Introduction
PURPOSE
OF
PROCEDURAL RULES
OF THE
BILL
OF
RIGHTS STATES
OF THE
BOR
TO THE
RETROACTIVITY
WHAT
IS A
SEARCH?
In order for there to be a search, there must be action by a government official that interferes with a persons reasonable expectation of privacy. Whenever confronted with a is this a search? question, use the test in Katz below.
Katz v. United States (1967)
Facts: Katz was running a sports book from a public phone booth. The police, without a warrant, used a listening device on the outside of the phone booth to obtain information against Katz. The lower court held that, under current law, there must be a physical intrusion to find the action to be an illegal search and that, because there was no trespass, the recordings were admissible.
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Open Fields
In Hester v. US (1924), the SC held that the special protection of the Fourth Amendmentdoes not extend to open fields.
Oliver v. United States (1984) reaffirming Hester Facts: Defendant owns a one-hundred acre farm. In the middle of the 100 acres, defendant grows marijuana. On a tip, officers investigate the tip and enter defendants property. Marijuana is found and defendant is charged. He objects on the grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Holding: Open fields cannot support a reasonable expectation of privacy and are thus not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Reasoning: "Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance." The Court also cited practical considerations as weighing on its decision, since open fields "usually are accessible to the public," and "no trespassing" signs are generally ineffective at "bar[ring] the public from viewing open fields in rural areas," and "the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air."
The court in Oliver says that the Fourth Amendment applies if police search a persons home or the curtilage immediately adjacent to the home, but not if the police are searching in an open field. Thus, the SC in Dunn attempted to clarify the distinction between curtilage and open fields which is crucial in deciding if the Fourth Amendment applies
United States v. Dunn (1987) Facts: Dunn was manufacturing phenylacetone and amphetamine in a barn behind his ranch house. DEA agents entered onto respondents ranch property and acquired probable cause which allowed them to get the warrant. Dunn argues that these confirmatory searches violated the 4th Amendment.
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Aerial Searches
When the police use an aircraft to view defendants property from the air, anything the police can see with the naked eye falls within the plain view doctrine (so long as the aircraft is in public, navigable airspace). California v. Ciraolo (1986)
Facts: Defendant was growing weed in his yard within the curtilage of his property. Police used a low-flying plane to observe this activity in order to obtain a search warrant. Holding: There is no violation of the Fourth Amendment when officers are at a lawful vantage point above the curtilage; if you are exposed to the public, there is no protection. Reasoning: Anyone flying in airspace above the house could have seen everything police saw, so expectation of privacy is not reasonable.
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Searches of Trash
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what a person chooses to discard outside of his curtilage. California v. Greenwood (1988)
Facts: Local police suspected defendant was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags defendant had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges. Holding: Garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. Reasoning: There was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public." Brennans Dissent: A trash bag is a common repository for ones personal effects and should inevitably be associated with an expectation of privacy. The possibility that meddlers might rummage through the trash should not negate the expectation of privacy. Note: It is important to note that the SC has not yet ruled on a case where the garbage was still inside the curtilage of the home.
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Public Conversations
United States v. White (1971) plurality opinion of four Facts: The court here considered whether there was a search when a government informer carrying a radio transmitter engaged in a conversation with a suspect. Holding: Listening in on a conversation is not a search when at least one of the parties involved is aware of the recording. Reasoning: When a person is talking in pubic, and loud enough for another to hear, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the subject of the conversation. However, when a person makes reasonable efforts to guard against others from hearing, efforts to listen are in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Note: It is still questionable as to whether a search has taken place when neither party is aware of the recording.
Pin Registers
Smith v. Maryland (1979) Facts: McDonough was robbed and began receiving threatening phone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. The police used a pen register (trace) to monitor the calls and record the numbers. The defendant argues that he has a reasonable right to privacy in the numbers he dials and any recording of such numbers is a search in violation of that right.
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THE REQUIREMENT
FOR
PROBABLE CAUSE
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Definition
The classic definition of PC as stated in Carroll v. United States is whether the facts and circumstances are such to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense had been committed.
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The particularity requirement is evaluated by assessing what police knew or should have known. Warrant must be based on probable cause and supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized,
The affidavit supporting the request for a warrant must include information that provides a basis for probable cause.
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EXCEPTIONS
TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
In creating exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court has balanced the privacy interests involved against the extent to which adhering to the warrant requirement would unduly hamper effective law enforcement. Searches Incident to Arrest
Chimel v. California (1969)
Facts: Three officers arrived at home of petitioner with warrant authorizing his arrest. He was not present, and his wife let officers in. They waited for him to return from work, and then handed him the arrest warrant and searched the premises based on the lawful arrest. The officers seized numerous items. Rule: Police, while performing a valid, in home, custodial arrest, may search the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. Holding: The search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
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Inventory Searches
Police may inventory property when (1) it is lawfully in the possession of the police and (2) established procedures are followed. This is an exception to both the probable cause and warrant requirements.
Three bases for this exception are: (1) the protection of the owners property; (2) the protection of the police against false claims; and (3) the protection of police from potential danger.
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Checkpoints
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990)
Facts: The case involves a police checkpoint of all vehicles passing through in which drivers are briefly examined for signs of intoxication. Defendant was not stopped by the checkpoint but challenges its constitutionality. Holding: The Court holds that a warrantless, suspicion-less checkpoint designed to detect drunk driving is permissible. Reasoning: Advancing a state interest in preventing drunk driving is outweighed by the brief stop of individual motorists. Everyone is stopped; procedure follows established guidelines; and only if police have reasonable suspicion is anyone given secondary examination.
Consent
A search is permissible without a warrant or probable cause if undertaken pursuant to valid consent
What constitutes valid consent? Consent must be voluntary/not coerced by police
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Drug Testing
Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton (1995)
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Exigent Circumstances
In an emergency, the police can search without a warrant if there is probable cause. When the officer has probable cause to believe a crime has occurred, exigent circumstances may include:
Preventing destruction of evidence of a serious crime;
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SEIZURES
AND
ARRESTS
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STOP
AND
FRISK
Generally
To approach a person and ask them questions, an officer does NOT need reasonable suspicion. An officer may make an investigatory stop when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is involved in criminal activity. If the person is stopped, there can be a frisk but ONLY if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity AND there is a belief that he is armed and dangerous. For an arrest there must be probable cause that the person has committed a crime.
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RS Based on Profiles
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DESIRABLE REMEDY
FOR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICE
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 Reasoning: Scalias opinion look like arguments against the exclusionary rule all together. The interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence." The knock-andannounce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for which they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits," and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. Breyers Dissent: the Court has a long history of upholding the exclusionary rule; the majority's cited precedents do not support its conclusion. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.
THE ORIGINS
OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Mapp v. Ohio (1961) overruled Wolf decision which stated that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the states.
Facts: Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Holding: "All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by the Fourth Amendment, inadmissible in a state court." Reasoning: Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 Harlans Dissent: I do not believe that this Court is empowered to impose this much-debated procedure on local courts, however efficacious we may consider the Weeks rule to be as a means of securing Constitutional rights.
TO THE INTRO OF
EVIDENCE
AND
RAISE
THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 Reasoning: People who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests. Short-term visits for commercial transactions are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that nothing in the case served to show that Carter was accepted into the household. Ginsburgs Dissent: The logic of the decision in Olson below extends to shorter-term guests as well. One need not stay overnight to anticipate privacy in anothers home.
Minnesota v. Olson (1990) part of the opinion of Carter case; Court states that an overnight house guests gains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Brendlin v. California (2007)
Facts: Police stopped Karen Simeroth's car for having expired registration tabs. Bruce Brendlin, who had a warrant out for his arrest, was riding in the passenger seat. Police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Simeroth's person. In a California trial court, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Holding: A passenger is seized during a traffic stop and thus has standing to challenge the stop/seizure of the vehicle (however, a passenger does not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle).
EXCEPTIONS
TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Independent Source
Evidence obtained in violation of the 4th amendment is still admissible if it is also obtained through a source independent of the police misconduct and untainted by the illegal actions of the police. Murray v. United States (1988) 4 to 3 decision
Facts: Police illegally entered a warehouse and viewed burlap sacks; police left and obtained a warrant; they then returned with the warrant to search the warehouse. During this legal search, other evidence was obtained. Holding: The court found that the source was sufficiently "independent" because police already had sufficient probable cause to get a warrant for the first search regardless of what they viewed during that search.
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Inevitable Discovery
If the police can demonstrate that they inevitable would have discovered the evidence, even without a violation of the 4th amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence is admissible. Nix v. Williams (1984)
Facts: Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest. Holding: The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams' statements. Brennans Dissent: The doctrine should require that the government satisfy a heightened burden of proof before it is allowed to use such evidence (clear and convincing evidence). Increasing the burden of proof serves to impress the fact-finder with the importance of the decision and thereby reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be admitted.
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Herring v. United States (2009) this case is not a strict good faith exception case as there are some distinguishing factors from Leon 5 to 4 decision
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The Exception for Violations of the Requirements for Knock and Announce
Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 5 to 4 decision
Holding: The court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply if police violate the "knock and announce" requirement of the 4th amendment. Reasoning: Majority was concerned that allowing exclusion would cause a flood of litigation in order to protect a relatively "minute" protection of the fourth amendment. Dissent: Holds that the result of the case is a significant departure from precedent and severely weakens the practical value of the knock and announce protection.
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DUE PROCESS
AND THE
REQUIREMENT
FOR
VOLUNTARINESS
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Deception
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 Advantages: focuses on the totality of the circumstances; also a concern for the reliability of the confession. A confession gained through violent, coercion, or deprivation is unreliable. Disadvantages: relatively little guidance to police officers as to what they can and cannot do; inconsistency in the courts decisions.
ON IN-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Waiver: Any constitutional right can be waived; burden of proof is on the state and the standard is a preponderance of the evidence; you may waive at any time even when you have already answered questions. Invocation of Rights: When you invoke your right to silence, the questioning might continue; when you invoke your right to counsel, the questioning must stop. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Procedural History: The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way." In Miranda v. United States, petitioner convicted of rape after confessing without being advised of his rights.
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Is Miranda Desirable?
There are three main criticisms of Miranda:
Ineffective: Study found that regardless of whether people are read their warnings, they are still likely to proceed to answer questions. The lack of effect may be that police still has the ability to undermine the warnings; or perhaps in-custodial interrogations are too inherently coercive that no warnings can lessen that. Too effective: Miranda prevents police from gaining confessions and allows guilty people to go free. Study shows that Miranda has increased the rate of lost confessions involving serious crimes. Constitutional Interpretation and the Role of the Judiciary: Critic and the dissenters argue that neither the text nor the history of the Fifth Amendment support the requirement of warnings or of counsel during interrogations.
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What is an Interrogation?
Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) Facts: Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. Holding: The police "interrogation" en route to the station did not violate Innis's Miranda rights. Reasoning: The Court held that the Miranda safeguards came into play "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent," noting that the term "interrogation" under Miranda included "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." The Court then found that the officers' conversation did not qualify as words or actions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a response from Innis. Arizona v. Mauro (1987) The Court held that no interrogation took place when the suspect was allowed to speak to his wife in the presence of a police officer. Illinois v. Perkins (1990) Facts: While being held in jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing a murder to an undercover police officer who was posing as another inmate. Holding: The undercover police officer did NOT violate the accused's Miranda rights as protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Reasoning: Conversations between suspects and undercover officers are not afforded Miranda protection since they are not done in a "policedominated atmosphere" where compulsion to confess is present. "It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation." There was no danger of coercion in this case.
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Booking Exception
Police can ask a person questions when taking a person into custody that are needed in the booking process, such as name, address, date of birth, height, and weight. The Court has said that the answers to these questions are admissible, even without administration of Miranda warnings. Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) Facts: Muniz is parked on shoulder of the road. Police stop to offer assistance, and they note symptoms of alcohol consumption. Muniz fails field sobriety tests. He is taken to a booking center and asked basic questions. He is also asked the date of his 6th birthday. He is then Mirandized and admits to driving under the influence. Holding: The Court held that the delivery (slurring) does not have a testimonial aspect. It is much like physical evidence (Schmerber v. CA)
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Waiver
What is Sufficient to Constitute Waiver? North Carolina v. Butler (1979) Facts: NC Supreme Court argues that no statement of a person under interrogation may be admitted in evidence against him unless, at the time the statement was made, he explicitly waived the right to the presence of a lawyer. Holding: The SC held that, although the courts must presume that a defendant did NOT waive his rights, in at least some cases waiver can clearly be inferred/implied from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Dissent: "The court shrouds in half-light the question of waiver, allowing courts to construct inferences from ambiguous words and gestures." Ambiguity should be interpreted against the interrogator considering the "compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation." Under such conditions, only the most explicit waivers can be considered knowingly and freely given. Fare v. Michael C. (1979) the Court said that the totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even when interrogation of juveniles is involved. This include consideration of age, background, experience, etc. into the capacity to under the warnings given and consequences of waiving those rights. Moran v. Burbine (1986) Defendant has waived his right to counsel but unbeknownst to him, his sister had retained counsel for him who had told the police that no interrogation should be done. The suspect confessed and at no time was told that he had a lawyer appointed. The Court held that events occurring outside of the presence of the suspectand unknown to him can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.
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Davis v. United States (1994) the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. Facts: Petitioner was interviewed after waiving his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing. An hour and half into the interview, the petitioner says: Maybe I should talk to a lawyer. The interview then proceeded as follows. An hour later, the petitioner says that he wants a lawyer before saying anything else; questioning ceases at that point. Holding: After a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. Reasoning: The police are not required to ask clarifying questions. If the statement is not unequivocal, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning. Note: The decision seems to put inarticulate or those who speak poor English in danger of having their invocation neglected.
THE
TO
COUNSEL
AND
POLICE INTERROGATIONS
Generally
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the rightto have the assistance of counsel for his defense. This include ensuring right to counsel at trial for crimes involving imprisonment as well as police interrogations that occur after adversarial proceeding have begun (all efforts by police to deliberately elicit statements from a person after formal criminal proceedings have been initiated).
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) in the same year as Massiah, the Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to those who were questioned by the police but had not yet been formally charged. However, the decision in Miranda a year later made this protection unnecessary under the Sixth Amendment since it is guaranteed now under the Fifth Amendment.
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 Kirby v. Illinois (1972) the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at police identification procedures (such as lineups) applies only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal chare, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Brewer v. Williams (1977) 5 to 4 decision
Facts: Williams was convicted of killing a ten-year-old girl after he abducted her from a YMCA wrestling tournament. After his arrest, but before his trial, he met with with lawyer during his arraignment and was advised not to say anything. Before being transferred to Des Moines, to speak to an attorney there, the transporting police officers promised not to question Williams. During the drive the officers, knowing Williams was a deeply religious man and was a former mental patient, spoke about how the girl deserved a "Christian Burial". Williams then made incriminating statements and led the officers to the girl's body. Williams was tried and convicted of murder, and then petitioned for habeas corpus asserting that he had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and further ruled that he had not waived that right. Holding: The Court held that the speech by the officer was unlawful interrogation in violation of defendants Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Note: This case also addressed the unanswered questions from Massiah case: Adversarial judicial proceedings commence with: Filing of formal charges; preliminary hearing; indictment; information (Follows a preliminary hearing when there has been a finding by a judge that there has been probable cause); arraignment; and possibly an arrest warrant (but this is distinguishable from the rest of the list because there has not been a commitment by the prosecution to go forward with the case, even though there has been a judicial determination of probable cause). Derives from language of 6th Amendment: Right is guaranteed to the accused; Court said that this is not a mere formalism What is Deliberate Elicitation? Deliberate elicitation is tantamount to interrogation What is a waiver of 6th Amendment right to counsel? No explicit waiver in this case. Court said that waiver would have been valid if police had repeated warnings to see if Williams was willing to relinquish right.
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 Under the Fifth, police cannot initiate questioning as to any crime one the defendant has invoked his right to counsel. However, under the Sixth, the police are only barred from questioning the suspect about the specific crime for which formal proceedings have been initiated. McNeil v. Wisconsin (1981) Defendant was formally charged with armed robbery and asserted his right to counsel. Police questioned him about a murder and another armed robbery in another part of the state to which he confessed. The Court held that the right to counsel was invoked only for the formally charged offense therefore, no violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred. Texas v. Cobb (2001) 5 to 4 decision
Facts: While under arrest for an unrelated offense, Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged. Holding: the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does NOT extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. Reasoning: Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. Since the right to counsel was offense specific, and the offenses were separate, the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [Cobb's] confession was therefore admissible." Blockburger Test: The double jeopardy test can be used to determine the offense specific test under the Sixth. The test to determine whether there are two different offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does notif so, the offenses are different. Breyers Dissent: Define it in terms of the conduct that constitutes the crime that the offender committed on a particular occasion, including criminal acts that are "closely related to" or "inextricably intertwined".
Waivers
Michigan v. Jackson (1986)
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Patterson v. Illinois (1988) The Court held that Massiah does not apply to a defendant who is not represented by counsel and has never requested counsel. The SC distinguished Jackson on the grounds that the defendant there had expressly invoked his right to counsel. The defendant waiver here of his Fifth Amendment right pursuant to Miranda was sufficient for a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Montejo v. Louisiana (2009)
Facts: Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death for murder. At his trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence a letter of apology he wrote to the victim's wife. Montejo wrote the letter at the suggestion of a detective who accompanied him in a search for the murder weapon. Before the search, Mr. Montejo was read his Miranda rights and wrote an explanation for his participation in the search. However, no one in the search party knew, including Mr. Montejo, that he had been appointed an attorney the same morning. Mr. Montejo contended under these circumstances that the Sixth Amendment barred the introduction of this evidence since his attorney was not present when he wrote and submitted the letter of apology. Holding: After the appointment of an attorney, a defendant does NOT need to take additional steps to accept the appointment in order to secure the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment Reasoning: The Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Michigan v. Jackson which held that evidence obtained through interrogation after the defendant has invoked his right to counsel was inadmissible. The Court reasoned that the Jackson framework was unworkable in jurisdictions that appoint counsel regardless of a defendant's request. Instead, the Court stated that the protections afforded under Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick were sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from police badgering that might elicit culpable evidence.
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Kansas v. Ventris (2009) the court held that statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be used for impeachment purposes.
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 ** A person arrested at his home and questioned there must still be given his Miranda warnings b/c he is sufficiently "in-custody" ** A person questioned in an interview with a special agent of the IRS may not be protected by Miranda warnings because they are free to leave and not "in-custody". ** The determination of whether a person is in custody is an objective test (reasonable person standard). ** Common interrogation methods: Air of confidence; Why did you do it?; Cops patience and perseverance; Trickery (i.e., the fake ID or reverse lineup); Environment (i.e., isolation) ** Benefits of an attorney: Keep defendant from saying anything; A witness to the interrogation techniques ** Under current USSC jurisprudence, the suspect's education, intelligence, and prior experience with law enforcement cannot be used to determine if she is in custody. The court said "maybe" in respect to consideration of the age. (Alvarado) ** Roadside questioning during a traffic stop is not "custodial" to require an officer to advise of the person of their Miranda rights. ** Under current Miranda analysis, it is not required that a suspect be advised of her Miranda rights immediately upon her arrest. Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person is (1) in custody; and (2) is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. ** The usual traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry Stop than to a formal arrest. (Berkemer) ** Miranda warnings during custodial interrogations ARE required even when the suspect is arrested and questioned about minor offenses. (Berkemer) ** Voluntarily agreeing to interview at police station is not a custodial interrogation. ** Interrogation under the Miranda case includes direct questions or the functional equivalent. (Innis) ** Direct questioning of a suspect by a law enforcement agent while the suspect is in custody will NOT always require the Miranda warnings before questioning. (Perkins) ** The Miranda rule does NOT require that the content of Miranda warnings be a virtual incantation of the precise language contained in the Miranda decision before questioning. (Prysock or Duckworth). ** The Miranda rule is NOT violated when a suspect is not told explicitly that he has the right to have an attorney appointed without cost before questioning.
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Administration of Criminal Justice Harges Spring 2010 ** A witness's testimony discovered as a result of a Miranda violation is admissible in court. ** A piece of evidence discovered as a result of a Miranda violation is admissible in court. ** A second confession given after Miranda warnings during a custodial interrogation one hour after an initial confession that was taken in violation of Miranda is admissible in court even if it was knowingly and voluntarily made. (Elstad).
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