DISTRICT COURT OF NEW DUBLIN STATE OF NEW IRELAND

THE STATE OF NEW IRELAND vs. JEAN VALJEAN

CASE NO. 123456789

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

COMES NOW MARY JANE GREEN, Defendant, and files her Motion to Suppress Evidence, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the N.I. Rules of Criminal Procedure, and requests a hearing hereon in advance of trial, and would show unto the Court the following: 1. The evidence was obtained without a warrant. 2. The evidence was

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." "At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980).

TO SUPPRESS THE FRUITS OF THE SEARCH THAT OCCURRED AT 3369 N. PALMER STREET ON MAY 17, 2005 To suppress the fruits of the search conducted at 3369 N. Palmer St., Milwaukee, on May 17, 2005 for the reason that the officers made a warrantless entry into the home without probable cause combined with exigent circumstances and the warrant that was later obtained was obtained through the use of the illegally seized evidence.

D. Statement of Standing and Need for Evidentiary Hearing. 12. The defendant, Lawrence Butler, hereby alleges and shows to the

court that on May 17, 2005 he was an overnight guest at 3369 N. Palmer Street and, therefore, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. That this expectation of privacy is one that the community is prepared to recognize and, therefore, that Butler has standing to challenge the search. 13. The government does not contest Butler's standing to challenge the search. The defendant hereby requests and evidentiary hearing for the purpose of establishing standing and for the purpose of resolving the disputed issues of fact. Additionally, it is requested that the court permit the parties to file their legal memoranda after the evidentiary hearing.

1. The deputies in this matter illegally entered and searched the residence and property without a warrant and without consent in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition, the open-view and/or exigent circumstances exception do not apply to the facts of this case. 2. Any alleged consent to search subsequent to the prior illegal search is tainted and not free and voluntary. 2.a. Evidence gained during an illegal search of a home before the officer's obtained a search warrant could not be relied upon to support the federal warrant. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988) (officers who illegally entered warehouse and observed bags of marijuana could not rely on their knowledge of the marijuana in support of application for warrant). Neither can an officer put false, misleading, or unsupported facts in a affidavit to obtain a warrant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (intentionally false statement or omission regarding material fact requires suppression of evidence). 3. The initial entry to the home was illegal because any alleged consent to enter his home obtained from the defendant, to the extent that voluntary consent is claimed by the prosecutor for the State Attorney's Office in Tampa, Hillsborough County, or by the deputies was involuntary and coerced. 4. Furthermore, any inspection of the backyard or adjacent property was illegal because it is well established under Florida law that an uninvited and warrantless search of a side-yard area or a back-yard area violates the Fourth Amendment and subjects any evidence gathered from such a search to exclusion. State v. Morsman, 394 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1981) (seizure of marijuana plants in defendants backyard was illegal when plants were not visible to the public and police officer had no right to be in backyard); Maggard v. State, 736 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Glass v. State, 736 So.2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (marijuana plants suppressed where officers had no right to enter backyard even when they saw people in the backyard). 5. Generally, people have an increased reasonable expectation of privacy in the backyard of their homes. Moorsman, supra.

6. In this case, the evidence is clear that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, backyard, and the two story structure attached to his home. It is also clear that the deputies violated this expectation of privacy and the defendants Fourth Amendment rights by entering the back yard, and going up a outside staircase, without a warrant and without consent. 7. In addition, the deputies were not justified to conduct a warrantless search of the adjacent property based on the open-view exception. State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1982); Oliver v. State, 989 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). 8. In an open view situation, the police may not seize contraband observed from an adjacent lot without a warrant where the defendant has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and there are no exigent circumstances. State v. Rickard, 420 So.2d 303, 307 (Fla. 1982). 9. An open-view situation is treated similarly to the plain-view exception except that some exigent circumstances [are] required to justify warrantless entry into the protected area in an open-view situation. Oliver v. State, 989 So.2d 16, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). 10. Initially, the evidence above establishes that there is no way that the deputy could have made any observations that were consistent with a grow house operation through anything he saw in an open view. 11. Having established that the entry and subsequent search of the interior of the main house and the exterior upstairs portion of the upstairs was illegal, any subsequent searches, seizures and statements allegedly obtained through consent are tainted and therefore not free and voluntary. 12. When the initial police activity is illegal, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that there has been an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of prior illegal police action and thus render consent freely and voluntarily given. Maggard, supra, citing, Jordan v. State, 707 So.2d 338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also United States v. Quintana, 594 F.Supp.2d 1291 (M.D.Fla. 2009). 13. In this case, there is no evidence of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of the prior illegal entry and search. If anything, there is simply evidence of more illegality by the police officers through threats and coercion. As such, any alleged consent to search the resident, and any evidence seized from or statements obtained, are tainted and subject to exclusion. 14. On its own, the alleged consent in this case was not voluntarily and freely given. Consent may not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. United States v. Quintana, 594 F.Supp.2d 1291, 1303 (M.D.Fla. 2009), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). 15. In the instant case, our client did not sign any form that authorized the alleged consent to search the home or property. 16. It is undisputed by the officers that our client immediately requested the right to remain silent

and not answer any questions without his attorney being present. As such, any statements obtained from our client must be suppressed because they were taken in violation of his Miranda warnings. After the hearing on our motion, the Assistant State Attorney did not make any legal argument in support of the legality of the search. The Court found that based on the facts presented the allegations in the search warrant were false, based on illegally obtained evidence, or unsupported to the extend that the entire warrant and all evidence gained from it had to be suppressed. After granting our motion to suppress, the prosecutor acknowledge that the motion was dispositive (which means that the prosecutor had no evidence to support any of the charges). Therefore, the trial court also granted our motion to dismiss.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=476&invol=207 http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_41

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays that the Court hold a hearing on this motion and that this motion in all things be granted, and that the statement complained of herein be suppressed.

Respectfully submitted, _________________________ Daniel Webster SBN 99999999 1234 Main Street Clutch City, Texas 77002 (713) 228-1111 FAX (713) 228-2222

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foegoing has been hand-delivered to the District Attorneys Office on this the _____ day of __________________, 2003.

__________________________ Daniel Webster

No. 000000 THE STATE OF TEXAS vs. JEAN VALJEAN IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 999th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS CUSTODIAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT CAME ON FOR CONSIDERATION the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement of Defendant, and the Court, having examined such motion and heard evidence thereon, and arguments of counsel, and being of the opinion that the said Motion should be granted, and that the statement complained of in such motion was obtained illegally from Defendant and was involuntary. IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement of Defendant is in all things GRANTED. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's "Statement of Person in Custody" is hereby SUPPRESSED. it is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the State of Texas and its witnesses not mention, refer to, or elicit in any manner, any evidence that Defendant gave an oral or written confession or statement while in custody. It is further ORDERED that the attorney for the State instruct his witnesses concerning the terms of this Order. SIGNED this ______ day of __________________, 2003.

_____________________________ JUDGE PRESIDING