November 1, 2010

Kenneth S. Carlson Administrative Law Judge State of New York Public Employment Relations Board 80 Wolf Road, Suite 500 Albany, NY 12205-2656 RE:

certified mail, return receipt requested

PERB U-28826 UUP v. State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo)

Dear Judge Carlson: Enclosed please find an original and four (4) copies of Charging Partys brief in the above captioned matter. I have also enclosed proof of service of a copy of the brief upon Lynn Vance, Esq., counsel to Respondent. Yours truly,

Tara Singer-Blumberg Labor Relations Specialist Enclosures cc: Lynn Vance Jeff Malkan Marilyn Raskin-Ortiz Martin Coffey Mike Behun Paul Zarembka

TSB/lb cwa1141/afl-cio

STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD In the Matter of: UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, AFT, LOCAL 2190, AFL-CIO, Charging Party, -andSTATE OF NEW YORK (State University Of New York at Buffalo) Respondent. Case No. U-28826
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ERIE

) : ss. )

Tara Singer-Blumberg, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. That deponent is not a party to this action, is over 18 years of age, and resides at 55 Rosewood Drive, Williamsville, NY. On the 1st day of November, 2010, deponent served the within brief upon Lynn Vance, counsel to Respondent in this action, at the address designated by Respondent for that purpose, by depositing a true copy of same, enclosed in a post-paid wrapper, in a post office box under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the State of New York, by certified mail, return receipt requested.

2.

________________________________ Tara Singer-Blumberg Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , . ________________________________ Notary Public

State of New York Public Employment Relations Board IN THE MATTER OF

UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, AFT, LOCAL 2190, AFL-CIO, Charging Party,

-and(State University of New York at Buffalo)

STATE OF NEW YORK Respondent.

PERB Case No. U-28826

__________________________________________________________________________ BEFORE: Kenneth S. Carlson Administrative Law Judge

A BRIEF ON BEHALF OF CHARGING PARTY United University Professions

Submitted By: Tara Singer-Blumberg Labor Relations Specialist NYSUT Regional Office 270 Essjay Road Williamsville, NY 14221 (716) 634-7132 Date: November 1, 2010

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The instant matter is a proceeding upon an improper practice charge brought by the United University Professions, NYSUT, AFT (Charging Party) pursuant to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law (Taylor Law) against the State of New York, State University of New York at Buffalo claiming a violation of 209-a.1(a) and (c) (ALJ1)1. An answer was filed denying that the Respondent's actions violated the Taylor Law and raising certain affirmative defenses (ALJ4). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Kenneth S. Carlson on November 17, 2009, March 31, 2010 and April 1, 2010.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The claims in the instant matter concern certain actions taken by the Respondent in terminating Jeffrey Malkan (Petitioner)s employment as a clinical professor at the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School (UB).

Petitioner was hired by UB on September 1, 2000, on a joint appointment (CP1). His academic appointment was as a clinical associate professor. He also held an administrative position as Director of the Research and Writing (R&W) program. Petitioner continued in this dual appointment (CP3, CP4) until he was summarily removed as Director by the Dean of the Law School, Makau Mutua, (Dean) during the schools spring break in March 2008 (J2, J3). The Director position was an at-will position. Due to the summary way that he was removed, an inference of wrongdoing was sensed by the faculty at large. Given the negative impact on Petitioners reputation as a result, he requested assistance from his Union representatives to advocate on his behalf to secure a name clearing hearing and announcement to the faculty. Tara Singer-Blumberg, the United University Professions (UUP) labor relations specialist made numerous requests to various people in UB administration for this to occur (J4, J 5, J6). Respondent refused to do so. As the pressure imposed by the Union mounted, Petitioner was non-renewed (J7).

ALJ# denotes ALJ exhibits, J# denotes jointly admitted exhibits, CP# denotes Charging Party exhibits, R# denotes Respondent exhibits, and T# refers to pages in the hearings transcript.
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Petitioners appointment letter in effect at the time of his non-renewal was a 3-year appointment with a two-year automatic extension (CP3, CP4). It had been signed by the then Dean of the Law School, Nils Olsen. As a clinical associate professor, Petitioner was not eligible for tenure. However, the American Bar Association (ABA) guidelines require tenurelike protection to faculty on non-tenure track lines. Petitioners appointment letter provided extensive detail on both Petitioners appointment expectations, as well as on what specific limited grounds he could be non-renewed. When Petitioner was non-renewed, the specific reason provided by the Dean was that the law school had terminated the R&W program (J7). In fact, the R&W program was not terminated. On June 19, 2008, the Dean had appointed a professor to study the feasibility of making changes to the program (CP6). Any proposal would then be presented to the full faculty for a vote. Almost one year later, in April 2009, the faculty was finally presented with a proposal, which did not materially change any aspect of the R&W program (CP7). The same number of instructors is being employed, using the same curriculum, schedule, and textbooks as in prior years (CP13, CP14). The only change was that the R&W program was put under the administrative umbrella of a skills program which now included second and third year course offerings (CP7). The justification that the R&W program was terminated is completely false, not supported by the facts, and pretextual. As a result, Petitioner asserts that Respondents nonrenewal of Petitioner is violative of the Act.

DISCUSSION It is well-settled PERB precedent that a Charging Party must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish a prima facie improper motivation charge: (1) the employee was actually engaged in protected activity; and (2) the employer knew of the protected activity; and (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee because of the engagement in such protected activity.2 Proof of unlawful motivation in violation of 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act can be demonstrated through direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.3 The circumstantial evidence presented to prove a prima facie case must give rise to an inference that but for the protected activity the employer would not have engaged in the adverse employment action. If sufficient circumstantial evidence is introduced to establish such an inference, the burden of persuasion shifts to the Respondent to rebut the inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that its conduct was motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason.4 If the Respondent presents evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to the Charging Party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is pretextual.5 A violation will be found where the Charging Party has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent would not have taken the action but for the protected activity.

See, e.g., Elwood Union Free School District, 43 PERB 3012 (2010); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 3020 (1985); Town of Independence, 23 PERB 3020 (1990); Board of Education of the City School District of New York (Grassel), 41 PERB 3024 (2008); United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB 3007 (2008), confirmed sub nom. Jenkins v. New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd 41 PERB 7007 (Sup Ct New York County 2008) affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB 7008 (1st Dept 2009). 3 Elwood Union Free School District, supra note 1; United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFLCIO (Jenkins) supra note 1. 4 Elwood Union Free School District, supra note 1; United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFLCIO (Jenkins) supra note 1. 5 Elwood Union Free School District supra note 1.

Applying this standard to the instant case, there is no dispute that Petitioner was engaged in protected activity. He sought assistance from his Union, to advocate on his behalf, to administration (T98-102). And the Union, through its representatives, openly and repeatedly did so.
POINT I

Respondent failed to refute the Charging Partys prima facie case because the evidence showed that the Dean was aware of the Unions involvement. The Respondents principal defense to this charge is that the Union failed to establish a prima facie case of anti-union animus because the Dean did not know that the Petitioner had sought the Unions advice and assistance. That defense cannot be sustained because the evidence presented at the hearing on March 31 and April 1 permits no other conclusion than that the Dean was fully apprised of the Unions actions on Petitioners behalf.

Despite his attempt to insulate himself from liability by using intermediaries to deal with Employee Relations (ER) and Human Resources (HR), it is impossible to believe that the Dean did not realize that the Union was the source of their concern. The uncontroverted testimony of everyone in contact with the Dean was that they were fully aware of the Unions involvement. It would have taken an unbelievable level of incompetence by the Deans Chief of Staff, Jim Newton, as well as by the Universitys Vice-President for HR, Scott Nostaja, for them to carelessly withhold from the Dean the crucial fact that the Universitys collective bargaining partner had taken up a position on the matter of Petitioners request to meet with him. 1. Jim Newton informed the Dean about the Unions involvement. It is undisputed that the Director of ER, Jeff Reed, was aware of the Unions involvement (T348-358). It is also undisputed that Tara Singer-Blumbergs email demanding that the Dean meet with Petitioner was sent to both Jim Newton and Marlene Cook, who were expected to share it with the Dean (T121, 349). Jim Newton confirmed to Jeff Reed that he shared everything in the email (J4) with the Dean (T350), and would have had a copy of the email with him, when he discussed it at the meeting with the Dean (T373). That email is the Unions request on behalf of Petitioner (J4).

The only reason Jim Newton accompanied the Dean to Albany was to corroborate the Deans testimony. When he took his place on the witness stand, however, he wasnt asked the simple question he was there to answer whether he had told the Dean that Petitioners requests were coming into ER and HR through the intercession of the Union (T364-370). That question would have been an obvious one for Respondent to ask indeed, unavoidable if in fact the answer would have been helpful. Its inexplicable failure to ask Mr. Newton the key question did you tell the Dean that Professor Malkan was proceeding through the Union? should be fatal to Respondents claim that the Dean did not know about the Unions involvement. 2. Scott Nostaja also informed the Dean about the Unions involvement. The Dean denied having ever spoken to Scott Nostaja about Petitioner (T232). This denial directly contradicted what Mr. Nostaja had told Ms. Singer-Blumberg. Ms. Singer-Blumberg testified that [Scott] told me that he had spoken with the dean and that the dean was adamantly refusing to do anything we were asking of him, that he was very resistant to Scotts push to the unions request, but that Scott would speak with him again to see whether we could get any of the things that we were looking for. (T131).

In order to resolve this conflict, it was necessary for Respondent to have Mr. Nostaja testify as a witness for Respondents case in chief about what his conversations were, and with whom (T376-378). Even though Respondent advised the Court in its opening statement (T150), and again on the second hearing day (T233-235) that it had to call Mr. Nostaja, it ultimately chose not to present him as a witness (T376-378). After the last witness concluded on April 1, the Court even offered to extend the hearing for an additional day to allow Mr. Nostaja to travel to Albany (T377). Respondents failure to accept this offer must tip the scale in Petitioners favor.6 If Respondent had the ability to impeach Tara Singer-Blumberg, and corroborate the testimony of the Dean, why did Respondent decline? The only inference to be drawn is that Mr. Nostajas testimony would have contradicted the Deans.

Elwood Union Free School District, supra note 2; State of New York (division of Parole), 41 PERB 3033, n. 15 (2008).

POINT II

Respondents contention that Petitioners employment was terminated because of the termination of the Research and Writing program is wholly without merit. Petitioners non-renewal letter (J7) stated that he was being non-renewed because the Law School has terminated the Research and Writing Program and is replacing it with the Skills Program. The ABAs accreditation Standard 405(c) mandates that clinical professors can only be terminated for good cause, while Interpretation 405-6 of that standard allows that a termination or material modification of an entire clinical program can qualify as good cause. The Dean contended in the non-renewal letter that the termination of the Research and Writing program, and its replacement by the Skills Program meet the requirements of this rule (J7).7 This was the only rationale he ever offered for terminating Petitioners employment. When Dean Mutua wrote the non-renewal letter to Petitioner, on August 28, 2008, the R&W program had not been terminated. In fact no changes at all had been made to the program at that time. When questioned on cross-examination, Dean Mutua testified that in his mind, the R&W program had been terminated (T310-312, 316-317). In reality, however, the only event that had occurred was that a faculty member had been appointed to make recommendations and proposals on what changes, if any, should be made to the R&W program (T316).

Any changes to the program would have to be presented to the full faculty for a vote before they would be implemented, in order to give the faculty an opportunity to approve and buy in, as the Dean put it (T224). That vote, in fact, did occur, but not until April 22, 2009 (CP7), when the faculty received the recommendations of the Academic Policy and Planning Committee (the APPC), and approved placing the existing R&W program under the administrative umbrella of what would be designated as the Skills Program, which, in addition to R&W, would include a menu of other skills-based second and third year courses. The cover
It should be noted that the termination or material modification clause does not automatically terminate a clinical professors employment that is, the clause is not self-executing. All it does is state a contractual condition that gives the law school the legal option of non-renewing a clinical professors contract even though good cause hasnt otherwise been shown. The law school would still have to decide whether it wants to exercise the option, which, under the faculty by-laws would require a vote of the Committee on Clinical Promotion and Renewal (CP8).
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letter attached to the proposed faculty resolution, dated April 15, 2009, specifically advised the faculty that it provides for an administrative reorganization of the efforts that the Law School is already making in the area of legal skills training but it does not itself propose the creation of any new programs (CP7, T66-69).

The 2009-2010 R&W program offered exactly the same first-year courses as the 2008-09 program, including the same section of the same course, R&W section L4, that Petitioner had taught the previous year (CP13, CP14, T94-95). The legal writing curriculum was also the same objective writing of office memos in the fall and persuasive writing of trial and appellate briefs in the spring, culminating with an oral argument in moot court (T25, T60). In the fall 2009 issue of the law school alumni magazine, the UB Law Forum, Charles P. Ewing, the faculty member who had subsequently been appointed to oversee the Skills Program wrote in the present tense that [t]he program I inherited is already strong and solid, but my goal is to make it one of the best in the country (J9) (emphasis added). This evidence shows that nothing had been terminated in the law school except Petitioners employment, and that the only thing new about the new Research and Writing program was that Petitioner no longer taught in it. Even if the R&W program had been materially modified at the time the non-renewal letter was issued, that would not have been a legitimate business reason to terminate his employment because the changes that were made to the program did not result in the elimination of Petitioners instructional position. The law school still teaches first-year legal writing, and Petitioner is fully qualified to teach any conceivable first-year writing course, indeed, far more so than any of the instructors who were retained or newly hired (T82). Moreover, he was never an instructor in the R&W program (T72), as claimed by Dean Mutua in his non-renewal letter (J7), but held a permanent faculty appointment, separate and apart from his Director position. As a clinical professor, he had already taught many courses outside the realm of R&W (CP2, T36-37). His contract, dated October 19, 2006, specifically contemplated the possible effect of Interpretation 405-6 on Petitioners employment, and provided that A change in the structure or staffing of the law schools research and writing program will not equate with for good cause to terminate or not renew your contract since your contract as Clinical 7

Professor is separate from your administrative appointment as Director of Research and Writing. Should your appointment as Director of Research and Writing end, you would still maintain your position as Clinical Professor. In that capacity, without the administrative workload of Director of Research and Writing, you would be expected to teach two courses each semester as per the normal teaching load of all faculty. Those courses could be writing courses, IP courses, or whatever teaching load you mutually agree upon with the Dean and Vice Dean for Academic Affairs at the time. (CP3, T43-47) (emphasis added). All of these facts prove that there is no reason why Petitioner could not have continued to teach at the law school. Indeed, he could only be denied the right to continue teaching two courses per semester at the rank of clinical professor, not limited to the first-year R&W program, if the Dean was prepared to break his contract which, unfortunately, is exactly what the Dean was prepared to do. Finally, Petitioner applied for an instructional position in the new program, as he had been invited to do in the August 28, 2008 non-renewal letter (J7), and was the only member of the incumbent legal writing faculty rejected without an interview (CP12, R6, T80-82).8 That rejection is inexplicable, except as proof of retaliation, despite the Deans incredible claim that he had put into place a complete veil and had no knowledge of what the hiring committee was
The model Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure promulgated by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) would require that a professor with a continuing appointment, whose job is eliminated as the result of a bona fide formal discontinuance of a program or department of instruction, must be offered any available teaching job in the school for which he or she is qualified.
8

Before the administration issues notice to a faculty member of its intention to terminate an appointment because of formal discontinuance of a program or department of instruction, the institution will make every effort to place the faculty member concerned in another suitable position. If placement in another position would be facilitated by a reasonable period of training, financial and other support for such training will be proffered. If no position in the institution is available, with or without retraining, the faculty members appointment may then be terminated, but only with provision for severance salary equitably adjusted to the faculty members length of past and potential service. See Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure 3-4 (1957, rev. 2009), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/E45D7D3B-00F1-4BC0-9D0A-322DF63A1D07/0/RIR.pdf

doing (T338). Why would the Dean think it was a good idea to install a veil between his office and the committee that was hiring R&W instructors unless he wanted to insulate himself from liability for the illegal act of retaliation that he knew was taking place on the other side?
POINT lll

The Deans failure to follow the Law Schools bylaws and involve the Clinical Promotion and Renewal Committee in Petitioners non-renewal is further evidence of his improper motive. The facultys bylaws and clinical appointments policy both require that a clinical professor coming up for renewal must apply to the Committee on Clinical Promotion and Renewal (CP8). Petitioner was terminated before he had a chance to apply, and his non-renewal was not brought before the committee (T70-71, 275-277). Dean Mutua claimed that since Petitioner was out of category his case did not need to go before the committee (T227, 275277). As a result, he did not allow the faculty to review Petitioners non-renewal, either in that forum or any other, including the facultys grievance committee (CP8). The effect was a complete denial of due process overriding the rules and procedures put into place by the faculty for the protection of its integrity and academic freedom in which a dean took the extraordinary and unprecedented step of firing a professor with a full-time, continuing appointment, without consulting or even informing the faculty.9

The other two clinical professors whose contracts expired on the exact same date, and were due to be renewed at the same time as the Petitioners, did go before the committee, at which time they received favorable decisions from their peers (T84-87, CP16). That occurred on April 22, 2009. By this point, almost eight months had passed since the Dean had notified the Petitioner that he was being summarily fired. Why did the Dean refuse to allow the faculty to vote on the Petitioners non-renewal at the April 22 meeting, or, for that matter, at any other? Perhaps he surmised that his curious notion that the R&W program was defunct, having been terminated in his mind would not be well received by a room full of law professors.

The AAUP model regulations, cited in note 8, supra, require such due process in cases where the termination of a faculty members employment is based on the bona fide formal discontinuance of an entire academic program. A faculty member may appeal a proposed relocation or termination resulting from discontinuance and has a right to a full hearing before a faculty committee (emphasis added).

The truth of the matter is that the Dean was so driven by his desire to punish the Petitioner that he made a mockery out of all legal constraints on his power, refusing to even acknowledge Petitioners state title (T270, 290-291), his appointment contract (T313-315), or the procedures mandated by the faculty bylaws and clinical appointments policy. According to Petitioner, the Dean had made his views against employees going to their unions for assistance in that case, the CSEA very clear in a meeting in front of the majority of the faculty (T89-92). It was not until the Union started putting pressure on the Dean that the Dean terminated him. This sequence of cause and effect explains why the Dean had given no indication at the time Petitioner was removed as Director of R&W that he also intended to terminate his employment as a clinical professor (T123, T190, 202-203). The reason is obvious: the Dean hadnt decided to do so until the Union got involved.

POINT IV The Court should not consider any justifications for Petitioners termination that were not stated in the non-renewal letter or in the answer to the IP charge.

The Deans testimony was permeated with disparaging and scandalous statements about Petitioners character and competence. The Dean did not, however, refer to either character or competence in the August 28, 2008 letter that provided the reason for Petitioners termination (J7), nor did SUNY refer to them in its answer (ALJ4) to the charge presently before this Court. It is not clear at this point whether these statements were made for some strategic legal purpose, or whether they were merely gratuitous insults and slanders. In any event, if SUNY belatedly tries to use them to fabricate a pretext for the Deans reprisal against Petitioner, the court should summarily dismiss them as irrelevant, self-serving, and materially false.

1. In his direct testimony, the Dean asserted that Petitioner was not validly promoted to full clinical professor. He testified that the Promotion and Tenure (P&T) Committee, on April 28, 2006, instead of promoting Petitioner, voted to terminate his employment on one years notice (T175). In other words, he claimed that Dean Nils Olsen overrode the facultys recommendation to terminate Petitioners employment and promoted him to full clinical

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professor with 405(c)-protected status, without telling anyone, apparently even Petitioner, what he had done (T177-78).

This is an incredibly bizarre claim, and quite obviously a calculated lie, given that Dean Olsen was so disengaged from Petitioners promotion that he did not even attend the hearing and delegated the task of presiding over the P&T Committee to his vice-dean (T173-74). If Dean Mutua were serious about substantiating this serious allegation (and one can only guess what purpose he had for impugning the integrity of his predecessor in office), he needed to bring at least one other faculty member who had been present at the meeting to support his implausible story. He certainly had the authority and resources to call any employee he needed for his defense to come with him to Albany on March 31, 2010, as he did Jeff Reed and Jim Newton.

2. For good measure, the Dean also claimed that Petitioner was never a bona fide clinical professor, but only an out of category legal writing instructor, given an inapt title by the connivance of Dean Olsen, with exactly the same legal status as the six instructors whom Petitioner had the responsibility for hiring and supervising (T227, 276). It is astonishing that the Dean would say this, given that Petitioners letters of appointment from the University President assigned him the rank of Clinical Associate Professor and subsequently Clinical Professor (R8, T180). Is he admitting that SUNY perpetrated a deliberate fraud on Petitioner? Moreover, the non-renewal letter (J7) plainly acknowledged that ABA standard 405(c) the clinical faculty standard governed the terms and conditions of Petitioners employment. In addition, Petitioner testified that it is common practice at some of the best law schools in the U.S., including Cornell and the University of Michigan, to assign legal writing teachers the university rank of clinical professor after they have qualified for 405(c) (i.e., clinical tenure) protected status (T103). 3. Finally, the Dean took the opportunity to testify that Petitioners contract was a legal nullity, that is, an outrageous piece of legal craftsmanship which any lawyer worth his salt could see through (T314). He did not deny that the contract had been transmitted to the Provosts Office in the normal course of business, and followed-up by a letter of appointment, at the new rank to which he had been promoted, from the President of the University at Buffalo. What lawful purpose could SUNY have for giving Petitioner a fake contract? 11

CONCLUSION

When it considers the facts and circumstances of this charge in their entirety, we ask the Court to take into account the pervasive dishonesty of Dean Mutuas testimony, as well as the devastating effect that the Deans reprisal has had on Petitioners career.

In the profession of legal education, a clinical professorship with 405(c)-protected status is considered a permanent faculty appointment, i.e., one that is reasonably similar to university tenure and can only be terminated for good cause. According to the ABA standards, good cause in this context is essentially the same standard that would be applied by the university to justify the termination of a tenured professor and is invariably understood to mean serious personal misconduct or a serious failure of job performance that the faculty member has failed to correct after warnings have been duly given, and due process provided. By breaking Petitioners contract on a pretext that would be glaringly obvious as such to anyone in the profession, not only did the Dean wrongfully terminate Petitioners employment at SUNY at Buffalo, but he also made it impossible for him to be hired anywhere else in the field of legal education, which is reflected by his inability to find employment at another law school, despite his best efforts (T88).

The Dean is well aware of the hardship his abuse of power has inflicted on Petitioner. The Dean was so deeply offended by the unions intervention that he recklessly tossed aside state labor laws, university contracts, norms and customs of academic employment, faculty rules and procedures, and ABA accreditation standards, in order to make sure that no one who knew what had happened to Petitioner would ever again risk wounding the ego of the world-renowned workers rights advocate, Makau Mutua, by going over his head to the Union. The Court should find that the Deans purpose for terminating Petitioners employment cannot have been anything other than repression and retaliation, which was malicious, illegal, and motivated by anti-union animus.

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For all the reasons noted above, Charging Party UUP requests that PERB sustain the Charge, and order the Respondent to: 1. Rescind Petitioners non-renewal; 2. Retroactively reinstate Petitioner to his position as clinical professor, with full back pay, benefits and interest at the maximum legal rate10; 3. Appoint Petitioner to another three year Contract, plus two year extension; 4. Make Petitioner whole; 5. Cease and desist from violating the Taylor Law.

On Behalf of: Charging Party, UUP Respectfully Submitted,

Tara Singer-Blumberg Labor Relations Specialist New York State United Teachers 270 Essjay Road Williamsville, NY 14221

10

For precedent on PERBs award of interest, see, e.g., Elwood Union Free School District, supra note 2.

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