The negatives values will be Autonomy and Pragmatism.

The Criterion for these will be finding the most efficient means of helping people, while not demeaning the victim.

The first, and most important contention is the abuser. Many domestic abusers are soldiers, who risked their lives in battle for us and have come home with serious mental conditions, we shouldnt be suggesting they be killed, what they need judge, is help.
Slosson, Mary. "Violent sex crimes by U.S. Army soldiers rise: report." Reuters. Reuters, 19/Jan/2012. Web. 16 Feb 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/20/us-army-health-report-idUSTRE80J01C20120120>.

Violent sex crimes committed by active U.S. Army soldiers have almost doubled over the past five years, due in part to the trauma of war, according to an Army report released on Thursday. Reported violent sex crimes increased by 90 percent over the five-year period from 2006 to 2011. There were 2,811 violent felonies in 2011, nearly half of which were violent felony sex crimes. Most were committed in the United States.
One violent sex crime was committed by a soldier every six hours and 40 minutes in 2011, the Army said, serving as the main driver for an overall increase in violent felony crimes. Higher rates of violent sex crimes are "likely outcomes" of intentional misconduct, lax discipline, post-combat adrenaline, high levels of stress and behavioral health issues, the report said.

"While we have made tremendous strides over the past decade, there is still much work to be done," Army Vice Chief of Staff General Peter Chiarelli said in a statement. "Many of our biggest challenges lie ahead after our soldiers return home and begin the process of reintegrating back into their units, families and communities," Chiarelli said.
Violent sex crimes committed by U.S. Army troops increased at a rate that consistently outpaced the national trend, a gap that is expected to continue to grow, the Army said. The top five violent felony offenses committed by soldiers in 2011 were aggravated assault, rape, aggravated sexual assault, forcible sodomy and child pornography.

Soldiers suffering from issues such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury, and depression have been shown to have higher incidences of partner abuse, according to the report.

Soldiers with PTSD are up to three times more likely to be aggressive with their female partners than those without such trauma, the report said. Also, judge, I would like to add, many other abusers were themselves abused, these people also need help dealing with their intense, emotional scarring. We shouldnt be killed them, we should find a way to help them.

Contention 2 is the way the affirmative team portrays the abused creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading abused people to believe that they are a victim with a license to kill.
The language of victimhood is a process of control that stigmatizes individuals into groups of powerless abnormals

Bumiller 88 (Kristin, Prof of Poly Sci + Womens/Gender Studies @ Amherst College, The Civil Rights
Society: The Social Construction of Victims, p. 69)

The descriptions of the victims no longer take the form of tragic legends, nor are the actions of the victims monuments for future memory.

For the modern victim of circumstance the characterization of their lives will serve as a means to classify them into groups of powerless abnormals. The descriptions of victims personalities (or their social psychology) individualize their situation through a comparison with the norm. Individualization becomes a process of controla mark of difference or a badge of stigma. Foucault describes how this happens:
[W]hen one wishes to individualize the healthy, normal and law abiding adult, it is always by asking him how much of the child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, what fundamental crime has he dreamt of committing.

There are two implications of this are, the First is the inability to see oneself as anything other than victim propelling and unleashomg the greatest forms of violence

Sengupta 06 (Shuddhabrata, media practitioner, filmmaker and writer with the Raqs Media Collective,
"I/Me/MineIntersectional Identities as Negotiated Minefields," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture, http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/SIGNS/journal/issues/v31n3/40253/40253.html)

Once you position or foreground a particular circumstance of victimhood, it enables a scotoma, an inability to see oneself as anything other than a victim, and this, if anything, propels and unleashes the greatest violence.

The Affirmatives call for simplistic solutions and benefits to victimhood merely prolong ones victimization and passivity is inconsistent with a capacity for autonomy

Elias 04 (Robert, Professor of Politics and Chair, Legal Studies Program; University of San Francisco,
Winter, 52 Buffalo L. Rev. 225, lexis)

Since victimhood and offenderhood, and victim and offender labels, are inconsistent with a capacity for autonomy, they should be viewed only as temporary descriptions. Claiming rights for victims as victims is detrimental to victims, according to Dubber. And tying benefits to victimhood only prolongs one's victimization and passivity. Victimological essentialism (that victims are born victims and share common characteristics) is the flip side of criminal essentialism. These assumptions are detrimental to both victims and offenders,
and ignore the evidence that victims and offenders are often very much alike. Historically, the victim's role in criminal law has been challenged the most by notions that crime is an offense against the state instead of against individuals. But the state's preoccupation with victimless (rather than "victimful" crimes) has done the most damage. The host of victims' rights provisions (such as the pending Victims' Rights Amendment) are typically toothless, and promoted largely for symbolic purposes. n33 Victims now enjoy rights long held by criminal defendants, but they are as useless to victims as they have been to defendants. Most of the rights supposedly gained are unenforceable and denied in practice. Much attention has been given to victim impact statements. But aside from their questionable legitimacy, they have had only a minimal effect. n34 Dubber takes particular aim at the victims' rights movement. While he credits it for some accomplishments, he views the movement as primarily counterproductive for [*244] victims. The victims' movement gets us to identify with victims, but as victims rather than as persons. It has helped the state use the criminal law as nuisance control and helped it conduct a war on (purported) criminals (but not on crime). The victims' movement has been successful largely because it has associated itself (and been co-opted by) the war on crime. But the success has been largely symbolic. The interests of real victims have rarely been served, and often have been further harmed. According to Dubber, the image of victims in the victims' movement is one of helpless and vengeful individuals. n35 This plays nicely into the war on crime, exploiting victims for state interests. n36 Active and strong victims are an impediment to officials while helpless victims are malleable and grateful. The victims' movement, Dubber argues, prefers cries for help and simplistic solutions (such as extreme punishment) instead of confident explorations by victims of the meaning of their victimization and the healthiest response. The victims' movement thereby helps preserve victimhood, thus undermining the victim's personhood. In a criminal process designed to vindicate autonomy, a helpless victim has no place. A state response should come only if a genuine victim requires it. Unless there is a harm to a person's autonomy, there is no need to fix it. But criminal law under the war on crime does everything but respect the victim's autonomy. n37

And the fact is, judge, Personal autonomy outweighs all other values

Taylor 99 (James Stacey, Prof of Philosopy @ College of New Jersey, "The Theory of Autonomy,"
Human Studies Review 12:3, http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php/33.html)

autonomy is a concept upon which we structure the world around us, being a fundamental concept for our perception of the world and our place in it (Thomas May, _Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility_, [Boston:
There are two possible reasons why autonomy plays such a major role in so many debates. The first reason is that Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998], p.13) once it is recognised as being a central characteristic of persons (Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", _Journal of Philosophy_ Vol. LXVIII, no. 1 [January 14, 1971]. Reprinted in Harry G. Frankfurt [ed.] _The Importance of What We Care About_ [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988]: 11-25. All future references to Frankfurt's work will be to this later volume unless otherwise indicated. See also Stanley I. Benn, "Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person", _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ Vol. LXXVI [1976].) May (1998) holds that since we view autonomy in this way, in order to treat persons _as_ person we must recognise that they are able to direct their own lives and actions in accordance with their plans, projects, and personal commitments--and

that we must temper our actions towards them to respect this. Indeed, the Bill of Rights attached to the American Constitution may be seen to be indicative of the importance of autonomy within American society. (May [1998]; p.15, Richards [1989].)

Thus, it is because we view ourselves as persons in a certain way that autonomy is the prominent "super-value" that it is. That is to say, autonomy is not simply one value among many other, competing values. Rather, it is of _such_ value that when it conflicts with other values autonomy has a prima facie trumping force. (May [1998]; p.15.) Respecting autonomy, then, comports well with the values of a
democratic society which elevates individualism and freedom over community and authority. (Janet Smith, "The Pre-eminence of Autonomy in Bioethics", in _Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics_, David S. Oderberg and Jacqueline A. Laing, [eds.], [New York: St. Martins Press, Inc., 1997]: 182-195, p.186, citing the views of Paul Ramsey, _The Patient As Person_ [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970].)

Secondly, and just as importantly, the language of victimhood undermines the capacity for choice and action and suppresses structural dimensions of oppression

Minow 93 (Martha, Prof of Law @ Harvard, August, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411, lexis)

The recovery movement risks replacing hope for everyone with victimization for everyone. Finding intimate violence everywhere trivializes it

People who invoke victim language may do so to obtain sympathy and avoid personal responsibility. In the process, though, this language also suppresses societal and structural dimensions of oppression and harm. The language of victimhood, as a result, seems to produce a dilemma, which is explored by Professor Collins in her book on Black feminist thought. She treats issues of
violence and abuse in the broader contexts of racism and sexism. The book concludes that

and obscures important distinctions in gradations of harm.

African-American women have been victimized by race, gender, and class oppression. But portraying Black women solely as passive, unfortunate recipients of racial and sexual abuse stifles notions that Black women can actively work to change our circumstances and bring about changes in our lives. Similarly, presenting African-American women solely as heroic figures who easily engage in resisting oppression on all fronts
minimizes the very real costs of oppression and can foster the perception that Black women need no help because we can "take it." n71

Focusing on victimization undermines capacity for choice and action; however, focusing on capacity for choice and action may minimize real facts of victimization. The passive and helpless connotations of victimization lie at the heart of this dilemma.

Victim rhetoric creates a self-fulfilling prophecyit discourages people who are victimized from developing their own strengths or working to resist limitations

Minow 93 (Martha, Prof of Law @ Harvard, August, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411, lexis)

Victim talk tends to invite more victim talk. It has a rebounding quality we see in discussions of crime victims and offenders,
in claims of reverse discrimination, in arguments that political correctness silences students in the majority, in arguments that responses to family violence victimize men or adults, and in assertions that the litigation explosion hurts America. In each instance, the claim that "I'm a victim, and I'm not responsible" triggers a rejoinder, "I'm a victim, and I'm not responsible," and perhaps, "You're the one to blame." n80 It reminds me of the

ritually exchanged statements of personal hurt that epitomized the honor-oriented culture of the Southern duel. n81 In that culture, the sensation of victimization triggered duels and deaths. Yet unlike the traditional Southern culture of honor and duels, which supported a sense of agency and power even for offended parties,

contemporary victim talk tends to suppress the strengths and capacities of people who are victims. n82 Victim talk can have a kind of self-fulfilling quality, discouraging people who are victimized from developing their own strengths or working to resist the limitations they encounter. And if they
assert or demonstrate those strengths or capacities, they risk being blamed for their victimhood or their failures to transcend or end it.

The third contention is that in order to actually solve Human Rights and other major issues pressing us, we must DO, we must not only speak. The way they represent this issue detracts from it.
The Affirmative is simply intellectual, but their abstract discussions of the world that could be deflects attention from actually making real-world changes, this is from Nayar in 1999
[Jayan, Ph.D from the University of Cambridge, Fall, School of Law, University of Warwick Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Orders of Inhumanity]

Located within a site of privilege, and charged to reflect upon the grand questions of worldorder and the human condition as the third Christian Millennium dawns, we are tempted to turn the mind to the task of abstract imaginings of "what could be" of our "world," and "how should we organize" our "humanity." Perhaps
such contemplations are a necessary antidote to cynicism and skepticism regarding any possibility of human betterment, a necessary revitalization of critical and creative energies to check the complacencies of the state of things as they are. n1 However, imagining [*601] possibilities of abstractions--"world-order," "international society," "the global village," "the family of humankind," etc.--does carry with it a risk. The "total" view that is the take-off point for discourses on preferred "world-order" futures risks deflection as the abstracted projections it provokes might entail little consequence for the faces and the names of the humanity on whose behalf we might speak. So, what do we do?

Now, judge, the discussion of the resolution in the ivory tower creates an illusion of reality that diverts attention from practical solutions to problems, this is from Baudrillard in 1995 [Jean, April 19, "Radical Thought", http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=67]
All this defines the insoluble relationship between thought and the real. A certain type of thought is an accomplice of the real. It starts with the hypothesis that there is a real reference to an idea and that there is a possible "ideation" of reality. This is no doubt a comforting perspective, one which is
based on meaning and deciphering. This is also a polarity, similar to that used by ready-made dialectical and philosophical solutions. The other thought, on the contrary, is ex-centric from the real. It is an "ex-centering"2 of the real world and, consequently, it is alien to a dialectic which always plays on adversarial poles. It is even alien to critical thought which always refers to an ideal of the real. To some extent, this thought is not even a denial of the concept of reality.

It is an illusion, that is to say a "game"3 played with desire (which this

thought puts "into play"), just like metaphor is a "game" played with truth. This radical thought comes
neither from a philosophical doubt nor from a utopian transference4 (which always supposes an ideal transformation of the real). Nor does it stem from an ideal transcendence. It is the "putting into play"5 of this world, the material and immanent illusion of this so-called "real" world - it is a non-critical, non-dialectical thought. So, this thought appears to be coming from somewhere else. In any case,

there is an incompatibility between thought and the real. Between thought and the real, there is no necessary or natural transition. Not an "alternation,"6 not an alternative either: only an "alterity"7 keeps them under pressure8.
Only fracture, distance and alienation safeguard the singularity of this thought, the singularity of being a singular event, similar in a sense to the

singularity of the world through which it is made into an event. Things probably did not always happen this way. One may dream of a happy conjunction of idea and reality, in the shadow of the Enlightenment and of modernity, in the heroic ages of critical thought. But that thought, which operated against a form of illusion - superstitious, religious, or ideological - is substantially over. And even if that thought had survived its catastrophic secularization in all the political systems of the 20th century, the ideal and almost necessary relationship between concept and reality would in any case have been destroyed today. That thought disappeared under the pressure of a gigantic simulation, a technical and mental one, under the pressure of a precession of models to the benefit of an autonomy of the virtual, from now on liberated from the real, and of a simultaneous autonomy of the real that today functions for and by itself - motu propio - in a delirious perspective, infinitely self-referential. Expelled, so to speak, from its own frame, from its own principle, pushed toward its extraneity, the real has become an extreme phenomenon. So, we no longer can think of it as real. But we can think of it as "ex-orbitated," as if it was seen from another world - as an illusion then. Let's ponder over what could be a stupefying experience: the discovery of another real world, different from ours. Ours, one day, was discovered. The objectivity of this world was discovered, just like America was discovered, more or less at the same period. But what was discovered can never be created again. That's how reality was discovered, and is still created (or the alternate version: this is how reality was created, which is still being discovered). Why wouldn't there be as many real worlds as there are imaginary ones? Why would there be only one real world? Why such a mode of exception? In reality, the notion of a real world existing among all other possible worlds is

unimaginable. It is unthinkable, except perhaps as a dangerous superstition. We must stay away from that, just as critical thought once stayed away (in the name of the real!) from religious superstition. Thinkers, give it another try!

The affirmative acts as an Ivory Tower intellectual, reducing us to a seminar-room warrior instead of engaging in actual solutions to domestic abuse. This is from Farmer and Gastineau in 2002
(Paul and Nicole, LEGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS INTERVENTION FOR HEALTH: Rethinking Health and Human Rights: Time for a Paradigm Shift Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics Winter ln) A few years ago, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and his colleagues pulled together a compendium of testimonies from those the French term "the excluded" in order to bring into relief la misere du monde. Bourdieu and colleagues qualified their claims for the role of scholarship in addressing this misery: "To subject to

scrutiny the mechanisms which render life painful, even untenable, is not to neutralize them; to bring to light contradictions is not to resolve them." n23 It is precisely such humility that is needed, and rarely exhibited, in academic commentary on human rights. It is difficult merely to study human rights abuses. We know with certainty that rights are being abused at this very moment. And the fact that we can study, rather than endure, these abuses is a reminder that we too are implicated in and benefit from the increasingly global structures that determine, to an important extent, the nature and distribution of assaults on dignity. Ivory-tower engagement with health and human rights can, often enough, reduce us to seminar-room warriors. At worst, we stand revealed as the hypocrites that our critics in many parts of the world have not hesitated to call us. Anthropologists have long
been familiar with these critiques; specialists in international health, including AIDS researchers, have recently had a crash course. It is possible, usually, to drown out the voices of those demanding that we

stop studying them, even when they go to great lengths to make sure we get the message. But social scientists with more acute hearing have documented a rich trove of graffiti, songs, demonstrations, tracts, and broadsides on the subject. A hit record album in Haiti was
called International Organizations. The title cut includes the following lines: "International organizations [*659] are not on our side. They're there to help the thieves rob and devour... International health stays on the sidelines of our struggle."