Andrew Patterson November 7, 2011 History 180 Professor Cardwell Truman and the Recognition of Israel

Truman and his decision to recognize the state of Israel at 6:11 p.m. on May 14, 1848, only eleven minutes after the state declared its independence, has been heavily scrutinized for the last six decades.1 Historians have put forth various arguments of why Truman chose to recognize the Jewish state and did so not only unilaterally also with such urgency. Their historical arguments vary from the argument that Truman was motivated primarily by his Midwest upbringing to those who suggest that his decision was motivated by short-range domestic goals. The primary resources made available six decades after 1948 suggest that historians should resist the temptation of trying to simplify such a complex moment in history by trying label one factor as the most influential. Rather the primary sources suggest that Truman decided to recognize the Jewish state because it was the best course of action available to him; the course of action that had carried with it the least risk and the most rewards: economically, strategically, and politically. Truman then stuck by his decision to recognize Israel and embraced it as one the defining moments of his presidency forever linking May 14th with his presidential legacy. The debate over Trumans decision to recognize Israel will continue to go on but one fact that historians can agree upon is that Trumans decision, regardless of reasoning behind it, continues to impact the United States to this day. British Mandate When World War II finally came to an end the world was a dramatically changed place compared to when fighting broke out a decade earlier. With millions of lives lost and millions more

Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel, pg. 34.

displaced countries ravaged by fighting began the long process of rebuilding. The war resulted in a shift of world power away from the traditional colonial states to the United States and the Soviet Union. Traditional colonial powers such as Britain and France ended the war as a shadow of their former glory. Weakened by years of war the British and French had to decide of how they were going to govern territories being occupied by their troops. At the end of the war British forces remained in charge of their protectorate in Palestine but the future of the territory was uncertain. The British had more pressing matters besides the small Arab state; India, Greece, and the domestic affairs took priority over the traditional Jewish heartland over allocating limited long term resources to Palestine.2 One of the byproducts of World War II was that millions of people throughout the world had nothing to return home to. A large portion of those displaced in Europe were Jewish. Roughly 6 million Jews had died in the Holocaust; those who had escaped the gas chambers often had nothing to return to and no one to fall back on.3 As the Allies tried to organize and rebuild parts of Europe these displaced persons were moved into semi-permanent camps. The plight of these displaced Jews garnered public attention and there was an outpouring of sympathy from many Americans including President Truman. Truman initially tried to pass an immigration bill that would increase the amount of displaced people allowed in the United States but Congress did not support it.4 Worried about a post-war depression Congress did not want to take in a large number of refugees to immigrate to the country that was going to be a burden on the economy and the system. As it became evident that the displaced persons were not going to able to seek asylum in the United States it lent support to the growing Zionist cause. Jewish communities in the United States began to argue that the Holocaust survivors should have a place of their own to live.

2 3

Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel. Pg. 84. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, pg. 771-775. 4 Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel. Pg. 30.

The Zionist movement did not just materialize after World War II but rather was a pro-Jewish movement that had been slowly gaining international support for over two decades. The primary goal of the Zionist movement was to create a state for the Jewish people. In 1923 the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour sent a personal letter to a member of a Jewish Federation stating that His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.5 This personal letter, which became known as the Balfour Declaration, was eventually incorporated into the British Mandate for Palestine.6 When the fighting of World War II finally dissipated Jewish groups around the world began voicing their support for a creation of a Jewish homeland; citing the principles outlined in the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate for Palestine, and the potential humanitarian relief it would provide to the displaced persons of Europe. With the presidents immigration bill shot down in Congress the Truman administration began putting pressure on the British Foreign office in the hopes of opening up their immigration policy in Palestine. While Trumans administration was pressuring the British it came under severe criticism from the media over the deplorable conditions in the displaced person camps around Europe. Truman ordered General Eisenhower to improve the living conditions in the camps but also concentrated on finding a permanent solution to the problem.7 Trumans work towards solving the problem of displaced persons in Europe and his pressure on the British government for opening up immigration in Palestine reflected his gradual acceptance of what became known as refugee Zionism; a policy where the administration would share the some of the limited goals stated by the traditional Zionist movement by lobbying for further Jewish migration.8 Zionists were encouraged when Truman made several controversial comments on October 4, 1946 concerning a potential Jewish state. These comments are often referred to as the Yom Kippur
5 6

Balfour Declaration Palestine Royal Commission Report 7 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, p. 785-786. 8 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, p. 578.

statements. Truman called on Britain to expand immigration quotas and to find a solution that included a viable Jewish state.9 The timing of the statements reflects Trumans desire to capitalize on the issue of a Jewish state for political reasons and marks a transition from Truman supporting a narrow policy of refugee Zionism to a policy that tried to maximize the political benefits of pursuing a pro-Jewish policy. The president though was purposely vague in his statements but was successful in garnering widespread praise from Jewish leaders across the country. Truman was not relying solely on the British to take the initiative in Palestine. Truman wrote to the Saudi King on October 28, 1946 reiterating the public stance he had taken in the Yom Kippur statements.10 The disconnect between the two sides is apparent, as Saudi Minister Amir Faisal accuses the United States of following an immigration policy for Palestine which renders the pretense of prior consultation a mockery and argues that the will of 45,000,000 Arabs will prevail against the special pleading of almost 5,000,000 Jewish lobbyists.11 While Jewish communities celebrated the Yom Kippur statements, just as they had done with the Balfour Declaration decades earlier, the growing friction between the Arab countries and the United States threatened American interests in the Middle East. Their pressure on Truman to fulfill his vague promises stated on Yom Kippur mounted as the deadline for British involvement in Palestine slowly drew near. This is reflected in the sheer volume of mail that the White House received during 1947-1948 on the subject of Palestine totaled 48,600 telegrams, 790,575 cards, and 81,200.12 At the conclusion of World War II, British forces controlled large swaths of territory in the Middle East. The United Nations legitimized Britains temporary control over the territory through U.N. mandates. The British were keen though not to commit to the region long term. The British resisted Trumans efforts to allow for unrestricted immigration into Palestine instead they offered a

Truman Pledges U.S. to Help Speed Entry of Jews in Palestine, Pittsburg Press. Truman Library: The Recognition of the State of Israel Online Research File. Harry S. Truman Library. 11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, p. 615-616. 12 Truman Library: The Recognition of the State of Israel Online Research File. Harry S. Truman Library.
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compromise. The British allowed for a monthly immigration quota to be established.13 The British were worried that there might be economic and social problems if they allowed mass immigration into Palestine that would upset native Arabs and require British forces to stay past their U.N. mandate. The British on February 7, 1947 made it clear to all parties that they intended to withdraw from Palestine after their mandate expired.14 On May 13, 1947 the United Nations created a Special Committee on Palestine to find a possible solution to the impending crisis. On November 29, the commission reported that it favored partition in Palestine; with the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states.15 On March 18 the Special Commission of Palestine cited rising violence rescinded its original recommendation of favoring partition and instead proposed a temporary U.N. sponsored trusteeship.16 Zionists though adamantly opposed the commission reversal. A U.N. sponsored trusteeship would indefinitely suspend their dream of a Jewish state.

Trusteeship Proposal On March 19, 1948 U.S. Representative Austin, the a member of the United States delegation to the U.N., gave a speech to the Security Council that the United States supported the idea of a trusteeship in Palestine when the British mandate expired. Senator Austin urged other nations to come together to solve this troubling situation. President Truman, with the benefit of hindsight, claimed that the State Department had pulled one over on him.17 The president had a day earlier talked to prominent Jewish leaders about the Palestine issue and had assured them that he supported their cause. So to have the head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. stating that the United States fully supported a trusteeship in Palestine was extremely embarrassing for the president. It appeared to the Zionist leaders

13 14

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 127-128. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, p. 511-513. 15 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, November 29, 1947. 16 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, March 18, 1948. 17 Schnoebaum, The United States and the State of Israel, pg. 58.

that at best Truman was not in control of his U.N. delegation or at worse he had purposely doublecrossed them. Representative Austins speech to the U.N. that the United States supported the partition commissions findings created a serious dilemma for President Truman. The president did not want it to become public that he was not in control of his U.N. delegation. The president allowed for the U.S. delegation to keep working towards the plan of trusteeship while Truman called and assured Jewish leaders that nothing had changed. The State Department and Representative Austin claimed in their defense that a draft of the speech had been sent to Truman and that he had approved its content. Truman and his White House aides argued that they had seen an earlier draft of the speech and considered that version to be inline with White House policy.18 The State Department and the White House under the Truman administration did not operate in a cohesive manner during Trumans presidency. It was this lack of cohesion that allowed a serious misunderstanding to occur between the State Department and the White House Palestine concerning Palestinian policy. There were various underlying reasons of why the relationship between the two bureaucracies had deteriorated to the point were a public miscommunication of this magnitude could occur. It was partially due to the transition between Truman and his predecessor. The State Department, had largely been ignored by during the Roosevelt administration, sought to have a greater influence of foreign policy with the new president.19 Truman and his White House were concerned with the motives of the State Department when it came to the issue of Palestine. Truman thought that the State Department was periodically withholding documents from him that they did not want to see in order to shape his policy.20 This lack of trust between the White House and the State Department was dealt another blow due to the fact that Truman held a personal distain for the elitist State Department.

18 19

Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 86-88. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pg. 43-44. 20 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 195-197.

In order to improve the communication between the White House and the State Department Truman created a position of a special White House advisor to the State Department. The appointment of an advisor was not met well. The State Department did want someone from the White House to be Trumans eyes and ears inside their building. They thought the advisor was going to undercut their recommendations to Truman concerning foreign policy. The former army general that Truman was able to coax out of retirement for the special position was meant with such disdain that he quickly vacated the post citing health reasons.21 Some historians have argued that Truman approved had originally approved Representative Austins speech but was taken aback by the universal criticism that it received from all sides.22 The Jewish community reacted with predictable outrage. Their lobbyists quickly reached out to Republicans and Democrats alike to ensure that a potential Jewish state still had supporters in Congress. The Arabs were unhappy because it meant that the U.N. was going to maintain a presence in the region for a prolong period. Eager to move away from the memory of colonial domination the Arab nations were not interested in seeing several hundred thousand troops deployed to Palestine for an indefinite time period to implement a trusteeship plan. While the reaction from outside of the government was troubling to the Truman administration the trusteeship plan also met opposition from experts inside the United States. The lack of support from the Jews and Arabs in Palestine would make the Trusteeship plan hard to enforce. Trumans advisors estimated that it would take a force of 200,000 men to enforce the plan.23 This would require partial mobilization of the U.S. economy. The predicted negative reaction to the plan by the American public could potentially put the nail in the coffin for Trumans future political aspirations. The partial mobilization could also prove disastrous to the economy and would require an increase in national

21 22

Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 80. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 191. 23 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 175-176.

spending. Not only was the trustee plan not supported by the major players on the ground, it would also prove costly on the political and economic front yet the State Department still supported it. Truman was also worried that the U.S. couldnt afford to transfer military resources from Western Europe to the Middle East due to escalating tensions with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had begun to crack down on opposition forces within Czechoslovakia.24 Truman didnt want to transfer U.S. military units from Western Europe to the Middle East because he viewed the units as vital as a preventive measure from Soviet aggression on the continent. The prospect of other Western countries championing Senator Austins trustee plan was almost nonexistent. The British foreign office made it clear to the U.N. that under no circumstances would they extend their mandate.25 The British refused to divert their limited resources in an area like Palestine when they were trying to hold together other parts of the splintering empire. The French were likewise not willing to commit troops or resources to Palestine. French forces were trying to exert control over Indochina after the Japanese forced them out during World War II.26 As the U.N. mandate was set to expire tensions began to build, as the future of Palestine was unclear. When the British removed their forces there would be no government or recognized governing body was ready to replace them. The Arabs and Jews were not close to coming to a consensus. Imminent violence was a real possibility but the options available to the international community were limited. The trustee proposal set forth by Representative Austin was still being deliberated in the U.N. While the U.S. delegates were reporting that progress was being made for gathering support it was unlikely that enough resources and troops would be committed to the plan for it ever to go into effect. Truman was facing a tough decision over what course of action he should pursue once the U.N. mandate

24 25

Ottolenghi, Harry Trumans Recognition of Israel. Truman Library: The Recognition of the State of Israel Online Research File. 26 Tonnesson, Vietnam: 1946, pg. 3-4.

in Palestine expired; a decision that would shape not only his presidential legacy but would have a lasting impact on how the United States is perceived in the Middle East for decades to come.27 May 12, 1948 At 4:00 P.M. on Wednesday, May 12, just two days before the British U.N. mandate in Palestine was set to expire Truman convened a meeting between his White House aides and the State Department to discuss the issue of Palestine. Present at the meeting were White House aides David Niles, Clark Clifford, and Matt Connelly along with Lovett, Fraser Wilkins, Robert McClintock, George Marshall from the State Department. It is worth noting that anti-partitionist Loy Henderson was specifically not invited in order to alleviate tension between the two sides.28 President Truman instructed Clark Clifford before the meeting to prepare statements as if he was going to make an argument before the Supreme Court. Truman wanted Clifford to lay out point by point the rationale for not only why the United States should recognize a Jewish state but why it should also do so before the state was declared. Clifford was to speak for the President in the hopes of reconciling the ongoing feud between the State Department and the White House over what course of action should be taken in Palestine; the White Houses proposal for early recognition of a Jewish state or the State Departments plan for a U.N. backed trusteeship.29 Secretary of State Marshall was not informed before the meeting that Clifford was at the meeting representing and speaking for the President. The Secretary of State reacted with hostility when he walked into to the conference room and saw the presidential aide. He wanted to know why Clifford was even present since the issue of Palestine fell within his sphere of responsibility as Secretary of

27 28

Trygv Lie Lauds 1948 U.S. Recognition of Israel. New York Times. Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 154. 29 Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 153.

State. Truman tried to placate Marshall by saying that Clifford had been invited because Palestine was such a serious policy dilemma that all points of view and recommendations should be considered.30 Marshall and Lovett stressed that recent military gains made by Jewish forces were fragile. The Secretary of State warned that recent progress might encourage Jewish leaders to establish a new state unilaterally without first securing military truces with its neighbors. On May 8 Marshall had warned Jewish forces that in the event of a regional conflict that the U.S. was not going to provide aid and that they should proceed accordingly. Marshall advised Truman that the best option for the U.S. to pursue was Senator Austins Trusteeship plan in the U.N. and to wait for events to become clear in Palestine.31 Clifford then responded to Marshalls statements. The Presidential aide pointed out that the State Departments plan for the U.N. was unrealistic and nave and that best policy option available was to follow the United Nations Special Committee on Palestines recommendations of November 29th.32 The British refused to extend their mandate in Palestine past May 14 making an agreement before the mandate expired highly unlikely.33 Even if the trusteeship plan was approved the military resources required to implement the plan were unrealistic. The United States would have to partially mobilize in order implement the unpopular State Department plan which hurt the Truman administration domestically and U.S. image abroad.34 With recent Jewish victories in Palestine the partition plan outlined by the U.N. in November 1947 was already practically in place. The Jews had proven themselves as resourceful fighters and could be key allies within the region. To counter the State Departments agreement that U.S. support for a Jewish state would alienate the Arab-U.S. relations Clifford argued that the Arab states were too reliant

30 31

Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 156. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 212-213. 32 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, November 29. 33 Truman Library: The Recognition of the State of Israel Online Research File. 34 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Pg. 817.

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on U.S. investments to push the countries into the Soviet camp.35 It was when Clifford started mentioning the potential domestic benefits if Truman recognized the Jewish state did Marshall start to become visibly angry. Clifford argued that Trumans decision to recognize Israel would motivate Jewish voters in key swing states that were vital to both national and regional upcoming elections, a boost the Democratic Party desperately needed.36 Clifford stated that it was not only vital for the President to recognize the Jewish state but for him to do so in a manner that was the most beneficial to the administration. Clifford wanted the President to announce U.S. support for a potential Jewish state immediately after the meeting or at the very least recognize the state before the British mandate expired. The rationale for recognizing the Jewish state before the mandate expired would benefit both the country and Truman in a variety of ways. By following Cliffords advice the United States would beat the Soviets from recognizing the new state an act that the State Department had warned in a letter in September the previous year.37 By having the United States be the first to recognize the Jewish state would result in a public relations coup of sorts. The world would be shown another example of the U.S. promoting and assisting emerging democracies. Another reason for early recognition was that mass rallies were scheduled for May 16 across the country as a show of support of the Jewish population in Palestine.38 If Truman recognized the Jewish state before these rallies took place he would be the central political figure to rally around which would hopefully translate into votes on Election Day. By recognizing the Jewish state promptly would prevent the buildup of even more public pressure and scrutiny on the administration. Truman

35 36

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 189. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 178. 37 Truman Library: The Recognition of the State of Israel Online Research File, Harry S. Truman Library 38 Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 108.

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could claim that he did what was right for the nation both morally and strategically and preempt Republicans from championing the issue as their own.39 Lovett countered Cliffords argument for preemptive recognition of a Jewish state on a variety points. If the U.S. was going to recognize Israel, an act still opposed by the State Department, the timing of the declaration was crucial. Lovett argued that it would be inappropriate for Truman to recognize the Jewish state before the British mandate expired because it appear as a transparent attempt to win the Jewish vote, would undermine the authority of the U.N., and had no precedent under international law.40 Secretary of State Marshall confronted with what he saw as domestic politics interfering with foreign policy stated that if Truman followed Cliffords advice that he would not vote for Truman in the upcoming presidential elections.41 The degree of seriousness that Marshall attached to this statement and Trumans reaction to it are a matter of continued historical debate but Marshalls reasoning for saying what he said to the sitting president is understandable. To the State Department it appeared that the President was pursuing a course of action that directly threatened the countrys national security and economic wellbeing. Truman would be taking a gamble by recognizing a Jewish state. His decision could push the Arab states into the Soviet camp and thereby threatening U.S. access to oil and trade routes.42 In the face of Marshalls comments about voting against him in the upcoming election Truman decided to end the meeting before the conversation degenerated further. Clifford later recalled Truman as raising his hand and saying I think I understand the questions involved and I think we need no further discussion of it. I think we must follow the position General Marshall has advocated.43 It is

39 40

Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 155. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 189. 41 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 213. 42 Brown, The Recognition of Israel. 43 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 214-215.

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important to determine which position of Marshalls Truman was backing. Truman was not saying that he was going to follow his Secretary of States advice on not recognizing a Jewish state at all merely that he was not going to recognize the Jewish state before the British mandate expired and the new state requested recognition. Even though this meeting was convened in order to get both the State Department and the White House on the same page the degeneration of the conversation during the meeting caused Truman to end the meeting prematurely. With only two days before the mandate was set to expire and both the White House and State Department had yet to reach a consensus over Palestine. This was going to have several embarrassing and otherwise preventable side effects. With Truman accepting the State Departments advice that granting recognition to a state before it had even asked for it not only had no precedent but that it would also come off as influencing the country, Clifford and the other White House aides sought to make sure that the United States was waiting to respond to a request when it was made. To accomplish this goal the aides had to try and accomplish several things over the next two days. The most important task for the White House aides to accomplish was to ensure that Secretary of State Marshall would not break with the president publically over Palestine. The aides also had to keep the media and other interest groups at bay during the next two days to make sure that Trumans intention of extending imminent recognition to a Jewish state was not made public.44 The potentially volatile issue of Palestine and a Jewish state was not the only issue that concerned President Truman in 1948. During his term in office Harry Truman was consistently battling low approval ratings. Facing turmoil from both within his own party and from Republicans it was extremely important to the administration to have George Marshall as Secretary of State. Marshalls war record and reputation for being an effective and impartial administrator was invaluable to the

44

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 216.

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beleaguered president. Having Marshall come out openly against Trumans policy towards Palestine would prove likely fatal as Truman faced reelection in 1948.45 Truman was not the only politician to facing mounting political pressure at this time. Democrat leaders from around the country urged Truman to support the Jews when it came to Zionism. There was actually a movement within the Democrat Party to nominate General Eisenhower as the Democrats nominee for office instead of the incumbent president. This almost unprecedented action of going against the incumbent from their own party just shows how vital the Jewish vote and swing states like New York were considered in domestic politics.46 This political pressure had been growing for months. John A. Kennedy, a personal friend of Trumans, recalled that in either April or May of 1948 he paid a visit to the Oval Office. On his way in to meet Truman Kennedy passed a group of Jewish leaders waiting in the hall to meet with Truman after Kennedys appointment. During his visit Kennedy jokingly asked whether Mr. President, are you going to recognize Israel? As of course that is what this group who are following me would like to know. Truman responded Well, how many Arabs are there registered voters in the United States?47 While Trumans comment was not supposed to be taken to literally it does show that Truman understood the domestic pressure that surrounded the Palestine issue and how vital it was going to be for the upcoming presidential campaign. Truman could not afford to miss the opportunity presented by the issue of Palestine or be undermined by public dissent from his Secretary of State; two points that were understood by both Truman and his White House aides. May 14, 1948 Lovett and Clifford met over lunch on May 14 to review the events of the day. Clifford told Lovett that Truman had been persuaded to not recognize a Jewish state prematurely by the State Department but that tonight after the mandate had expired and a Jewish state was declared that the

45 46

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 202. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 202-203. 47 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 215-216

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President intended on recognizing the state. Lovett stated that there was no legal bar to recognition but that he urged that the decision be delayed by a couple of days. The State Department was worried about notifying its Allies, especially the British and French governments, and needed time to do damage control when it came to relations between Arab countries and the U.S. Lovett also did not want Trumans decision to become known while the U.N. was still in session working on the trustee proposal.48 Clifford state that the president planned on moving forward with his decision concerning the Jewish state. In the meeting Lovett and Clifford decided to split the responsibility of notifying the different parties of the news that the U.S. was going to imminently recognize a Jewish state in Palestine.49 Lovett was able to persuade Marshall into adopting a publically neutral stance on the Palestinian issue. Marshall called the president on May 14th and said: Mr. President, I cannot support your action in recognition but I will not oppose it. To which Truman replied: Thank you, General Marshall. That is all that I need.50 Earlier that morning White House aide David Niles working closely with Clifford was instructed to notify the Jewish Agency representative in Washington to expect a call before noon. Clifford called and instructed the Jewish Agency and stated that if the Jewish Agency sent over a formal request to the White House and the State Department that the United States would recognize a Jewish state.51 52It is interesting to note that this phone conversation happened before Cliffords lunch with Lovett revealing that while Truman felt that having Marshall by his side on the matter was important he was willing to go ahead with his decision.

48 49

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 218. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 217. 50 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 218. 51 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 219. 52 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, pg. 1005-1007.

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At 5:45 P.M. Clifford notified the State Department that the president was going to recognize the State of Israel shortly after 6:00 P.M. or right after midnight in Palestine.53 State Department employee Dean Rusk voiced his opposition to the timing of the decision. The United Nations was in session and the American delegation was still promoting Senator Austins trusteeship proposal, which now enjoyed majority support.54 At 6:11 P.M. eleven minutes after the British mandate had expired and a Jewish state called Israel had declared its independence. President Truman released the following statement of recognition. The deep repercussions felt both domestically and abroad when the State Departments trusteeship was proposed paled in comparison to Trumans decision.

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been request by the provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the State of Israel. Harry S. Truman May 14, 1948. 6:11 P.M.55 Just as Dean Rusk and Undersecretary of State Lovett had warned the last minute timing and secrecy of Trumans statement caught the United States metaphorically with its pants down. After getting off the phone with Clifford, Dean Rusk called and notified Warren Austin of the presidents decision. Instead of returning to the General Assembly that was currently in session Austin decided to instead to drive straight home.56 Austin did this to show that that the decision had been Trumans and the American delegation had not been deceiving the other delegations and no knowledge of Trumans intentions.

53 54

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg.219. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, pg. 1005-1007. 55 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Pg.992. 56 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg.219.

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A member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., Francis B. Sayre, was actually addressing on the issue of Palestine when the news broke of Trumans recognition of the Jewish state. The news was at first received with muffled laughter for surely that U.S. would have warned its delegates prior to a decision so monumental. Another delegate, Albert Fernandez of Colombia, asked the United States delegation if they could give the General Assembly verification of the rumors that were circling the chamber. It was only after the American delegates telephoned the State Department that they received confirmation. It fell to Philip Jessup to stand up and read Trumans recognition to the rest of the assembly.57 Here the American delegation had publically worked towards achieving a truce and the establishments of a trusteeship within Palestine to only have the White House go ahead and recognize a Jewish state unilateral. President Truman and his State Department let the delegations in the U.N. and it allies around the world feeling that at best they had been deceived and at worse unintentionally doublecrossed. After learning of Warren Austins reaction to drive home Marshall instructed Rusk to head up to New York and prevent the U.S. Delegation from resigning en masse.58 Marshalls worst fears were not realized as cooler heads prevailed but the spectacle of having U.S. diplomats caught off guard when it came to Trumans decision was repeated on smaller and private scales throughout the world. Warren Austin later wrote to the Secretary of State Marshall warning that the recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel last Friday evening has deeply undermined the confidence of other delegation in our integrity and that this is a factor which the Department will want to keep in mind in the immediate future.59 Trumans decision to recognize Israel not only undermined U.S. integrity in the U.N. it also damaged the U.S.-Arab relations as a whole.

57 58

Sentsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 112. Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 219-220. 59 Foreign Relations of the United State, 1948, pg. 1013.

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In a telegram from a State Department official Lebanon, written by Pinkerton, it outlined the memorandum adopted by the Arab League Political Committee that their intervention in Palestine has been prompted solely by the consideration for the aims to prevent the spread of disorder so that a creation of a unitary state of Palestine based upon the democratic principles can be founded.60 With this motive the Arab league engaged in armed intervention in Palestine.61 Truman may have been the midwife of Israel, as Lovett put it, but the country he just help deliver was in danger of being overrun.62

Reaction to Trumans Decision The State Department had warned Truman that irrevocable damage could potentially be done to American interests around the world, especially in the Middle East, if he recognized a Jewish state. Secretary of State Marshall accused Truman in private of following the advice from aides like Clifford and Niles who sought to sacrifice long term strategic interests of the country in exchange for short term political considerations. While it might have appeared to State Department officials and to some authors who enjoy the benefits of hindsight that Truman was acting solely on domestic considerations this line of reasoning is not logical. Trumans aides claimed that Trumans decision to economize the Jewish state of Israel was the most pragmatic option available to the administration. For recognizing Israel was not only domestically beneficial but it also represented the reality on the ground that Jewish forces had already partitioned Palestine. Not recognizing Israel, the White House aides argued, would have been a missed opportunity. The Republicans were ready to make the issue a contentious political topic. The respected Republican Senator Vandenburg had a statement prepared for May 14 urging Truman in the strongest language to extend recognition to the Jewish state. As a result of Trumans actions Vandenburg edited his statement
60 61

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, pg. 1003. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, pg. 1000. 62 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, pg. 1005-1007.

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and congratulated the president on his heroic decision.63 The American domestic reaction to Trumans decision to extend recognition is easier to definitively gauge; there are elections results, newspapers articles, and documented rallies to analyze.64 Instead of extending de facto recognition to Israel Truman could have supported the official State Department proposal that called for a trusteeship to be implemented in Palestine through the newly created U.N.65 this proposal brought together all sides involved with the question of Palestine in opposition to the plan. The Jewish population wanted a Jewish state. The Arab league opposed the plan because it would mean that foreigners would continue to have a mandate that justified having troops within the region. The British refused to offer to stay even if they received an extended mandate. They simply did not want to commit troops and money to the complicated situation. France was busy trying to exert its control once again over Indochina. Like Britain, France just didnt prioritize the Palestine situation high enough to warrant troop commitment. Truman was not willing to commit U.S. forces to enforce a trusteeship in Palestine with that had little local support and no other major contributors. It was months later when Truman extended De Jure recognition.66 If the United States had wanted to it could have enforced a trusteeship in Palestine unilaterally but doing so would require an estimated 100,000 troops to be deployed. Any troop commitment that was more than a division or 20,000 troops would require partial mobilization.67 This made the prospect of enforcing a trusteeship practically impossible. The administration could not afford to partially mobilize the country. The Republicans would lambast the president for committing U.S. forces in the Middle East leaving Europe open to the communists not to mention that impact partial mobilization could potentially have on the economy. When Jewish forces secured large swaths of territory in

63 64

Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 167. New York Times, May 15, 1948. 65 Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, pg. 110. 66 Sentsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, pg. 135. 67 Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 177.

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Palestine by May 1948 it further backed Trumans reservations about the State Departments trusteeship program; for any deployment of U.N. troops in these areas would result in a high probably that casualties would occur on both sides.68 While some historians have agreed with the State Department sentiment that Trumans recognition of Palestine offers an extraordinary example of foreign policy conducted in line with shortrange political expediency rather than long-range national goals.69 No president how dire his need for a short term boost to the polls would purposely undermine nations long-term goals. Rather it is more likely that Truman decided to recognize the Jewish state because it was the best choice available to him. Recognizing Israel offered the greatest reward for Truman with the least amount of risk of failure. Part of that reward was hopefully securing the Jewish vote in the upcoming election. Over the course of three years Truman gradually shifted from supporting refugee Zionism to eventually unilaterally recognizing a Jewish state. It is evident in Trumans correspondence to Jewish leaders shortly after May 14th and in his statements to those that were close to him that he was confident that he had made the correct decision concerning Israel. There is a group of historians that have tried to counter the claim that Truman acted for purely domestic reasons when it came to extending recognition to the Jewish state. This group of historians have stressed that it was Trumans character that allowed him to make to act against the advice of the pinstriped men at the State Department. By using the term Spongier Ground these authors claim that Trumans upbringing and character as a man was the main reason for him to recognize the new Jewish state. The authors that support the concept of the Spongier Ground point out that since Truman was an adolescent he considered himself a deeply religious person.70 There are several passages that in the bible can easily be used to justify the creation of Israel and that Truman having read them

68 69

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 177-180. Snetsinger, John. Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, pg. 140 70 Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 6-7.

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growing up was influenced by these stories. These authors suggest that Trumans decision to go against his state department was due to his biblical, Midwestern, upbringing that was also reinforced by his long time personal friendship to Eddie Jacobson. Eddie Jacobson knew Truman since their youth and was later tapped to speak on the Zionist behalf for Truman to recognize Israel as the right decision to make.71 Like so many pivotal moments in history Trumans decision on May 14 can be and will be interpreted in various ways by different historians. The proponents of this spongier ground concept do enjoy several advantages by putting forth their style of argument. First is that the real motivation of Truman to recognize Israel unilaterally will never be known especially after Trumans death. Citing Trumans Midwest upbringing as a major influence on his foreign policy decision is hard to overturn because there are no statistics to analyze just an assumption of what kind of man the president was and how much of his early life effect his decision making. It seems slightly preposterous that Truman was motivated to make such a monumental decision as to recognize the Jewish state based solely on his moral character, Midwest upbringing and personal friendships. It is interesting to note that while Truman did recognize Israel he did not permanently tie the United States to the fledgling country. Truman refused to lift the arms embargo, he extend only de jure recognition, and did not allocate military or humanitarian aide to the embattled country.72 The creation of limited ties between the U.S. and Israel suggests that Truman understood the nature of the situation he was involving the United States in. The limited recognition that was extended shows that Truman was not willing to commit the U.S. to the long term. The proponents who support the spongier ground concept tend not to explain why the Trumans failed to provide aid to the country he had just recognized.

71 72

Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 8-9. Mearsheimer, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, pg. 24-25.

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Some critics of Trumans decision suggest that domestic considerations where the most important factor in recognizing Israel.73 By May 1948 the Truman was facing an uphill battle to get reelected for a second term. Politicians in his own party began to doubt whether the incumbent president stood a chance against the Republican nominee, Dewey. Truman was advised by politicians from large cities like Chicago and New York that obtaining the Jewish vote was vital to his campaign bid.74 The urgency in which Truman needed a political bump was made worse when a movement in the Democratic Party wanted to nominate General Eisenhower instead of Truman. When Truman recognized Israel Jewish communities throughout the country were overjoyed. As one author put it that Trumans name was always spoken with reverence in Synagogues after May 14.75 In order to counteract the Trumans bump in popularity with the Jewish population the Republicans nominated Henry Wallace as Deweys vice president nominee. Henry Wallace had served under former President Roosevelt and his addition to the ticket was designed to pull indecisive voters in key states.76 Truman verse Dewey was one of the closest presidential elections in the history of the United States. The election was so close that newspapers prepared articles in case either candidate won. After it was announced that Truman was the eventual winner he posed for the famous picture of him holding the Chicago Tribune that reads the Dewey Defeats Truman.77 While Truman was not able to win New York, a state that was deemed vital before the results came in; he was able to secure other swing states by a very slim margin. It is suggested that the Jewish population in New York was evenly split between Truman and support for Henry Wallace costing Truman the state. Jewish communities in other states though were able to swing their states for the Democratic nominee.78 Legacy
73 74

Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 114. Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 119. 75 Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 167. 76 Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 133. 77 Chicago Tribune, November 2, 1948. 78 Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and Israel, pg. 134.

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The debate over Trumans decision to recognize Israel is no closer to being settled since the debates began on May 14, 1948. The sheer amount of information available to historians has allowed several different groups of historians to emerge each with their own thesis to explain Trumans actions. Those that support the argument that Truman acted for the Jewish state because he thought it was the right thing to do often point to Trumans memoirs as vindication of their argument. In his memoirs Truman states multiple times that he made his decisions based on morale factors.79 It is not surprising though that Truman approaches the recognition of Israel this way. It was a pivotal moment in his presidency equal to his decision to drop the bomb on Japan or to get tough with the Soviets. Truman was not going to jeopardize his legacy by coming out and saying that he made the decision for purely political reasons; the former president would lose of some of the amazing credibility that he has built up over the years. Truman is often referred as being a member of the near-great club those presidents who were only slightly less important than George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Jimmy Carter.80 This evolved perception of Truman is due to the fact that the man may have benefited the most out of his gamble on May 14th. In an article that appeared in the New York Times ten years after Truman recognized Israel the article congratulates the former president on his historic decision.81 For Truman will always been known for first to recognizing Israel, he doing so on his own terms, and also winning the upcoming presidential election, a task that seemed highly unlikely before his actions on May 14th. The State Departments worse fears of Arab countries cutting off oil were not realized partially due to the Soviets extending recognition to Israel on May 16th.82 Most Americans who do know that Truman recognized Israel do not associate the action with ongoing problems in the Middle East sixty years later. While Trumans actions were deemed irresponsible, especially by State Department officials, other Western Nations, and even a group of historians that have the benefit of hindsight it seems
79 80

Cohen, Truman and Israel, pg. 275. Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, pg. 8-9. 81 Trygve Lie Lauds 1948 U.S. Recognition of Israel New York Times. 82 Rucker, Moscows Surprise:The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949.

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unlikely that Truman sole consideration for the recognition of Israel was for just domestic reasons just as the other side of the argument suggesting that Truman recognized Israel because he grew up in the Midwest and had Jewish acquaintances has even less clout. It is more likely that that Trumans true motivation for extending recognition lie in the middle ground between these two camps. Truman only committed himself to recognizing the Jewish state when it became the easiest and safest course of action available to him when the British mandate expired. With Jewish forces effectively controlling a large swath of territory in Palestine Truman had three options open to him. The first was to do nothing and wait; the second was to follow the trustee plan outlined by the State Department that was not only unpopular but also not feasible without partial mobilization, or the third option to unilaterally recognize Israel. Truman chose the third option, which was still a gamble but presented the biggest payoff. Truman won the election and help cement his near great presidential legacy. The sheer amount of literature published on the subject and lack of consensus among these works suggests that historians will never agree upon what was the main motivational factor that guided Truman. It is important to keep an open mind when considering the subject and look for the rational motivation behind Trumans actions of May 14th. Truman believed that recognizing Israel was the right course of action to take; for his political career and for the country.

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Bibliographies Primary Balfour, James. "Balfour Declaration." Letter to Lord Rothschild. 2 Nov. 1917. MS. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East, and Africa, 1945. Vol. 8. Department of State. Print. Chicago Tribune Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1946. Vol. 7. Department of State. Print. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1947. Vol. 5. Department of State. Print. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1948, Part 2. Vol. 5. Department of State. Print. London Times New York Times Palestine Royal Commission Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 1937, Cmd. 5479. His Majestys Stationery Office., London 1937. 404 pages. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Minutes. November 29, 1947. Partition Plan. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Document. March 18, 1948. Violence. "Truman Pledges U.S. To Help Speed Entry Of Jews in Palestine", Pittsburgh Press, October 4, 1946, p1. "Trygve Lie Lauds 1948 U.S. Recognition of Israel." New York Times. 28 Apr. 1958. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. Secondary Benson, Michael T. Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. Print. Brown, Phillip. "The Recognition of Israel." The American Journal of International Law 42.3 (1948): 62027. Jstor. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193961>. Cohen, Michael Joseph. Truman and Israel. Berkeley: University of California, 1990. Print. Miscamble, Wilson D. From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print. Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, 25

Straus and Giroux, 2007. Print. Ottolenghi, Michael. "Harry Truman's Recognition of Israel." The Historical Journal 47.4 (2004): 963-88. JStor. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4091664.pdf?acceptTC=true>. Rucker, Laurent. "Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949." Cold War International History Project 46. Web. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_461.pdf>. Schoenbaum, David. The United States and the State of Israel. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print. Snetsinger, John. Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1974. Print. Tnnesson, Stein. Vietnam 1946: How the War Began. Berkeley: University of California, 2010. Print. "Truman Library: The Recognition of the State of Israel Online Research File." Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/index.php?action=chrono>.

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