IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v.

) Criminal No. 09-759 (JLL) ) LOUIS M. MANZO, ) ) Defendant. )

PETITION FOR AN ORDER AND FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANT MANZO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES PAYABLE BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND/OR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WITH SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT

Louis M. Manzo Pro Se

JURISDICTION

Defendant Manzo meets the standing requirements of the Equal Access to Justice Act and the requirements of the Hyde Amendment as applied in the criminal context. See Equal Access to Justice Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. 2412 and 18 U.S.C. 3006A. Public Law 105-119.7 Section 617 which amended 18 U.S.C. 3006A (Adequate Representation of Defendants). These laws allow a court to award a prevailing defendant a reasonable attorneys fee and other litigation expenses when the federal prosecution was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust. Section 617 is popularly known as the Hyde Amendment, named after its sponsor, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL). On or about July 23, 2009, Louis Manzo and Ronald Manzo, were arrested and charged in a complaint with conspiracy to commit extortion under color of right in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The charges arise from alleged dealings with long-time government informant Solomon Dwek. The two were arrested along with many others in a publicity-tinged "take down" of public officials.
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On or about October 6, 2009, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Louis Manzo and Ronald Manzo. As in the complaint, the indictment alleged a conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right, attempted extortion under color of official right, and travel in interstate commerce to promote, carryon and facilitate bribery. On January 27, 2010, defendant Manzo submitted several pretrial motions, including challenges to the charges themselves. Defendant Ronald Manzo joined in said motions by letter also filed on January 27, 2010. On March 23, 2010, the Court held a hearing on said motions, disposing of several and reserving decision on others. The Government filed a supplemental letter regarding said motions on March 24, 2010. On April 20, 2010, the Government returned a Superseding Indictment against defendants Ronald Manzo and Louis Manzo adding a new charge of violation of the mail fraud act 18 U.S.C.A. 1341 and 2. On May 18, 2010, the Hon. Jose Linares, U.S.D.J. issued his opinion regarding the pending motions and (1) granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the Hobbs Act charges contained in Counts 1-4 of the Superseding Indictment in its entirety, (2) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment in its entirety based on outrageous government conduct (3) denied Defendants' motion for discovery of the grand jury

proceedings and (4) denied Defendants' motion for discovery of the requested Jack Shaw recording. On May 24, 20 10, the Government filed a Notice of Appeal to the Third Circuit from the Hon. Jose L. Linares's, J.D.C. Order dismissing the Hobbs Act Counts of the Superseding Indictment. On January 11, 2011, oral argument took place in Philadelphia, PA. before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and on May 16, 2011, that Court entered a Judgement affirming the decision of Judge Linares. The Government then sought two extensions in order to consider the filing of a request for an en bane hearing before the Third Circuit, but ultimately chose to seek a second superseding indictment instead. In July 2011, Defendant Ronald Manzo pled guilty to charges contained in another indictment, which resulted in the dismissal of the charges against him in the first superseding indictment. Ronald Manzo agreed to testify against his co-defendant, Dennis Elwell in the other indictment, and did so from June 20-23, 2011 in the United States District Court before the Hon. Jose Linares. Despite Ronald Manzo having clearly exculpated the defendant, Louis Manzo from any wrongdoing, on June 24, 2011, the day after Ronald Manzo finished testifying, the Government brought the charges within the second

superseding indictment, solely against Louis Manzo two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to promote, carryon and facilitate bribery [18 USC 1952 (a) (3)] and misprision of a felony [18 USC 4]. On February 17, 2012, the Hon. Jose Linares, U.S.D.J. issued his opinion regarding newly filed motions pertaining to the second superseding indictment and (1) granted Defendants' motion to dismiss all charges in its entirety, and (2) withheld judgement, rendering as moot, other motions of the defendant relative to substantive government misconduct and selective prosecution. Defendant Louis Manzos attests that his net worth is less than $2,000,000.00 and the defendant is therefore eligible to receive said award of attorney fees. This petition has been filed within 30 days of final judgment in the criminal case and is therefore timely filed under the EAJA and Title 18 USC provisions. The criminal case was filed after the effective date of the act, November 26, 1997, in this district and tried before this court. The Undersigned defendant, Louis Manzo, acting pro se, retained the services of John P. Lynch Esq. a sole practitioner engaged primarily in criminal defense practice and with over 30 years experience. The financial

agreement was a flat fee of $150,000 for all work prior to trial, and an agreement of an additional $50,000 for trial. Defendant has paid to date, with an outstanding balance of still owed to counsel.

Defendant Louis Manzo was the prevailing party within the meaning of the Act and submits that the prosecution was vexatious, frivolous and in bad faith both on the United States Attorneys Office for the District of New Jersey, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of Justice, all being Departments of the United States of America, plaintiff herein. There are no special circumstances that make this award unjust.

ARGUMENT

1.) The government misapplied three relevant laws to wrongfully prosecute Defendant Manzo, despite precautions cited in DOJ guidelines. The government applied legal alchemy in attempting to charge Manzo, a candidate for public office, as a public official. The prosecution wrongfully proceeded on this theory in charging the Hobbs Act, The Travel Act and the New Jersey Bribery statute. Despite the clear language of the Appellate Court decision that candidates are a distinct classification under the law, the

government persisted to indict Defendant Manzo a third time, contrary to both Courts opinion. These discrepancies were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3. 2.) The government willfully proceeded with defendant Manzos prosecution, despite having learned from the testimony of their own government witness, under oath, at trial before the second superseding indictment, and in debriefing sessions prior to and subsequent to the indictment, that the charges, facts, and allegations in the indictment were false. The government never alerted the trial Court during such testimony that the governments witness had offered untruthful statements. (SEE EXHIBIT A and B) 3.) The arrest and case against Louis Manzo was initiated by prosecutors with the clear appearance of conflicts of interests, and who disregarded DOJ guidelines and federal law requiring them to recuse themselves from a matter if such participation may result in a personal, financial, or

political conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof. 28 USC 528. The threshold for recusal cited in the United States Attorneys Manual (USAM) is where a conflict of interest exists or there is the appearance of a conflict of interest or loss of impartiality. USAM 3-27-260. In

determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution or take any action against a person, the standard imposed by the USAM is the attorney for the government should not be influenced by political associationor the possible affect of the decision on the attorneys own professional or personal circumstances. USAM 9-27.260. In February of 2009, at a campaign event in West Windsor, NJ, Christie publicly intimated that he was still in contact with USAO staff from his old office and stated he would be bringing some to Trenton. A text of Christie's comments: "You know, we're going to ferret out waste and fraud and abuse in government. I think you know I'll do that better than anybody. I've got a group of US Attorneys sitting down in Newark still doing their job. But let me tell you, they are watching the newspapers. And after we win this election, I'm going to take a whole group ofthem to Trenton and put them in every one of the departments because they saw a lot of waste and abuse being investigated while we were in the US Attorney's office that didn't rise to the level of a crime. So I told them, the good news is, when we get to Trenton we don't have to worry about beyond a reasonable doubt anymore." The first of Christie's campaign contributions from USAO attorneys arrived within weeks of the speech, according to New Jersey ELEC records. Members of the office who personally or whose family members made

donations and later obtained jobs in the Christie administration include: Robert Hanna from AUSA to Director N.J. Division of Law; Richard E. Constable III from AUSA to N.J. Deputy Labor Commissioner; Charles McKenna from Exec. Asst. to the United States Attorney to ultimately N.J. Homeland Security Director; Debra Gramiccioni, formally AUSA in charge of the Commercial Crimes Unit under Christie was later promoted to the Director of the Authorities Unit in the New Jersey Attorney General's Office; Rosemary Iannacone from Chief Administrator USAO to Director of Operations New Jersey Governor's Office. Other former key members of the USAO involved in Bid Rig III who obtained employment in or through the Christie Administration include Ralph Marra now Director of the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority and Michele Brown now Appointments Counsel, Thomas Calcagni now Director of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs and Christopher Gramiccioni (also a donor), husband of Debra Gramiccioni, now First Assistant Prosecutor for Monmouth County. Gramiccioni was personally responsible for the handling of the previous indictments against Louis Manzo in this case. Some of these same and other prosecutors negotiated jobs and accepted the employment prospects promised by Christie, while the Bid Rig III

investigations and prosecutions that they were overseeing - and which buoyed Christies campaign - were still ongoing. Ironically, one of the charges alleged against Louis Manzo is that he promised employment for an illicit campaign contribution. In August of 2009, it was disclosed that Christie had given Michele Brown a personal loan of $46,000.00 which he than failed to report on his ethics financial disclosure statement and federal income tax report. It was revealed that Brown had been paying back the loan to the Republican candidate for Governor of New Jersey while still overseeing an investigation and prosecution of Democrat candidates for office in Hudson County, which would ultimately benefit Christie's campaign. Christie called his failure to report the loan an honest mistake. The uncovering of Brown and Christie's discreet loan led to a barrage of complaints from the campaign of Christie's opponent in the election for Governor, Jon Corzine. The campaign had requested FOIA requests regarding Brown and Christie's work, travel and expense schedules. Brown had personally taken charge of the requests despite an obvious conflict of interest due to her and Christie's financial relationship.

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At the same time another incident regarding a breach of ethics and laws by Brown, concerning her activities with Bid Rig III, were uncovered by the New York Times. An article dated October 20, 2009 reported:

" .. .interviews with federal law enforcement officials suggest that Ms. Brown used her position in two significant and possibly improper ways to try to aid Mr. Christie in his run for governor. In mid-June, when F.B.I. agents and prosecutors gathered to set a date for the arrests of more than 40 targets of a corruption and money-laundering probe, Ms. Brown alone argued for the arrests to be made before July 1. She later told colleagues that she wanted to ensure that the arrests occurred before Mr. Christie's permanent successor took office, according to three federal law enforcement officials briefed on the conversation, presumably so that Mr. Christie would be given credit for the roundup ... 13 News of Mr. Christie's loan to Ms. Brown broke in August ... Less than two weeks later, Justice Department officials told Mr. Christie's interim replacement, Ralph Marra to remove Ms. Brown from acting as coordinator of the Freedom ofInformation Act requests about Mr. Christie's tenure because of the obvious conflict of interest, according to a federal law enforcement official briefed on the communications. Ms. Brown resigned from the prosecutor's office the same day, the official said." Because Brown had since resigned her position by the time the New York Times published its story, no immediate action was taken by neither the DOJ nor the USAO. Subsequently, various internet news sources reported that Brown, while still in a supervisory position in the United States Attorney's Office, had attended a social gathering held at candidate Christie's Mendham home.
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Though not billed as a political event, many of the attendees were Republican County Chairmen, legislators and campaign staffers." Shortly after Christie's election victory, The Star Ledger reported on November 29, 2009, that Brown had been employed as a volunteer "helping recruit lawyers from the U.S. Attorneys office for the Christie transition team." Many of the actual staff from the USAO that she recruited had been and were still actively working on the Bid Rig III ongoing investigation and prosecution. In light of the impact that the prosecution of the Democratic office seekers in Hudson County would have on the New Jersey election for Governor (SEE EXHIBIT C), as well as on the future employment prospects for members of the USAO and their families, individuals from the USAO who were investigating and prosecuting Bid Rig III - and had a stake in Christie's election - were required by previously cited agency guidelines and law to recuse themselves from the investigation and prosecution. They did not. In its response to this allegation, during oral arguments, the United States Attorneys Office did not dispute, nor offer any rebuttal of the defendants allegations. They attempted to excuse this egregious misconduct of the United States Attorneys Office by stating:

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conflict of interest, even if it did exist at some point, certainly does not exist, that exists now, and certainly does not exist with respect to the indictment that we are going to hopefully go to trial for in the coming weeks, because that indictment has been independently reviewed by a democratically appointed United States Attorney.

The succession of prosecutors in the case does not remedy the harm handed down. Indeed, the democratically appointed United States Attorney who independently reviewed the matter had a further obligation under DOJ guidelines: shall report the evidence or non-frivolous allegation to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) or to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), and to EOUSA. USAM 1-4.100. 4.) The government relied on documents used for securing DOJ approval for the investigation and the confidential human sources otherwise illegal activity authorization that were tampered with and forged by the government. Contrary to strict Attorney General Guidelines, many of these documents were clipped and pasted together from copies of earlier dated documents with the earlier documents date still intact. It is also apparent that FBI agents and the CHS apparently pre-signed and postdated crucial affirmations attesting to the CHSs admonishments. These major legal infractions corroborates the denial of due process to the individuals who were targeted and then prosecuted. (SEE EXHIBIT D)

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These discrepancies were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3. 5.) The government failed to preserve Jencks material vital to defendant Manzos defense and proceeded to prosecute the case without intending to provide it. According to trial testimony by Solomon Dwek and FBI agents, the government failed to preserve in writing the FBI instructions given to Dwek during the hundreds of prep sessions before target meetings and which lasted sometimes up to an hour. According to the Attorney General Guidelines, when instructions are given to a confidential human source regarding Tier I or Tier II Otherwise Illegal Activity, and which are outside of the investigations mandatory 90day reporting sessions, and which might differ or expand the OIA that he has already been authorized to engage in, then the instructions must be commemorated in the sources file within 72 hours. According to the testimony at trial, the instructions were never preserved and placed in Dweks file. (Attorney General Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI

Confidential Humans Sources) These discrepancies were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3. (SEE EXHIBIT E)

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6.) Defendant Manzo was selectively targeted and prosecuted. Solomon Dweks allegations - testified to under oath - that he bribed Monmouth County and South Jersey elected officials who were still in office went unaddressed by prosecutors. Despite statements in investigation reports and in trial testimony, which corroborate the unlawful conduct regarding prominent New Jersey Republican party officials and elected officials, and a prominent Republican Party fundraiser - all with connections to Christie's campaign for Governor they were spared being targeted under dubious circumstances. These individuals, coincidentally, just so happened to play prominent roles in the gubernatorial campaign of Chris Christie, and some of these same officials actually ran for office with Christie on the same partisan ballot line in the November 2009 New Jersey general election. Moreover, when an actor presented Dwek with the opportunity to bribe the campaign of Chris Christie, he suspiciously declined - the only time he ever did. Such misconduct is remnant of the past National scandal involving United States Attorneys who were fired for failing to engage in selective prosecutions. Even if Dweks statements, under oath at trial, could not be believed without taped evidence, it fails to explain why the government allowed such direct testimony before a jury - if the government had reason to doubt Dwek,

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or why no further targeting or surveillance of these implicated officials was ever conducted, and why, instead, Dwek was used to target and tape Democrat party operatives and candidates in Hudson County, who had never been implicated by anyone as engaging in criminal activity. (SEE EXHIBIT F NARRATIVE AND SUPPORT DOCUMENTS) These discrepancies were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3. 7.) The government mishandled the Confidential Human Source. Undercover investigations that employ the use of confidential witnesses or informants (CI or CW) who act as agents for the government must adhere to protocol and guidelines established by the United States Attorney General. The guidelines are to ensure the integrity of an investigation and guarantee that the Constitutional rights of targets in the investigation are not violated. The AG's Guidelines establish the following restrictions for CI operations: under no circumstance may the CI participate in an act that constitutes obstruction of justice (e.g., perjury, witness tampering, witness intimidation, entrapment, or the fabrication, alteration, or destruction of evidence) or initiate or instigate a plan or strategy to commit a federal, state or local offense.

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The guidelines further require that when ever the FBI and USAO authorize a CI to engage in Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity, it must take all reasonable steps to: (a) supervise closely the illegal activities of the CI; (b) minimize the adverse effect of the authorized Otherwise Illegal Activity on innocent individuals. Solomon Dwek was authorized to engage in Tier 1 Otherwise Illegal Activity. The Tier 1 activity was defined as activity that "would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under federal, state, or local law if engaged in by a person acting without authorization; and that involves ... corrupt conduct, or the significant risk of corrupt conduct, by an elected public official or a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position in federal, state or local government." The definition makes it clear to all the government personnel who reviewed and signed .off on the forms that nonelected public officials, who were candidates for local public office, were outside the intended scope of investigations sanctioned by governments' guidelines. They ignored the guidelines and persisted to target non-public officials anyway. The Attorney General's Guidelines' authorization requirements are even more specific, stating, "The written authorization by the FBI Special Agentin-Charge and/or the Chief Federal Prosecutor shall be as narrow as

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reasonable under the circumstances as to the unlawful activity's scope, geographic area, duration and other related matters." The guidelines further instructed that, when Dwek was informed of, and given, his written instructions concerning the Otherwise Illegal Activity, an FBI Agent and another government official had to be present. The guidelines then clarify that Dwek was to be instructed that his participation in "any illegal activity other than the specific conduct set forth in the written authorization" could subject him to "criminal prosecution." Because of the Tenth Amendment Constitutional restrictions and prohibitions cited in the Public Integrity Section guidelines, any Otherwise Illegal Activity regarding or involving the local elections and campaigns that were underway, were crimes that were off limits and could never be authorized. Moreover, in order not to leave any lingering doubt, the guidelines further declare, "the Confidential Human Source shall not initiate or instigate a plan or strategy to commit a federal, state or local offense." A read of the governments' descriptions and recordings of the statement of facts as depicted in the investigation's criminal complaints and the indictments portrays election conduct. Indeed, the approach to candidates who were not elected or public officials was the entree of the ongoing election. Dwek was practically demanding that his targets take his campaign

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donations and not report him, as required, on their election financial disclosure forms. Sometimes he gave his donations to straw donors, who then fraudulently cut checks to candidates' campaigns. By way of example, Councilman Mariano Vega's criminal complaint summarized it best: ... CW further told defendant Vega that the check CW gave defendant Vega was 'only a small token,' and that the CW could be more generous as the election got closer, but had to figure out ways to contribute without the contributions coming back directly to the CW." Throughout the course of the sting operation the USAO and FBI expended close to $400,000 of checks and cash, of which at least half was utilized, according to the criminal complaints, in the elections of two cities in Hudson County - Jersey City and Hoboken. The monies were significant enough to have had the potential to prevent a runoff election in Jersey City's mayoral election, potentially altered the Jersey City at-large council election and affected the Hoboken Mayoral election. As previously stated, such unprecedented action served to disenfranchise the voters of both municipalities, corrupted the election results and violated the sovereign electoral process of States as protected by the United States Constitution.

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Without approval from the DOJ and USAO, Dwek cannot participate in criminal conduct. In the case at bar as in others developed during the sting, Dwek required more oversight since he planned and coerced crimes so extensively. (See Serrano complaint: pages 3,4,5; see King complaint: pages 3,4,5; see Webb-Washington complaint: pages 3,5,6; see Jaslow, Castagna, M. Manzo complaint: pages 3,4,5,6; Cammarano and Schaffer complaint: pages 7,8; Elwell complaint: page 5; Smith and Greene complaint: page 5; Vega complaint: pages 3,4,5,7; Shaw, Cheatam, Beldini complaint: pages 4,5,7,8,9,10,11,13; Louis Manzo and Ronald Manzo complaint: page 3 / indictment: pages 5,7. It is apparent that Dwek's use of the bounty system enabled four defendants (Shaw, Cheatam, Maher Khalil, and Dennis Jaslow) to operate as appendages for him, without the constraints of the AG's guidelines. In an apparent attempt to avoid the guideline requirements, the agents and prosecutors handling Dwek tried to portray his same conduct in two ways both as Tier 1 and Tier II Otherwise Illegal Activity. By doing so, they avoided the scrutiny of Department of Justice overseers. They could not authorize Otherwise Illegal Activity that federal law states the government cannot be involved in - affecting the outcomes of elections by passing off illicit campaign donations into active campaigns through straw donors or

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other means. Therefore, when convenient, they classified the same conduct as Tier II, in order to ensnare candidates who were not public officials; and Tier 1 when trying to ensnare public officials, but then they always failed to elaborate upon the "specific description" of the conduct that they had Dwek engaging in with the targets, as required by the authorization forms. Both the authorization forms and the Attorney General's Guidelines require the FBI to implement "precautionary measures" and that they "must take all reasonable steps to monitor closely the activities of the Confidential Human Source." They further required that the FBI "must take all reasonable steps to minimize the adverse effect of the Otherwise Illegal Activity on innocent persons." The Government did not. These discrepancies were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3. (SEE EXHIBIT G) 8.) The Government further flouted laws and regulations in its

prosecution of Louis Manzo in the context of his bank records. The United States Code of Federal Regulations prohibits anyone from "impeding or endeavoring to influence the due and proper administration of the law." (18 USC 1505) The government has only recently made known to the defense the existence of exculpatory evidence that they possessed prior to the initial

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indictment and that had never since been revealed - the bank statements of Louis Manzo and the bank statements of the campaign account. This evidence is part of the proof that Louis Manzo never accepted the "campaign donations" offered from Dwek. Louis Manzo knew that the government had accessed his bank records in August 2009, after his arrest but prior to the first indictment. The bank had notified him that his accounts were being closed, but declined to state a reason. Manzo inquired if the closing of the accounts were in relation to his arrest and if the government had obtained his bank records. Again, the bank declined to answer. When Manzo personally appeared at the bank, he learned by accident, and not from government or bank personnel, that the government had in fact been made privy to his financial records. Under 12 U.S.C. 3413(i) & 12 US.C. 3409 a financial institution must disclose to its customers whether the government has secured their account. An exception occurs when the government issues a grand jury subpoena, and obtains a Court Order sealing the existence of the subpoena. To obtain such an order, the government must show that revealing the existence of its subpoena would endanger life or safety, flight from prosecution, or destruction of evidence. In this case, involving campaign

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donations, the government cannot genuinely claim that any of the above apply. In certain circumstances, a financial institution is precluded from revealing the existence of a grand jury subpoena. See 18 U.S.C. 1510 (i.e., bank fraud, money laundering, etc.). In these instances, at the point in time after the Grand Jury has issued an indictment, the evidence must be disclosed to the defense. That was not the situation in this case, and the Governments intrusion into the defendant's bank records violated Louis Manzo's due process rights and caused him great personal financial harm. The government stated in oral arguments that they subpoenaed the bank records, but had never provided this discovery to the defense as provided by law. These discrepancies were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3. 9.) The government failed to present exculpatory evidence to the Grand Juries, and willfully and knowingly presented false evidence to all of the defendants Grand Juries. During the oral arguments on motions, the government acknowledged that Ronald Manzo was not the campaign manager of defendants mayoral campaign, and moved to strike the language

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from the indictment. The damage, unfortunately, was already repeatedly done. Ronald Manzo was never Louis Manzo's campaign manager. This information was presented to the Government as reciprocal discovery in the initial indictment, pointed out in Defendant's Third Circuit brief, and is clearly documented with Louis Manzo's campaign filings. An individual named Sean Connolly was the campaign manager. Since the government vetted Louis Manzo's campaign records when it alleged violations of the New Jersey Election Laws, it clearly was aware of this situation. Nevertheless, they chose to deliberately ignore it in the presentation to the Grand Jury for the Second Superseding Indictment. The Government apparently desired to advance a relationship between Ronald and Louis Manzo that was more than just siblings - it was serious business. More than brotherly support, it was made to appear as formal, structured direction. However, that portrayal was blatantly untrue and prejudiced the Grand Juries against Mr. Manzo. Moreover, the Court should disclose the Grand Jury materials, to determine if the Government fulfilled its obligation to present exculpatory evidence. As indicated supra, Ronald Manzo, Louis Manzo's brother and

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former co-defendant consistently and repeatedly testified in United States v. Elwell, that this defendant was completely unaware of the illicit activities of himself, Dwek, Shaw and Cheatam. Since Ronald Manzo concluded his testimony on June 23, 2011, and the indictment against Louis Manzo was returned within days, it is extremely doubtful that the Grand Jury was appraised of this crucial evidence. Yet, the Department of Justice has mandated that such evidence be presented to the Grand Jury. United States Attorney's Manual Reg. 9-11.233 pertains to the presentation of exculpatory evidence and states: In United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992), the supreme Court held that the Federal courts' supervisory powers over the grand jury did not include the power to make a rule allowing the dismissal of an otherwise valid indictment where the prosecutor failed to introduce substantial exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. It is the policy of the Department of Justice, however, that when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person. While a failure to follow the Department's policy should not result in dismissal of an indictment, appellate courts may refer violations of the policy to the Office of Professional Responsibility for review.

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Should the disclosure of the Grand Jury materials reveal an absence of the presentation of such testimony, as the defendant anticipates, the arguments contained elsewhere in this brief, pertaining to selective prosecution and misconduct on the part of the Government through the complete disregard and disdain for its own rules are further buttressed. Here, the particularized need for disclosure of the grand jury materials is both real and substantial: the grand jurors likely indicted based on an incorrect understanding of the law and facts. By also charging misprision of felony, along with the Travel Act violations, the Government had portrayed Manzo as a bystander to the machinations of his brother and Ed Cheatam, and an active participant with them in a bribery scheme. The defense was left with the impression that the grand jury misunderstood the standards for indicting under those statutes and returned a superseding indictment based on improper and convoluted evidence. Indeed, if discovery and a later evidentiary hearing confirm that this impression is true, the prejudice here would be clear and obvious. Louis Manzo should not have been indicted. The discrepancies in the initial and first superseding indictment were overlooked by prosecutors with conflicts of interest cited in argument 3.

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Applicable Law In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) the Court held: The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Similary, United States v. Shaygan, 661 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1292 (S.D.Fla. 2009) held: ... it is the responsibility of the United States Attorney and his senior staff to create a culture where 'win-at-any-cost' prosecution is not permitted. Indeed, such a culture must be mandated from the highest levels of the United States Department of Justice and the United States Attorney General. It is equally important that the courts of the United States must let it be known that, when substantial abuses occur, sanctions will be imposed to make the risk of non-compliance too costly.

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Unfortunately, in the case at bar, "the win at any cost" mentality has pervaded the Governments prosecution of Louis Manzo. He was initially ensnared in the net of arrests focused on Democrats in Hudson County. As detailed supra, the Government exacerbated this selectivity through the illegitimate machinations it employed during the investigation and prosecution of BID RIG III; to wit, the mishandling of the confidential source, the blatant conflicts of interest, the "bounty system", the destruction of the text messages and the refusal to acknowledge Ronald Manzo's exoneration of his brother from any wrongdoing. However, most glaring is the Government's continued insistence in ignoring existing case law and wrongfully prosecuting Manzo as a "public official" when he was only a candidate. The statutory violations alleged in the indictment simply do not apply. This refusal to acknowledge that "candidates" are a separate class of individuals subject to separate laws Can only be deemed deliberate and in complete disregard of Louis Manzo's due process rights. Louis Manzo has also been the victim of selective prosecution within the parameters of the confidential human source Solomon Dwek, the timeframe preceding the 2009 gubernatorial election, and the Bid Rig III investigation. In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1966), the Supreme Court

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recognized that a claim of selective prosecution "is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the constitution". Under the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the decision to prosecute may not be based on "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification". Id. at 46465; see also Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000). "A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons ... with a mind so unequal and oppressive' that the system of prosecution amounts to a "practical denial" of equal protection of the law". Id. In a selective prosecution claim" the moving party must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the federal prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and (2) that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; see also United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 808 (11th Cir. 2000). Discriminatory effect is proven by showing that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted, Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1906), and discriminatory impact may be demonstrated by showing a disparate impact. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that disparate impact is sufficient to show a discriminatory effect).

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Discriminatory purpose examines whether the federal prosecution was carried out because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). Inquiry into discriminatory purpose is "practical" and must necessarily usually rely on objective factors. Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev'l Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). If direct evidence of discriminatory purpose is unavailable, the alleged

unconstitutional purpose must be examined in the context of(1) disparate impact; (2) historical background; (3) specific events leading up to the challenged decision; and (4) any associated legislative or administrative history. Arlington, 429 U.S. at 266-67. In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F. 2d 34, 36 (3nl Cir. 1986), the Court discussed the principle of selective prosecution in a habitual offender case: However, the Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutorial discretion, although broad, is subject to constitutional constraints. See Wayte, 105 S.Ct. at 1531. If a prosecutor's decisions on whom to prosecute are made on a discriminatory basis with an improper motive, the prosecutor's actions may constitute a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. See Yick W0 v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356, 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1072-73,30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 447 US. 907, 100 S.Ct. 2991, 64 L.Ed 2d 856 (1980); United States v. Aleman,
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609 F.2d 298, 305 (ih Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 US. 946,100 S.Ct. 1345,63 L.Ed2d 780 (1980); Crass v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 460 F.Supp. 941, 944 (E.D.Tenn. 1978), aff'd without opinion 627 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1980). In order to demonstrate that selective prosecution is a violation of equal protection, defendants must make two showings. See LeClair, 627 F.2d at 609; United States v. Torquato,602 F.2d 563, 569 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 444 US. 941, 100 S.Ct. 295, 62 L.Ed.2d 307 (1979); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Berrios 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). First, they must provide evidence that persons similarly situated have not been prosecuted. Second, they must show that the decisions were made on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, see Wayte, 105 S.Ct. at 1231; Martin, 549 F.2d at 52; United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1973), "such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.: Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456,82 S.Ct. at 506, or to prevent the defendant's exercise of a fundamental right, see United States v. Goodwin, 457 US. 368, 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 2485,2488-89, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). See, United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1209, (2nd Cir. 1974), where the Court dismissed the charges against the defendant because of selective and discriminatory prosecution, holding (after citing Oyler, supra.): Selective prosecution then can become a weapon used to discipline political foe and the dissident, see, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (ih Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).

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The prosecutor's objective is then diverted from the public interest to the punishment of those harboring beliefs with which the administration in power may disagree. This case involves such allegations.

During oral argument, the government stated that it did not proceed to target a prominent South Jersey Republican Official implicated by Dwek who had resigned from that position in 2007, just as Dwek's cooperation was beginning, and certainly at that point the Government had no longer had an opportunity to try to investigate that individual. The fact is that the individual transitioned from a public official to a party official, and was still listed in a succession of 90-day a authorization reports for the investigation through May of 2008. Shortly after the individuals name no longer appeared in the reports, the individual assumed a prominent role in the primary campaign and general election campaign of candidate Chris Christie. The defendant submits that the requisite showing for selective prosecution (EXHIBIT F) will more than amply be demonstrated. The standard for recusal is found in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009), where the United States Supreme Court held that "under our precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when the probability of bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."
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Though that case concerned a trial judge, the principles enunciated by the court are applicable to those decision makers at every level of a legal proceeding. Ethical codes delineate when an obligation for recusa1 is necessary, and when a decision is made not to recuse oneself, intervention by the judiciary is essential to protect a defendant's rights of due process. In a criminal proceeding, when one's liberty is at stake, the Supreme Court's standards apply to the investigation, grand jury and prosecution processes as well. On page 2256, the Caperton court cited Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510(1927): "Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man ... to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law," Recusal, as enunciated in the United States Attorneys Manual and previously cited, is mandated "where a conflict of interest exists or there is the appearance of a conflict of interest or loss of impartiality." In determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution or take any action against a person, the standard imposed by the USAM is "the attorney for the government should not be influenced by political association or the possible affect of the decision on the attorney's own professional or personal
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circumstances." This defendant has shown that conflicts abounded throughout this investigation, thus tainting the entire prosecution and bordering on obstruction. (Candidate Christies promise of jobs and

personal loan to prosecutors overseeing the defendants prosecution, donations from prosecutors overseeing defendants prosecution to Candidate Christies campaign, job negotiations with Governor-Elect and Governor Christie transition team and administration by prosecutors who were hired by Christie administration and who oversaw the defendants prosecution.) Because of the discretionary language of the Hyde Amendment and the district courts unique familiarity with trial court litigation, a district court is vested with discretion in ruling on a defendants motion under 3006A. United States v. Bowman, 380 F.3d 387, 390 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curium). As used in 3006A, the term frivolous, according to Bowman, is restricted to those cases where the Governments position is utterly without foundation in law or fact. Bowman, 380 F.3d at 390 (citing United States v. Beeks, 266 F.3d 880, 883-84 (8th Cir.2001)). In United States v. Heavrin, 330 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2003), the court rejected this more restrictive definition that had been applied by a lower court and defined frivolous under the Hyde criteria as: A frivolous position is one lacking a reasonable expectation of attaining sufficient material evidence by the time of trial. Id.

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In United States v. Manzo, the District Court and the Appellate Court characterized the governments theory of prosecution as legal alchemy. The government, further, could not cite not one legal precedent for bucking DOJ guidelines and persisted instead, despite a sound District Court and Appellate Court ruling, to continue to prosecute a candidate for office in an active election cycle as though he were a public official. The governments prosecution theory was void of its main necessity a public official. A prosecution is vexatious for purposes of the Hyde Amendment if the defendant can show that the criminal case was objectively deficient, in that it lacked either legal merit or factual foundation, and a showing that the Governments conduct, when viewed objectively, manifests maliciousness or an intent to harass or annoy. United States v. Knott, 256 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2001). In Heavrin, supra, the court said vexatious was similar to frivolous but is distinguished by embracing the distinct concept of being brought for the purpose of irritating, annoying, or tormenting the opposing party. A prosecution is brought in bad faith if it stems, not simply from bad judgment or negligence, but rather involves the conscious doing of a wrong based upon dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; ... it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. United States

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v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Certainly, the recusal requirements for prosecutors and the strict stipulations regarding conflicts of interest, as underscored by the Supreme Court in Caperton, were to circumvent a state of mind operating with furtive design or ill will, United States v Gilbert, and constitute "bad faith." Indeed, the mindset of these very prosecutors was described by the authors who were given a birds eye view of the investigation by the government, in their book depicting Bid Rig III (The Jersey Sting): The FBI and U.S. Attorneys

Office have an uncomplicated view of Hudson County politicians. To them, there were only two types: the crooked and the dead. In order to prevail on a motion for attorneys fees and costs under the Hyde Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate more than that he prevailed at the pretrial, trial or appellate stages of the prosecution; rather, he must show that the Governments position underlying the prosecution amounted to prosecutorial misconduct a prosecution brought vexatiously, in bad faith, or so utterly without foundation in law or fact as to be frivolous. In short, in order to grant a Hyde Amendment claim, a court must find that the governments conduct was wrong and outside the norm as defined by the above case law. Also see United States v. Stephens, 177 F. Supp.2d 1108, 1112-1115 (D. Mont. 2001), affirmed at United States v. Manchester

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Farming Partnership, 315 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2003), rehearing denied at 326 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). To make a prima facie case of selective or vindictive prosecution, defendant must show: (1) that someone similarly situated to him e.g. Republican figures listed in EXHIBIT F, were not prosecuted; and (2) the decision to prosecute was based on an impermissible ground. See United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978), such as charging candidate Manzo as a public official, despite precautions listed in government guidelines and without the support of legal precedent not one, solitary case law in the history of American jurisprudence to rely upon or support the government's theory of prosecution. One of the more egregious tactics in this case was the grossly negligent conduct of obtaining a superseding indictment without engaging in minimum due diligence. In the Heavrin case, supra, the Sixth Circuit held that it is improper. The superseding indictment was obtained to further harass Manzo because of his desire to exercise his First Amendment right to speak out against his perceived injustice excoriating past prosecutors for ignoring ethically driven DOJ guidelines requiring recusal in light of conflicts of interest, and excoriating current prosecutors for failing to take corrective actions as required by DOJ guidelines.

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The Heavrin court concluded that the case must be examined in the total context of the prosecution and it is possible to recover in cases where some counts were justified and others were not and this is best decided by the district court. Defendant submits that the totality of the circumstances surrounding this unusual and bizarre prosecution (the points in argument - 1 through 9) warrants an award of attorney fees in the amount claimed.

WHEREFORE, defendant moves the Court to award Mr. Manzo reasonable Attorney fees incurred.

Respectfully submitted,

Louis Manzo 409 8th Avenue Belmar NJ 07719

Dated: March 14, 2012

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