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Written evidence from the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection
Post-Legislative Scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act 2000

1. The BUAV is an anti-vivisection organisation. It has made reasonably extensive use of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), with mixed results. Among the public authorities of which it has made requests are: the Home Office (the regulator of animal experiments), various universities, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and the Veterinary Medicines Directorate.

2. The reasons the BUAV uses FOIA reflect the policy underpinning the Act identified by the Ministry of Justice Memorandum: to inform public debate (on a contentious issue); to increase the accountability of public authorities; and to improve decision-making. An important aspect of accountability is ensuring that the Home Office is regulating animal experiments in a lawful manner particularly important given that animals in laboratories, self-evidently, cannot whistleblow.

3. Animal experiments are conducted in conditions of considerable secrecy. Section 24 Animal (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA) makes it in an offence, punishable by two years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine, for a minster or official to disclose, even to Parliament, information which a researcher prefers to be kept secret even information about his or her wrongdoing. 1

4. There are some sources of publicly available information about animal experiments:

The Home Office publishes statistics each year, but although they are reasonably
comprehensive they have been widely criticised, including by a House of Lords select

See the Court of Appeal decision in BUAV v the Home Office and the Information Commissioner [2008] EWCA Civ 870. The Court of Appeal ruled that it was entirely for the provider of information whether he gave it in confidence. The law of confidence under which information about wrongdoing or other information which in the public interest needed to be made available had no relevance 1


committee and the Home Secretarys advisory body, 2 and are no substitute for detailed information about particular experiments.

The Home Office encourages (but does not require) licence applicants to prepare a
short abstract (summary) of their application; these are then published under the Home Offices FOIA publication scheme. These, too, are no substitute for detailed information. They often read like PR documents, designed to persuade the public of the value of the research in question, and playing down animal suffering. The Information Tribunal, in a case brought by the BUAV (the abstracts case), described five abstracts it was able to compare with the licences they were purporting to summarise as positive spin, with little said about what was to happen to the animals. 3 Successive opinion polls show that, unsurprisingly, it is the suffering of the animals with which the public is most concerned.

Some animal research is published, but only a minority. Even when it is, researchers
generally give no more information about what the animals experienced than is strictly necessary to understand the research. Little information is given about consideration given to the use of non-animal alternatives (a statutory requirement). 4

5. The litmus test for any transparency regime is whether it is able to shed light on areas of public policy which are controversial. Animal experiments remain acutely controversial, with public opinion divided and shifting according to the latest aspect to hit the headlines. Controversy extends to scientific efficacy as well as to ethical considerations and there are therefore vital human health issues at stake. Public surveys confirm that the public, irrespective of their views about animal experiments, want to have more information. For example, a survey by YouGov in 2009 on behalf of the BUAV in the UK, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Italy 5 asked whether the then proposed new EU directive on animal experiments should require that all information about animal experiments be publicly available, except information which is confidential and information which would identify researchers or where they work. 80% of respondents thought it should.
2 3

The Animal Procedures Committee EA/2007/0059: see paragraph 8 4 Section 5(5) ASPA 5 Fieldwork was undertaken between 24th February - 4th March 2009 2


The exception for confidential and identifying information is important. There are, of course, exemptions in FOIA covering these. 6 The BUAV always says that information it requests can be provided in anonymised form.

6. The Information Tribunal 7 in another case brought by the BUAV 8 recognised the importance of transparency in this area: Substantially for the reasons relied on by BUAV, we consider there can be no doubt about the strong public interest in animal welfare and in transparency and accountability as regards animal experimentation conducted under the ASPA regime. The existence of the statutory controls operated by the Home Office does not annul this interest which extends to seeing how, and the extent to which, the statutory system is working in practice. Such private scrutiny as takes place inside the statutory system is not a substitute for well-informed public scrutiny. In the present case these interests are further underline by the fact that the research was supported by public funds Mr Justice Eady made similar comments on appeal in the abstracts case. He suggested there should be a presumption that licence applications should be open with confidential information separated out. 9 7. In addition to FOIA, the BUAV has made extensive use of EC Regulation 1049/2001. This is similar to FOIA, except that there are far fewer exemptions. The regulation covers documents held by any of the EU institutions. The BUAVs experience is that it is far easier, and quicker, to get documents under this regulation that it is to get information under FOIA. This is despite the general perception that the EU is a secretive body. 8. This submission will address two issues only: the cost of compliance exemption; and aspects of internal reviews.

Cost of compliance

Those in sections 38 (health and safety), 40 (data protection), 41 (information provided in confidence information) and 43 (trade secrets and commercial interests) 7 Now called the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) 8 BUAV v Information Commissioner and Newcastle of University EA/2010/0064 paragraph 52 9 Home Office v BUAV and Information Commissioner [2008] EWHC 892 (QB) at para 61 3


9. Section 12 of FOIA says that a public authority does not have to comply with a request for information where it estimates that the cost of compliance would exceed the appropriate limit. The Secretary of State is given regulation-making powers to determine the appropriate limit and the costs which can be taken into account. The current regulations are The Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (the Fees Regulations). 10 The appropriate limit is currently 600 (or 24 hours) for central government and 450 (or 18 hours) for other public authorities.

10. The High Court in the recent case of The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire v Information Commissioner

decided that the reg 4(3) of the Fees Regulations, which

lists the activities which can be taken into account when a public authority estimates whether the appropriate limit will be reached, does not allow the inclusion of time spent considering whether an exemption applies (including reading time), internal discussions and deciding on redactions. This might be termed thinking time. Only what might be termed physical time, such as that spent locating and retrieving the requested information, can be taken into account. This had indeed been the approach of the Information Tribunal in three cases, including the one under appeal. The Ministry of Justice memorandum 11. The Memorandum discusses the cost of compliance in Section H. It says that public authorities largely favour reform, either by reducing the appropriate limits or including thinking time. It refers to the recommendation of the report by Frontier Economics in 2006 that thinking time should be taken account, although an agreed methodology would be needed. The Memorandum records that the Constitutional Affairs Committee (CAC) rejected the recommendation 12 and that the Government agreed with it.

12. The Memorandum also records that the total cost to public authorities of responding to FOIA requests is around 40m per annum. This excludes opportunity costs caused by the need to divert (presumably non-FoI) staff from their day job. The MoJ has commissioned a comprehensive study into the time spent by a range of public authorities on FOIA requests. It hopes to provide the results to the Committee early in 2012.
10 11

SI 2004 No 3244 [2011] EWHC 44 (Admin) 12 4


Analysis 13. The BUAV believes it is of central importance that thinking time continues to be excluded from the cost of compliance. The exclusion is found in regulations, and the empowering provision - section 12 FOIA - is, linguistically at least, sufficiently broad to permit its removal. The Secretary of State could therefore remove it at the stroke of a pen with no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. For this reason, it is, with respect, important that Committee addresses the issue and confirms the recommendation of its predecessor that the exclusion be maintained.

14. The arguments pointing to retention may be summarised as follows: i. Removal would seriously circumscribe the right to information which FOIA creates. In the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire case, the Tribunal had cautioned: It is also clear from the time limits in the Fees Regulations [18 hours and 24 hours depending on the public authority], that if it covered the time cost of redactions, in addition to the tasks listed in regulation 4(3), many, if not most, requests involving exemptions, particularly multiple exemptions, could be refused. This ..., in our view, could not have been the legislative intent. In the High Court Mr Justice Keith agreed: 13 if the time spent redacting information which is exempt from disclosure is included in the calculation, I suspect that the appropriate limit would be exceeded very much sooner than anyone could have intended In other words, removal of the exclusion would in practice result in a substantive change of legislative policy, not merely a change of detail about hours. Parliament chose to include as many as 24 exemptions in FOIA. Some, such as that relating to personal information (section 40: data protection), are extremely convoluted and require consideration of separate, complicated legislation. Others, such as information provided in confidence (section 41), appear straightforward on their face but incorporate other areas of law including a mass of recent and difficult caselaw.


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Parliament cannot have intended to give with one hand the right to information but then to take away with the other because of the inevitable need to spend time considering whether one or more exemptions apply (irrespective of whether in fact they do).

For obvious reasons, detailed or complex information would be particularly vulnerable to such a de facto change in legislative policy.

The CAC recognised that, the more contentious a request, the more time is likely to be spent considering it: 14 We conclude that the proposed regime could result in public authorities avoiding answers to embarrassing, contentious or high-profile cases as the number of internal consultees rises in proportion to the sensitivity of particular requests. The result, inevitably, would be that requests in contentious areas where the need for public scrutiny is likely to be strong - could easily be rejected.


There is another important aspect to this. The focus in the Memorandum is on the time spent by employees of public authorities. But cost in the Fees Regulations also extends to legal advice. Public authorities, quite properly, do take legal advice (including external advice) about the applicability of exemptions in difficult cases. It hardly needs pointing out that the appropriate limits of 450 or 600 would be reached very quickly were legal advice sought.


It is very difficult to see how thinking time could be assessed in any objective, consistent way. Some people read quickly, some less quickly. Whether an exemption applies should not depend on the lottery of whether a request comes before a slow reader or a quick reader. Similarly, some FoI officers will be more conscientious than others in considering the exemptions. The more conscientious an officer is, the more likely the request would fail an expanded section 12 test. In some cases an almost limitless amount of time considering caselaw could be spent. The length of a document cannot be determinative it may be much more difficult to decide whether


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an exemption applies with a short document than with a much longer one. Would time thinking about a request in the bath be allowed? If not, why not? The Frontier Economics report acknowledged the need for an agreed methodology, but devising one would be seriously problematical if not impossible. iv. It would be too easy for a public authority which did not want to disclose particular information to invoke the cost of compliance if thinking time were included. Public authorities should, of course, approach their task in an objective manner, disinterested as to whether application of the FOIA tests leads to disclosure or non-disclosure. The reality, sadly, is different. Ministers may become involved with controversial requests and politics therefore enter the fray. There is a widespread belief that the Cabinet Office is determined not to release information about Cabinet discussions about the Iraq War, for example.

With animal experiments, the BUAV has had the very strong impression - necessarily not capable of proof - that some public authorities faced with requests for certain types of information start from the premise that the information will not be disclosed and then get their lawyers to come up with supporting arguments. Newcastle University, in the case referred to above, strongly resisted the BUAVs request for information in two project licences despite the fact that the researchers had voluntarily published the research. This is how the Information Tribunal described one of the Universitys major arguments that it did not (for technical legal reasons) hold any information relating to the very extensive animal research it conducted: [The BUAVs advocate] submitted that the result for which the University contended was an affront to common-sense. He submitted it would be remarkable if the University did not hold important information about extensive animal research carried out on its premises by its employees, for which it received the funds, for which it provided the facilities, the training, the ancillary staff, the drugs, the routine equipment and the necessary insurances, in respect of which the University owed duties of care to safeguard employees and the local community from biosecurity risks, in respect of which the University claimed intellectual property rights, and for which its Registrar acted as the certificate holder representing the governing body and protecting the interests of the University. We agree , and consider the common-sense answer to be the correct one on the facts of this case


The Newcastle example shows the length to which some public authorities may go to hide behind legal arguments, however unmeritorious, so that they do not have to disclose information. Whether suspicions of bad faith are warranted in a particular case is not the point. The very fact that suspicion exists undermines confidence in the working of FOIA. Allowing thinking time to be included would increase suspicion that public authorities could easily dispose of any request that they did not want to meet.

Newcastle initially, in fact, relied on section 12, despite at the same time arguing that other exemptions applied to all the information requested if it was confident that everything was exempt, how could it project that it would need to spend over 18 hours dealing with the request? The opportunity to misuse section 12 would be all the greater were thinking time to be included. Simply instructing external lawyers as Newcastle did would guarantee the appropriate limit being reached.


40m pa the annual average cost of meeting FOIA requests - seems a very small sum to pay for improved governance and accountability. Only a part of that sum, of course, is attributable to time-consuming requests.

Conclusion 15. Lord Bingham said in the House of Lords case of R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport: 15 The fundamental rationale of the democratic process is that if competing views, opinions and policies were publicly debated and exposed to public scrutiny the good will, over time, drive out the bad and the true prevail of the false. Axiomatically, informed public debate and scrutiny cannot take place unless the public has access to relevant information. The more contentious the issue, the more important that there is access, so that the good can drive out the bad and the true prevail over the false.


[2008] UKHL 15 at 28 8


16. The MoJ Memorandum in its discussion of the section 12 issue betrays a disappointing reluctance to acknowledge the importance of transparency the benefit side of a cost:benefit assessment. Everything is seen through the prism of burden on public authorities. Staff are diverted from their day job when in fact it should be part of the day job of any public sector employee to assist in meeting FOIA requests when called upon to do so.

17. The Coalition Agreement says: The Government believes that we need to throw open the doors of public bodies, to enable the public to hold politicians and public bodies to account. 16 Allowing thinking time to be taken into account would have the opposite effect.

18. If it were felt that some lessening of the burden on public authorities is needed, it should be limited to a small reduction in the 18 and 24 hour limits spent on physical activities.

Internal Reviews
19. Before a disappointed requester can make a complaint to the Commissioner, he must first ask for an internal review by the public authority. There is nothing objectionable in principle about this. However, reviews must be robust and conducted as quickly as possible. a) Independence 20. In the BUAVs experience, reviews are generally not sufficiently robust. With the vast majority of our requests, the reviewer simply confirms the original decision. A corporate view appears to be taken. On one occasion the reviewer admitted to having had discussions with the original decision-maker (who was at a more senior rank than him). We note that the Memorandum says 17 that, with central government, only 9% of internal reviews resulted in the original decision being overturned. 16% of internal review decisions were overturned in full by the Commissioner. In broad terms that means 25% of

16 17 Para 146 9


original decisions were wrong (plus those identified as incorrect on a successful appeal by a requester to the Information Tribunal).

21. An aspect of independence is that the reviewer should not be involved with the policy area in question. In the BUAV Newcastle case, it emerged that the reviewer, the University Registrar, was also the certificate of designation holder under ASPA the person in charge of all animal experiments at the establishment. It is obvious that he should not have been making FOIA decisions relating to animal experiments. 22. The select committee may wish to underline the importance of the reviewer being truly independent, both of the original decision-maker and of personnel in the policy area in question.

b) Double review

23. Some public authorities, such as Newcastle University and Imperial College, London, have a two-stage review. This adds to the delays which are already endemic in the process. A two-stage review would appear to be unlawful. There is no suggestion in the section on complaints procedures in the Code of Practice issued by the Secretary of State under section 45 FOIA 18 that a two-stage review is contemplated indeed, paragraphs 39 and 46 clearly contemplate a single stage only. There is no rationale for a public authority to consider a request no fewer than three times before a requester is able to obtain a truly independent adjudication. Newcastles complaints procedure could take at least 42 working days (2 months), over twice the 20 working days within which an initial request should be dealt with. That would be inimical to the requirement of the code that complaints should be dealt with promptly.

24. The select committee may wish to reiterate that internal reviews should be conducted as quickly as possible and involve no more than a single stage.

February 2012

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