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Sachin Radhakrishnan Ethnic Conflict Kyle Joyce/Jakub Benes 19 March 2012 Natural Resources and Civil War: An Analysis of Three Studies Introduction: The link between natural resources and intrastate conflict is a widely discussed relationship in civil war literature. Conflict, which includes nonviolent protest, rebellion, and more widely studied, civil war, is considered to be a result of greed and/or grievance and the control of resources. The rebel group and governments ability to fund an uprising or suppression, respectively, through the exploitation of natural resources validates the relationship as well. However, questions over the types of resources, level of conflict, and affect on duration have prompted several scholars to undertake further research into the correlation. Recent literature that will be further examined in this paper includes, Michael Rosss 2004 article How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From Thirteen Cases, Pivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmores A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource in 2005, and Patrick Regan and Daniel Nortons 2005 work, Greed, Grievances, and Mobilization in Civil Wars. Michael Ross examined the effects of resource wealth on civil war onset, war duration, and intensity of conflict (casualties). The few, shaky linkages between natural resources and promoting conflict in civil war literature motivated Ross to undertake serious scrutiny into the causal mechanisms of resources and civil war onset in thirteen cases. The chosen cases provide optimal examples for causal mechanisms to aid in a more general study. His findings support the relationship between the promotion of conflict and oil, non-

Radhakrishnan 2 fuel minerals, and drugs, and no evidence to include legal agricultural commodities. Effects of resources on war duration reveal ambiguities as the case studies show wars being both prolonged and shortened (Ross, 35-38). Patrick Regan and Daniel Nortons work examines intrastate conflict at three different stages: nonviolent protest, rebellion, and civil war. They looked at the roles of inequality, repression, and resource exploitation in causing conflict at these three levels. Their catalyst for researching internal conflict came from disagreement with the widely considered belief of grievances and inequality leading to conflict. Both authors believed that grievance alone could do little to promote conflict as collective action would still require financial resources in addition to motivation. Also, the notion of inequality versus repression describes two separate situations in which a person reflects on the former as a grievance compared with others while the latter is compared with his/her own expectations. This implies that inequality does not provide adequate grievances in the first place to lead to civil war while repression does so by creating a collective problem with the government rather than amongst ones peers. Their findings claim that different factors contribute to each level of violence, government responses are crucial to rebel group behavior, and the idea of diamonds as inconclusive in matters of civil unrest (Regan and Norton, 319-327). Pivi Lujala et al. researched the relationship between diamond production, both primary and secondary, and the incidence and onset of civil war. They also examined this relationship within poor nations, countries with high ethnic fractionalization, and the period following the Cold War. The opportunity to undertake such extensive research on the role of diamonds arose when a new database on diamond deposits and production called DIADATA came into being for purposes like their study. The authors find a significant

Radhakrishnan 3 relationship between secondary diamond production and civil war onset, especially in nations with high ethnic divisions and production in the post-Cold War era. Primary diamond production was found to actually to make the onset and incidence of ethnic war less likely (Lujala et al., 538-540). For the remainder of this paper, these three articles will be discussed more in depth. I will first be examining the hypotheses for each article and the theoretical arguments behind one hypothesis per article. Then a comparison of the theoretical arguments and hypotheses between the authors will follow. After, I will outline the various data sets and research designs per article, then compare and contrast these components as well. Lastly, an empirical analysis for each articles hypothesis links the statistical data with the theoretical arguments. An overall comparison of the respective analyses rounds out the last section of the paper, which is then followed by the conclusion. I will conclude by examining the results as a whole in what they provide the field of civil war literature and the implications for the future for each article. Theory: Although the three articles deal with natural resources and their effects on promoting civil conflict, similar and different theoretical arguments provide backing for the several unique hypotheses that arise from the six authors. Rosss theoretical arguments can be split between explaining resources affecting onset of civil war, duration of war, and intensity of conflict. Regan and Nortons arguments are divided between factors that support either greed or grievance at different levels of conflict. Lujala et al. contend separate theoretical explanations for the type of diamonds that causes war and the context certain countries face ethnically, economically, and temporally.

Radhakrishnan 4 Michael Rosss work includes five broad theoretical frameworks that guide his research. 1.) Lootable natural resources provide the rebel forces the funding necessary to start war with the government. 2.) The governments exclusive control over natural resources could also create a grievance for rebels to fight. 3.) The exploitation of resources can either provide funding to rebel groups or the government. If the weaker side controlled those resources, it would be able to sustain conflict and increase duration, but oppositely, if the wealth goes to the stronger side, it increases their effectiveness in militarized conflict which would shorten wars. 4.) Provided resource exploitation is more attractive during wartime than peacetime for combatants, fighting will ensue rather than peace if the opposite is true. 5.) Similarly, Ross concludes that if war leads to more economic profit for rebels, the intensity of conflict will rise, but if peace provides profit, the heightened incentive for peace will lower the intensity of conflict (38-46). Norton and Regan contend three theoretical arguments that provide the basis for their articles contentions. 1.) The incentives to rebel against the government occur because economic inequality creates a grim shadow of the future. This grim outlook provides rebels the expectation of similarly low or worse utility, which incites conflict as that poses a greater chance of achieving prosperity. 2.) Government repression will similarly incite conflict but beyond the stages of nonviolent protest because the government has moved beyond nonviolent means of dealing with its citizens. 3.) Resource exploitation will increase the likelihood for rebellion and civil war, not nonviolent protest, because it provides rebels groups funding to recruit and start/maintain campaigns against the government. Nonviolent protest is not included in this because the economic resources required to carry out protest are low in the first place (323-326).

Radhakrishnan 5 Pivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmores examination of the role of diamonds in civil war literature includes five theoretical frameworks that provide basis for correlation. 1.) Secondary diamond production, as opposed to primary production, provides rebel groups the economic resources necessary to recruit and retain soldiers and acquire arms for warfare. 2.) Primary diamond sources, while not economically aiding the rebels, could provide rebels with enough of a grievance to motivate rebellion seeing as how a victory would equal control over valuable resources. 3.) Ethnic tension also provides a grievance, which in tandem with diamond production, leads to conflict because both motivation and opportunity are present. 4.) Similarly, citizens of poor countries also have a grievance against the government and will use the resources from diamond extraction to their well-being. 5.) Lastly, the end of the Cold War has forced rebel groups to look for financing elsewhere, as the previous bipolar system was characterized by an environment filled with government backing of rebel groups, and new lines of conflict other than ideological tensions have recently become more prevalent (540-545). In a comparison of the different theoretical arguments backing each articles proposed hypotheses, one can conclude that present in each article are both ideas of natural resources providing an opportunity for rebels as well as a grievance to incite conflict against the government. Also, the three articles relate to each other in the fact that the resources must not simply be present in a nation, but have the crucial characteristic of exploitability by the rebels, pre or post-war, in order for conflict to take place. The differences between the articles arise in subtle fashion. First, Ross differentiates his work from the other five authors by claiming the role of natural resources in both lengthening and curbing conflict after the onset of civil war. The other authors solely look at prewar

Radhakrishnan 6 incentives and opportunities, and how they remain throughout the conflict, but do not relatively examine the aspect of duration. Regan and Norton separate their piece from the others in the sense that they recognize the effects of natural resources at different levels of conflict like nonviolent protest and rebellion, not just outright civil war. Lujala et al. are unique in their research of natural resource correlation to conflict by examining the specific role of diamonds and theorize that diamonds have been a unique factor in the past twenty years in general civil war and ethnic civil war. With the broad theoretical arguments in place, the examination of one hypothesis from each article provides a microcosmic insight into their general respective findings. The chosen hypothesis from Michael Rosss article claims that Resource wealth tends to increase (decrease) the duration of civil wars when it provides funding to the weaker (stronger) side (43). Theoretical explanations for this proposed phenomenon stem from literature that has developed consensus on the idea that rebel groups can initially fund and sustain conflict once control over resources and an ability to extract wealth from those resources is established. Ross uses two assumptions from the existing literature to form the basis for his hypothesis. Together the assumptions entail that the weaker sides ability to control resources leads to increased war duration. Ross concludes that this statement is true after evaluating other scholarly literature on war duration and resources, but adds his own twist theory. He hypothesizes that if the stronger side were to gain control over those same disputed resources, the duration of war would be shortened because it exponentially enhances the stronger sides ability to defeat the opposition (42-44). The hypothesis from Regan and Nortons work that will be further examined theorizes that The existence of exploitable resources will increase the likelihood of

Radhakrishnan 7 observing rebellion and civil war; however, given the lower cost for participation in protest activity, extractable resources will have no effect on the likelihood of protest (326). The theoretical basis for this hypothesis is as follows. In order for rebels to entice their fellow citizens into rebellion or outright civil war, there exists competition with the government to provide benefits to these people in exchange for loyalty. The rebel groups must control and exploit natural resources in order to provide benefits to member recruits to fight against the government. An inability to do so will give the government the chance to either steal the loyalty of its subjects or repress them. Both actions will allow the government to remain in power. The theory behind the second part of the hypothesis is that the cost for nonviolent protest requires a much more insignificant amount of resources to take place than rebellion and civil war, so its propensity for occurrence remains constant regardless of a rebel groups ability to exploit resources (326). Pivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmores questions over the role of diamonds have prompted the hypothesis that The presence of secondary diamonds is positively associated with the onset and incidence of civil war in countries with a high level of ethnic fractionalization (545). Their observations of existing theoretical explanations contend that grievances along ethnic lines are an outstanding factor for causing civil war. Lujala et al. go on to use this theory in addition with the idea of resource-driven conflict to compound the two into one hypothesis. They claim that there is a higher correlation of diamonds to war in ethnically divided countries because there is both a strong grievance and opportunity (544-545). Amongst the three hypotheses, all authors concur that the possibility of exploitable natural resources is vital in fueling conflict by contending similar theoretical arguments.

Radhakrishnan 8 Theory that claims wealth from natural resources as vital to funding rebel and government troops alike provides the backbone for the authors hypotheses. Dyadic comparisons of the articles yield differences and other commonalities. Rosss hypothesis versus Regan and Nortons hypothesis both find parallels in the idea that government access to resources could prevent civil war from occurring or significantly shortening it. The two differ in thought as the former authors article looks at natural resources after civil war onset while the latter examines the effects before. Ross and Lujala et al. find common ground in linking natural resources to opportunities for rebel groups to finance warfare and also a portion of research dedicated to observing affects beyond onset of civil war. They differ by the latter papers focus on diamonds instead of a wide list of natural resources and attention to grievance and opportunity rather than just opportunity. Rosss paper also delves into unique levels of conflict. Lujala et al. compared to Regan and Norton find a commonality in focusing on prewar effects of natural resources on civil war onset but find two key differences in Regan and Nortons attention to government access to resources and Lujala et al. examining solely diamonds and the side focus of ethnic fractionalization. Overall, the three articles are highly similar in the theoretical backings of why exploitation of natural resources is vital in the arena of civil war, but several differences separate the authors works as attention to specific resources, the parties involved, grievance versus opportunity, and diverse stages of conflict take the theories into unique directions. Research Design: The various research designs between the three articles show some degree of overlap but there are differences that separate the models used to test their respective hypotheses, which may influence their various findings. Starting with Michael Rosss

Radhakrishnan 9 article, the research design pegs the unit of analysis as civil war-year, the temporal domain from 1990-2000, and the spatial domain to include all civil wars (46). Patrick Regan and Daniel Norton employ their unit of analysis as country-year, the temporal domain from 1976-1997, and the spatial domain to include all countries (327). Lujala et al. attribute their unit of analysis as country-year, the temporal domain from 1945-1999, and the spatial domain to include all countries (546-547). Upon comparison of these three unique research designs, one notices that Rosss unit of analysis differs from the other two articles in examining civil war-year rather than country-year. This is due to the fact that Rosss intentions were to study the effect of natural resources on the duration of civil wars rather than onset. The spatial domains also differ because of the differences in units of analysis, with Rosss article examining all civil wars compared to all countries. The most subsantial difference between all three articles is the varied temporal domain. All of the articles study datasets that include the 1990s but Lujala et al. includes the period following the end of World War II to the end of the 1990s. Regan and Nortons temporal domain skips the first half of the Cold War and starts from 1976 until 1997. Onto each papers hypothesis, with its respective dependent and independent variables, one notices overlap in the analysis of the independent variables, but the dependent variables reveals contrast between the research designs. Michael Rosss hypothesis of resource wealth positively correlating to the prolongation or shortening of civil war duration depending on the strength of the looting party displays the dependant variable of civil war duration and the independent variable of wealth from the exploitation of natural resources. The dependent variable of war duration is measured in years after looting of a natural resource takes place. Ross examines thirteen

Radhakrishnan 10 case studies from Collier & Hoefflers 2001 list of thirty-six civil wars from 1990-2000 and pinpoints the duration of time after the onset of looting. The sources for deriving natural resource data also come from the aforementioned article, which provides a statistical point of reference that compares primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP. Ross broadly defines resources as oil, gemstones, non-fuel minerals, agricultural commodities, illicit drugs, and timber (46-49). Regan and Norton examine civil conflict as their dependant variable, which more specifically can be separated into nonviolent protest, rebellion, or civil war, and coin an independent variable of wealth from exploitable resources. The Minorities at Risk project provides a twelve-point scale for determining levels of civil conflict ranging from nonviolent opposition to outright civil war. At different points on the scale, the dummy variables for the three components of civil conflict take on a value of 0 or 1. The measures for extractable resources come from the Diamond Registry, the National Gemstone Association, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, which respectively analyze the exploitable resources of diamonds, gemstones, and opiates. The datasets reveal the existence of production for certain resources in a given year and are deemed accessible to rebel groups in surrounding areas (327-328). Lujala et al. undertake their dependant variable for analysis as civil war onset and incidence. Their independent variables that tie together in their previously mentioned hypothesis are ethnic fractionalization and secondary diamond production. The measurements for civil war onset and incidence stem from two datasets, Fearon and Laitins 2003 study on 127 civil war cases from 1945-1999, and Indra de Soysas 2002 article that compiles the conflict studies from Uppsala/PRIO list of civil wars from 1989-

Radhakrishnan 11 1999. The dataset for secondary diamond production comes from the Gilmore et al. paper in 2005 that reveals the diamond deposits and production data in fifty-three countries. The data set is known as DIADATA and helps Lujala et al. differentiate between primary and secondary diamond production (546-548). Empirical Analysis: Through comparisons of the findings in the three articles, only two out of the three aforementioned hypotheses receive empirical support. The six authors reach a diverse set of conclusions that change the landscape of known correlations between natural resources and civil war. Michael Rosss findings with regards to his hypothesis over resource wealth influencing the duration of civil wars during the 1990s receive significant empirical support but uncover separately related issues that are important in civil war studies. Through his examination of thirteen key civil war case studies that are widely known for their involvement with natural resources, Ross concludes that there is a robust relationship between exploitable resources and the duration of conflict. In two separate test models, Ross finds that looting after the onset of civil war lengthened ten out of thirteen conflicts in one model and lengthened eight, while shortening two out of thirteen in another model. Both examples reveal the substantial impact of exploitable resources. Strangely however, Ross finds in tandem that rebel groups only began looting after civil war onset, which challenges the notion set forth by others that looting leads to war (49-55). Daniel Norton and Patrick Regan struggle to find any substantially significant correlation between resource wealth and the onset civil conflict. They only find a marginally significant relationship over resource wealth and civil war onset, garnering

Radhakrishnan 12 significance in the 95th percentile. Diamonds, gemstones, and opiates provide no relationship to the onset of nonviolent protest and rebellion, the former which was initially hypothesized, but more importantly, Regan and Norton find that natural resources are associated with a decreased probability of observing civil war. This conclusion is similar to the extension of findings in Rosss article, claiming that wealth from resource exploitation has no correlation to the onset of civil war (329-334). Pivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmores contention over the presence of secondary diamond production in ethnically divided countries promoting both the onset and incidence of civil war yields mixed results. While no statistical evidence points to any positive correlation between secondary diamond production and civil war onset, its relationship to the incidence of ethnic civil war demonstrates a significant relationship that supports their hypothesis. In the fifth model of their statistical research, the combined factors of ethnic fractionalization and secondary diamond production revealed significance at the 90th percentile in promoting the incidence of civil war after the start. What is interesting is that the production of secondary diamonds on its own had no correlation to civil war incidence but the aggregation of both independent variables led to a significant finding. Lujala et al. conclude that while ethnic divisions within a country carry significance in civil war incidence, combining it with secondary diamond production results in a deadly duo that positively correlates with prolonging civil wars (549-556). Conclusion: From the results of the three articles presented here, one can conclude that the onset of civil war is unlikely to be affected by exploitable resource wealth. However, natural resources have shown a tremendous effect in prolonging civil wars, especially ethnic civil

Radhakrishnan 13 wars. It is interesting that the studies have shown negative correlations between resource exploitation and civil war onset but positive correlations on the prevalence of civil war. While Ross and Lujala et al. study onset and incidence, Regan and Nortons decision to only study onset reveals why they lacked any significant findings. Overall, it is vital to know that rebel groups can finance warfare through the exploitation of natural resources and should pose further research to understand why onset is unaffected by it. Even though the three articles used widely different data sets, the overlap in the 1990s makes it reasonable to discuss their findings within the same topic but still require further tests under a standard data set. In conclusion, for the realm of civil war studies in tandem with natural resource influence, the opposite relationship between wealth from exploitable resources and civil war onset versus incidence carries tremendous significance for the future, revealing a source of power for rebel groups after the beginning of a war, but the negative correlation also reveals that wealth derived during times of peace, even in illegal manners, will prolong peace between citizens and their government.

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Works Cited 1. Michael L. Ross. 2004. How Do Natural Resources Inuence Civil War?: Evidence from Thirteen Cases." International Organization 58(1): 35-67. 2. Paivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore. 2005. A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource." Journal of Conict Resolution 49(4): 538-562. 3. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton. 2005. Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars." Journal of Conict Resolution 49(3): 319-336.