: to effectuate a continuing fraud upon the Courts, Parsons and the Estate of Ann Parsons. Parsons anxiously guards his interests for several reasons, both as a matter of principle and pragmatics. In principle when a person agrees to perform services in a relationship of trust and violates that relationship, express or implied, particularly when attorneys do this to their client an injustice occurs, whether there are actual damages or not. As a pragmatic concern, the Court System must determine if Parsons and the Estate of Ann Parsons are entitled to damages, and if so in what amount. XI. VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 11.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations made in the above
paragraphs, as if fully set out at length herein (and specifically paragraphs 5.05, 6.01 &
7.09.)
11.02 Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were and are in violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The DTPA has generally applied to legal services. There is no statute that exempts attorneys. In Latham v Castillo, the Texas Supreme Court held that an attorney's misrepresentations to his clients that cause the clients to lose their day in court can constitute unconscionable action under the DTPA. Defendants engaged in false, misleading, and/or deceptive acts or practices that Plaintiff relied on his detriment and in an unconscionable course of action. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker have violated the provisions of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (the "DTPA") by failing to disclose certain
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information to Plaintiff, that was intended to induce Plaintiff (the consumer) into a transaction (legal services) he otherwise would not have entered into and/or otherwise would not have continued with the representation, if disclosure had been made promptly. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker and/or its agents, employees, and servants acting within the course and scope of their employment engaged in false, misleading, deceptive and unconscionable conduct. Specifically, the wrongful,
unconscionable, and culpable conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following: a. representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities which they do not have, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.46(b)(S); representing that goods or services are of a particular standard or quality, when they are or another, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.46(b)(7); representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve or which are prohibited by law, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.46(b)(12); the failure to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.46(b)(24) engaging in unconscionable conduct, actions and courses of action, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.S0(a)(3) making an express misrepresentation of a material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment or opinion an unconscionable act or course of action that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment or opinion; and failure to disclose information in violation of 17.46(b) (23) [which makes actionable the failure to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction, if such failure to disclose information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into
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b. c.
d.
e. f. g. h.
which the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed.] 11.03 Plaintiff is a consumer because he sought legal services that form the basis of the DTPA complaint. See Business and Commerce Code, section 17.45. Also the DTPA does not require privity for a cause of action to arise. Contractual privity is not a consideration. Defendant lawyers Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker committed a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice; and engaged in the conduct intentionally and knowingly. Defendants had actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or
unfairness of the act or practice and acted with a specific intent that Plaintiff act in detrimental reliance on the falsity or deception, or in detrimental ignorance of the unfairness. Plaintiff relied to his detriment. Such false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice constituted a producing cause of the plaintiffs actual damages. 11.04 Defendants Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker acted knowingly and intentionally, and took advantage to a grossly unfair degree of the lack of knowledge of the Plaintiff and failed to mitigate the harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks and is entitled to recover actual damages, damages for emotional distress, attorney's fees and additional statutory damages. Furthermore, Plaintiff is entitled to such damages because Plaintiff has complied with the statutory notice requirement of the DTPA by issuing a timely demand on Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, and because all conditions precedent have been met. XII. NEGLIGENCE 12.01 Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations made in the above
paragraphs, as if fully set out at length herein (and specifically, Paragraphs 5.50, 6.01 & 7.09)
12.02 The individual Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were attorneys practicing law within the State of Texas at all relevant times herein. Each was an attorney for Plaintiff. In Texas, an attorney client relationship may be implied by the conduct of the parties, even during preliminary consultations regarding the attorney's possible retention or when circumstances lead the party to believe that the attorney is representing him. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker maintained an attorney-client relationship which may be inferred that he had fiduciary responsibilities toward Plaintiff. The contract of employment is implied by the conduct of the parties. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were negligent in the course of the performance of their legal services to their client, Roger K. Parsons, individually, and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons. 12.03 Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker solely controlled the timing of the citation and petition upon Turley and failed to exercise diligence when delaying same. The failure to obtain service of process, causing limitations to run is "negligence" and "gross negligence." 12.04 Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker owed Plaintiff the duty to exercise the level of care that other attorneys practicing in the same locality and in the same or similar circumstances would have exercised. However, Baron, Greenberg and
Motsenbocker actionslinactions in the course of their representation of Plaintiff did not meet the standard of care as required by their profession, and thereby Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached their duty of care to Plaintiff. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker failed to use ordinary care, that is failing to do that which an attorney
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of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney of ordianary prudence not have done under the same or similar circumstances. Even in the post remand briefing Greenberg and Motsenbocker failed to brief available arguments that the statute of limitations was not a defense to the Turley lawsuit. These actions or inactions amount to legal negligence. Their breach of duty proximately caused the Plaintiff injury. 12.05 Due to Greenberg and Motsenbocker's lack of diligence, delay and neglect, Parsons lost his claims against Turley which include, but are not limited to: a. Turley's failure to use reasonable effort to obtain an award of adequate compensatory damages; Turley's failure to develop and/or use sufficient evidence of gross negligence in order to have secured an exemplary damages award; breach of contract claim related to the attorney/client agreement; and breach of the fiduciary duties or aided in a breach of fiduciary duty owed to Parsons.
b. c. d.
Turley's actions/inactions were below the standard of care, causing Plaintiff damages. 12.06 As direct and proximate result of these acts of negligence, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages, in an amount of the compensatory damages Plaintiff would have recovered in excess of the jury verdict if Turley had properly prepared and presented the trial evidence against DuPont, in an amount of the additional compensatory damages and the exemplary damages Plaintiff would have received in the DuPont litigation, in an amount of compensatory and exemplary damages Plaintiff would have received against Conoco, in an amount to compensate Plaintiff for Turley's breach of the employment contract between Plaintiff and Turley, the forfeiture of the approximate $1,500,000.00 fee paid by Parsons to Turley, the amount of any prePLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION
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judgment and post-judgment interest as a result of those lost exemplary damages, in addition to the attorney's fees Plaintiff paid Greenberg and Motsenbocker during the course of their representation, all of which Plaintiff now seeks judgment as against XIII. GROSS NEGLIGENCE 13.01 There is a standard of care required for lawyers practicing law within the State of Texas. There is a standard of care that requires a lawyer to be reasonable and prudent, i.e., not negligent, with the respect to the handling of affairs to which he is entrusted. There is also a standard of care that requires an attorney to act as a
fiduciary and comply with his fiduciary duty to the client at all times. In this case, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached the standard of care applicable to attorneys. The acts and omissions of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were negligent and in violation of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff. In particular, Plaintiff would say that the following non-exclusive conduct fell below the standard of care required for Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, separately or as a group because Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker neglected a legal matter that was entrusted to them, because in doing all of the actions that are complained of herein, without notice to the client or without an adequate explanation to the client, and without the informed consent of the client, they showed a conscious disregard for the responsibilities that they owed to the client. 13.02 In the underling cases against Conoco and DuPont, Turley and LOWT breached the standard of care applicable to attorneys. The acts and omissions of
Turley and LOWT were negligent and in violation of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and also is fraud or, more specifically, a constructive fraud.
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13.03 All of this conduct was a breach of the duties that were owed to Plaintiff. This conduct constituted unreasonable conduct, which was negligent as that term is defined in law and which is a proximate cause of damage to the Plaintiff. 13.04 Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations made in the paragraphs, as if fully set at length herein. 13.05 The acts of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker constitute a departure from that which a person of ordinary prudence would do under the same or similar circumstances. As such, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker are liable for In above
negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence and gross negligence per se.
particular, Plaintiff would show that Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were negligent and/or breached their fiduciary duty in connection with one or more of the following nonexclusive particulars: a. b. c. Failing to properly handle Plaintiff's legal matters regarding the Turley and LOwr litigation, and the DuPont and Conoco litigation; Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker in general have been trying to promote their own economic self-interest rather than their client; Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker actually abandoned the client by failing to timely serve Windle Turley and his law firm, and therefore, should forfeit all of the fees and/or economic benefits and/or items of economic substance that they received; and Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker failed to advise and counsel Plaintiff, any point in time, of the legal risks and consequences involving their actions and/or inactions.
d.
13.06 All of these items are negligent, grossly negligent and violation of the fiduciary duty that Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker owe to its client. These actions either have been taken by Defendants and/or taken by its partners, agents, employees or other entities over whom it has control.
Further, when these actions have been

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brought to the attention of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, they were totally callous and in a blatant disregard of any rights or considerations the client might have. All of this is negligent, grossly negligent, a breach of fiduciary duty and is fraud or, more specifically, a constructive fraud. A breach of fiduciary duty is a form of constructive fraud. All of these torts are a proximate cause of damages to the Plaintiff. 13.08 Each of the above and foregoing acts of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker constituted negligence, negligence per se and were a proximate cause of damage to Plaintiff. Therefore, for all of such actions, Plaintiff hereby requests actual damages as appropriate under law. Nothing the Plaintiff did or failed to do in any way caused or contributed to the injuries complained of herein. 13.09 Further, the conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker was intentional, willful, and grossly negligent and in total disregard for the rights of Plaintiff. More specifically, the conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker was consciously indifferent and/or grossly negligent, towards Plaintiff, in that they knew the importance, and the monetary value of providing competent legal services on behalf of the Plaintiff, as well as Plaintiff's immediate desire and need to have competent legal services regarding the Turley litigation. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, with such knowledge, failed to protect the interests of Plaintiff and, in fact, put their interests before the interests of the Plaintiff. The conduct was of the kind and character that warrants the imposition of punitive damages in order to compel respect for the law and the rights of others, and to deter Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker and others similarly situated from similar conduct in the future. Plaintiff is entitled to recover
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punitive damages in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of the Court. 13.10 Plaintiff would show that there are no applicable bars to his case based upon any statute of limitations. First, Plaintiff would show that the statute of limitations has not run on the causes of action asserted herein. Plaintiff would show that either the causes of action have not accrued, or have accrued within the last two years. Plaintiff also alleges that Plaintiff has two (2) years from the date that the acts complained of were known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff would also plead the benefit of any tolling statute of limitations, including any tolling of statute of limitations regarding the time period during which any Defendants were out of the State of Texas. 13.11 In addition, Plaintiff would show that any statute of limitations would be tolled during the period of time that defendants had an attorney/client relationship that was ongoing with Plaintiff because the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations for claims of breaches of fiduciary duty. 13.12 Plaintiff would show that many of the allegations referred to herein as acts of malpractice on the part of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, occurred within two (2) years of the date the conduct of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker became known to Plaintiff and, therefore, are not barred by the statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiff would also plead the effect of any tolling statute regarding amended or supplemental pleadings arising out of the transaction or occurrence as relating back to the date of the original filing.
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13.13 Plaintiff would ask the Court to take judicial notice of the date the original filing in this case took place and also judicial notice of the date that any amendments to the petition are filed. 13.14 Plaintiff would ask the court to apply the discovery rule to all applicable claims. Additionally, Plaintiff hereby pleads the Hughes rule, as cited by the Texas Supreme Court in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991) and the Apex rule, as cited by Texas Supreme Court, is Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3D 118 (Tex. 2001). Under the Hughes and Apex doctrines, the statute of limitations is tolled until Plaintiff has exhausted all litigation and appeals. Until then, the cause of action does not accrue. Plaintiff therefore asserts each of these exceptions to the tolling of the statute of limitations to support the timely filing of the Plaintitrs original petition in this matter. 13.15 Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations made in the above paragraphs, as if fully set out at length herein. 13.16 The individual Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were attorneys practicing law within the State of Texas at all relevant times herein. Each was an attorney for Plaintiff. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff and Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker maintained an attorney-client relationship. Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were negligent in the course of the performance of their legal services to their client, Roger K. Parsons, individually, and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Parsons. 13.17 Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker solely controlled the timing of the citation and petition upon Turley and failed to exercise diligence when delaying same.
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13.18 Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker owed Plaintiff the duty to exercise the level of care that other attorneys practicing in the same locality and in the same or similar circumstances would have exercised. However, Baron, Greenberg and
Motsenbocker actions/inactions in the course of their representation of Plaintiff did not meet the standard of care as required by their profession, and thereby Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached their duty of care to Plaintiff. Even in the post remand briefing Greenberg and Motsenbocker failed to brief available arguments that the statute of limitations was not a defense to the Turley lawsuit. These actions or inactions amount to legal negligence. 13.19 Due to Greenberg and Motsenbocker's lack of diligence and neglect, Parsons lost his claims against Turley which include, but are not limited to: a. b. c. d. Turley's failure to use reasonable effort to obtain an award of adequate compensatory damages; Turley's failure to develop and/or use sufficient evidence of gross negligence in order to have secured an exemplary damages award; breach of contract claim related to the attorney/client agreement; and breach of the fiduciary duties or aided in a breach of fiduciary duty owed to Mr. Parsons.
Turley's actionslinactions were below the standard of care, causing Plaintiff damages. 13.20 As direct and proximate result of these acts of negligence, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages, in an amount of the compensatory damages Plaintiff would have recovered in excess of the jury verdict if Turley had properly prepared and presented the trial evidence against DuPont, in an amount of the additional compensatory damages and the exemplary damages Plaintiff would have received in the DuPont litigation, in an amount of compensatory and exemplarY damages Plaintiff
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would have received against Conoco, in an amount to compensate Plaintiff for Turley's breach of the employment contract between Plaintiff and Turley, the forfeiture of the approximate $1,500,000.00 fee paid by Parsons to Turley, the amount of any prejudgment and post-judgment interest as a result of those lost exemplary damages, in addition to the attorney's fees Plaintiff paid Greenberg and Motsenbocker during the course of their representation, all of which Plaintiff now seeks judgment as against Defendants, jointly and severally. 13.21 There is a standard of care required for lawyers practicing law within the State of Texas. There is a standard of care that requires a lawyer to be reasonable and prudent, i.e., not negligent, with the respect to the handling of affairs to which he is entrusted. There is also a standard of care that requires an attorney to act as a
fiduciary and comply with his fiduciary duty to the client at all times. In this case, Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker breached the standard of care applicable to attorneys. The acts and omissions of Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker were negligent and in violation of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff. In particular, Plaintiff would say that the following non-exclusive conduct fell below the standard of care required for Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker, separately or as a group because Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker neglected a legal matter that was entrusted to them, because in doing all of the actions that are complained of herein, without notice to the client or without an adequate explanation to the client, and without the informed consent of the client, they showed a conscious disregard for the responsibilities that they owed to the client. 13.22 In the underling cases against Conoco and DuPont, Turley and LOWT breached the standard of care applicable to attorneys. The acts and omissions of
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Turley and LOwr were negligent and in violation of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and also is fraud or, more specifically, a constructive fraud. 13.23 All of this conduct was a breach of the duties that were owed to Plaintiff. This conduct constituted unreasonable conduct, which was negligent as that term is defined in law and which is a proximate cause of damage to the Plaintiff. 13.24 The damage done to Plaintiff was of a value in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of this court
XIV. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
14.01 Plaintiff pleads the rules in 552 of Restatement of (second) Torts. Texas Supreme Court held that lawyers may be liable to non-clients for negligent misrepresentation. McCamish, Mariin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interest, 991 S.W 2d 787 (Tex. 1999). 14.02 Plaintiff had a relationship Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker who solely controlled the timing of the citation and petition upon Turley and failed to exercise diligence when delaying same. 14.04 Plaintiff was informed by the Greenberg Defendant's and the
Motsenbocker Defendants that his legal rights had been protected from summary judgment defenses in the Parsons v Turley litigation in that petition had been timely filed. This was a material misrepresentation. 14.03 Plaintiff relied on Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker who neglected a legal matter that was entrusted to them.
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XV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 15.01 Motsenbocker was in the course and scope of his employment with FDO&S during the time period that they were representing the Plaintiff. Further, he was in the course and scope of his law practice at all times thereafter when he made legal decisions regarding the representation of Plaintiff. Accordingly, FDO&S is responsible for the actions of Motsenbocker. Motsenbocker is an agent of the firm of Shafer Davis, either as vice-principal, principal, partner, employee, or as express, implied, ostensible or apparent agent. FDO&S is both directly responsible for being negligent, and for its agent's negligence, and for a breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, FDO&S is vicariously responsible for the actions of Motsenbocker. 15.02 In addition, FDO&S should have had policies, procedures, rules, regulations and codes of conduct that would have prevented this sort of outcome. To the extent that FDO&S did not have such policies, procedures, rules, regulations or codes of conduct in place, then FDO&S is negligent in not operating its firm in accordance with standards that would comport with the minimum standards required of attorneys who are practicing law in the State of Texas and discharging rights and obligation to their clients. 15.03 Greenberg was in the course and scope of his employment with Baron and/or B&B during the time period that they were representing the Plaintiff. Further, he was in the course and scope of his law practice at all times thereafter when he made legal decisions regarding the representation of Plaintiff. Accordingly, Baron and/or B&B are responsible for the actions of Greenberg. Greenberg is an agent of Baron and/or B&B, either as vice-principal, principal, partner, employee, or as express, implied,
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ostensible or apparent agent. Baron and/or B&B are both directly responsible for being negligent, and for its agent's negligence, and for a breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, Baron and/or B&B are vicariously responsible for the actions of Greenberg. 15.04 In addition, Baron and/or B&B should have had policies, procedures, rules, regulations and codes of conduct that would have prevented this sort of outcome. To the extent that Baron and/or B&B did not have such policies, procedures, rules, regulations or codes of conduct in place, then Baron and/or B&B is negligent in not operating its firm in accordance with standards that would comport with the minimum standards required of attorneys who are practicing law in the State of Texas and discharging rights and obligation to their clients.
XVI. DISCIPLINARY RULES
16.01 The Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Texas (sometimes called the DR's) provide guidance to courts in evaluating the conduct of attorneys. The rules can be considered by the court, or by the trier of fact, as evidence of a violation of existing duty of care when considering claims for legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. Given this, it is appropriate to point out to the court that Plaintiff is alleging violations of . the following Texas Rules of Disciplinary Conduct including but not limited to: a. 1.01 (a lawyer shall not neglect or show inattentiveness to a legal matter that is entrusted to him); 1.03 (a lawyer should make full disclosure to a client and keep a client reasonably informed); 2.01 (a lawyer should have undivided loyalty to his clients); and 5.01 (a lawyer is responsible if he orders, encourages or knowingly permits conduct that is improper).
b. c. d.
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16.02 All of the disciplinary rules are relevant in determining whether or not the Baron, Greenberg or Motsenbocker have breached the standard of care that is required.
XVII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
17.01 Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of the above paragraphs. Pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 37.001, et seq., Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that: a. b. Evidence that the pilot suffered from alcoholism should have been discovered and utilized by Turley; Plaintiff would have satisfied the Texas standard for gross negligence, and thus would have been granted an exemplary damages award, if the evidence that the pilot suffered from alcoholism had been discovered, along with the other evidence discovered by Defendants, and not utilized by Turley; Turley's failure to use the Cardamone letters and the testimony of. Cardamone at the DuPont trial would have satisfied the subjective awareness prong of a gross negligence finding; Plaintiff was damaged by virtue of the breach of such duties; Plaintitrs damages were proximately caused by the breach of such duties by Defendants; The discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations for the claims of breach of fiduciary duties made herein; Defendants Conoco and DuPont are vicariously liable for the fraudulent acts of Greenberg; Legal Services; Motsenbocker; SDO&S; Baron; B&B; Turley; and LOWT; and Plaintiff is entitled to a return of all fees and expenses paid to Defendants and Defendants' recommended consultants and experts.
XVIII. ATTORNEYS' FEES
c.
d. e. f. g.
h.
18.01 Plaintiff incorporates the provisions of the above paragraphs and would show the Court that pursuant to the terms of the contract, the DTPA and Section 38.001
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et seq., of the Civil Practices & Remedies Code, Plaintiff is entitled to recover of and from Baron, Greenberg and Motsenbocker a sum representing Plaintiffs reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees, which sum is a reasonable charge for the services rendered in bringing this suit. In the event of Baron's, Greenberg's or Motsenbocker's, one or more, unsuccessful appeal to the court of appeals, Plaintiff would be further entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee; and in the event of Baron's, Greenberg's or Motsenbocker's unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Plaintiff would be entitled to an additional reasonable attorneys' fee.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Roger K. Parsons, individually, and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Esther Ann Kartsotis Persons respectfully prays that on final trial, Defendants be held liable as follows: a. Judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for the actual and special damages suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the Defendants' conduct in an amount within the jurisdictional limits of the court; Forfeiture of all attorneys' fees or interests received by or conveyed to the Defendants, plus interest; Imposition of a constructive trust on the Turley Defendant's insurance policies in effect at the time or such other assets as the Court determines appropriate for the unjust enrichment, all attorneys' fees or interests conveyed to the Turley Defendants, plus for all attorneys' fees or interests; Imposition of a constructive trust on the DupontlConoco Defendant's insurance policies in effect at the time or for such other assets as the Court determines appropriate for the unjust enrichment of DupontlConoco For declaratory judgment as requested herein; Reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees; Exemplary damages;
b. c.
d.
e. f. g.
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h.
Statutory penalties; Costs of suit; Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and Such other and further relief at law or in equity, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
i.
j. k.
Respectfully submitted,
Byn~~k.p~
Roger K.rsons . P.M.B.739 2520 Avenue K, Suite 700 Plano, Texas 75074 (214) 649-8059 (972) 295-2776 (FAX) PRO SE FOR PLAINTIFF ROGER K. PARSONS, INDIVIDUALLV, AND AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ESTHER ANN KARTSOTIS PARSONS
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-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 16, 2009, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the following counsel of record: Jim Ross Jim Ross & Associates, P.C. 420 E. Lamar Blvd. Suite 110 Arlington, Texas 76011 Counsel for Robert M. Greenberg, and Legal Services, P.C. Robert M. Greenberg, Attorney
R. H. Wallace Monika T. Cooper Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, L.L.P. 777 Main Street, Suite 3800 Fort Worth, Texas 76102-5304 Counsel for Robert E. Motsenbocker, and Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc.
William D. Cobb, Jr. Cobb Martinez Woodward, P.L.L.C. 1700 Pacific Avenue, Suite 4545 Dallas, Texas 75201 Counsel for the Estate of Frederick M. Baron and Baron & Budd, P.C. Martin E. Rose Tammy H. Cole Rose-Walker, L.L.P. 3500 Maple Avenue, Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75219 Counsel for E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and ConocoPhillips f/kla Conoco, Inc. Richard L. Smith, Jr. Quilling, Selander, Cummiskey & Lownds, P.C. 2001 Bryan Street, Suite 1800 Dallas, Texas 75201 Counsel for Ronald Windle Turley and Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. aIkla Turley Law Firm, P.C.
'\(~~K.9~
Roger K. Parsons

Plaintiff&#39;s Sixth Amended Petition in Parsons v. DuPont, ConocoPhillips, Baron &amp; Budd, Windle Turley, Greenberg and Motsenbocker

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Plaintiff&#39;s Sixth Amended Petition in Parsons v. DuPont, ConocoPhillips, Baron &amp; Budd, Windle Turley, Greenberg and Motsenbocker

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No. 017-217971-06 ROGER K. PARSONS.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

TARRANT COUNTY. TEXAS

17th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

This case is Discovery Control Plan Level 3.

Roger K. Parsons ("Parsons") is an individual resident of Dallas, Dallas

McCollum, Ashley, O'Leary & Stoker, Inc. ("SDO&S") is a professional corporation

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

In the following, the phrase "the DuPont/Conoco Defendants" refers to

Defendants" refers to Baron and the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants collectively.

A. The investigation in anticipation of the Parsons v. Turlev litigation

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

In July 1996, on Baron's referral and recommendation, Parsons hired

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

Parsons accepted Greenberg's recommendations that Parsons contract

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

On October 29, 1997, Greenberg filed a motion to perpetuate the

By January 13, 1998, Barbara M. G. Lynn ("Lynn"), a partner in

By May 1998, when Laynn appeared as Greenberg's co-counsel in the

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

B. The Parsons v. Turley litigation

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

C. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins and Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

in Parsons v. Turley sustaining Richter's order granting Turley summary judgment in

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

Bridges misrepresents to the Supreme Court of Texas that the Turley

Bridges' Campaign Contribution and Expenditure filings with the Texas

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

The Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants recommended that Parsons

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants would likely have recovered in the Parsons v.

Turley litigation, but for the Greenberg/Motsenbocker Defendants' legal malpractice

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

5.66 Throughout Summer and Fall of 2008, Parsons instructed Queenan to

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

Parsons also instructed Queenan to amend the petition to include claims

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

Plaintiff seeks the equitable imposition of constructive trusts upon the

PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH AMENDED PETITION

Plaintiff's Sixth Amended Petition in Parsons v. DuPont, ConocoPhillips, Baron & Budd, Windle Turley, Greenberg and Motsenbocker

Plaintiff's Sixth Amended Petition in Parsons v. DuPont, ConocoPhillips, Baron & Budd, Windle Turley, Greenberg and Motsenbocker