And the Winner Is...

: Authoritarian Elections in the Arab World Author(s): Jillian Schwedler and Laryssa Chomiak Reviewed work(s): Source: Middle East Report, No. 238, Year of Elections: Fact and Fiction (Spring, 2006), pp. 1219 Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25164705 . Accessed: 05/03/2012 15:43
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\
Supporters of President fine al-AbidineBen Ali rally inTunis before the October 1999 presidential election. FETHI BELAID/AFP

And

the Winner

Is... in the Arab World

Authoritarian

Elections

Julian and Schwedler Laryssa Chomiak

the incumbents Does anyone believe thatArab citizens are freely choosing their leaders inelections that return bymargins of90 percentormore? SurelyArab leaders cannot. Yet, even thoughtheiroutcome is not inquestion, almost all authoritarianregimes intheArabworld now hold at least semi-regularelections. Why investscarce state resources inballot boxes and vote counters?Why bother? 12
MIDDLEEAST 238 SPRING 2006 REPORT

The

administration of President George W Bush claims a commitment to promoting democratization in theArab world, whether through regime change or by pressuring authoritarian leaders through "transformational diplomacy" to open their political systems. It has been tempting for the administration'ssupporterstofind evidence for thesuccessof these Arab countries in 2005. policies in the spate of elections in United States assembly in Iraqwould not have occurred had the not invaded the country, but the ongoing military occupation and the flourishing of numerous armed groups outside of government control raise doubts about whether the outcomes really reflect the preferences of Iraqis. Arguably, US pressure played a role in keeping theMay-June elections in Lebanon
Certainly, December's elections for a four-year national

All this leads to a question: what do authoritarian regimes gain by holding bogus elections?1 Some leaderswho claim a commitment to democratization blame the lack of progress in their countries on, for example, the threatof radical Islam, the lack of viable political parties or instabilityresultingfrom weak
Yet virtually every regime embraces the language

economies.

held or called for elections of some kind, though the resulting assemblies have little actual power. If neither their citizens nor the international community are bedazzled by these great
performances,

of democracy and most hold regular elections. Even states that have long resisted the trend toward increased participa tion, such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have

standing having taken place under Israelimilitary occupation. The US response to theHamas victory, however, betrays the to hypocrisy underlying Washington's exhortations democratize. US spokespersons were caught in the contradiction between on holding successful elections congratulating the Palestinians
and

on schedule, though the results there,which reinforced old confessional divisions, sapped the popular democratic energies that had earlier been on display. The US can also claim some credit for the January 2006 elections thatgaveHamas control of most what was clearly the thePalestinian Legislative Council, in democratic balloting the region had seen in decades, notwith

resources in elections? Why

why

do

authoritarian

regimes

invest

scarce

bother?

Do Elections ProduceLegitimacy?
One
tions

frequent refrain is that authoritarian regimes hold elec

in order to gain "legitimacy"?a

the broadest sense,means

ruled.2 But the reasons

something like the consent of the

are many, and not all of

slippery

term

that,

in

for consent

Lebanon and Palestine, there are good reasons forquestioning whether the fact ofmore or less democratic elections equates
to

denouncing

the victor

as a terrorist

organization.

In

Iraq,

Muhammad. They recurrentlydeploy symbols and rhetoric as the to that end?the Moroccan king portrays himself cratic them as such. For "Commander of the Faithful," while Jordan's King Hussein and no one mistakes measure, by any in current claimed a role as protector of the holy sites in Jerusalem. The states" such as elections and former years, "rogue a and Iraq under Saddam Hussein's rule have been mocked Syria ruling family in Saudi Arabia stakes different, religiously are. as the fraudulent has a based claim to moral authority, stemming from its role as for instance, practices Syria, they decades-long history ofmounting patently false elections for the protector of the holy cities ofMecca and Medina. All a domestic audience that is no more fooled than the interna threemonarchies have continuously presented themselves as tional one. Syrians "approve" thepresident every seven years by legitimate, though the consent of their subjects has been far referendum, and they "elect" the People's Council every four from constant, and they have held at best irregular legisla tive elections. (Certainly, they have not put themselves up in an years competition. ostensibly multi-party for election.) Charade-like elections are also the norm inUS-allied Arab The ruled might consent to other forms of undemocratic Palestine of Iraq, and Lebanon countries?the examples rule because of the popularity of a charismatic leader or a thepolicies of theBush administration notwithstanding?and have not changed this. Initially promising political openings political ideology. Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser was popular in Jordan,Tunisia and Yemen have since been emptied ofmost Arab world forhis pan-Arab nationalist project, throughout the and Tunisia's PresidentHabib Bourguiba won popular support while the formal trappings of electoral democracy substance, for his early policies of rapidmodernization. A regimemight and pluralism remain. The more recent openings ofMorocco also become popular by bringing an end to conflict, ousting and Egypt appear, upon closer inspection, to be littleconcerned an occupying force or to itscitizens. Finally, with broadening real participation. In 2005, Egypt promised a providing security an unpopular but militarily powerful regime might secure election and then adopted measures competitive presidential to ensure that a real contest could not happen. the appearance of consent of the ruled (or at least the absence of overt dissent) through the omnipresent threat of arbitrary Most
democracy.

them require the unencumbered choice between politicians vying for public support that the term "elections" implies. One possibility is that people recognize their leader as to possessing themoral authority to rule according religious Hashemite monarchy and Morocco's prescriptions. Jordan's Alaoui monarchy both claim the right to the throne based in part on claims of familial descent from the Prophet

elections in theArab world, however, are not demo

Julian Schwedler teaches governmentand politics at the University of Maryland and is chair ofMERIP's board ofdirectors.Laryssa Chomiak isa doctoral student ingovern ment and politics at the University of Maryland. The authors thankSamirFayyaz,Marc on earlierdrafts. Lynch, Shana Marshall and Lisa Wedeenfor theirdetailed comments

that such a regimewas legitimate, but the regimewould most likely claim to be.

imprisonment

or worse.

No

independent

observer

would

say

MIDDLE 238 2006 EAST REPORT SPRING

13

Even Saddam Hussein held elections. Voting booths in Baghdad, 1995.

shepard

sherbell/corbis

saba

Not

facto consent of the ruled in theArab world, but also there

is no are reason to think legitimacy to the polls. that authoritarian on Does those occasions believe regimes when that believe citizens gaining they are

only

have

elections

been

unnecessary

for

gaining

de

Algeria's war

1991-1992

elections

threatened

to do

military suspended the democratic process entirely, and civil

ensued.

just

that,

the

The most democratic elections in theArab world?though

they are certainly for not choosing without a their flaws?emerged from among as parties mechanisms government when

summoned

of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen are freelyconsenting to be ruled

their by or more elections? respective than 90 presidents percent the of when those men in win 88 percent spurious the vote cannot. obviously

anyone

the citizens

to a conflict (Lebanon after the civilwar), during unification

(Yemen) and under

Surely

presidents

Little Real Commitment

The explanation for why authoritarian regimes hold elections more likely to be found among these five reasons: to carry is
out a real commitment to democratization; to distract citizens

are eitherweak or entirely absent (Iraq and Palestine). The elections in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine all were held in
contexts each choose Palestine, where armed raising non-state questions candidates. to territory, of control portions to the ability of voters In the cases of and today's Iraq about long-term democratization?in militias

occupation,

existing

state

structures

freely among

the commitment

from other crises; to respond to foreign pressure; to display state power; and simply because they have held them in the
past. Multiple rationale rationales are often regime tends at for any one a in any play to shift over state, time. and the

the form of both regular elections and vibrant, independent

institutions?remains uncertain.

The leaders of Jordan, Morocco,

all claim genuine norms, alternatives commitment but none to the processes produce and real

Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia

to advance has allowed an democratic election When to

Newly unified Yemen's elections in 1993 looked promising at the time. The People's Democratic Republic ofYemen and theYemen Arab Republic unified as theRepublic ofYemen in
1990, part of and the former regimes agreed efforts on a democratic to undermine system the electoral as of unification. Despite

process?through
assassination

vote buying, intimidation and hundreds

attempts (many successful) against leaders

incumbent

regime.

2006 EAST REPORT 238 SPRING 14 MIDDLE

from the souths Yemeni Socialist Party?Yemenis returned an which no partywon amajority and independents assembly in won 48 of 301 seats.A brief civilwar in 1994 an abrupt brought to that process, however, when President Ali Abdallah end Salih's military defeated the leaders from the south.

national private investment to bolster the economy. Though regimesmight hold elections for purposes of distraction, the contestsmay indeed mark the initiation of a real democratic transition even if the regime never intends to cede any real power to the new assemblies. Elections held for these reasons

Distraction
Authoritarian other crises. These might include rapid price hikes while the regime is lifting subsidies in accordance with International or otherwise regimes may also hold elections initiate processes of democratization to distract citizens from

are not necessarily fake, although in practice the regimes typi structure the electoral systems and draw districts with cally a view toward producing the results theywant. After these initial openings, regimesmay continue to hold elections for
different reasons.

very

Monetary Fund recommendations, domestic political tensions like the arrest of a popular opposition figure, or international Authoritarian regimesmight also hold elections in response issues like allowing foreign troops to amass in preparation for to real or perceived foreign pressure, for example, ifan inter intervention in the region. Elections are initiated for strategic national agency or foreign statemade a lucrative aid package on or the toward reasons, as the regime hopes to channel opposition energy contingent progress improvement into state-controlled processes. This strategy has the added benefit ofmaking opposition forces both visible and subject to state regulations, such as the legal requirements for declaring or registeringas a candidacy political party. Jordan called for fullnational elections in 1989, thefirstsince the 1967Arab-Israeli war, largelyas a strategy distraction. The of had sufferedfrom the drop in oil prices Jordanian economy of the early 1980s and a decrease in labor remittances from of human rights. As the world s largestprovider of foreign aid, theUnited States should be in a unique position to put teeth the Middle into its declared commitment to democracy promotion East. in
democracy

Foreign Pressure

But while the Bush administration has indeed moved democratization to the center of debates about political reform in the Middle East, inpractice itcontinues to provide and even

Jordaniansworking in theGulf. By 1988, the regime devalued its dinar by half and adopted an IMF-led austerity program that included a reduction in certain subsidies. In April 1989, Jordanians rioted in response to the price increases,first in the south and then throughout the country.King Hussein called a
meeting of both conservative and reformist advisers to evaluate

Authoritarianregimes often hold elections to distractcitizens from othercrises.

increase aid to authoritarian regimes, including military aid that cannot be sold as mere succor for long-sufferingpopula tions.Military aid to Jordanwent up from $76.5 million in 2001 to $207.4 million in 2005, while military aid to Morocco from $3.5million to $17million in the same period. jumped Washington rightlywelcomed Egypt's announcement in February 2005 that itwould hold competitive presidential elections in September and open its parliamentary elections later in the year towider competition, all as part of a program of significant political reform.But the requirements for presi

the situation,with one side advocating repression and theother urging political liberalization to deflate growing opposition to
the regime.3 Seven months later, a newly restructured parlia

ment4 returned a pluralist, opposition-dominated assembly, and other advances followed, for example, the adoption of the National Charter codifying political rights,a reduction of state control over the media and the legalization of political parties. Morocco's King Hassan initiated a political Likewise, poor economic conditions. In particular, the regime hoped that the strategy of liberalization would deflate the increas ingly vocal urban, educated opposition calling for political reform.The monarch had previously relied on cooptation and divide-and-rule tactics to consolidate itspower, so itsdecision a
opening in the early 1990s in response to growing unrest around

to initiate a gradual political liberalization process marked saw significant turn. In a short time,Morocco significant constitutional reforms, first in 1992 and then again in 1996 municipal council members from at least 14provinces. Because with the establishment of a bicameral legislaturewith a popu both houses of Parliament and most local councils are domi nated by the rulingNational Democratic Party, "establishing larly elected lower chamber (replacing the indirectly elected unicameral parliament) and the creation of ad hoc commissions eligibilitywould be nearly impossible in practice."5 to on these means affairs. government investigate Washington remained largely silent "legal" As in Jordan, of electoral manipulation. of State Condoleezza Morocco's regime initiated a political opening Secretary a to to largely temper opposition while invitingdomestic and inter Rice did cancel trip Cairo in February 2005 to protest the MIDDLE EAST 238 REPORT SPRING 2006 15

dential candidacy erected significantobstacles, particularly for independents. A candidate unaffiliatedwith a registeredparty must obtain the signatures of at least 65 members of the lower house of Parliament, 25members of the upper house and ten

for

good

governance, and

greater

political of

accountability

the advancement

elections, while tacitlybacking dictator ships. The difference is that the Bush administration explicitly claims to be reversing the decades of double-talk about Arab democracy. A 2005 democ
racy and "Promote governance Free and program Fair Elections," for Egypt, stated,

"For the 2005 national elections, USAID

will promote to a more transparent of and

competitive electoral process by offering

assistance

and civil society to improve the legal

framework, administration of elections

the government

Egypt

and civic participation. The resultwill

be a more open electoral to system and that an allows political compete parties to citizenry participate."

informed

2005, the Similarly, in December USAID and State Department program

for democracy issued a and governance on "Improved to Citizens," for this need to do in Morocco Government stating program for that was report

Responsiveness "the based rationale on

the urgent

a better job of responding to the real

needs of its citizens or face their prospect

the government

of Morocco

USAID
regime

of their looking elsewhere." In practice, has neverwithheld aid to anArab

for not making and advances governance,6 in areas and of democratization

inany case thedollar amount of aid from

these programs is almost

strong relations by military aid.When with allied "friendly" Arab regimes clash
with the alliances Indeed, democracy are promotion always initiatives, preferred. seems

always

dwarfed

willing
toral in Voters try to enter a polling station blocked by riot police in the Delta town of Talkha, December 1, 2005. her

to ignore serious flaws in elec

when they to take authoritarian remarks place states. In

Washington

almost

processes

"friendly" opening

the House

arrestof opposition politician Ayman Nour on highly dubious and ran against President Husni Mubarak
in December he was convicted on the charges of fraud. Nour was released on bail two weeks later,

in September, but
charge and

Committee hearing on the fiscal 2006 Federal Secretary of State Rice budget, kept the glass half-full: "FromMorocco to Jordan to Bahrain,
we are

on Appropriations

was mild in tone, remains in jail. Scolding from Washington and aid to Egypt has not been suspended. Of course, the failure to put teeth into US aid to Arab years, various US
regimes is not unique to the Bush administration. For

trumped-up

minorities, and the beginnings of political pluralism. Recent

weeks have seen an

seeing

elections

and

new

protections

for women

and

agencies have included language calling

elections in Saudi Arabia, and a to open up decision by President Mubarak very important competition in Egypt's presidential elections." A year later, on selling "transformational diplomacy" at House hearings in the first-evermunicipal 2006 EAST REPORT 238 SPRING 16 MIDDLE

opening

toward

broader

participation

the fiscal 2007 budget, Rice did not even mention countries by name, perhaps because five US-allied
was no progress toward democracy in 2005

these there

NEW FROM ZONE BOOKS

in Morocco,

Jordan, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. She also chose not to mention either the shenanigans preceding the Egyptian presidential race or the fraud and violence surrounding
the

Muslim

Likewise, in his 2006 State of the Union Address, Bush celebrated Egypt's electoral experi ences, declaring, "The great people of Egypt have voted Brotherhood.
in a

parliamentary

elections

that

returned

88

seats

for

the

Academic

Freedom 11

government should open paths of peaceful opposition that will reduce the appeal of radicalism." The second half of
the sentence but might the word be taken as an oblique makes reproach it clear of the regime, "radicalism" that, given

multi-party

presidential

election?and

now

their

after September
In the aftermath 11, 2001,

EDITED BY BESHARA DOUMANI

of September

the choice between Mubarak stands with Mubarak.

Muslim and the

Brotherhood,

institutions of higher subjected sophisticated

the US

learning have been to an increasingly

Asserting Power
As the presidential elections inEgypt illustrate, authoritarian which the outcome is so regimes sometimes hold elections in manipulated and over-determined that it seems unlikely that the regime expects anyone to be fooled by the charade. No real competition ispossible and the victory of the incumbent
regime is a foregone conclusion. The regime uses not only

infrastructure of surveillance, intervention, and control. Are the dark clouds academic hovering over storm, a structural a key societies? life a passing

or do they betoken pillar of democratic some of the nation's to analyze

shift that undermines

This book bringstogether

leading the new in the scholars challenges discussion. Beshara Post,

electoral engineering and gerrymandering, but finds various ways of eliminating all viable opposition before winning in a landslide. United Yemen's first presidential elections illustrate this
process well.7 By 1999, President Salih was Yemen auto

facing the system of higher education providing a solid platform Contributors include Joel Beinin,

United States,

for informed public Judith Butler, Robert

cratically, just as he had ruled theYemen Arab Republic from 1978 until 1990.Two months before the election, a united oppo
sition announced its intended candidate, the secretary-general

ruling

Doumani,

Kathleen Strum.

J. Frydl, Amy Newhall,

and Philippa should

"[This

book]

be read by anyone universities." Columbia

interested

in the

Yemeni Socialist Party, Ali Salih 'Ubad "Muqbil." Few in of the the opposition believed Muqbil had a chance ofwinning even iffairelections were held. Yemen had a requirement, borrowed from the Tunisian judicial codes, that every candidate must be approved by 10 percent of the sitting parliament; Muqbil did
candidate, a choice Salih Najib between Qahtan two won al-Shaabi. candidates 96.3 Yemenis from of were

future vitality of American ?Jonathan R. Cole,

University

"This

is a vital and

timely book....

These

insightful essays academic freedom for dealing

analyze since with ? it."

the nature of the peril menacing 11 and suggest Columbia

not meet the threshold. Salih's party then put forth its own
"alternative" thus offered party, did As and the same the vote.

September

strategies

Rashid

Khalidi,

University

If Salih would dominate even a free contestwith Muqbil, why

the regime stage an election whose was outcome not and was a contest assert obvious? but an Lisa Wedeen argues, the election to both

unsurprisingly

percent

$21.95 paperback original ISBN 1-890951-61-7 328 pages, 5.75x9

occasion

Indeed, by presenting Yemenis with a bogus alternative candi

date,

for the regime

announce

its power.

to Salih were available.

The Tunisian regime

the regime

effectively has

demonstrated

that no

alternatives

ZONE
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also

used

sham

elections

to demon

strate itspower. Optimism marked Zine al-Abidine Ben Alis ouster of "president-for-life"Bourguiba in a bloodless coup on November 7, 1987. Ben Ali pledged to introduce political MIDDLE 238 EAST 2006 REPORT SPRING 17

competition,

free elections

and

greater

freedom by releasing

of

the press, numerous trade

and he demonstrated opposition leaders

that commitment under house

arrest,

like

former

unionist Habib Achour, and in jail, like Islamist leaderRachid Ghannouchi. But Ben Ali also coopted personnel and rhetoric
from that could the opposition, the presence ensuring not threaten the regime. seriously term in a of "alternatives"

On October
consecutive

24, 2004, Ben Ali was elected to his fourth

shamelessly rigged exercise.

Of the reported 90 percent of voters who turned out, 94.48 percent endorsed him. He had introduced a constitutional
amendment and in eliminating was the measure 2002. In that the three-term in a three allowed limit landslide for presidents, referendum "approved" contest, had been

five-year

May

opposition

candidates

communist Tajdid Party, openly criticized the election, after winning only 0.95 percent of the vote. Mohamed Bouchiha, the secretary-general of the Popular Unity Party and also a relative of Ben Alis wife, received 3.78 percent, and Mounir Beji of the Liberal Social Party gained 0.79 percent.8
Like the "alternative" candidate in Yemen, these challengers

to two in 1999 and none in 1994 and 1989. Of the three leader of the ex challengers, only Mohamed Ali Halouani,

government-selected to run, compared

We have one of the best renewal rates in the industry. That

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did not oppose the platforms of Ben Ali or his party, nor did they have any significant political following. The inclusion
of government-approved candidates posing in these the 2004 who was that illustrated presidency are available. alternatives Following an Marzouki, opposition figure to the challenge no real "contests," election, not Moncef to no real

Middle East for $22?more than40percent depthanalysisof the off the regular price (Youget the same percentagediscount if
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participate, described Ben Ali's three-pronged policy thusly: "To remain indefinitely in power, to remain indefinitely in
power, to remain indefinitely in power."9

Trapped!
A final consideration is that authoritarian regimes that have
held elections in the

Name Address Code ZIP/Postal

may find it difficult to discontinue holding them at regular

intervals. This

past?for

any

combination

of reasons?

likeTunisia's Ben Ali comes to power claiming to support

democratization, Morocco or when regimes openings like those of Jordan largely and tout democratic that were initiated

may

be

the case when

an

City From: Name Address

State/Province/Country

authoritarian

leader

for purposes of regime preservation. With the expanding embrace of democratic norms and rhetoric (if not global
actual democratic

even recognizably bogus elections may be particularly high for US-allied regimes. With the Gulf war of 1990-1991, Jordan's King Hussein found himself politically and economically isolated, particu unilateral severing of aid to the larly with Washington's kingdom for failing to join theUS-led coalition. Although political freedoms continued to expand with the drawing of theNational

practices),

the

symbolic

cost of

abandoning

City

State/Province/Country

Code ZIP/Postal

J Check/Money Enclosed Order is US (Prepaymentrequired, only) payablein dollars J MasterCard J VISA

Number Card Signature

Date Expiration Date

Charter, the legalization of political parties and the liberalization of print media, the king struggled

Massachusetts Ave. NW,Suite 119 MERIP, 1500 Clip thiscouponandmail to Washington, DC 20005. Offer expires April30, 2006.

18 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 238 SPRING 2006

to rebuild relations with Washington

one trump card: a peace treaty with

until he played his

Israel. As momentum

toward the treatybuilt, the regime held to its commitment of regular elections but implemented a number of reforms to ensure that theNovember 1993 ballot would return an Middle East, primarily because they concluded peace treaties The 1997 elections were with Israel. The Bush administration strengthened its rela assembly willing to ratify the treaty. tionswith Yemen in large part to pursue radicals connected, also held on schedule, but were marred by a boycott led by to two former prime ministers and theMuslim Brotherhood however al-Qaeda. loosely, the false rhetoric of democracy will have the unin Islamic Action Front. The scheduled 2001 dominated Perhaps tended consequence of educating liberal democratic citizens elections were postponed until June 2003, due to tensions 11attacks and the popularity of that they indeed possess rights, including the right to have surrounding the September the second Palestinian intifada in the kingdom. Indeed, the even its carefully constructed regime seemed unsure whether time, citizens will negotiate the limited political spaces that have clearly been created by these openings until they can effectivelydemand reforms from the arbitrary regimes. More likely, in the near term these regimes will remain in power as long as they have themeans to do so. Moving beyond the theatrical performances of elections by authori tarian regimes will require that those means be removed
and democratic alternatives made available. The citizens representative and accountable governments. Perhaps, over

regimes allied with the United States hold elections whose results are equally suspect, though regular may receive praise and encouragement from they Washington. Egypt and Jordan are amongWashington s closest allies in the authoritarian

virtually every substantive dimension of the 1989 opening, save (mostly) regular parliamentary elections. But as long
as elections are commitment the held, regime to democratization. can continue to claim a

elections systemwould return an assembly thatwould not suspend the peace treaty.Jordan's regime has thus reversed

Similarly, inYemen, following the 1994 civil war and the consolidation of Salih's regime, elections no longer served a practical role inmediating among competing political forces. The ruling General Party Congress blatantly manipulated the 1997 elections through vote buying, intimidation and an electoral agree abandoning significant portions of ment with the Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Tajammu' al-Yamani lil-Islah), its former partner in the 1993 coalition government with the Socialists and following the 1994 conflict. Salih continues to call Yemen an "emerging
name he

more substantive, therefore, the source of billions of dollars in annual aid must insist on substantive political openings. Bush spoke in the 2006 State of the Union address of a commitment to supporting democratic reform across the broader Middle East: "Elections are vital, but they are only
and protection of minorities, and strong, accountable institu

authoritarian Arab regimes are and subjects of US-allied not bamboozled by bogus elections, and extensive polling indicates that the preference for democratic alternatives is overwhelming. To pressure these regimes tomake elections

democracy"?a

Democratic
democratic

Institute conference of Arab

transitions. The 2003 elections

adopted

from

1997

National

states beginning
were compara

the beginning. Raising up a democracy requires the rule of law,

1994 conflict, Salih's regime has thoroughly consolidated its power through the personalization of his rule as well as through the provision of pork. Although diverse political parties have formed a united opposition bloc to challenge
the only game in town.10

was due in tively freer, but this large part to the fact that the possibility of a genuinely competitive affair had been foreclosed. Since the demise of the Socialists following the

tions that last longer than a single vote." These are the right words, but theUS needs to back them up. Only thenmight themany democratic reformers in theArab world find their way into power?through Endnotes
our broader examinationof thisquestion, 1 We are indebtedto LisaWedeen for inspiring Events in which sheexploresin "SeeingLike aCitizen,ActingLike a State:Exemplary Unified inSociety History 45/4 (October 2003). See also her earlier and Yemen," ComparativeStudies account ofphony electoralritualsin and Symbols Domination: Politics, Rhetoric of Ambiguities inContemporary Syria (Chicago:UniversityofChicago Press, 1999). 2 See, forexample, Dankwart Rustow, "Electionsand Legitimacy in the Middle East,"Annals American Political Science482 (November 1985). of the Academy of 3 See Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and theOnset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," Political Studies 32/1(February1999). Comparative seatsforthe 4 The previous system West Bank, over which providedhalfof theparliamentary thekingdom had relinquisheditsclaim in 1988. Middle East ReportOnline, 5 Mariz Tadros, "Egypt'sElection All About Image,Almost," September6, 2005. 6 A partialexceptionisthe November 2005 withdrawalof a $20millionMillennium Challenge Account grantto Yemen, on thegroundsofYemen'sinsufficient progressinfighting corruption. Millennium Challenge Accounts?a formofUS democracypromotion assistance?are ad ministeredby thequasi-governmental Millennium Challenge Corporation,which isoverseen of USAID director. by a board of directors includingthe secretary stateand the 7 This analysisdraws heavilyon Wedeen, "SeeingLike a Citizen, Acting Like a State." vs. theAuthoritarian 8 This sectiondraws on JohnEntelis, "TheDemocratic Imperative Middle East Journal 59/4 Impulse: The Maghrib State betweenTransition and Terrorism," (Autumn2005). 9 Ibid., p. 551.

free and fair elections.

the regime, Salih's consolidation of power rendered his party

The cases of Jordan and Yemen illustrate how regimes use elections to produce different political outcomes, might and how these dynamics can change dramatically from one contest to the next. But for US-allied regimes, one compelling reason to continue to holding bogus elections is maintain, at the very least, a fa?ade of democratic progress that can be as as by the Bush administra championed by the regimes well not legitimacy, but the appropriation thereof. tion. This is

Back It Up
While decades of meaningless elections in Syria, Libya and Saddam's Iraq deserve the ridicule they receive,many other

10 Sheila "How Yemen's Ruling Party Secured an Electoral Landslide," Middle Carapico, East Report Online,May 16,2003.

MIDDLE EAST 238 2006 19 REPORT SPRING