Lecture: Lessons Learned on Current Operations of the Naxalites (Maoist Communists of India) MILS671: The Non State Soldier

American Military University Martin Scott Catino, Ph.D. Instructor

Summary: Current counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts of the government of India have yielded much success yet are limited by structural defects stemming from poor governance, a situation exploited by the Naxalites. Indias security forces (the Indian Armed Forces) have exploited the overstretch of Naxalite forces while rapidly applying lessons learned and effective intelligence gathering. The current situation on the ground reveals a major tactical success of Indias COIN program, as well as the shortcomings of the same when effective governance is not realized at the local level.

BACKGROUND 1. Emergence. The Naxalites emerged from a shifting and conflictive organizational and party apparatus based on radical communist ideology following the teachings of Mao Zedong. In 1967 these communists emerged from a faction of the Communist Party of India and attacked landlords in West Bengal, thereby beginning a communist uprising. 2. Early success. The Naxalites successes stemmed from geographical isolation, forested terrain useful for sanctuary and evasion, and tribal and rural marginalization from the central government of India, all factors exploitable by the Communist leadership/politburo. 3. Overplaying ones hand. Throughout the successive decades, the Naxalites met with measured success and severe setbacks. Locals and urbanites in particular became repulsed at the target killings and radical agenda, and internecine fighting weakened the Party leadership. Attempts of the Naxalites to expand into other regions of India met with resistance at the national level as well as locally.

4. Survivability. Nonetheless, the Naxalites have demonstrated to the present a notable capability for survival. The following factors are evident. a. The Naxalites are able to replace rapidly their senior leadership. b. The message of the Naxalites resonates with the tribal populace, and rural poor exploited and neglected by Delhi. c. The Naxalites are able to exploit the urban-rural divide and the power vacuum in the tribal areas, using social services and shadow or competing governance to subvert Delhis rule. 5. Current threat to Indias security. a. The Naxalites have killed more people in India that another terrorist/insurgent groups combined. b. The Naxalites are currently collaborating and consorting with Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and thereby can augment ISI capabilities against India, as well as Naxalite lethal capabilities against India. 6. Current capabilities and force strength. The Naxalites are well organized in leadership structure, and have 20,000 fighting forces that are well armed and well trained. Although weapons procurement is flexible, locally and internationally procured (see map on previous page), the lack of uniformity or standardization of weapons diminishes this capacity. MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED 1. Indian Armed Forces rapidly developed intelligence, counter-subversion (infiltration), and tactical flexibility in COIN operations, using these assets against the Naxalites. 2. Indian Armed Forces increased not only the capacity to gather intelligence, but also the ability to share information, and to apply lessons learned to tactical operations. Case in point, Indian security forces overextended their COIN forces and thereby became vulnerable to attacks and losses. 3. Indian counter-guerrilla forces effectively won local battles and drove insurgent forces from the field (effective clearing operations). 4. Delhis use of soft power, the ability to address grievance and reform governance occurred locally and sporadically, but not without success. The problem involves applying these reforms uniformly and over a large area of insurgent held territory. 5. Effective decapitation strategy targeting the senior leadership of the Naxalites succeeded to no small degree. Seven of twenty two politburo members of the Naxalites currently remain alive. 6. Diminution and degradation of territorial control. Indian security forces have not only reduced the area of insurgent control (from 223 to 182 districts) but also the level of control within these districts (many being loosely held and in the beginning stages of organization).