The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap Author(s): Alexander L.

George Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George (Mar., 1994), pp. 143-172 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791443 Accessed: 21/01/2010 11:13
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Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994

The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap1

Alexander L. George Stanford University

Differentapproaches to foreign policy taken by academic scholars and practitioners of foreign policy are identified. The gulf between these "two cultures" can be bridged by focusing on the relationshipof knowledge to action in the conduct of foreign policy. Thus, in order to select viable strategies in dealing with other countries,policymakersneed three types of knowledgethat academic scholars can help to produce. These threetypes of knowledgeare (1) conceptual models of each strategy (e.g., deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, crisis resolution,cooperation, etc.); (2) general ("generic") knowledgeof conditions that favor successful employmentof each strategy; and (3) actorspecific models of the values, mind-sets,behavioralstyles, internalpolitics, and cultureof actors toward whom the strategies may be directed. The essay points out how these three types of knowledgecan help to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of foreign policy.
KEY WORDS: foreign policy; theory and practice;strategy;knowledge for statecraft.

In 1966, while still a member of the RAND Corporation,I became impressed with the need to supplement efforts to formulate general theories of international relations with theories having greaterrelevance for the conduct of foreign policy. To this end I initiated a small research project, "Theory and Practice in International Relations."Later, upon moving to StanfordUniversity in 1968 I elaboratedthe title to "Bridgingthe Gap between Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy" and this has remainedthe focus of my researchprogramand, in one way or another,of most of my studies since then.
'This paper draws on a more detailed study preparedlater for the United States Instituteof Peace (1993), and is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the 33rd Annual Convention, International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 March-4 April 1992. 143
? 0162-895X X/XX/XOO-OXXX$06.50/1 1994 International Society of Political Psychology Publishedby Blackwell Publishers,238 Main Street, Cambridge,MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 IJF, UK.

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Quite early in implementingthis researchprogram,I concluded(for reasons detailedlater in this paper)thatit would be necessaryto move beyond structuralrealist theory, rational choice theory, and game theoretic approaches. These approaches"black-box"decision-makingand strategicinteractionand deal with these processes by assumption.Instead,I felt it necessaryto engage in directbut admittedlydifficult empirical study of decision-makingprocesses and strategic interactionbetween actors. However, I do not regarddeductive and empirical ways of approachingthe task of developing internationalrelations theory as antithetical.Rather,like many other researchers,I believe that the development of both deductive and empiricalapproachescan be improvedby closer interaction between them. I found it useful in developing policy-relevanttheory,which I regardas the to type of knowledge needed for what historiansused to refer to as "statecraft," between two types of theory.2"Substantivetheory,"the first type, distinguish deals with standard and foreignpolicy undertakings strategiessuch as deterrence, crisis management,coercive diplomacy,war termination,mediationand dispute resolution, or security cooperation. In selecting some of these foreign policy activities for systematic study, I was guided by historical events that demonstratedthat a better knowledge base was needed by U.S. leaders for managing Cold War crises so as to avoid war. My interest in studying deterrence, for example, was arousedby the outbreakof the KoreanWarin June 1950, which I regardedas a conflict thatcould well have been avoided. Similarly,what seemed to me another,avoidablewarlaterthatyear in Korea-this time with the People's Republic of China-aroused my interest in understandingbetter the requirements and modalities of crisis management. Later, again reacting to what I regardedas a misguided, flawed Americanpolicy, I began to study the limitations of coercive diplomacy after observing the abortive U.S. effort to use air power in early 1965 to intimidateNorth Vietnam. Some years later, I initiateda large collaborativestudy in orderto understand why U.S.-Soviet effortsto cooperateon securityissues since the end of WorldWarII were sometimes successful and failed on other occasions. In a recent study for the United States Instituteof Peace, I found that four of the six strategiesthe United States employed in dealing with Iraqafter the IranIraq war failed in partbecause policy-makersdid not have adequateconceptual and generic knowledge of these strategies. Employed sequentially during the period 1988-1991, these six strategies were (1) the effort to resocialize an "outlaw"state and to reforma "rogue"leader;(2) appeasement;(3) deterrence; (4) reassurance;(5) coercive diplomacy;(6) use of militaryforce and ceasefire terms for achieving postwar political objectives. Only for deterrenceand coer21 use the word "theory" encompassa broadrangeof ways of formulating to knowledgethatcome out

of the scholarly tradition.

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have adequateconceptual cive diplomacydid officials of the Bush administration of these strategies, which failed for other reasons. and empirical knowledge "Processtheory,"on the other hand, focuses on how to structureand manand age the policy-makingprocess to improve information-processing judgment so as to increasethe likelihood of betterdecisions. My researchon these matters of was stimulatedby case studiesthatpointedto various"malfunctions" the U.S. policy-making system. My conception of the contributionthat process theory should make to betterdecisions is a broadone. It rejectsplacing reliance on the and criterionof "technicalrationality" emphasizesthatthe policy-makingprocess needs to be sensitive as well to the broadercriterionof "valuerationality" to and normativeconsiderations(George, 1984; 1976, pp. 114-119; George, Hall & Simons, 1971, pp. ix-xviii; George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 616-642; Smoke & George, 1973). Both substantivetheory and process theory are needed; they complement each other in contributingto efforts to improve the analytic component and effectiveness of foreign policy. Quite obviously, substantiveknowledge of foreign affairs can have no impact on policy unless it enters into the process of policy-making. The present paper deals only with substantive theory, and it begins by noting some of the difficulties encountered in developing general knowledge of these instrumentsof statecraftand in making use of such knowledge in policy-making.

THE TWO CULTURES The developmentof theoryaboutinternational relationsby academicscholars and the use of this knowledge by practitioners3 the conduct of foreign in has been handicappedby the differentculturesin which they have tradipolicy tionally resided. Members of these two communities have been socialized in quite differentprofessional and intellectualworlds. They generally define their interest in the subject of internationalrelations differently and have pursued differentobjectives; and, not surprisingly,for all these reasons they have difficulty communicatingwith each other. An additionalobstacle to bridgingthe two cultures is the reluctance of some academic scholars, particularlywhen they disagree with foreign policies of the government, to serve as "technicians"for
3I use the term "practitioners" broadlyto include specialists who make differentkinds of contributions to the policy-makingprocess. In additionto central decision-makers,this includes advisers, differences policy analysts, intelligence specialists, functionaland areaexperts. Thereare important in perspectivetoward scholarlyresearchand its relevanceto policy-makingbetween political-level officials (elected or appointed)andcareerprofessionalswho serve at lower levels in the government. The formerare more action-oriented,the lattermore likely to give attentionto the analysis of policy issues and to be more receptive to the work and views of academic scholars.

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the state by providingspecializedknowledge thatmay be "misused"; such scholars prefer the role of critic and that of the "unattached intellectual"(Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). With the passage of time, however, there has been some erosion of the gulf between the two communities.As academicallytrainedspecialistsin international affairs and academic scholars themselves have moved in and out of government service, and as former foreign policy practitionershave found places in academia, a substantialinterminglingof the two cultureshas taken place. Many policy specialists and technical experts holding positions especially in middle levels of the policy-makinghierarchyhave had advancedtrainingin international relations or in related fields. In additionto drawingupon their own familiarity with scholarly knowledge, they are likely to maintain contact with academic scholars and their publications.Therebythese policy specialists can serve as an informalbridge between the two worlds and increasethe likelihoodthat relevant scholarly knowledge can be utilized in policy-making. Policy specialists in the governmentincreasinglyhave tried in a variety of ways to tap and make use of the knowledge of scholars on specific policy problems. Frequentlyutilized for this purpose are conferences and meetings at which academic specialists meet with policy specialists to discuss a particular problem. Foundationshave made in contributions encouraginginteraction between academicsand policy important For example, the Council on Foreign Affairs has for many years specialists. conducteda fellowship programthatplaces carefullyselected young international relations scholars in the governmentfor a year and places mid-careerpolicy specialists in academic centers of foreign policy and security research. As a how scholarlyresearchon interresult, progressis being made in understanding nationalrelationscan benefit from the perspectiveand experience of the policy world and how, in turn, policy-makingcan benefit from the scholarly research. The objective of the present study is to furtherthis development. This favorabletrend,however, remainsquite uneven. Quite strikingwas the rapidity with which academic and policy-makingperspectives converged after WorldWarII in the field of strategicstudies and armscontrol. Because this was a the relativelynew, wide-openfield, it attracted thoughtfulinterestof a numberof academic scholars who had been exposed to problems of military strategy and operations during the war and who were galvanized by the new challenge of the understanding impact of nuclearweapons on strategyand foreign policy. In to fact, much of the impetusand some of the most important early contributions the new field of strategicstudies and armscontrolwere madeby civilians such as BernardBrodie, WilliamKaufmann,HermanKahn, andothers, andby members of the new postwarthinktankssuch as the RAND Corporation. International law relationsin which there has been appearsto be anothersubfield of international good two-way communication between specialists on the subject within the governmentand academic scholars in the subfield. And it may be that with the

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infusion of economists into government departmentsconcerned with foreign policy, academic and policy-making perspectives in related issue areas have come closer together. But progressin bridgingthe two worlds of policy-makingand academiahas been much slower and more difficult in otherbasic dimensionsof foreign policy having to do with the role of force and threats of force in the conduct of diplomacy, and in the various dimensions of conflict management.And though there are strikingexceptions, even less appearsto have been accomplishedthus far in bringingaboutmore fruitful,sustainedinterplaybetween the academicand the practitionerin the importantissue-areas of conflict avoidance and conflict resolution, and more generallyin the studyof international cooperationand longterm change in the international system. in The interminglingof scholarsand practitioners each other'sworlds offers for learninghow to make additionalprogressin bridging important opportunities the gap between the two culturesand their traditional perspectives. It is just this and challenge thathas motivatedthe presentstudy.It is well to begin opportunity that by clearing some of the underbrush still standsin the way and to formulatea common ground on which productive two-way interactioncan take place between the theoretical approachto study of internationalrelations pursued in academiaand the practitioner's need for the kind of knowledge thatcan facilitate formulationof sounder, more effective policy. That common ground, it will be suggested here, is to be found in the relationshipbetween knowledge and action. I shall consider first some typical reservations,whetherwhollyjustified or thatmany (thoughnot all) practitioners foreignpolicy andmany academic of not, internationalrelations scholars have about each other's approachto the subject (Rothstein, 1972; Druckman& Hopmann, 1989; Caplan, Morrison & Stambaugh, 1975; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980). I hope thatthe readerwill keep in mind that this is a highly condensed characterization reservationsabout each other of held by academicsand policy specialists, and thatthere is considerablevariation in the views held by membersof both groups. LaterI shall offer a differentset of observationsregardinghow the relationshipbetween knowledge and action can be conceptualizedso as to provide a bridge between scholars who specialize in the productionof betterknowledge of international relationsand policy specialists within the governmentwhose responsibilityincludes using availablegeneral knowledge of this kind to producepolicy analyses to assist centralpolicy-makers to make their decisions.

PRACTITIONERS' RESERVATIONSABOUT "ACADEMIC" THEORY Academic specialists have often been struck by the fact that the eyes of policy specialists quickly glaze at the first mention of the word "theory"or the

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relations."This reactionis unsettlingto phrase "scientific study of international academic scholars since they have been socialized in a world in which the developmentof theory and scientific knowledge enjoys the greatestrespect and highest priority. What lies behind and helps explain the glazing of the practitioners' eyes? It is a certainimage of academiceffortsto theorizeaboutinternational relationsand policy-making.A familiarcomplaintis thatacademicscholarsdo not understand how policy is actuallymade, even when they undertake case studies to follow in the "papertrail"of how a particular decision was made. Lacking an understanding of the process, academics tend to overintellectualizepolicy-making and of as exaggeratethe importance "analyticrationality" the criterionon the basis of which policy is, or at least ought to be, chosen. And even when the resultsof scholarlyresearchare potentiallyrelevant,the resultsof scholarlyresearchare underutilized anotherreason. Thus, not a few for to the scholarly literaturehave concluded that most policy specialists exposed universityprofessorsseem interestedin writinglargely for one anotherand have little inclinationor ability to communicatetheirknowledge in termscomprehensible to policy-makers. Some practitionersare acutely uncomfortablewith the unfamiliarand, to them, pretentiousjargon with which their activities are describedand the esoteric explanationsgiven theirbehavior.One may recall in this connectionSecretaryof StateDean Acheson's tongue-in-cheek responsewhen he became awareof the way in which his role in the U.S. decision of late June 1950 to come to the assistanceof SouthKoreahad been referred in a scholarlystudy. to Acheson professedto take exceptionto being treatedas a "dependent variable"in this study, observing dryly that he would have thoughtthat it would be obvious that he had played the role of an "independent variable"in that crisis! Practitionersalso object to what they judge to be a heroic but misguided effort by academiciansto put foreign policy on a scientific basis. Insisting that statecraftis an artand not a science, practitioners emphasizethe role of judgment in makingpolicy decisions. Some years ago George Ball, then undersecretary of state, emphasizedthis point in describingthe complexity of the problemhe and his colleagues had faced duringthe CubanMissile Crisis:
We were presented ... with an equationof compoundvariablesand multipleunknowns. No one has yet devised a computerthatwill digest such rawdataas was availableto us and promptlyprint out a recommendedcourse of action. (Ball, 1962, pp. 987-991)

How do policy specialists respondto quantitativestudies producedby academic scholarswho attemptto accountfor war andotherforeignpolicy outcomes by means of statisticalcorrelations?Quantitativestudies may claim, for example, to "accountfor" (but not necessarily explain) 75% of the variance in the outcome of many instances of a particular phenomenon. Such studies may provide the policy-makerwith a useful indicationof the probabilitydistribution,but

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of course this finding does not tell him whetherthe individual case he is confrontedwith falls in thatgroupor is amongthe 25%thatare not accountedfor by the statisticalstudy. A more important dissatisfactionwith this type of study for the policy-makerstems from the fact that it typically ignores domestic political and decision-makingvariables. The policy relevance of such studies is limited, therefore,because they do not include variablesover which the policy-makerhas some leverage, which he can try to exercise in order to influence outcomes. Therefore,such studies give the policy-makerno help in deciding whathe can do to avoid unwantedoutcomes and to achieve desired ones. More generally, the gap between academic scholars and practitionersreflects the difference between their professional missions. Academics aim at relations;practiincreasing general knowledge and wisdom about international tioners are more interestedin the type of knowledgethat increasestheir ability to influence and control the course of events. In the role of policy-maker, the individual often adapts by becoming a "man of action":he needs less complicated diagnoses of problemsand simpler"answers" them in orderto respondat to all. It is not surprising thatpolicy specialists should "wantshort, precise answers to problems rapidly. . . . But the academic cannot give a short answer to a policymaker's question-not because the academic is long-winded or pretentious, but because [it appearsto him that] that short answer is in fact not an answer . . " (Post & Ezekial, 1990, p. 506). Similarly, the practitionerfinds it difficult to make much use of academic approachessuch as structural-realist theory and game theory which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations,and which rest on the simple uncomplicated assumptionthatstatescan be regardedas rationalunitaryactors. As againstthis, practitioners believe they need to work with "actor-specific" models that graspthe differentinternalstructures and behavioralpatternsof each state and leaderwith which they must deal. can Similarly,althoughpractitioners accept the academician'sargumentthat the assumptionof pure rationalityis a powerful tool for the constructionof theory, they are more impressedwith the caveat that sophisticatedacademiciansadd, to the effect that the validity of such theories of course must be established by empiricalresearchthat examines their "fit" with reality. Practitionershave a similar reservationwhen encouragedto use new psychological theories developed under carefully controlled laboratoryconditions that purportto-and indeed do-have relevance for some aspects of foreign policy. Perhapsdrawingon their memoryof undergraduate psychology courses, policy specialists recall that experimentalpsychologists themselves emphasize that it remains to be seen whether theories that have emerged from carefully circumscribed controlledlaboratory and conditionshave "external validity"when an attemptis made to applythem to the greatercomplexityand messiness of realworld situations.

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Policy specialists also believe thatthereis often good reasonto questionthe results of studies producedby academic scholars that explain and evaluate foreign policy decisions. Policy-makerssuspectthatscholarlystudiesare not always "objective," even though dressed up to look that way, but that they contain a political or ideological bias. Given the proliferation of competitive "advocacy analysis" in the ever-expandingworld of think tanks and academic centers, policy-makers can find excuses and justification for rejecting those studies that do not fit their own policy orientationsand rely instead on those that do. Then, too, the databaseutilized in scholarly studies, policy specialists arNot gue, is often inadequateand can distortthe scholar'sinterpretations. only is access to classified informationfor such studies limited, available declassified informationdoes not give the whole picture and may introduce flaws in the Similarly, data a scholar obtains from currentor formerpolicyinterpretations. makersare subjectto a varietyof limitationsthatthe scholaris often unawareof or does not adequately take into account. In some cases a scholar relies too uncritically on information about an unsuccessful policy provided by policy specialists lower down in the hierarchy,who say in effect, "Wehad the correct analysis of the problem and the right answer, but higher-upsdidn't listen." Finally, the practitioneris often wary of theories and generalizationsproduced in academic research that purportto provide policy advice. A strong reservationof this kind was expressed by RichardGoodwin (1968), a former in policy adviser in the Kennedyand Johnsonadministrations, a sharplycritical review some years ago of the book Arms and Influence written by Thomas Schelling, a leading strategic theorist. For Goodwin, Schelling's book "raises devotedto troublingquestionsaboutthe growingbody of social-science literature Goodwin rejected the view that what Schelling called "the military theory." diplomacy of violence" can be the subject of systematic theory and marshalled several familiarargumentsto buttresshis conclusion. For Goodwin history is sui generis and thereforeto generalizefrom one historicalcrisis to anotheris dangerous and "almost guaranteeserror."In any case, the task of developing valid generalizations is, according to Goodwin, virtually insuperable. And even if some sort of generalizationwere somehow derived, its relevanceto any immediate policy problem could not be determined, since in almost any situation decision-makersmust act withoutknowing all the facts, and the variablesin the situation"are so numerousthat they elude analysis." These concerns led Goodwin to put forwarda sober warning:"Themost profoundobjectionto this kind of strategictheory is not its limited usefulness but its danger, for it can lead us to believe we have an understanding events and a control over their flow which of we do not have" (1968, pp. 19-20). I shall returnto Goodwin's concern later in this article.

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ACADEMIC SCHOLARS' RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE POLICY WORLD relationssharplydisagree Although specialists in the study of international themselves over questions of method and theory, many share the belief among and thatpolicy-makersare too aconceptualand atheoretical,even anticonceptual antitheoretical.At the same time, academicscholarsnote thatpolicy-makersand their advisers often do operate with a general view of internationalpolitics with realisttheory and such relatedconcepts as influenced by their acquaintance "nationalinterest"and "balanceof power." Academic specialists express concern, however, that the realist theory that shapes the mind-set of these policymakersis a warmed-overand simplified version of Hans Morgenthau'sinfluential post-WorldWarII textbook, Politics AmongNations, and similar efforts by others in that era to steer Americanforeign policy away from what they considered to be a well-meaningbut naively idealistorientation.These academicscholars hope that policy-makersdo not take at face value Morgenthau'sdubious contentions that "power"is and ought to be the dominantobjective of foreign policy; that the "nationalinterest"is an objective, scientific criterion that can provide the decision-makerwith firm guidance in choosing policies; and that "ideology"is merely rhetorical justificationfor policy and does not (and should role in determining a nation's policy. Elements of this earlier not) play any classical realisttheoryhave been criticizedand reformulated since then by a new of academic scholars. generation The simplified and dated view of realist theory employed by many policymakers is seen by academics as part of a larger problem. Grantedthat policy specialists and top policy-makerscome into governmentwith "intellectualcapital" derived from earliereducationand other relevantexperience, their work in governmentprovides most of them with little opportunityfor replenishingand updatingtheir knowledge. Full-time work in governmentoffers inadequateopportunityand little inclinationfor keeping abreastof relevant scholarly knowlhas edge. More thanone policy-maker expressedconcernthatover time one uses and exhaustsone's intellectualcapital.4Some policy professionals, academic up scholars find, tend to have a fixed body of knowledge which is relatively impervious to outside influence and challenge. Commentingon this state of affairs, some scholars who have had opportunitiesto participatein and observe poli4Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, states in his memoir that during his four years as President Carter'snational security adviser, "I was very conscious of the degree to which my intellectual arsenal was becoming depleted in the course of a continuousrace against time. There was hardly ever any time to think systematically,to reexamineviews, or simply to reflect. A broaderhistorical perspective and a sense of direction are the prerequisitesfor sound policy making, and both tend graduallyto become victims of in-house official doctrine and outlook and of the pressuretoward compromise"(1983, p. 514).

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cymaking speak of the policy professionals'"resistanceto knowing"what they do not alreadyknow. Academics are skeptical of claims that the intuitivejudgment and "experience" of policy specialists suffices to ensure sound foreign policy decisions, that they need not make use of what academics refer to as "theory"and systematic empirical knowledge regardingthe uses and limitations of the various instruments of statecraft.Academics also point out thatin fact, whetherpolicy-makers realize it or not, they do use "theory," though usually in the form of a variety of beliefs, and maxims that are seldom raised to full conimplicit assumptions, sciousness and examined critically. Policy beliefs and maxims of this kind emerge from an individual'spersonal or vicarious experience of past historical events and from "lessons" of the past passed on from earlier generations of policy-makers.And such policy beliefs andhistoricalanalogiesare usuallyrather simple, uncomplicatedformulationsof causal relationships.An example of this is the familiarpropositionderived from the experienceof the '30s that was and remains influentialin shaping Americanpolicy, namely: "If appeasement,then WorldWarIII," or as it is often worded, "If we appease the opponent now we shall have to fight a much larger war against him later." To the academician, simple generalizationsof this kind seriously oversimplify the complexity of foreign policy strategiesand outcomes. They should be generalizations-thus, one needs to ask "underwhat replacedby "conditional" conditions is appeasementcounterproductive when does it serve to increase and the likelihoodof war?"And also "underwhatdifferent conditionsis appeasement a useful, viable strategyfor conflict resolution?" Systematicstudy of a varietyof historical cases and more thoughtful reflection, the academician argues, are needed to providediscriminating conditionalgeneralizationsof this kind. (At the same time, however, it must be said, academic scholars have yet to produce a systematic, empirically grounded, and differentiatedtheory of appeasement!) A relatedcriticism singles out the policy-maker'shabit of relying upon and often misusing a single historicalprecedentor analogy (Neustadt& May, 1986; Vertzberger,1990, Chapter6; Jervis, 1976; Khong, 1992). Policy-makersand those who, like RichardGoodwin, reflect their perspectiveoften maintainthat history is sui generis, that each case they have to deal with is unique;nonetheless, this conviction does not dissuade them from searching for and using a historicalanalogy to help them to deal with a "unique" case. As seen by academicians, policy specialists seem to have no interestin cumulating"lessons"from a numberof differenthistoricalcases and no effective method for doing so. As a result, so academiciansbelieve, what the policy-makerlearnsfrom history often does not take into account and digest properly a broaderrange and variety of relevant historical experience and, therefore, is of dubious validity. For these and other reasons, academic scholars believe that policy-makers need to develop a betterunderstanding how theirown beliefs and tacit assumpof

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tions aboutthe international politics, and otheractorsin the system, international state system influence theirperceptionof developments,theirdiagnoses of situations, and their judgments. Academics, therefore, are very much in agreement with the observationmade many years ago by a formerState department planner, Louis Halle, thatthe foreignpolicy of a nationaddressesitself not to the external world per se but ratherto "the image of the externalworld," that is in the minds of those who make foreignpolicy. Halle concludedhis book on Americanforeign policy with a sober warning:"In the degree that the image is false, actually and philosophicallyfalse, no technicians, however, proficient, can make the policy that it is based on it sound"5(Halle, 1960). Accordingly, academic specialists suggest, practitionersshould recognize the importanceof subjectingthe operative beliefs and policy maxims they rely upon to scrutinyvia scholarlystudies of a broaderrange of historicalexperience. Finally, academic specialists believe that in choosing a policy, decisionmakers are too often swayed by political considerationsof one kind or another ratherthan by the results of objective analysis. According to this view, policymakers are perceived as less inclined to choose the best policy than one that commands greaterpolitical supportand avoids too much controversy.Another criticism is that even when good policies are announcedthis is done largely in orderto be able to say thatthe administration does have a policy but one to which it assigns low priorityand does little to implement.At the same time, it must be said that many academic scholarsdo not understand sympathizewith the fact or thatpolicy-makersmust deal with difficulttrade-offdilemmasbetween the quality of a policy, the need for consensus, and the effective use of time and political resources.
* * * *

I have called attentionto the somewhatdifferentconceptionsof knowledge about international affairsthat are valued most in academiaand in the world of policy-making. Also contributingto the gulf between these two culturesare the ratherdifferentsocializationexperiencesthat shape an individual'scareerorientationand professionalstyle in the worldsof academiaandpolicy-making.Those who participatein policy-makinglearnthat nothingmuch can usually be accomplished by the individual without a great deal of coordinationand cooperation with others. And one gets ahead in governmentby being able to adapt to the norms and proceduresof various kinds of group work. The policy-makingprocess blends the searchfor a high-qualitydecision with the need for developing a skills as well as analyticcompedegree of consensus and support.Interpersonal tence are at a premium. At the extreme, this goes so far on occasion that the
5By "philosophicallyfalse," Halle probablyhad in mind the conceptual inadequacyof theories of international relationsthat ignore or minimize the importanceof actors'cognitive beliefs and mindsets.

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individual finds it preferablenot to claim credit for a good idea but instead to plant it inconspicuouslyin the process of interactingwith others. On the other hand, as is well known, efforts to cooperate and coordinate often break down, and the policy process is then ridden by the dynamics of bureaucratic politics cannotbe tamedby politics. When the game of bureaucratic at higher levels, informationand knowledge become instrustrong leadership ments of the struggle between competing policy advocates. in Academiais less conduciveto participation groupwork. To get aheadone tries to differentiateone's ideas and scholarlyproductsto give them a distinctive is as stamp.Importance attachedto establishingan individualreputation againsta in for effective participation group work. Not surprisingly,some acareputation demics who enter government often find that the individualistic professional style into which they have been socialized encountersdifficultiesin the world of policy-making. However, it must also be said that other academics enteringthe policy world adapt all too readily to tempting opportunitiesto participatein influencing policy. They become absorbed in the internal politics of policymaking and lose interest in strengtheningthe role of scholarly knowledge in policy-making.

A COMMON GROUND: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION The most promisingway to bridgethe gap between the academicianand the policy-maker,I believe, is to focus on the relationshipof knowledge to action in the conduct of foreign policy. That relationship,of course, must be conceptualizedin a way thatwill speakto both academicscholarsandpolicy specialists. What this means, more concretely, is that scholars should acquire a clear and detailed understandingof the types of knowledge that are needed by policymakersin consideringhow to understand deal with differenttypes of foreign and of policy problems. Scholarscan be assisted in refining their understanding the of "knowledge requirements" practitionersto some extent by what policy specialists themselves can convey as to the kinds of knowledge they believe are needed. But since practitionersand their staff specialists may not be able to articulateknowledge requirementswell enough, scholars need to study actual policy-makingclosely in orderto identify the types of theoryand knowledge that are likely to be relevant. Since so many individualswho serve as policy specialists and in staff roles in the governmenthave previously studied internationalrelations in academic between the two centers, they can and do serve as informalintellectual"brokers" cultures. To the extent that they accept this role, they are in a position to draw upon and adapt the results of academic researchfor use in policy-makingand, also, to familiarizeacademicspecialistswith the kindsof informationandknowl-

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edge requiredby policy-makers.How much interestthey have in doing so and how well they performthis role, however, is anotherquestion. Nonetheless, it is useful to interview present and past former policy specialists and intelligence in officers having academicbackgrounds orderto drawupon theirexperienceand to obtain suggestions for obtaining a better appreciationof the relationshipbetween knowledge and action. In concluding this discussion of the "two cultures," I return to one of RichardGoodwin's criticisms, noted earlier, of Thomas Schelling's Arm's and Influence. Goodwin arguedthata "systematictheory"of the kind he (incorrectly) attributed Schelling was impossible as well as dangerous.The criticism rests to on a misunderstanding "systematictheory"as somethingthatseeks to provide, of or seems to provide, the policy-makerwith detailed, high-confidenceprescriptions for action in each contingencythatmay arise. Such a theory,however, does not exist and is not feasible. But the choice is not between detailed, highconfidence prescriptionsfor action, or nothing. Insteadof a focus primarilyon the prescriptiveutility of theory for policy-making,the presentstudy arguesthat more immediateand feasible is the contributionthat theory and generic knowledge can make to diagnosis of the specific situationsthat policy-makersmust make before they decide how to deal with that situation. My assumptionis that correctdiagnosis of a policy problemshould precede and-as in much of medical practice-is usually a prerequisitefor efforts to make the best choice from among policy options. The analogy with the medical profession is an apt one since the policy-maker,too, acts as a clinician in striving to make a correct diagnosis of a problembefore determininghow best to prescribefor it. The readerwill note that for Goodwin's rhetoricalquestion whethera "systematic theory"is possible I have substitutedthree differentquestions:(1) What is the relationshipbetweenknowledge and action?(2) Whatkind of knowledge is most relevantfor assisting policy-making?(3) How can this type of knowledge be developed by scholars and researchspecialists and how can it be employed effectively by policy-makers?6

THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY international relationstheory and What, then, is the state of contemporary what does it contributeto the knowledge base needed for the conduct of foreign policy? Expectations in this respect should not be excessive since, as is well
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do not wish to imply that knowledge exists independentlyof, or always prior to action. As is well-known, knowledge can be gained throughaction in several ways: for example, action can be undertakento remove uncertainties,to gain additionalrelevant knowledge of the problem, or to "test" existing hypotheses; and past actions can be evaluated so as to draw "lessons" (whether corrector not is a differentmatter)and to learnmoreaboutthe phenomenonof interest.(See also the discussion below of the importanceof developing empiricallyderivedconditionalgeneralizations.)

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known, theory necessarilyabstractsand simplifies reality to some extent. Moreover, as the difficulties scholarshave encounteredin tryingto explain the failure to predictthe end of the Cold Warhas remindedus, theorymust often struggleto catch up with changing realities; and in the field of internationalrelations, it generallydoes betterexplainingwhat has happenedthan in predictingit (Jervis, 1991-1992). For various reasons, therefore, we should not expect too much from generaltheoriesof international relations,for they do not attemptand by no means claim to provide all the knowledge needed for the conduct of foreign policy. The study of international relationslacks a single comprehensive,coherent is fragmented,much of it is not very well-developed, theory. Rather,theorizing and not surprisinglythe field continuesto be markedby often intense controverrelationstheosy. Much of the "ThirdDebate"currentlywaged by international rists is focused on epistemological and normativeissues. Rarely do participants in the debate ask what difference the positions they advocate makes for the development of policy-relevantknowledge (Ferguson& Mansbach, 1991). Indeed, many scholars in the field show little interestin bridgingthe gap between theory and practice. At the same time, however, other researchon international relations theory is evolving in importantdirections as scholars pay increasing attentionto developing knowledge thathas policy relevance, broadenthe agenda of problemsto which theory should be applicable, and undertakemore sophisticated and systematic study of the importanceof cognitive, organizationaland political variables (Holsti, 1989; Walt, 1991). The dominantacademictheoryof international politics-variously referred to as "structural realism"or "neorealism"-deals only with basic structural features of the internationalsystem such as its "anarchical" nature, the relative distributionof power, and the importanceof the balance of power. This theory draws upon the tradition of political realism which has ancient roots in the writing of Thucydides, and attemptsto transformclassical realism into a scientific deductive theory that focuses on the structureof the internationalsystem. The most authoritative and influentialstatementof neorealisttheory is Kenneth Waltz'sTheoryof InternationalPolitics. It should be noted that Waltz'stheory is a leanerversion of classical realisttheorythatwas formulatedmany years ago by Hans Morgenthau.It avoids questionableassumptions,ambiguities, and contradictions that Waltz and other scholars discernedin Morgenthau'swritings with respect to the central concepts of "power,""nationalinterest,"and "balanceof power" (Waltz, 1979; 1991). At the same time, Waltz's book has stimulateda considerabledebateregardingthe uses and limitationsof structural-realist theory and numerous suggestions for broadeningthe scope of internationalrelations theory (Keohane, 1986; Vasquez, 1983). It shouldbe recognizedthatclassical realisttheorywas more comprehensive in scope and more ambitious in its aims that Waltz's leaner neorealist theory.

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Morgenthau,for example, claimed that his version of political realism not only could explain and predict the play of internationalpolitics but also could and ought to guide statesmen engaged in the conduct of foreign policy. In other words, Morgenthau's theory was also a theoryof statecraft.In contrast, narrowthe scope of Morgenthau'stheory, Waltz attempted to convert it into a ing attributes scientifically respectabledeductivetheory,one that relies on structural of the internationalsystem to generate predictionsand provide a basis for explaining outcomes of internationalpolitics. We need to consider how well it achieves these goals and how much it contributesto the knowledge base needed for the conduct and understanding foreign policy. of it is cast in the form of deductivetheory,structural realismis not a Although deductive theory since its key variables and hypotheses have not full-fledged in been "operationalized" order to make predictions of outcomes of specific cases.7 In consequence, structural-realist theory can make only predictionsof a character.But since such predictionslack groundingin systematic probabilistic empirical analysis of the observed relationshipbetween relative capabilitiesand outcomes in a large and presumablyrepresentativesample of interactionsbetween states, the theorycannotexpress probabilityin statisticaltermsand is little more thana statementof likelihood. Nor does structural realismdo much by way of identifyingthe conditionsunderwhich it expects its predictionsto materialize. As its foremost proponentsacknowledge, the few structuralvariables enbut compassed by the theory operatenot as determinants merely as constraints, on choices made by policy-makers. In though certainly importantconstraints, effect the theorywarnsthatthe relativepowerof statesin the international system should be properlyattendedto by statesmenin conductingforeignpolicy because their failure to respect the power advantageof an adversarywill likely lead to their being "punished"-either by the state's being eliminatedas an actor in the system or by incurringcostly setbacks in interactionswith other states. This general warningis indeed highly relevantand useful, but policy-makersare still left to decide as best they can how, and by how much, their calculationof utility and risk should be influenced by power inferioritywhen they consider whether and how to pursue their interests in specific situations. And, as will be noted later, leaders of weak states-not deterredby the general warningconveyed by structural realism-often find successful strategiesfor advancingtheir interests in interactionswith strongerstates. Particularlyrelevantto this discussion of the relationshipof knowledge to action, therefore, is the fact that structural realist (neorealist) theory is not a
7Fora rareexample of a full-fledged deductivetheory in the field of international relations, one that operationalizeskey variables, see Bueno de Mesquita, 1981. The theory is used to generatepredictions for each of a large numberof specific historicalcases. Whateverreservationsone may have about the implementationand results of the study, it is valuable because it recognizes the need for and provides an explicit operationalization a rational-choicetype of theory. of

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theory of foreign policy. This was explicitly acknowledged by Waltz, who warnedagainst expecting his theory to "explainthe particular policies of states" and regardedit as an error"to mistake a theory of internationalpolitics for a theory of foreign policy." Waltzalso acknowledgedthat structural-realist theory "makes assumptionsabout the interests and motives of states, ratherthan exon plainingthem." Thathe regardedit as a theoryof "constraints" foreign policy ratherthan a theory of foreign policy was made clear in the additionalobservation that "what it [structural-realist theory] does explain are the constraintsthat confine all states" (Waltz, 1979, pp. 121-122). Grantedthatstructural-realist theorydoes not claim to be a theoryof foreign it is nonethelessuseful for presentpurposesto identifyits limitationsfrom policy, the standpointof the knowledge base that is needed for the conduct of foreign policy. "Power"remains an elusive concept in the theory. The emphasis on the of importance the differencesin power amongstatesfails to take into accountthat not all the capabilitiesa statepossesses come into play and influencethe outcome of its interactionswith other states. The theory fails to distinguish-and cannot distinguish-between what might be called the totality of "gross capabilities"a state possesses and the "usableoptions"that its leaders can employ or wish to make use of in particularsituations. And yet the distinction between gross capabilitiesand usable options is often critical for understanding why powerful states do less well in militaryconflicts and tradingdisputes with weaker states (Aggarwal, 1985; Yoffie, 1983; George, 1971). Much of the power resourcesa strongstatepossesses may simply not be relevantor usablein some disputeswith weaker states (or, indeed, with other powerful states). Weakerstates often do surprisinglywell in disputes with strongerstates insofar as they enjoy an asymmetryof motivationin a dispute, a variablethatcan compensatefor inferiorityin overall power capabilities. What is at stake in a particular dispute may be more to important the weakerstatethanto its strongerrival-the "balanceof interests" may work to the advantageof the weaker state and enable it to obtain a better outcome than could be predictedby the relative distributionof raw power capabilities. Thus, if it is true, as structural-realist theory warns, that weaker states can be punishedif they ignore power inferioritywith strong states, it is also true, as structural-realist theory fails to add, that strong states can be punished if they ignore asymmetryof motivationthat weaker states sometimes enjoy in disputes with stronger states. Nor should one overlook that strong states often have multiple, global foreign policy intereststhat compete with and place in perspective the particularinterestsengaged in a dispute with a weaker state. The more intereststo powerful state may not attachenough importanceto these particular warranta heavy expenditureof resources to achieve a maximum payoff in the dispute with a weaker but highly motivatedadversary. None of these limitations of structural-realist theory are unknown to, or

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denied by scholarswho attachgreat importanceto the theory.The sophistication of their understandingof the complexities and uncertaintiesof international relationsis muchbroaderthanthe scope of the theory.The point emphasizedhere concernsthe theoryitself; its inabilityto encompassthe distinctionbetween gross capabilitiesand usable options is a majorlimitationof the theory.The deficiency is intrinsicto the theory,not a piece of it that is accidentallymissing or one that could be added without changingthe very natureof the theory's exclusive focus on structuralvariables. Rather, the distinction between gross capabilities and usable options can be accommodatedonly by a different kind of theory that works with the decision-makinglevel of analysis and studies the actual process of strategic interactionbetween states, both of which are deliberatelyexcluded by structural-realist theory, which deals with them by assumptions. Another major deficiency is the limited scope of neorealist theory. Much that goes on in relationsamong states, includingwhat policy-makersare sometimes most concerned with, cannot be explained, predicted, or guided by the maxims of neorealisttheory. Critics have pointed to a numberof limitationsof the scope of the theory,includingthat it does not provide much help in address(1) ing and understanding all the sources of long-termtrendsin the international system; (2) how to promotepeaceful change in the international system; (3) how to avoid conflict and to resolve it via diplomacy;(4) how to achieve cooperation and among states; and (5) how to understand promoteforeign policy "learning" states and their leaders. Each of these importantproblems requirespolicyby makersand studentsof foreignpolicy to pay attentionto variablesexcluded from structural-realist theory. Still anotherlimitationof neorealisttheoryis thatnot only are its predictions sometimes badly off the mark, which is to be expected of any theory that is capable of makingonly probabilisticpredictions,but even its correctpredictions are typically of a general character.For example, althoughit is true that during World WarII neorealist theory would have successfully predictedthat conflict would develop between the UnitedStatesandthe Soviet Union aftertheircooperation in defeating Nazi Germany,the theory could not predict whetherpostwar U.S.-Soviet conflict would result in a spheres-of-influenceagreement, a withdrawal of the United States from Europe in favor of a hemispheric "Fortress America"securitypolicy, a relativelybenign collaborative-competitive relationship, a Cold War,or WorldWarIII. Othervariables, not encompassedby neorealist theory, would have to be consideredin orderto try to predict or explain any of these highly differentoutcomes. Indeed, structural-realist theory was not designed to make more specific predictionsof this kind. I am not criticizingit for not being able to do more than it was designed to do but merely pointing out the limits of what it is capableof doing when viewed from the perspective important or the knowledge base needed for the conduct of statecraftand for the explanation of importantforeign policy outcomes.

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In sum, althoughneorealisttheory is an indispensableand necessarypartof the knowledge needed, it is quite insufficient by itself for the study and even affairs. Other more insufficientfor the conduct and managementof international variablesthat influence foreign policy decisions and their outcomes that are not and encompassedby neorealisttheory-such as domestic structure politics, idebelief systems, images of the opponent, various impedimentsto and disology, tortions of informationprocessing, bureaucratic politics, strategy and bargainto be brought into the analytic framework. At the same time, of ing-need course, the substantialdifficulty of developing theory and generalizationsas to how these additionalvariablesalso affect foreign policy decisions and outcomes must be recognized. This discussion has used the critiqueof structural-realist theory as an examOther theoretical approachesalso have major limitations as seen from a ple. policy perspective. This particulartheory has been used here to illustrate the limitationsof theories of international relationsmore generallybecause this one is currentlypredominantin academic circles. How then can progress be made in developing the additionalknowledge needed for the study and conduct of foreign policy? One approachthat scholars have taken is to develop empiricallyderived generalizationsabout the ways in which each of these additionalvariables-domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, or ideology, for example-influence the process of policy-making, the content of decisions taken, the implementation politics, and their outcomes. of Knowledge of this kind can indeed serve to sensitize policy specialists, if they have not alreadybeen alertedthroughexperience, to the ways in which foreign policy can be influencedfor betteror worse by each of these variables.However, theories and generalizationsthat focus narrowlyon but one of these individual causal variablesare of limited utility, among other reasons because they are not linked with variationin situationalcontexts and with strategiesand instruments of policy that practitioners employ in attemptingto influence outcomes in their interactionswith otherstates. It is to theoriesandknowledge aboutstrategiesthat the discussion now turns, but before doing so it should be acknowledged that policy-makersneed many othertypes of knowledge that are not discussed in this paper. There are a host of important problemsthataffect the interestsof individual nations and their peoples to which scholarsand policy specialists must be attentive. Among these problemsare proliferation nuclearweapons and othermass of destructioncapabilities, environmental ecological problems, populationand and demographictrends, food productionand distribution,water scarcities, sanitation and health, and emergence of nationalistic,ethnic, and religious conflicts. Well-informed,objective analyses of these problemsare an essential part of the for knowledge requirements conduct of foreign policy.

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THEORY THAT FOCUSES ON INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY More useful in policy-makingthan structural-realist theoryand theoriesthat deal with individualcausal variablesis anothertype of knowledgethatfocuses on differentinstrumentsof foreign policy, strategies, and undertakings-for example, negotiation, deterrence, economic sanctions, coercive diplomacy, crisis management,war termination,regime formationand maintenance,detente, conflict resolution, internationalcooperation, and so on. All of these activities involve strategic interactionbetween two or more states. I should note briefly that game theory can generatehypothesesaboutthese differenttypes of strategic interactionfor assessment, refinement, or qualificationby means of empirical research. The objective of scholarly investigation is to develop for each of these or strategies(1) an abstract"theory" conceptualmodel that identifies the critical variables of that strategy and its general logic, and (2) general (or "generic") knowledge of the strategywhich, derived from systematic comparisonof relevant historicalcases, identifies those circumstancesand conditionsthat favorthe success of that type of undertaking those otherconditionsassociatedwith its and failure. What I refer to as abstracttheoryor conceptualmodel can be regardedas a quasideductivetheory, one that is not yet operationalizedand therefore not capable of makingspecific predictions.Generic, empiricallyderivedknowledge of a strategybears a similarity,of course, to "laws"which as yet have not been fully developed or validated. Together,the abstract"theory"of a strategy and "genericknowledge"8(see George and Smoke, 1974; George, 1991a) regarding its efficacy provide policy-relevantknowledge abouteach of these policy instruments and foreign policy undertakings. However, it must be emphasized that although an abstract model of a strategy and generic knowledge of its workings can help to bridge the gap between theoryandpractice,they cannoteliminateit. Theoryand generic knowledge are best conceived as aids to policy analysis and to the judgement of the policy-maker. Even the best knowledge of that strategy cannot substitute for
a 8Manyexamples of "genericknowledge"regarding particular foreignpolicy strategyor undertaking could be cited. Perhapsone or two will suffice. Studies of historicalcases of failures of deterrence led to the formulationof the following generalization: deterrencecan fail in several differentways and for differentreasons dependingupon not merely whetherthe adversarybelieves that a commitment exists to defend but even in the face of such a commitmentwhen the adversaryidentifies an option for challenging the status quo for which she or he believes the risks can be calculated and controlled. Similarly,studies of the effectiveness of the strategyof coercive diplomacyhave identified severalcriticallyimportant conditions-all of a psychologicalcharacter. Thus the success of the strategyoften dependson creatingin the opponent'smind(1) a sense of urgencyfor compliancewith what is demanded;(2) a belief that there is an asymmetryof motivationthat favors the coercing power; and (3) a fear of unacceptablepunishmentif the demand is not accepted.

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policy analysis thatmust considerwhethersome version of that strategyis likely to be viable in the situationat handor substitutefor the finaljudgmentthe policymakermust exercise in deciding whetherto employ thatstrategyin thatsituation. Let us consider, therefore, how conceptual, quasideductive models and generic knowledge can contributeto policy analysis and to the judgment of the decision-maker.A conceptualmodel is not itself a strategybut merely a starting point for developing a strategy; its usefulness for policy-making is limited to the providing the basic frameworkfor understanding general requirementsfor and implementingan effective strategy.The "logic" of the model, in designing situation turn, indicatesin a generalway what must be achievedin any particular for that strategyto be effective. Thus, for example, the logic of deterrencestates that the threatto respondto an action against one's interestsshould be credible and potent enough to persuade the adversarythat the costs and risks of his contemplatedaction outweigh the expected gains. A similarlogic is identifiedin the conceptualmodel of coercive diplomacy,the differencebeing that the objective of the threatof punishmentin this strategyis to persuadethe adversaryto stop or undo a harmful action he has already taken. (Both these conceptual, quasideductivemodels, as well as those that describe other strategies, rest upon the assumptionof pure, uncomplicated"rationality" the partof the opponent, on which will be discussed later.) Conceptualmodels of this kind identify only the general logic of an effective strategy,not whatthe policy-makerwould have to do to inducethatlogic into the adversary's calculations. To achieve that result, the policy-maker has to convert the abstractmodel into a specific strategythat is tailoredto the peculiar situationand to the characteristics that particular of configurationof a particular For adversary. example, to convertthe abstractmodel of coercive diplomacyinto a specific strategy, the policy-maker has to fill in the four empty "boxes" of (variable-components) the model: (1) what to demand of the opponent; (2) whetherand how to createa sense of urgencyfor compliance;(3) how to createa threat of punishment for noncompliance that, hopefully, will be sufficiently credible and potent enough to induce compliance;and (4) whetherto couple the threatwith a positive inducement(a "carrot") facilitatecompliance, and what to kind and how much of such an inducement. Several additional types of knowledge are needed for this purpose: (1) empiricallyderived generic knowledge as to how and why the strategydoes or does not do well under various conditions;and (2) an actor-specificbehavioral model regardingthe adversaryin question. Genericknowledge assists the policy analyst's and the policy-maker'sdiagnosis of the situation, for which they draw on availableintelligence and informationaboutthe case at handin orderto judge whetherthe favorableconditions identifiedby generic knowledge for the use of the strategyexist and to identify possible obstacles and constraintsthat would be encounteredby the strategy.Genericknowledgecan also make a significantinput

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to policy analysis and policy planning that addresses the task of considering whether a specific variant of the strategy can be devised that is sufficiently tailored to the peculiar configurationof the situation and to the opponent in questionso as to offer a good possibility of inducingthe requisite"logic"into the calculations of the adversary. As the discussion suggests, generic knowledge often takes the form of "conditionalgeneralizations."Such generalizationsarereferredto as "conditional" because they identify those conditions and factors that favor success and others that are associated with likely failure of the strategy. A few examples will suffice to illustratethe natureof "conditionalgeneralizations." Some years ago aftercomparinga numberof historicalcases of efforts to mediate conflicts, Zartmanadvanceda theory of "ripeness"that identified a number of conditions which, if present in a crisis, would seem to favor the possibility of successful mediationby an outside actor. Accordingto this conditional generalization, briefly summarizedhere, a crisis is ripe for mediated resolutionwhen (1) the actorsperceive thata deadlockhas emergedand fear that things will get worse; (2) when they believe that a satisfactory outcome via unilateralaction is no longer possible and that acceptablejoint solutions may be feasible; and (3) when the side that previously had the upperhand has slipped, and the underdoghas gained in strength.Zartmancharacterized such conditions as "a mutuallyhurtingstalemate" (Zartman,1985; Stedman, 1991; Haass, 1990). Anotherexample of conditionalgeneralizations providedby a studyof the is encounteredin getting the recalcitrant problems partiesin the Arab-Israeliconflict to the negotiating table. Janice Gross Stein analyzed "pre-negotiation" efforts by mediatorsto achieve this objective in 13 historicalcases. Severalconditions were identified that appearedto favor the success of such efforts. (1) At least one side must fear a looming crisis-such as the prospectof war or in the aftermath a recentwar;(2) Both sides mustbe persuaded of thatparticipating a in pre-negotiationprocess is acceptablebecause the "exit costs" of failure of prenegotiationare lower (and more likely to be acceptable)than would be the case of a failureof direct negotiations;(3) Both sides must believe thatprenegotiation and may offer the possibility of limitingthe scope, participants, agendaof formal talks later, thus reducing some of the critical uncertaintiesand risks of formal in negotiations;and (4) one or both sides believe thatparticipating prenegotiation will yield useful "side-effects"independentof whetherit leads to agreementto enter formal negotiations(Stein, 1989). How, then, can conditional generalizationsand actor-specific behavioral models contributeto the policy analyst'sjudgmentregardingthe likely outcome of employing a particularstrategyin a given situation?An example is provided by the U.S. decision to employ the strategyof coercive diplomacy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. After discovering Soviet missiles in Cuba in October 1962, U.S. policy-makersfelt they had to choose between undertakinga militaryresponse

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and applyingcoercive diplomaticpressureto persuadeKhrushchev remove the to missiles peacefully. Critical for this choice of policy was the question whether in Soviet leaders were capable of a diplomatic"retreat" a situationof this kind. Or was it the case thatthe deploymentof missiles into Cubahad proceededso far and that Soviet leaders were so committedto the daring venture that for them there could be no turningback? An answer to this question was suggested by a conditional generalizationand knowledge of an importantaspect of the Soviet political style derived from studies of past Soviet behaviorand Soviet political doctrine (e.g., Leites, 1953). Readiness to retreatin order to extricate oneself from a situationof overwhelmingdangerwas one of the cardinalmaxims of the old Bolshevik doctrine. A good Bolshevik had to know when the time came for retreatand not let false considerationsof pride or emotion get in the way. Even so, U.S. policy-makershad to judge whether in this particular situation they means to activatethe latentSoviet capabilityfor retreatcould devise appropriate ing under pressure. It was concluded that the possibility existed, and President Kennedy proceeded to try coercive diplomacy based on the expectation that it might well induce a withdrawalof the missiles. This example is useful also in conveying thatgenericknowledgeregardinga it particular strategyis itself not prescriptive; does not tell policy-makerswhether to undertakea course of action, nor does it tell them how to devise effective policy means. What generic knowledge does do is to help policy specialists formulatea specific estimate of the likelihood of success afterthey have made a diagnosis of the situationand applied their general knowledge of the behavioral patternsof the adversaryin question in order to choose an option. (A detailed discussion of "actor-specific" behavioralmodels appearsbelow.) I have distinguishedbetween two ways in which theory and generic knowledge can contributeto policy-makingand have placed greateremphasis on the diagnostic contributionthey can make than on their ability to prescribe sound choices of policy. Correctdiagnosis of a policy problemshouldprecedeand-as in much medical practice-is usually a prerequisitefor efforts to make the best choice from amongpolicy options. The analogywith the medicalprofessionis an apt one since the policy-maker,too, acts as a clinician in striving to make a correct diagnosis of a problem before determininghow best to prescribefor it. THE NEED FOR ACTOR-SPECIFIC BEHAVIORAL MODELS As was emphasizedearlier and as the CubanMissile crisis example illustheotrates, essential for correct diagnosis and prescriptionare "actor-specific" ries regarding the values, mind-sets, behavioral styles, internal politics, and policy-making systems of other actors in the internationalsystem. Such actorspecific theories, combinedwith genericknowledgeregardingthe conditionsthat

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favor effective use of each instrumentof policy-whether negotiation, deterrence, or conciliation-will assist policy specialists to make betterdiagnoses of situations to which they must attend and to devise a more appropriatepolicy response. The important diagnosticfunctionof theoryand genericknowledge is insufficiently appreciatedand understoodby many scholars. Even those engaged in developing policy-relevant theory often show little interest in the diagnostic dimension of policy-makingand, instead, place reliance upon general rationalchoice theory in the expectationthat it should bear directly or indirectlyon the selection of policy. Rational-choicetheoristsrisk making questionableor insigto nificantcontributions decision-makinginsofaras theirtheoriesignorethe need for actor-specificmodels and also fail to take into accountvariablesand circumstances that even rationalpolicy-makersmust consider in deciding how best to respondto a situation.9 The general assumptionof "rational"actors made in game theory and in many formulationsof strategiessuch as deterrenceand coercive diplomacy has often been sharplyquestioned. But in conductingforeign affairs,policy-makers, too, often operatewith an oversimplifiedimage of a rationalopponentwho is, in effect, a "mirror image"of themselves in this respect. Instead,what is needed for and what scholars and area specialists are sometimes called upon policy-making to develop are "actor-specific"behavioralmodels that characterizein a more discriminatingway how particularleaders or leadershipgroups in anotherstate approachthe difficult task of assessing situations, make utility calculations, and select a course of action that they hope will furthertheir values and interests. In otherwords, the abstractmodel of rationalityhas to be supplemented replaced or by an empiricallyderived theory as to the values and "mind-set"of a particular actor and how that actor tends to deal with the various, well-known constraints on rationalityin decision-making.In employing strategiessuch as deterrenceand coercive diplomacy, and in engaging in crisis management,policy-makersneed in actor-specificbehavioralmodels of the adversary orderto take into accountthe possibly idiosyncraticpsychological, cultural, and political variablesthat shape and influence the adversary'sbehavior. I have emphasizedthat good theory and sound generic knowledge can help bridge the gap between theory and practice but that they cannot eliminate it. Theory and generic knowledge are best conceived as aids to policy analysis of a specific foreignpolicy problemandto thejudgmentof the policymaker.Even the
9In the development of game theoreticalapproachesand formal models, increasing recognition is aboutthe actor. George Downs (1991, being given to the need for making "auxiliaryassumptions" p. 75), for example, states that the degree of correspondence,if any, of a formal model with reality "will be strongly affected by the appropriateness certain auxiliary assumptions ... a wellof specified formal model must implicitly make some assumptionabout the nature of the decision maker in each state."

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best theory and the most highly developed generic knowledge cannot substitute for policy analysis and for the judgmentthe policy-makermust make in deciding what to do.10 Understandingthe limited contributionof theory and generic knowledge or should not be a reason for discouragement disillusionment.Rather,it should all concernedto define betterthe conceptualmodels and generic knowledge help that need to be developed and how best to use them in policy-making.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Scholars specializing in international relationsand policy specialists within the governmenttogether face the challenging task of improvingthe knowledge base requiredfor more effective foreign policy. This objective will be furthered of by a better understanding the gap between the theory and practiceof foreign policy. Bridging this gap, in turn, will be facilitatedif differencesbetween the two cultures of academia and the policy-makingworld can be bridged. Many membersof these two communitiesdefine their interestin international relations somewhatdifferently;they pursuedifferentprofessionalgoals and have difficulty communicatingwith each other. However, these differenceneed not lead to pessimism as to the prospectsfor more effective two-way interaction.Noteworthyis the fact that the boundaries between academia and the policy-making arena are quite permeable;there is much movement of individualsbetween them and many opportunitiesfor joint discussion of policy problems. Individuals who have had experience in both worlds are in a particularlygood position to contribute to bridging the gap between scholarlyresearchon international relationsand the practiceof foreign policy. As a stratagemfor achievingthis objective, I have suggestedthat scholars and policy specialists put aside reservationsabout each other and focus instead on their sharedinterestin understanding betterthe relationshipbetween knowledge and action. The dominantand most prestigious scholarly theory of internationalrelations is structural-realist theoryor, as it is sometimescalled, neo-realisttheory.I have called attentionto the limited scope of this theory when viewed from the perspective of the knowledge base requiredfor the conduct of foreign policy. Indeed, as proponentsof that theory explicitly acknowledge, it is not a theory of foreign policy; but it is precisely that kind of theory that policy-makers need!
'?Manyyears ago, CharlesHitch, one of the foundersof modem systems analysis, emphasizedthat even the best analysis of this kind should be regardedas an aid to the preparation sound policy of decisions and not a substitutefor the judgment of the policy-maker.

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Clearly, scholars who wish to contributeto the developmentof theory and knowledge that is relevant for the conduct of foreign policy will have to go beyond realist theory.In this paper,I have advocatedthat systematicresearchbe of directedtowarddeveloping threetypes of knowledge:betterconceptualization each strategy,empiricalknowledgeof the conditionswhich favorits success, and also more sophisticatedactor-specificbehavioralmodels of actors in international politics to replace the simple assumptionmade by realist-theoryand other academic approachesthat states are rational, unitaryactors. Althoughthe three types of policy-relevantknowledge I have identifiedcan is indeed help bridgethe gap, they cannoteliminateit. Rather,their contribution best understoodas that of making an input to policy analysis of specific issues within the government, and as providingan aid, not a substitutefor judgments that decision-makers must exercise when choosing policies. Although such scholarly knowledge can generallybe expected to make only an indirectcontriwill butionto policy-making,neverthelessits contribution often be criticalfor the choice and implementationof sound policies. In thinking about the kind of policy-relevantknowledge that needs to be developed, and its role in policy-making,we should give more attentionto the contributionit can make to the diagnosisof problem-solvingsituationsthanto its ability to prescribesound choices of policy. The three types of knowledge that have been identified are particularlyappropriatefor diagnosing situations to which a policy response must be worked out. The same cannot be said for rational-choicetheories favored by some scholars, for these theories typically bypass the task of situationaland contextualanalysis or deal with it by assumption, and instead proceed directly to offering prescriptive advice on policy choices. I would like to put forwarda numberof additionalobservationsfor discussion and further consideration. First, the types of policy-relevantknowledge identifiedhere need not meet the most exacting requirements science in order of to contributeto the sensible conductof foreign policy. Just as intelligentpersons are generallyable to managethe multiplicityof chores with which they must deal in everyday life reasonablywell withoutbenefit of scientific knowledge governing each decision they must make, so too can intelligentpolicy-makersmake use of the best "quasi-scientific" afknowledge of differentaspects of international fairs. Hence, conditionalgeneralizations the regarding efficacy of a strategyneed not achieve a high degree of verification in order to retain their usefulness in policy-making. Of course, ideally, policy-makerswould like the general knowledge on which they base decisions to have as high a level of verification as possible, but as a practicalmatterthey will settle-if for no other reason than that they have to-for more modest levels of verification. Decision-makerscan make responsibleuse of conditionalgeneralizations even thoughsuch generalizations have limited empiricalsupportand thereforeare only plausible(Lindblom,

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1990).11Policy-makerscan do so by drawingon availableinformationaboutthe case in question in orderto judge whetherthe plausible generalization particular is likely to hold for that situation. Second, academic scholars should include in their research designs variables over which policy-makershave some leverage. Strategy is just such a variable. Third, taking note of concern often expressed by policy-makers, scholars should recognize that for theirresearchto be more relevantand useful in policymaking they should not define concepts and variables at too high a level of abstraction.The more abstracta concept, the more remote it is from its referent in the real world, and the greaterand more difficult the intellectualdemandon to the practitioner make that linkage and to benefit from it. scholars should recognize that too strict a pursuitof the scientific Fourth, for criterionof parsimonyin their efforts at theorizingis inappropriate developuseful policy-relevanttheory and knowledge. A "rich"theory or theoretical ing framework-which I define as one thatencompassesa relativelylarge numberof the variablesthat can influence the outcome of a policy-is often more useful in policy-makingthan a simpler theory of narrowscope, such as structural-realist theory,that encompassesonly a few causal variables.The policy-makerwho has to deal with complex situationsthatembracemany variablesgets more help from a "rich" theory, even though it enjoys less verification than from a simple, parsimonioustheory that establishes a linkage of some kind between only a few of the operativevariables.This does not meanthatthe policy-makeris reducedto makingpurelysubjectiveor highly speculativejudgments.Thoroughverification of such "rich"theories is not a majorissue for the policy-makersince, as noted for earlier,he can try to assess the validityof thattheoryor generalization at least the particularcase at hand by using the detailed informationavailable on that case. A "rich"theorythatembracesa largernumberof policy-relevant variablesis useful to the policy-makerif it meets two criteria:its contents must be at least plausible, and it must contain indicationsof the special conditions underwhich its propositionsare likely to be true or false. Such a rich, differentiated theory serves at the very least as a sophisticatedchecklistwhich remindspolicy analysts and policy-makersof the numerousconditions and variablesthat can influence theirability to achieve desiredoutcomes andto avoidundesiredones in any given foreign policy activity. When more fully developed, a rich, differentiated theory regarding a particulartype of foreign activity identifies those conditions that "favor,"though they do not guarantee,its success. Such conditions have causal relevance even though they cannot be regardedas either "necessary"or "suffi' A conditionalgeneralization "plausible" it is not contradicted availableevidence and if some is if by evidence, at least, supportsit.

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cient" conditions for a given outcome to occur (George, Hall & Simons, 1971; George 1979). Fifth, an important objective in developing policy-applicabletheory should be to producejust such conditional generalizations. These are more useful in that merely asserta probabilisticrelationship policy-makingthan generalizations between two variables without identifying the conditions under which the relaare tionshipdoes and does not hold. Conditionalgeneralizations also more useful than deductive theories and universal generalizationsthat are able to claim no more than perhapsto have identifieda "necessary" conditionfor the success of a instrumentor undertaking,but have nothing to say about what particularpolicy in addition to the necessary condition must also be present for that favorable outcome to occur. This is not to say, however, that it is a relatively simple research task to produce conditional generalizations.For example, despite the considerableresearcheffortof many scholarsover the years on the question"Do armsraces lead to a war?", a recent review of this literaturetells us that "thereis still no wellunderwhich armsraces will or developed theorythatdescribesthe circumstances will not lead to war. Nor is there a theory that provides a reliable guide for policymakers"(Downs, 1991). However, what increasingly sophisticated researchon this questiondoes permitus to say is not withoutvalue. Thus, it is clear that armsraces are neithera necessary conditionfor the occurrenceof war (since wars do sometimes occur in the absence of a priorarmsrace): nor are armsraces a sufficientconditionfor war (since an armsrace is not always followed by war). However, additional assessment of the relevant historical experience should make it possible at least to identify a numberof conditions, which if presentin a given case, can be said to favoror increasethe likelihoodof war. Hopefully,such a study would also identify ways in which policy-makerscan act to reduce or control the likelihood that an arms race might result in war. Sixth, but by no means least in importance,in attemptingto develop conditional generalizations, scholars should consider whether the phenomenon in question is characterizedby "equifinality."This term is employed in general systems theory to refer to the fact that similar outcomes in differentcases of a phenomenoncan have differentcausal explanations.An example of equifinality was the discovery thatdeterrencecan fail in severaldifferentways, leading to the identification of three different causal patterns leading to deterrence failure (George & Smoke, 1974). Anotherexampleof equifinalityemergedin the identification of severaldifferentpathsto "inadvertent war"-that is, a war thatoccurs even though neither side wanted or expected it at the beginning of the crisis (George, 1991b). The phenomenonof equifinalityis in fact pervasivein much of international relationsand indeed in manyotherareasof life, as JohnStuartMill recognizedso many years ago in his Systemof Logic. Mill warnedthat the methods of agree-

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ment and differencehe outlined were not applicableto many social phenomena because their occurrencewas subject to "pluralityof causes." Equifinalityhas importantimplications not only for the form that causal knowledge of foreign policy outcomes often must take but also for researchstrategyaimed at developing causal theory. Scholars should not assume-as they often do-that the task of developing theory and causal knowledge consists in finding a single causal that have resulted in a similar generalizationfor all instances of an undertaking outcome. Rather,the researchtask will be betterpursuedand be more fruitfulif the investigator is alert to discovering different causal patterns that led to a similar outcome.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS to The authorexpresses appreciation the United States Instituteof Peace for a fellowship which made the study possible, and for the helpful commentson an earlierdraftby AndrewBennett, RobertBowie, Dan Caldwell, AndrewCarpendale, ArthurCohen, Eliot Cohen, Hugh DeSantis, Daniel Druckman, Juliette George, Steve Grummon, Richard Haass, Stephen Hosmer, Jeffrey Hughes, Bruce Jentleson, Joseph Lepgold, Samuel Lewis, Sean Lynn-Jones, Andrew Marshall, Ernest May, Joseph Montville, Alexander Moens, Patrick Morgan, JosephNye, RobertPastor,Alan Platt, RichardSmoke, StephenStedman,Janice Gross-Stein, Eric Stern, and I. William Zartman.

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