HAZOP
A worksheet (data base spreadsheet) form is used to collect and collate the process hazard analysis review data. A computer software generated spreadsheet is typically used. For a complete description of commercially available HAZOP or What-If software, the user should refer to the manufacturers HAZOP or What- If software User Although pre-printed forms may be Instructions. used, they are highly inefficient and should be maintained only as a backup in case of computer hardware or software failures. The worksheet is organized with identification data at the top of the page, followed with columns for the review discussions and notes. The columns are usually organized from left to right with the sequence of the review information that is gathered and analyzed. In this respect the deviations are written on the left, causes and consequences in the middle and safeguards, possible recommendations and comments and remarks at the right. Examples of suggested HAZOP and What-If worksheets are given in Tables 11 and 12 respectively. 8.1 HAZOP Worksheet For a typical HAZOP worksheet the columns are identified a description of the contents is given: by the following titles and
Guideword (GW): Simple word or phrase used to generate deviations by application on a system or process activities (e.g. pressure, level, level, temp, etc.). Deviation: less, etc.). Causes: A departure from the design and operating intention (e.g. high, low, more,
etc.).
Consequences: The effects of a deviation resulting from various causes (fire, explosion, process upset, etc.). Safeguards: surveillance, Measures taken to prevent or mitigate instrumentation, ESD, blowdown, etc.). the risk of accidents (operator
Severity: The magnitude of physical or intangible loss consequences of consequences compared to industry experience).
(qualitative measure
53
54
Application
of EIAZOP
Likelihood: A measure of the expected frequency of an events occurrence measure of probability based on historical data or theoretical estimate).
(qualitative
Ranking: The qualitative estimation of risk from severity and likelihood levels, in order to provide a prioritizing of risk based its magnitude (refer to corporate risk matrix for ranking based on severity and likelihood levels). Recommendations: Activities identified which may reduce a risk through the lowering of a probability or consequence levels (suggested safety improvement to a process to reduce risk level). Comments: (supplemental Technical information notes of the facility, system, about the issue being discussed). related to the review (project or process under study
decisions,
related data,
GW
Dev.
CilUSeS
Cousequeuce
Safeguards
Recs
Remarks
Comments
Arrangement
HAZOP Company: Facility: S.arlcn: 2 03-30-93 Nod.: I V-116 Permeter: Flou Revfriar: 0 INLET SEPARATOR INEW Int.ntionrT450 Dug& 50151-01-016
Node: 1 Page: 1
--.---_.-----+-.-----------_-..-...__-
SAFESUARDS I CONSECUEWCES 1 .+-------.---.----..+...-.---.-..--.-.__._.._. 0 rlgnlficmt onsequcncc this ode - posrlbl. recess qmct ptrem
+-.
tEClMMENOAllCUS 1 REMARKS .----~--~~.~~~.~+__.~~~_~~__~___-__. M conwrnt NOTE: derlgneted V-116 as an inlet reperator with no rlug catching rcquiremntr; refer to ninutr fran February project revieu ieeetin!g CUWENTS i --.--.---_.__-_______+
.l..s. to flare pstrem of the sv N-34 llfuvxlon IOU releaser to lore. including ,ecycl. frun :arprerror8 Ntelt check rive dour&rem If ESV to prevent eck flow of Ba. roe the :onprerrorr with Block valve end m-inch bypesr lor starting and xrrglng OTE: Check alv. ad ona nch byparr nrtelted; refer 0 revired PUO I.V. n
tcycle on conprerror
111 opw - *yltan )t rhut dan Ml1
HAZOP
cv - 34 v.lv.
eft open 0 flow from pstrem nod.
to
perrtor training
thlfi
and What-If
Syota Boer Into recycle; PIC-SO rtleaeea rpstrem flw to flare; pressure bull&q in verrsel
sV-401
Cwlder
In8t~lllng PSV101 directly on ver8.1 Btock vatv. to k installed *tree4 ~IBI donstrem of PR for servlclng
10TE: PSV-401 Inatelled; refer to revised PRID Rev. B ROTE: Block valve Installed; refer to revised PRIO Rev. B
sv-401 located on Iln. nd will not relieve if (no p1~g.d out of easel
Worksheets
55
__- - ___________. . _
56 8.2
Application of HAZOP What-If Worksheet For a typical What-If worksheet the columns are identified description of their contents is given: by the following titles and a
What If: What-If questions scenarios that prompts process hazard analysis concerns. Hazard: Characteristic, (physical or other) that has the potential for causing harm to people, property, the environment, or continued business operation. Consequences: Safeguards: Severity: Likelihood: The effects of a deviation resulting from various cases. Measures taken to prevent or mitigate the risks of accidents. The magnitude of physical or intangible loss consequences. of an events occurrence. levels in order
Ranking: The qualitative estimation of risk from severity and likelihood to provide a prioritizing of risk based on its magnitude.
Recommendations: Activities identified which may reduce a risk through the lowering of probability or consequence levels. Comments: Remarks: Technical notes of the facility, sys:em, or process under study. related to the review.
Other information
What-If
Hazard
Consequence
,%feguards
Recs
Remarks
COIUIlleOtS
WA1
IF
Facility: session: 1 08-10-93 Revision: 0 08-10-93 System: 2 tlycol Indirect Heater and utilities UHAT IF... HAZARD Dug): 81C-It-02 SAFEWARDS RECablENDATlONS
Cmpany:
system: 2 Page: 1
CCUSECUENCES
REMARKS
Lou pressure gas line .oss of fuel for heater 'otslshutdoun md lnstrunent gas pLugg=J. IUPPLY Loss of fwl gss to lter. @Irate formation blugging line
v'alvesare
S afe,
initiates ESD
ndiract firs i eater should FIrovideheat 4iource Loss of instrwnt A system. Liquid build up In el gas system. Liquid deep of V-2 ils closed.
iemeas I1
'lugged instrments
System shutdowc
I.ocsl
ESD system fails to Failure of safety devices due to pluggin operate ard corrosion Liquid duq~ of V-2 ils open. Tenperature ntroller fails. No significant hazard Possible loss of glyco frm system from boil over
tasting
Tube is exposed. 1SH on V-l Possible tube failure TSH on H-l Local TI LSL
May exceed design tq 3 TSH on V-l Equipment dsmsge Local TI Air intake designed 3 feet above grou-d lace in opsrator onus1 squiraments for
58
Application
of HAZOP
8.3
Worksheet
Every
Identification
worksheet should be provided with an identification and a means to correlate it to the node and design conditions it was evaluated against. Locations for date, location, node identification or description, and design parameters should be drawing reference, noted on each worksheet.