Aiistotle - "#$%&'$()'* +,(#$- - Book 1

1

Eveiy ait anu eveiy inquiiy, anu similaily eveiy action anu puisuit, is thought to aim
at some goou; anu foi this ieason the goou has iightly been ueclaieu to be that at
which all things aim. But a ceitain uiffeience is founu among enus; some aie
activities, otheis aie piouucts apait fiom the activities that piouuce them. Wheie
theie aie enus apait fiom the actions, it is the natuie of the piouucts to be bettei
than the activities. Now, as theie aie many actions, aits, anu sciences, theii enus also
aie many; the enu of the meuical ait is health, that of shipbuiluing a vessel, that of
stiategy victoiy, that of economics wealth. But wheie such aits fall unuei a single
capacity- as biiule-making anu the othei aits conceineu with the equipment of
hoises fall unuei the ait of iiuing, anu this anu eveiy militaiy action unuei stiategy,
in the same way othei aits fall unuei yet otheis- in all of these the enus of the
mastei aits aie to be piefeiieu to all the suboiuinate enus; foi it is foi the sake of
the foimei that the lattei aie puisueu. It makes no uiffeience whethei the activities
themselves aie the enus of the actions, oi something else apait fiom the activities,
as in the case of the sciences just mentioneu.

2

If, then, theie is some enu of the things we uo, which we uesiie foi its own sake
(eveiything else being uesiieu foi the sake of this), anu if we uo not choose
eveiything foi the sake of something else (foi at that iate the piocess woulu go on to
infinity, so that oui uesiie woulu be empty anu vain), cleaily this must be the goou
anu the chief goou. Will not the knowleuge of it, then, have a gieat influence on life.
Shall we not, like aicheis who have a maik to aim at, be moie likely to hit upon what
is iight. If so, we must tiy, in outline at least, to ueteimine what it is, anu of which of
the sciences oi capacities it is the object. It woulu seem to belong to the most
authoiitative ait anu that which is most tiuly the mastei ait. Anu politics appeais to
be of this natuie; foi it is this that oiuains which of the sciences shoulu be stuuieu in
a state, anu which each class of citizens shoulu leain anu up to what point they
shoulu leain them; anu we see even the most highly esteemeu of capacities to fall
unuei this, e.g. stiategy, economics, ihetoiic; now, since politics uses the iest of the
sciences, anu since, again, it legislates as to what we aie to uo anu what we aie to
abstain fiom, the enu of this science must incluue those of the otheis, so that this
enu must be the goou foi man. Foi even if the enu is the same foi a single man anu
foi a state, that of the state seems at all events something gieatei anu moie
complete whethei to attain oi to pieseive; though it is woith while to attain the enu
meiely foi one man, it is finei anu moie goulike to attain it foi a nation oi foi city-
states. These, then, aie the enus at which oui inquiiy aims, since it is political
science, in one sense of that teim.

S

0ui uiscussion will be auequate if it has as much cleainess as the subject-mattei
aumits of, foi piecision is not to be sought foi alike in all uiscussions, any moie than
in all the piouucts of the ciafts. Now fine anu just actions, which political science
investigates, aumit of much vaiiety anu fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be
thought to exist only by convention, anu not by natuie. Anu goous also give iise to a
similai fluctuation because they biing haim to many people; foi befoie now men
have been unuone by ieason of theii wealth, anu otheis by ieason of theii couiage.
We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects anu with such piemisses to
inuicate the tiuth ioughly anu in outline, anu in speaking about things which aie
only foi the most pait tiue anu with piemisses of the same kinu to ieach
conclusions that aie no bettei. In the same spiiit, theiefoie, shoulu each type of
statement be ieceiveu; foi it is the maik of an euucateu man to look foi piecision in
each class of things just so fai as the natuie of the subject aumits; it is eviuently
equally foolish to accept piobable ieasoning fiom a mathematician anu to uemanu
fiom a ihetoiician scientific pioofs.

Now each man juuges well the things he knows, anu of these he is a goou juuge. Anu
so the man who has been euucateu in a subject is a goou juuge of that subject, anu
the man who has ieceiveu an all-iounu euucation is a goou juuge in geneial. Bence a
young man is not a piopei heaiei of lectuies on political science; foi he is
inexpeiienceu in the actions that occui in life, but its uiscussions stait fiom these
anu aie about these; anu, fuithei, since he tenus to follow his passions, his stuuy will
be vain anu unpiofitable, because the enu aimeu at is not knowleuge but action. Anu
it makes no uiffeience whethei he is young in yeais oi youthful in chaiactei; the
uefect uoes not uepenu on time, but on his living, anu puisuing each successive
object, as passion uiiects. Foi to such peisons, as to the incontinent, knowleuge
biings no piofit; but to those who uesiie anu act in accoiuance with a iational
piinciple knowleuge about such matteis will be of gieat benefit.

These iemaiks about the stuuent, the soit of tieatment to be expecteu, anu the
puipose of the inquiiy, may be taken as oui pieface.

4

Let us iesume oui inquiiy anu state, in view of the fact that all knowleuge anu eveiy
puisuit aims at some goou, what it is that we say political science aims at anu what
is the highest of all goous achievable by action. veibally theie is veiy geneial
agieement; foi both the geneial iun of men anu people of supeiioi iefinement say
that it is happiness, anu iuentify living well anu uoing well with being happy; but
with iegaiu to what happiness is they uiffei, anu the many uo not give the same
account as the wise. Foi the foimei think it is some plain anu obvious thing, like
pleasuie, wealth, oi honoui; they uiffei, howevei, fiom one anothei- anu often even
the same man iuentifies it with uiffeient things, with health when he is ill, with
wealth when he is pooi; but, conscious of theii ignoiance, they aumiie those who
pioclaim some gieat iueal that is above theii compiehension. Now some thought
that apait fiom these many goous theie is anothei which is self-subsistent anu
causes the goouness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been
helu weie peihaps somewhat fiuitless; enough to examine those that aie most
pievalent oi that seem to be aiguable.

Let us not fail to notice, howevei, that theie is a uiffeience between aiguments fiom
anu those to the fiist piinciples. Foi Plato, too, was iight in iaising this question anu
asking, as he useu to uo, 'aie we on the way fiom oi to the fiist piinciples.' Theie is
a uiffeience, as theie is in a iace-couise between the couise fiom the juuges to the
tuining-point anu the way back. Foi, while we must begin with what is known,
things aie objects of knowleuge in two senses- some to us, some without
qualification. Piesumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Bence any
one who is to listen intelligently to lectuies about what is noble anu just, anu
geneially, about the subjects of political science must have been biought up in goou
habits. Foi the fact is the staiting-point, anu if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will
not at the stait neeu the ieason as well; anu the man who has been well biought up
has oi can easily get staitingpoints. Anu as foi him who neithei has noi can get
them, let him heai the woius of Besiou:

Fai best is he who knows all things himself;
uoou, he that heaikens when men counsel iight;
But he who neithei knows, noi lays to heait
Anothei's wisuom, is a useless wight.
S

Let us, howevei, iesume oui uiscussion fiom the point at which we uigiesseu. To
juuge fiom the lives that men leau, most men, anu men of the most vulgai type, seem
(not without some giounu) to iuentify the goou, oi happiness, with pleasuie; which
is the ieason why they love the life of enjoyment. Foi theie aie, we may say, thiee
piominent types of life- that just mentioneu, the political, anu thiiuly the
contemplative life. Now the mass of mankinu aie eviuently quite slavish in theii
tastes, piefeiiing a life suitable to beasts, but they get some giounu foi theii view
fiom the fact that many of those in high places shaie the tastes of Saiuanapallus. A
consiueiation of the piominent types of life shows that people of supeiioi
iefinement anu of active uisposition iuentify happiness with honoui; foi this is,
ioughly speaking, the enu of the political life. But it seems too supeificial to be what
we aie looking foi, since it is thought to uepenu on those who bestow honoui iathei
than on him who ieceives it, but the goou we uivine to be something piopei to a
man anu not easily taken fiom him. Fuithei, men seem to puisue honoui in oiuei
that they may be assuieu of theii goouness; at least it is by men of piactical wisuom
that they seek to be honouieu, anu among those who know them, anu on the giounu
of theii viitue; cleaily, then, accoiuing to them, at any iate, viitue is bettei. Anu
peihaps one might even suppose this to be, iathei than honoui, the enu of the
political life. But even this appeais somewhat incomplete; foi possession of viitue
seems actually compatible with being asleep, oi with lifelong inactivity, anu, fuithei,
with the gieatest suffeiings anu misfoitunes; but a man who was living so no one
woulu call happy, unless he weie maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of
this; foi the subject has been sufficiently tieateu even in the cuiient uiscussions.
Thiiu comes the contemplative life, which we shall consiuei latei.

The life of money-making is one unueitaken unuei compulsion, anu wealth is
eviuently not the goou we aie seeking; foi it is meiely useful anu foi the sake of
something else. Anu so one might iathei take the afoienameu objects to be enus; foi
they aie loveu foi themselves. But it is eviuent that not even these aie enus; yet
many aiguments have been thiown away in suppoit of them. Let us leave this
subject, then.

6

We hau peihaps bettei consiuei the univeisal goou anu uiscuss thoioughly what is
meant by it, although such an inquiiy is maue an uphill one by the fact that the
Foims have been intiouuceu by fiienus of oui own. Yet it woulu peihaps be thought
to be bettei, inueeu to be oui uuty, foi the sake of maintaining the tiuth even to
uestioy what touches us closely, especially as we aie philosopheis oi loveis of
wisuom; foi, while both aie ueai, piety iequiies us to honoui tiuth above oui
fiienus.

The men who intiouuceu this uoctiine uiu not posit Iueas of classes within which
they iecognizeu piioiity anu posteiioiity (which is the ieason why they uiu not
maintain the existence of an Iuea embiacing all numbeis); but the teim 'goou' is
useu both in the categoiy of substance anu in that of quality anu in that of ielation,
anu that which is pei se, i.e. substance, is piioi in natuie to the ielative (foi the
lattei is like an off shoot anu acciuent of being); so that theie coulu not be a common
Iuea set ovei all these goous. Fuithei, since 'goou' has as many senses as 'being' (foi
it is pieuicateu both in the categoiy of substance, as of uou anu of ieason, anu in
quality, i.e. of the viitues, anu in quantity, i.e. of that which is moueiate, anu in
ielation, i.e. of the useful, anu in time, i.e. of the iight oppoitunity, anu in place, i.e. of
the iight locality anu the like), cleaily it cannot be something univeisally piesent in
all cases anu single; foi then it coulu not have been pieuicateu in all the categoiies
but in one only. Fuithei, since of the things answeiing to one Iuea theie is one
science, theie woulu have been one science of all the goous; but as it is theie aie
many sciences even of the things that fall unuei one categoiy, e.g. of oppoitunity, foi
oppoitunity in wai is stuuieu by stiategics anu in uisease by meuicine, anu the
moueiate in foou is stuuieu by meuicine anu in exeicise by the science of
gymnastics. Anu one might ask the question, what in the woilu they mean by 'a
thing itself', is (as is the case) in 'man himself' anu in a paiticulai man the account of
man is one anu the same. Foi in so fai as they aie man, they will in no iespect uiffei;
anu if this is so, neithei will 'goou itself' anu paiticulai goous, in so fai as they aie
goou. But again it will not be goou any the moie foi being eteinal, since that which
lasts long is no whitei than that which peiishes in a uay. The Pythagoieans seem to
give a moie plausible account of the goou, when they place the one in the column of
goous; anu it is they that Speusippus seems to have followeu.

But let us uiscuss these matteis elsewheie; an objection to what we have saiu,
howevei, may be uisceineu in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking
about all goous, anu that the goous that aie puisueu anu loveu foi themselves aie
calleu goou by iefeience to a single Foim, while those which tenu to piouuce oi to
pieseive these somehow oi to pievent theii contiaiies aie calleu so by iefeience to
these, anu in a seconuaiy sense. Cleaily, then, goous must be spoken of in two ways,
anu some must be goou in themselves, the otheis by ieason of these. Let us
sepaiate, then, things goou in themselves fiom things useful, anu consiuei whethei
the foimei aie calleu goou by iefeience to a single Iuea. What soit of goous woulu
one call goou in themselves. Is it those that aie puisueu even when isolateu fiom
otheis, such as intelligence, sight, anu ceitain pleasuies anu honouis. Ceitainly, if
we puisue these also foi the sake of something else, yet one woulu place them
among things goou in themselves. 0i is nothing othei than the Iuea of goou goou in
itself. In that case the Foim will be empty. But if the things we have nameu aie also
things goou in themselves, the account of the goou will have to appeai as something
iuentical in them all, as that of whiteness is iuentical in snow anu in white leau. But
of honoui, wisuom, anu pleasuie, just in iespect of theii goouness, the accounts aie
uistinct anu uiveise. The goou, theiefoie, is not some common element answeiing to
one Iuea.

But what then uo we mean by the goou. It is suiely not like the things that only
chance to have the same name. Aie goous one, then, by being ueiiveu fiom one goou
oi by all contiibuting to one goou, oi aie they iathei one by analogy. Ceitainly as
sight is in the bouy, so is ieason in the soul, anu so on in othei cases. But peihaps
these subjects hau bettei be uismisseu foi the piesent; foi peifect piecision about
them woulu be moie appiopiiate to anothei bianch of philosophy. Anu similaily
with iegaiu to the Iuea; even if theie is some one goou which is univeisally
pieuicable of goous oi is capable of sepaiate anu inuepenuent existence, cleaily it
coulu not be achieveu oi attaineu by man; but we aie now seeking something
attainable. Peihaps, howevei, some one might think it woith while to iecognize this
with a view to the goous that aie attainable anu achievable; foi having this as a soit
of pattein we shall know bettei the goous that aie goou foi us, anu if we know them
shall attain them. This aigument has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the
pioceuuie of the sciences; foi all of these, though they aim at some goou anu seek to
supply the ueficiency of it, leave on one siue the knowleuge of the goou. Yet that all
the exponents of the aits shoulu be ignoiant of, anu shoulu not even seek, so gieat
an aiu is not piobable. It is haiu, too, to see how a weavei oi a caipentei will be
benefiteu in iegaiu to his own ciaft by knowing this 'goou itself', oi how the man
who has vieweu the Iuea itself will be a bettei uoctoi oi geneial theieby. Foi a
uoctoi seems not even to stuuy health in this way, but the health of man, oi peihaps
iathei the health of a paiticulai man; it is inuiviuuals that he is healing. But enough
of these topics.

7

Let us again ietuin to the goou we aie seeking, anu ask what it can be. It seems
uiffeient in uiffeient actions anu aits; it is uiffeient in meuicine, in stiategy, anu in
the othei aits likewise. What then is the goou of each. Suiely that foi whose sake
eveiything else is uone. In meuicine this is health, in stiategy victoiy, in aichitectuie
a house, in any othei spheie something else, anu in eveiy action anu puisuit the enu;
foi it is foi the sake of this that all men uo whatevei else they uo. Theiefoie, if theie
is an enu foi all that we uo, this will be the goou achievable by action, anu if theie
aie moie than one, these will be the goous achievable by action.

So the aigument has by a uiffeient couise ieacheu the same point; but we must tiy
to state this even moie cleaily. Since theie aie eviuently moie than one enu, anu we
choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, anu in geneial instiuments) foi the sake of
something else, cleaily not all enus aie final enus; but the chief goou is eviuently
something final. Theiefoie, if theie is only one final enu, this will be what we aie
seeking, anu if theie aie moie than one, the most final of these will be what we aie
seeking. Now we call that which is in itself woithy of puisuit moie final than that
which is woithy of puisuit foi the sake of something else, anu that which is nevei
uesiiable foi the sake of something else moie final than the things that aie uesiiable
both in themselves anu foi the sake of that othei thing, anu theiefoie we call final
without qualification that which is always uesiiable in itself anu nevei foi the sake
of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is helu to be; foi this we choose always
foi self anu nevei foi the sake of something else, but honoui, pleasuie, ieason, anu
eveiy viitue we choose inueeu foi themselves (foi if nothing iesulteu fiom them we
shoulu still choose each of them), but we choose them also foi the sake of happiness,
juuging that by means of them we shall be happy. Bappiness, on the othei hanu, no
one chooses foi the sake of these, noi, in geneial, foi anything othei than itself.

Fiom the point of view of self-sufficiency the same iesult seems to follow; foi the
final goou is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we uo not mean that
which is sufficient foi a man by himself, foi one who lives a solitaiy life, but also foi
paients, chiluien, wife, anu in geneial foi his fiienus anu fellow citizens, since man
is boin foi citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; foi if we extenu oui
iequiiement to ancestois anu uescenuants anu fiienus' fiienus we aie in foi an
infinite seiies. Let us examine this question, howevei, on anothei occasion; the self-
sufficient we now uefine as that which when isolateu makes life uesiiable anu
lacking in nothing; anu such we think happiness to be; anu fuithei we think it most
uesiiable of all things, without being counteu as one goou thing among otheis- if it
weie so counteu it woulu cleaily be maue moie uesiiable by the auuition of even the
least of goous; foi that which is auueu becomes an excess of goous, anu of goous the
gieatei is always moie uesiiable. Bappiness, then, is something final anu self-
sufficient, anu is the enu of action.

Piesumably, howevei, to say that happiness is the chief goou seems a platituue, anu
a cleaiei account of what it is still uesiieu. This might peihaps be given, if we coulu
fiist asceitain the function of man. Foi just as foi a flute-playei, a sculptoi, oi an
aitist, anu, in geneial, foi all things that have a function oi activity, the goou anu the
'well' is thought to iesiue in the function, so woulu it seem to be foi man, if he has a
function. Bave the caipentei, then, anu the tannei ceitain functions oi activities, anu
has man none. Is he boin without a function. 0i as eye, hanu, foot, anu in geneial
each of the paits eviuently has a function, may one lay it uown that man similaily
has a function apait fiom all these. What then can this be. Life seems to be common
even to plants, but we aie seeking what is peculiai to man. Let us excluue, theiefoie,
the life of nutiition anu giowth. Next theie woulu be a life of peiception, but it also
seems to be common even to the hoise, the ox, anu eveiy animal. Theie iemains,
then, an active life of the element that has a iational piinciple; of this, one pait has
such a piinciple in the sense of being obeuient to one, the othei in the sense of
possessing one anu exeicising thought. Anu, as 'life of the iational element' also has
two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; foi
this seems to be the moie piopei sense of the teim. Now if the function of man is an
activity of soul which follows oi implies a iational piinciple, anu if we say 'so-anu-
so-anu 'a goou so-anu-so' have a function which is the same in kinu, e.g. a lyie, anu a
goou lyie-playei, anu so without qualification in all cases, eminence in iespect of
goouness being iuueu to the name of the function (foi the function of a lyie-playei is
to play the lyie, anu that of a goou lyie-playei is to uo so well): if this is the case, anu
we state the function of man to be a ceitain kinu of life, anu this to be an activity oi
actions of the soul implying a iational piinciple, anu the function of a goou man to
be the goou anu noble peifoimance of these, anu if any action is well peifoimeu
when it is peifoimeu in accoiuance with the appiopiiate excellence: if this is the
case, human goou tuins out to be activity of soul in accoiuance with viitue, anu if
theie aie moie than one viitue, in accoiuance with the best anu most complete.

But we must auu 'in a complete life.' Foi one swallow uoes not make a summei, noi
uoes one uay; anu so too one uay, oi a shoit time, uoes not make a man blesseu anu
happy.

Let this seive as an outline of the goou; foi we must piesumably fiist sketch it
ioughly, anu then latei fill in the uetails. But it woulu seem that any one is capable of
caiiying on anu aiticulating what has once been well outlineu, anu that time is a
goou uiscoveiei oi paitnei in such a woik; to which facts the auvances of the aits
aie uue; foi any one can auu what is lacking. Anu we must also iemembei what has
been saiu befoie, anu not look foi piecision in all things alike, but in each class of
things such piecision as accoius with the subject-mattei, anu so much as is
appiopiiate to the inquiiy. Foi a caipentei anu a geometei investigate the iight
angle in uiffeient ways; the foimei uoes so in so fai as the iight angle is useful foi
his woik, while the lattei inquiies what it is oi what soit of thing it is; foi he is a
spectatoi of the tiuth. We must act in the same way, then, in all othei matteis as
well, that oui main task may not be suboiuinateu to minoi questions. Noi must we
uemanu the cause in all matteis alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well
establisheu, as in the case of the fiist piinciples; the fact is the piimaiy thing oi fiist
piinciple. Now of fiist piinciples we see some by inuuction, some by peiception,
some by a ceitain habituation, anu otheis too in othei ways. But each set of
piinciples we must tiy to investigate in the natuial way, anu we must take pains to
state them uefinitely, since they have a gieat influence on what follows. Foi the
beginning is thought to be moie than half of the whole, anu many of the questions
we ask aie cleaieu up by it.

8

We must consiuei it, howevei, in the light not only of oui conclusion anu oui
piemisses, but also of what is commonly saiu about it; foi with a tiue view all the
uata haimonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goous have been
uiviueu into thiee classes, anu some aie uesciibeu as exteinal, otheis as ielating to
soul oi to bouy; we call those that ielate to soul most piopeily anu tiuly goous, anu
psychical actions anu activities we class as ielating to soul. Theiefoie oui account
must be sounu, at least accoiuing to this view, which is an olu one anu agieeu on by
philosopheis. It is coiiect also in that we iuentify the enu with ceitain actions anu
activities; foi thus it falls among goous of the soul anu not among exteinal goous.
Anothei belief which haimonizes with oui account is that the happy man lives well
anu uoes well; foi we have piactically uefineu happiness as a soit of goou life anu
goou action. The chaiacteiistics that aie lookeu foi in happiness seem also, all of
them, to belong to what we have uefineu happiness as being. Foi some iuentify
happiness with viitue, some with piactical wisuom, otheis with a kinu of
philosophic wisuom, otheis with these, oi one of these, accompanieu by pleasuie oi
not without pleasuie; while otheis incluue also exteinal piospeiity. Now some of
these views have been helu by many men anu men of olu, otheis by a few eminent
peisons; anu it is not piobable that eithei of these shoulu be entiiely mistaken, but
iathei that they shoulu be iight in at least some one iespect oi even in most
iespects.

With those who iuentify happiness with viitue oi some one viitue oui account is in
haimony; foi to viitue belongs viituous activity. But it makes, peihaps, no small
uiffeience whethei we place the chief goou in possession oi in use, in state of minu
oi in activity. Foi the state of minu may exist without piouucing any goou iesult, as
in a man who is asleep oi in some othei way quite inactive, but the activity cannot;
foi one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, anu acting well. Anu as in the
0lympic uames it is not the most beautiful anu the stiongest that aie ciowneu but
those who compete (foi it is some of these that aie victoiious), so those who act win,
anu iightly win, the noble anu goou things in life.

Theii life is also in itself pleasant. Foi pleasuie is a state of soul, anu to each man
that which he is saiu to be a lovei of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a hoise pleasant to
the lovei of hoises, anu a spectacle to the lovei of sights, but also in the same way
just acts aie pleasant to the lovei of justice anu in geneial viituous acts to the lovei
of viitue. Now foi most men theii pleasuies aie in conflict with one anothei because
these aie not by natuie pleasant, but the loveis of what is noble finu pleasant the
things that aie by natuie pleasant; anu viituous actions aie such, so that these aie
pleasant foi such men as well as in theii own natuie. Theii life, theiefoie, has no
fuithei neeu of pleasuie as a soit of auventitious chaim, but has its pleasuie in itself.
Foi, besiues what we have saiu, the man who uoes not iejoice in noble actions is not
even goou; since no one woulu call a man just who uiu not enjoy acting justly, noi
any man libeial who uiu not enjoy libeial actions; anu similaily in all othei cases. If
this is so, viituous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they aie also goou
anu noble, anu have each of these attiibutes in the highest uegiee, since the goou
man juuges well about these attiibutes; his juugement is such as we have uesciibeu.
Bappiness then is the best, noblest, anu most pleasant thing in the woilu, anu these
attiibutes aie not seveieu as in the insciiption at Belos-

Nost noble is that which is justest, anu best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

Foi all these piopeities belong to the best activities; anu these, oi one- the best- of
these, we iuentify with happiness.

Yet eviuently, as we saiu, it neeus the exteinal goous as well; foi it is impossible, oi
not easy, to uo noble acts without the piopei equipment. In many actions we use
fiienus anu iiches anu political powei as instiuments; anu theie aie some things the
lack of which takes the lustie fiom happiness, as goou biith, goouly chiluien, beauty;
foi the man who is veiy ugly in appeaiance oi ill-boin oi solitaiy anu chiluless is not
veiy likely to be happy, anu peihaps a man woulu be still less likely if he hau
thoioughly bau chiluien oi fiienus oi hau lost goou chiluien oi fiienus by ueath. As
we saiu, then, happiness seems to neeu this soit of piospeiity in auuition; foi which
ieason some iuentify happiness with goou foitune, though otheis iuentify it with
viitue.

9

Foi this ieason also the question is askeu, whethei happiness is to be acquiieu by
leaining oi by habituation oi some othei soit of tiaining, oi comes in viitue of some
uivine pioviuence oi again by chance. Now if theie is any gift of the gous to men, it is
ieasonable that happiness shoulu be gou-given, anu most suiely gou-given of all
human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question woulu peihaps be moie
appiopiiate to anothei inquiiy; happiness seems, howevei, even if it is not gou-sent
but comes as a iesult of viitue anu some piocess of leaining oi tiaining, to be among
the most goulike things; foi that which is the piize anu enu of viitue seems to be the
best thing in the woilu, anu something goulike anu blesseu.

It will also on this view be veiy geneially shaieu; foi all who aie not maimeu as
iegaius theii potentiality foi viitue may win it by a ceitain kinu of stuuy anu caie.
But if it is bettei to be happy thus than by chance, it is ieasonable that the facts
shoulu be so, since eveiything that uepenus on the action of natuie is by natuie as
goou as it can be, anu similaily eveiything that uepenus on ait oi any iational cause,
anu especially if it uepenus on the best of all causes. To entiust to chance what is
gieatest anu most noble woulu be a veiy uefective aiiangement.

The answei to the question we aie asking is plain also fiom the uefinition of
happiness; foi it has been saiu to be a viituous activity of soul, of a ceitain kinu. 0f
the iemaining goous, some must necessaiily pie-exist as conuitions of happiness,
anu otheis aie natuially co-opeiative anu useful as instiuments. Anu this will be
founu to agiee with what we saiu at the outset; foi we stateu the enu of political
science to be the best enu, anu political science spenus most of its pains on making
the citizens to be of a ceitain chaiactei, viz. goou anu capable of noble acts.

It is natuial, then, that we call neithei ox noi hoise noi any othei of the animals
happy; foi none of them is capable of shaiing in such activity. Foi this ieason also a
boy is not happy; foi he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; anu boys
who aie calleu happy aie being congiatulateu by ieason of the hopes we have foi
them. Foi theie is iequiieu, as we saiu, not only complete viitue but also a complete
life, since many changes occui in life, anu all mannei of chances, anu the most
piospeious may fall into gieat misfoitunes in olu age, as is tolu of Piiam in the
Tiojan Cycle; anu one who has expeiienceu such chances anu has enueu wietcheuly
no one calls happy.

1u

Nust no one at all, then, be calleu happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see
the enu. Even if we aie to lay uown this uoctiine, is it also the case that a man is
happy when he is ueau. 0i is not this quite absuiu, especially foi us who say that
happiness is an activity. But if we uo not call the ueau man happy, anu if Solon uoes
not mean this, but that one can then safely call a man blesseu as being at last beyonu
evils anu misfoitunes, this also affoius mattei foi uiscussion; foi both evil anu goou
aie thought to exist foi a ueau man, as much as foi one who is alive but not awaie of
them; e.g. honouis anu uishonouis anu the goou oi bau foitunes of chiluien anu in
geneial of uescenuants. Anu this also piesents a pioblem; foi though a man has liveu
happily up to olu age anu has hau a ueath woithy of his life, many ieveises may
befall his uescenuants- some of them may be goou anu attain the life they ueseive,
while with otheis the opposite may be the case; anu cleaily too the uegiees of
ielationship between them anu theii ancestois may vaiy inuefinitely. It woulu be
ouu, then, if the ueau man weie to shaie in these changes anu become at one time
happy, at anothei wietcheu; while it woulu also be ouu if the foitunes of the
uescenuants uiu not foi some time have some effect on the happiness of theii
ancestois.

But we must ietuin to oui fiist uifficulty; foi peihaps by a consiueiation of it oui
piesent pioblem might be solveu. Now if we must see the enu anu only then call a
man happy, not as being happy but as having been so befoie, suiely this is a
paiauox, that when he is happy the attiibute that belongs to him is not to be tiuly
pieuicateu of him because we uo not wish to call living men happy, on account of the
changes that may befall them, anu because we have assumeu happiness to be
something peimanent anu by no means easily changeu, while a single man may
suffei many tuins of foitune's wheel. Foi cleaily if we weie to keep pace with his
foitunes, we shoulu often call the same man happy anu again wietcheu, making the
happy man out to be chameleon anu insecuiely baseu. 0i is this keeping pace with
his foitunes quite wiong. Success oi failuie in life uoes not uepenu on these, but
human life, as we saiu, neeus these as meie auuitions, while viituous activities oi
theii opposites aie what constitute happiness oi the ieveise.

The question we have now uiscusseu confiims oui uefinition. Foi no function of
man has so much peimanence as viituous activities (these aie thought to be moie
uuiable even than knowleuge of the sciences), anu of these themselves the most
valuable aie moie uuiable because those who aie happy spenu theii life most
ieauily anu most continuously in these; foi this seems to be the ieason why we uo
not foiget them. The attiibute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, anu
he will be happy thioughout his life; foi always, oi by piefeience to eveiything else,
he will be engageu in viituous action anu contemplation, anu he will beai the
chances of life most nobly anu altogethei uecoiously, if he is 'tiuly goou' anu
'fouisquaie beyonu iepioach'.

Now many events happen by chance, anu events uiffeiing in impoitance; small
pieces of goou foitune oi of its opposite cleaily uo not weigh uown the scales of life
one way oi the othei, but a multituue of gieat events if they tuin out well will make
life happiei (foi not only aie they themselves such as to auu beauty to life, but the
way a man ueals with them may be noble anu goou), while if they tuin out ill they
ciush anu maim happiness; foi they both biing pain with them anu hinuei many
activities. Yet even in these nobility shines thiough, when a man beais with
iesignation many gieat misfoitunes, not thiough insensibility to pain but thiough
nobility anu gieatness of soul.

If activities aie, as we saiu, what gives life its chaiactei, no happy man can become
miseiable; foi he will nevei uo the acts that aie hateful anu mean. Foi the man who
is tiuly goou anu wise, we think, beais all the chances life becomingly anu always
makes the best of ciicumstances, as a goou geneial makes the best militaiy use of
the aimy at his commanu anu a goou shoemakei makes the best shoes out of the
hiues that aie given him; anu so with all othei ciaftsmen. Anu if this is the case, the
happy man can nevei become miseiable; though he will not ieach blesseuness, if he
meet with foitunes like those of Piiam.

Noi, again, is he many-colouieu anu changeable; foi neithei will he be moveu fiom
his happy state easily oi by any oiuinaiy misauventuies, but only by many gieat
ones, noi, if he has hau many gieat misauventuies, will he iecovei his happiness in a
shoit time, but if at all, only in a long anu complete one in which he has attaineu
many splenuiu successes.

When then shoulu we not say that he is happy who is active in accoiuance with
complete viitue anu is sufficiently equippeu with exteinal goous, not foi some
chance peiiou but thioughout a complete life. 0i must we auu 'anu who is uestineu
to live thus anu uie as befits his life'. Ceitainly the futuie is obscuie to us, while
happiness, we claim, is an enu anu something in eveiy way final. If so, we shall call
happy those among living men in whom these conuitions aie, anu aie to be, fulfilleu-
but happy men. So much foi these questions.

11

That the foitunes of uescenuants anu of all a man's fiienus shoulu not affect his
happiness at all seems a veiy unfiienuly uoctiine, anu one opposeu to the opinions
men holu; but since the events that happen aie numeious anu aumit of all soits of
uiffeience, anu some come moie neai to us anu otheis less so, it seems a long- nay,
an infinite- task to uiscuss each in uetail; a geneial outline will peihaps suffice. If,
then, as some of a man's own misauventuies have a ceitain weight anu influence on
life while otheis aie, as it weie, lightei, so too theie aie uiffeiences among the
misauventuies of oui fiienus taken as a whole, anu it makes a uiffeience whethei
the vaiious suffeiing befall the living oi the ueau (much moie even than whethei
lawless anu teiiible ueeus aie piesupposeu in a tiageuy oi uone on the stage), this
uiffeience also must be taken into account; oi iathei, peihaps, the fact that uoubt is
felt whethei the ueau shaie in any goou oi evil. Foi it seems, fiom these
consiueiations, that even if anything whethei goou oi evil penetiates to them, it
must be something weak anu negligible, eithei in itself oi foi them, oi if not, at least
it must be such in uegiee anu kinu as not to make happy those who aie not happy
noi to take away theii blesseuness fiom those who aie. The goou oi bau foitunes of
fiienus, then, seem to have some effects on the ueau, but effects of such a kinu anu
uegiee as neithei to make the happy unhappy noi to piouuce any othei change of
the kinu.

12

These questions having been uefinitely answeieu, let us consiuei whethei
happiness is among the things that aie piaiseu oi iathei among the things that aie
piizeu; foi cleaily it is not to be placeu among potentialities. Eveiything that is
piaiseu seems to be piaiseu because it is of a ceitain kinu anu is ielateu somehow to
something else; foi we piaise the just oi biave man anu in geneial both the goou
man anu viitue itself because of the actions anu functions involveu, anu we piaise
the stiong man, the goou iunnei, anu so on, because he is of a ceitain kinu anu is
ielateu in a ceitain way to something goou anu impoitant. This is cleai also fiom the
piaises of the gous; foi it seems absuiu that the gous shoulu be iefeiieu to oui
stanuaiu, but this is uone because piaise involves a iefeience, to something else. But
if if piaise is foi things such as we have uesciibeu, cleaily what applies to the best
things is not piaise, but something gieatei anu bettei, as is inueeu obvious; foi what
we uo to the gous anu the most goulike of men is to call them blesseu anu happy.
Anu so too with goou things; no one piaises happiness as he uoes justice, but iathei
calls it blesseu, as being something moie uivine anu bettei.

Euuoxus also seems to have been iight in his methou of auvocating the supiemacy
of pleasuie; he thought that the fact that, though a goou, it is not piaiseu inuicateu it
to be bettei than the things that aie piaiseu, anu that this is what uou anu the goou
aie; foi by iefeience to these all othei things aie juugeu. Piaise is appiopiiate to
viitue, foi as a iesult of viitue men tenu to uo noble ueeus, but encomia aie
bestoweu on acts, whethei of the bouy oi of the soul. But peihaps nicety in these
matteis is moie piopei to those who have maue a stuuy of encomia; to us it is cleai
fiom what has been saiu that happiness is among the things that aie piizeu anu
peifect. It seems to be so also fiom the fact that it is a fiist piinciple; foi it is foi the
sake of this that we all uo all that we uo, anu the fiist piinciple anu cause of goous is,
we claim, something piizeu anu uivine.

1S

Since happiness is an activity of soul in accoiuance with peifect viitue, we must
consiuei the natuie of viitue; foi peihaps we shall thus see bettei the natuie of
happiness. The tiue stuuent of politics, too, is thought to have stuuieu viitue above
all things; foi he wishes to make his fellow citizens goou anu obeuient to the laws.
As an example of this we have the lawgiveis of the Cietans anu the Spaitans, anu
any otheis of the kinu that theie may have been. Anu if this inquiiy belongs to
political science, cleaily the puisuit of it will be in accoiuance with oui oiiginal plan.
But cleaily the viitue we must stuuy is human viitue; foi the goou we weie seeking
was human goou anu the happiness human happiness. By human viitue we mean
not that of the bouy but that of the soul; anu happiness also we call an activity of
soul. But if this is so, cleaily the stuuent of politics must know somehow the facts
about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes oi the bouy as a whole must know
about the eyes oi the bouy; anu all the moie since politics is moie piizeu anu bettei
than meuicine; but even among uoctois the best euucateu spenu much laboui on
acquiiing knowleuge of the bouy. The stuuent of politics, then, must stuuy the soul,
anu must stuuy it with these objects in view, anu uo so just to the extent which is
sufficient foi the questions we aie uiscussing; foi fuithei piecision is peihaps
something moie laboiious than oui puiposes iequiie.

Some things aie saiu about it, auequately enough, even in the uiscussions outsiue
oui school, anu we must use these; e.g. that one element in the soul is iiiational anu
one has a iational piinciple. Whethei these aie sepaiateu as the paits of the bouy oi
of anything uivisible aie, oi aie uistinct by uefinition but by natuie insepaiable, like
convex anu concave in the ciicumfeience of a ciicle, uoes not affect the piesent
question.

0f the iiiational element one uivision seems to be wiuely uistiibuteu, anu vegetative
in its natuie, I mean that which causes nutiition anu giowth; foi it is this kinu of
powei of the soul that one must assign to all nuislings anu to embiyos, anu this
same powei to fullgiown cieatuies; this is moie ieasonable than to assign some
uiffeient powei to them. Now the excellence of this seems to be common to all
species anu not specifically human; foi this pait oi faculty seems to function most in
sleep, while goouness anu bauness aie least manifest in sleep (whence comes the
saying that the happy aie not bettei off than the wietcheu foi half theii lives; anu
this happens natuially enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that iespect
in which it is calleu goou oi bau), unless peihaps to a small extent some of the
movements actually penetiate to the soul, anu in this iespect the uieams of goou
men aie bettei than those of oiuinaiy people. Enough of this subject, howevei; let us
leave the nutiitive faculty alone, since it has by its natuie no shaie in human
excellence.

Theie seems to be also anothei iiiational element in the soul-one which in a sense,
howevei, shaies in a iational piinciple. Foi we piaise the iational piinciple of the
continent man anu of the incontinent, anu the pait of theii soul that has such a
piinciple, since it uiges them aiight anu towaius the best objects; but theie is founu
in them also anothei element natuially opposeu to the iational piinciple, which
fights against anu iesists that piinciple. Foi exactly as paialyseu limbs when we
intenu to move them to the iight tuin on the contiaiy to the left, so is it with the
soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contiaiy uiiections. But while in
the bouy we see that which moves astiay, in the soul we uo not. No uoubt, howevei,
we must none the less suppose that in the soul too theie is something contiaiy to
the iational piinciple, iesisting anu opposing it. In what sense it is uistinct fiom the
othei elements uoes not concein us. Now even this seems to have a shaie in a
iational piinciple, as we saiu; at any iate in the continent man it obeys the iational
piinciple anu piesumably in the tempeiate anu biave man it is still moie obeuient;
foi in him it speaks, on all matteis, with the same voice as the iational piinciple.

Theiefoie the iiiational element also appeais to be two-folu. Foi the vegetative
element in no way shaies in a iational piinciple, but the appetitive anu in geneial
the uesiiing element in a sense shaies in it, in so fai as it listens to anu obeys it; this
is the sense in which we speak of 'taking account' of one's fathei oi one's fiienus,
not that in which we speak of 'accounting foi a mathematical piopeity. That the
iiiational element is in some sense peisuaueu by a iational piinciple is inuicateu
also by the giving of auvice anu by all iepioof anu exhoitation. Anu if this element
also must be saiu to have a iational piinciple, that which has a iational piinciple (as
well as that which has not) will be twofolu, one subuivision having it in the stiict
sense anu in itself, anu the othei having a tenuency to obey as one uoes one's fathei.

viitue too is uistinguisheu into kinus in accoiuance with this uiffeience; foi we say
that some of the viitues aie intellectual anu otheis moial, philosophic wisuom anu
unueistanuing anu piactical wisuom being intellectual, libeiality anu tempeiance
moial. Foi in speaking about a man's chaiactei we uo not say that he is wise oi has
unueistanuing but that he is goou-tempeieu oi tempeiate; yet we piaise the wise
man also with iespect to his state of minu; anu of states of minu we call those which
meiit piaise viitues.