ENHANCED IDENTITY BASED SECURITY AND USER PRIVACY USING PSEUDONYM BASED TECHNIQUE FOR VECHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS

A PROJECT REPORT Submitted by

Angalaeswari.K Sahana.C Vijayalakshmi.A

in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of

BACHELOR OF ENGINEERING
in COMPUTER SCIENCE ENGINEERING P.S.R.RENGASAMY COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING,SIVAKASI

ANNA UNIVERSITY : CHENNAI 600025

APRIL 2012

ANNA UNIVERSITY : CHENNAI 600025

BONAFIDE CERTIFICATE
Certified that this project report ENHANCED IDENTITY BASED SECURITY AND USER PRIVACY USING PSEUDONYM BASED TECHNIQUE FOR VECHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS is the bonafide work of K.Angalaeswari(99508104300),C.Sahana(99508104310),

A.Vijayalakshmi

(99508104064) who carried out the project work under my supervision.

SIGNATURE Dr.C.Balasubramanian HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT Prof & HOD/Department of CSE P.S.R.Rengasamy College of Engineering Sivakasi

SIGNATURE Dr.C.Balasubramanian SUPERVISOR Prof & HOD/Department of CSE P.S.R.Rengasamy College of Engineering Sivakasi

Submitted to project viva voce Examination held at P.S.R.Rengasamy College of Engineering , Sivakasi on

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INTERNAL EXAMINER
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL EXAMINER

CHAPTER NO.

TITLE

PAGE NO.

ABSTRACT

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LIST OF TABLE
LIST OF FIGURES xviii

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LIST OF SYMBOLS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Network Security 1.2 Vanet 1.3 Applications of Vanet 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Existing System 2.2 Literature Survey 3 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
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3.1 Overview 3.2 Proposed System 3.3 Entities And Procedures 3.3.1 System Setup 3.3.2 Pseudonym generation and authentication for privacy 3.3.3 Threshold signature for nonframeability 3.3.4. Threshold authentication defense 4 MODULAR DESIGN 4.1 Pseudonym generation 4.2 Pseudonuym authentication 4.3 Secured communication 5 RESULT AND DISCUSSION 5.1 Results 5.2 Sample code 6 7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK REFERENCES

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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 3.1 3.2 FIGURE NAME A Vanet System Logic diagram of interrelations and interactions 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 Initially the RTA will Started Generating the CRL BS Started Randomly generated the BS Another BS Started Randomly Generated another BS Started the Vehicle node Generated the Vehicle node Started the another vehicle node Generated the another vehicle node
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PAGENO.

5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20

BS 4 & 9 are not connected Enter the BS id Wrongly Connected the BS 4&9 Wrong connection will provide the error BS 4 & 9 are Connected Vehicle nodes 7 & 5 are connected Both BS monitored the vehicle Node 7&5 Message for vehicle 5 Wrongly connected the vehicle nodes 7 &5 Only BS Monitored the Unauthorized node

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

VANET MANET BS RTA LEA RSU C2C CRL PKI TA VN WMN P2P OBU

Vehicular Ad hoc Network Mobile Ad Hoc Network Base Station Regional Transportation Authority Law enforcement authority roadside unit Car To Car Certificate Revocation List Public Key Infrastructure Trusted Authority Vehicular Network Wireless Mesh Network Peer to Peer On-Board Unit
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ECPP TTP PLT

Efficient Conditional Privacy Preservation Trusted Third Party Pseudonym Lookup Table

ABSTRACT In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), the malicious messages and tampered messages threat other drivers' life or confuse the traffic order possibly. The anonymity has to be traceable when the law enforcement authority wants to figure out the accountabilities about the anonymity. The problem that

characterizes the privacy of VANETs and proposes a new anonymous key mechanism with a system architecture based on bilinear paring and elliptic curve cryptography which adapts to VANETs. The anonymous key pair generated by proposed anonymous key mechanism can realize basic security requirements, and protect identity privacy and location privacy in VANETs communication. The data storage cost can also be decreased when the numbers of node grows quickly. A hardware based security framework that uses both standard asymmetric PKI and symmetric cryptography for faster and secure safety message exchange.The Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network is a form of MANETS to provide communications among near by vehicles and between vehicles and nearby fixed equipment. Attacking and misusing such network could cause destructive consequences. It is therefore necessary to integrate security requirements into the design of VANETs and defend VANET systems against misbehavior, in order to ensure correct and smooth operations of the network. In addition to satisfying fundamental security requirements including authentication, nonrepudiation, message integrity, and
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confidentiality. Moreover, a privacy-preserving defense technique for network authorities to handle misbehavior in VANET access, considering the challenge that privacy provides avenue for misbehavior. The proposed system employs an identity-based cryptosystem where certificates are not needed for authentication. We show the fulfillment and feasibility of our system with respect to the security goals and efficiency. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Network Security The networks are computer networks, both public and private, that are used every day to conduct transactions and communications among businesses, government agencies and individuals. The networks are comprised of "nodes", which are "client" terminals (individual user PCs) and one or more "servers" and/or "host" computers. They are linked by communication systems, some of which might be private, such as within a company, and others which might be open to public access. The obvious example of a network system that is open to public access is the Internet, but many private networks also utilize publiclyaccessible communications. Today, most companies' host computers can be accessed by their employees whether in their offices over a private communications network, or from their homes or hotel rooms while on the road through normal telephone lines. Network security involves all activities that organizations, enterprises, and institutions undertake to protect the value and ongoing usability of assets and the
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integrity and continuity of operations. An effective network security strategy requires identifying threats and then choosing the most effective set of tools to combat them. 1.2 Vanet A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network, or VANET is a technology that uses moving cars as nodes in a network to create a mobile network. VANET turns every participating car into a wireless router or node, allowing cars approximately 100 to 300 metres of each other to connect and, in turn, create a network with a wide range. As cars fall out of the signal range and drop out of the network, other cars can join in, connecting vehicles to one another so that a mobile Internet is created. It is estimated that the first systems that will integrate this technology are police and fire vehicles to communicate with each other for safety purposes. 1.3 Applications of Vanet Mostly interests to MANETS belong to the VANETS but the features are different. Vehicles are likely to move in structured way. The connection with wayside equipment can similarly be indicated absolutely accurately. In the end, mostly automobiles are limited in their motion range, such as being controlled to pursue a paved way. VANETs pose unique challanges due to the dynamic environment. A C2C information management infrastucture has to fulfill requirements such as persistent and location-dependent availability of information. Based on a VANET infrastructure, it is then possible to design and realize deployment applications.
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One characteristic of these applications is that they are highly dependent of the current context of a car. VEHICULAR ad hoc networks (VANETs) are receiving increasing

attentions from academia and deployment efforts from industry, due to the various applications and potential tremendous benefits they offer for future VANET users. Safety information exchange enables life-critical applications, such as the alerting functionality during intersection traversing and lane merging, and thus, plays a key role in VANET applications[1],[2],[3]. Other applications are also possible including different warning messages for congestion avoidance, detour notification, road conditions (e.g., slippery), etc., and alarm signals disseminated by emergency vehicles (e.g., ambulance) for road clearance. The attractive features of VANETs inevitably incur higher risks if such networks do not take security into account prior to deployment. For instance, if the safety messages are modified, discarded, or delayed either intentionally or due to hardware malfunctioning, serious consequences such as injuries and even deaths may occur. This necessitates and urges the development of a functional, reliable, and efficient security architecture before all other implementation aspects of VANETs. Fundamentally,VANETsecurity design should guarantee authentication, nonrepudiation, integrity, and in some specific application scenarios,

confidentiality, to protect the network against attackers. Besides the fundamental security requirements, sensitive information such as identity and location privacy should be preserved from the vehicle owners perspective, against unlawful tracing and user profiling, since otherwise it is difficult to attract vehicles to join the network. On the contrary, traceability is required where the identity information need be revealed by law enforcement authorities for liability issues, once accidents or crimes occur.
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Specifically, our main contributions are: 1. 2. A pseudonym-based scheme to assure vehicle user privacy and traceability. We design a threshold signature-based scheme to achieve nonframeability in tracing law violators. In this scheme, an innocent vehicle cannot be framed by a corrupted law enforcement authority due to our role-splitting mechanism. 3. A novel privacy-preserving defense scheme is proposed leveraging threshold authentication. It guarantees that any additional authentication beyond the threshold will result in the revocation of the misbehaving users. Moreover, the dynamic accumulators in the threshold authentication technique [5] facilitates each user to place further restrictions (besides the threshold) on other communicating users, which is an attractive feature to service providers. 4. Our design incorporates mechanisms that guarantee authentication, nonrepudiation, message integrity, and confidentiality. 5. We provide comprehensive analysis to show the fulfillment of the security objectives and the efficiency.

The law violators (or violators) and misbehaving users to describe VANET users who misbehave in the law enforcement scenario and the infrastructure access scenario, respectively.

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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW A literature review is a body of text that aims to review the critical points of current knowledge including substantive findings as well as theoretical and methodological contributions to a particular topic. Literature reviews are secondary sources, and as such, do not report any new or original experimental work. Most often associated with academic-oriented literature, such as a thesis, a literature review usually precedes a research proposal and results section. Its ultimate goal is to bring the reader up to date with current literature on a topic and forms the basis for another goal, such as future research that may be needed in the area. A well-structured literature review is characterized by a logical flow of ideas; current and relevant references with consistent, appropriate referencing style;
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proper use of terminology; and an unbiased and comprehensive view of the previous research on the topic. 2.1 EXISTING SYSTEM There is a large body of research work related to the security and privacy in VANETs. The most related works are on the design of privacy-preserving schemes. The privacy issue by proposing a pseudonym-based approach using anonymous public keys and the public key infrastructure (PKI), where the public key certificate is needed, giving rise to extra communication and storage overhead. The three credential revocation protocols tailored for VANETs, namely RTPD, RC2RL, and DRP, considering that the certificate revocation list (CRL) needs to be distributed across the entire network in a timely manner. All the three protocols seem to work well under conventional public key infrastructure (PKI). However, the authors also proposed to use frequently updated anonymous public keys to fulfill users requirement on identity and location privacy. If this privacy preserving technique is used in conjunction with RC2RL and DRP, the CRL produced by the trusted authority will become huge in size, rendering the revocation protocols highly inefficient. A lightweight symmetric-key based security scheme for balancing auditability and privacy in VANETs is proposed in. It bears the drawback that peer vehicles authenticate each other via a base station, which is unsuitable for inter-vehicle communications. An identitybased (IDbased) ring signature scheme to achieve signer ambiguity and hence fulfill the privacy requirement in VANET applications. The disadvantage of the ring signature scheme in the context of VANET applications, is the unconditional privacy, resulting in the traceability requirement unattainable. Group signature based schemes are proposed in, where signer privacy
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is conditional on the group manager. As a result, all these schemes have the problem of identity escrow, as a group manager who possesses the group master key can arbitrarily reveal the identity of any group member. In addition, due to the limitation of group formation in VANETs (e.g., too few cars in the vicinity to establish the group), the group-based schemes may not be applied appropriately. The election of group leader will sometimes encounter difficulties since a trusted entity cannot be found amongst peer vehicles. However, their framework is limited by the strong dependence on the infrastructure for short-lived pseudonym generation, which renders the signaling overhead overwhelming. The proposed nonrepudiation scheme enables a single authority to retrieve the identity which may raise the concern on potential abuse. Schemes leveraging pseudonyms in VANETs can also be found in with the revocation feasible in limited settings, and in where the certificate authority maintains mapping from an identity to the set of vehicle-generated pseudonyms. There are also a number of defense techniques against misbehavior in VANET literature besides those in. An indirect approach via the aid of infrastructure is used. The TA distributes the CRL to the infrastructure points which then take over the TAs responsibility to execute the revocation protocol. The advantage of this approach is that vehicles never need to download the entire CRL. Unfortunately, the conditional anonymity claimed and only applies to amongst peer vehicles, under the assumption that the infrastructure points are trusted. The infrastructure points can reveal the identity of any vehicle at any time even if the vehicle is honest. The scheme leverages a single TA to recover the identity of a (possibly honest) vehicle, where revocation issues are not discussed.

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2.1 LITERATURE SURVEY 2.1.1 Position verification approaches for vehicular ad hoc networks, T. Leinm uller, E. Schoch, and F. Kargl, [Oct 2006]. Intervehicle communication is regarded as one of the major applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Compared to MANETs, these so-called vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have special requirements in terms of node mobility and position-dependent applications, which are well met by geographic routing protocols. Functional research on geographic routing has already reached a considerable level, whereas security aspects have been vastly neglected so far. Since position dissemination is crucial for geographic routing, forged position information has severe impact regarding both performance and security. In this work, we first analyze the problems that may arise from falsified position data. Then, in order to lessen these problems, we propose detection mechanisms that are capable of recognizing nodes cheating about their location in position beacons. In contrast to other position verification approaches, our solution does not rely on special hardware or dedicated infrastructure. Evaluation based on simulations shows that our position verification system successfully discloses nodes disseminating false positions and thereby widely prevents attacks using position cheating

2.1.2

An Identity-based Ring Signature Scheme with Enhanced Privacy,

AUTHOR: C.Gamage, B. Gras, B. Crispo, and A.S. Tanenbaum, [Aug 2006]. There are many applications in which it is necessary to transmit authenticatable messages while achieving certain privacy goals such as signer
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ambiguity. The emerging area of vehicular ad-hoc network is a good example application domain with this requirement. The ring signature technique that uses an ad-hoc group of signer identities is a widely used method for generating this type of privacy preserving digital signatures. The identity-based cryptographic techniques do not require certificates. The construction of ring signatures using identity-based cryptography allow for privacy preserving digital signatures to be created in application when certificates are not readily available or desirable such asin vehicle area networks. We propose a new designated verifier identity based ring signature scheme that is secure against full key exposure attacks even for a small group size. This is a general purpose primitive that can be used in many application domains such as ubiquitous computing where signer ambiguity is required in small groups. We consider the usefulness of identity-based cryptographic primitives in vehicular ad-hoc networks and use a specific example application to illustrate the use of identity-based ring signatures as a tool to create privacy preserving authenticatable messages.

2.1.3

Eviction of misbehaving and faulty nodes in vehicular networks,

AUTHOR: M.Raya, P. Papadimitratos, I. Aad, D. Jungels [Oct 2007] Vehicular networks (VNs) are emerging, among civilian applications, as a convincing instantiation of the mobile networking technology. However, security is a critical factor and a significant challenge to be met. Misbehaving or faulty network nodes have to be detected and prevented from disrupting network operation, a problem particularly hard to address in the life-critical VN environment.

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Existing networks rely mainly on node certificate revocation for attacker eviction, but the lack of an omnipresent infrastructure in VNs may unacceptably delay the retrieval of the most recent and relevant revocation information; this will especially be the case in the early deployment stages of such a highly volatile and large-scale system. In this paper, we address this specific problem. We propose protocols, as components of a framework, for the identification and local containment of misbehaving or faulty nodes, and then for their eviction from the system. We tailor our design to the VN characteristics and analyze our system. Our results show that the distributed approach to contain nodes and contribute to their eviction is efficiently feasible and achieves a sufficient level of robustness.

2.1.4

GSIS: A secure and privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular Communications

AUTHOR: X. Lin, X. Sun, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, [Nov 2007]. To identify some unique design requirements in the aspects of security and privacy preservation for communications between different communication devices in vehicular ad hoc networks. We then propose a secure and privacypreserving protocol based on group signature and identity (ID)-based signature techniques. We demonstrate that the proposed protocol cannot only guarantee the requirements of security and privacy but can also provide the desired traceability of each vehicle in the case where the ID of the message sender has to be revealed by the authority for any dispute event. Extensive simulation is conducted to verify the efficiency, effectiveness, and applicability of the proposed protocol in various application scenarios under different road systems. 2.1.5 A security architecture achieving anonymity and traceability
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in wireless mesh networks AUTHOR: J. Sun, C. Zhang, and Y. Fang[2008]. Anonymity has received increasing attention in the literature due to the users' awareness of their privacy nowadays. Anonymity provides protection for users to enjoy network services without being traced. While anonymity related issues have been extensively studied in payment-based systems such as e-cash [1] and peer-to-peer (P2P) [2] systems, little effort has been devoted to wireless mesh networks (WMNs). On the other hand, the network authority requires conditional anonymity such that misbehaving entities in the network remain traceable. In this paper, we propose a security architecture to ensure unconditional anonymity for honest users and traceability of misbehaving users for network authorities in WMNs. The proposed architecture strives to resolve the conflicts between the anonymity and traceability objectives, in addition to guaranteeing fundamental security requirements including authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation . Further security enhancements can be incorporated, rendering the proposed architecture conditionally anonymous in terms of network access activities, location information, and communication paths.

2.1.6

ECPP: Efficient Conditional Privacy Preservation Protocol for Secure Vehicular Communications

AUTHOR: R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Zhu, P.-H. Ho and X. Shen,[Apr 2008].

In this introduce an efficient conditional privacy preservation (ECPP) protocol in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) to address the issue on anonymous authentication for safety messages with authority traceability. The proposed
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protocol is characterized by the generation of on-the-fly short-time anonymous keys between on-board units (OBUs) and roadside units (RSUs), which can provide fast anonymous authentication and privacy tracking while minimizing the required storage for short-time anonymous keys. We demonstrate the merits gained by the proposed protocol through extensive analysis.

2.1.7

A defense technique against misbehavior in VANETs based on threshold authentication

AUTHOR: J. Sun and Y. Fang, [Nov 2008].

Vehicular Ad Hoc network (VANET) can offer various services and benefits to VANET users and thus deserves deployment effort. Misusing such network could cause destructive consequences. It is therefore necessary to discourage misbehavior and defend VANET systems against it, in order to ensure correct and smooth operations of the network. In this paper, we propose a defense technique to handle misbehavior in VANETs, caused by either malfunctioning hardware (unintentional) or purposeful attacks. It can be used in both inter-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, where user privacy is highly desirable but adds more complexity to the defense. By employing our misbehavior defense technique, users of the system can opt for allowing occasional or unintentional misbehavior while preventing frequent or disruptive misbehavior.

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CHAPTER 3 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN We describe the functionalities of our security system and define security requirements in this section.
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3.1 Overview Major entities in a VANET environment are depicted in Fig.3.1. As mentioned before, traceability is needed by law enforcement authorities (LEAs) who require the identity of a violating vehicle to be disclosed for investigating the cause of accidents or crimes.

Fig 3.1 A Vanet System . Due to the seriousness of liability issues, if a single authority (e.g., the police) is fully capable of revealing the vehicle identity, this privilege may be abused. It is desirable if two or more authorities (e.g., the police, judge, special agents, and other possible law enforcement authorities) are granted distributed control over the identity retrieval process. One benefit in doing so is that corrupted authorities (the number being less than the threshold) cannot arbitrarily trace vehicle users to compromise their privacy. Another benefit is that malicious authorities cannot falsely accuse (or frame) honest users. Such role splitting is not required for network authorities since the threshold authentication technique in our
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defense scheme prevents a network authority from falsely accusing honest users. The proposed security system primarily consists of techniques addressing the privacy, traceability, nonframeability, and revocation (only by network authorities) issues. The logic diagram of the entities interactions is depicted in Fig.3.2, where the arrowed lines indicate the direction of packet flow or physical communications, the bracketed numbers near each line index the major events or procedures between the connected entities. The vehicle users are further split into access group owners and members, whereas the RSUs can only be access group owners. The entities and events/procedures are described in what follows. 3.2 Proposed System Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are receiving increasing attentions from academia and deployment efforts from industry, due to the various

applications and potential tremendous benefits they offer for future VANET users. Safety information exchange enables life critical application fs, such as the alerting functionality during intersection traversing and lane merging, and thus plays a key role in VANET applications . value-added services can enhance drivers traveling experience by providing convenient Internet access, navigation, toll payment services, etc. more other applications are also possible including different warning messages for congestion avoidance, detour notification, road conditions (e.g., slippery), etc., and alarm signals disseminated by emergency vehicles (e.g., ambulance) for road clearance. The attractive features of VANETs inevitably incur higher risks if such networks do not take security into account prior to deployment. For instance, if the safety messages are modified, discarded, or delayed either intentionally or due to
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hardware malfunctioning, serious consequences such as injuries and even deaths may occur. This necessitates and urges the development of a functional, reliable and efficient security architecture before all other implementation aspects of VANETs. Fundamentally, VANET security design should guarantee

authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and in some specific application scenarios, confidentiality, to protect the network against attackers. Besides the fundamental security requirements, sensitive information such as identity and location privacy should be preserved from the vehicle owners perspective, against unlawful tracing and user profiling, since otherwise it is difficult to attract vehicles to join the network. On the contrary, traceability is required where the identity information need be revealed by law enforcement authorities for liability issues, once accidents or crimes occur. In addition, privilege revocation is required by network authorities (e.g., network administrator) once misbehavior is detected during network access. It is less difficult to prevent misbehavior of unauthorized users (i.e., outsiders) since legitimate users and roadside units (RSUs) can simply disregard communication requests from outsiders by means of authentication. Nevertheless, misbehavior of legitimate users of VANETs (i.e., insiders) is more difficult and complex to prevent, the reason being that insiders possess credentials issued by the authority to perform authentication with peer vehicles or RSUs who can be easily tricked into trusting the insiders. Consequently, the insiders misbehavior will have much larger impact on the network and will be the focus of this paper. Our proposed system in this paper and many recent proposals on VANET security, provide the option of using anonymous credentials in authentication, rendering it even more complex to handle misbehavior in VANETs,
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since the user identity is hidden and cannot be linked arbitrarily which curbs the punishment of misbehaving users. Our contributions. Given the conflicting goals of privacy and traceability, and the challenges in designing a privacy-preserving defense scheme for VANETs, we are motivated to propose a security system that can effectively and efficiently solve the conflicts and challenges. Specifically, our main contributions in this paper include: 1. We propose a pseudonym-based scheme to assure vehicle user privacy and traceability. 2. We design a threshold signature based scheme to achieve non-frameability in tracing law violators. In this scheme, an innocent vehicle cannot be framed by a corrupted law enforcement authority due to our role-splitting mechanism. 3. A novel privacy-preserving defense scheme is proposed leveraging threshold authentication. It guarantees that any additional authentication beyond the threshold will result in the revocation of the misbehaving users. Our defense scheme differs from others mainly in that it yields flexibility in the revocation (i.e., not all types of misbehavior should be punished). Moreover, the dynamic accumulators in the threshold authentication technique, facilitates each user to place further restrictions (besides the threshold) on other communicating users, which is an attractive feature to service providers. 4. Our design incorporates mechanisms that guarantee authentication, nonrepudiation, message integrity, and confidentiality.

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5. We provide comprehensive analysis to show the fulfilment of the security objectives and the efficiency of the proposed system. In what follows, we use law violators (or violators) and misbehaving users to describe VANET users who misbehave in the law enforcement scenario and the infrastructure access scenario, respectively. 3.3 Entities and Procedures The entities in our system are the regional transportation authorities (RTAs), law enforcement authorities (LEAs), network authorities, roadside infrastructure including border RSUs for pseudonym management and regular RSUs (simply RSUs) for Internet access, and vehicle users. Considering practical scenarios, the RSUs in our system are mainly responsible for providing infrastructure access and network services.

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Fig.3 2. Logic diagram of interrelations and interactions

The RSUs are assumed to be operated by third-party service providers (SPs) who have business contracts with the RTA to build access infrastructure in the RTAs region. The RSUs are thus not owned by the RTA and have no preestablished trust relationship with the RTA. On the other hand, borders RSUs are owned and operated by the RTA, and can be considered as the agents who are delegated with the RTAs authority. These entities are involved in the following procedures: 3.2.1 System setup This procedure is executed by the RTA for initial VANET system setup including domain parameter publication, public/private key assignment for entities in the system to perform desired tasks, and database creation for storing necessary records (i.e., the pseudonym lookup table PLT). 3.2.2 Pseudonym generation and authentication for privacy RTA and border RSUs execute this procedure to assign pseudonym/private key pairs to both vehicles traveling in their home domain and vehicles from other
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RTAs domains, so that these vehicles are able to authenticate with RSUs and other vehicles to obtain services and useful messages. 3.2.3 Threshold signature for nonframeability This procedure is invoked by LEAs to share the secret information for recovering a guilty vehicles identity. Meanwhile, it prevents corrupted authorities from gathering full power to accuse an innocent vehicle. The functional component of this procedure is the threshold signature. 3.2.4 Threshold-authentication-based defense Designed for the network authorities, this procedure is used to revoke a misbehaving vehicles credential, refraining the vehicle from further disrupting system operations. As the core of this procedure, the threshold authentication technique provides a mechanism to allow certain types of misbehavior that should not result in revocation. For instance, the misbehavior may be caused by malfunctioning hardware and thus is incidental. These types of misbehavior share a common feature, i.e., their occurrence or frequency is low, specifically, lower than a predetermined threshold. Threshold authentication-based defense further consists of six subprocedures: 3.2.4.1 Membership registration RSUs and vehicle users register with the RTA to use VANETs. Upon successful registration, a member public/private key pair (mpk; msk) is issued to each RSU and vehicles. The RTA associates the members credential with the issued public key and includes this pair of information into a credential list IDlist.

3.2.4.2 Access group setup

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RSUs and vehicles setup their own access groups, the member of which is granted privilege to communicate with the access group owner. The group owner adds members to the group and updates related public information. Each added member obtains an access key mak for the group. 3.2.4.3 Access group revoking The access group owner revokes the granted privilege when deciding to stop communications with a member, due to some decision criteria for misbehavior. The access group owner removes the member from the access group and updates related public information. 3.2.4.4 Tracing This procedure is used to trace a misbehaving member. who attempts to authenticate more than times. The procedure output which is reported to the RTA. 3.2.4.5 Revocation/recovery Upon receiving the complaints from other entities in the system as the output of Tracing, the RTA decides if the misbehaving members credential needs to be revoked. The RTA then performs the identity recovery by looking up the same pseudonym lookup table PLT (cf. System setup above) which also records the correspondenc between the credential n and identity IDn. Note that for the ease of presentation, we assume the RTAs to act as network authorities for the defense scheme in this paper. In reality, when the roles of RTA and network authority are separate, the network authority can simply take charge as the RTA in the above subprocedures. Nonetheless, in the execution of Revocation/recovery, the network authority needs to establish trust with or be delegated by the RTA in order to access the PLT. When we mention network authorities in what follows, we implicitly refer to RTAs in the network authority role.

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CHAPTER 4 MODULAR DESIGN we adopt the privacy preserving technique based on pseudonyms. In this paper, we do not assume the existence of pervasive VANET infrastructure and will rely on available wireless networks whenever possible.Pseudonym Technique includes, 1. 2. 3. Pseudonym Generation Pseudonym Authentication Secured Communication based

4.1 Pseudonym Generation Unlike sensors and some mobile nodes, storage is not a stringent requirement for vehicles, rendering the preloading of a large pool of pseudonyms feasible. Raya and Hubaux [3] quantitatively studied the storage space requirement for preloading anonymous keys (i.e., pseudonyms) and associated certificates for long term use (i.e., one year). Their results are obtained based on quantifying the upper and lower bounds on the pseudonym change interval for maintaining a satisfactory degree of privacy. We adopt the preloading method in our ID-based VANET system where a pool of shorter-lived pseudonyms is loaded into the vehicle by the RTA at the time of registration. The pool will be replenished in a shorter period which may be a month, week, or even a day. The merit of our approach is that considering the unavailability of the dedicated infrastructure for VANETs, the preload-and-replenish mechanism can be realized through the existing wireless infrastructure, such as Wi-Fi networks,
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wireless mesh networks (WMNs), etc. For instance, when the network is accessible and less busy some time close to an update, the pseudonym pool will be replenish via the secure channel between the vehicle and RTA or border RSUs after proper authentication. If the vehicle is requesting pseudonym update in the home region, the real identity will be indicated in ciphertext to the home RTA, which will then update the PLT. When the vehicle is requesting the pseudonym update in a foreign region, the obsolete pseudonym at the time of entering (used for recording the correspondence with the newly assigned pseudonyms) will be indicated in cipher text to the foreign RTA, which will update the PPLT accordingly. The pseudonym revocation list which will be much smaller in size than the credential revocation list (CRL) in [3], can also be downloaded using the available wireless infrastructure when the dedicated infrastructure is not yet pervasive. In addition to the preload-and-replenish mechanism, we base our system on the IDbased cryptosystem so that the vehicle need only store the pseudonym (public key), which saves the storage space required for certificates as in the conventional PKIbased systems [3]. 4.2 Pseudonym Authentication Equipped with sufficient pseudonyms, a vehicle can update its credential frequently enough to preserve privacy (cf. [3]). An important feature of VANET security is the digital signature as a building block. Whether in intervehicle communications or infrastructure access, authentication is the basic requirement since only messages from legitimate users should be considered. Message confidentiality remains an option in VANETs depending on the specific application scenario. For instance, safety-related messages do not contain sensitive information and thus encryption is not needed [3].

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In some other applications such as toll paying where vehicles obtain Internet services from RSUs, message confidentiality via encryption schemes may be desired. When a vehicle attempts to broadcast a message to peers or to request network access from RSUs. The ID-based signature using private key , and the current system time to prevent message replay attack [11]. Upon receiving the message, a peer vehicle or RSU is able to authenticate the sender by verifying the signature which also ensures message integrity. Afterwards, a shared key can be derived locally at vehicle and another vehicle or RSU, if further communications are desired (e.g., the two vehicles remain in each others transmission range for a while) at the border RSU so that the above configuration can be skipped. A common drawback of these alternatives is the limitation of the pseudonym selection, i.e., the regional information that is imperative in our proposed security system cannot be arbitrarily incorporated into the pseudonym. The merit of our approach is that considering the unavailability of the dedicated infrastructure for VANETs, the preload-and-replenish mechanism can be realized through the existing wireless infrastructure, such as Wi-Fi networks, wireless mesh networks (WMNs), etc. For instance, when the network is accessible and less busy some time close to an update, the pseudonym pool will be replenish via the secure channel between the vehicle and RTA or border RSUs after proper authentication. If the vehicle is requesting pseudonym update in the home region, the real identity will be indicated in ciphertext to the home RTA, which will then update the PLT. When the vehicle is requesting the pseudonym update in a foreign region, the obsolete pseudonym at the time of entering (used for recording the

correspondence with the newly assigned pseudonyms) will be indicated in ciphertext to the foreign RTA, which will update the PPLT accordingly. The pseudonym revocation list which will be much smaller in size than the credential
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revocation list (CRL) in [3], can also be downloaded using the available wireless infrastructure when the dedicated infrastructure is not yet pervasive. In addition to the preload-and replenish mechanism, we base our system on the ID-based cryptosystem so that the vehicle need only store the pseudonym (public key), which saves the storage space required for certificates as in the conventional PKIbased systems [3].

4.3 Secured Communication A secure VANET system should satisfy several fundamental requirements, namely, authentication, nonrepudiation, message integrity, and confidentiality where sensitive information is being exchanged, to protect the system against unauthorized-message injection, denial of message disseminations, message alteration, and eavesdropping, respectively. Nonrepudiation also requires that violators or misbehaving users cannot deny the fact that they have violated the law or misbehaved. This procedure is executed by the RTA for initial VANET system setup.The RTA will provide the certificate to the each and every user vehicle. So RTA and RSU is used to tracing the misbehaving vehicle users. When the vehicles are want to communicate with each other ,then the RSU will check authentication. If the vehicle is authentic then the message can be transfer to the vehicle and also moniter the RSU . Otherwise RTA and RSU drop the message.

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CHAPTER 5 RESULT AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Sample Code

BaseStation.java import java.io.*; import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; import java.net.InetAddress; import java.net.ServerSocket; import java.net.Socket; import java.awt.*; import java.awt.event.*; import javax.swing.*; import java.sql.*;
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import com.ecc.jecc.*;

class BaseStation extends JFrame { static int portno; String localIP; int nodeID; long tstamp; String cert; ObjectOutputStream dos; ObjectInputStream ois; Socket s; ServerSocket ss; String TP="127.0.0.1"; String TTP="127.0.0.1"; String BSN="127.0.0.1"; String ONode="127.0.0.1"; DerIOBuffer der; Connection con;
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Statement st; static JTextArea area; JTextField text1; JLabel label1; JButton b1; JScrollPane jsp; static String ip; static int port; public BaseStation() throws Exception { System.out.println("Node started...."); Class.forName("sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcDriver"); con=DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:odbc:pcds"); st=con.createStatement(); st.executeUpdate("delete from bstable"); ReadfromVehicle r=new ReadfromVehicle(portno+1,st); Thread t=new Thread(r.read); t.start(); this.setVisible(true);
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this.setSize(330,500); this.setLocation(100,100); getContentPane().setLayout(null); label1=new JLabel("Destination ID "); area= new JTextArea(); text1 = new JTextField(); b1=new JButton("Connect"); jsp = new JScrollPane(area); area.setLineWrap(true); label1.setBounds(40,15,100,20); text1.setBounds(170,15,100,20); b1.setBounds(115,55,100,30); jsp.setBounds(13,150,287,287); add(jsp); jsp.setVisible(false); repaint(); add(label1); add(text1); add(b1);
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jsp.setVisible(true); b1.addActionListener(new ActionListener() { public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent ae) { try { if(text1.getText().trim().equals(null)|| text1.getText().trim().equals("")) { JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Enter Destination Base Station ID","Error",0); } else { Socket s=new Socket(TP,2231); //System.out.println("<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>"); ObjectOutputStream doS=new ObjectOutputStream(s.getOutputStream());
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Data d=new Data(text1.getText().trim()); doS.writeObject(d); //s.close(); ois=new ObjectInputStream(s.getInputStream()); Data d1=(Data)ois.readObject(); ip=d1.nodeIP; port=d1.port; if(ip.equals("false")) { JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Destination Not available","Error",0); } else { /*System.out.println("ip << "+ip); Socket s1=new Socket(ip,port+1); ObjectOutputStream dos=new ObjectOutputStream(s1.getOutputStream()); System.out.println(ReadfromVehicle.from+" ,
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"+ReadfromVehicle.to+" , "+RfromVehicle.message); Data d2=new Data(ReadfromVehicle.from,ReadfromVehicle.to, ReadfromVehicle.message); dos.writeObject(d2); s1.close();*/ } s.close(); } } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } } } public void getNodeIP()throws Exception { localIP=InetAddress.getLocalHost().toString();
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localIP=localIP.substring(localIP.indexOf("/")+1); s=new Socket(TTP,2221); dos=new ObjectOutputStream(s.getOutputStream()); Data d=new Data(localIP,"BS",portno); dos.writeObject(d); System.out.println("Node IP "+localIP+" had sent to TP"); s.close();

} public void receiveNodeID()throws Exception { ss=new ServerSocket(portno); s=ss.accept(); ois=new ObjectInputStream(s.getInputStream()); Data data=(Data)ois.readObject(); nodeID=data.nodeID; tstamp=data.tstamp; cert=data.certificate; this.setTitle("Base Station "+nodeID);
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System.out.println("Token and Certificate has been received from TP"); s.close(); st.executeUpdate("insert into bstable values("+nodeID+", '"+localIP+"',"+portno+")"); //st.executeUpdate("insert into bstable values(0,'',0)"); } public void coonectBSN()throws Exception { s=new Socket(BSN,2223); dos=new ObjectOutputStream(s.getOutputStream()); Data d=new Data(nodeID,tstamp,cert); dos.writeObject(d); System.out.println("Node ID "+nodeID+" has been sent to Boot Strap Node"); s.close(); } public void waitBSN()throws Exception { ss=new ServerSocket(2224);
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s=ss.accept(); ois=new ObjectInputStream(s.getInputStream()); Data d=(Data)ois.readObject(); nodeID=d.nodeID; tstamp=d.tstamp; der=d.der; s.close(); } public void connectNetwork()throws Exception { s=new Socket(ONode,2225); dos=new ObjectOutputStream(s.getOutputStream()); Data d1=new Data(nodeID,tstamp,der); dos.writeObject(d1); } public static void main(String[] args) { try {
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portno=Integer.parseInt(args[0]); BaseStation n=new BaseStation(); n.getNodeIP(); n.receiveNodeID(); // n.coonectBSN(); // n.waitBSN(); // n.connectNetwork(); } catch(Exception e) { System.out.println("Check whether u given base station ID............"); e.printStackTrace(); } } } class ReadfromVehicle { ServerSocket ss; Socket s;
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ObjectInputStream ois; ObjectOutputStream oos; static int from,to; static String message; Statement st; ReadfromVehicle(int pn,Statement st)throws Exception { ss=new ServerSocket(pn); this.st=st; } Runnable read=new Runnable() { public void run() { try { int flag=0; while(true) {
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s=ss.accept(); ois=new ObjectInputStream(s.getInputStream()); Data d=(Data)ois.readObject(); from=d.from; to=d.to; message=d.message; flag++; if(flag==1) BaseStation.area.append(message+" from "+from+" to "+to); System.out.println("ip << "+BaseStation.ip); Socket s1=new Socket(BaseStation.ip,(BaseStation.port)+1); ObjectOutputStream dos=new ObjectOutputStream(s1.getOutputStream()); Data d2=new Data(ReadfromVehicle.from,ReadfromVehicle.to, ReadfromVehicle.message); dos.writeObject(d2); s1.close(); System.out.println("to=="+to); ResultSet rs=st.executeQuery("select portno from nodetable
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where id="+to); int p=0; if(rs.next()) { p=rs.getInt(1); } Socket s2=new Socket("localhost",p+1); ObjectOutputStream dos1=new ObjectOutputStream(s2.getOutputStream()); Data d3=new Data(message,from); dos1.writeObject(d3); s2.close(); } } catch(Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } }
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} }

5.2 Results

Fig.5.1 Initially the RTA will started.

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Fig.5.2 Generating the CRL

Fig.5.3 Base station started.

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Fig 5.4 Randomly generared the Base station

Fig 5.5 Another Base Station Started

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Fig 5.6 Randomly Another Base Station Generated

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Fig 5.7 Started the Vehicle Node

Fig 5.8 Generated the Vehicle Node

Fig 5.9 started the anther vehicle Node

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Fig 5.10 Generated the Another Vehicle Node

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Fig 5.11 Two BS are not Connected

Fig 5.12 Enter the BS ID

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Fig 5.13 Base Stations 9 & 4 Wrongly Connected

Fig 5.14 Wrong Connection will provide the Error

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Fig 5.15 Two Base Stations 4 & 9 are Connected

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Fig 5.16 Two vehicle nodes 7 & 5 are Communicated

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Fig 5.17 Both Base Stations Monitered the Vehicle Node 7 & 5

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Fig 5.18 Message For Vehicle 5

Fig 5.19 Vehicle Node 7 & 5 are Wrongly Connected

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Fig 5.20 Only BS Monitered the Unauthorized(vehicle 52) node

1.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 1. Conclusion

We have presented the VANET security system mainly achieving privacy, traceability, nonframeability, and privacypreserving defense against misbehavior. These functionalities are realized by the pseudonym-based technique, the threshold signature, and the threshold authentication based defense scheme. The ID-based cryptosystem facilitates us to design communication and storage efficient schemes. Through security and efficiency analysis, our system is shown to satisfy the predefined security objectives and desirable efficiencies.

6.2 Future Enhancement Our future work consists of simulating the proposed security system and experimenting it in real VANET settings.

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REFERENCES [1] K. Plo l, T. Nowey, and C. Mletzko, Towards a Security Architecture for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, Proc. First Intl Conf. Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 06), Apr. 2006. [2] B. Parno and A. Perrig, Challenges in Securing Vehicular Networks, Proc. Fourth Workshop Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets IV), Nov. 2005. [3] M. Raya and J-P. Hubaux, Securing Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, J.Computer Security, special issue on security of ad hoc and sensor networks, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 39-68, 2007. [4] X. Lin, X. Sun, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, GSIS: A Secure and PrivacyPreserving Protocol for Vehicular Communications,IEEE Trans. Vehicular Technology, vol. 56, no. 6, pp.3442-3456,Nov. 2007. [5] L. Nguyen and R. Safavi-Naini, Dynamic K-Times Anonymous Authentication, Proc. Applied Cryptography and Network Security Conf., vol. 3531, pp. 318-333, 2005. [6] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, I. Aad, D. Jungels, and J.-P. Hubaux, Eviction of Misbehaving and Faulty Nodes in Vehicular Networks,IEEE J. Selected Areas Comm., vol. 25, no.8, pp. 1557-1568, Oct. 2007. [7] C. Gamage, B. Gras, B. Crispo, and A.S. Tanenbaum, An Identity-Based Ring Signature Scheme with Enhanced Privacy, Proc.Second Intl Conf. Security and Privacy in Comm. Networks (SecureComm 06), Aug. 2006. [8] R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Zhu, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, ECPP: Efficient Conditional Privacy Preservation Protocol for Secure Vehicular Communications, Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Apr. 2008. [9] J. Sun and Y. Fang, A Defense Technique Against Misbehavior in VANETs Based on Threshold Authentication, Proc. IEEE Military Comm. Conf., Nov. 2008.
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[10] J. Sun, C. Zhang, and Y. Fang, A Security Architecture Achieving Anonymity and Traceability in Wireless Mesh Networks, Proc.IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 1687-1695, Apr.2008. [11] A. Menezes, P.V. Oorschot, and S. Vanston, Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996. [12] T. Leinmu ller, E. Schoch, and F. Kargl, Position Verification Approaches for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, Proc. IEEE Wireless Comm., pp. 16-21, Oct. 2006.

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