Tpe and Fvolo-FIenonenon in OoelIe's Science

AulIov|s) HeinvicI HeneI

Souvce FMLA, VoI. 71, No. 4 |Sep., 1956), pp. 651-668
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TYPE AND PROTO-PHENOMENON IN
GOETHE'S SCIENCE*
BY HEINRICH HENEL
AS MY STARTING point I shall take a statement about Goethe's
relation to science which is both recent and
precise,
and which was
made
by
Ronold
King, professor
of
physics
at Harvard
University.
Ac-
cording
to
King,
Goethe was a true scientist in
every respect, except
that
he limited his
inquiry
in two
ways:
he
practiced
observational science
but
rejected experimental science;
and he formulated scientific
insight
in terms of fundamental
principle,
but not in terms of mathematical law.
Goethe's aversion to
experimental
science is
explained by King
as a fear
of
analytical processes
which do not lead to a
subsequent reintegration
or
synthesis,
and this
fear,
in
turn,
is attributed to Goethe's failure to
understand that the
application
of mathematics to the
findings
of ex-
perimental
science
produces precisely
such
syntheses. King
believes that
"if Goethe had
anticipated
that out of
analysis
and
planned experiment
might
rise the
great
tower of
systematic
world-science ... he would have
met the
challenge
of mathematics in nature and in life as
resolutely
and
as
effectively
as he had met the
challenge
of observational science to the
anti-rationalism of his
youth."'
I doubt that
many
scientists will be as broad-minded as
King
and
admit to their ranks a man who avoids the use of
apparatus
and mathe-
matics.
And,
more
important,
I doubt the correctness of
King's assump-
tion that Goethe did not know what he was
doing
when he refused to
venture
very deeply
into
experimental science,
and when he
rejected
completely
the use of mathematical
concepts
as a means of
expressing
general principles.
It
may
be conceded
readily
that Goethe's under-
standing
of mathematics was
slight,
and
that,
in
particular,
he failed to
grasp
its
efficacy
as a tool for
integrating knowledge;
but I wish to
argue
nevertheless that he understood mathematics well
enough
to know that
it would not do the
things
he wanted to
do,
and that its
integrations
were different in kind from the
syntheses
for which he strove. And I
wish to
argue
also that Goethe was
fully
aware of the assistance which
*
Beginning
and end of this
study
were
presented
as a
paper
at the Sixth Triennial
Congress
of the International Federation for Modern
Languages
and Literatures and have
since been
published
in its
Proceedings,
Literature and Science
(Oxford,
Blackwell, 1955),
pp.
216-221.
Goethe on Human Creativeness and Other Goethe
Essays,
ed. Rolf
King (Athens, Ga.,
1950), p.
247. Abbreviations hereafter used:
JA=Goethes
Samtliche
Werke, Jubilaiums-Aus-
gabe (Stuttgart
and Berlin:
Cotta,
n.d.
[1902-1907]); MR=Goethe,
Maximen und Re-
flexionen,
ed. Ginther
Miiller,
3rd ed.
(Stuttgart, 1949).
651
Goethe's Science
apparatus
renders to the scientific observer
(after all,
he was himself a
careful and successful
experimenter),
and that he
kept
his
experiments
simple,
not because he failed to see that
complicated apparatus
brings
results,
but because he was convinced that it
produces
the
wrong
kind of
results.
I have said
advisedly
"the
wrong
kind of
results,"
and not
"wrong
results."
Unfortunately,
Goethe himself did not make this distinction
with sufficient
clarity.
He often
spoke
of his work as if it were
part
of the
accepted
science of his
day,
and when he admitted (as
indeed he was
forced
to)
the
inconsistency
of much of his
teaching
with that of
science,
he tried to win the scientists over to his side. Thus in the most obvious
and celebrated case-his
struggle against
Newton's
optics-he spoke
and
wrote as if he could not be
right
unless Newton were
wrong,
whereas in
actual fact the two theories of colors are based on
totally
different basic
assumptions
and hence are not
really comparable.
In other
words,
Goethe
did not
always
remember that scientific
insight
is
insight
of a
special
kind,
and that scientific truth is not
necessarily
the
only
kind of truth
available to man. Much is
made,
in the literature on our
subject,
of those
parts
of Goethe's work which have stood the test of science and have be-
come
part
of its doctrine: his contribution to the
physiology
of
colors,
for
example,
or his role as one of the initiators of
morphology.
But these mat-
ters can be
overemphasized:
if Goethe had not made these
discoveries,
other scientists would have made them.2 Had his
way
of
studying
nature
not differed
radically
from scientific
method,
his name would be found
in small
print
in some handbooks on the
history
of
science,
but would not
otherwise be remembered in the annals of man's
exploration
of nature.
The real
importance
of Goethe as a student of nature lies in the fact
that he was the last
great figure
in the Western world to offer an alterna-
tive to what is now known as science. He was
wrong
when he claimed
superior
truth or
validity
for this
alternative;
but he
may
have been
right when,
as on other
occasions,
he asserted that it was healthier and
more in
keeping
with the needs of man. As
regards experimental science,
three
points may
be made. The first
point
concerns Goethe's dislike of
manipulating
nature or of
"improving" upon
it. He was convinced that
there was a basic
harmony
in all
creation,
that man and nature are made
for each
other,
and that the
processes by
which civilization modifies na-
ture and turns it to more convenient use must be restrained
by
caution
and reverence so as not to
upset
that
harmony. Secondly,
Goethe wished
2
Some of Goethe's
discoveries, notably
that of the
intermaxillary
bone in
man,
had
actually
been made before his time. His
essays,
"Meteore des literarischen Himmels"
(JA, xxxix, 37-43)
and "Erfinden und Entdecken"
(JA, xxxix, 44-46),
discuss the
ques-
tion of
priority.
652
Heinrich Henel
to
keep
a direct
relationship
between the total
sensibility
of the observer
and the observed
phenomenon.
Results obtained in this fashion are crude
compared
with those obtained with
precision instruments,
but
they
are
true to the observer rather than true to his tools.
They provide
him with
knowledge
with which he can
cope,
not
knowledge
which
may
overwhelm
him. The third
point, finally,
was
put succinctly by
Goethe himself when
he said that nature falls silent when
put
on the rack
("Die
Natur ver-
stummt auf der
Folter").
What he meant was that the answers extracted
by
the
high-pressure
tools of
experimental
science are not
spoken by
nature,
or at least not
by
that nature which we see and feel around us.
Here Goethe has been corroborated
by
a modern
physicist,
Werner
Heisenberg,
who in a
paper published
in 1941
pointed
out that "science
no
longer
deals with the world which offers itself to us
directly,
but with
the dark
background
of this world which we
bring
to
light by
our
experi-
ments.
Surely, then,
this
'objective'
world is
produced,
as it
were, only by
our active
interference, by
the refined
technique
of our observation."3
Goethe's
point, then,
was that
experimental
science
produces
a
highly
specialized
view of
nature,
which is
certainly
not the
only possible
view
and
may
not be the view most
congenial
to man and most conducive to
his
happiness.
As
regards
Goethe's
rejection
of
mathematics,
I shall adduce
only
two
passages explaining
his reasons. In an
essay
written in 1784 or 1785 and
published posthumously
under the title of
"Philosophische Studie,"
Goethe
argued against measuring living organisms,
because their iden-
tity
eludes
comparison
with other
objects
and because all measurement
constitutes a
comparison (JA, xxxIx, 7).
And in an
osteological paper (on
the bones in the forearm and the lower
leg)
written in 1795 and
published
in
1824,
Goethe declared that "bare number and measurement
nullify
form and banish the
spirit
of
living
observation"
(ibid, p. 205).
The first
of these reasons is
philosophical,
the second of a more
practical
kind.
Science does not
attempt
to define individual
identity
and
may
therefore
rely
on the
"magic
of numbers" to reduce
diversity
to
identity. Goethe,
on the other
hand,
was concerned with
identity
of a
totally
different
kind-the
identity
of the one
object
before
him,
which he wished to
pre-
serve whole and
unimpaired.
The mental
equivalents
of
physical reality
which science
produces
are mathematical
concepts gained through analy-
sis and
reintegration,
whereas Goethe strove for mental
equivalents
re-
sembling photographic images
or rather
moving pictures (because
his
idea of "Gestalt" or form includes the idea of
change). Again
this is not
a
question
of
right
or
wrong,
but rather a difference of basic
assumptions
"Die Goethe'sche und die Newton'sche Farbenlehre im Lichte der modernen
Physik,"
Geist der
Zeit,
xrx
(1941),
270.
653
Goethe's Science
and ultimate
purpose.
It is the difference between
quantity
and
quality,
between abstraction and
intuition,
between science and art. I shall re-
turn to this later.
Turning
now to the
positive
content of Goethe's
teaching
about na-
ture,
we are faced with two terms which he coined and which have at-
tracted a
great
deal of attention. I
refer,
of
course,
to the
"Typus"
or
type
and to the
"Urphanomen"
or
proto-phenomenon.
First of all it
should be said that these two terms must not be confused or identified.
The
type concept
arose from Goethe's
biological
studies and is
clearly
present
in The
Metamorphosis
of
Plants of 1790. The idea of
proto-
phenomena,
on the other
hand,
was first foreshadowed in an
essay
of
1792,
but the word was not introduced until 1810 in the
Theory of
Colors.
The
type
is a
morphological concept,
a
generalized form,
a model or
pat-
tern
according
to which nature is
supposed
to fashion the individuals of
a certain
species.
For
example,
Goethe believed he was able to discern the
type "leaf,"
the
type
"annual
plant,"
the
type "skull,"
the
type
"bone
structure of
mammals,"
etc. The
type
is found
by comparison
of
empiri-
cal
objects
with one
another,
and it embraces both their
similarity
and
their variations. It is a flexible norm
allowing
for the
changes occurring
during
the life of an individual organism as well as for the variations oc-
curring among
the individuals of a certain kind or
species.
It is
not,
how-
ever,
a
phylogenetic concept,
that
is,
it does not include
changes
which
appear
in the evolution of the kind or
species
itself. Thus I cannot
agree
with those who have hailed Goethe as a forerunner of Darwin. Hans
Fischer,
a member of the Medical
Faculty
of
Ziirich
University,
has
stated the case
correctly
in his excellent brief
survey,
Goethes Naturwis-
senschaft.
He
says:
"A few
passages
in
[Goethe's]
scientific
writings
indi-
cate that he had an occasional
inkling
of
evolutionary theory
.... How-
ever,
this
point
of view was not
important
for him. The
theory
of evolu-
tion was not a valid
problem
for one who was interested in
comparative
morphology
and
anatomy.
He was satisfied with an
understanding
of the
homologous
structure of the vertebrates." And Fischer adds: "The
modern
geneticist
cannot but view with a certain
skepticism
efforts to
develop
a
theory
of
organic
form
wholly separate
from the
biological
conditions of
heredity
and evolution."4
The
type concept,
like Goethe's
thought
in
general,
is difficult to
grasp
because it
attempts
to reconcile the notions of the static and the
dynamic.
It includes the idea of
change,
but not irrevocable
change,
not
change
as linear
progress
or evolution in
history. Change
in Goethe's
sense is more like
rotation,
which reveals
successively
and
recurrently
4
(Zurich, 1950), pp. 37,
39. Cf. Karl
ViCtor,
Goethe:
Dichtung, Wissenschaft,
Weltbild
(Bern, 1949), pp.
395-399.
654
Heinrich Henel
the
qualities
of a
permanent
and stable essence. Terms like
"Bildung"
and
"Gestaltung,"
which he used in his
morphology,
are
intentionally
ambiguous, referring
to both
being
and
growth,
and this
ambiguity
be-
comes
explicit
in his famous
phrase,
"Dauer im Wechsel." The
type
is
precisely
this: it is the essential and
permanent
form which
may
be
per-
ceived
through
observation of
changing shapes.
A
necessary corollary
of these
views,
and a most
important
one for
Goethe,
was the belief that there are limits to what is
empirically
discov-
erable. He was convinced that "nature creates
according
to
ideas,"
and
that his own ideas
(the types)
were commensurate with those of nature.
The
type, being
the intellectual
image
of that which
exists,
at the same
time excludes that which does not exist. It
represents
what is constant
or recurrent in the infinite
variety
of
empirical phenomena,
and it draws
a borderline between the
possible
and the
impossible,
the natural and
the unnatural.
Thus,
to
apprehend
the
type
means to
gain
the
power
of
prediction.
Goethe's infinite
delight
when he
got
hold
firmly
of the
type
concept
of
plants-he
called it
"Urpflanze"
at that
time-sprang
from
his belief that he had won a
significant victory
over the
strictly empirical
scientists,
because he could now foretell what
plants,
as
yet unknown,
might
in the future be found to
exist,
and what other
imaginary plants
were
purely
fanciful and would never be found to exist. "Tell
Herder,"
he wrote to Charlotte von Stein on 8
June 1787,
"that I am
very
close
to the secret of
plant organization
and that it is the
simplest thing imag-
inable.... The
primal plant
is
going
to be the most wonderful
thing
in
the world.... With this model and the
knowledge
how to use it one
could
go
on forever
inventing plants
that would be consistent and would
have an inner
necessity
and truth."6 Similar remarks are found
through-
out Goethe's
work,
but I shall
quote only
one
more,
written in 1829 and
therefore late in Goethe's life. It is the
passage
in which he confesses
that he "moves
consciously
in the
region
where
metaphysics
and science
overlap,
and where an
honest,
faithful
investigator prefers
to dwell. For
here he is no
longer
harried
by
the
pressure
of infinite
detail,
because he
learns to
appreciate
the
great
effect of
simple
ideas which are
capable
of
reducing variety
to
clarity
in various
ways."6
5
The translation is Barker
Fairley's (A Study of Goethe, Oxford, 1947, p. 197).
Goethe
spoke
in similar terms in a letter to Charlotte von Stein of 10
July
1786: "What
pleases
me
most at
present
is
plant-life
.... The whole
gigantic kingdom
becomes so
simple
that I can
see at once the answers to the most difficult
problems....
And it is no dream or
fancy;
I am
beginning
to
grow
aware of the essential form with
which,
as it
were,
Nature
always
plays,
and from which she
produces
her
great variety.
Had I the time in this brief
span
of
life I am confident I could extend it to all the realms of Nature-the whole realm"
(transla-
tion taken from R. D.
Gray,
Goethe the
Alchemist, Cambridge, 1952, pp.
62
f.).
6
Physiologische Bemerkungen (1829), JA, xxxix, 102; quoted by Fischer, p.
36. Cf. be-
low, p. 663,
n. 16a.
655
Goethe's Science
The
concept
of the
proto-phenomenon
is both more difficult and more
questionable
than that of the
type.
It
may
be defined as a
comprehensive
phenomenon
or a
phenomenon
of the
highest order,
because it reveals a
principle
which
governs
a whole
sphere
of nature. In
everyday experience
we are confronted with innumerable
phenomena,
no two of which are
quite
alike because of
varying
accidental conditions. The scientist de-
termines the conditions
through
observation and
experiment,
controls
them,
and thus obtains a constant
phenomenon.
The scientific
phenome-
non is more
comprehensive
than the
empirical phenomenon
because it is
subject
to fewer conditions.
Now, says Goethe,
let us continue to elimi-
nate conditions until we arrive at a
point
where
only
the minimum condi-
tions are
operative
and
where,
if we remove another
condition,
no
phe-
nomenon will
appear.
The
last, simplest phenomenon, subject
to the few-
est
conditions,
is the
proto-phenomenon.
It is the most
inclusive,
because
once it is found we can reverse our
procedure,
add
conditions,
and thus
derive all other
phenomena
from it.
An
example
will show what is meant. When a
light
surface is seen
through
a turbid
medium,
the
eye perceives
a
yellowish
tint.
Conversely,
when a dark surface is seen
through
an illuminated turbid
medium,
the
eye perceives
a bluish tint.
Only
three conditions are
present: light,
dark-
ness,
and the turbid medium.
This, then,
is the
"Urphanomen"
of
Goethe's color
theory.
He took it as
proof
that the colors are due to the
opposition
of
light
and
darkness,
and to
turbidity mediating
between
them;
that
yellow
and blue are the
only
basic
colors;
and that all other
colors can be derived from them.
Through
other observations and
experi-
ments he found that
green
results from the mixture of
yellow
and
blue;
that
orange
and
purple
are
produced through
an intensification of
yellow
and
blue, respectively;
and that red is a combination of
orange
and
pur-
ple. Translating
his results into
general terms,
Goethe declared that the
colors reflect the
polarity
which is manifest in all nature
(yellow belong-
ing
to the side of
light
and blue to the side of
darkness),
but that the
polar opposites
strive for
totality through
their reunification on a
higher
level. When
yellow
and blue are
intensified,
there
appears
in them a red-
dish hue which is an enhancement or
"Steigerung"
of their
original quali-
ties;
and when the enhanced colors
orange
and
purple
are
combined, they
lose their
affinity
to
light
or darkness and
produce
the
"royal red,"
which
is the
highest
color because it
represents totality. Polarity
and enhance-
ment are the two
great principles
which
operate
in all nature and
produce
the
great multiplicity
of
physical phenomena.
As our
example indicates,
the
concept
of the
proto-phenomenon
was
formed
by
Goethe in connection with his
theory
of
colors;
indeed this is
the
only example
which he
developed fully
and
methodically.
On other
656
Heinrich Henel
occasions,
he
spoke
of the
magnet,
of the
spiral
vessels in
plants,
and of
beauty
as
proto-phenomena,
but these are incidental remarks which do
not elucidate the term. In the context of Goethe's color
theory, however,
the
concept
has a definite function: it is intended to
prove
the
epistemo-
logical
soundness of his methods. To understand Goethe's
teaching
about
colors we must
distinguish
between his methods of
investigation
and his
methods of
explanation.
Both differ from scientific
method,
but whereas
the former are valuable and
sound,
the latter have aroused considerable
doubt. Goethe's method as an
investigator
was to collect
phenomena,
preferably
those observable in
nature,
but also those
producible
in the
study
or
laboratory
with
comparatively simple apparatus.
Whenever
possible
he observed with the naked
eye,
and when he used artificial aids
such as the
prism
he trusted more in what he called
subjective experi-
ments
(in
which the
object
itself is
viewed)
than in
objective experiments
(in
which the
image
cast
by
an
object
is
viewed).
In this manner he col-
lected a vast amount of
data,
and it is his skill and
diligence
as an ob-
server which
distinguish
him from
philosophers
of nature and from Pla-
tonic
idealists,
and which have earned him the
respect
of
professional
scientists. On the other
hand,
he differs from scientists in that he took
his observations not
only
as ultimate units of
direct, empirical experience,
but also as ultimate units of
reliably
ascertainable fact. He refused to
break
reality
down into what in
biology
he called
"Similarteile,"
homo-
geneous
elements of which we have no direct
experience
and which can be
discovered
only through
a combination of intellectual
analysis
and ex-
periments
with
complicated apparatus.
And he was even less
willing
to
reduce the visible world to a mathematical
system
in which differences of
quality
are
expressed through
numbers and numerical
relationships.
Just
as in his
biological
studies he
stopped
short at
fairly large
units of form
or
organization
such as the
leaf,
so in his
physics
he worked with com-
paratively large
units of
experience
which he called the
phenomena.
As
he used
it,
the word
phenomenon acquired
a
limiting quality:
whatever
lay beyond
the
phenomena
was no
longer
solid fact but mere
hypothesis
and
speculation.
And since what he called a
proto-phenomenon
sum-
marizes the evidence
provided by
the
phenomena
in a certain
sphere
of
experience, Goethe,
in at least three
passages
of his
Theory of Colors,
expressly
forbade scientists to seek
anything beyond
it.7
The
great
attraction of Goethe's
work,
the
joy
it affords the
reader,
is due to its
presenting
a world which is
immediately recognizable by
all
who can see. Indeed it teaches us to
see, just
as Goethe
taught
his col-
laborator
Eckermann,
and even his
servant,
to observe and to discover
7
H.
Henel,
"Goethe und die
Naturwissenschaft," JEGP,
XLVIII
(1949), 521,
n. 50. See
also
MR,
Nos. 993 and 1258.
657
Goethe's Science
in the manner of the master.
Reality
to him was what the senses
per-
ceive;
it was the
great variety
of
shapes
and forms and their
qualitative
differences. And this world of the senses will
always
be
there,
no matter
what science
says
about it or does to it in its
experiments.
Hence it will
always
be valuable to observe nature in Goethe's
way.
He is the
great
antidote to
science,
or
perhaps
the touchstone of its
adequacy
to the
needs of man as a natural
being.
Goethe as a student of nature is common
sense and common
sensibility personified.
It is not
possible
to
speak
with
equal
assurance when one turns to
Goethe's methods of
explaining
the
phenomena.
Since he was
unwilling
to
push analysis
to the
point
where he could
operate
with
homogeneous
elements
(which
are
easily synthesized),
he had to find the common
denominator of
fairly large
units which were different in
quality. Or,
speaking paradoxically
after Goethe's own
manner,
one
might say
that
he wished to
gain
universals without
abstraction,
or that he
attempted
to
grasp principles
without
letting go
of the
specific
and the concrete. He
himself
gave
two different
explanations
of how this
might
be done. The
one,
which he advanced in connection with his color
theory
and which in-
volves the
concept
of
proto-phenomena,
seems
implausible;
the
other,
which he offered on
many
other
occasions,
is both more credible and
more
likely
to describe his actual
procedure.
The
Theory of
Colors is
predicated upon
Goethe's
struggle against
New-
tonian
physics.
He
explained
the color
phenomena
without recourse to
mathematics,
and this made it
necessary
for him to show that his
gen-
eralizations were
just
as reliable as mathematical formulae-indeed
more so. He
attempted
to show this
by insisting upon
the
strictly empiri-
cal basis of his
theory,
or
really by declaring
that there was no
theory
at
all and that the
phenomena
were
simply
allowed to
speak
for themselves.
In the relevant
passage
of the
Theory
of Colors
(? 175),
Goethe
says
that
the
phenomena
fall
naturally
into certain
groups,
that these
groups
in
turn
arrange
themselves in
categories
of a
higher order,
and that the
principles emerging
from such a
pyramidal arrangement
of natural
phenomena
"are not revealed
through
words and
hypotheses
to the
mind,
but likewise
through phenomena
to the
eye."8
These ultimate
phenomena
or
proto-phenomena
are arrived at without
any
interference
by
the hu-
man mind and hence
give
a truer
picture
of
reality
than mathematical
formulae. Nature has
spoken
in her own
language, revealing
her secret
to the
patient investigator
who followed her
step by step.
The same ideas were advanced in an
essay
written
eighteen years
8
Goethe's text is not
entirely
clear in this
place.
"Likewise" seems to refer to the
groups
just
mentioned.
658
Heinrich Henel
earlier and entitled "Der Versuch als Vermittler von
Objekt
und Sub-
jekt"
(1792).9
The
essay
mentions Goethe's
Beitrdge
zur
Optik (published
in 1791 and 1792 as the first fruits of his studies of
color)
and
might
be
called a
methodological appendix
to them. Without
actually naming him,
the
essay suggests
that Newton's results were obtained
by drawing
con-
clusions from a few isolated
experiments
and that his theories owed more
to the observer's mind than to the observed
phenomena;
and it asserts
that, by contrast,
Goethe in his
Beitrdge
attempted
to find out what
phenomena belong together
in nature. To this end he
repeated
each ex-
periment many times, varying
the conditions
only very slightly.
Thus
he obtained series of
experiments which,
as it
were,
amounted to a
single
experience
viewed under various
aspects.
Such an
experience
Goethe
calls "an
experience
of a
higher
kind." He
compares
it to a mathematical
formula,
for
just
as an
algebraic
formula
expresses
an infinite number of
arithmetical
problems,
so an
"experience
of a
higher
kind" summarizes
an infinite number of
empirical experiences.
It is the last statement which reveals most
clearly
Goethe's
purpose
in
writing
the
essay.
Here as in the
Theory of
Colors he is at
pains
to
prove
that his
generalizations
are at least as valid as mathematical
generaliza-
tions. He
says "experience"
instead of
"phenomenon,"
and
"experience
of a
higher
kind" instead of
"proto-phenomenon";
but it is clear that he
means the same
things.
To be
sure,
this
similarity
was not seen
by
those
who missed the connection of "Der Versuch als Vermittler" with the Bei-
trage
and therefore failed to
appreciate
that it is a
piece
of
polemical
writing.10 They
have discussed the
essay
as if it were a
wholly
disinter-
ested,
definitive
explanation
of Goethe's methods.
They
have seized
especially
on the
passage
where Goethe describes how he
arranged
his ex-
periments
in series
and, finding
a formal
similarity
here to scientific meth-
od,
declared that he worked like a scientist. But
they
have overlooked the
essential difference. Goethe asserts that nature itself
prescribes
the order
in which the
phenomena
must be studied and
arranged,
and that his
experiments
were
designed
to discover this order. Scientific
experiments,
on the other
hand,
are made to test a
hypothesis.
Now it is true that no
series of
any
kind can be established unless the mind has made a
choice,
unless there is a
goal;
and indeed I shall
try
to show
presently
that
Goethe, too, proceeded
from
hypotheses.
But the
point
which concerns us
at the moment is that in "Der Versuch als Vermittler" Goethe denies
this,
9
The MS. is dated 28
April
1792. It was sent to Schiller in
1798,
but the
essay
was not
published
until 1823.
10
See, e.g.,
Erst
Cassirer,
"Goethe und die mathematische
Physik,"
Idee und
Gestalt,
2nd ed.
(Berlin, 1924), pp. 44,
63,
78.
659
Goethe's Science
that he
speaks
as if each
phenomenon
had
only
two
neighbors
and as if
the
problem
were
merely
to find the one true linear series of
phenomena.
This
presupposes
an
extraordinarily
naive
epistemology.
It amounts to
saying
that
physical reality
is
simply there,
that it offers itself to the
mind without
being urged,
and that the task of
understanding
consists
merely
in
grasping
what lies before the
investigator's eyes.
I have
suggested
that the
concept
of
proto-phenomena
as
expounded
in
the
Theory of
Colors is untenable. The notion that it is
possible
to dis-
tinguish
between
major
and minor
phenomena,
that the latter
may
be
subsumed under the
former,
and that nature itself
guides
the
investigator
in this
enterprise
seems no more than a
pleasant fancy.
And I have
sug-
gested
also that
proto-phenomenon
is
really
a
polemical
term which
Goethe invented in the heat of
battle,
but to which he
clung
and which
tied him to an
epistemology
far too
simple.
The root trouble with the con-
cept
is that it
denies,
or at least
minimizes,
the intellectual element in
cognition.
This is also the reason for its
inferiority (both epistemologically
and in
practical usefulness)
to the
concept
of the
type.
For whereas the
type
is an idea
(albeit
nature's idea as much as
man's),
the
proto-phenom-
enon is a fact which reveals an
idea,
and this idea
belongs
to nature much
more than to man.
However,
as I have said
earlier,
Goethe also
gave
a different
explana-
tion of how he understood
nature,
and this second
explanation
is much
more
convincing.
Before we discuss
it,
we should note that both "Der
Versuch als Vermittler" and the
Theory of
Colors contain
passages
which
are irreconcilable with the
concept
of
proto-phenomena.
In the
essay
we
read: "One
may truly say
of
every phenomenon
that it is connected with
an infinite number of other
phenomena, just
as one
may say
of a
freely
suspended
luminous
point
that it sends out
rays
in all directions." The
conclusion to be drawn from Goethe's
comparison
is that there is no one
true
way (prescribed by
nature
itself)
of
arranging
the
phenomena
in
series.
Strangely enough,
he does not draw this
conclusion,
but immedi-
ately goes
on to
say
that when we have made an
experiment
we must find
out "what borders it
immediately,
what is the next
thing
to follow"
(Goethe's italics) (JA, xxxIx, 23).
In the
Theory
of
Colors
(? 359),
on
the other
hand,
Goethe does draw the
necessary conclusions,
but in so
doing
he
destroys
the basis for his
concept
of
proto-phenomena.
He
says:
"It should be remembered that even
closely
related natural
phenomena
are not linked
together
in a real
sequence
or continuous
series,
but that
they
are
produced by overlapping
activities
[of nature],
so that in a sense
it does not matter which
phenomenon
is considered first and which
last,
because the
only important thing
is to have them all
present
in one's
mind
(as
much as this is
possible),
so that
they
can at last be
gathered
660
Heinrich Henel 661
together
from a
single point
of
view, partly according
to their nature and
partly
in human
ways
and
according
to human
convenience."'l
The essence of Goethe's second
explanation
is that his
insights
were
gained by intuitions,
and that the intuitions were occasioned
by objects
of
symbolical significance.
This
explanation
differs from the first in two
vital
respects:
it admits the
primary
and active role of the
mind,
and it
dismisses the notion that the
phenomena
are
conveniently arranged
in a
hierarchy
or
pyramid
at whose
apex
the
investigator may
behold truth
incarnate. For now it is a
single phenomenon
or a
single experience
which
leads to the
general principle;
and
insight
is not a revelation received
passively,
but is achieved
by
an act of the mind. Whereas Goethe's first
explanation
asserts that the
phenomena,
as it
were, carry
their own ex-
planation
with them and that his theories are
simply empirical experience
translated into
words,
the second
explanation
admits that
knowledge
is
gained through
an
interplay
of observation and
thought.
Indeed Goethe
goes
even farther and asserts that intuitions are not
possible
unless a
person
has
potential
knowledge in
anticipation
of actual
experience.
He
ascribes to
persons gifted
for creative work in the arts or sciences a kind
of inborn
knowledge
which he calls
variously
"an
original feeling
for the
truth,"
"anticipation,"
and
"presentiment,"
and he
says
that all real dis-
coveries and all
really
new ideas are due to this
gift.l2 Making
a
discovery
or
forming
an idea is a release or
actualizing
of
potential knowledge
which
takes
place
with
lightning speed
when the
right object
or
phenomenon
is
encountered.
Every investigator
makes
only
those discoveries which cor-
respond
to his
anticipatory knowledge,
for
"what,
after
all,
is invention?
It is the end of
searching" (MR,
No.
1167). Finally,
Goethe declares
n1
To disabuse
unsuspecting
readers of the notion that
they may safely
read Goethe in
translation,
I will
quote
the German text followed
by
Eastlake's translation: "Was ferner
die
Ordnung
der
Kapitel iiberhaupt betrifft,
so
mag
man
bedenken,
daI3
selbst verwandte
Naturphainomene
in keiner
eigentlichen Folge
oder
stetigen
Reihe sich
aneinanderschlieB3en,
sondern dal3 sie durch
Tatigkeiten hervorgebracht werden,
welche verschrankt
wirken,
so daf3 es
gewissermal3en gleichgiiltig ist,
was fur eine
Erscheinung
man zuerst und was fir
eine man zuletzt
betrachtet,
weil es doch nur darauf
ankommt, daI3
man sich alle
m6glichst
vergegenwartige,
um sie zuletzt unter einem
Gesichtspunkt,
teils nach ihrer
Natur,
teils
nach Menschenweise und
Bequemlichkeit,
zusammenzufassen."-"With
respect
to the
order of the
chapters,
it should be remembered that natural
phenomena,
which are even
allied to each
other,
are not connected in
any particular sequence
or constant
series;
their
efficient causes act in a narrow
circle,
so that it is in some sort indifferent what
phenomenon
is first or last
considered;
the main
point is,
that all should be as far as
possible present
to
us,
in order that we
may
embrace them at last from one
point
of
view, partly according
to their
nature, partly according
to
generally
received methods"
(Goethe's Theory of Colours,
tr. Charles L.
Eastlake, London, 1840, pp.
151
f.).
12
Henel,
"Goethe und die
Naturwissenschaft," pp.
514
f.;
"Der
junge Goethe,"
Monats-
hefte,
XL
(1949),
155-157.
Goethe's Science
that such
syntheses
of mind and
experience
are
possible only
because of
the
preordained harmony
between nature and man. This
harmony
even
reaches down to a
correspondence
between certain
phenomena
and
spe-
cific
sensory organs.
The
eye,
for
example,
was created
by light
for the
per-
ception
of
light.l3
And
just
as the
eye
is
sunlike,
so man is
godlike:
he re-
ceives the most blissful assurance of the
great
cosmic
harmony
when in-
tuitions are
granted
to him. The
following quotation, already para-
phrased,
is best left in the
original language:
Alles,
was wir
Erfinden,
Entdecken im hoheren Sinne
nennen,
ist die bedeutende
Austibung, Betaitigung
eines
originalen Wahrheitsgefiihles, das,
im stillen
langst
ausgebildet, unversehens,
mit Blitzesschnelle zu einer fruchtbaren Erkenntnis
fiihrt. Es ist eine aus dem Innern am Aul3ern sich entwickelnde
Offenbarung,
die den Menschen seine Gottahnlichkeit vorahnen la3t. Es ist eine
Synthese
von Welt und
Geist,
welche von der
ewigen
Harmonie des Daseins die
seligste
Versicherung gibt. (MR,
No.
1164)
The role which intuitions
played
in the formation of Goethe's
theories is
amply
documented
by
his
biographical writings.
The idea of
the
metamorphosis
of
plants was,
if not
conceived,
at
any
rate
firmly
grasped
and made into a
permanent
conviction when Goethe saw a
palm
tree at Padua
(sample
leaves of which he
preserved
and "venerated like
fetishes")
and
when,
the
following spring,
he studied the
plants
in the
botanical
gardens
at Palermo. A
sheep's
skull he found at Venice in 1790
convinced him that all the bones in the skulls of mammals are meta-
morphosed
vertebrae. And his
explanation
of the
origin
of colors came
to him the first time he looked
through
a
prism:
"After a moment's
thought
I realized that a border
[between light
and
darkness]
is needed
to
produce colors,
and as
by
instinct I said out aloud at once that New-
ton's
theory
was false."'4 Goethe's accounts of these occasions
emphasize
not
only
the suddenness of his
insights,
but also that
they sprang
from the
contemplation
of
specific objects.
His
pithiest
statement of the
theory
of
knowledge
here
implied
runs as follows: "What is the universal? The
spe-
cific case. What is the
particular?
Millions of cases"
(MR,
No.
994). Or,
to
quote
a less
cryptic
statement:
"Truth,
identical with the
divine,
can
never be known
by
us
directly:
we
perceive
it
only
in its
reflection,
in an
example,
a
symbol,
in
single
and related
phenomena."15
If I understand
t8
Einleitung, Farbenlelre,
ed. H. Wohlbold
(Jena, 1928), p.
212.
14
Der
Verfasser
teilt die Geschichte seiner botanischen Studien mit
(Goethes Morphologische
Schriften,
ed. W.
Troll, Jena [1932], pp.
201
f.);
cf. Italienische
Reise,
17
April
and 17
May
1787;
also
"Bericht," July,
1787.-Bedeutende Fordernis durclh ein
einziges geistreiches
Wort
(ed. Troll, pp. 293, 471).-Materialien
zur Geschichte der
Farbenlehre,
"Konfession des Ver-
fassers" (ed.
Wohlbold, p. 480).
15
"Einleitendes und
Allgemeines,"
Versuch einer
Witterungslehre,
Weimar
ed.,
Part
II,
Vol.
xn, 74; quoted by
G.
Miller, MR, p. lxvi,
and
by
E. L.
Stahl,
"The Genesis of
Symbolist
Theories in
Germany," MLR,
XLI
(1946),
307.
662
Heinrich Henel
these
pronouncements aright,
Goethe wishes to
say
that there are
phe-
nomena in nature which are so clear or so
congenial
to the mind of the
particular
observer that
they
afford him
knowledge
of a
principle
without
the usual
process
of
collecting
and
sorting
data and of
drawing generalized
conclusions from them. Whereas of a multitude of cases no two are
quite
alike,
so that their common
principle
can be
grasped only by
a
process
of
abstraction,
a
single
case can
give
rise to an intuition and thus
acquire
symbolical significance.
In view of what has been said it
may
be
possible
to
redefine,
and thus
to
rehabilitate,
Goethe's
concept
of
proto-phenomena.
A
proto-phenome-
non,
we
may say,
is a
simple phenomenon
which
explained
to Goethe a
large range
of
related,
more
complicated phenomena.
Its
importance
is
purely biographical.
The term is a title of honor or a distinction which
Goethe conferred on those
phenomena
which occasioned his intuitions
and thus
yielded
him
significant insights
into nature. When Goethe
says
that a
proto-phenomenon
can be "found"
(Theory of Colors, ?177),
we
must not take him
literally.
What he found was not different from other
phenomena;
it became different because of what he saw in it. He redis-
covered in nature what had
already
existed in his mind:
potential
knowl-
edge
became actual
knowledge.
E. L.
Stahl,
in his excellent
paper
on The Genesis
of Symbolist
Theories
in
Germany (p.
311
f.), quotes
a most instructive
passage
from Goethe's
letter to Schiller of 16
August
1797. In this
letter,
Goethe declares that
the Rof3markt
(an
ancient market
square
in
Frankfurt)
and his
grand-
father's house are
"symbols
of
many
thousand similar
cases,
in this trad-
ing city, especially for
me"
(my italics).
And he defines
symbols
as "emi-
nent cases . . . which
represent many others,
include a certain
totality,
demand a certain
sequence,
stir
up
in
my
mind related and remote mat-
ters,
and thus
lay
claim to a certain
unity
and
universality
both from
without and from within." The definition is
sufficiently
close to what
Goethe
says
about
proto-phenomena
to
permit
identification of the two
terms: a
proto-phenomenon
is
really
a
symbol.'6
And if we ask
why
Goethe needed
symbols
in his
study
of
nature,
the letter answers that
question also,
for Goethe confesses
that,
rather than
struggle,
as he used
to
do,
with the million-headed
hydra
of
empirical reality,
he would re-
turn
home,
not look around in the world
any more,
and create
imagina-
tively, producing phantoms
from his innermost
being. Thus, just
like the
type,
the
proto-phenomenon
is a means of
simplifying
the
study
of na-
ture.l6a
It relieves the
investigator
of the need to
go
on forever
collecting
data,
for truth can be
perceived
in
symbolic phenomena, which,
once
16
ViCtor
(pp. 396, 545)
and Miiller
(pp. Ixvi-lxviii)
came to the same conclusion.
l"
See
above, p. 655,
n. 6.
663
Goethe's Science
found,
will
explain
all similar
phenomena,
whether known or
yet
to be dis-
covered."
It
might
be
objected
that Goethe's letter deals with his
problems
as
an author and that it is
impermissible
to
apply
statements about his
literary
work to his activities as a student of nature.
However,
Goethe
himself would
hardly
have made such a distinction. He was
fully
aware
(although
he denied this when he
argued
with the
Newtonians)
that he
was
primarily
a
poet
and that he could not shed his nature when he
turned to scientific
pursuits.l8
He
knew, too,
that "the
phenomenon
is not
separated
from the
observer;
rather it is involved
in,
and intertwisted
with,
his
individuality" (MR,
No.
1020).
Thus he could
say
of his
journal
Zur
Morphologie
that it was intended to
explain
"how I
study nature,
but
at the same
time,
in a
way,
to reveal
my
inward
self, my
mode of
being."19
17
There
is,
to be
sure,
an alternative to the modest
and,
if one
will, skeptical interpreta-
tion of the term
proto-phenomenon
which we have
proposed.
This alternative-it is the
only
one
open
to those
unwilling simply
to
repeat
the term in
pious
wonder-is to
say
that
"Urphanomen"
in the
Theory of
Colors means the basic
opposition
between
light
and
darkness itself. A number of
distinguished scholars,
Karl Vietor
among them,
have in
fact
adopted
this
alternative,
but if their
interpretation
saves Goethe's
concept,
it accuses
him, implicitly
at
least,
of an
extraordinarily
loose use of the
language.
For even if
light
and darkness
might conceivably
be
thought
of as
phenomena,
their
opposition
is not a
phenomenon,
because it cannot be observed.
Moreover,
those who took this view realized
quite clearly
that it makes the terms
proto-phenomenon
and
type
mean
virtually
the
same
thing. They
declared that the
proto-phenomenon
has the same function in Goethe's
physics
that the
type
has in his
biology.
Now the
type
is not a
phenomenon;
it is an idea.
Only during
the earliest
stages
of his
biological
studies did Goethe search for an actual
"Urpflanze,"
a
primal plant
or
proto-plant.
Not a trace is left of the
"Urpflanze" concept
in The
Metamorphosis of
Plants of
1790,
and if he did cherish a
lingering hope
of
finding
the
proto-plant
in an actual botanical
specimen,
he was
finally
disabused of this
hope by
Schiller in their famous conversation of 20
July
1794. The
proto-phenomenon,
on the other
hand,
is definitely
a
phenomenon
and not an idea. This is not only implied by
the term
which Goethe
coined,
but it is also confirmed
by
the definitions of it which he
gave.
Goethe's
argument
in the
Theory of
Colors is as clear as it is novel and
challenging:
he asserts that
the
phenomena
carry their own
explanations
with
them,
and that the
explanations
can
be found in
phenomena
of a
special
kind-the
proto-phenomena.
This
argument
becomes
meaningless
if we assume that Goethe said
"phenomenon"
but meant
"idea,"
because
there would be
nothing
new in the assertion that the observation of
phenomena
can
give
rise to ideas. It is
preferable,
I
think,
to believe that Goethe was mistaken than to believe
that he uttered
platitudes.
18
See
my
"Goethe und die
Naturwissenschaft,"
p.
508,
n. 2.
19
Bedeutende Fordernis
(1823),
JA, xxxrx,
48.
Significantly,
Goethe says
in this
pas-
sage
that his earlier
essay,
"Der Versuch als
Vermittler,"
is a
particularly
clear revelation
both of himself and of his methods in the
study
of nature (see p. 659, above).
Goethe also
reversed the idea:
just
as a man's character is revealed
through
his attitude toward
nature,
so he discovers who he is
through
observation of the world outside. Discovery
Goethe
defines as
"becoming
aware of one's inward self on the occasion of an external
phenom-
enon,"
and he adds: "Man
gains certainty of his own nature
through recognizing
that the
nature outside is like him,
is
governed by laws"
(JA, xxxrx, 38; cf. JA, xxxix, 49).
664
Heinrich Henel
And he wrote:
"My
whole inward
working proved
to be a heuristic
proc-
ess, which, recognizing
a
yet unknown,
but
conjectured law, attempts
to
find the same in the external
world,
and to introduce it there."20 What
strikes us most in this sentence is that "to find" and "to introduce" are
used as
interchangeable
terms. This makes sense
only
if Goethe's
theory
of
anticipatory knowledge
is
accepted.
And if the
phenomena
are in-
volved in the
individuality
of the
observer,
then
surely
the
proto-phe-
nomena are even more
deeply
involved in it: the character and
approach
of the
investigator
determine what
proto-phenomena
he will find.
A more serious
objection
can be made to
my
distinction between the
two
ways
in which Goethe
explained
his methods of
gaining knowledge.
He himself made no such
distinction,
nor am I able to
say
that the second
explanation superseded
the first in his
writings.
Nevertheless I believe
the distinction is useful. Goethe made a
great many
statements about
his methods and their
epistemological foundations, but,
as
Giinther
Mtil-
ler observed
very wisely, they
were
rarely
meant as final
pronouncements.
Most of them were made with a
specific
situation in
mind-they
were
monologues continuing
the conversation with friends or
opponents.
In
his studies of
nature,
Goethe found himself in a
position
where he had to
fight
the
pure empiricists
on the one hand and the
pure theorists,
the
mathematical
physicists,
on the other. When he
argued against
the
former,
he insisted that observation and
thought
are
inseparable
and
that
perception
itself is a form of
theorizing;
but when he
argued against
the latter he stressed the
importance
of the
phenomena
and cautioned
against
the substitution of intellectual
concepts
for observable facts. His
position
was solid when he asserted that nature cannot be understood
by
merely cataloguing empirical data;
it was much less solid when he at-
tacked the abstractions of mathematical
physics
as mere chimeras.
Hence his
uncertainty,
and hence his failure to notice the
inconsistency
of the two kinds of
explanation
which I have
distinguished.
The second
explanation represents
his true
opinion;
the first was
produced by
the
exigencies
of
controversy.
Let me summarize. Goethe declared
repeatedly
that he was not a born
observer and that there was a conflict between his character and em-
pirical experience.2
It was
only
at the
age
of
thirty
that he trained him-
self to observe
closely
and that he became a
systematic
student of na-
20
MR,
No. 486. The translation is R. D.
Gray's (p. 96).
21
In the letter to Schiller
already
mentioned
(p. 663, above),
Goethe
speaks
of "the
conflict... between
my
nature and immediate
experience,
which in former times I was
never able to resolve." And in
Naturwissenschaftlicher Entwicklungsgang (1821)
he admits
that he
"very
soon turned
against
visible
nature,"
that he was not born with a
sharp
sense
of
sight,
and that this
gave
him
(the
poet's) ability
to see the
gracefulness
of
things (JA,
xxxix, 46).
665
Goethe's Science
ture. On the other
hand,
he had been interested in natural
phenomena
since childhood and had
given
them much
thought.
Thus he had formed
ideas about nature
long
before he
began
to
study
it in
earnest,
and it is
not
surprising
to find that these ideas determined the
goals
of his later
work.22 Those who have
difficulty
in
accepting
Goethe's
theory
of antici-
patory
knowledge
may, therefore, say
that the
principles
which he redis-
covered in nature were
really
ideas
going
back to his formative
years.
At
any rate,
whatever their
origin,
Goethe felt the need of
confirming
his ideas
by
a most
painstaking study
of
nature,
but at the same time the
results of his studies were in
large
measure
predetermined by
his
general
beliefs. He was an ardent student of
nature,
but not a
scientist;
and he
was a
profound thinker,
but not a
philosopher.
That is to
say,
his im-
mense interest in
physical reality
did not
prevent
him on occasion from
neglecting,
or
doing
violence
to,
facts which did not fit into his
general
frame of ideas
(a failing
which was noted even
by
such
early
and devoted
followers as Eckermann and
Schopenhauer);23 while,
on the other
hand,
he was not content with
building
a
philosophical system
which is valid
because of its inner coherence and
logical consistency.
He
spoke
of a new
kind of science which would be both methodical and
mystical (MR,
No.
896),
and it is this dual or
ambiguous position
which has
challenged (as
well as
embarrassed)
innumerable
interpreters,
and which has defied a
fully satisfactory analysis.
Goethe called his new science also
"ideell,"
i.e., governed by ideas,
and
perhaps
this
description
is the most
helpful,
because it connects his stud-
ies of nature with his creative work in literature.
According
to his own
testimony,
it was his
purpose
as an author "to
give poetic
form to
reality"
rather than "to realize the so-called
poetic,
the
merely
fanciful."24 A simi-
lar
purpose
can be discovered in his studies of nature. He
rejected
the
nature
philosophy
of the romanticists because it seemed
merely
a
product
of the mind and not based on observation. On the other
hand,
he
rejected
mathematical
physics
because it seemed to shatter the
phenomena per-
ceived
by
the
senses,
and to be
incapable
of
piecing
the
fragments
to-
gether again
and thus of
producing
a
comprehensive
view of nature.
By
contrast,
Goethe
kept
intact the
pictorial quality
of the world around us
and
attempted
to "see" the
meaning
of the
pictures
which nature
pre-
sents to the observer.
Or,
to
change
the
metaphor,
one
might say
that he
22
One such strain of
early
ideas was examined
recently
in R. D.
Gray's book,
Goethe
the Alchemist.
23
J.. Eckermann, Gesprache
mit
Goethe,
19 Feb.
1829,
ed. Eduard
Castle, I,
259 f. and
II,
164. Goethe on his
part
reacted
sharply against
the heresies of his
pupils.
At least one of
his
poems
on color
theory
is directed
against Schopenhauer.
See also
Gray, p. 113,
n. 1.
24
Dichtung
und
Wahrheit,
Book 18
(JA, xxv, 67).
666
Heinrich Henel
tried to read the ideas manifested in nature off the
phenomena
as music
is read off the sheets. He himself described the
process
as
"gegenstand-
liches Denken" or "anschauliches Denken"
(objective thinking
or intui-
tive
thinking),
and he insisted that it had served him
equally
well in his
literary production
and in his studies of nature.26 What he meant was
that his
thinking
was stimulated
by gazing upon specific objects
and that
the elements or units with which his mind
operated
were
images
and not
abstractions. His
imagination, being
that of a
poet,
seized
upon
the
phenomena
and saw in them the manifestations of ideas which were also
powers
and almost like
persons.
Nature itself was to Goethe a
living
force,
not dead matter controlled
by
laws which can be
statistically
established. This
hylozoistic
view of nature26 made it
impossible
for him
to
accept
the materialism of science or to be satisfied with its
explana-
tions in terms of cause and effect. Like
Schopenhauer,
he
distinguished
between the
elementary
forces
("Urkrafte")
which
produce
the
physical
phenomena,
and the causes
(Goethe
called them
merely conditions)
which determine the manner in which these forces act on
specific
occa-
sions. Therefore to understand the causes or conditions of the
phenomena
was not
yet
to understand their
origin.
It was
merely
a
preparatory step
which showed that the
confusing variety
of
empirical phenomena
was
due
only
to
varying
accidental conditions. The
greater
task was to see
that
they
were all
produced by
a few constant "Urkrafte." The
colors,
for
example,
Goethe described as
products
of the actions and
sufferings
of
light.
There is a "refined
anthropomorphism"27
in Goethe's
conception
of
nature,
and his
theory
of
colors,
taken as a
whole, might
be called a
modern
mythology.
It is a
mythology
because it resembles the
myths
of
the ancients in
hypostasizing
certain
phenomena
like
magnetism
and
light,
and in
explaining
the
physical
universe as
resulting
from their co-
operation, conflict, sublimation,
and reunion on a
higher level;
but it is
a modern
mythology
because it builds
on,
indeed contributes
to,
the
body
of fact collected
by
observational
science,
and because it is
anthropo-
morphic only
on the
highest
level of theoretical
explanation.28
Whereas
the ancients identified
every fountain, rock,
and tree with a "local
god"
(Hermann
Usener's
phrase)
and thus
explained
nature
by creating
a
fanciful world of
nymphs, oreads,
and
dryads,
Goethe summarized
(or
better, integrated)
the
phenomena
of
everyday experience
in
images
which are
only faintly anthropomorphic.
He offered a
genuine theory,
26 Bedeutende Fdrdernis
(JA, xxxix,
48
f.).
26
Giinther Muller,
Introd. to
MR, pp.
lxiv f.
27
Ernst
Cassirer, p.
58.
28
Cf.
MR,
No. 895: "In the sciences it is most meritorious to return to the insufficient
truths which the ancients
possessed,
and to
improve upon
them."
667
Goethe's Science
but since he was
dealing
with the
pictorial
world
perceived by
the
eye,
his
universals, too,
could not be abstracts but had to be visualized ideas
-the
proto-phenomena.
Goethe set himself a
gigantic
task: he
attempted
to rival science both
as an observer and as a theorist. His theories were meant to
explain
the
world around us in human terms and thus to reestablish the ancient be-
lief in the
psycho-physical unity
of
existence,
in what former
ages
called
the
correspondence
between macrocosm and microcosm. And his observa-
tions,
which he made in the conviction that "man himself ... is the
greatest
and most accurate
physical apparatus" (MR,
No.
1265),
were
meant to
support
these theories.
Thus, although
he
gave
an immense
amount of time and care to
observation,
it would be
wrong
to conclude
that for Goethe the
purpose
of observation was the same as for the
scientist. He observed as an artist
observes,
not to collect data for
gen-
eralized
conclusions,
but to
acquire
a
personal
skill or
mastery.
Observa-
tion for Goethe was a means of
training
the
observer,
an exercise in the
acquisition
of intuitive
assurance,
a
preparation
for the ultimate task of
perceiving types
and
proto-phenomena. Just
as an artist might
study
hundreds of roses so that when the time came he could
paint
the rose
(which
is both a
reproduction
of the
specific
model before him and an
image
of what all roses
are),
so Goethe studied individual
objects
and
phenomena
so as to learn how to
perceive types
and
proto-phenomena.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
Madison 6
668