Human Mobility

Report 2011
Migration and Human Development
in African, Caribbean and Pacic Countries
ACP Group of States Secretariat Human Mobility Report 2011
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Human Mobility
Report 2011
migration and human development
in African, Caribbean and Pacifc Countries
Supervision
Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas
Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean and Pacifc (ACP) Group of States
Ms Michele Dominique Raymond
Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the Department of Political Affairs and Human Development
Mr Denis Salord
European Commission, AIDCO
Task Team
Aya Kasasa
Department for Political Affairs and Human Development
Christophe Fleureau-Dauloudet
European Commission, AIDCO
Andrea Gallina (Team Leader)
Cristiano Maugeri (Task Manager)
Anna Mizzoni (Assistant)
ARS Progetti
Scientifc Advisory Committee
Adepoju Aderanti (Network of Migration Research on Africa)
Juriaan Booij (Sinking Tuvalu Project)
Laurent De Boeck (Observatory on African, Caribbean and Pacifc Migration)
Mohanty Manoranjan (University of South Pacifc)
Frederic Jacquemin (ACP Cultural Observatory)
Steven Mac Andrew (CARICOM)
Thando D Gwebu (University of Botswana)
Vijay Naidu (University of South Pacifc)
Jacqueline Meido Madiot (ACP Culture and Film)
Ndioro Ndiaye (Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development)
Matteo Pedercini (Millennium Development Institute)
Bridget Wooding (Caribbean Migrants Observatory, OBMICA)
Graphic Layout
Lai-momo - Filippo Mantione
Contact
Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacifc Group of States
Avenue Georges Henri 451
B - 1200 Brussels Belgium
email : info@acp.int
www.acpsec.org/index.htm - www.acpsec.org/migration
Tel: +32 2 743 06 00
Fax: +32 2 735 55 73
Published with the fnancial support of the European Commission
under the Framework Contract No2009/216741 implemented by ARS Progetti S.P.A.
The Report may contain material subject to copyright. In case of reproduction please quote the source.
Reproduction and dissemination for educational and training purposes are permitted free of charge provided
that reference to the ACP Group of States Secretariat is duly acknowledged.
Human Mobility Report 2011. Migration and Human Development in ACP Countries, Brussels: ACP Secretariat
(author: Andrea Gallina).
Andrea Gallina and the ACP Secretariat
First Published in Brussels
ACP Secretariat, September 2010
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOrEwOrd.................................................................................. 5
ACkNOwLEdgEmENTS..................................................................... 6
ACrONymS................................................................................... 7
LiST OF TABLES, grAphS, BOxES, FigurES ANd mApS............................. 8
OVErViEw................................................................................... 9
ChApTEr 1
ACp grOup ApprOACh TO ThE mOBiLiTy ANd dEVELOpmENT NExuS.......... 13
Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility is the Ultimate ACP Policy Goal 15
The ACP Group of States Approach to Human Mobility 18
Unpacking the Linkage Between Migration and Development 19
Four Migrant Capitals 20
ChApTEr 2
FiVE kEy pOLiCy ChALLENgES.......................................................... 23
1st Key Challenge: Develop Time and Cost-effective Research Tools
for Analysing the Mobility-Development Nexus in ACP Countries 25
2nd Key Challenge: Ensure Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility 29
3rd Key Challenge: Address Environmentally Induced Mobility 32
4th Key Challenge: Integrate Human Mobility to National Development Policies 36
5th Key Challenge: Assure Social Inclusion, Respect and
Protection of Migrants in ACP Countries 38
ChApTEr 3
mOBiLiTy TrENdS ANd pATTErNS iN ACp COuNTriES.............................. 41
An Introduction to Mobility in the ACP Group of States 43
Immigration into ACP Countries 49
Emigration from ACP Countries 60 T
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Sub-Saharan Africa Emigration Systems 64
Emigration from the Caribbean 68
Emigration from the Pacifc 68
A Final Remark on the Emigration of Women in ACP Countries 71
ChApTEr 4
migrANT CApiTALS: TrENdS, pATTErNS ANd mAiN COrridOrS.................. 75
An Overview of Migrant Economic Capital in the ACP Countries 77
Macroeconomic Importance of Remittances in ACP Countries 81
Migrant Human Capital: The Brain Drain and the Brain Gain 88
Migrant Social Capital: Transnational Practices as Development Tools 94
Migrant Cultural Capital: Tangible and Intangible Factors Shaping Development 99
Creative Industries and Diaspora Linkages 100
Two Case-Studies: Analysing Migrant Capital Flows
in Two Intra-ACP Mobility Corridors
105
ChApTEr 5
iNdiCATiONS FOr pOLiCiES ANd prOJECTS........................................... 113
Implications for the ACP Group of States Secretariat 115
The Way Forward: Towards a New MDG 120
STATiSTiCAL ANNEx........................................................................ 121
gLOSSAry OF TErmS...................................................................... 127
rEFErENCES................................................................................ 130
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Migration is a very important livelihood strategy for millions of ACP countries
nationals. Their contribution to the home country development is made of tan-
gible and intangible resources which are seldom appreciated by policy makers
and development practitioners. In this frst ACP Human Mobility Report 2011 we
unveil the complex and multifaceted dynamic of the linkage between migration
and development in the ACP countries and aim to make this linkage more visible
into national, regional and international development plans.
FOrEwOrd
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n a global partnership centred on human dignity and mutual respect,
issues of mobility, migration and development are central to the fu-
ture of our countries, and indeed are interrelated with almost all of
the Millennium Development Goals. As our knowledge and understand-
ing with respect to the multidimensionality of peoples mobility within and
across borders improves, we realise the complexity of this process, which
encompasses historical, geographical, economic, sociological and political
spheres. Nonetheless, in recent years, the management of population mo-
bility has all too often been limited to an approach centred on infux regula-
tion and security considerations.
Solutions to migration cannot be based solely on security concerns. Shared refections and
dialogue on approaches that will be more effective and less destructive in terms of the overall
perception of the general public in the countries of origin, as well as transit and host countries,
based on respect for human rights including the right to seek asylum are part of a long-term
strategy as opposed to short-term security concerns.
The mobility of ACP nationals as a human right that contributes to the cultural, social and eco-
nomic diversity of peoples in the countries of origin, as well as in transit and host countries,
must be defended, and the positive impact of these migrants capital in host societies needs to
be studied in greater depth.
Peoples ability to choose the place they call home is a dimension of human freedom that we
refer to as human mobility. Nonetheless, the ACP Group of States believes mobility cannot be a
substitute for national development strategies directed toward investing in people and creat-
ing conditions for people to prosper at home. Indeed, the potential of mobility to improve the
well-being of disadvantaged sectors of the population is limited precisely because these are
often the least likely to move.
The ACP Group believes that international migration and mobility constitute major challenges to
ACP States and their partners, in particular as regards development policy. To this end, the ACP
Group advocates a broader, more comprehensive people-centred approach to migration and
mobility issues that could steer and maximise the benefts of international and internal migration
towards sustainable development goals, while minimizing the negative consequences of these
population movements, not only for countries of origin and destination, but also for migrants.
Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas
Secretary-General of the African,
Caribbean and Pacifc (ACP) Group of States
6
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his Report is the result of a collaborative effort that involved several people in the Depart-
ment of Political Affairs and Human Development of the ACP Group of States Secretariat.
First and foremost, the Team is grateful to the intellectual exchange with former Secretary-
General Sir John Kaputin, who led the ACP Group of States Delegation to the III Global Forum
on Migration and Development in Athens in 2009, where this Report was conceived as a tool to
provide data and analysis based on evidence concerning the main migration and development
challenges in the ACP countries, and thus fll a longstanding gap. The Team is also thankful to
the strong and enthusiastic support of former Head of Department of Political Affairs and Human
Development and Deputy Secretary-General Andrew Bradley in insisting that it should elaborate
on controversial and politically sensitive issues and provide the needed evidence base. The
European Commission Aidco Team in the Governance Unit led by Kirsi Pekuri, with the support
frst of Michele Devys and later Christophe Fleureau-Dauloudet has also been instrumental in
pursuing this endeavour and providing the necessary support to the ACP Secretariat in order to
complete this task. We extend them our deep gratitude. The Team is also extremely thankful to
the recently appointed ACP Group of States Secretariat Secretary-General Mohamed Ibn Cham-
bas and to the new Head of Department of Political Affairs and Human Development and Deputy
Secretary-General Michele Dominique Raymond for ensuring continuity and political support to
the entire ACP Migration Dossier, of which this Report is an important component. Last but not
least, the Team acknowledges the enthusiastic and timely help of Aya Kasasa of the Department
of Policy Affairs and Human Development. Without her invaluable backing this Report would have
not been produced and the long hours at the ACP Secretariat would not have been so engaging.
Finally, as Task Team Leader and Report Lead Author I am deeply grateful to ARS Progetti Task
Manager Cristiano Maugeri for his fawless logistic and administrative support, as well as to Anna
Mizzoni. Earlier drafts of the Report were reviewed by international experts from ACP and other
countries. In particular, I am grateful to Mohanty Manoranjan and Vijay Naidu professors at the
University of South Pacifc, Steven Mac Andrew Specialist on Movement of Skills and Labour at
CSME Unit in CARICOM, Adepoju Aderanti, Director of the Network of Migration Research on
Africa, Thando D Gwebu at the University of Botswana, Jacqueline Meido Madiot Specialist at
the ACP Group of States Secretariat for ACP Culture and Film, Ndioro Ndiaye, Director Alliance
for Migration, Leadership and Development, Matteo Pedercini, Deputy Director for Capacity De-
velopment and Modeling at the Millennium Institute, Laurent de Boeck, Director Observatory on
African, Caribbean and Pacifc (ACP) Migration, Susanne Melde Research Offcer at the Observa-
tory on African, Caribbean and Pacifc (ACP) Migration and Frederic Jacquemin Specialist at the
ACP Cultural Observatory. Particular thanks go to Bridget Wooding, Director of the Observatorio
Migrantes del Caribe and Wilfredo Lozano, Director of the Centro de Investigacin Econmica y
Social at UNIBE, Dominican Republic, for the engaging intellectual discussions on the subject.
The responsibility for what has been written in this Report remains, of course, entirely mine.
On behalf of the Task Team,
Andrea Gallina
Lead Author and Task Team Leader - ARS Progetti S.P.A.
August 2010, Brussels and Santo Domingo
ACkNOwLEdgEmENTS
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ACrONymS ACkNOwLEdgEmENTS
ACp African Caribbean and Pacifc
ACp hmr 2011 African Caribbean and Pacifc Human Mobility Report 2011
AdOpEm Dominican Association for the Development of Women
ApmrN Asia-Pacifc Migration Research Network
Au African Union
CAriCOm Caribbean Common Market
CEN-SAd Community of Sahel-Saharan States
COmESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSmE Caribbean Single Market and Economy
drC Democratic Republic of Congo
DRC-Sussex Development Research Centre at Sussex University
CASS CARICOM Agreement on Social Security
EAC Eastern African Community
EBS Equity Building Society
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOwAS Economic Community of West African States
EpA Economic Partnership Agreement
Eu European Union
Fdi Foreign Direct Investment
gATS General Agreement on Trade and Services
gdp Gross Domestic Product
hdi Human Development Index
hdr Human Development Report
idp Internally Displaced People
iFC International Finance Corporation
iOm International Organisation for Migration
NOmrA Network of Migration Research in Africa
OBmiCA Caribbean Migrants Observatory
OdA Overseas Development Assistance
OECd Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
mdg Millennium Development Goal
midSA Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa
mOST Management of Social Transformations
NEpAd New Partnership for Africas Development
OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OFw Overseas Filipino Worker
OwwA Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
p-ACp Pacifc ACP
piC Pacifc Island Country
piFS Pacifc Island Forum Secretariat
pOEA Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
ppp Purchasing Power Parity
prSp Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAdC Southern African Development Community
SAmp South Africa Migration Project
SiS Small Island States
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SwAC Sahel and West Africa Club
uN United Nations
uNdESA United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs
uNdp United Nations Development Program
uNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientifc and Cultural Organization
uNhCr United Nations High Commission for Refugees
uS United States
uSAid United States Agency for International Development
uSd United States Dollar
wB World Bank
wTO World Trade Organisation
wwB Women World Banking
8

Tables
Table 1.1 A Framework for Migration and Development Policies 16
Table 2.4 ACP Emigration Towards the Global North 121
Table 2.5 ACP Diasporas (Total and as Percentage of Population, 2007) 122
Table 3.1 ACP Emigration: Comparing UN and DRC Datasets on Migrant Stocks 48
Table 3.2 Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) [] end-2008 50
Table 3.3 Emigration of ACP Nationals 60
Table 3.4 ACP Regions and Sub-Regions: Emigration to the Global North 63
Table 3.5 Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) [] end-2008 66
Table 4.1 Remittances and Migration in ACP 78
Table 4.2 - Workers Remittances, Compensation of Employees, and Migrant Transfers, Credit (US$
Million) 79
Table 4.3 Creative Goods: Exports by Economic Group, 2005 100
Table A1 Main Socio-Economic Indicators of ACP Countries [...] (in Annex) 123
Table A2 Physicians Born in African Countries Appearing in Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries
Circa 2000 (in Annex) 124
Table A3 Professional Nurses Born in African Countries Appearing in Censuses of Nine Receiving
Countries Circa 2000 (in Annex) 125

Graphs
Graph 0.1 - HDI Sub-Regional Average, Lowest and Highest in the ACP Group 9
Graph 3.1 - World and ACP Migrant Population 43
Graph 3.2 - Female Migrants (about 2000) 44
Graph 3.3 - Female Migrants as Share of Total in ACP Regions and Sub-Regions 44
Graph 3.4 - World and ACP GDP per capita 44
Graph 3.5 - International Migrants Abroad as Percentage of the Population and GDP per capita
Current US$, 2007 44
Graph 3.6 - HDI and Population Abroad in ACP 47
Graph 3.7 - ACP Top 20 Diasporas in the Global North 64
Graph 3.8-3.13 - Female Migrants in ACP Countries as Share of Total, in 1960 and 2005 126
Graph 4.1 - ACP and World Migrant Workers Remittances in Billion USD, 2009 77
Graph 4.2 - Selected ACP Countries Migrant Workers Remittances as Percentage of GDP 82
Graph 4.3 - Comparing Financial Flows in Western Africa 83
Graph 4.4 - Comparing Financial Flows in Southern Africa 84
Graph 4.5 - Comparing Financial Flows in Central/Middle Africa 85
Graph 4.6 - Comparing Financial Flows in Eastern Africa 85
Graph 4.7 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Caribbean 86
Graph 4.8 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Pacifc 89

Boxes
Box 2.1 - The Regional Coordination Process Through MIDSA 31
Box 2.2 - The Sinking of Tuvalu Seen by Visual Artists 33
Box 4.1 - Beyond Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 80
Box 4.2 - Task-Shifting from Highly Skilled Health Workers to Less Skilled Health Workers 94
Box 5.1 - Strengthening Migration Impact in the Caribbean by Protecting Migrants Rights 116

Figures
Figure 1 - The Haiti-Dominican Republic Mobility-Corridor 106
Figure 2 - The Zimbabwe-South Africa Mobility-Corridor 108
Maps
Map 1.1 - African, Caribbean and Pacifc (ACP) Group of States 22
Map 3.1 - Feminization of Migration in Africa 45
Map 3.2 - Feminization of Migration in the Caribbean 46
Map 3.3 - Feminization of Migration in the Pacifc 46
Map 3.4 - Sub-Saharan Africa. Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population 52
Map 3.5 - Caribbean. Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population 55
Map 3.6 - Pacifc. Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population 59
Map 3.7 - Intra-Sub-Saharan African Mobility 61
Map 3.8 - ACP South-North Mobility 63
Map 3.9 - Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa 65
Map 3.10 - Emigration from the Caribbean 69
Map 3.11 - Emigration from the Pacifc 70
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OVErViEw
Demographic Trends in ACP Countries
Pose Important Challenges for Migration
Management, Especially for Sub-Saharan Africa
The ACP Group of States brings together 79
countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacifc
regions. In 2007 the ACP population of approx-
imately 850 million could be broken down as
follows: 802 million (or 94.4 per cent) were
Sub-Saharan Africans, 38 million were from the
Caribbean and about 10 million were from the
Pacifc Islands. During the period from 2005 to
2010, the natural annual population increase
averaged 2.7 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa,
2.6 per cent in the Pacifc and 1.7 per cent in
the Caribbean.
At this pace, by 2020 there will be 285 mil-
lion more people in ACP countries (278 m in
Africa, 4 m in the Caribbean and 3 m in the
Pacifc), and the ACPs share of the world pop-
ulation will expand from 10.5 per cent to 15
per cent. Considering the demographic struc-
ture of many ACP countries (more than two
thirds of the population in Africa are under 25
years of age), this will imply a large increase
in the share of working-age persons likely to
seek greener pastures abroad. In the coming
years, these young people will place consider-
able demands on health, housing and educa-
tion services, as well as the job markets and
natural resources. Furthermore, ACP youth will
certainly have an average education level and
connectivity with the rest of the world that is
far higher than that of their elders, coupled
with greater expectations from local labour
markets, which are currently unequipped to
meet their demands for adequate jobs.
Low Gross Domestic Product and Low Human
Development Affect ACP Mobility Patterns
Despite a 10.5 per cent share of the worldpop-
ulation, the ACP countries account for only 1.8
per cent of world GDP. The ACPs average GDP
per capita in 2007 (in current US$) was 7 times
lower than the average GDP per capita in the
world. A comparison of average GDP purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) in US dollars per capita
within the ACP regions confrms the relatively
better situation of the Caribbean countries
vis--vis the African and Pacifc regions. In
Sub-Saharan Africa we also fnd the most un-
equal distribution of wealth in the entire ACP
Group of States: Namibia has a Gini coeffcient
of 74, Botswana 61 and South Africa 57, among
the highest in the world.
1

Even if the GDP in PPP is only a partial meas-
ure of a countrys development, the Human
Development Index (HDI) classifcations indi-
cate similarly troubling levels. It situates 59 of
the 79 ACP countries in the Medium and Low
HDI segment, with only 9 in the High HDI seg-
ment and one, Barbados, in the Very High HDI
segment with a 0.903 HDI value, just above
Malta and equal to the Czech Republic (two
EU countries). Data is not available for 11 ACP
countries. At the lowest extreme of the ACP
scale we fnd Niger, with a 0.340 HDI, the low-
est in the world. Regional averages refect the
relative low level of HDI except for the Carib-
bean region (see Graph 0.1).
The extent of poverty and material depriva-
tion associated with very low levels of human
Graph 0.1 - HDI Sub-Regional Average, Lowest
and Highest in the ACP Group
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR, 2009.
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development and GDP per capita has impor-
tant consequences for migratory fows. Due to
poverty, deprivation and the isolation of many
ACP countries, the overall share of ACP mi-
grants on the world migrant stock in 2010 will
remain much the same as in 2005, despite a 5
point increase in the population.
For the most part, migrants from ACP countries
can afford only short-distance migration, of-
ten in order to escape confict, environmental
disaster or to seek temporary occupations in
neighbouring countries with sometimes even
lower income levels.
2
However, while these mobility patterns have
been the norm for many semi-nomadic groups
for centuries, contemporary mobility patterns
are increasingly permanent and demand other
types of measures, which are diffcult to ad-
dress using already stretched budgets.
The Effects of the Global Crisis Slow
Down Development Efforts and Diminish
the Positive Effects of Migration
The global fnancial, fuel and food crisis that
originated in the developed world in 2008, has
not contributed to improving mobility frame-
works. In ACP countries the crisis led to a
dramatic slowdown of Foreign Direct Invest-
ments (FDIs), a reduction of exports and earn-
ings from Trust Funds,
3
and a sharp decline in
remittances, which are only now beginning to
slowly recover. Foreign reserves to cover im-
ports are dwindling, thus jeopardizing many
countries capacity to import even basic prod-
ucts such as food, medical supplies and agri-
cultural inputs. The estimated loss of output
is signifcant and erodes the results of positive
growth in previous years. As a result, per cap-
ita income is declining and resources for na-
tional development are being curtailed. Only
Chinese and Indian investments are preventing
African growth poles to decline further.
Secondary effects in neighbouring countries
related to petty trade linkages and remit-
tances are also signifcant. In this context,
the vulnerability of migrants increases and
the effects on the communities left behind
in terms of reduced disposable income can
be tangible. The poor are the most affected.
The effects of the crisis are particularly vis-
ible in those countries with large diasporas
4

in OECD nations and regions most affected by
the crisis, such as the United States and the
European Union. As migrant workers tend to
be employed in shrinking sectors such as con-
struction, retail and tourism, migrant work-
ers incomes are signifcantly affected, with a
negative impact on remittances to family back
home.
5

Migrant workers are even more affected by the
crisis not only because of the types of sectors
they work in, but also because of the more
precarious jobs they hold, compared to local
citizens. In times of economic hardship, they
are the frst to be laid-off due to this more
vulnerable employment status. Although this
is related to such general issues as discrimina-
tion and migrant worker rights, it clearly wors-
ens the negative impact on migrants caused by
the current crisis.
Measures to minimise impact are being un-
dertaken by some ACP country governments,
including fscal stimulus packages (Mauritius,
Jamaica and Tanzania), revising budget ex-
penditures and targeting assistance to key
sectors (such as tax cuts for mining compa-
nies in Zambia), strengthening regulation of
the banking sector and fnancial markets, and
other macroeconomic and monetary policies
(such as the short-term fscal, monetary and
exchange rate measures introduced by the
government of the Democratic Republic of
Congo). However, the ability of ACP countries
to sustain an adequate level of investment
is severely limited. Pre-existing resource
constraints are being exacerbated by a wid-
ening savings-investment gap. Estimates by
the Committee of African Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors established to
monitor the crisis, highlighted that to merely
maintain pre-crisis levels of growth in Africa
would require an additional US$50 billion in
2009 and US$56 billion in 2010, and that in-
creasing investment to the level needed to
achieve higher growth rates consistent with
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
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would require an additional US$117 billion in
2009 and US$130 billion in 2010.
6
Consequently, commitments to increase over-
seas development assistance (ODA) to ACP
countries must be made quickly. However
donor countries are also curtailing develop-
ment assistance as a measure to cut their own
budgets and in any case, ODA alone will not
be enough to allow ACP countries to restore
growth levels suffcient to reduce poverty. In
this context, it is unlikely that substantial new
additional resources can be found. In this con-
text, is desirable that resources for poverty
reduction be untied from migration manage-
ment policies.
Mobility Frameworks Need to Be
Reformed in ACP Countries
Unequal distribution of opportunities, wealth,
demographics as well as the existence of tran-
snational communities gives rise to migratory
fows. Mobility is here to stay. There is a need,
therefore, to improve its developmental di-
mension and reverse the negative implica-
tions. The brain drain that affects relevant
sectors, including education and health, con-
stitutes a major obstacle to the development
of ACP countries. Yet it can be turned into an
opportunity if mobility schemes are modifed
at both ends of the migratory chain.
Mobility in ACP countries has been and will
continue to be one among the various liveli-
hood strategies available to improve individu-
al and family conditions. The key issue is how
to improve mobility without jeopardising the
development efforts of other countries and
individuals.
Main Objectives and Structure of the Report
This Report aims to shed light upon the chal-
lenging current issues at hand by providing data
and analysis on the current mobility trends
and patterns in the ACP Group of States, and
to raise awareness among policy makers of
the challenges and opportunities that mobility
represents for human development.
The Report is organised in fve chapters. Chap-
ter 1 presents the ACP Group of States ap-
proach to mobility and its linkage to human de-
velopment. Chapter 2 highlights the fve main
development challenges to the ACP Group of
States in addressing mobility as an element of
human development. These key challenges are
those that emerged during the international
fora and regional ACP events, in which the ACP
Group of States Secretariat participated, as
well as in the recent discussion on the revision
of the Cotonou Agreement with the European
Union. Chapter 3 provides an overview on ACP
migration. The aim of this chapter is to give a
picture of the ACP countries emigration and
immigration trends and patterns, globally and
by focusing on each sub-region. Chapter 4 fo-
cuses on the developmental impact of mobil-
ity. It aims to provide an overview of the main
fows of migrant economic, human, social and
cultural capital. It also describes at micro-lev-
el the impact of mobility in human develop-
ment by looking at human mobility corridors,
in order to identify the bottlenecks and areas
of intervention propitious for stimulating posi-
tive use of migrant capitals for development.
Chapter 5 refects an effort to provide an-
swers to the main challenges identifed in the
Report. It addresses the areas of public poli-
cies that can be promoted and/or reformed
with an eye toward eliminating the structural
barriers that impede the full and positive uti-
lisation of the migrants resources.
Notes
1 - UNDP (2009)
2 - Ratha Dilip and William Shaw (2007)
3 - The fnancial crisis also negatively affected earn-
ings from Trust Funds held by Kiribati and Tuvalu. The
Pacifc Conference on the Human Face of the Global
Economic Crisis, Port Vila, 11

February, 2010.
4 - The term diaspora is used throughout the
HMR2011 to indicate the migrant population outside
the home country. The term diaspora organisations is
used to indicate those emigrants formal and informal
groups who have left the country and are interested
in supporting home country and hometown develop-
ment efforts.
5 - Awad Ibrahim (2009)
6 - African Development Bank Group (2009)
Istockphotos
Mobility in the ACP Group of States is a key challenge to development
due to its linkages with climate change, confict, social exclusion,
declining international development assistance and growing
urbanization. These common challenges call for an improved mobility
framework, in which mobility is considered a fundamental individual
freedom that can lead to substantial benefts for all people and
countries involved.
ACp grOup ApprOACh TO
ThE mOBiLiTy ANd
dEVELOpmENT NExuS
ChApTEr 1
Antonio Scarponi,
Human Camoufage
14
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ChApTEr 1
ACp group Approach to the mobility
and Development Nexus
Mobility in the ACP Group of States is a key challenge to development due to its
linkages with climate change, confict, social exclusion, declining international
development assistance and growing urbanization. These common challenges call
for an improved mobility framework, in which mobility is considered a funda-
mental individual freedom that can lead to substantial benefts for all people
and countries involved.
Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility is the
ultimate ACp policy goal
The ACP Group of States includes 79 coun-
tries distributed over three continents and six
macro-regions, with a wealth of social, cul-
tural, economic diversity and different devel-
opment priorities (see Map 1.1). Yet they all
share a common vision: improving the devel-
opmental dimension of international mobility.
This translates into a mission that demands
real commitment from policy makers at both
ends of the migratory chain for the purpose
of improving the current mobility frameworks
in order to ensure free, secure and regulated
mobility for all.
On the one hand, this implies the elimination
of barriers that impede people from having
the freedom to choose their place of residence
and work, while on the other hand it implies
favouring the positive utilisation of resources
accumulated during the migratory project,
namely the cultural, social, human and eco-
nomic capital of migrants.
1
This Report is based on two underlying as-
sumptions. The frst is that immobility has a
cost for ACP countries and their people. The
second is that a positive migration and devel-
opment nexus can only exist within a system
of international relations that favours inclu-
sion, cohesion, protection and acceptance of
migrants and their families; that considers the
individual rights of migrants in cases of vol-
untary or forced returns; and that values the
positive contributions that the economic, hu-
man, cultural and social capital of migrants
make to development.
This ACP Human Mobility Report is about un-
packing the linkage between migration and
development in the African, Caribbean and
Pacifc Group of States, by making operational
both migration-friendly development policies,
meaning development policies that create
conditions for the utilisation of migrant capi-
tals for the development of migrant-sending
countries, and development-friendly migra-
tion policies which by facilitating mobility,
support the process of accumulation of mi-
grant capitals. The policy objectives and ex-
pected results of these two Policy Areas are
detailed in Table 1.1. The Report also aims to
contribute to national, regional, and interna-
tional debate on these issues.
In the felds of development and migration
policies, these are not small challenges. By
To operationalise the developmental impact
of migration and mobility, commitments are
needed from policy makers at both ends of
the migration chain.
16
means of this Report and the various Decla-
rations and Resolutions approved in the past
fve years, the ACP Group of States calls for an
international agenda that reforms the current
international mobility framework and devel-
opment paradigm, and includes the migration
and development nexus in a broader and ul-
timately essential agenda for global welfare,
in which the benefts and costs of mobility are
equally shared among nation-states involved.

Eliminating barriers is not enough. The elim-
ination of structural barriers to migration and
mobility is only one side of the coin. Migrants
move anyway, sometimes forced to choose
between diffcult and dangerous routes and
means, which both increases their vulnerabil-
ity to exploitation and diminishes the return
on their investment in the so-called migrato-
ry project. Therefore, the need to eliminate
barriers is self-evident.
The other side of the coin is the mobilisation of
migrant resources for development. Whether
documented or undocumented, migrants pur-
sue their dream of a better life and accumulate
skills, knowledge, and contacts, promote their
cultures, and save money for remittances, all
of which play an important role in their own
human development and that of their fami-
lies left behind. Enhancing the development
potential of mobility for individuals as well
as sending and receiving countries requires
looking at both sides of the migration and de-
velopment equation.
Constrained mobility has a cost for coun-
tries and individuals. When moving South to
North, ACP nationals face barriers such as lim-
ited access to segments of the labour market
that correspond to their actual skills, limited
recognition of diplomas and professional com-
petences acquired at home, hidden forms of
discrimination in the labour market, the high
costs of travel and remittance transfers, and
xenophobic attitudes that force them to keep
a low profle and not engage with the host so-
ciety.
Due to costs, the second-best alternative
is to move regionally. When moving South to
South, which is the most typical case for most
ACP-country nationals, barriers to mobility are
reduced due to the permeability of borders.
This is particularly visible in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, where mobility is an intrinsic element of
Migration in the ACP Group of States is main-
ly between neighbouring countries. Stories
of exclusion, discrimination, lack of protec-
tion, and xenophobic reactions are common
among migrants moving from one ACP state
to another and constitute an insurmountable
barrier to enhancing the positive dimensions
of migration.
Table 1.1 - A Framework for Migration and Development Policies
Source: Andrea Gallina for the ACP Group of States Secretariat HMR2011.
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the semi-pastoral nomadic cultures that co-ex-
ist with the artifcially designed borders inher-
ited from colonial times. Some countries have
booming economies or have suffcient cultural
and linguistic affnities to make them a pre-
ferred destination for migrants. Established
networks and communities of fellow compatri-
ots do the rest. Social capital is very important
for ACP nationals in their migration projects.
Nevertheless, stories of exclusion, discrimina-
tion, lack of protection, and xenophobic re-
actions are common among migrants moving
from one ACP state to another, and constitute
an insurmountable barrier to enhancing the
positive dimensions of migration.
The fuidity of seasonal mobility among ACP
countries is jeopardised by conficts, political
instability and transformations of the physi-
cal environment due to climate change. All
of these factors convert temporary mobility
into something permanent, with visible con-
sequences for urban development and the
management of natural resources. Defnitive
resettlement in the destination countries re-
duces ties with the homeland and therefore
the possibility of using the resources acquired
for that nations development. As will be seen
later, contemporary mobility patterns are in-
creasing the so-called mobility hotspots and
mobility tipping points.
This ACP Human Mobility Report calls for the
defnitive abandonment of the root-causes
approach to migration which still permeates
some policy arenas. It has been empirically
demonstrated, by means of the so-called mi-
gration-hump theory, that progress in devel-
opment indicators lead to increased migration
and not vice-versa, until a point is reached
at which people fnd enough opportunities
at home, and hence migration slows down.
2

Therefore, policy makers concerned about de-
velopment should take into account that a re-
duction in poverty leads to migration and that
migration in turn helps people out of poverty.
Nevertheless, addressing the root-causes of
migration remains a challenge for ACP coun-
tries that are troubled by environmental cri-
ses, conficts and other forms of forced mi-
gration. Eliminating those root causes is a
priority for ACP States and the international
community alike, but requires different tools
and measures than those envisaged in the
development-friendly or migration-friendly
policy framework.
Free, regulated and secure mobility is in-
cluded in the development agendas of ACP
countries. In both regional and inter-conti-
nental mobility fows, the benefts of migra-
tion are not fully reaped because of the afore-
mentioned structural constraints. Elimination
of these structural constraints to mobility is at
the core of the ACP Group of States Brussels
Declaration and Plan of Action, approved by
the ACP countries Ministers of Asylum, Migra-
tion and Mobility in April 2006, and the ACP
Group of States Brussels Resolution on Migra-
tion and Development, which in turn was ap-
proved in May 2008. Through these documents,
the ACP Group of States promotes a liberal and
rights-based conception of mobility, which frst
and foremost guarantees the migrants rights
to choose their place of residence and work
within established legal frameworks, while
fostering the positive impact that human
mobility has on the development of migrant-
sending countries.
The ultimate goal of this Report is to con-
tribute to international and national policy
debates. Much has been written on this topic
and discussed at recent international fora on
Migration and Development. Yet often these
debates and related literature have refected
the opinions, worries, and needs of countries
of the Global North.
The ACP Group wishes to contribute to the
debate at all levels by highlighting existing is-
sues and defciencies, lessons learned and good
practices, as well as by shedding light on data,
correcting common misperceptions and placing
more emphasis on the positive side of the link-
age between mobility and development. This
is achieved by stimulating discussion on how to
create an environment that promotes the mi-
grants freedom to choose their place of work
18
and residence, while at the same time promot-
ing the mobilisation of human, economic, so-
cial and cultural resources for development.
The ACP Group of States Approach
to human mobility
For the ACP Group of States, migration and
mobility are intrinsic elements in the process
of human development, as theorised by Nobel
Laureate Amartya Sen and liberal philosopher
Martha Nussbaum.
On the mobility side of the equation there
is a need to focus on the basic rights of mi-
grants. Nussbaum puts forward three basic
ideas that can be borrowed for positioning the
ACP Group of States approach vis--vis human
mobility and development. The frst is that all
human beings have equal dignity and worth, no
matter where they are situated in society. The
second idea is that this worth originates from
the power of moral choice human beings have,
which means they are able to plan a life in ac-
cordance with their own evaluation of ends.
3

The third idea is the notion that the moral
equality of persons gives them a fair claim
to certain types of treatment at the hands of
society and politics [...] This treatment must
do two things: respect and promote freedom
of choice, and [...] respect and promote the
equal worth of persons as choosers.
4
These
three ideas set the stage for policy makers
who are interested in adopting a liberal and
rights-based approach to human mobility.
On the development side of the equation,
the issue is resources. The development side
of the migration and development equation is
well explained by Amartya Sens analysis of the
capabilities approach, and especially by the
concept of substantive freedoms or capabili-
ties. Amartya Sen defnes development as the
process of expanding individual capabilities or
substantive freedoms.
5
According to Nussbaum
and Sen, there are two common elements that
are relevant for development planners.
Firstly, the capability approach rejects the util-
itarian standard preferences line of thought.
According to the latter, development inter-
vention should maximize the satisfaction of
individuals. However, as noted by Nussbaum,
a preference can be distorted either by social
norms or asymmetrical power distribution. For
example, a migrant can eventually become
convinced that to work without a contract is
not ideal but at least constitutes work, and
despite being denied access to social security,
is the best he or she can do. The migrant is
adapting his or her preferences to a given
circumstance which does not lead to greater
freedom. The utilitarian approach suggests
that the goal of development is a state or con-
dition of persons (i.e. a state or condition of
satisfaction), and thus understates the impor-
tance of agency and freedom in the develop-
ment process.
6

The second common element is that the ca-
pability approach requires development plan-
ners to identify the needs that individuals
have for resources, and their diverse ability
to convert these resources into activities or
functioning.
7
A mere distribution of resources
is not enough because it fails to take account
of the fact that individuals need differing lev-
els of resources if they are to come up to the
same level of capacity to function. They also
have differing abilities to convert resources
into actual functioning.
8
Functioning is a key
concept in the theoretical constructs of Am-
artya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The latter
has listed ten basic and internal capabilities.
9

She then adds a third level: the combined ca-
pability.
10
This combined capability is the com-
bination of internal capability and an external
environment that allows said functioning to be
exercised. For example, if there is no freedom
of movement, then a person may have the in-
ternal capability to exercise a profession, but
lacks the actual opportunity to use it (as he
or she deem appropriate) in his or her coun-
Peoples ability to choose the place they call
home is a dimension of human freedom that
we refer to as human mobility. Nonetheless
mobility cannot be a substitute for national
development strategies
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try, and transform it into earnings and savings.
Without the enabling environment that trans-
forms internal capabilities, it would be impos-
sible to transform and convert resources into
something that has worth.
The challenge to development planners
and policy makers is promoting capabili-
ties. The internal and combined capabilities
on Nussbaums list are all relevant for migrant
workers and their families (while it is often as-
sumed that basic capabilities do not apply to
migrants, since people able to move to another
country already have enough basic capabilities
to embark on a migratory project). Therefore,
since the aim of human development policies
is the promotion of combined capabilities, two
efforts are needed from development plan-
ners. The frst is to promote the internal capa-
bilities of prospective migrants, for example
through education and professional training.
The second is providing the material and in-
stitutional conditions available for exercising
these capabilities and transforming them into
combined capabilities.
The negative impact of mobility on those
left behind should not be underestimated.
The theories of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya
Sen have been applied to the UN Human De-
velopment Report 2009, which focuses on mo-
bility and development.
The UNDP Report argues that before we start
asking whether the freedom of movement, for
example, has signifcant effects on incomes,
education or health, we need to recognise
that movement is one of the basic actions that
individuals can choose in order to realise their
life plans. In other words, the ability to move
is a dimension of freedom that is part of de-
velopment with intrinsic as well as potential
instrumental value.
11

Yet, one should be careful not to view mobility
as benefcial to everybody, or as a form of indi-
vidual freedom that indiscriminately benefts
everyones human development. The brain
drain of health care professionals is a case in
point. The freedom to fnd employment op-
portunities in better health systems abroad
should not be detrimental to the ability of peo-
ple in ACP countries to access good doctors at
home. However, given the current state of the
health care sector in most ACP countries, on
the one hand, and the net return from educat-
ing those health workers who move abroad, on
the other, the blame for dysfunctional health
sectors in ACP countries cannot be attributed
to migrating health workers but rather to ne-
glected social protection policies or predatory
recruitment policies on the part of countries
who need health workers.
Mobility cannot be a substitute for devel-
opment. The ACP Group of States believes
mobility cannot be a substitute for national
development strategies focused on investing
in people and creating conditions that make it
possible for people to prosper at home.
The potential of mobility to improve the well-
being of the very poor and most disadvantaged
groups is limited, because these groups are of-
ten the least likely to move. Therefore, while
human mobility is not a panacea for underde-
velopment, the largely positive effects it has on
both movers and stayers suggest that it should
be an important component of any strategy
aimed at generating sustained improvements
in human development around the world.
The need to move beyond security concerns.
Finally, this approach calls for a redefnition of
current hegemonic discourses that search for
solutions to migration based on security con-
cerns. Shared refections and dialogue about
approaches that will be more effective and
less destructive in terms of the general pub-
lics overall perceptions in the countries of
origin, as well as in transit and host countries,
and that are based on respect for human rights
including the right to seek asylum are part
of a long-term strategy that goes beyond just
addressing short-term security concerns.
Unpacking the Linkage Between Migration
and development
In this Report we unpack the development
20
side of the equation by identifying four de-
velopmental dimensions of mobility, or re-
sources, which are accumulated by migrants
during their migratory projects. These are the
equivalent of migrant internal capability.
The ultimate goal of ACP policy makers is to
transform these internal capabilities of mi-
grants into combined capabilities.
Four Migrant Capitals
1. Economic capital: remittances of savings
accumulated during the migratory process.
High transfer costs and reduced access to
conventional inexpensive and safe systems
signify additional constraints that reduce the
potential of the migrants economic capital.
Reducing these costs by half could result in an
additional $2.5 billion in remittance fows to
Sub-Saharan Africa alone. Especially in times
of crisis, reducing costs may compensate for
lower remittance fows. Many ACP countries
can tap the wealth of their diaspora by issu-
ing diaspora bonds. In Sub-Saharan Africa, is-
suing these bonds and overcoming weaknesses
in the regions legal and regulatory systems
could help investors tap $5 billion to $10 bil-
lion annually.
12
2. Human capital: education, technical and
entrepreneurial skills learned at home and
improved abroad. Facilitating recognition
of formal and informal skills in the destina-
tion countries would enhance the accumula-
tion of human capital and avoid the so-called
brain-waste, meaning the under-utilisation
of skills. In the case of less skilled workers,
facilitating the formal learning process could
have positive implications for both receiving
and destination countries. Facilitating return
and especially circulation can enrich the proc-
ess of human capital accumulation, as well as
mobilise critical mass of expertise needed to
conduct the development process in the coun-
try of origin.
3. Social capital: networks, associations, and
trust developed during the migration process
that increase the migrants access to relevant
information, facilities and resources, and re-
duce transaction costs. Social capital repre-
sents a source of more informed choices for
those deciding to move, while providing social
safety nets upon arrival in destination coun-
tries. Social networks are vital to this end,
and diasporic linkages are instrumental to im-
proved mobility. Social capital also leads to
business network formation as a substitute for
welfare assistance for unauthorised migrants
in the host society, thereby facilitating the so-
cial inclusion of migrants upon arrival at their
destination. Despite the diffculties faced by
migrants in host societies and their limited
social and economic inclusion, initiatives that
maintain close ties with home communities
are fourishing.
4. Cultural capital: ideas, attitudes, values
and artistic expressions (tangible and intan-
gible) that are present in the migrants com-
munities and that are important elements for
bridging different cultures, so that migration
is perceived not only as a way to improve indi-
vidual migrants economic situations but also
as a means by which to encourage cultural di-
versity and simultaneously promote cultural
industries. In the ACP region, the cultural di-
mension of migration and mobility needs to be
considered, insofar as sedentary and nomadic
peoples have always co-existed and made cul-
tural contributions, and therefore both have a
right to live within their own cultures.
The dominant role played by mobility in ACP
cultures facilitates the circulation of ideas,
know-how and best practices (universities,
students, trainees, artists, researchers, etc.)
although the full acknowledgement of this
fact and its economic importance in develop-
ment planning has been limited.
The dominant role played by mobility in ACP
cultures facilitates the circulation of ideas,
know-how and best practices (universities,
students, trainees, artists, researchers, etc.)
although the full acknowledgement of this
fact and its economic importance in develop-
ment planning has been limited.
21
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Furthermore, migration might make a positive
contribution to integration and inclusion by
promoting better understanding among civili-
sations and cultures, thus helping to transcend
post-colonial and territorial divisions, estab-
lish relationships between states and peoples,
and reduce the confdence gap between na-
tive and migrant communities.
Defning the Migration and
Development Nexus
For the purpose of operationalising migration-
friendly development policies, in this Report
a migration and development project is any
initiative that enables migrants if they so
desire to become agents of development,
mobilising and investing the human, economic,
social and cultural capital accumulated during
the migration project in the interest of their
own and their communities human develop-
ment. A migration and development project
is, therefore, any kind of public or private-led
action that proves to be successful in: a) pro-
moting and enhancing the mobilisation of the
economic, human, social, and cultural capital
of migrants for achieving a more inclusive and
balanced process of development, in origin,
transit and host countries; b) contributing to
creating the pre-conditions that allow this
process to occur, by integrating factors related
to human mobility into national development
strategies and eliminating barriers to mobil-
ity; and fnally, c) improving the management
of migration, addressing the root causes of
forced migration, ensuring the protection of
refugees, displaced and traffcked people, and
ensuring the circularity of mobility.
Operationalising the linkage requires a fresh
and complementary approach to develop-
ment policy. In this framework, the inclusion
of human mobility in the agenda of develop-
ment cooperation does require a major change
in the current approaches taken by internation-
al cooperation actors. It does, indeed, demand
that they embrace an innovative approach to
addressing human mobility and, hence, the
migrants resources at the local, national, re-
gional and international levels both South-
South and South-North to complement their
current practices. A major change is required,
on the one hand, in the form of both the insti-
tutionalisation and harmonisation of migration
regimes of international cooperation actor,
and on the other, in mainstreaming mobility in
government policies.
Removing the structural barriers to mobility is
a long-term development goal. Meanwhile, op-
erationalisation of the linkage between migra-
tion and development can occur by creating
the environment for mobilisation of migrant
resources accumulated during various stages
and places of the migratory project. Migrant
agency is central to facilitating the process, as
is the role played by government and develop-
ment partners.
Notes
1 - Social capitals role in local economic develop-
ment has been extensively studied following the
works of Putnam Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and
Raffaella Nanetti (1993). The role of human capital in
economic development has pioneered by Becker Gary
S. (1975). The importance of cultural capital is high-
lighted by Bourdieu Pierre (1986). The role of remit-
tances or the economic capital of migrants is widely
documented. For a review of the literature see World
Bank (2005)
2 - Martin, Philip L. and J. Edward Taylor (1996)
3 - Nussbaum Martha C. (1999)
4 - Ibidem
5 - Sen Amartya (1999)
6 - Nussbaum Martha C. (2003)
7 - Nussbaum Martha C. (1999)
8 - Nussbaum Martha C. (2003)
9 - A basic capability is, for example, the capability
of practical reasoning, while an internal capability is
the capability to speak freely. Nussbaums list of ten
basic capabilities includes life, bodily health, bodily
integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions,
practical reasoning, affliation, care for other species,
play, and control over ones environment.
10 - Nussbaum Martha C. (1999) pp. 41-42.
11 - UNDP (2009) pp. 14-15.
12 - Ratha Dilip, Sanket Mohapatra, Sonia Plaza
(2008)
22
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Map 1.1 - African, Caribbean and Pacifc (ACP) Group of States
Only the main islands of the atolls are represented.
The size and position of the Pacifc Islands on this map do not
correspond to the actual ones.
Tha map has only descriptive purposes.
This chapter identifes fve main challenges to enhancing the migration
and development nexus in ACP countries. Given the scarcity of data, the
diversity and variety of socio-economic conditions, climatic challenges,
xenophobic attitudes, mobility trends and patterns in the ACP, individual
responses as well as collective improvements of the existing national and
international mobility frameworks are needed.
FiVE kEy pOLiCy ChALLENgES
ChApTEr 2
Sea rise and king tides are
main concerns for Pacifc
Islands people Juriaan Booij
24
FiVE kEy pOLiCy ChALLENgES
ChApTEr 2
25
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This chapter identifes fve main challenges to enhancing the migration and de-
velopment nexus in ACP countries. Given the scarcity of data, the diversity and
variety of socio-economic conditions, climatic challenges, xenophobic attitudes,
mobility trends and patterns in the ACP, individual responses as well as collective
improvements of the existing national and international mobility frameworks
are needed.
ChApTEr 2
I
n the ACP countries the migration and de-
velopment nexus is affected by a complex
set of challenges that demands for concerted
actions at the national, regional and interna-
tional level. Poverty and human deprivation,
youth population and labour force, unemploy-
ment and the potential for social disharmony,
local and regional conficts, and governance
issues are as important as climate change,
policy coherence, lack of data and migration
policy frameworks.
The ACP countries migration and development
challenges discussed in this Chapter are at the
core of the recent ACP Ministries of Migration
and Asylum Brussels Declaration and Plan of
Action and the ACP Group of States Brussels
Resolution on Migration and Development.
The III Global Migration Forum on Migration
and Development in Athens presented as well
an important arena for the ACP Secretariat to
put forward these key policy challenges as the
priorities for the coming years in the feld of
migration and development.
1st Key Challenge:
Develop Time and Cost-effective
Research Tools for Analysing the Mobility-
Development Nexus in ACP Countries
Research on migration trends and patterns in
ACP countries has traditionally been geared
towards satisfying the policy and security con-
cerns of Northern countries. With the excep-
tion of some noteworthy examples that will be
described later, very little has been analysed
from a South-South perspective.
1
This is mainly
due to the scarcity of comprehensive, reliable
and comparable data on mobility.
As people move, resources move also. Skilled
people too migrate regionally, and both skilled
and unskilled workers send remittances home.
Along with people, there is also movement of
music, cultural goods and industries, as well
as information about jobs, living conditions
and business opportunities. Not only are facts
and fgures often missing or incomplete, but
we know very little about the dynamics that
characterise these fows, the conditions faced
by migrants, the families left behind and the
actual and potential benefts for human devel-
opment that can be generated by this intra-
ACP mobility.
Furthermore, the informality of many regional
fows in the ACP countries adds elements of
complexity to existing but rather weak sta-
tistical information. Diffculties in calculating
undocumented migrants, the lack of surveys
allowing for comparative analysis during pe-
riods between censuses, a lack of coordina-
26
tion among data collection methods in sending
and receiving countries, selective collection
of country data, the lack of updated histori-
cal series and so on all signifcantly undermine
policy development in this area.
While harmonisation and consolidation are
needed, policy based on evidence cannot wait
for these to occur, and alternative qualifed
methods need to be developed.
The Human Mobility Corridor Approach
Analysis of the migration and development
nexus within ACP countries needs to employ a
more cost and time-effective research meth-
od. Within the ACP Group of States, a time and
cost-effective solution would be to improve
and systematise the qualitative data collection
methods developed by specialised research in-
stitutions in ACP countries, and combine them
with selected quantitative data for the pur-
pose of establishing common frameworks and
indicators.
The migration and mobility corridor approach
proposed in this Report can serve as the unit
of analysis. The method proposed by the mo-
bility corridor is an analysis of the fows of
migrant economic, social, cultural and human
capitals between two countries (a migrants
sending and receiving country), which should
enable an understanding of their processes of
accumulation, utilisation and interrelations
with structural factors and obstacles. This ap-
proach in essence expands the remittance
corridors approach developed by the World
Bank, by including other fows of migrant re-
sources and especially by considering the in-
terrelationships between structural factors,
resource fow dynamics and the migrants
agency. Understanding the characteristics of
the creation and mobilisation of these resourc-
es is instrumental to improving policy-making
in the area of migration and development, and
consequently human development.
Furthermore, framed within the capability-
based approach to migration and develop-
ment, this method emphasises the positive im-
plications of migration on human development
while also highlighting its negative dimensions
and constraints. It thus promotes the principle
that mobility issues need to be addressed by
cooperation frameworks that involve govern-
ments at both ends of the mobility chain.
For example, a policy addressing issues of so-
cial cohesion in which migrant communities are
well settled and integrated would necessarily
need to be different from a policy addressing
the inclusion needs of migrants moving within
a newly established mobility corridor. Here,
social networks are probably thinner and ac-
cess to relevant information is more limited.
Therefore, policies should focus on newly ar-
rived migrants and reduce their vulnerability
by means of institutional social protection
measures, while in the former case it would
be more important to focus on engaging with
established diaspora formations that already
provide welfare services in addition to or as
a complement to state protection policies.
Targeting policies in this manner would limit
the risk of adopting incoherent one-size-fts-
all measures, while enabling policy-makers
and development practitioners to understand
migration and development dynamics, defne
context-specifc policies, and establish institu-
tional frameworks that can maximize the ben-
efts of mobility for human development.
Finally, the quantitative-qualitative method
proposed by the mobility corridor approach
can also help to identify human mobility
hotspots, as well as migration tipping points.
A mobility hotspot is an area of great activity
of a specifc type, such as border zones or ur-
ban areas that particularly attract migrants,
and urbanized areas along transit routes in
which tensions are being spurred between mi-
grants and local communities that may have
a negative impact on social and economic co-
hesion. A hotspot is also a place where there
is intense mobility of people due, for exam-
ple, to intensive cross-border small-scale
trade activities involving human mobility, or
due to forced migration and displacement. A
hotspot is a point to be monitored. It is not
necessarily a negative area, yet it requires
priority actions to foster the positive dimen-
sions of human mobility, in order to avoid
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crossing a tipping point. A tipping point is a
previously rare phenomenon that is becoming
rapidly and dramatically more common. The
term is borrowed from the feld of physics, in
which adding a small amount of weight to a
balanced object can cause it to topple sud-
denly and completely. Social stability and co-
hesion can topple if migrants are not socially
and economically included in the host society
and labour market. Xenophobic reactions are
an indication that a migration tipping point is
being reached. This could occur, for example,
in areas of high intensity deforestation, or
with limited access to water and sanitation,
or in areas where the unemployment situation
is particularly severe and causes xenophobic
reactions towards migrants. Identifying mobil-
ity hotspots and tipping points can help to
establish key entry points for policy-makers
and practitioners in the feld.
The ACP Secretariat and its member states can
contribute to improved policy and institutional
coherence by considering the peculiarities of
each mobility corridor and being able to iden-
tify if they are hotspots and/or are close to
the tipping point.
Ongoing research programs and initiatives in
the ACP countries are already focusing on im-
portant corridors. In the ACP countries, there
are notable examples of research networks
that address mobility issues from a mobility-
corridor perspective, yet these sometimes
focus on only one of the implications of the
process of accumulation, loss and transfer
of migrant resources. For example there are
in-depth studies on brain-drain, return migra-
tion, remittances, transnational relationships
and so on, but few address the loss of migrant
capitals and training / education in a systemic
and holistic way, and how these interact with
human development processes.
Some Notable Regional Research Experiences
In Southern Africa, the Southern African Mi-
gration Programme (SAMP) is an international
network of organisations founded in 1996 to
promote awareness of migration-development
linkages in the Southern Africa Development
Cooperation (SADC) region. SAMP conducts ap-
plied and policy-oriented research on migra-
tion and development issues in specifc South-
ern Africa corridors (Zimbabwe-South Africa,
Zimbabwe-Botswana, Lesotho-South Africa,
etc.), looking especially at migrant resource
formation and critical constraints. SAMP is
also establishing an electronic Migration Data
Observatory for the SADC region which will be
accessible from its website, and has contrib-
uted to the Migration Dialogue for Southern
Africa (MIDSA) (see Box 2.1).
In Western Africa, a notable initiative is the
Sahel and West Africa Club SWAC/OECD, a
semi-autonomous initiative established under
the OECD and managed by a Secretariat. The
SWAC/OECD reviews migratory policies, gen-
erates strategic thinking on various aspects of
the regional integration process, and is work-
ing to create a Regional Observatory on Migra-
tion in Western Africa. The research combines
a macro-level analysis of intra-regional fows
of people and resources, and a micro-level
analysis of mobility in cross-border regions
by looking at social, economic, cultural, and
skills formation factors. The work of SWAC/
OECD contributed to the formulation of a Joint
ECOWAS Approach to Migration that promotes
the free intra-regional movement of persons,
and supported the negotiations during the
EU-Africa Dialogue on Migration and Develop-
ment.
Another recently established yet promising
regional network in Western Africa is the Net-
work of Migration Research in Africa (NOMRA)
located in the Human Resources Development
Centre (HRDC), Lagos, Nigeria. This is a collab-
orative organisation of researchers stemming
from a UNESCO/MOST initiative. The Network
aims to build a regional migration research
network and research capacity to carry out
cross-national, multidisciplinary and innova-
tive research on socio-cultural, economic and
political aspects of international migration
in the region in order to advance knowledge
on migration dynamics and policy-making in
the region. An important goal of NOMRA is
to ensure that migration is adequately main-
28
streamed into development activities, includ-
ing PRSPs and develop capacities, through
training, of offcials to help governments bet-
ter understand migration management.
2

An important regional initiative in the Carib-
bean is the Caribbean Migrants Observatory
(OBMICA), jointly established by the Centre
for Research and Social Studies at the Do-
minican Republics Ibero-American University
and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sci-
ences, providing research on social, cultural,
human and economic capital formation and
patterns in the Caribbean, with a particular
focus on the Haiti-Dominican Republic mobil-
ity corridor. The Observatory has conducted
in-depth analyses of the social exclusion of
Haitian migrants and Dominican-Haitian de-
scendents in the Dominican Republic, and
the socio-economic implications of the inte-
gration of Haitian migrants into specifc less-
skilled segments of the labour market, such
as domestic work. Research on the Dominican
Republic-United States migration corridor is
also another established research area of the
Observatory.
In the Pacifc, the Asia-Pacifc Migration Re-
search Network (APMRN) established in 1995
as a research project of the UNESCO Manage-
ment of Social Transformations (MOST) Pro-
gramme is located at the School of Govern-
ment, Development and International Affairs,
attached to the Faculty of Business and Eco-
nomics at the University of the South Pacifc in
Suva, which also coordinates the Pacifc group
of migration carrying out research on migra-
tion and climate change, as well as migration
fows between Pacifc Islands and Australia /
New Zealand.
These are only some examples of the ongo-
ing initiatives at the regional and sub-regional
levels. There are many other initiatives and
individual researchers in the ACP regions that
are promoting interesting studies about the
nexus between migration and development. To
support these local initiatives, the ACP Group
of States Secretariat established an Intra-ACP
Migration Observatory in the 9th European De-
velopment Fund. Research efforts will beneft
from linking southern research programs and
institutions in order to collaborate in the area
of migration and development.
The Role of Female Migration in the
ACP Countries Remains Understudied
Another important limitation in ACP migration
research is the limited analysis of women role
in shaping migration patterns and the impact
on human development.
The participation of women in international
mobility represents an important medium for
enhancing womens range of choices, empow-
erment and hence human development. Mi-
gration may offer women the opportunity to
increase their economic independence, man-
age economic resources, gain control over
remittances, increase their agency and es-
cape traditional norms and values that often
have detrimental effects on their freedom to
choose a social and professional life they con-
sider worth living. However, female migration
comes with social costs attached. Child-rearing
in many ACP countries is a female-dominated
task and migration implies family arrange-
ments that are not necessarily optimal for the
psychological and physical well-being of the
children. That said, in the Caribbean context,
for example, so-called transnational mother-
ing has been widely recognised as a success-
ful adaptive mechanism to the feminisation of
migration, building on traditional female sup-
port networks where historically the menfolk
have largely been absent from child-rearing
responsibilities.
3
This may offset the benefts
of migration, although remittances improve
the opportunities, human development and
education of children (especially girls). The
increasing feminisation of migration by health
care workers is also signifcantly affecting ACP
countries health care services, to the detri-
ment of those that do not choose to migrate.
More information is needed to understand the
extent of womens path to emancipation by
way of mobility, as well as its negative effects
on human development and the social protec-
tion of children and the elderly left behind.
The migration of women is often studied as a
29
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separate subject, when instead it should be an
ordinary dimension of all surveys and statistics
dealing with remittances, migration decisions,
labour conditions, the earnings of migrants,
and the like.
There is not enough evidence as yet to allow
for reaching conclusive results on the role
played by migration in the reconfguration
of gender roles leading to sustained gender
equilibrium. More empirical evidence on the
regulatory frameworks intended to empower
women in these directions could guide policy
makers in both the migration and develop-
ment areas, and introduce a more gendered
perspective on migration and development in
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Nation-
al Development Plans in ACP countries.
4
The Observatory represents an important re-
sponse by the ACP Group of countries to this
frst key policy challenge.
2nd key Challenge:
Ensure Free, Regulated and Secure Mobility
In order to function, the linkage between
migration and development needs coherent
policy and institutional frameworks that as-
sure effective measures against poverty and
unemployment, while promoting social cohe-
sion and protection for migrants. Unregulated
and insecure mobility has other economic and
social costs: to the migrants, because they
will have to spend more money to pay expen-
sive travel intermediaries, will face diffcul-
ties fnding a job corresponding to the skills
and education levels obtained at home, and
will be at risk of ending up in exploitative and
unprotected forms of labour. There are also
expenses for the country of destination be-
cause of the cost of exclusion, i.e., not be-
ing able to properly utilise the pool of skills
available among the migrant labour force,
together with costs incurred from patrolling
coastlines and land borders, fghting human
smuggling and traffcking, removing undocu-
mented migrants, labour inspections, the
missed income from fscal revenues, and so
on.
5
Finally, there are costs to the country of
origin because of reduced remittances and
a decrease in the chances they will return.
Socially and economically excluded migrants
remit less money home, have fewer oppor-
tunities to bring back ideas, information and
technologies, and the families and children
left behind cannot beneft from frequent vis-
its by migrating parents.
Strengthening Circular Migration
The natural corollary of free, regulated and
secure mobility is the concept of circular mi-
gration.
In this Report, the concept of circular mi-
gration refers to a continuity of mobility in
which the governments of destination and
origin countries are committed to protecting
individual migrants and protecting their right
to choose their place of work and residence.
Incentives for circular migration can involve
both long-term foreign-born residents those,
for example, enjoying double citizenship who
can easily move between two countries with-
out restriction as well as short-term migrants
in search of temporary work opportunities.
Circular mobility schemes are usually debated
in terms of national development strategies,
the alleviation of unemployment by coun-
tries of origin, and the reliance on a fexible
and undemanding labour force by destination
countries, with limited consideration of the
needs of migrants and a lack of understand-
ing of transnational family and community
patterns. Further, a structural problem in this
policy feld is the unpredictability of economic
crises, changing trade agreements and other
factors may undermine notable migration
management policy efforts and hold back cir-
cular migration agreements.
Effective circular migration can be a strat-
egy to remove barriers that force migrants
to remain indefnitely in the host countries.
Measures securing residence status (dual citi-
zenship, permanent or multi-annual residence
permits) are only some of the possible meas-
ures that can operationalise the concept.
Measures should therefore be encouraged that
move from a simple concern over brain-drain
to improving the management of qualifed
30
workers in strategic sectors in a timely and
collective fashion by the governments of both
sending and destination countries.
Free mobility is also very important for the
country of origin. Increased mobility enables
stronger ties with the home country, whereas
permanent settlements associated with family
reunifcation loosen them, reducing the trans-
fer of migrant capital (resources are no longer
saved and remitted but invested in settlement
mortgages and the education of children in
the host country, for example). Eventually,
social costs (family separations, children left
behind, etc.) associated with long-term mi-
gration can be reduced with eased mobility.
It is important to acknowledge that the dura-
tion of temporary work permits for unskilled
low-wage migrant workers is generally not suf-
fcient to recover the investment in the migra-
tion project (or allow for meaningful invest-
ment at home).
However, in the current policy debate, cir-
cular migration is often used as the equiva-
lent of temporary, cyclical or contract
migration. Circular migration should instead
mean that migrants are free to come and go,
in contrast to other forms of migration that
are more or less forced, and managed types
of temporary residence, which can be easily
curtailed in times of economic downturn.
Current attempts to promote free and secure
mobility for all are undermined by new genera-
tions of return and reintegration policy instru-
ments, as well as temporary circular migration
schemes. These are too recent to be assessed,
especially considering the recent impact of
the global economic slowdown and recession.
However, there are strong indications that
they have yielded unconvincing results and
mixed feelings: short-term visa holders often
become unauthorised over-stayers or perma-
nent settlers (with increased social costs, of-
ten unaccounted for), whereas regularly set-
tled migrants do not necessarily move back to
the home country to establish new businesses,
despite incentives. There is no point in pro-
moting return if people have no clear pros-
pects regarding their lives in the countries of
origin. This always leads to failure: people re-
emigrate shortly after their return. But when
such perspectives do exist, then people will
return, even without specifc incentives. Well-
known examples of this phenomenon are India
and China.
Policy and Institutional Coherence
In many ACP countries, circular mobility be-
tween countries, often for seasonal work, is
an established human activity. There are ongo-
ing initiatives in the ACP countries that foster
and strengthen policy coordination in the area
of migration. For example, in West Africa, a
treaty establishes free mobility for Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
passport holders. In Southern Africa, policy co-
ordination at the regional level takes place in
the framework of MIDSA, and is coordinated
by the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM). The projects aim is to facilitate region-
al dialogue and cooperation on migration poli-
cy issues among the governments of the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC).
The overall objective is to facilitate regional
co-operation in migration management by fos-
tering a greater understanding of migration
and strengthening regional institutional and
personnel capacities (see Box 2.1).
Ongoing dialogue and discussion about migra-
tion issues also take place at the level of the
African Union (AU). A Strategic Framework for
a Policy on Migration in Africa was developed,
specifcally in response to the pressing issue
of African expertise recruitment by developed
countries. The African Unions framework sug-
gests countering the exodus of skilled nationals
by promoting the New Partnership for Africas
Policy coherence in the feld of migration
and development is defned as the pursuit of
win-win-win opportunities for host and send-
ing countries and the migrants through the
systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing
policies in all areas, as well as the promotion
of specifc synergies between migration and
development policies.
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Development (NEPAD) strategy. Its aim is to
create mechanisms that retain Africas human
capacities while providing gainful employment
and educational opportunities to qualifed na-
tionals in their home countries.
Other regional economic cooperation initia-
tives in Sub-Saharan Africa are addressing the
issue of free mobility, although the lack of
political will is often the main constraint to
progress in the feld (see Chapter 3).
In the Caribbean, important strides are be-
ing made as concerns the free movement of
people. The CARICOM Single Market Econo-
my (CSME) is designed to include free move-
ment of people. The frst phase has granted
free movement to eleven categories of skilled
migrants: university graduates, artists, musi-
cians, media workers, sportspersons, teach-
ers, nurses, holders of associates degrees
or equivalent qualifcations, artisans with a
Caribbean Vocational Qualifcation (CVQ) and
households domestics with a CVQ or equiva-
lent qualifcation. Besides these categories,
free movement has also been granted to all
persons who are moving to establish a business
or provide a service.
6

The agreement foresees issuing Certifcates
of Recognition of CARICOM Skills Qualifca-
tion from the designated ministry of the home
or host country.
7
In a subsequent phase, the
agreement also foresees the Right of Estab-
lishment for other professionals (business
owners, the self-employed, managerial, tech-
nical, and supervisory staff, as well as spouses
and immediate dependents). Some CARICOM
member states have started issuing a CARICOM
passport. A study on intra-CARICOM free circu-
lation is being undertaken and expected to be
released by late 2010.
In the Pacifc region, the countries of the Pa-
cifc Islands Forum are also coordinating activ-
ities leading to temporary migration schemes
within the region and beyond. In order to en-
sure sustainability and maximum benefts for
the members of the Forum, the Pacifc Island
States Secretariat is supporting policy discus-
sion and negotiations.
Various directives have been issued by lead-
Box 2.1 The Regional Coordination
Process Through MIDSA
The Forum created through the MIDSA
process works to achieve the following
specifc goals:
> To foster co-operation among SADC
Member States on migration-related is-
sues, enhancing their capacity to man-
age migration within a regional context.
To contribute to an increased awareness
among SADC offcials and policy-makers
of the role of migration in the regions
social and economic development, and
to ensure that orderly migration is per-
ceived and used as a positive factor in
the development process.
> To help develop regional institutional
capacities to deal with the challeng-
es of migration management, and to
strengthen the capacity of governments
to meet these challenges in a coopera-
tive and knowledge-based manner.
> To enhance the understanding of off-
cials and policy-makers regarding caus-
es, dimensions and the impact of migra-
tion in Southern Africa.
> To promote dialogue and interaction
between governments and other agen-
cies and institutions with migration-re-
lated interests and expertise.
> To deliver technical co-operation and
training to build the capacity for migra-
tion management, the sharing of infor-
mation and research, as well as infor-
mation dissemination activities.
> To enhance the capacity of SADC coun-
tries to collectively manage migration,
including substantial progress towards
harmonised systems of data collection
and harmonised immigration policy and
legislation.
Source: wInternational Organization for Migra-
tion, 2000.
32
ers of the Pacifc Islands Forum, leaders of
the Small Island States (SIS), trade ministers
of the Pacifc ACP (P-ACP), and the forum of
economic ministers. On 26 October 2006, at
the Thirty-Sixth Pacifc Islands Forum, the Ka-
libobo Road Map was approved, which includ-
ed an initiative to integrate trade in services,
including temporary movement of labour, into
the Pacifc Island Countries Trade Agreement
(PICTA) and the Economic Partnerships Agree-
ment (EPA).
Discussions and negotiations at the regional
level led to the promotion of guest worker
schemes between New Zealand and Australia
and several countries. The Pacifc Island Fo-
rum Secretariat (PIFS) has also supported a
feasibility study regarding the development
of a training programme for caregivers in the
Solomon Islands and the exploration of employ-
ment opportunities for its youth in the Cana-
dian market of care for the elderly, as a means
of assisting the countrys economic recovery.
Pacifc ACP trade ministers regularly meet for
ongoing bilateral discussions with selected EU
member states, and to develop other parallel
activities related to the temporary movement
of people in the Pacifc region.
3rd Key Challenge: Address Environmentally
induced mobility
Understanding and predicting climate change
and related human mobility is extremely dif-
fcult. This is another key policy challenge for
ACP countries in the XXI century. Estimates
predict 50 million environmental migrants
8
by
2010,
9
and projections are that 150 million,
10
200 million
11
or as many as 1 billion
12
people
will be obliged to move because of climate-
related events by 2050, depending on calcu-
lations.
13
Although there is disagreement on
these fgures, which are often heroic extrapo-
lations from the best available data,
14
there
is consensus that climate change will compro-
mise the ability of ecosystems to provide live-
lihoods. Hence there is a need to address the
link between mobility and climate change.
Scholars at the University of Oxford Refugee
Studies Centre have underlined that while not
denying the potentially widespread displace-
ment consequences of environmental change,
these estimates instil a fear of waves of mi-
grants and humanitarian crises. These may
obscure the positive role of human agency in
mediating these potential outcomes how, in
practice, local communities actually do, or
might, react and thus what the appropriate
policy responses should be. By homogenis-
ing the concept of environmentally-induced
displacement, they deny the need to design
a complex variety of policy interventions ad-
justed to the many different situations of such
displacement.
15
Temporary migration is the response most of-
ten used by an affected community to adapt
to the new environment, especially when
other resources are exhausted. The mobility
of environmental migrants is often circular
and within regions; most people come back to
their place of origin once the original condi-
tions are re-established. Long-distance, inter-
national migration induced by changes in the
physical environment has been and will most
likely remain very limited. If this holds true,
intra-ACP migration is likely to increase. Fur-
thermore, people most vulnerable to climate
change are often the ones with only very lim-
ited resources vis--vis mobility. This has obvi-
ous policy implications.
16

Despite being the least responsible for
greenhouse gas emissions, ACP countries
will be the most affected by climate change.
Adverse effects will manifest themselves in
different ways in the various regions and sub-
regions.
Climate Change in the Pacifc Islands
Pacifc countries are already facing drought
and rises in sea levels. In fact, the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recognised that risk related to climate change
in this region is three times greater than in
industrialised countries.
17
Based on the most
plausible scenarios, the IPCC estimates that
sea levels will rise worldwide by 0.09m to
0.88m between 1990 and 2050.
18
33
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In the Pacifc, most of the small island states
have very low elevations, and therefore are
already suffering from repeated foods and
cyclones. Forced displacements have already
begun in Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua-New Guinea
and Tuvalu. In Vanuatu, 100 villagers from Te-
gua were moved to higher ground in August
2005, around 600 metres from the coast.
19
Vil-
lagers were relocated to higher areas in the
interior of Tegua, one of the chains northern-
most provinces, after their coastal homes were
repeatedly swamped by storm surges, aggres-
sive waves and king tides linked to climate
change. The relocation, part of a project en-
titled Capacity Building for the Development
of Adaptation in Pacifc Island Countries, un-
derlines the increasingly drastic measures now
being undertaken to protect low-lying commu-
nities threatened by increased levels of man-
made emissions to the atmosphere.
20

In Kiribati, villagers also had to be moved away
from seaside. Early in 2009, forty families be-
gan relocating from the fooded Carterets Is-
land to the nearby Papua New Guinean island
of Bougainville. Their island home is expected
to be submerged by 2015.
21
But the most criti-
cal case to date is Tuvalu. Tuvalus 11,000 in-
habitants are confronted with regular fooding
and the island is expected to be uninhabitable
by 2050. Currently about 3,000 Tuvaluans have
migrated to Auckland, New Zealand, many of
whom prompted at least in part by concerns
about the environment.
22
The options being
considered by the Tuvalu government include
Box 2.2 - The Sinking of Tuvalu Seen by
Visual Artists
[] The frst time I heard of Tuvalu was
when I read about it in the newspaper. It
said the country was in danger of disap-
pearing beneath the waves due to the ef-
fect of climate change. That is why a few
years later I found myself on board a small
propeller plane on my way to the tiny air-
port on the capital island of Tuvalu, one
of the smallest and most remote countries
on earth. I went to this frontline of cli-
mate change, to get a real sense of the
impact on the nation. From an idealistic
point of view, but also as a visual artist.
With all the material I collected during my
stay I created a project called The Sinking
of Tuvalu. By the use of photography, flm,
text and illustration, I was able to bring
the story without using abstract numbers
or future scenarios, but by giving it a real
face. Tuvalu is symbolic for the rest of the
world; the Tuvaluans are destined to be-
come the frst complete nation of climate
refugees, banned from their home-islands,
their culture and identity taken away. I
wanted to capture the uniqueness of this
fragile nation before it is wiped from the
map. The project was launched as a single
exhibition in the city of The Hague in The
Netherlands. National newspapers got in-
terested in publishing the story and so did
national television. This resulted in more
exhibitions, magazine features and tel-
evision playtime on an international level,
which is still ongoing. So what I hoped for
before starting the project happened; to
raise awareness about what is happening
to our world is evidence that major parts
of our economic system are not in balance
with the environmental reality. This may
all be best expressed in the phrase Tatou
ne Tuvalu Katoa We are all Tuvaluans
which is often used in Tuvalu as an expres-
sion of national unity, calling on Tuvaluans
to pull together in the collective interests
of their tiny, isolated, and very vulnerable
country []
Source: Extract from a project of visual artist Ju-
riaan Booij.
34
buying land in Australia or New Zealand, buy-
ing an empty island, or moving to Niue or Kioa
(a Fijian island). However, Australia and New
Zealand are reluctant to accept a full reloca-
tion, while atoll inhabitants and decision-mak-
ers are reluctant to abandon their place of ori-
gin and are afraid of losing their culture. The
Pacifc Access Category (PAC) arrangement be-
tween New Zealand, Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, and
Tonga allows small numbers (75 residents from
Tuvalu and Kiribati, and 250 from Tonga and
Fiji) to migrate to New Zealand every year. At
this rate, however, it will take 100 years to
empty Tuvalu.
23
Kiribati and Tuvalu are cases in point. Inter-
island migration has been a customary method
of adapting to climate change. However, al-
though Pacifc islanders have learned to adapt
to their ever-changing environments over the
centuries, recent climatic shifts may exceed
the capacity of local resiliency.
24
For exam-
ple, Kiribati considered one of the ten most
vulnerable countries to climate change in the
world by the International Institute for Envi-
ronment and Development is experiencing a
sea rise that is leading to coastal erosion and a
gradual salinisation of potable water supplies
and agricultural land. Increased drinking wa-
ter scarcity, coral reef depletion and coastal
erosion on the outer islands are increasing mi-
gration towards the capital city. Drought in the
Gilbert Islands is also another push factor.
25
Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa
In Sub-Saharan African countries, it is esti-
mated that land degradation is causing a 3 per
cent annual loss in the contribution by agri-
culture to GDP.
26
By 2050, African countries
will have as much as 10 per cent less annual
rainfall in their interior regions, with serious
implications for their mainly rain-fed agricul-
ture systems. The 2007 IPCC report from the
Second Working Group estimates that yields
from rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 50
percent around the year 2020.
27
In March-April
2009, fooding killed 60 Angolans and affected
220,000 people, and 92 Namibians were killed
and 350,000 more were affected by fooding
during the same period.
28
There were 29 natu-
ral disasters in Africa during the frst half of
2009, killing a total of 309 people and affect-
ing another 794,467 persons. Water scarcity
problems in Africa could impact 75-250 million
people by 2020.
29

Heavy rainfall in south-eastern Africa in early
2008 again fooded the low-lying river areas
along the Zambezi River in central Mozam-
bique, and displaced as many as 80,000 people
the second such occurrence in two years.
This was in addition to the tens of thousands
already displaced from the foods and cyclones
in 2000, 2001 and 2007.
30
In Mozambique, about
14 million people (70 per cent of the popula-
tion) have been affected by drought over the
past half-century, mostly in the southern part
of the country. Fires affect about 39 per cent
of this countrys land area every year.
31
Fire is
used as a strategy to hunt small animals such
as the bush-rat. In the Sahel, land degradation
and drought have historically played a central
role in displacement, though drought-induced
migration is often only temporary.
The traditional movement in Western Africa
has followed seasonal patterns, with peo-
ple moving to coastal and urban agglomera-
tions, as well as to the coastal states, dur-
ing the dry season. However, as rainfall has
decreased but the fewer rains create fooding,
land degradation in the arid and semi-arid ar-
eas of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
has increased and resulted in rapid intra-coun-
try migration southward, with the consequent
swelling of large cities such as Dakar, Bamako,
Ouagadougou, Niamey and Kano. Estimates
for Burkina Faso suggest that close to half the
adult population born there moves to coastal
states such as Cte dIvoire and Ghana for at
least part of the year.
32
Economic downturns
such as the one faced now push people back to
the countryside, although the areas to which
people return to are often already degraded.
One example is the migration of residents
from the village of Farka to the village of Car
in the Tilabri region of Niger, because soil
degradation has made crop cultivation impos-
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sible in Farka. Though often temporary, envi-
ronmentally induced migration can evolve into
a constant onward movement if environmen-
tal changes make livelihoods unfeasible in the
area of origin.
Another region that is particularly affected by
man-made changes to the environment with
important implications for mobility is Cen-
tral Africa. This region is home to the second
largest humid tropical forest in the world, af-
ter the Amazon basin in Latin America. Its 200
million hectares span the Democratic Republic
of Congo, the Popular Republic of Congo, the
Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, and Cameroon.
The deforestation process has received a great
deal of attention, especially in Cameroon. In
the decade following the severe economic cri-
sis of 1986, the deforestation rate had doubled
in comparison to 1973-1986.
33
Macroeconomic
changes (decline in GDP, employment and
terms of trade) pressured rural migrants to
leave urban areas and return to their villages
of origin to work in agriculture, especially in
crop production. In fact, while cocoa and cof-
fee prices as well as production declined, the
demand for local foods like cassava increased
due to a reduction in food imports during the
crisis. This, combined with the permanence of
plantations (which for cultural reasons cannot
be cleared if inherited) has led to land clear-
ance instead of crop substitution on the same
land. The example of Cameroon highlights the
fact that small farmers and increased popu-
lations in rural areas contribute to deforesta-
tion, but the causes are also linked to macr-
oeconomic dynamics and hence policies.
Another important environment-migration link
in this region of Africa is found in coastal areas.
The loss and degradation of coastal habitats
and the modifcation of marine ecosystems
due to pollution from land-based urban and in-
dustrial sources (including oil and natural gas
development) as well as the from the overhar-
vesting of marine fsh stocks is expanding at
a rapid pace. Internal and regional migration
leading to population growth in coastal cit-
ies such as Douala in Cameroon and Libreville
in Gabon are having a growing impact on the
coastal environment.
Issues related to high population density are
exacerbated by the fooding of low-lying coast-
al areas. These provide livelihoods for millions
who are employed in both the artisanal and
industrial fshery industries. Industrialized
foreign feets are responsible for the overex-
ploitation of border-crossing migratory fsh,
to the detriment of artisanal fshermen and
especially the growing coastal communities
that depend on near-shore fshery resources
for food.
34
Furthermore, internal migration is
contributing to urbanization, which in Central
African Region stands at 41 per cent, the high-
est in Sub-Saharan Africa (compared to 39 per
cent elsewhere), with its consequent environ-
mental degradation. With an annual growth
rate of 4.1 per cent between 2005 and 2010,
the pace of urbanization is highest in the Cen-
tral African region, compared to 3.7 per cent
in Western Africa and 3.2 per cent in the other
Sub-Saharan countries.
35

Climate Change in the Caribbean
In the Caribbean, half the population lives
within 1.5 km of the shoreline, and major
infrastructure and economic activities are
located in coastal areas. Vulnerability to ty-
phoons and hurricanes is therefore very high.
In Grenada, Sandy Island on the west coast of
Carriacou has lost around 60 per cent of its
area, and small sand banks that existed for
hundreds of years between Carriacou and Pe-
tite Martinique have completely disappeared.
The economic impact of tourism in the Carib-
bean region is greater than in any other region
of the world. Tourism accounts for roughly 17
per cent of total Caribbean GDP, over 21 per
cent of all Caribbean capital formation, nearly
20 per cent of total regional exports, and ap-
proximately 16 per cent of total employment
(2.5 million jobs).
36
A decade ago, a rough es-
timate of the potential economic impact that
climate change could have on the CARICOM
nations was US$1.4 to 9.0 billion (in 1999 dol-
lars), assuming no shift in climate change con-
ditions.
37
36
The frequent disasters endured by the Carib-
bean region in recent years refect this vul-
nerability. During 1990-2006 a total of 163 dis-
asters affected about 18 million people, and
caused more than 8,500 deaths. The volcano
eruption of Montserrat in 1995, entailing the
virtual relocation of the entire population off
the island (and subsequent faltering return to
part of the island) was a tremendously signif-
cant event in the Caribbean context. The vol-
cano continues sporadic eruption (including in
2010).
38
The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti is raising
the toll to unprecedented levels; more than
300,000 people died and 3 million were af-
fected. Two weeks after the earthquake, one
half-million people were already internally
displaced and the number of those migrating
to the Dominican Republic is still unknown.
During the 2008 hurricane season, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic and Haiti were direct-
ly affected by at least seven major tropical
storms, which caused widespread devastation
and human suffering. In 2008, Hurricanes Fay,
Gustav, Hanna, and Ike affected more than a
million people in these three countries. Flood-
ing wiped out 70 per cent of crops in Haiti,
and dozens of children died from malnutrition
in the months following the storms. Extreme
poverty is the root cause of the relentless de-
struction of huge forested areas, leaving be-
hind treeless mountain slopes that thereupon
collapse during heavy rains.
39
By 2008, only 1.5
per cent of Haitis forests remained, and there
has been sustained and signifcant mobility of
Haitians across the border in search of live-
lihoods. Although deforestation is not mainly
attributable to climate change at this stage,
the direct and indirect effects of such change
will most likely accelerate it. This underlines
the need to adopt a more nuanced approach to
analysing the linkage between climate change
and mobility, and the multiple causes that un-
derlies the relationship.
40

4th key Challenge: integrate human
Mobility to National Development Policies
ACP countries Declarations and Plans that con-
tribute to freedom of mobility for the promo-
tion of socioeconomic and political develop-
ment are not lacking. The Declaration and Plan
of Action of the African Union Special Ouaga-
dougou Summit on Employment and Poverty
Alleviation; the Ouagadougou Action Plan to
Combat Traffcking in Human Beings, Especially
Women and Children; the African Union Com-
mon Position on Migration; the ACP Ministries
of Migration and Asylum Brussels Declaration
and Plan of Action; and the ACP Groups Brus-
sels Resolution on Migration and Development
point clearly to the ACP countries strong com-
mitment to integrating migration issues to de-
velopment. However, translating analysis and
proposals into policy and actual commitments
remains a limited option for countries whose
budgets are already stretched.
Coherent and informed migration and de-
velopment policies require solid data col-
lection practices, on the one hand, and
substantial political will and commitment
from all governmental stakeholders, on the
other. institutional coordinating mechanisms
are indispensable for policy coherence, along
with appropriate measures to support capacity
building, eliminate institutional bottlenecks
and evaluate the results of policy coherence
efforts.
If we look at how migration is integrated to
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and
followed up on in their Progress Reports, we
The ACP Secretariats response to this key
policy challenge is the establishment of an
Intra-ACP Migration Facility aimed at build-
ing capacities at the institutional and human
resource level, in order to better integrate
mobility to development plans and policies.
In the majority of countries, national devel-
opment strategies take account of both inter-
nal and international mobility as a develop-
ment factor.
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fnd signifcant policy coherence in ACP coun-
tries. In the ACP countries for which those
strategic documents are available (39 of 79
countries), the following common features
emerge:
In most countries, national development
strategies take into account both internal and
international mobility as a factor in develop-
ment. Internal migration is often considered
an issue that has positive dimensions (increas-
ing productivity in the service sector propelled
by rural migration), but also some negative
aspects (increased pressures on water and
sanitation systems, land, and housing in urban
areas). Certain measures have been devised
and budgeted, depending upon each specifc
context accordingly. International migration is
also analysed in terms of positive (remittanc-
es, social capital formation, enterprise crea-
tion, macroeconomic stability) and negative
(dependency, brain-drain) dimensions.
In countries with signifcant diasporas, spe-
cifc analyses and measures are contained in
the PRSPs (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cte
dIvoire, Dominica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Li-
beria, Rwanda, Senegal, Timor-Leste, etc). In
the case of Cape Verde, diaspora groups were
also invited to participate in the preparation
of the PRSP.
Measures to promote the export of labour are
not well developed in the PRSPs. In a few cas-
es where migration is mainly regional and less
intercontinental, labour export is considered
as a complementary and transitional strategy
for achieving endogenous and less dependent
development processes (Burkina Faso govern-
ments development strategy is a good exam-
ple in this direction).
In countries recently affected by conficts or
environmental issues, PRSPs focus on the man-
agement of refugees and internally displaced
people. Measures providing social protection
to vulnerable groups are integrated into devel-
opment strategies and are budgeted (Burundi,
Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Republic
of Congo, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Timor-Leste,
and Zambia).
Environmental issues and risks are also ana-
lysed in terms of mobility. Migration represents
both a threat to fragile ecosystems and is also
a consequence of environmental degradation
(Cape Verde and Comoros). Changing environ-
ments and traditional practices are also exam-
ined in relation to mobility and social impact
in the documents from Chad and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo.
Economic restructuring is analysed in terms of
its effects on human mobility. The reorganisa-
tion of the mining sector in Zambia is a good
example of internal movement associated
with changing sector dynamics. In some re-
cent PRSP Progress Reports, restructuring due
to the global fnancial, food and fuel crises is
analysed also in terms of impact on migrant
employment, remittances, and so on (Haiti,
Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica and Ghana).
In most papers, health concerns are also ana-
lysed with respect to HIV/AIDS in relation to
migration dynamics, especially regionally and
in cross-border areas. Otherwise, the main
concern in regard to the health sector is the
so-called brain drain of health professionals
(Cte dIvoire, Cameroon, Comoros, Domini-
ca, Haiti, Nigeria and Zambia), and measures
designed to retain health workers, mainly by
making the sector more attractive.
Demographic issues, especially the growing
youth population, are addressed in terms of
employment and migration. These are consid-
ered to be some of the thorniest challenges (as
in the Mali strategy). Measures are designed
to improve employment opportunities at home
and inform youth regarding risks associated
with international migration (specifcally the
case of Senegal).
The characteristics of national policies aimed
at integrating mobility into development,
or using mobility as a national development
strategy, depend largely on the political his-
tory and labour migration of each individual
country. For example, small island states in the
Pacifc region suffer from a shortage of skilled
labour and increasing urban migration, which
has induced the majority of Pacifc countries
to emphasise human resource development in
38
their development strategies, in order to sat-
isfy needs at home while exporting labour.
The ACP Secretariats response to this key
policy challenge is the establishment of an
Intra-ACP Migration Facility aimed at build-
ing capacities at the institutional and human
resource level, in order to better integrate
mobility into development plans and policies.
This is an area where policy and institutional
coherence are extremely important at both
the ACP country level and among the donor
community.
5th key Challenge:
Assure Social Inclusion, Respect and
Protection of Migrants in ACP Countries
This ffth key policy challenge is probably the
most complex, because it requires a radical
shift in the way migration and mobility are
perceived by public opinion and policy makers
in ACP countries. ACP governments often in-
sist upon stronger protection for their migrant
workers when they reach their destinations in
wealthier countries. This has been a central
topic at the Global Forums on Migration and
Development in Athens and Manila. However,
these criticisms often lack coherence when
considering the way in which migrant labour-
ers are treated when migrating from one ACP
country to another. And even while it is true
that social protection policies are already
stretched thin and under-resourced in most
ACP countries, this does not imply that protec-
tion, respect and social inclusion of migrants
should not be sought.
Exploring Horizontal Inequalities in
destination countries
With this ffth key policy challenge, we intro-
duce another important element that is cen-
tral to the principles of human development,
namely the need to address horizontal ine-
qualities in migrant destination countries.
Horizontal inequalities are inequalities be-
tween culturally defned groups, e.g. ethnic,
religious, racial or caste-based groups.
41
These
kinds of inequalities encompass not only in-
come levels, but also broader economic, social
and political dimensions. For example, eco-
nomic inequalities include differences in asset
ownership, employment and other economic
opportunities, which are the main causes for
inequalities in incomes. Social horizontal in-
equalities include unequal access to services,
such as education, health and housing, which
in turn produces inequalities in health and ed-
ucational outcomes. Horizontal inequalities in
the political sphere are inequalities concern-
ing political opportunities, participation and
power, such as control over the main govern-
ing bodies of a country such as the presidency,
the cabinet, the army, the police, and regional
and local governments.
42
Analyses of horizontal inequalities indicate
that unequal access to political / economic
/ social resources by different cultural groups
can reduce the welfare of individuals in the
losing groups over and above what their in-
dividual position would merit, because their
self-esteem is bound up with the progress of
the group.
43
Therefore, even if migration can
offer people and groups opportunities to im-
prove their situation in principle, the fnan-
cial, language and structural constraints to
migration as well as limits to social inclusion in
the destination country/area often curtail this
possibility in practice. Whether internal or in-
ternational, the migration process creates a
new set of unequal relations in the destination
areas unless relevant policies are formulated
and implemented.
Migrants often arrive in urban areas that have
only limited capacity to incorporate the ad-
ditional labour supply, resulting in higher un-
employment and poverty rates among migrant
groups. Even when they arrive in areas where
there is employment, migrants are often rel-
egated to wage labour and denied access to
land, assets and credit that would otherwise
Xenophobia presents a very diffcult chal-
lenge to policy makers and civil society. It
represents an insurmountable structural
barrier that undermines the relationship
between migration and development.
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help them improve their socio-economic con-
ditions. Therefore, although migration can
improve the socio-economic conditions of mi-
grants relative to their situation in the home
country, the development of vast slums and
shantytowns in many ACP countries, where mi-
grants often live in appalling conditions, indi-
cates that migration results in important hori-
zontal inequalities and that this can lead to
situations of confict and tension.
44
Horizontal
inequalities are therefore undesirable because
they trap people of certain ethnicities or races
in relative poverty and powerlessness, and be-
cause they threaten political stability, since
cultural differences provide a powerful poten-
tial political mobilization mechanism.
45
Xenophobic Attitudes are widespread
in ACP countries
Stories of past and recent xenophobic reac-
tions abound in the ACP countries. Recent news
about the deportation of Guyanese migrants
from Barbados, the attacks on Zimbabwean
migrants in South Africa, the raids against Hai-
tians in the Dominican Republic, as well as past
experiences such as the expulsion of 800,000
Ghanaians from Nigeria in the 1980s, the ex-
pulsion of Ghanaians, Burkinabe and Malians
from Cte dIvoire, of Eritreans from Ethiopia
and Ethiopians from Eritrea, the expulsion of
West Africans from Zambia and Angola, the
massive rights violations against Sierra Leo-
nean refugees in Guinea, including expulsions,
the deportation from Angola of more than a
quarter million foreign citizens involved in ar-
tisanal diamond mining, and the deportation
of thousands of Mahamid Arabs who had fed
insecurity in Chad during the 1980s from Ni-
ger these are all clear examples of deeply-
rooted negative attitudes held by the people
and governments of ACP countries toward the
migrants from other ACP countries.
Xenophobia presents a very diffcult challenge
to policy makers and civil society. It represents
an insurmountable structural barrier that un-
dermines the relationship between migration
and development. Xenophobia towards mi-
grants and refugees directly contributes to
the vulnerability and exploitation of these
groups, leading to marked inequalities in the
long-term between migrant and non-migrant
populations. In a broader sense, xenophobia
undermines the principles of human equality,
social justice, and social cohesion.
46

Xenophobia reinforces horizontal inequali-
ties and therefore is a key challenge to ad-
dressing the issues of social cohesion and
protection of migrant workers. Limited
budgets for social protection policies and wel-
fare schemes, labour markets unable to absorb
new arrivals and urban areas with precarious
availability of basic services for newly arrived
families are features common to almost all
ACP countries. This, of course, does not justify
the use of nationalistic discourses to mobilize
people against foreigners. However, it demon-
strates that the challenge is much greater than
simply solving a single problem, and it calls
for a broader understanding of social justice.
Elimination of horizontal inequalities between
culturally and ethnically different groups can
lead to improved social cohesion, and there-
fore reduced social tensions. Policies enhanc-
ing the linkage between migration and devel-
opment also need to address this key policy
challenge. Often, bridging cultural diversities
and emphasising the contribution of migrants
to local economies and societies by changing
peoples perceptions is an important starting
point that needs to be explored by the govern-
ments and civil societies of ACP nations, be-
fore any major reform of migration laws and
welfare systems can be implemented.
Notes
1 - South-South migration is simply migration between
developing countries. Throughout the Report South
indicates the Global South and is a synonymous of
developing countries, whereas North indicates the
Global North and is synonymous of industrialised coun-
tries. For an-depth discussion on this see Bakewell
(2009).
2 - Recent research results of the NOMRA are pub-
lished in Adepoju Aderanti (2009) International Migra-
tion within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World,
40
Sub-Saharan Publishers: Ghana.
3 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-
ment during the peer review process.
4 - Irena Omelaniuk (undated)
5 - Martin Philip (2003) in Pcoud Antoine and Paul
de Guchteneire (2005). The 25 richest countries spend
25-30 billion dollars per year on the enforcement of
immigration laws. These costs stem not only from con-
trolling the borders, but also the issuance of visas and
residence permits, as well as the prosecution, deten-
tion and removal of undocumented migrants, labour
inspections and the implementation of sanctions on
employers, the treatment of asylum-seekers claims,
the resettlement of refugees, and the search for un-
documented migrants.
6 - This paragraph was provided by Steven Mac Andrew
at the CSME during the peer review process.
7 - In Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica and Suriname the
Skills Certifcates are issued by the Ministry of Labour.
Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago
have Ministries for Caribbean Community Affairs which
issue such Certifcates. Meanwhile, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines issue the Certifcates through their Minis-
tries of Immigration.
8 - IOM has suggested a broader working defnition of
environmental migrants as persons or groups of per-
sons who for compelling reasons of sudden or progres-
sive changes in the environment that adversely affect
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave
their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either tem-
porarily or permanently, and who move either within
their country or abroad. McKinley Brunson (2008)
9 - UN University Institute for Environment and Hu-
man Security (2005)
10 - International Symposium on Stabilization of
Greenhouse Gas Concentrations Avoiding Dangerous
Climate Change, Exeter, United Kingdom, on 1-3 Feb-
ruary 2005.
11 - Myers N. (2005)
12 - Christian Aid (2007)
13 - Boano Camillo, Roger Zetter, Tim Morris (2008)
14 - Brown O. (2008)
15 - Boano Camillo, et al. (2008) pp. 12-13.
16 - Brown O. (2008) p. 9.
17 - Gemenne Franois (2006)
18 - Ibidem
19 - Ibidem
20 - Press Release of the 11th Conference of the Parties
to the United Nations Climate Convention in Montreal,
Canada. http://www.grida.no/news/press/1533.aspx
visited on 24 January 2010.
21 - http://www.treehugger.com/fles/2008/11/
worlds-frst-climate-change-refugees-to-be-rescued-
in-2009.php, visited on 24 January 2010.
22 - Warner K., C. Ehrhart, A. de Sherbinin, S. Adamo,
and Tricia Chai-Onn (2009) p. 18.
23 - Locke J.T. (2009) p. 174.
24 - Ibidem
25 - ADB (2009)
26 - Grote Ulrike and Koko Warner (undated)
27 - IPCC (2007) p. 10.
28 - CRED CRUNCH (2009)
29 - IPCC (2007)
30 - Stal Marc (2009) p.3.
31 - United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
(2007)
32 - Warner et al (2009)
33 - Sunderlin W. D., J. Pokam (2002)
34 - UNEP (2006) p. 167.
35 - UNFPA (2007)
36 - Haites Erik (2002) p. 16.
37 - Haites Erik (2002) p. 43.
38 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-
ment during the peer review process.
39 - Alscher Stefan (2009)
40 - Boano Camillo, et al. (2008)
41 - Brown Graham and Frances Stewart (2006)
42 - Ibidem
43 - Stewart Frances (2001) p.3.
44 - Stewart Frances and Arnim Langer (2007)
45 - Ibidem
46 - Crush Jonathan and Sujata Ramachandran (2009)
p.3.
Mobility in the ACP countries is linked to weak domestic labour markets,
seasonal work, adaptation to climate change and conficts. Proximity
plays an important role given the relative high cost of international
migration for many ACP nationals. Fences and walls have not been
successful in stemming the fow of migrants searching for better
opportunities abroad. Rather, they have increased the cost of migration
and the vulnerability of people. This chapter provides an answer to the
question of how many people move in the ACP regions and whereto.
mOBiLiTy TrENdS ANd
pATTErNS iN ACp COuNTriES
ChApTEr 3
Andrea gallina
42
mOBiLiTy TrENdS ANd pATTErNS iN
ACp COuNTriES
ChApTEr 3
43
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S Mobility in the ACP countries is linked to weak domestic labour markets, seasonal
work, adaptation to climate change and conficts. Proximity plays an important
role given the relative high cost of international migration for many ACP nation-
als. Fences and walls have not been successful in stemming the fow of migrants
searching for better opportunities abroad. Rather, they have increased the cost
of migration and the vulnerability of people. This chapter provides an answer to
the question of how many people move in the ACP regions and whereto.
An introduction to mobility in the
ACP Group of States
Depending on the sources of the statistics
used, there are about 18.6 to 23 million ACP
international migrants, equivalent to approxi-
mately 2.2 per cent 2.9 per cent of the total
ACP population.
1
This fgure is very close to
the world estimated average of 3.1 per cent,
meaning that the proportion of migrants in the
ACP is similar to that of the global migration
phenomenon (see Graph 3.1).
However, when comparing the number of ACP
migrants to the global number of migrants,
only about 1 in 10 of world migrants comes
from an ACP country, despite the fact that ACP
population accounts for about 12.7 per cent of
world population.
ACP statistics on female migration suffer from
the same problems as the statistics previously
analysed on migrant stocks. The main differ-
ence is that the UNDESA database provides dis-
aggregated data on female migration, whereas
the Sussex University DRC database does not.
That said, the latter provides more realistic
fgures on migrant stocks than UNDESA.
Globally, women in the year 2000 represented
49 per cent of all migrants.
2
The difference
between men and women was quite similar al-
ready in 1960 (47 per cent women to 53 per
cent men), but despite this situation migra-
tion researchers and policy makers have only
About one in ten of world migrants come
from an ACP country. This is probably due to
the lack of resources to undertake a migra-
tion project: an ACP national is 7 times
poorer than an average world citizen.
graph 3.1 - world and ACp migrant population
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR2009
Dataset and DRC-Sussex Dataset.
44
recently focused their attention on women.
The UNDESA database indicates a female ACP
migrant population of 8,047,907 persons, or
43 per cent of the total, but it enormously un-
derestimates the migrant population from the
Caribbean. If we apply the percentage fgures
of the UNDESA database to the Sussex Univer-
sity DRC migrant stock database, we can esti-
mate an ACP female migrant stock population
of 10.8 million, which means a more realistic
share of 47 per cent of the total 23.2 million
ACP migrants (see Graph 3.2).
A nuanced regional analysis shows that female
migration is stronger in Eastern, Central and
Western Africa and weaker in the Caribbean,
Pacifc and Southern Africa (see Graph 3.3).
Why do people in ACP countries move less
than people from other continents, regions
and countries? The answer is that poverty
limits mobility. Therefore ACP nationals move
less than the average world citizen.
This is most likely due to a lack of resources
with which to undertake a costly international
migration project. Indeed, when measuring
wealth as GDP per capita, an ACP national is
seven times poorer than the average world
citizen. This has implications for the distances
that can be travelled (see Graph 3.4).
The relation between wealth (in terms of GDP
per capita in current 2007 US$) and migration
is also refected at the ACP sub-regional level
3

(see Graph 3.5).
Graph 3.2 - Female Migrants (about 2000) graph 3.4 - world and ACp gdp per capita
Graph 3.3 - Female Migrants as Share of Total
in ACP Regions and Sub-Regions
Graph 3.5 - International Migrants as
percentage of the population and gdp per
capita Current uS$
Source: own elaboration on UNDESA and
Sussex DRC 2007 Datasets.
Source: own estimate based on Sussex Datasets 2007.
Source: own elaboration World Bank 2009a.
Source: own elaboration World Bank 2009a for GDP,
Sussex DRC Migration Dataset for migrant stocks and
WDI, 2003 for the population.
45
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The Caribbean region has a higher GDP per
capita and therefore a relatively higher pro-
portion of residents abroad, at 13.8 per cent
of its total population. The ACP Pacifc region
has a lower GDP per capita and thus a smaller
share of people living abroad (5.1 per cent).
Still, this is higher than the ACP African sub-
regions, which have the lowest GDP per capita
and only 2.4 per cent of their populations re-
siding abroad.
The four African regions include 48 countries
and 800 million people, with a diaspora of
some 17.5 million. This is equivalent to the
combined diaspora of two countries such as
Mexico and Bangladesh, which have less than
a third of the ACP population, or to the di-
aspora of just seven European countries taken
together (Italy, Germany, France, UK, Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain).
Migration is less prevalent in countries with
a low Human Development Index. The differ-
ent rates of migration (measured in terms of
the percentage of people abroad in relation to
the total population) are not only associated
with GDP per capita but also the values shown
in the Human Development Index (HDI). Peo-
ple in low HDI countries are less mobile.
4

This can be seen clearly in the cases of Af-
rican countries with medium HDIs such as
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cape Verde, the
Seychelles and Mauritius, which have a signif-
cant share of their populations living abroad.
The highest migration rates are found among
map 3.1 - Feminization of migration in Africa
Angola
8enln
8oLswana
8urklna
laso
8urundl
Cameroon
Cape
verde
CenLral Afrlcan
8epubllc
Chad
Comoros
u[lbouLl
LquaLorlal
Culnea
LrlLrea
LLhlopla
Cabon
1he Cambla
Chana
Culnea
Culnea-8lssau
kenya
LesoLho
Llberla
Madagascar
Malawl
Mall
MaurlLanla
Mozamblque
namlbla
nlger
nlgerla
8wanda
So 1ome
and rlnclpe
Senegal
Slerra Leone
Somalla
SouLh
Afrlca
Sudan
Swazlland
1anzanla
1ogo
uganda
Zambla
Zlmbabwe
u8 Congo
Congo
CLe
d'lvolre
lemlnlzaLlon of mlgraLlon ln Afrlca
less Lhan 30 of lnLernaLlonal mlgranLs are women
MaurlLlus
Seychelles
Mu eluboruLed for Lhe ACP SecreLurluL by Andreu Culllnu zoo
more Lhan 30 of lnLernaLlonal mlgranLs are women
46
8ellze
Cubu
1he 8uhumus
HulLl
Lomlnlcun Reubllc
Cuyunu
1umulcu
Surlnume
1rlnldud und 1obugo
8urbudos SL. vlncenL und Lhe Crenudlnes
Crenudu
SL. Luclu
Lomlnlcu Lomlnlcu
SL. KlLLs und Nevls
AnLlguu und 8urbudu AnLlguu und 8urbudu
Mu eluboruLed for Lhe ACP SecreLurluL by Andreu Culllnu zoo
lemlnlzaLlon of mlgraLlon ln Lhe Carlbbean
less Lhan 30 of lnLernaLlonal mlgranLs are women
more Lhan 30 of lnLernaLlonal mlgranLs are women
East Timor
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Fiji Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Samoa
Palau
Niue
Nauru
Kiribati
Cook Islands
Marshall Islands
On|y the main is|ands of the ato||s are represented .
The size and position of the Pacific Is|ands on this map do not correspond to the actua| ones.
The map has on|y descriptive purposes. This does not imp|y any assumptions regarding po|itica|
or other affi|iations of countries or territories by the ACP 5ecretariat.
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mu eluboruLed for Lhe ACP SecreLurluL by Andreu Culllnu zoo
lemlnlzaLlon of mlgraLlon ln Lhe aclflc
less Lhan 30 of lnLernaLlonal mlgranLs are women
more Lhan 30 of lnLernaLlonal mlgranLs are women
map 3.2 - Feminization of migration in the Caribbean
Map 3.3 - Feminization of Migration in the Pacifc
47
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countries in the Caribbean and Pacifc, where
HDI values are also higher.
In the ACP countries higher levels of mobility
contribute to higher levels of human devel-
opment and income. There is a vast body of
literature on the relationship between migra-
tion and economic development. In essence,
there is consensus on the following: a) a non-
linear inverted U relationship exists between
migration and development the so-called
migration hump meaning that citizens of
countries with low levels of income and human
development tend to migrate less until they
reach a certain level of income, whereupon mi-
gration frst increases, then declines when the
gap between the sending and receiving coun-
try narrows. Therefore at low levels of income,
development seems to foster migration. b) The
resources that individuals accumulate during
the migration process and that are sent back
home have mainly positive impacts on the hu-
man development of families and communities
left behind, especially on groups often mar-
ginalised from development processes (such as
girls). c) There are few studies on bilateral mi-
gration corridors among developing countries
which attempt to show the impact of migration
on the income and development of both the
receiving and sending countries. d) The devel-
opment of a country cannot be explained only
by emigration; rather, there is a set of driv-
ers, among which institutions play the most
important role. The impact of emigration on
enhanced opportunities and the welfare of in-
dividuals and families is more evident.
5

In ACP countries mobility increases the oppor-
tunity for individuals to mobilise resources,
whether these be remittances, information,
contacts, skills, technologies, norms and val-
ues that can exert a positive impact on human
development in both migrant sending and re-
ceiving countries. Yet these effects vary large-
ly, depending on the sources and destinations
of mobility. In the case of the Caribbean and
the Pacifc countries, proximity to the United
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
has strengthened the creation of migration
corridors with high income countries, which
graph 3.6 - hdi and population Abroad in ACp
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR2009 Dataset.
48
implies better opportunities for remittances,
further education and training. In these two
regions, the long-standing existence of legal
migration channels has also helped migrants
to maintain ties with the homeland. This has a
signifcant impact on the creation of migrant
networks, hometown associations, and the for-
mation of engaged diasporas. The situation of
Sub-Saharan African countries is much bleaker.
Because of their limited resources, migrants
from countries in the four Sub-Saharan African
sub-regions cannot afford long-distance mi-
gration. Thus they tend to migrate to nearby
countries with better but still very low income
and HDI. According to Ratha and Shaw (2007),
over 80 per cent of the South-South migration
for which there is statistical evidence takes
place between countries that share a common
border, compared to 20 per cent for South-
North migration.
6

Migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries
thus fnd themselves in a mobility trap: on
the one hand, if and when they cross borders,
they end up seeking opportunities in countries
with relatively little to offer; on the other, by
showing remarkably lower levels of emigration
and remittances infows, they are less likely
to succeed in attracting funds and developing
policies which link migration to development.
However, behind the regional aggregate sta-
tistics there are important country-specifc
situations which need to be addressed in order
to get ACP countries out of the mobility trap
and increase the potential between migration
and human development across ACP regions.
Regardless of how robust the causality nexus is
between migration and development at coun-
try level, mobility is analysed here in terms of
the expanded opportunities it offers individu-
als to carry out their life plans.
About Numbers and Directions:
A Methodological Clarifcation Is
Needed from the Outset
There are two important sources of statistics
on ACP migrant stocks, defned as people
residing in a country different from that of
birth: the frst is the United Nations Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Analysis Popula-
tion Division which has collected data based
on the year 2000 round of censuses taken in
countries of destination. This dataset is peri-
odically revised and here we have taken the
latest 2008 Revision; the second is the Glo-
bal Migrant Origin database at the Sussex Uni-
versity Development Research Centre (Sussex
DRC), which created a matrix of 226x226 coun-
tries and territories based on data from the
national censuses conducted during the year
2000 round of censuses (between 1995-2004)
in nearly all countries and with revisions based
on estimates and new information available.
7

The Sussex DRC is a complete dataset on origin
and destination countries. It thus provides a
very powerful tool for the analysis of intra-
regional and bilateral movements.
8
We have
used the Sussex DRC dataset to create a 79x79
bilateral migrant stocks matrix for ACP coun-
Table 3.1 - ACP Emigration: Comparing UN and DRC-Sussex Datasets on Migrant Stocks
Source: own elaboration on Datasets UNDESA 2009, Sussex DRC Dataset,
and own estimation using WDI 2004 population data.
49
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tries and have compared it to the UN dataset
in order to highlight differences and similari-
ties, as well as analyse intra-ACP migration.
At the aggregate level, there are only minimal
differences between the two datasets for Af-
rica, whereas in the case of the Pacifc and the
Caribbean some signifcant discrepancies can
be noted (see Table 3.1). At the sub-regional
level within Sub-Saharan Africa there are im-
portant dissimilarities between the two da-
tasets for Southern Africa and Central Middle
Africa. For example, the Sussex DRC dataset
underestimates data on migrants from South
Africa, Namibia and Botswana, whereas the
UNDESA dataset presents relative to the Sus-
sex DRC dataset lower estimates in the Cen-
tral / Middle Africa sub-region, especially for
Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and An-
gola. Then, we constructed a 79x226 table to
identify the direction of migration originating
from the 79 ACP countries toward the rest of
the world, which serves to highlight mobility
patterns for each of the six ACP sub-regions.
Despite the shortcomings of these sources
(they are based on estimates, and show stocks
that refect the cumulative number of migrants
and are therefore higher than annual fows),
the Sussex DRC datasets has the advantage
of providing both the source of migrants and
destination by country, which is central to the
type of analysis undertaken in this Report.
In the following sections the main features of
the mobility systems of each of the ACP re-
gions are analysed. These include the four Af-
rican sub-regions (Western, Central/Middle,
Eastern and Southern), the Caribbean and the
Pacifc. The analysis is divided in immigration
and emigration trends and patterns in each of
the regions and sub-regions. A section is dedi-
cated to South-North migration fows, which
among ACP countries are numerically relevant
for the Caribbean and the Pacifc, but less so
for most of the Sub-Saharan African countries.
Finally, even though it represents an important
feature of mobility patterns in ACP countries,
and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, internal
migration is not analysed in the Report as part
of a separate section because the limited data
available, although reference is made to its
implications for the development processes in
each of the relevant part of the Report.
Immigration into ACP Countries
Analyses of immigration trends in ACP countries
do not abound and little is known about the
conditions, measures and policy interventions
affecting immigrants. In particular, it is worth
mentioning that among the studies available
and reviewed in preparing this report, there
is a great deal of analysis demonstrating the
negative impacts of migration on local welfare
and employment, while there is a dearth of
empirical analysis on the positive dimensions
of immigration on local economies.
9

Regional Dynamics: Immigration in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Immigration in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is
largely under-researched and goes unad-
dressed by policy makers. Despite the long his-
tory and traditions of mobility, and important
recent trends, immigration in Sub-Saharan
countries is under-studied,
10
except perhaps in
the Southern Africa sub-region, where a rea-
sonable amount of research has been carried
out recently.
In SSA mobility is linked to historical patterns of
human movement, only partly modifed by the
artifcial construction of national boundaries.
Contemporary emigration and immigration are
common phenomena in most countries of the
continent, infuenced by the boom and boost
of economic activities, environmental change
and political turmoil.
Faced with the dilemma of diffcult border
management and the need to have fexible
manpower to work in the plantations, mines
and oil felds, many Sub-Saharan countries have
historically adopted a laissez-faire approach to
migration. In recent times, however, pressure
from Northern countries to improve migration
management and return undocumented mi-
grants has provided the political capital to ne-
gotiate migration quotas with the North.
As a result, measures to restrict immigration
are being introduced in many African countries
50
in exchange for immigration quotas for their
own nationals to Northern countries. Not sur-
prisingly, in 2005 UNDESA reported that only 9
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Rwanda, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia,
South Africa, Liberia and Togo) had a policy for
the integration of non-citizens,
11
despite the
fact that immigrants in some countries rep-
resent an important share of the population.
Others countries, such as in Cte dIvoire, Ni-
geria and Liberia, have in place policies that
discriminate against non-nationals in private
sector employment.
12
Similar to the approach
taken by wealthier Northern countries, the
Sub-Saharan African governments approach to
migration and development is therefore tinted
by strong national interests, often masked be-
hind a layer of imprecise information.
However, despite the presence of external
infuence in managing migration and control-
ling undocumented transit fows, the impor-
tance of mobility for development among
both skilled and unskilled migrants is widely
acknowledged by many countries regional
economic communities and is in fact clearly
stated in the African Union Executive Council
Declaration of 2006.
13

Regional communities such as the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
14

and the Eastern African Community (EAC)
15

have implemented regional free mobility
measures for passport holders. Other regional
economic communities such as the Southern
African Development Community (SADC),
16
the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Af-
rica (COMESA),
17
the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS)
18
or the Com-
munity of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
19

have signed free regional mobility protocols,
thus indicating a promising way forward, al-
though these will be enforceable only once
ratifed by member states.
This diffculty in addressing the relationship
between mobility and human development in
Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be neglected, espe-
cially in contexts in which budgets are stretched
and development priorities overlap. Still, the
issue needs to be addressed by indicating the
ways in which governments can turn the nega-
tive aspects linked to mobility into develop-
ment opportunities. A frst step could be done
by revamping and consolidating the myriads of
regional economic communities as viable focal
points of south-south migration. The formula-
tion and implementation of the free mobility
protocols face several hurdles, and political
leaders often pay lip service to these and other
bilateral, multilateral and non-binding agree-
ments. ACP governments and international or-
ganisations should consider creating the neces-
sary incentives for making the protocols more
attractive and effcient.
20
Furthermore, the complexity in unpacking the
mobility issue in SSA is exacerbated by the fact
Table 3.2 - Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees (Refugees
and IDPs), Stateless Persons, and Others of Concern to UNHCR by Country/Territory
of Asylum, end-2008 (Table Established: 10 June 2009)
51
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that immigration seems to bring another layer
of complexity to already existing ethnic con-
ficts, sectarianism and struggles for political
power, rather than being treated as an auton-
omous policy issue related to social cohesion,
integration and multiculturalism.
In Africa, intra-regional fows affect all coun-
tries, some as exclusively destination countries
and others as countries of both origin and desti-
nation. Particularly attractive are Cte dIvoire,
Nigeria and now Senegal in West Africa; Gabon
and Cameroon in Central Africa; and South Af-
rica and Botswana in Southern Africa.
21
Forced migration represents a particularly
important policy challenge for Sub-Saharan
African countries with signifcant develop-
ment implications. SSA governments also face
important challenges stemming from forced
migration. The four African sub-regions ac-
count for 99.74 per cent of refugees and in-
ternally displaced people (IDPs) in the ACP
countries, which in absolute terms amount to
more than 10 million people. Two sub-regions,
Eastern and Central Africa, host about 87 per
cent of forced migrants from ACP countries
(63 per cent in Eastern Africa and 25 per cent
in Central Africa); for their part, Southern Af-
rican countries are home to over 11 per cent
of ACP country refugees (see Table 3.2).
Thus already poor SSA countries are facing sig-
nifcant refugee problems and are in need of
additional tools with which to deal with immi-
gration that go beyond labour market integra-
tion policies. Issues of protection, especially
for women, as well as livelihoods programs
are among the areas to be further explored
as a means by which to re-create the condi-
tions needed for people to fnd opportunities
within the camps, including the provision of
proper identity and travel documentation to
refugees. Refugees who are close to urban set-
tlements often move out of the camps with-
out permission and by doing so become illegal
migrants, making them more vulnerable to
policy abuse and exploitation from landlords
and employers.
22

Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of sys-
tematic analysis of the livelihood and socio-
economic dynamics of refugees and IDPs camps
and settlements, which is of serious concern for
the migration and development policy frame-
work.
23
The work of international relief agen-
cies in supporting livelihoods in the refugees
and IDP camps could beneft from an increased
focus on impact evaluation analyses.
Sub-Regional Dynamics:
Immigration in Western Africa
In contemporary Western Africa there is a
dynamic circular mobility system based on
seasonality and favoured by the presence of
agreements that facilitate free movement, al-
though regional and national regulations are
not always synchronized.
This mobility system is the result of both pre-
colonial seasonal migration, and the introduc-
tion of cash crops during colonial times, which
set the stage for important movements from
landlocked countries to coastal area planta-
tions and urban centres.
24
Due to the high de-
gree of uncertainty surrounding statistics on in-
tra-regional migration in this region,
25
we have
elaborated on the data found in the DRC Sussex
database (2007), which refects the movement
of approximately 5.6 million migrants from one
Western African country to another.
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the two main
host countries were Cte dIvoire and Nigeria.
The economic downturn of the two subsequent
decades, as well as armed confict in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, have led to a reshaping of
the regional mobility system. Today, Senegal
and Mali also host a signifcant numbers of
refugees.
26
The countries with the highest per-
centage of foreign population are the Gambia
(15.2 per cent), Cte dIvoire (12.3 per cent),
Ghana (7.6 per cent), Burkina Faso (5.6 per
cent) and (4.4 per cent) (see Map 3.4).
In Cte dIvoire migrants are mainly from
neighbouring countries and in particular Burki-
na Faso, Ghana and Mali. Even after the po-
litical turmoil of the late 1990s, characterised
among other things by strong xenophobic cam-
paigns, there are about 1 million people from
Burkina Faso, 437,000 Malians and a 330,000
52
Ghanaians living in Cte dIvoire.
27

In terms of mobility and development chal-
lenges in the mobility corridor between Cte
dIvoire and Burkina Faso, three aspects need
to be underlined: frst, following the expulsion
of adult Burkinabe from Cte dIvoire (over
a million were forced to return to Burkina
Faso),
28
the number of very young migrants has
increased, in part as a measure by which Ivo-
rian entrepreneurs can reduce labour cost;
29

second, the return of migrants to villages of
origin and other settlements has led to popula-
tion growth in rural areas;
30
and third, increas-
ing deforestation in the south-western part of
Cte dIvoire (due to both international migra-
tion and internal migration of Ivoirians from
North to South) are posing signifcant chal-
lenges to human development in both coun-
tries. This situation needs to be addressed,
31

as these three contemporary aspects of mo-
bility between Burkina Faso and Cte dIvoire
demand urgent measures. Especially the issue
of youth migration in this sub-regional mobility
system has been sorely neglected. For exam-
ple, the recent academic literature on youth
migration has rightly emphasised that youth
migration between Sub-Saharan Africa coun-
tries is a rite of passage from childhood to
adulthood, intertwined with a set of complex
inter-generational relationships and value sys-
tems.
32
From a policy perspective this is im-
portant, since it implies that the defnition of
youth traffcking, which is a quite widespread
phenomenon in Western Africa, should be used
map 3.4 - Sub-Saharan Africa
Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina
Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape
Verde
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Djibouti
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom
and Prncipe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South
Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
DR Congo
Congo
Cte
d'Ivoire
Immigrants as % of total population
0.1 - 0.9% 1 -2.9 % 3-4.9% 5-9.9% > 10%
Mauritius
Seychelles
Map elaborated for the ACP Secretariat by Andrea Gallina 2010
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cautiously in migration management policies,
so as to avoid addressing youth migrants as a
homogenous group. The need to understand
the nature of child internal and international
migration in Western Africa
33
and the specifc
problems child migrants face in given circum-
stances has already been underlined.
34
Howev-
er, even when youth migration is underpinned
by a high degree of autonomy, which refects
the importance of mobility as a mechanism to
increase individual freedoms, there are im-
portant social protection challenges ahead for
reducing the negative aspects of this type of
mobility, especially for girl migrants.
Within the corridor between Cte dIvoire and
Burkina Faso, the issue of forced return to
Burkina Faso following the expulsion from Cte
dIvoire is another important challenge yet to
be addressed beyond the humanitarian emer-
gency relief operations. The pressure created
by the returnees on the social infrastructures
is enormous, leading to issues of co-habitation
between ethnic groups (most returnees are
Mossi from the Central Plateau, whereas the
area at the border with Cte dIvoire is popu-
lated with Senufo and Bobo ethnic groups).
The intensity of human mobility in this corri-
dor has also led to environmental degradation
and illegal land clearance for cash crop plan-
tations. However, the relationship between
migration and environmental degradation has
yet to be confrmed, since the ownership of
the plantations remains in the hands of a few
Ivoirians landlords who employ mostly migrant
workers.
Other important migration corridors in West-
ern Africa are between Ghana and Cte
dIvoire, between Mali and Cte dIvoire, and
between Mali and Burkina Faso: more than
300,000 Ghanaians, or a third of Ghanas total
emigrants and about 486,000 Malians reside
in Cte dIvoire, while 437,000 Malians live in
Burkina Faso to replace Burkinabe who have
migrated to Cte dIvoire.
In Burkina Faso the peace and stability of the
past two decades have worked as major at-
traction factors for migrants, despite its very
low income and HDI levels. Especially cotton-
growing is fourishing in the south-western
part of the country. Further, the eradication
of parasitic diseases, such as the river blind-
ness, contribute to make Burkina an increas-
ingly attractive place for migrant workers in
the region who thus supply labour to the grow-
ing cotton industry.
Sub-Regional Dynamics:
Immigration in Eastern Africa
Pre-colonial and colonial time movements of
people in Eastern Africa for purposes of work-
ing with cotton, coffee, mining and pastoral-
ist agriculture have more recently been re-
placed by forced movement due to conficts
and famine. In this region, forced migration
is extremely important: in particular Kenya,
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania contain
the bulk of refugees and IDPs, with more than
a million people at risk in each country ex-
cept Tanzania, which has about 320,000 refu-
gees. Virtually all countries in this sub-region
have received or sent asylum-seekers, and the
refugee camps in the Horn of Africa are transit
points for people seeking to reach the Middle
East or Europe.
Djibouti (13.7 per cent of foreign-born popula-
tion) is the country in the region hosting the
highest share of migrants compared to the
total population, followed by the Seychelles
(10.2 per cent), Rwanda (4.8 per cent) and
Zimbabwe (3.1 per cent).
In Eastern Africa, the presence of high num-
bers of forced migrants has probably diverted
the attention of scholars and development
agencies from the problems and issues related
to migrant workers. For example, in this sub-
region an interesting case is Mauritius, not due
to the proportion of immigrants (it has only 3.3
per cent) but because of their typology. Fully
integrated into global production chains, Mau-
ritius is importing labour from China and India
to work mainly (78 per cent) in manufactur-
ing factories in export processing zones, and
partly (10 per cent) in the construction sector,
both of which are shunned by native workers
because of the very poor conditions.
35
Migrant
workers in these factories have little interac-
54
tions with Mauritian society and despite being
numerically few (about 30,000), their claims
for better conditions represent an important
demand for reforming industrial relations and
immigration policies.
36
Sub-Regional Dynamics:
Immigration in Central / Middle Africa
Immigration in Central / Middle Africa is main-
ly associated with forced migration. This sub-
region includes some of the poorest countries
on the continent and is not a major immigra-
tion post. The paucity of data and studies do
not help to shed light on mobility in this ar-
ea.
37
Central / Middle African countries also
receive large infuxes of refugees (83,300 in
Cameroon, 13,300 in Gabon, 25,000 in Congo,
155,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
330,500 in Chad and 12,000 in Angola).
38
What is well known is that migratory move-
ments in Central / Middle Africa are linked
mainly to wars and instability. Countries such
as Chad have a third of a million refugees in
its territory, originating mainly from Darfur in
Sudan, whereas the Democratic Republic of
Congo has a very large population of IDPs and
about 150,000 refugees.
In some cases, immigration is motivated by the
presence of geological scandals, meaning an
enormous wealth of precious minerals, such as
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo,
which attract people to work in the mines. In
the Democratic Republic of Congo there are
migrants from French-speaking countries such
as Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal known as
Bawusa in Kasai and as Lingali in Kinshasa,
which means West-African nationals, as well as
people from neighbouring Angola.
39
The nation-
als of bordering countries who live in a radius
of 15km from the frontier are allowed 72-hour
access to the Democratic Republic of Congo,
upon acquiring a token at the border.
40

Sub-Regional Dynamics:
Immigration in Southern Africa
In Southern Africa the main pole of attraction
for migrants is South Africa and in part Bot-
swana. The sub-region is also characterised
by an increase in undocumented and forced
migrants from crisis-ridden Zimbabwe, as well
as by the repatriation of refugees originating
from the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique,
which still pose serious challenges. Mobility in
this sub-region is particularly dynamic and un-
stable.
41

Within Southern Africa migration is perceived
as a temporary livelihood strategy. With the ex-
ception of the Mozambicans that fed the civil
war of the 1980s and remained in South Africa,
surveys have shown that migrants in the region
tend to return because they prefer living in
their own countries. South Africa and Botswana
are seen as better places only in relation to job
opportunities and health services.
42

Botswana has a more relaxed migration policy,
especially for skilled workers. Between 1960
and 2005, the proportion of foreign-born to
total population grew from 1.4 per cent to 4.4
per cent, with migrants coming mainly from
Congo, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania
and South Africa.
A particular feature of this sub-region is the
high level of HIV/AIDS among the popula-
tion. Mobility has contributed to increase the
spread of the epidemic. The two countries in
the region with better transport infrastruc-
ture, more development and higher rates of
international and internal mobility, namely
Botswana and South Africa, also have the high-
est rates of HIV/AIDS.
43

The relationship between mobility and HIV/
AIDS is a complex one: people affected tend
to return home to seek care and are replaced
by another member of the household who will
migrate in search of income-earnings opportu-
nities, or migrate to seek better treatment in
another country, or put pressure on rural com-
munities, which in turn try to compensate for
a reduction in productivity with out-migration.
The recent increase of Mozambican workers in
South African mines can also be explained by
the fact that in Mozambique the prevalence of
HIV/AIDS is lower. Understanding how this re-
lationship operates in Southern Africa can help
to address similar situations in other African
sub-regions.
44
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With the end of the apartheid regime in South
Africa and the gradual reinsertion of the coun-
try into the international economy, there is a
major increase in international labour migra-
tion, internal migration from rural areas and
tourism from neighbouring countries.
In this sub-region, as a share of the total popu-
lation, Namibia has the highest percentage of
foreigners (6.6 per cent), mainly South Afri-
cans and Angolans. However, when looking at
absolute numbers, South Africa has the high-
est immigrant population, with the Sussex DRC
database indicating about 720,000 migrants,
while the UNDP Report 2009 dataset indicates
2.6 per cent of the population (which would
mean about 1.3 million foreign-born).
The lack of precise statistics on immigrants
in South Africa has led to uninformed media
campaigns against immigrants, especially in
Zimbabwe, which has implications for poli-
cy-making as well. A detailed analysis of the
Zimbabwe-South Africa mobility corridor can
be found in Chapter 4.
Regional Dynamics:
Immigration in the Caribbean
In the Caribbean region immigrants can repre-
sent a signifcant share of the resident popula-
tion. In 2005, as much as 22 per cent of the
population in Antigua and Barbuda was foreign-
born, with 14.4 per cent in Belize and about
10 per cent Barbados, Grenada, Bahamas, and
Saint Kitts and Nevis (see Map 3.5).
Migration in the Caribbean has not necessar-
ily been linked to linguistic or cultural simi-
larities. During the frst three decades of the
Belize
Cuba
The Bahamas
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Guyana
Jamaica
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Grenada
St. Lucia
Dominica
St. Kitts and Nevis Antigua and Barbuda
Immigrants as % of total population
0.1-0.9% 1.0-2.9% 3.0-4.9% 5.0-9.9% > 10.0%
Map elaborated for the ACP Secretariat by Andrea Gallina 2010
map 3.5 - Caribbean
Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population
56
20
th
century people from Anglophone countries
moved to the Hispanic Caribbean and the Neth-
erlands Antilles.
45
By mid-century, however,
movements were mainly between Anglophone
countries and from Haiti to the Bahamas, Cuba
and the Dominican Republic, with migrants
seeking employment in the sugar cane sector.
There are also movements in opposite direc-
tions, such as for example Dominicans settling
in St. Kitts and Nevis under citizenship entitle-
ments based on the nationality of their grand-
parents who had migrated from St. Kitts-Nevis
to the Dominican Republic as labour migrants
in the 1920s and 1930
46
(the so-called coco-
los). The immigrants living in the Caribbean
had mostly settled prior to the seventies and
eighties, attracted by development projects
and periods of economic growth driven by a
particular industry, such as oil in Trinidad,
tourism in the Bahamas (as well as in the U.S.
Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands). More re-
cently migration in the region has continued
apace but without particular peaks.
These trends indicate relatively stable and
therefore mature bilateral migration corri-
dors. Further, the demand for a specifc seg-
ment of the labour force has implied a selec-
tion process, which is confrmed by analyses
that often shows higher levels of education
among migrants in relation to the population
in both the destination and country of origin.
For example, the study undertaken by Eliza-
beth Thomas-Hope at the University of the
West Indies (Jamaica) uses the Caribbean
Community Regional Census Offce (1994) con-
frms that in the early 1990s in Antigua 16.5
per cent of the non-national population had
tertiary (pre-university or university) qualif-
cations, compared to 5.5 per cent among the
national population. In the Bahamas, the fg-
ure is 19.4 per cent for non-nationals, 7.9 per
cent for nationals; in Barbados, 54.6 per cent
for non-nationals and 8.7 per cent for nation-
als; in the British Virgin Islands 17.4 per cent
for non-nationals and 7.5 per cent for nation-
als. The educational levels also refected the
employment distribution of non-nationals. In
Jamaica only 5 per cent and in the Bahamas
33 per cent of non-nationals were employed in
occupations requiring lesser skills, while the
majority was employed replacing profession-
als that migrated to the United States.
47

In countries such as Belize, immigration rates
are particularly high due to the movement of
people from Central American countries that
suffered lasting periods of political instability.
Over the past 20 years this has caused rapid
and drastic changes in the population com-
position, and has posed a set of serious chal-
lenges to the country.
In Belize, the main diffculties brought about
by migration range from environmental issues
to competition over access to basic infrastruc-
ture, such as water, education, health and san-
itation. Migrants are also blamed for having in-
troduced unsustainable agricultural practices,
increasing the level of poverty as a consequence
of environmental degradation and, particularly
in rural areas, dumping of wages and working
conditions, which have led to anti-immigrant
sentiment being expressed by sectors of the
native population.
48
The government of Belize
has introduced measures to mitigate these
problems by means of laws allowing for selec-
tive permanent residency or citizenship, refu-
gee management and increasing the number of
employment permits granted.
49
Furthermore,
contrary to other Caribbean countries, current
legislation in Belize allows for foreign nation-
als to rapidly acquire political rights.
50

A characteristic feature of migration in the
Caribbean region is undocumented migra-
tion. Although precise data on this are lacking,
the number of cases of interdiction of boats
and persons appearing at airports with forged
travel documents, as well as the number of
deportees, give an indication that this is an
important regional phenomenon. There are
estimates according to which over one-half
million undocumented Haitians migrants are
living in other Caribbean countries.
The direction of these undocumented mobil-
ity fows depend very much on the assessment
made by the migrants as concerns risk versus
cost. The risk of being intercepted is lower in
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those countries of the region that can afford
only rudimentary coastguard surveillance. For
example, since 1994 entry into the Turks and
Caicos Islands has been relatively easier than
into the Bahamas (and far easier than entry
to the US Virgin Islands, whose coasts are pa-
trolled by the US Coastguard).
51

The main sources of undocumented migrants
are Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
The Bahamas or the Turks and Caicos Islands are
used by Haitians as a stepping stone to the US,
whereas Cubans travel usually (but not always)
directly to Florida and Dominicans attempt to
cross the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico.
Job opportunities in the tourist industry of
the eastern Caribbean (Antigua, the British
Overseas Territory of Anguilla and the French
Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe,
including their off-shore islands, Marie Galan-
te and the Iles des Saintes), are attracting
migrant workers from the region. European
Union overseas territories are often used as
a stepping stone to the European Union. Un-
documented migration via these routes also
involves smuggling and traffcking of young
women destined to work in unprotected and
unsafe jobs.
52

Migration also takes place from the Eastern
Caribbean countries (Guyana, Grenada, St
Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica)
into Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados.
53
More
recently, besides the traditional fows of un-
documented migrants within the Caribbean,
many countries are facing the challenge of ris-
ing numbers of Asian undocumented migrants
using the Caribbean as a transit route to the
United States.
Undocumented migration and its implica-
tions are also common issues in the Domini-
can Republic. Another important intra-Car-
ibbean migration corridor is the one between
Haiti and the Dominican Republic (a detailed
analysis can be found in Chapter 4). Haitian
migrants in the Dominican Republic face a
very similar situation as their countrymen in
the Turks and Caicos Islands. Haitians in the
Dominican Republic are mainly young males
with low levels of education. Employment
is concentrated in two sectors, namely con-
struction (39 per cent) and agriculture (41 per
cent), with another 13 per cent in services
such street vending, transportation and do-
mestic help.
54
Particularly those living on the
bateys (sugar cane plantations) face challeng-
ing situations of extreme poverty, limited ac-
cess to water and sanitation and a generalized
lack of basic services.
Undocumented migration is often associ-
ated with exclusion and poverty. Margin-
alisation, exclusion from public life and a
higher occurrence of poverty among migrant
communities is also the result of limited inter-
vention by both governments in the areas of
documentation and regularisation, recognition
of basic rights and investments in human capi-
tal.
55
Lack of documentation seems to be the
primary driver of exclusion and poverty among
Haitians migrants in the Dominican Republic.
This situation of marginalization also affects
the condition of those born in the Domini-
can Republic to persons of Haitian origin, for
whom the opportunity to obtain citizenship or
a permanent residency is very slim, despite
having lived in the country for many years
and/or coming from a family which may have
lived for generations in the Dominican Repub-
lic. Further, this group is not entitled under
the Haitian Constitution and Haitis 1984 law
on nationality to gain automatic access to Hai-
tian nationality.
56
In any case this may not be a
route to an effective nationality if the person
in question has no real link with Haiti. State-
lessness is a condition affecting about 300,000
Haitian-Dominican descendents.
57

The result of a survey carried out on the Turks
and Caicos Islands among 1,062 households,
with 2,960 individuals, shows that Haitians
comprise 30 per cent of the population, yet
they make up 38 per cent of those persons liv-
ing below the poverty line. Nationwide, 26 per
cent of the population are below the poverty
line.
58

The more qualitative analyses show that in the
absence of programmes to manage cultural di-
58
versity existing levels of immigration strain the
psychological carrying capacity of the receiv-
ing country.
59
And yet, while there is agree-
ment on the fact that the continued growth
of the economy depends on access to cheap
labour by migrants from Haiti and the Domini-
can Republic who are willing to work in jobs
shunned by natives, the government has enun-
ciated no clear strategy on the rate of growth
that might be compatible with the capacity of
the country to manage the negative effects of
massive immigration. The private sector also
provides an important perspective: employers
consider migrant workers more reliable and
committed to their work than belongers.
60

Immigration in the Caribbean has produced
mixed reactions. Haitians in Turks and Cai-
cos are stigmatised as non-Belongers, in the
Bahamas the offspring of Haitians migrants
are often denied citizenship when they turn
18 years of age, and in the Dominican Repub-
lic the new Constitution of 2010 specifcally
denies those born in the Dominican Republic
to foreigners who are not residing legally in
the Dominican Republic the right to national-
ity and hence citizenship. This new exclusion-
ary clause disproportionately affects impov-
erished Haitian migrants and their offspring
born after the Constitution comes into effect
given that they are the foreigners most likely
to be unauthorized in the Dominican Republic.
Moreover, it brings into question why there has
not been a regularisation programme for long-
standing irregular migrants in the Dominican
Republic which should have taken place prior
to the implementation of the new migration
law approved in 2004.
Conversely, despite being stigmatised as mu-
lattas, Dominican women migrants in Turks
and Caicos are particularly welcomed to work
in the service sector because of their pleasant
appearance and lighter skin colour.
The demand for labour in the Turks and Caicos
Islands has also prompted the return of Turks
and Caicos migrants from the Bahamas. It is
thus possible that the pressure on health and
education services is the result of a combined
infux of migrants and returnees. This is cor-
roborated by the fndings of the Institute of
Health Sector Development, for which non-
nationals are relatively under-supplied with
services and therefore cannot possibly repre-
sent a burden for society. Appalling living con-
ditions for Haitians and Dominican Republic
migrants, combined with limited interventions
in the areas of social inclusion and integration
(such as bilingual education for the children
of migrants) are responsible for the persist-
ence of an underutilised labour force and low
growth in human capital.
Across the region, social protection and the
inclusion of migrants into society are impor-
tant factors that must be addressed by policy
makers interested in enhancing the linkage
between migration and development.
Regional Dynamics: Immigration in the Pacifc
Despite the vastness of the Pacifc Ocean and
the small size and isolation of land areas, Pa-
cifc people have historically moved freely and
frequently, created social networks, traded
and exchanged goods.
61

In the 19
th
and 20
th
century immigration in the
Pacifc took various forms: from Melanesia
and Micronesia to Fiji (Melanesia), and Samoa
(Polynesia). Ethnic Fijian nurses and teachers
have migrated in large numbers to the Mar-
shall Islands because of the demand for their
services, as well as the opportunity to earn
better income in US dollars. Fijians of all eth-
nicities have migrated to the Cook Islands for
employment in the booming tourism industry
as well as to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu
and Tonga to take up positions in professional,
managerial and trades areas. During political
crises (military coups) and their aftermath,
Indo-Fijians have migrated to Australia and
New Zealand. In recent times, large numbers
of ethnic Fijians have followed suit.
62

In the Pacifc, the share of immigrants in rela-
tion to the local population varies widely. There
are countries with immigrant populations as
large as half or a third of the total population,
such as in Nauru and Palau, respectively. How-
ever, whereas in Nauru immigration is mainly
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composed of refugee-seekers applying for asy-
lum to Australia, Palau is instead a country in
which migrant labour mainly from China, the
Philippines and Bangladesh represents more
than 50 per cent of the labour force.
In exchange for foreign aid from Australia, the
Nauru Government has accepted to become
part of the Pacifc Solution to refugee-seek-
ers. In Palau, however, the economy needs
less-skilled and low-paid Asian migrants. These
are often undocumented and thus fnd them-
selves vulnerable. According to the Philippine
Overseas Labour Offce, 80 per cent of the
roughly 5,000 Philippines migrant workers in
Palau moved there as tourists and then over-
stayed. In this region as well, social protection
of the foreign-born population is one of the
recently identifed priority policy areas.
63

An important mobility pattern in the Pacifc
Islands is linked to internal migration, which
is the movement of people from outer to
inner islands of the same state. Migration
from remote islands towards main islands and
from impoverished rural to accessible coastal
urban areas has grown considerably in recent
years.
64

This in turn has led to the depopulation of the
smaller and outer islands towards the inner
and more equipped islands, where opportuni-
ties for education and access to health serv-
ices are available, and to the concentration of
the public administration and state bureauc-
racy in the so-called urban areas, without
mechanisms for taxation and redistribution of
income toward rural and more peripheral are-
as. This tends to perpetuate territorial imbal-
ances and spurs migration, while having only
limited compensating effects from internal
remittances.
65
The most visible consequences
have been the growth of squatter settlements,
diminished services due to excessive demo-
graphic pressure, and social tension between
newcomers and the original settlers.
Tonga, for example, has a population of about
100,000 people. According to the most recent
census (2006), about 70 per cent of the popu-
East Timor
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Fiji Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Samoa
Palau
Niue
Nauru
Kiribati
Cook Islands
Marshall Islands
Immigrants as % of total population
Only the main islands of the atolls are represented.
The size and position of the Pacific Islands on this map do not correspond to the actual ones.
The map has only descriptive purposes.
Micronesia, Federated States of
0.1-0.9% 1.0-2.9% 3.0-4.9% 5.0-9.9% > 10.0%
Map elaborated for the ACP Secretariat by Andrea Gallina 2010
Map 3.6 - Pacifc
Immigrants as Percentage of Total Population
60
lation now resides on the main island of Tonga-
tapu, and practically one-quarter of the entire
population lives in the capital, Nukualofa.
Population growth in South Tarawa, the capital
and urban centre of Kiribati, was 5.2 per cent
per annum (1995-2000), reaching a population
density of 2,558 inhabitants per km
2
, compara-
ble to Brasilia, Rome and Kuala Lumpur. It now
contains 60 per cent of the entire population.
In Tuvalu, Funafuti Island accounts for 66 per
cent of the population; in Fiji, the main island
Viti Levu is home to 80 per cent; and the main
island of Samoa (Upolu) has 60 per cent.
66

This type of internal migration is also having a
signifcant impact on pollution, waste manage-
ment, and renewable resources such as fresh
water and near-shore fshing stocks, which in-
directly affect the local populations health
and nutrition, as they become more depend-
ent with each passing day on imported foods,
with the corresponding implications for their
health. In Kiribati, overcrowding in the main
urban centre has led to poor sanitary condi-
tions associated with inadequate sewerage
and a lack of garbage disposal systems. This in
turn puts stress on local health facilities and
results in the highest human poverty index in
the Pacifc Islands.
67

Emigration from ACP countries
International mobility in ACP countries is linked
to proximity and remains a regional phenom-
enon, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa coun-
tries. More than half (about 54 per cent) of
ACP migrants move to another ACP country
often a bordering one while about 38 per
cent are spread across the Global North. The
remainder lives in North Africa and Asia.
The small island states of the Caribbean and
the Pacifc tend to look beyond their regions
when seeking and fnding greener pastures,
whereas those that can afford to migrate in
the Sub-Saharan countries are trapped in a
short-distance mobility scheme to other Sub-
Saharan countries that can offer relatively
better incomes, but that are often still very
much at the bottom of the development lad-
der.
Cultural and linguistic affnities continue to
be very important, but new trends are emerg-
ing.
68
Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to
Europe is increasingly diversifed, and today
includes destinations such as Germany, the
Netherlands, Italy and Spain. Ghanaians, Sen-
egalese, Nigerians and Somalis are particularly
dispersed across Europe, and there is an in-
creasing fow of Francophone Africans, mainly
Congolese and Ivoirians, moving into the UK or
into Anglophone African countries.
69

ACP mobility is also directed towards non-ACP
Global South destinations (a very under-re-
searched phenomenon). For example, in the
Philippines we found 40 per cent of migrants
from Antigua and Barbuda (about 25,000 peo-
ple), while about 10,000 Dominicans, Cubans
and Jamaicans live in Pakistan.
What is striking is that migration towards the
North is skills-biased. It is the best educated
that move South-North in search for better
income opportunities, whereas South-South
migration, with notable exceptions, is mainly
characterised by migrants with lesser skills.
70
The data, although scarce and not always
comparable, prove at least one important
fact: there is a strong misperception on how
many persons move from ACP countries and
whereto. This is especially important for Eu-
ropean policy makers, since on the one hand,
Caribbean and Pacifc Islands migrants move
to North America, Australia and New Zea-
land, while on the other hand, only one out
of fve Sub-Saharan Africans moves to the Glo-
bal North (and only 1 out of six move to the
EU27+Norway and Switzerland).
Table 3.3 - Emigration of ACP nationals
Source: own elaboration on Sussex DRC
Dataset, Version IV, 2007.
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In the following sections an overview of emi-
gration patterns within ACP countries and be-
tween ACP to the Global North is provided.
The remainder of the Chapter will discuss the
emigration patterns of each sub-region, high-
lighting the main mobility corridors that will
be analysed subsequently in greater detail
(see Chapter 4).
Intra-ACP Migration: Overview
Intra-ACP migration is a characteristic especial-
ly of the four Sub-Saharan Africa sub-regions.
Here, intra-regional migration accounts for 70
per cent of the total (see Table 3.3).
In Map 3.4 these patterns are detailed. Partic-
ularly dynamic is the mobility within Western
Africa. Intra-Western Africa movements (about
5.6 million people) account for more than two-
thirds of all emigration in the entire sub-region.
Another million people are split into Eastern
Africa and Central / Middle Africa. Migration
towards Southern Africa is very small, although
there is anecdotal evidence that it is growing.
Mobility within Central / Middle Africa is very
limited and involves less than half-a-million
people. About half of the diasporas in Central
/ Middle African countries live in Eastern Afri-
ca. Southern Africa is the destination of about
400,000 migrants, whereas a mere 5 per cent
moves to Western Africa.
Within Southern Africa mobility is not par-
ticularly strong. This is the case because this
map 3.7 - intra-Sub-Saharan African mobility
62
sub-region accounts for only fve countries and
has a relatively small population compared to
other sub-regions. Intra-Southern Africa mi-
gration accounts for 10 per cent of emigra-
tion from this sub-region. A third of the total
emigration from Southern African countries is
directed towards Eastern Africa.
Eastern African countries share similar mobili-
ty patterns as Western Africa. Intra-Eastern Af-
rica migration accounts for 2.5 million people
or 46 per cent of the total. Another 8 per cent
(ca. 440,000 people) moved to Southern Afri-
ca. Other consistent Eastern Africa diasporas
live in Western Africa (ca. 160,000 people) and
Central / Middle Africa (ca. 106,000 people).
For its part, in Sub-Saharan Africa sub-region-
al and continental migration is the predomi-
nant pattern of mobility. In the Pacifc and the
Caribbean, intra-ACP migration is somewhat
limited.
In the Caribbean region only about 4 per cent
of total migrants move to another Caribbean
island of the ACP group. The main source of
intra-Caribbean migration is Haiti. There are
also other diaspora groups in the Caribbean,
but the numbers are rather small: about four
thousand Guyanese live in Antigua and Barbuda,
three thousand in Barbados, and fve thousand
in Trinidad and Tobago. A couple of thousand
Jamaicans are in Antigua and Barbuda, the Ba-
hamas and Cuba. Four thousand migrants from
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines can be found
in Barbados and about eight thousand in Trini-
dad and Tobago. A couple of thousand people
from Trinidad and Tobago have moved to Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as Barba-
dos. Similar fgures are recorded for the di-
aspora from Dominica to Antigua and Barbuda.
Among the non-ACP Caribbean Islands there
are some main attraction poles for migrants in
the region such as the U.S. Virgin Islands and
the Cayman Islands, in which the demand for
workers among the tourist and other service
industries is consistent.
Intra-ACP migration in the Pacifc is also a
limited phenomenon, involving less than 3
per cent of Pacifc migrants. The main human
mobility between the Pacifc Islands is charac-
terised by internal migration movements from
outer to inner islands within the same state.

South-North Migration Trends and Patterns
Current migration policies in the Global North
prevent ACP migrants from moving easily to
Northern countries. Those that do are often
subject to temporary schemes linked to spe-
cifc economic sectors. People from ACP coun-
tries who are residents in the Global North
represent only a small fraction of its foreign-
born population. It is estimated that about 8.7
million people from ACP countries have emi-
grated to OECD countries, or about 9 per cent
of all migrants living in these.
71

The twenty largest Diasporas in absolute num-
bers of migrants are shown in Graph 3.5. Of
these, the top fve account for 42 per cent of
migrants to the Global North and all are based
mostly in the United States.
Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa toward
the North is rather limited. Only 1 out of
fve Sub-Saharan African migrants move to
the Global North. About 4 million migrants
from Sub-Saharan Africa are resident in a coun-
try of the Global North. The bulk of these (2.8
million) are in the EU27 +Norway and Switzer-
land, another million is in the United States
and Canada and the remainder live in Australia
and New Zealand (see Table 3.4). Sub-Saha-
ran Africa migrants in the EU are less than the
migrants from Northern Africa, despite having
more than twice the population.
For some of the countries in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica migration to the Global North represents
more than 50 per cent of migrants abroad, es-
pecially for the Island States of So Tom and
Prncipe (67.8 per cent), Madagascar (66.5 per
cent), Mauritius (63.1 per cent), Cape Verde
(61.6 per cent) and Comoros (51.5 per cent).

Conversely, for Caribbean ACP countries
the bulk of emigration is towards the Glo-
bal North, especially the United States,
Canada and former European colonies. In-
deed, 85 per cent of the 5 million Caribbean
migrants live in the global North, with North
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America as the main destination, followed by
the EU27+Norway and Switzerland.
The fve largest Caribbean Diasporas in abso-
lute numbers are Cuba, Jamaica, the Domini-
can Republic, Haiti and Suriname. These are
concentrated in only a few countries. Thus
over 80 per cent of Cuban and 77 per cent of
Dominican migrants are in the United States,
60 per cent of Haitian and Jamaican migrants
also move to the United States and 68 per
cent of Surinamese can be found in the Neth-
erlands. These mobility corridors have been
studied widely and frequently, thanks to eas-
ily available datasets based on censuses and
Table 3.4 - ACP Regions and Sub-Regions: Emigration Towards the Global North
112 Lhousands (or 24)
lefL Lo norLh Amerlca
222 Lhousands (or 48)
lefL Lo AusLralla and new Zealand
400,000 or 4
moved Lo norLh Amerlca
LLCLnu
107,000 (or 12)
lefL Lo AusLralla and new Zealand
240,000 (or 27)
lefL Lo Lhe Lu27+
AbouL 1 mllllon or 18
moved Lo Lhe Lu27+
380,000 or 7 moved
norLh Amerlca
and 68,000 (1.2) Lo
AusLralla and new Zealand
380,000 or
19 lefL Lo Lhe Lu27+
and 30,000 Lo norLh Amerlca
(1.7)
3.6 mlll or 70
moved Lo norLh Amerlca
760,000 or 13
lefL Lo Lhe Lu27+
WLS1L8n Al8lCA
SCu1PL8n Al8lCA
LAS1L8n Al8lCA
CLn18AL Al8lCA
CA8l88LAn
AClllC
South-North m|grat|on f|ows or|g|nat|ng from the AC countr|es
(Lhe arrows' Lhlckness lndlcaLes Lhe slgnlflcance of Lhe moblllLy ln absoluLe numbers)
Lu27+: Lu, SwlLzerland and norway norLh Amerlca: uS, Canada, Mexlco
112,000 or 13
lefL Lo norLh Amerlca
map 3.8 - ACp South-North mobility
64
surveys, and might well provide important in-
sights for ACP policy makers.
In the Pacifc, migration towards the Glo-
bal North involves three-fourths of all mi-
grants. Half of the approximately one half
million Pacifc islanders living abroad are in
New Zealand and Australia, whereas another
100,000 have chosen North America as their
preferred destination. The remaining group is
based mainly in Asia, with very small diaspo-
ras in EU27+Norway and Switzerland, notably
those from Fiji and Timor-Este.
A more detailed analysis of the emigration
patterns for each region and sub-region is pro-
vided in the sections below.
Sub-Saharan Africa Emigration Systems
In Sub-Saharan Africa mobility is a very old
livelihood strategy, linked to pastoralist pro-
duction systems, trade caravans, environmen-
tal transformations and man-made crises. It
is, however, a phenomenon that is spread un-
evenly across the continent.
On the one hand, we fnd countries with a very
high proportion of residents abroad relative to
the population at home, Cape Verde (39.9 per
cent), Seychelles (16.8 per cent), Equatorial
Guinea (15.9 per cent), Congo (15.2 per cent),
Mali (12.7 per cent), Eritrea (11.8 per cent),
So Tom and Prncipe (11.4 per cent), Burki-
na Faso (9.2 per cent) and Comoros (8.1 per
cent). On the other, there are countries with
a population residing abroad that accounts for
less than 1 per cent of its residents, such as for
example Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Cte dIvoire, Nigeria, Cameroon
and Botswana (see Map 3.9).
However, for some of the most populated coun-
tries, the low percentage of residents abroad
in relation to the population at home hides
signifcant diaspora formations. For example,
Nigeria has less than 3 per cent of its popula-
tion residing abroad, but in absolute numbers
this represents a diaspora of more than a mil-
lion people. Other diasporas surpassing one 1
million people are those of Mali and Burkina
Faso. Diasporas of less than a million but over
half a million people can be found in Ghana,
Angola, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic
Graph 3.7 - ACP Top 20 Diasporas in the Global North (Number of People)
Source: own elaboration based on Sussex DRC Dataset, IV, 2007; Global North includes: EU27 + Switzerland and
Norway, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada and Mexico.
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of Congo, South Africa, Sudan, Benin, Guinea
and Congo (see Table A.1 in Annex).
Emigration from Central/Middle Africa
There are very few studies on internal, region-
al and international mobility from and within
Central Africa.
72
When it occurs, migration is
short-distance and mainly within the region or
to other countries on the African continent. It
should be noted that the percentage of people
living abroad in relation to the total popula-
tion in this sub-region is particularly low, con-
frming the association between poverty levels
and migration levels. By contrast, fgures are
high for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, the two
countries of the region with the highest GDP
per capita and Human Development Index.
In this sub-region migrant movement includes
Congolese to Angola, Zambia and Congo Braz-
zaville, especially migrants originating in West-
ern Congo (where Kinshasa is located). Zambia
is a common destination for migrants from the
Lubumbashi region in Katanga.
73
Camerooni-
ans move mainly to Gabon and South Africa
for work, although the recent economic down-
turns have made life diffcult for migrants in
many African destination countries. Cameroon
is a common destination for neighbouring Ni-
gerias migrants who seek livelihoods in south-
western Cameroons cocoa plantations, fol-
map 3.9 - Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa
Residents Abroad as Percentage of Total Population
Chud
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina
Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape
Verde
Central African
Republic
Comoros
Djibouti
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom
and Prncipe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South
Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
DR Congo
Congo
Cte
d'Ivoire
ResldenLs ubroud us ercenLuge of LoLul ouluLlon
o. -z.g%
.o -.g%
.o-g.g%
o.o -z.g%
> z.o%
Mauritius
Seychelles
Mu eluboruLed for Lhe ACP SecreLurluL by Andreu Culllnu zoo
66
lowing a mobility path established in colonial
times. Equatorial Guineas migrants seek em-
ployment in Gabon, which is the main destina-
tion of Central Africas migrants.
74
In the Cen-
tral / Middle Africa region, while we record
a generalised increase in female migration
since the 1960s, the share of female migration
slightly decreased in the Central Africa Repub-
lic and Congo.
Refugees represent another very important
group of migrants in this region. Refugee fows
have been quite large since the independence
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The UNHCR estimates that in 2009 one third
of the DRCs one million refugees were living
in Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda and Uganda, and
increasingly in South Africa.
In 2009 there were 170,000 refugees from
Angola living in neighbouring countries, with
some 125,000 from the Central African Repub-
lic and 20,000 originating from Congo (see Ta-
ble 3.5). There is still very little knowledge on
the contribution of these important groups of
forced migrants on the development of both
countries of origin and destination.
Emigration from Central African countries fol-
lows historical patterns. Colonial ties between
So Tom and Prncipe, Angola, Guinea Bissau
and Portugal favour migration to Europe, much
as occurs between the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Belgium. However, migration from
this region to Northern countries is also be-
coming more diversifed and includes non-tra-
ditional destinations such as the United States
for Cameroonians, and the United Kingdom or
France for migrants from the Democratic Re-
public of Congo.
Emigration from Southern Africa
Migrants from countries in the Southern Africa
sub-region are attracted to South Africa, Na-
mibia, and to booming Botswana. Outside the
sub-region, movements are consistently east-
ward towards Mozambique and Tanzania.
For 93 per cent of migrants from Lesotho, the
fnal destination is another African country. For
migrants from Botswana and Swaziland, these
percentages stand at 60 per cent and 72 per
cent, respectively, while 78 per cent of Na-
mibian migrants choose an African country as
their place of residence and work, especially
Mozambique and Tanzania.
The permeability of borders, the existence of
established migration corridors and networks,
the persistence of political instability, and the
lower costs associated with proximity facili-
tate this process, sometimes despite the rig-
id migration policies of the main destination
countries. Seasonal migration and occasional
cross-border trade also play an important
role in shaping mobility patterns in this sub-
region. Neighbouring countries also represent
Table 3.5 - Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees (Refugees
and IDPs), Stateless Persons, and Others of Concern to UNHCR by Country/Territory of Origin,
end-2008 (Table Established: 10 June 2009)
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the preferred destinations for South Africans
(38 per cent move mainly to Mozambique, Na-
mibia, and Swaziland), although compared to
its neighbours South Africa migrants have es-
tablished more diversifed mobility corridors.
One-third of South African migrants reside in
Europe (mainly the United Kingdom, Portugal
and the Netherlands), 13 per cent in North
America (US and Canada) and 13 per cent in
Oceania (Australia and New Zealand).
In Southern Africa, the confguration of female
migration has changed with a signifcant 30
points increase in South Africa, offsetting neg-
ligible decreases in Swaziland and Lesotho.
Emigration from Western Africa
With few exceptions, migration in Western Af-
rica is mainly a regional phenomenon. Most of
the migration from Western African countries
is directed to a neighbouring country or within
the continent. Indeed, more than 90 per cent
of total emigration from Benin, Burkina Faso,
Guinea, Mali, and Niger is to another African
country. The permeability and artifciality of
borders, together with close cultural affnities
and diffculties enforcing legal migration proc-
esses, all contribute to this fuidity.
Cape Verde has sizeable communities in Portu-
gal, Cte dIvoire, and Senegal, while Mali has
a large emigrant community in France, and
Ghana in Italy, Spain and Germany. Migration
to North America is numerically larger
75
and in-
volves fewer countries (mainly Nigeria, Ghana,
and Sierra Leone to the US and Canada) and
mostly involves migrants with upper second-
ary and tertiary educations. Other migration
trends include mobility towards North Africa
as a gateway to Europe that often becomes a
permanent place of residence, as well as some
movement to countries where West Africa has
had limited historical, cultural, political, or
even economic links. Examples include Sen-
egalese and Malian migrants to Zambia and
more recently to South Africa.
76
In Western Africa, female migration has de-
creased slightly in Benin, Togo, Mali and Burki-
na Faso over the past forty years, whereas
during the same period increases have been
substantial in most countries, showing a dy-
namic migratory phenomenon and an impor-
tant reconfguration of household structures
and the labour market, especially at the re-
gional level.
Emigration from Eastern Africa
According to the Sussex University Develop-
ment Research Centre database, the main
destination of migrants from this sub-region
remains the African continent. Migration to-
wards other African countries accounts for 58
per cent of the total, but if one looks at intra-
Eastern Africa migration, this represents the
main mobility pattern and involves 46 per cent
of migrants. A small 8 per cent move to South-
ern Africa. At the individual country level,
intra-African migration is particularly impor-
tant for Burundi (91 per cent), Rwanda (85 per
cent), Mozambique (84 per cent), Malawi (83
per cent), Zambia (78 per cent), Eritrea (74
per cent) and Tanzania (67 per cent).
Emigration towards the Global North involve a
quarter of Eastern Africa migrants and is main-
ly to the 27 countries that make up the Euro-
pean Union (plus Norway and Switzerland) This
is particularly important for Madagascar (64
per cent), Comoros (51 per cent), Djibouti (47
per cent), Mauritius (48 per cent) and Uganda
(43 per cent). About 30 per cent of Ethiopian
migrants reside in North America, as do 14 per
cent of Kenyan and Ugandan migrants.
There are also considerable numbers of Suda-
nese and Ethiopian migrants in Asia, especially
in the Gulf countries. Seychelles migrants also
move to Oceania (15 per cent), as do 10 per
cent of migrants from Mauritius and 5 per cent
from Zimbabwe.
The mobility pattern in this region is charac-
terized by large-scale displacement and refu-
gee movements that have been occurring since
the early 1990s, making the region a place of
origin and destination for 60 per cent of Af-
rican refugees. About 250,000 refugees from
Burundi were in Tanzania in 2008, while at the
same time there were 20,757 refugees from
the Democratic Republic of Congo in Burundi,
52,409 in Rwanda, 47,329 in Zambia and 79,706
68
in Tanzania. Ethiopia presently hosts about
83,583 refugees, mainly from Eritrea, Somalia
and Sudan, while Eritrea hosts 21,018 refugees
from Ethiopia and 124,785 from Sudan. Kenya
is host to a third of a million refugees, includ-
ing Ethiopians. In Zambia, there were about
84,000 refugees in 2008, mainly from Angola
and the Democratic Republic Congo.
77

Transit migration is another characteristic of
this region. The Horn of Africa has developed
into a major transit hub for both transit mi-
gration and irregular migratory movements to-
wards Southern Europe, the Gulf of Aden and
other European destinations, mainly by South
and East Asian migrants.
78
Traffcking of East
African women to Middle Eastern countries is
another growing phenomenon. The number of
Ethiopian female migrants in Lebanon alone is
estimated to be between 17,000 and 35,000.
79

In Eastern Africa countries the share of female
migrants in Madagascar and Zimbabwe de-
creased during the last four decades. In this
region Mauritius has the highest portion of fe-
male migrants at 63 per cent.
In Eastern Africa, intra-regional mobility is re-
peatedly identifed by both local people and
outside observers as a source of tension.
80

Despite aridity and seasonality, East African
rangelands are fertile and support major live-
stock production systems and commercial
farming. Mobility has thus always created
competition and access to water and fertile
land has had to be negotiated. For centuries
the area has been dominated by semi-nomad-
ic pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples, but
tensions were exacerbated only in the late
20
th
century with the privatization of land.
81

Conservation legislation and the bypass of
customary laws protecting the rights of us-
ers were other factors that contributed to
marginalizing poor semi-nomadic farmers.
82

The enforcement of border controls and bor-
der fencing, together with the privatization
of communal land, have trapped pastoral
peoples within or between nations, where in
many cases they become targets of abuse,
state violence, low political representation
and social marginalization.
Emigration from the Caribbean
In the small Caribbean islands emigration is
a signifcant phenomenon that contributes to
both de-population and remittances. Intra-
Caribbean migration is common among coun-
tries that traditionally receive migrants (Bar-
bados), send migrants (St. Kitts, Dominica,
Haiti) or both receive and send migrants (Do-
minican Republic).
St. Vincent, Grenada and Barbados have been
actively involved in intra-regional migration,
particularly in relation to the development of
the oil industry.
The Haitian diaspora is one of the largest in
the region, which is rather interesting since
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere. On the one hand, this appar-
ently contradicts the empirical relationship
that exists between relatively higher incomes
and mobility. More accurate analyses show
that Haitians in the diaspora have a generally
higher level of education and income rela-
tive to those that stay behind. However, the
Haitian case is noteworthy because it dem-
onstrates that without strong institutions at
home, the large infows of remittances gen-
erated by the diaspora can likely drop into a
vacuum. In fact, although remittances to Haiti
have contributed to a safety net for millions
of Haitians who would otherwise have fallen
into poverty, their impact on human develop-
ment is negligible.
In the Caribbean, except in Cuba, Dominica,
Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Suriname, fe-
male emigration has grown considerably, and
for some countries such as Barbados and Anti-
gua and Barbuda, it accounts for about 60 per
cent of migrants. Female emigration is gen-
erally higher in the Anglophone insular Carib-
bean than in the rest of ACP Group Caribbean
countries.
Emigration from the Pacifc
In Pacifc countries emigration is linked to
demographic growth, changing systems of
production and limited opportunities and ac-
cess to basic services. Emigration from Pacifc
countries has three poles: Australia, New Zea-
69
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land and the United States (Hawaii, Guam and
America Samoa).
Although human mobility from the Pacifc Is-
lands Countries (PICs) is limited on the glo-
bal scale in both absolute and relative terms
(only 0.14 per cent of the worlds population
lives in the Pacifc region and its migrants
represent only 0.2 per cent of world migrant
stocks), it represents a key factor in develop-
ment and has become a structural element in
the social and economic systems of many PICs.
Given the particular features of this region,
which is characterized by small island states
with fragile ecosystems, migration contributes
to human development while simultaneously
depriving local societies and economies of al-
ready scarce human resources.
The fragility of the linkage between mobil-
ity and human development in this region is
exacerbated by the impact that generalized
demographic growth has on already strained
economies. There will be 3 million more peo-
ple in the region by 2020, and 2 million of
these will be in Papua New Guinea alone. Bi-
lateral migration quota policies are in place
to alleviate the demographic pressure (about
1,000 Samoans are allowed to migrate to New
Zealand every year),
83
but it is unlikely these
policies can provide a sustainable response to
the challenges that the PICs will face in the
longer term.
Traditionally, PICs have been grouped into
three geographic zones: Polynesia, Micronesia
and Melanesia, each with distinct international
and internal migration patterns.
84
Population
movement in Polynesia (mainly from Samoa
and Tuvalu) is primarily international, whereas
it is mostly internal in Melanesia (principally
8ellze
Cubu
1he 8uhumus
HulLl
Lomlnlcun Reubllc
Cuyunu
1umulcu
Surlnume
1rlnldud und 1obugo
8urbudos
SL. vlncenL und Lhe Crenudlnes
Crenudu
SL. Luclu
Lomlnlcu Lomlnlcu
SL. KlLLs und Nevls
AnLlguu und 8urbudu AnLlguu und 8urbudu
ResldenLs ubroud us ercenLuge of LoLul ouluLlon
o. -z.g%
.o -.g%
.o-g.g%
o.o -z.g%
> z.o%
Mu eluboruLed for Lhe ACP SecreLurluL by Andreu Culllnu zoo
map 3.10 - Emigration from the Caribbean
Residents Abroad as Percentage of Total Population
70
from the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and a
combination of both in Micronesia (predomi-
nantly from Kiribati). Traditionally, Kiribatis
migrants have been recruited by the mining
industry in Nauru and have worked in the in-
ternational shipping industry.
85

Mobility trends in the Pacifc region are strong-
ly determined by the proximity to Australia,
New Zealand and the United States. Migration
from the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia toward the United States
is due to the freedom these countries citizens
have to migrate to the US and its dependencies
(through the Compacts of Free Association).
Intra-PIC migration also takes place, although
to a limited extent. The opening of the Uni-
versity of the South Pacifc in Fiji (as a result
of cooperation between twelve states) has
created a signifcant movement of staff and
students from Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa,
Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Solomon Is-
lands and Vanuatu who study at the Laucala
campus in Suva, Fiji, as well as from Fiji to
Samoa to study agriculture and Vanuatu to
pursue legal studies.
However, the most highly educated persons
from the Pacifc Islands States fnd only limited
opportunities due to the small size of the local
markets for talent. The median migration rate
among holders of upper secondary and terti-
ary education diplomas is 59 per cent. Brain
drain
86
is of particular concern to small states
because of the limited opportunities offered
by their minute economies.
87

A recent study on migration determinants
and the return of high academic performers
from two PICs included in the ACP Group of
States (Tonga and Papua New Guinea) shows
that among Tongas skilled migrants are medi-
cal doctors and nurses (19 per cent), teach-
ers (10 per cent), bankers and accountants
(10 per cent). Papua New Guineas migrants
working overseas have similar occupations: IT,
accounting, law, academia, engineering, and
nursing. For top students graduating in Tonga,
the main destinations are New Zealand (31
East Timor
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Fiji Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Samoa
Palau
Niue
Nauru
Kiribati
Cook Islands
Marshall Islands
On|y the main is|ands of the ato||s are represented .
The size and position of the Pacific Is|ands on this map do not correspond to the actua| ones.
The map has on|y descriptive purposes. This does not imp|y any assumptions regarding po|itica|
or other affi|iations of countries or territories by the ACP 5ecretariat.
Micronesia, Federated States of
ResldenLs ubroud us ercenLuge of LoLul ouluLlon, zoo
o. -z.g%
.o -.g%
.o-g.g%
o.o -z.g%
> z.o%
Mu eluboruLed for Lhe ACP SecreLurluL by Andreu Culllnu zoo
Map 3.11 - Emigration from the Pacifc
Residents abroad as percentage of total population
71
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per cent), the United States (23 per cent),
Fiji (18 per cent) and Australia (17 per cent).
The main destinations of Papua New Guineas
top students are Australia (50 per cent) and
New Zealand (18 per cent), while the rest are
scattered across Japan, China, the Solomon Is-
lands, and Laos.
88
In some Pacifc Islands emigration is a serious
concern due to the loss of customary norms,
cultural models and skills that this implies.
89

For example, changing lifestyles and dietary
customs have over time increased the preva-
lence of diabetes among indigenous people in
the Pacifc region. Recent studies show that
this disease is generally lowest in traditional
Pacifc environments and highest in both ur-
ban Pacifc and adopted metropolitan envi-
ronments (such as New Zealand); in the latter
environments, prevalence is markedly higher
among Pacifc people than white people,

and
it has been increasing rapidly in all three envi-
ronments as Pacifc people experience greater
morbidity and more complications than white
people with diabetes.
90
This has signifcant re-
percussions on both tight health budgets and
migration: since these diseases often cannot
be treated at existing health facilities, entire
families must migrate in order to seek the
services they need.
91

Depopulation is widespread in the Pacifc Is-
lands, especially among some of the smallest
states such as the Cook Islands, Niue and Pal-
au. Some countries are leasing land overseas
(Tonga), and others expect Australia and New
Zealand to offer resettlement opportunities
(Tuvalu, Kiribati).
In the Pacifc, except for Timor-Leste, migra-
tion is mainly a male phenomenon. The strong
demand for caregivers in the United States
and Australasia (but to some extent also in
Kiribati)
92
has stimulated the migration of
skilled women from the region, in particular
from Fiji. Migration of women in Samoa, Pa-
pua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands has
decreased during the past four decades, al-
though these years have implied an important
re-equilibrium of the migration gender-bias
that has for long characterised the region.
A Final Remark on the Emigration of
Women in ACP Countries
The descriptive data on female migration in
ACP countries allows for highlighting some
general trends and isolating specifc cases,
which can be further researched to with a
view toward improving the understanding of
changing gender dynamics in migratory proc-
esses. However, it is questionable to rely on
statistics for countries that have gone through
severe conficts. Further, few censuses have
been undertaken in the past decades, usually
of dubious quality. Indeed it is not uncommon
that in the UNDESA statistics on female share
of international migrant stocks (%) we fnd the
same fgure for both 1960 and 2005. Another
important limitation in this area is the pau-
city of evidence and studies on South-South
migration of women in ACP countries. Female
migration from ACP countries is mainly ana-
lysed from a South-North migration perspec-
tive, and little is known about the South-South
female migration patterns, except for studies
describing anecdotal experiences as concerns
the traffcking of women within the ACP re-
gions and of women moving from an ACP to
another ACP country to enter into previously
male-dominated areas of employment, such
as petty trade in border areas.
93
Even less is
known about the conditions of women who are
refugees and internally displaced. Interna-
tional organizations and NGOs are increasingly
inserting nutrition,
94
reproductive health and
gender equality into post-confict and demo-
bilization programs (e.g. in Mozambique and
Angola),
95
but still more can be done to tap
the development potential of women in reset-
tlement areas.
Notes
1 - The lower estimate is taken from UNDESA (2009)
Trends in Total Migrant Stocks: The 2008 Revision,
New York; whereas the higher forecast is based on the
Sussex DRC Migration Dataset, version IV, 2007.
2 - Zlotnik Hania (2003)
3 - Data on GDP per capita are from World Develop-
ment Indicators. World Bank (2009a)
4 - Bakewell Oliver (2009)
72
5 - Letouz Emmanuel, Mark Purser, Francisco Ro-
drguez, and Matthew Cummins (2009)
6 - Ratha, D. and Shaw, W. (2007)
7 - Those not taking part include Afghanistan, Colom-
bia, Peru, North Korea, Myanmar, Bhutan, Taiwan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Western Sahara, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Togo,
Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Sudan, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Somalia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Con-
go, and Madagascar. Source: United Nations, available
online at:
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/
census).
8 - The Sussex DRC Dataset Version IV is an important
source of statistics on international migration that
provides data on both countries of origin and country
of destination that can help to identify the major in-
tra-ACP migration corridors. This Global Migrant Origin
Database has been compiled by the Development Re-
search Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty
at the University of Sussex, England. There are four
versions of this dataset and we have taken the most
recent, because even though it is the least exact, it
is also the fullest in terms of coverage and has been
updated to 2007. The dataset is made of a matrix of
226 x 226 countries and territories and is based on na-
tional censuses conducted during the year 2000 round
of censuses in both countries of destination and ori-
gin. Isolating ACP countries, we obtain a fgure of 23.2
million migrant stocks in the world, slightly above the
UNDESA statistics, representing 2.7% of the total ACP
population. The comparison between these two data-
sets is important because there are some signifcant
differences at country and regional levels. These are
mainly due to different ways of calculating estimates.
It is important to note that both datasets present data
on migrant stocks i.e. the total number of migrants
both by country of origin and country of destination
and not the annual (or periodic) fows of migrants
between countries. The stocks are the cumulative ef-
fect of fows over a much longer period of time than
a year and hence are generally much greater than
annual fows would be. The dataset is available on-
line at: http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/type-
sofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html. A
detailed analysis of the limitations and potentialities
of this dataset for migration research can be found
in Parsons Christopher R., Ronald Skeldon, Terrie L.
Walmsley, L. Alan Winters (2007)
9 - See for example, the review of the literature in
ECLAC/CDCC (1998); ECLAC (2006); ECLAC (2006a)
10 - Bakewell Oliver (2009)
11 - United Nations Migration Chart available at:
http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/2006Migration_Chart/Migration2006.pdf
12 - Konseiga Adama (2005) New Patterns of Migra-
tion in West Africa, Wiener Zeitschrift fr kritische
Afrikastudien, Nr. 8/2005, Vol. 5, pp. 25-46; Adepoju
Aderanti (2005)
13 - African Union (2006)
14 - The 15 members of ECOWAS are: Benin, Burki-
na Faso, Cape Verde, Cte dIvoire, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sier-
ra Leone, Togo, Guinea (suspended after 2008 coup
dtat) and Niger (suspended after 2009 self-coup).
15 - The EAC members are the Republics of Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Its headquar-
ters are in Arusha, Tanzania. For example, in April
2010 the United Republic of Tanzania cancelled the
visa requirement for nationals of Burundi travelling
into its territory.
16 - SADC Member States are Angola, Botswana,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zim-
babwe.
17 - COMESA Member States are Burundi, Comoros,
D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sey-
chelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zim-
babwe.
18 - ECCAS Member States are Angola, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Gabon,
Guinea, Rwanda, and So Tom and Prncipe.
19 - The CEN-SAD includes 28 Member States, as fol-
lows: Central African Republic, Eritrea, Djibouti,
Gambia, Senegal, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia,
Tunisia, Benin, Togo, Cte dIvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Li-
beria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Comoro, Guinea, Kenya,
Mauritania and So Tom and Prncipe.
20 - I am grateful to Prof Aderanti Adepoju for this
comment during the review process.
21 - ACP Group of States and the New Land Foundation
(2004) p. 35.
22 - Landau, Loren B. and Segatti, Aurelia Wa Kabwe
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(2009); Landau, Loren (2005)
23 - Buscher Dale (2009)
24 - OECD/SWAC (1998)
25 - The UNDESA Population Division 2003 Migrant
Stocks Revision (Population Division, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations (2004)
Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision.
United Nations: New York, 2004) indicates a fgure
of 6.8, whereas the OECD comes up with a fgure of
7.5 million migrants moving within West Africa,

OECD
(2006)
26 - Konseiga Adama (2005)
27 - In West Africa the expulsion of undocumented mi-
grants is endemic. Senegal expelled Guineans in 1967;
Cte dIvoire expelled about 16,000 Beninese in 1964;
Sierra-Leone, and later Guinea and Cte dIvoire, ex-
pelled Ghanaian fshermen in 1968. Earlier on, Cte
dIvoire had expelled over 1,000 Benin and Togo na-
tionals in 1958; Chad expelled thousands of Benin
nationals who were illegal migrants and not law-
abiding. In early 1979 Togolese farmers were expelled
from Ghana and Cte dIvoire. Ghana expelled all ille-
gal aliens without valid residence permits in December
1969; this exercise involved an estimated half-a-million
people, mostly from Nigeria, Upper Volta and Niger.
Nigerian traders were once expelled from Cameroon,
Zaire and Cte dIvoire. These examples show that ex-
pulsion has been used extensively by most countries of
the sub-region. The largest case of mass expulsion of
undocumented aliens took place in Nigeria in 1983 and
1985. Adepoju Aderanti (2005) p. 4.
28 - Kress Brad (2006)
29 - According to Whitehead Ann and Hashim Iman
(2005) pp. 40-41: Cte dIvoire, in particular, being
the leading producer of the worlds cocoa (50%), has
been singled out as a country where many children
are involved in migration, including children consid-
ered to be traffcked [] the reduced prices going to
cocoa farmers upon privatization of the cocoa market,
has translated into a reduced price paid for labour,
which in turn, translated into an increased search for
the cheapest forms of labour. As a result, child mi-
grant workers have been extremely important in the
establishment and expansion of cocoa production in
the Cte dIvoire. Although many of these come with
their families and are working as family labour, some
are independent child migrants and they have been
the subject of considerable public concern regarding
coercion used to recruit them and the slave-like con-
ditions of their contracts.
30 - Zongo Mahamadou (2003)
31 - According to the Ministry of the Environment, the
forested area of Cte dIvoire decreased from 10 mil-
lion to three million hectares between 1988 and 2005.
Until 1984, the rate of deforestation in Cte dIvoire
was about 2.5 percent per year; but following the
start of widespread cocoa and coffee cultivation, it
rose to 11 percent annually. However, it is not only mi-
gration from elsewhere in the region that is to blame,
notes the United Nations Environment Programme.
According to this agency, the arrival of people from
the north of Cte dIvoire accounts for a large part of
the exploitation of forests. The south will experience
similar desertifcation if reforestation efforts in this
region are not intensifed. Zambl Fulgence (2007)
32 - Thorsen Dorte (2005)
33 - Kwankye Stephen O., John K. Anarf, Cynthia Ad-
doquaye Tagoe and Adriana Castaldo (2006)
34 - Whitehead Ann and Iman Hashim (2005)
35 - Hein Philippe (2004)
36 - Lincoln David (2009)
37 - Lututala Mumpasi B. (undated)
38 - http://www.unhcr.org, countries briefng notes,
accessed on 21 January 2010.
39 - Ngoie Tshibambe Germain, Mukohya Vwakyana-
kazi (undated)
40 - Ngoie Tshibambe Germain, Mukohya Vwakyana-
kazi (undated)
41 - Crush Jonathan, Vincent Williams, Sally Peberdy
(2005)
42 - Crush Jonathan, et al., (2005) p. 8.
43 - Ibidem
44 - Ibidem, p. 23.
45 - Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (undated)
46 - Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (2006) in ECLAC 2006a,
p. 58.
47 - Ibidem
48 - ECLAC (2006b)
49 - In 1999 an Amnesty came into effect allowing un-
documented migrants and recent arrivals to apply for
permanent residency as long as the applicant could
satisfy certain conditions. ECLAC (2006), p. 22.
50 - ECLAC/CDCC (2001)
51 - Kairi Consultants (2000); Thomas-Hope Elizabeth
(2003) p. 7.
52 - AS outlined by Dr Bridget Wooding during the peer
74
review process, the issue of sex-workers in the Car-
ibbean is a complex one and involves different pat-
terns of migration. For example, Dominican Republic
women have been going, legally, to Curacao since the
1950s (continuing to the present) in well regulated
and safe migration in the sex industry. This has been
documented, for example, by Kamala Kempadoo in
Sexing the Caribbean (2004) and the wider issues ex-
plored in Lesser Taryn et al (2006).
53 - Ibidem, p. 7.
54 - IOM and FLACSO (2004)
55 - Children without birth certifcates can enrol in
primary school up to sixth grade. However, there is
a high correlation between lack of a birth certifcate
and dropping out of school. World Bank (2006)
56 - Wooding Bridget (2009)
57 - Ferguson James (2003)
58 - Kairi Consultants (2000)
59 - Ibidem, p. xvi.
60 - Ibidem
61 - According to Helen Lee the vision of Tongan writer
Epeli Hauofa challenges the Western notion of the
Pacifc as an isolated and remote area. See Lee Helen
(2009)
62 - This paragraph has been contributed by Prof. Vi-
jay Naidu at the University of South Pacifc, during the
peer review process.
63 - Asian Development Bank (2009)
64 - Connell John (2003)
65 - Connell John (2003) in UNESCAP (2003)
66 - These fgures on the urbanization levels were
provided by Prof Vijay Naidu, at University of South
Pacifc, during the peer review process.
67 - Small C.A. and D. L. Dixon (2004)
68 - ACP Group of States and the New Land Founda-
tion (2004)
69 - Ibidem, p. 27.
70 - Walmsley Terrie L., S. Amer Ahmed, Christopher
R. Parsons (2007)
71 - ACP country migrants represent 13% of the non-
OECD foreign-born living in OECD nations, OECD
(2005)
72 - Lututala M.B. (2007)
73 - Schoumaker B., S. Vause, J. Mangalu (2009)
74 - Ratha D. and Z. Xu (2008)
75 - Donata Gnisci and Marie Trmolires (2006)
76 - Aderanti Adepoju (2006)
77 - UNHCR database, available at: http://www.unh-
cr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html accessed on 20 Janu-
ary 2010.
78 - ICMPD (2007)
79 - ICMPD (2008)
80 - Homewood Katherine, Ernestina Coast, Michael
Thompson (2004)
81 - This was particularly detrimental to women and
other dependents who did not qualify for registration
and land titles in the frst instance, Homewood Kath-
erine et al. (2004) p. 570.
82 - Ibidem, p. 573.
83 - ESCAP (2007) p.7.
84 - Ibidem, p. 8.
85 - Ibidem, p. 9.
86 - Docquier F. and H. Rapoport (2008)
87 - Mohanty M., M. Reddy and V. Naidu (2006)
88 - Gibson J. and D. McKenzie (2009)
89 - Ingram Imogen P. (2004)
90 - Foliaki Sunia and Neil Pearce (2003)
91 - Aitaoto, Nia, Joann Tsark, and Kathryn L. Braun,
(2009). According to this article Native Hawaiians
have the highest diabetes mortality rates of major
ethnic groups in Hawaii, at approximately 8%.The
World Health Organization and diabetes specialists in
the region note a high prevalence of diabetes in all
US-associated Pacifc Island jurisdictions. Estimates
suggest that 94% of American Samoans are overweight
or obese and 47% have diabetes. In the RMI, estimat-
ed diabetes prevalence is 30%, and amputation rates
increased by 28% from 2000 to 2001. In the CNMI, a
survey of tenth grade students found that 78% of stu-
dents had family members with diabetes and 64% of
the students had three or more risk factors (e.g. fam-
ily history, high body mass index [BMI], elevated cho-
lesterol, high blood pressure, tobacco use). In Guam,
diabetes prevalence doubled from 5% in 1996 to 10% in
2003. A door-to-door survey in Palau yielded a diabe-
tes prevalence rate of 14% in the group aged 50 to 64
years and 23.5% in the group aged 65 or older.
92 - Rokoduru Avelina (2006)
93 - Adepoju Aderanti (2006)
94 - For example, the NGO Alliance for Migration,
Leadership and Development (AMLD www.amld-ong.
org) together with WHO is carrying out a study on
nutrition for population in resettlement areas like
refugees camps, IDPs, to promote specifc nutriments
available from the local biodiversity.
95 - Irena Omelaniuk (undated)
This chapter focuses on the trends and patterns of migrant capital. The
chapter will identify main infows and outfows of migrant economic,
social, cultural and human capital. Two important mobility corridors will
be analysed in order to identify existing bottlenecks, good practices and
projects supporting the positive impact of mobility on development.
migrANT CApiTALS: TrENdS,
pATTErNS ANd mAiN COrridOrS
ChApTEr 4
Istockphotos
Istockphotos
Istockphotos
Lai-momo
76
migrANT CApiTALS: TrENdS, pATTErNS
ANd mAiN COrridOrS
ChApTEr 4
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This chapter focuses on the trends and patterns of migrant capital. The chapter
will identify main infows and outfows of migrant economic, social, cultural and
human capital. Two important mobility corridors will be analysed in order to
identify existing bottlenecks, good practices and projects supporting the positive
impact of mobility on development.
An Overview of migrant Economic Capital
in the ACP Countries
Evidence that the poor do not move much or
that, if they do, they move nearby into not-so-
rich countries, is based on statistics regarding
migrant workers remittances. In 2009, it was
estimated that the ACP countries received ap-
proximately US$28.2 billion in remittances or
8.9 per cent of the US$316 billion received by
developing countries (see Graph 4.1).
To put this in perspective, two countries alone
Mexico and Morocco receive about the
same amount of remittances as the entire ACP
Group of States. The ACP countries remittanc-
es are shared as follows: 6.5 per cent is re-
ceived by the Sub-Saharan African countries,
2.3 per cent by the Caribbean countries and
0.1 per cent by the Pacifc countries.
Three-quarters (US$20.5 billion) of the ACP
workers remittances go to Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries, a quarter to the Caribbean re-
gion, and a small 1.5 per cent to the Pacifc
Islands. Table 4.0 shows the distribution of
remittances, migrants and population shares
among ACP countries.
In relative terms, the Caribbean region per-
forms best among ACP regions: representing
only 4.4 per cent of the ACP population and
22 per cent of its migrants in the world, it is
able to tap more than a quarter of all ACP re-
mittances. The worst performance is by the
ACP African countries, confrming the impact
of reduced mobility on their populations. The
few ACP countries that have a considerable
portion of their diasporas living in wealthy
northern countries can reap more benefts
from mobility.
The relationship between remittances and mo-
bility patterns refects the assumption made
at the onset of the report: most of the ACP
migrants fnd themselves in a mobility trap; in
other words, they move but to countries that
can offer little in terms of economic capital
accumulation. Some people even move into
countries with lower per capita GDP.
At the sub-regional level of Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, this phenomenon is even more evident.
Graph 4.1 - ACP and World Migrant Worker's
Remittances in Billion USD, 2009
Source: own elaboration based on WB Dataset, 2009.
78
Among ACP Africa regions, Western Africa
(having noteworthy diasporas in France and
other European countries) receives the bulk
of remittances (61.8 per cent) although it ac-
counts for only 46 per cent of migrants from
ACP African countries. In contrast, Central/
Middle African countries tap a meagre 0.9 per
cent of remittances, although they account
for 17 per cent of ACP African migrants. South-
ern Africa receives 7.7 per cent of remittances
fowing into ACP Africa, although its migrants
comprise only 5 per cent of Sub-Saharan mi-
grants, spread across various regions includ-
ing North America and Oceania. The 31.5 per
cent of Sub-Saharan African migrants originat-
ing from Eastern African countries tap 29.5 per
cent of the regions remittances.
Table 4.1 shows the absolute fgure for work-
ers remittances infows in each ACP country
for which the data are available. The data for
the last fve years also allow us to see some
variations following the global fnancial crisis,
the impact of which will be discussed in a sub-
sequent section of this chapter. In addition to
remittance infows to ACP countries and re-
gions, there are also outfows, which although
substantially lower than inward fows, they
are an indication of the importance of intra-
regional migration.
1
The US$28.2 billion of
remittances infows to ACP countries in 2009
originate from few countries. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, four countries Nigeria (US$9.5 bil-
lion), Sudan (US$3 billion), Kenya (US$1.5 bil-
lion) and Senegal (US$1.2 billion) account
for three-fourths of the remittances tapped
by the African sub-regions. In the Caribbean,
three countries the Dominican Republic
(US$3.3 billion), Jamaica (US$1.9 billion)
and Haiti (US$1.2 billion) account for about
90 per cent of the regions remittances. In
the Pacifc, Fiji (US$169 million) and Samoa
(US$131 million) account for two-thirds of
the regions remittances. A shock in these key
countries can thus contribute to large varia-
tions in remittances for the entire ACP Group.
It is therefore necessary from a policy per-
spective to understand the dynamics of the
main remittance corridors for the key ACP
remittance countries in order to devise meas-
ures that facilitate transfers and reduce costs
in both the formal and informal remittance
transfer systems.
A study of informal remittance systems in the
ACP countries underlined the important func-
tion of these systems for migrants and their ar-
eas of origin. International migrants access to
money transfer operators and fnancial servic-
es are constrained by language, culture, socio-
economic position and legal status. They often
revert to informal systems, in part because of
the distance between their home villages and
formal banking and fnancial infrastructure.
Informal remittance systems can, in this re-
gard, be more effcient in reaching the fnal
recipient. There is no evidence that channel-
ling informal remittances into formal systems
will make them more accessible or cheaper.
Yet there is a need to explore ways to satisfy
the security and law-enforcement concerns of
states, without restricting the proven ability
of these systems to provide a much-needed
service.
2
Remittances and the Global Financial Crisis
The 2008 crisis in the global 3Fs (fuel, food
and fnance) that hit the world economy has
spared no one. In 2009, remittances to Latin
America and the Caribbean declined by 7 per
cent, those to the Middle-East and North Af-
rica by 6 per cent, and those to Sub-Saharan
Africa by 8 per cent. Intra-ACP workers re-
mittances are also declining sharply (as in the
case of remittances from South Africa to SADC
countries) and the situation may prove more
Table 4.1 Remittances and
migration in ACp
Source: own elaboration based on
World Bank (2008) estimates.
79
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serious for some small,
poor countries where re-
mittances make up a rela-
tively large share of GDP
(see Graph 4.2).
Migrant workers are gen-
erally more vulnerable in
times of crisis, and a reduc-
tion in wages has inevitably
affected the amount of re-
mittances sent back home
as well. Unemployment
among migrants is gener-
ally higher than among
native workers. The jobs
of male migrant workers
are concentrated in sec-
tors such as construction
and manufacturing, which
are particularly affected
by the crisis. Female-dom-
inated low-income occu-
pations such as domestic
work, caring for children
and the elderly or manu-
facturing items in export
processing zones are af-
fected in different ways.
3

During the recent econom-
ic crisis, female-dominated
occupations in the service
sectors (health and care of
children and the elderly)
proved more resilient to
the downturn because of
the increased global de-
mand in the care sector.
This is a phenomenon that
is attracting worldwide
attention, not least since
the United Nations agreed
(in 2010) to begin to draw
up a new international in-
strument to better protect
domestic workers (and es-
pecially migrant domestic
workers). However, em-
ployment conditions have
Table 4.2 - Worker's Remittances, Compensation of Employees,
and Migrant Transfers, Credit (US$ Million)
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary
Funds Balance of Payments Statistic Yearbook 2008.
80
worsened in this sector, as is also the case in
other sectors, with migrants in general pay-
ing the heaviest toll.
4
This indicates that so-
cial and cultural context infuences migration
patterns both in countries origin and destina-
tion, and even though female migration has
increased in most countries, migration policies
have not yet taken this into account.
Women have also received more attention as
remittance-managers and receivers. It has
been confrmed that the share of earnings sent
by women is higher than that sent by men (al-
though womens remittances are inferior in ab-
solute terms, because their wages are lower),
and that remittances made by women prioritise
expenses on education, clothing and health.
The fact that many ACP countries have a low
degree of integration to the global fnancial
system has cushioned them against some of
the most severe effects of the crisis. However,
ACP countries have been affected negatively
by international trade, mainly via increased
commodity and oil prices and a decreased de-
mand for their exports. Scarce diversifcation
in the economies of the ACP countries has in-
creased the level of vulnerability to the crisis.
The global fnancial crisis has also led to a dra-
matic slowdown of FDI in ACP states, a reduc-
tion of exports, and a sharp decline in remit-
tances. Foreign reserves to cover imports are
dwindling, jeopardising the capacity of many
countries to import even basic products such
as food, medical supplies and agricultural in-
puts. The estimated loss of output is signif-
cant and erodes the results of positive growth
in previous years. As a result, per capita in-
come is declining and resources for national
development are being curtailed. Investment
Box 4.1 - Beyond Overseas
Development Assistance
As indicated by the Migration and Remit-
tances Team of the World Bank, Sub-Sa-
haran Africa continues to depend on off-
cial aid for its external fnancing needs. In
2006, ODA was more than two-and-a-half
times the size of private fows received by
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the recent increase
in ODA appears to be driven by debt relief
provided through the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative and the Multilateral
Debt Relief Initiative (IBRD 2007). Accord-
ing to IBRD (2007), debt relief represented
close to 70% of the increase in bilateral of-
fcial development assistance (ODA) to Sub-
Saharan Africa between 2001 and 2005.
The relatively small FDI fows to the region
went mostly to enclave investments in oil-
exporting countries. Portfolio bond and eq-
uity fows were almost non-existent outside
South Africa. Private debt fows were small
and predominantly relationship-based
commercial bank lending, and even these
fows were mostly short-term in tenor. Less
than half the countries in the region have a
sovereign rating from the major credit rat-
ing agencies. Of those that are rated, most
have below-investment grade ratings. Cap-
ital outfows appear to be smaller than in
the previous decade, but the stock of fight
capital from the region remains high.
Migrant remittances appear to be increas-
ing, but much of the fow is believed to be
unrecorded as it bypasses formal fnancial
channels. In short, there is little room for
complacency; efforts to explore new sourc-
es and innovative mechanisms for fnancing
development in the region must continue.
Source: summary from Dilip Ratha, Sanket Moha-
patra, Sonia Plaza (2008) Beyond Aid: New Sources
and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Devel-
opment in Sub-Saharan Africa, Policy Research
Working Paper 4609, The World Bank, Develop-
ment Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances
Team, April 2008. Available at:
ht t p: //s i t er es our ces . wor l dbank. or g/I N-
TPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/
wps4609_BeyondAid.pdf
81
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plans have been scaled back in African growth
poles, reducing the demand for labour and in-
creasing the informalisation of the economy.
There are also signifcant secondary effects
in smaller neighbouring countries related to
petty trade linkages and remittances.
In this context, the increased vulnerability of
migrants and the negative effects on the com-
munities left behind in terms of reduced dis-
posable income is palpable.
From a global dialogue perspective, ACP coun-
tries as a group should aim to be part of the
overall response to the crisis by promoting re-
gional dialogue and common positions, as to
assure sustained fows of migrant economic
capital to ACP regions.
Macroeconomic Importance of Remittances in
ACP Countries
For many countries and regions, remittances
represent a very important source of foreign
currency, and their importance to macroeco-
nomic stability is shown by the share of remit-
tances in the GDP (see Graph 4.2).
Especially for small countries and island
states, remittances correspond to a relatively
large share of GDP, as follows: Tonga (37.7 per
cent) and Samoa (25.8 per cent) in the Pacifc;
Lesotho (27.3 per cent), Togo (10.1 per cent),
Senegal (9.8 per cent) and Cape Verde (9.0 per
cent) in Sub-Saharan Africa; and Guyana (24
per cent), Haiti (18.7 per cent) and Jamaica
(14.5 per cent) in the Caribbean are just the
most remarkable examples of remittance-de-
pendent economies.
In the following sections a sub-regional anal-
ysis of migrants remittances is presented,
comparing remittances to Overseas Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA).
Migrants Remittances in Western Africa
When calculated as a percentage of GDP, the
importance of remittances to the economies
of some countries in Western Africa is strik-
ing, specifcally in the cases of Sierra Leone,
Cape Verde, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau.
However, when compared to ODA in per capita
terms, remittances become less important,
although it should be emphasised that re-
mittances are direct household-to-household
transfers and therefore have a stronger im-
pact on recipient income than ODA.
The low per capita fgure for remittances can
be explained by the fact that the entire sub-re-
gion is highly dependent on ODA, while migra-
tion is mainly a regional phenomenon. There-
fore, remittances sent home are lower than if
they were sent from a higher-wage country.
There are, however, some noteworthy ex-
ceptions such as Nigeria, where remittances
per capita in 2007 topped US$62, compared
to US$14 in ODA, and Senegal which received
US$75 per capita in remittances, especially
thanks to the diaspora in France, while receiv-
ing US$68 in ODA. An interesting case of strong
dependency on foreign sources of currency in
the region is Cape Verde: in 2007, remittances
accounted for US$262 per capita and ODA for
US$308 per capita. In Togo, remittances total
twice as much as ODA per capita (see Graph
4.3).
The recent literature on the impact of remit-
tances in the region reveals a general consen-
sus that remittances reduce the headcount
poverty index and reduce the level, depth and
severity of poverty. Poverty is further reduced
when international, as opposed to internal,
remittances are considered.
5
When looking at
the impact of migrants economic capital on
development, conclusions are less straightfor-
ward. While remittances undoubtedly play an
important role in human capital accumulation
by educating young boys and girls and easing
access to health services, thus creating condi-
tions for long-term development, their use for
income-generating investments and related
multiplier effects seems to be rather limited.
This is due to many factors, chiefy lack of trust
in the intermediaries (often family members)
that are to monitor the investments, diffused
distrust in the local public administration, the
absence of services and structures supporting
and assisting the creation of small and medi-
um-sized enterprises with migrant funding,
and the migratory regimes currently in place
which often hinder the back-and-forth mobil-
82
ity of migrants who decide to invest in their
home countries. This is particularly true for
the European Union migration policies which
have restrictive features that create strong
disincentives for migrant workers to invest in
their home countries.
6
Collective Remittances: the Case of Gidimaxa
Jikk in Mali
7
This example of Malians originating from the
region of Kayes (mainly ethnic Soninke) living
in France has been used often in the literature
on remittances. The history of these organi-
sations began with the 1973-1974 drought as
a form of solidarity aid. Since the 1980s, the
organisations in France started to pursue a
philanthropic approach by supporting the con-
struction of schools, hospitals and roads, en-
deavouring to complement often-absent state
support in deprived areas. Later, productive
projects were put on the agenda, mainly for
the improvement of the agricultural sector. It
is estimated that the organisations of Malians
in France are responsible for 60 per cent of the
infrastructure projects in the region of Kayes
and for an investment of about 5 million per
year [i.e. about 10 per cent of Frances annual
development aid assistance to Mali].
The groups in France collect the money, design
the project and sometimes assist in the imple-
mentation of the project by sending a mem-
ber of the group to the village of origin. The
socio-cultural dimension of these practices is
quite peculiar. Non-monetary factors play an
important role (the gift to the village commu-
nity left behind, the status that the donation
to the association in France can bestow upon
the individual migrant, etc.) and the logic of
saving is also characteristic of some sub-Saha-
ran cultures which also use the informal saving
systems (tontines) in France. Furthermore, im-
migrant organisations reproduce the same so-
cial structure and hierarchy of the village com-
munity in Mali. The chief of the village in Mali
has an equivalent counterpart chosen with the
same criteria in the organisation in France.
The Gidimaxa Jikk association was created
in 1988 and is comprised of 3,000 Malians origi-
Graph 4.2 - Selected ACP Countries Migrant Workers' Remittances as Percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the International Monetary Funds
Balance of Payments Statistic Yearbook 2008.
83
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nating from the district of Aourou in the region
of Kayes. Some 45,000 people live in Aourou
in 24 villages which base their subsistence
on the cultivation of cereals. The association
has promoted projects in the areas of water
(wells, dikes), health (vaccination campaigns,
community health centres), literacy (motiva-
tional courses to enable the local population
to defne their needs and priorities and pos-
sible projects, training courses for women,
literacy courses), productive activities such as
support for horticultural production (provision
of seeds) and conservation of vegetables, and
road infrastructure (small bridges for crossing
rivers during the rainy season).
Workers Remittances in Southern Africa Are
Greater than Development Aid
Remittances to migrant-sending countries in
Southern Africa have grown steadily over the
past 40 years, despite being subject to the
boom and bust cycles of regional economies.
In the Southern Africa region, remittances are
also more important than ODA, except for Na-
mibia. In Lesotho, for each dollar spent for
development assistance, people receive 3.5
dollars from relatives abroad. In South Africa,
remittances and ODA per capita are almost
equal in amount, whereas Namibians receive
12 times more ODA than remittances (see
graph 4.4).
The recent SAMP survey shows important gen-
der differences in this region. Women remit
less than male migrants, as a consequence of
their lower levels of income and employment
security.
8
The survey also shows that remit-
tances play a vital role in supporting South-
ern African households, and gender differ-
ences have minimal impact on behaviour but
do change remittance volumes, since women
send less. Among the countries surveyed, Le-
sothos female migrants in South Africa send
more than female migrants from Zimbabwe,
Mozambique or Swaziland. This probably re-
fects higher earnings as domestic workers
rather than as informal traders.
9
Remittances in Central/Middle Africa Are
Not Very Important
In the Central African region, remittance in-
fows are negligible. Due to the low rates of in-
ternational migration, remittances do not rep-
resent an important source of revenue (US$4
per capita in 2007 for the Congo, US$9 for
Cameroon, US$8 for Gabon, and US$13 for So
Tom and Prncipe). In contrast, ODA per capita
Graph 4.3 - Comparing Financial Flows in Western Africa
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
84
in 2007 was US$228 for So Tom and Prncipe,
US$34 for the Congo, US$104 for Cameroon and
US$36 for Gabon (see Graph 4.5).
Remittances in Eastern Africa
In Eastern Africa, the potential impact of mi-
grant transfers varies across the sub-region.
Countries such as Mauritius and the Seychelles
are very dependent on remittances, which
are three to four times greater than ODA (see
graph 4.6). The other country with higher re-
mittances per capita compared to ODA is Ken-
ya. An important initiative has developed there
and is described in the following section.
10
The Case of Jijenge Realise Your Dream
The Kenya-based Equity Building Society (EBS)
has linked savings products to remittances.
Jijenge Realise Your Dream is a contrac-
tual savings product targeting the remittances
of Kenyan migrant workers. A part of their re-
mittances is deposited in a saving account in
order to build or purchase a house.
EBS was founded in 1984, and is registered
under the Building Society Act, Chapter 489
in Kenyan legislation. In 1994, EBS shifted its
focus from mortgage fnance to microfnance.
It began targeting the niche of small and medi-
um entrepreneurs, salaried persons in both the
formal and informal sectors, and small-scale
commercial farmers that were not receiving
services from mainstream fnancial institu-
tions. EBS currently serves as a distributor as
well as sender of remittances. Recently, EBS
signed a sub-agency agreement with Western
Union, allowing it to access Western Unions
money transfer services. As a result of the
agreement, Kenyans will be able to access a
worldwide network of 190 countries. EBS has
also partnered with the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) to support investment in a
private sector project to encourage market de-
velopment for photovoltaic energy. In Decem-
ber 2004, the Equity Building Society became a
full-fedged commercial bank. Today, Equity is
a public company that is 80.56 per cent owned
by over 2,416 indigenous shareholders, 8.20
per cent by Britak Investment Company Lim-
ited and 11.24 per cent by AFRICAP (consor-
tium of international development investors,
mainly the International Finance Corporation,
the private sector arm of the World Bank, and
the European Investment Bank).
The largest volume of its remittance business
is from Kenyans living in Europe and the United
States who send money home mainly to save,
invest or support their families. EBS is also
involved in money transfers out of Kenya for
clients that send money to support children
studying abroad. EBS can route international
remittances out of Kenya through Western Un-
ion or through bank telex transfer (traditional
wire transfer).
A specifc EBS product is of interest to this
study: EBS has a contractual savings product,
Jijenge which means Realise Your Dream
in Swahili, through which clients
can save a fxed amount over a
pre-determined period of time.
This product has been linked to
remittances received. EBS clients
include a number of Kenyans liv-
ing overseas who have subscribed
to this product. EBS also has an
ordinary savings account which is
where most remittance recipients
save a portion of their remittanc-
es. Eighty percent of remittance
recipients retain a portion of their
remittances in savings. The proc-
ess involves depositing the money
Graph 4.4 - Comparing Financial Flows
in Southern Africa
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
85
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Graph 4.5 - Comparing Financial Flows in Central/Middle Africa
Graph 4.6 - Comparing Financial Flows in Eastern Africa
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
86
into the savings account and withdrawing sums
at gradual intervals. Jijenge allows a customer
to commit to save a specifc amount of money
within a certain period for a specifc purpose,
such as school fees or business expansion. Ac-
cess to loans can be up to 90 per cent of the
deposits at 1.25 per cent interest rates per
month. The client, not EBS, determines both
the amount and the timeframe. People fnd
this contractual savings very helpful in saving
these small lump sums to use mainly for school
fees, buying household items, electronic ap-
pliances (in urban areas) and working tools or
cattle (in rural areas).
11
EBS also offers fxed deposits that provide a
premium interest-earning investment oppor-
tunity and super junior investment accounts to
invest in the future of dependants. It also pro-
vides education loans, salary advances, medi-
cal loans, business loans, farm input advances,
and development loans for the acquisition of
durable assets. EBSs other services include a
training program which equips clients with ba-
sic business skills as well as bank and school
fee cheques and Western Union money trans-
fers, remittance processing and inter-branch
transfers.
12

Caribbean Migrant Workers Remittances: an
Important Source of Revenue
Remittance fows sent home by Caribbean
migrants have been widely documented. The
data shows steady growth during the past for-
ty years, especially in the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, Haiti and Guyana.
Compared to GDP, remittance shares vary
from 24 per cent in Guyana and 18.7 per cent
in Haiti to about 7 per cent in St. Kitts and
Nevis and the Dominican Republic. Since 2008,
the global fnancial crisis has contributed to a
sharp decline (a drop of 7 per cent-8 per cent),
due to the high number of workers laid off in
the main destination countries (especially the
United States), pushing many of the house-
holds left behind below the poverty line.
13
In comparison to ODA, remittances represent
a much more important source of foreign
revenues for most Caribbean countries and
households, in particular the poorest ones. In
Guyana, remittances per capita were US$377
Graph 4.7 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Caribbean
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
87
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compared to US$178 in development aid per
capita in 2007 (see Graph 4.7); similarly, for
each development dollar received in Haiti,
about two dollars arrive in the form of remit-
tances.
There are two important initiatives in this re-
gion that support the utilisation of the addi-
tional income made available by remittances
for entrepreneurial activities. These are pre-
sented in the following sections.
The Case of the Dominican Association for the
Development of Women ADOPEM
An important experience linking microfnance
and remittances is that of the Dominican As-
sociation for the Development of Women
ADOPEM, an affliate of the Womens World
Banking Network. ADOPEM is embarking on a
strategy to integrate remittances into its cur-
rent business lines in partnership with Quis-
queyana (a money transfer operator). The
institution is professionally managed, offers
personalised services, utilises an internal
credit methodology and has embraced tech-
nology in its operations.
In the spring of 2003 ADOPEM recently con-
verted to a development bank, when it also
acquired Banco de Desarrollo del Valle. By De-
cember 2002, ADOPEM had extended a total
of 36,700 credits, providing Dominican women
credit for micro- and small businesses, as well
as training, as a means to economic empower-
ment and integration to the formal fnancial
sector. ADOPEM also offers individual loans
for business investment, working capital and
housing, as well as savings products. A measur-
able and reliable stream of remittances could
help secure many of ADOPEMs products and
services, including those targeting families
in extreme poverty and struggling businesses
that lack collateral.
Because ADOPEMs capacity-building train-
ing programs for management and vocational
skills are well-known and well-attended by mi-
crofnance professionals, this type of organisa-
tion might be a promising partner for delivery
of programs related to the productive use of
remittances within the context of fnancial ed-
ucation. Their adoption of palm- or handheld
devices for mobile credit portfolio manage-
ment illustrates a readiness to take advantage
of information technologies in their portfolio.
ADOPEMs vision is to further leverage remit-
tances into micro-health insurance, planned
savings, home improvement loans and other
products.
The Case of the Fonkoze Microcredit Service -
Haitis Alternative Bank for the Organised Poor
A New York-based microfnance institute,
Fonkoze - Fondasyon Kole Zepl (which trans-
lates as the Shoulder to Shoulder Foundation)
has recently entered the remittance business
together with a local money transfer opera-
tor, Rapid Transf. Fonkoze is Haitis largest
microcredit organisation, with 15 offces in
nine provinces of Haiti, offering microcredit
and saving schemes built on the principle of
solidarity. In 2004, the foundation organised a
summit in Haiti with microcredit institutions
from Asia and Africa to exchange experiences,
and in 2005 staff visited the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh and other similar programs to un-
dergo intensive training.
Today, it offers an international deposit service
called Ayiti Dirk Dirk Direct to Haiti for
Haitians living in the United States, in partner-
ship with the City National Bank of New Jersey,
which is headed by a Haitian-born person. With
the January 2010 earthquake, the transfer fee
has been temporarily abolished (usually there is
a US$10 fat rate for transfers under US$1000).
The remitter can send money home by de-
positing the money or the check in a special
account that is then automatically deposited
in the account in Haiti. Fonkozes remittance
services are also used by home town associa-
tions, churches and charity organisations. In
ten years, the number of loan clients has in-
creased from 110 to 31,090 and the saving ac-
counts have increased from 193 to 94,342 and
have transferred more than ten million dollars
(US$ 7.3 million in 2004 alone). Borrowers are
practically all women (99 per cent).
Fonkoze in Haiti was conceived of by its cur-
rent coordinator Reverend Joseph Philippe, to-
88
gether with civil society leaders that emerged
with the end of the military dictatorship. The
idea of a bank for the poor was motivated by a
Catholic ideal to empower people and provide
education, health and seed money for small
businesses. The literacy and business training
programs developed by Fonkoze have also been
adopted in Haiti by USAID and other NGOs.
The success factors for this microcredit foun-
dation involve the alliance with City National
Bank of New Jersey, which has a Haitian-born
chairman and thus accepted a lowering of the
transfer fee and the engagement of a local
Catholic priest who perceived the importance
of linking microcredit with social and pro-poor
programs, inspired by successful experiences
such as the Grameen Bank.
In the Pacifc Remittances Are an Important
Source of Household Income and Support
Macroeconomic Stability
Data on remittances point to the importance
of migration as a livelihood strategy in coun-
tries with fragile ecosystems and small econ-
omies, such as the Pacifc Island Countries
(PICs). In Tonga, workers remittances account
for about 38 per cent of GDP and are around
26 per cent in Samoa. For every dollar of ODA
received in Tonga and Samoa, three dollars of
private transfers (remittances) are received
(see Graph 4.8).
In other countries such as the Solomon Islands,
Fiji, Kiribati and Vanuatu, remittances are
much less important than ODA, but as they are
a direct transfer to households, remittances
are often the only cash infow families have.
Due to the low rate of emigration from coun-
tries like Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands, remittances are negligible.
The developmental impact of remittances
in the PICs is debated,
14
and more informa-
tion about recent trends is needed to inform
policy-makers.
15
There are strong indications
that migration represents an important liveli-
hood strategy in a context where employment
opportunities outside the public sector are
minimal. However, little is known beyond the
use of migration as a safety-valve in response
to pressing employment issues. Remittances
have undoubtedly stimulated construction
and services and spurred consumption, and
hence infation, but given the economic and
trade structure of these economies there is
still wide scope for policy intervention to inte-
grate mobility as a development factor. These
interventions can focus especially on ensuring
that remittances will not decay and instead
be sustained by ageing migrants able to fnd
opportunities for return.
There are also important differences in the
PICs when looking at remittances. For exam-
ple, in the Fiji Islands, remittances between
Indo-Fijian families are minimal since they
tend to perceive migration as a permanent
resettlement due to persistent discrimination,
whereas indigenous Fijian families are more
dependent on remittances since they perceive
migration as a temporary project.
16

migrant human Capital:
The Brain drain and the Brain gain
In analysing remittances, the fow of economic
capital accumulated by migrants is almost uni-
directional: from abroad to the community of
origin, often with a positive impact on devel-
opment and poverty alleviation. In the case of
migrant human capital, the fow generally goes
in the opposite direction: from the migrant
country of origin to the destination country,
often with negative development impacts at
home in terms of the depletion of human re-
sources. This is referred to as brain drain.
However, migrant human capital can also
fow in the opposite direction in case of re-
turn, whether permanent or temporary; this is
called brain gain. Yet migrant returns are not
only statistically rather insignifcant but there
are very few studies on their impact, thus lim-
iting efforts to demonstrate a rebalancing fow
of knowledge, skills and technologies acquired
abroad and transferred back home.
The utilisation of migrant human capital for
the development of the home country thus re-
mains a largely unexplored research feld, and
its positive impact is based on the assumption
that, upon return, migrants automatically fnd
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ways to deploy the skills and knowledge ac-
quired before and during the migration. A key
question for policy makers in ACP countries is
whether, given the lack of empirical analysis
regarding the impact of return migration, at
least creating the conditions for utilisation of
returnees skills and knowledge is a policy goal
to be addressed in the medium-term.
Migration, Brain Drain and Human Development
In the approach used in this report, the op-
portunity for a nurse, an engineer or a medical
doctor to migrate from a poor African country
to another country where he or she can fnd a
job matching expectations represents a very
important aspect of the individual freedom to
pursue a life worth living. However, we stated
from the onset that the exercise of individual
freedoms should not limit the freedoms of
others. For example, if the migration of the
nurse, engineer or medical doctor from an
ACP country implies that the hospitals at home
cannot deliver proper health services or that
roads cannot be built, then their actions jeop-
ardise the human development of others. The
stories that there are more Malawian doctors
in Manchester, Britain than in all of Malawi and
more physicians from
So Tom and Prncipe
in Portugal than at home
are unfortunately true,
and does not help to
reduce maternal and
infant mortality rates in
these African countries.
To regulate this situ-
ation and ensure the
happiness of both those
that want to migrate
and those that stay is
the realm of public pol-
icy that links migration
with development, and
which has been quite
absent in many devel-
oping countries to date.
This absence is justifed
by the predominant way
of thinking, strongly rooted in an approach
that treated (and sometimes institutionalised)
skilled migrants as an export commodity in ex-
change for the fow of remittances into the
country.
Early debates on brain drain highlighted gov-
ernment investment of substantial portions
of the national budget and development
aid to train nurses, engineers and medical
doctors and the economic loss for the state
when they leave the country. This would also
happen in countries where skilled migration is
highly institutionalised and regulated; indeed,
countries with a strong tradition of sending
professionals abroad are still suffering from
fragile health and education sectors. In con-
trast to this pessimistic approach, the more
recent and optimistic new brain drain litera-
ture has highlighted that there are usually sig-
nifcant infows of remittances to the country
following this skilled migration, and also that
this type of migration increases the expected
return from education, which may convince
youngsters to enrol in universities.
This debate on the positive or negative aspects
of skilled migration on the countrys welfare
has been quite animated in the past decade,
Graph 4.8 - Comparing Financial Flows in the Pacifc Region
Source: own elaboration on UNDP HDR 2009 Dataset.
90
with positions ranging from one extreme to
the other. A recent World Bank publication has
empirically tested some of the underlying as-
sumptions of the new brain drain literature
and has concluded that the impact of skilled
migration on welfare and growth of the home
country is likely to be smaller and the likeli-
hood of a negative impact signifcantly great-
er than reported in the literature. The study
concluded that the early brain drain literature
was close to the mark.
17
These conclusions are exemplifed by the fol-
lowing four arguments: 1) those that migrate
are usually individuals with greater ability and
those that stay generally have less ability; 2)
most migration from developing countries is
unskilled, indicating that education is not the
road to migration; 3) the road to skilled migra-
tion through education is full of uncertainties
(educational success, migration policies of
host countries, family ability to keep paying
for education, etc.); 4) additional resources
spent on education imply greater public and
private spending, fewer taxes (students usu-
ally work little or not at all) and less income
for the households which generate negative
externalities with possible negative impacts
on welfare. Brain drain is a signifcant loss
for developing countries, which can hardly be
compensated for by increased overseas de-
velopment aid investment in social sectors.
Furthermore, considering that this migration
is usually from the Global South to the Global
North, policy implications are important both
for ACP countries and for the coherence of
Global North development policies.
The following sections provide an overview of
skilled migration from ACP regions and sub-
regions.
Brain Drain in Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Haemorrhage of Health Professionals
Few existing datasets cover both countries of
departure and destination. Usually they only
cover physicians, or do not clearly defne coun-
tries of origin, while other analyses are based
on country surveys and anecdotal evidence. In
the Statistical Annex, we reported an exhaus-
tive table on ACP African-born physicians and
professional nurses living and working in de-
veloped countries.
18
About 40 per cent of migrants from Cameroon
and Chad are university-educated, and as
mentioned earlier, there are more physicians
from So Tom and Prncipe in Portugal than
in So Tom and Prncipe (96 in Portugal ver-
sus 63 in the home country). The same is true
for the number of physicians from Equatorial
Guinea in Spain (47 in the home country and
76 in Spain), indicating that health sector pro-
fessional migration is considerable from some
countries. Gabon, on the contrary, has only 6
per cent of its nurses and 15 per cent of its
physicians abroad, mainly in France.
19
In Western Africa, migration of highly edu-
cated people is particularly high for Nigeria
(more than half of migrants living in the OECD
countries have a university degree), Togo, and
Benin (35 and 42 per cent, respectively).
About 80 per cent of migrants that moved to
an OECD country have a high school diploma
or university degree. The selective migration
policies of OECD countries are an important
determinant of this phenomenon, as well as
the attractiveness of potential incomes in
OECD countries for skilled migrant workers.
There are large variations in the statistics on
health care workforces across the Western Af-
rica region: Niger, Mauritania, Cte dIvoire
and Guinea have a tiny physician and nurse
diaspora. Nigerias proportion of health care
workers abroad is also small, although it is
quite substantial in absolute terms: about
5,000 physicians and 13,000 nurses live and
work abroad.
20
The size of Western Africas
health professional diaspora relative to the
domestic workforce is also extreme. There are
approximately two physicians from Equatori-
al Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Liberia abroad
for each one working in the domestic health
sector. For every Gambian professional nurse
working in the Gambia, about two are living in
a developed country overseas; while for every
Liberian nurse working at home, four work in
a developed country abroad. A review of mi-
gration trends in 10 African countries reports
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that 69 per cent of doctors trained in Ghana
between 1995 and 2002 left the country, while
estimates of vacancy levels in the Ghanaian
Ministry of Health exceed 65 per cent for doc-
tors and nurses.
21
This also raises the question
of whether the Ministry of Health would have
had the resources to fll the vacancies.
For countries such as Zambia, Sudan, Uganda,
and Zimbabwe, a very critical brain drain has
been experienced in the health and education
sectors, especially during the last decade.
In some university faculties in Botswana and
Namibia, the percentage of Zambian lectur-
ers leaving the country was as high as 40 per
cent to 50 per cent per cent of the staff, while
the number of secondary and primary school
teachers is also increasing. The exodus of med-
ical personnel is very similar to that of univer-
sity lecturers. The main causes of this are the
poor working conditions in Zambian hospitals
as well as the mass sacking of medical doctors
in 2000 during the Chiluba regime.
22
This same
situation occurred in Uganda under Idi Amin,
when the most signifcant emigration fow of
professional migrants took place. As with most
skilled migrants in the region, many Ugandan
migrants were mainly attracted to Botswana
and South Africa, even during apartheid.
23
De-
spite measures taken to stem the fow, migra-
tion of nurses and midwives continues towards
Anglophone countries.
For example, there are only 12 physicians per
100,000 inhabitants in Zambia, which is lower
than the least developed country average of
18 per 100,000. New health graduates in Zam-
bia number only seven per 100,000 inhabit-
ants, which is the eighth lowest rate in Africa
and the world.
24
In the Caribbean, brain drain is worrisome
especially for the health sector. The propor-
tion of high school and university graduates
moving out of the countries is signifcant, with
fgures well above 60 per cent-70 per cent,
and as high as 75 per cent in Trinidad and To-
bago, the Bahamas and Suriname.
As in the case of other ACP countries and
regions, this mobility is having particularly
negative effects on the health sector. A re-
cent World Bank report on the nurse labour
market and education in the Anglophone CAR-
ICOM countries estimated that the number of
trained nurses working abroad was roughly
three times the number working in the An-
glophone CARICOM nations.
25
Although there
seems to be less emigration of nurses than
in the past, the current level of graduates is
about 10.5 per cent, as a result of measures
taken to attract nurses from abroad. With the
current attrition rate of 8 per cent (mainly
due to emigration), the local demand for
nurses cannot be met.
26
Given these trends
and current policies it is anticipated that the
gap between the demand for and the supply
of nurses will widen from 3,400 nurses today
to 10,700 nurses in 2025.
27
Agreements that support the free movement
of skilled workers, such as the General Agree-
ment on Trade and Services (GATS) and the
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME)
provide the framework for Caribbean nurses
to migrate. For example, nurses holding a
CARICOM license can practise their profession
in virtually any member state they desire, and
are even recognised for registering with the
Nursing Council in the United Kingdom.
28

There is a lack of complete datasets on Carib-
bean health care workforce migration. A 2007
study
29
using various sources indicates that
about 3,000 nursing positions were vacant in
the region in 2003, while approximately 1,199
nurses were trained during the years from 2001
to 2003; of these, over 900 left during that
same period, leaving only 299 nurses avail-
able to fll the vacancies. The vacancy rate for
nurses in the region remains high at 42.4 per
cent.
30
In addition to the fscal loss, Caribbean coun-
tries also lack an adequate nursing staff for
ensuring the delivery of quality health care.
Countries with the highest ratio of nurses,
such as the United States, the UK, Spain and
Canada are recruiting nurses from Jamaica,
where the ratio is only 17 nurses per 10,000
inhabitants, the Dominican Republic (18 per
10,000), and Guyana (23 nurses per 10,000 in-
92
habitants). In Jamaica, 58 per cent of nursing
positions were vacant in 2003. Between 2003
and 2008, a total of 2,830 nurses should have
been trained to meet the projected demand.
However, only 2,055 nurses were expected
to graduate in 2008, leaving 19 per cent of
posts vacant.
31
Furthermore, the number of
vacancies published is usually defned by the
funding available at the ministry level and
therefore underestimates actual need. None-
theless, flling these positions would not stop
the more experienced and highly trained nurs-
es from leaving the country. Some losses were
mitigated in Jamaica by recruiting around 650
skilled nurses from the Caribbean (Cuba and
Guyana) as well as from outside the region (In-
dia, Ghana, Burma, Russia, and Nigeria) during
the 1999-2005 period, leaving those countries
with their own shortages.
32
Forecasts concerning demand for nurses in the
United States and Canada are also alarming. In
the United States alone there will be a short-
age of over 808,416 nurses by the year 2020.
33

Given the current training capacity in the US,
this will imply a massive need to recruit from
abroad and hence ease regulations, which in
turn may jeopardise the efforts of ACP govern-
ments to manage migration, increase training
capacity and retain nurses. Canada also will
face a nurse shortage of 78,000 nurses in 2011
and 113,000 by 2016.
34
In the ACP Pacifc countries, brain drain is
widespread
In the Pacifc Island Countries, the median mi-
gration rate among holders of upper second-
ary and tertiary education diplomas is 59 per
cent. Brain drain
35
is of particular concern to
small states because of the limited opportuni-
ties offered by their minute economies.
There has been scant research on skilled migra-
tion in the Pacifc. A recent study on migration
determinants and the return of high academic
performers from two PICs included in the ACP
Group of States (Tonga and PNG) shows that
the main professions of Tongas skilled migrants
are medical doctors and nurses (19 per cent),
teachers (10 per cent), bankers and account-
ants (10 per cent). PNGs migrants working
overseas have similar occupations: IT, account-
ing, law, academia, engineering, and nursing.
The main destinations of skilled migrants from
the Pacifc are New Zealand, the United States,
Australia and Fiji, with some scattered across
Japan, China, the Solomon Islands, and Laos.
36

Migration by health workers is greatest in Fiji,
Samoa and Tonga, where more than half of
the countrys nurses were working abroad in
2000.
37
and policies are needed to counter the
negative effects. The government of Fiji,
for example, could eliminate the policy that
forces returned migrants that re-enter pub-
lic service such as teachers and nurses to
have to start again at the bottom of the career
and salary ladder, at the same level as new
graduates. This policy also neglects important
skills that have been acquired abroad and that
should be taken into account in the career
and salary schemes as a mechanism to attract
skilled migrants back home.
38
Review of Policy Implications in Health Care
Workers Migration
In this section we will focus in particular on
the policy regarding brain drain in the health
care sector. The migration of health care
workers has spurred an intense debate among
policy makers, international organisations and
practitioners.
In 2006, the World Health Organisation esti-
mated a global shortage of 4.3 million health
workers.
39
Migration management in this area
attempts to reconcile two human rights: the
right to access to health services for those
that stay behind and the right to freedom of
movement for those that want to leave. Many
suggestions have been put forward and in this
section we present some of the most salient
recommendations. Although their practical
implementation has been and can be diffcult
due to conficting political priorities and po-
litical opportunism in source and destination
countries, the increasing demand from the
Global North for health care workers requires
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reconsideration of the options available. The
key underlying message is that there is an ur-
gent need for measures that slow down or put
a halt to the exodus of skilled workers.
40
Three
main areas for policy interventions are identi-
fed. These are not mutually exclusive and, in
fact, should be pursued in parallel:
1) Increase health care workers training ca-
pacity by engaging the governments of the
host countries (where skilled migrants work)
to invest in education priorities in the source
country, sending experts or funding projects
in a manner proportional to the net benefts
received from skilled migration.
2) Manage migration by engaging migrant
sending and receiving countries in institu-
tionalising temporary migration schemes for
skilled migrants, and by strengthening policy
coherence in the overseas development assist-
ance for the health sector. Furthermore, this
area of migration management should support
the achievement of self-suffciency in the Glo-
bal North as a way to reduce the demand for
health care staff from the Global South.
3) Strengthen national retention policies by
engaging ACP Governments and international
development agencies to improve the work-
ing conditions of the sector. The health care
shortage due to migration is only the tip of
the iceberg. African-born doctors and nurses
working in Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) countries ac-
count for less than 12 per cent of the total
estimated shortages in Africa. Furthermore,
statistics about the African-born doctors in the
OECD hide the fact that many have obtained
their degree in an OECD country.
In the frst area, the issue of pre-service train-
ing is central to increasing the number of
health care workers. However, there are both
institutional and physical infrastructure con-
straints on this in most (though not all) ACP
countries and therefore this represents an im-
portant but longer-term strategy. In the Anglo-
phone Caribbean the issue has to do less with
clinical opportunities for training and more
with the insuffcient number of nurse tutors.
To ease these constraints, there is a need for
funds with which to fnance infrastructure,
as well as creative strategies to improve the
training system. For example, the lack of
nurse tutors can be supplied by the major ACP
nurse-importing countries, also tapping re-
sources among the health care diasporas. This
measure can also take advantage of another
important yet often overlooked resource in
technical assistance intervention: social capi-
tal among peers. In the shorter term, policies
should also consider establishing shorter train-
ing programmes while shifting tasks from long-
er-term to shorter-term graduates. This policy
would also produce a workforce that better
refects the health needs of the population
by training middle-level health workers such
as clinical offcers, assistant medical offcers,
midwives, surgical technicians and physician
assistants, instead of physicians.
In the second area, migration management is
a responsibility of both source and destination
countries. Source countries should not limit
the mobility of people with skills, just as des-
tination countries should enable them to move
more freely back and forth in order to ensure
that ties with the home country are main-
tained. Migration management in the health
sector has been fooded with criticism because
of the double standard in both source and des-
tination countries. Investments in health sec-
tor development by bilateral development
agencies are jeopardised by the aggressive
recruitment policies of health care staff from
the same countries. Policies should include
such actions as negotiating reduced recruit-
ment by higher-income countries and a better
enforcement of code of conducts. Source gov-
ernments have been criticised for their lack of
policies aimed at retaining health care work-
ers despite the crisis, and instead focusing on
remittances.
A third block of policy responses to the brain
drain involves retention policies, made up of
sanctions and promotional aspects. Sanctions
might include the request of monetary com-
pensation from departing health care profes-
sionals, bonding new graduates to work in
rural locations for a fxed term, or the per-
94
formance of periods of compulsory service
as a compensating mechanism for the State.
However, without prospects for staying and a
functional sector, many of these health care
workers will depart as soon as the conditional,
punitive period is over. Promotional meas-
ures are more diffcult to design, since they
are linked to more general issues of working
environment, salaries, incentives, and motiva-
tion, as well as the opportunity for professional
growth by training abroad and the like. These
require signifcant fnancial resources that the
government budgets of many ACP countries
do not have. Development donors should fo-
cus on the health sector and the brain drain,
also including results-oriented indicators that
show efforts to stop the exodus of health care
workers.
Generally speaking, given the global dimen-
sion of this challenge, individual efforts by
countries are probably doomed to fail. A re-
gional approach is needed to pursue these only
apparently conficting goals of stemming the
exodus and promoting diasporic linkages. The
monitoring of the health care labour market
and migration should be included as a task for
all Ministries of Labour in ACP countries and
for regional organisations that include mobility
management in their mandate, and appropri-
ate resources should be allocated to provide
timely responses to threatening trends.
Migrant Social Capital: Transnational Practices
as Development Tools
The importance of social capital formation for
economic development and poverty allevia-
tion has been demonstrated in the extensive
literature on the subject.
41

Social capital is important for development be-
cause, by facilitating ties and networks within
and between communities, it increases the cir-
culation of knowledge and hence reduces mar-
ket failures. Further, it improves knowledge
about peoples behaviour and thus controls
free-riding and opportunist behaviours. Social
capital also improves information fows.
Social capital is a precondition for develop-
ment and it would be erroneous to try to cre-
ate it when does not exist; of course, it would
be equally wrong to not try to reinforce it
when is already present. Since social capital
involves interactions and information, in the
analysis of the linkages between migration and
development any measure that reduces obsta-
cles to mobility and communication between
migrants and their hometowns is positive for
development.
Transnational migration studies
42
have high-
lighted the importance of migrant networks
and ties not only for the purpose of facilitating
of the migration project, social inclusion and
earnings of the migrant in the host society,
43
but have also demonstrated the importance of
social capital for the socio-economic develop-
ment of the place of origin through migrant
engagement in the creation of hometown as-
sociations and social and commercial enter-
prises.
44
Migrant social capital is about ties
and information and since it helps to reduce
information asymmetries, it represents an ad-
vantage compared to non-migrant investors.
Box 4.2 - Task-Shifting from Highly
Skilled Health Workers to Less Skilled
Health Workers
Countries like Brazil, Ethiopia and Paki-
stan implementing successful models of
task shifting are reaping improvements
in the health status of their popula-
tions. For example, the government of
Pakistan created the Lady Health Work-
er cadre in 1994. By 2005, there were
100,000 trained female community
health workers providing essential pri-
mary healthcare services in the commu-
nity. Evaluation found that the popula-
tion served by Lady Health Workers had
substantially better health indicators
than the control population.
Source: World Bank 2009b, op. cit.
95
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When social capital is thin, there is a high
likelihood that other migrant forms of capital
will fall into a vacuum. Social capital is the
glue that keeps the other capitals together.
Including migrant social capital formation in
the analysis of migration corridors can help to
achieve a deeper understanding of the mobili-
ty-development nexus.
Migrant engagement can take various forms:
the consumption of homeland foods, sending
remittances, frequent calls and internet con-
nections with relatives back home, investment
in small businesses, and the creation of home-
town associations and development NGOs to
materially support the community of origin.
Hometown associations in particular play the
double role of strengthening ties back home
and fostering a sense of community for the
newly-arrived migrants.
45
Hometown associa-
tions thus nurture the formation of collective
social capital that can also be mobilised for
the development of the communities in the
homeland.
The number of hometown associations per
migrant is an important indicator of social
capital within the diaspora. Among Sub-Sa-
haran African diasporas, the participation of
migrants in hometown associations can vary,
depending upon the place of residence. In the
United States, 16 per cent of Nigerians par-
ticipate in a hometown association, compared
to 15 per cent of Ghanaians. However, the fg-
ure for Ghanaians is relatively higher among
migrants living in European countries: 28 per
cent of Ghanaian migrants in the United King-
dom and 37 per cent in Germany are members
of a hometown association.
46
There are few
studies on membership and participation of
ACP migrants in migrant associations in other
ACP countries. However, the mere existence
of many of these associations in ACP countries
indicates that social capital formation is not
primarily dependent on income.
Although it is diffcult to determine the single
factor that increases the active participation of
migrants in hometown associations, there are
also indications that migrants who have lived
abroad longer, are more educated and enjoy
legal status tend to have stronger engagement
in the development of the home country.
47
A
quite unexplored dimension of social capital
is migrant women participation to hometown
associations. Migrant womens social capital is
often limited by isolation, exclusion from im-
portant positions in diaspora associations and
therefore decision-making processes. Some
women have thus organised their own diaspo-
ra groups, such as the Pan-African NGO Akina
Mama wa Afrika (Swahili for Solidarity among
African Women), which has a Head Offce in
Kampala and a UK/Europe sub-regional offce
in London.
48
Whereas some are more compelled
by social norms and values and therefore main-
tain close links to the communities back home,
mobility can in fact enhance womens role in
the community: for example, women are per-
ceived in Samoa and Tonga as more reliable in
terms of sending remittances and maintaining
family obligations.
49
Social Capital Formation and Migration
This section of the report will focus on how
social capital created abroad and at home
fosters transnational engagement for develop-
ment. Within ACP countries, given the diver-
sity and variety of the group, migrant devel-
opment associations in the diaspora present
important sub-regional and country-level va-
rieties. Almost every diaspora has developed
multiple hometown associations and devel-
opment NGOs; their total number remains
unknown and any attempt to catalogue them
would result in an unrepresentative inventory.
It is not the aim of this report to list a direc-
tory of good experiences in the transnational
engagement of diasporas. These are already
widely documented, and it is in any case likely
that any such attempt would not be able to
cover the extent of all interesting experiences
and innovative experiences in ACP countries.
Instead, this report will focus on the overall
common trends across the ACP countries and
will highlight common problems and potenti-
alities for investing in this sector.
We grouped transnational engagement into
three sectors: the ACP diasporas in the Glo-
96
bal North, the ACP diaspora in another ACP
country and an elite diaspora. The frst type
of hometown associations and development
NGOs originating from ACP diasporas living in
the Global North is comprised of groups work-
ing to provide welfare support and assistance
to vulnerable groups, and to provide technical
assistance for improving farming, water and
sanitation, renewable energy, health services
and microcredit. These groups are made up
of volunteer and semi-professional NGOs that
beneft from a renewed interest by bilateral
development agencies to foster migrants en-
gagement with their home countries and even-
tually facilitate voluntary return.
A second important group is comprised of as-
sociations of migrants moving from one ACP
country to another (South-South migration).
These groups have fewer resources compared
to the diaspora in the Global North. They
mainly provide welfare assistance to families
and communities back home in the form of
support for funerals, weddings, etc., as well
as support to newly-arrived migrants through
meetings, festivals and social events that fa-
cilitate encounters and networks. Although
migrant social capital is equally strong, their
impact on home country development is likely
to be constrained by lack of resources. This is
a particularly unexplored research area, but
one which is nonetheless relevant in the light
of the fndings of this report, highlighting the
need for policies addressing South-South mo-
bility and its development linkages.
There is also a third type of migrant diaspora
that is comprised of networks of highly-skilled
migrants using the internet and social net-
works to stimulate policy debates and intro-
duce technological solutions to development
and business problems in the home countries.
This diaspora is providing advice to policy
makers, stimulating debates on reforms and
introducing technological innovation and busi-
ness ventures. This is a particularly vibrant
group, one that can have a stronger impact
on the home country development, and that is
supported by important initiatives of regional
and international organisations.
50
The focus of
these initiatives is not the return of the high-
ly-skilled migrants but the utilisation of their
knowledge to improve development policies.
51

In the following sections, each of these three
types of migrant transnational formation is
discussed.
North-South Social Capital Flows
An articulated, engaged, and well-structured
diaspora in many European Union countries
and the United States is the one from Ghana.
It has been selected as an example because
it presents various types of philanthropic and
business engagement and a variety of local dy-
namics. The Ghana Union in the United King-
dom includes 50 Ghanaian groups; the Council
of Ghana Nationals Associations in Italy acts as
a large umbrella organisation; and the Union
of Ghanaian Organisations in Germany has a
membership of 21 local associations.
52
In the
United States, there is a Council of Ghana Na-
tionals only in Chicago, with 12 organisations.
They all provide access to information, serv-
ices and cultural activities that help newly-
arrived migrants to settle in the new country,
and many of them engage in philanthropic and
business ventures with Ghana.
However, the transnational engagement of
migrants in support of home country devel-
opment is not necessarily channelled through
these formal organisations. They are often
considered too bureaucratic, hierarchical,
and unprepared to engage with development
challenges. It happens quite often that Gha-
naian migrants organise their own small NGOs
and prefer to engage directly in development
initiatives outside the formal Unions of Gha-
naians abroad. These initiatives back home
are negotiated with trusted local leaders and
are more informal. Scholars also demonstrate
that, probably because of this informality,
these initiatives are more effective.
53
Remain-
ing small, these projects tend to rely on the
social capital created over time with the local
communities, and tend to avoid conficts with
local interest groups that may have different
ideas about development priorities.
Another interesting characteristic of the Gha-
97
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naian diaspora is that the engagement of the
hometown association is not necessarily con-
fned to intervention in the village of origin.
The Ghanaian transnational social entrepre-
neurs decision to invest is not necessarily
based on ties with the home community, but
rather on the likelihood of success and devel-
opment priorities. GhanaCoop (an Italy-based
Ghanaian migrant cooperative importing pine-
apples from Ghana) invests part of the proft
into a social venture in a very poor village
(Gomoa Simbrofo) in which the cooperative
members in Italy do not have ancestral linkag-
es. Their social engagement shows a national
perspective on development that is still lack-
ing in many other hometown and development
associations. The promoters of these projects
claim that easing travel formalities, improving
access to small grants, reducing administra-
tive burdens in the management of external
funds, strengthening the project management
capacity of those groups back home that deal
with the daily activities, improving transpar-
ency and fghting corruption at local level,
would signifcantly increase the likelihood of
success of their projects.
The engagement of Ghanaian migrants is just
one of many examples of hometown associa-
tions and development NGOs of the ACP di-
asporas based in the Global North countries.
Their needs and diffculties can be widely gen-
eralised to other diaspora groups.
South-South Social Capital Flows
South-South migration should lead to similar
transnational engagement for the develop-
ment of the home country. However, this is an
unexplored research area, probably because
South-South migration is a rather under-fund-
ed research area in many ACP countries and
because developing countries do not prioritise
diaspora in their development policies.
Nevertheless, despite the limited knowledge of
social capital fows between Southern countries
and their utilisation for development, there
are noteworthy experiences that may indicate
potential avenues for South-South cooperation
in the feld of migration and development.
Social capital in Zimbabwe is particularly well
developed, especially among Mozambican
refugees that fed from the civil war in the
1980s. They have maintained linkages to home
areas in Mozambique, reinforcing existing so-
cial networks and economic transactions, and
also helped the new waves of migrants feeing
from the economic crisis in Zimbabwe to ob-
tain shelter and jobs.
There is transnational engagement of Zim-
babwean migrants. For example, the Zim-
babwean migrant community in South Africa
presents well-established and organised burial
societies that provide collective support to
the communities back home. This could be de-
fned as nucleus of hometown associations.
54

The potential role of Zimbabwean social capi-
tal in South Africa is also highlighted in the
UNDP Zimbabwe Report. According to that re-
port, hometown associations can be created in
the area where workers are recruited (namely
Masvingo and Matabeleland South) through
the Beitbridge Border Initiative for processing
temporary work permits for farm workers in
South Africa.
55
Cameroonian migrants in South Africa also have
a complex and structured social organisation.
The Cameroon North Westerners Association
(CANOWACAT) holds fortnightly meetings in
the industrial suburb of Cape Town called Salt
River. The association includes not only north-
west Cameroonian migrants but has attracted
both Anglophone and Francophone groups.
56
It
aims to provide welfare support to the needy
and raise collective donations for burials. The
relevance of this example lies in the fact that
Cameroonian migrants from the northwest
region are well organised all over the world,
especially in the United Kingdom and the Unit-
ed States and are engaged in many types of
philanthropic work with the home country. Yet
there is very little research on the social capi-
tal formation and transnational engagement
of Cameroonians in South Africa, whereas the
presence and structure of the CANOWACAT in-
dicates a potential avenue to be explored by
development practitioners and the ACP Secre-
tariats Migration Observatory.
98
In Sub-Saharan Africa, there are many other
examples of diaspora groups formed as a re-
sult of South-South migration. The Haut Con-
seil des Guineens en Cte dIvoire (Higher
Council of Guineans in Cte dIvoire) organ-
ised transportation for thousands of workers
in Cte dIvoire following the political crisis
in 2002. Other groups include the Association
des Femmes du Mali et de la Gambie Bengha-
zi (Women Association of Mali and the Gambia
in Benghazi, Libya), the numerous associations
of Malians migrants in Cte dIvoire such as La
Coordination des Amicales Maliennes de Cte
Ivoire, the Coordination des Associations
Maliennes de Cte Ivoire, the Union des Res-
sortissants Maliens en Cte Ivoire, the Con-
seil de la Jeunesse Malienne de Cte Ivoire
and the Association des Cadres Maliens de
Cte Ivoire, to mention just a few. In South
Africa we also fnd active Nigerian voluntary
associations such as Durban Nigerian Associa-
tion which is the umbrella association that
accommodates all the different ethnic based
associations such as the Igbo Cultural Asso-
ciation, Yoruba Cultural Association, Hausa-
Fulani Associations that support projects and
communities in Nigeria both materially and
fnancially. The Durban Nigerian Association
is linked to the Union of Nigerian Friends and
the Peoples Club of Nigeria which work at the
national and international levels.
57
Nigerian
migrants are also active in Ghana where they
formed the ethnic-based Edo Association and
the national Association of Nigerian Women
both involved in supporting the integration of
newly-arrived Nigerian migrants, needy family
and women, and providing legal support to mi-
grants.
58
Migrant social capital reinforces the
social protection mechanisms of migrants.
59
South-South transnational engagement is also
frequent in the Caribbean, especially among
the Haitian diaspora organisations in the Do-
minican Republic. Groups such as the Mov-
imiento Sociocultural para los Trabajadores
Haitianos (MOSCTHA) that brings relief to Hai-
tian workers in the Dominican Republic sugar
cane bateyes, and the Movimiento de Mujeres
Dominico-Haitianas (MUDHA) which fghts for
the womens rights of Haitian descendents, are
now also involved in supporting communities in
Haiti affected by the January 2010 earthquake.
MOSCTHA and other more Haitian worker-based
organisations have worked in Haiti for several
years (including with legal registration there)
whereas those organizations working more with
the descendents of migrants in the Dominican
Republic (such as MUDHA) tend to intervene
more irregularly in Haiti at times of natural
disasters, as happened after the Mapou//Ji-
man fooding debacle in 2004 and now again
after the earthquake.
60
These migrant support
organisations have very strong linkages with
the communities in Haiti and hence could play
a double role of minority rights advocates and
protectors in the Dominican Republic, as well
as development agents for Haiti.
Elite Migrant Social Capital and ICT
The third type of migrant social capital in-
volves the diasporas formal and informal
networks of professionals which contribute
to policy debate and development strategies
back home, as well as technology transfers,
largely using information and communication
technologies (ICT) and social networks. Lead-
ing diasporas in this feld are the Indian and the
Chinese who also have substantial investments
back home in high-tech sectors. The diaspora
policies of ACP countries should explore their
experience.
An important initiative for Africa is UNIFEMs
Digital Diaspora Initiative, aiming to support
the economic empowerment of African wom-
en through ICT capacity building, using the
expertise available among African ICT entre-
preneurs.
61
The project also aims to provide
possibilities in the ITC sector for African en-
trepreneurs in the diaspora to participate in
socially responsible projects while securing
better livelihoods for women through ICT ca-
pacity building and access to fnancing.
Databases of diaspora ICT experts are also be-
ing used by development agencies, as in the
case of USAIDs Diaspora Skills Transfer Pro-
gram for Southern Sudan, to promote collab-
oration between the diaspora and the home
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country in development projects in health and
education.
62
This program uses the Sudanese
North American Diaspora Database (SNADD)
as one way of recruiting volunteer profession-
als to address critical human resource short-
ages in the areas of health and education. A
similar initiative is the World Bank African Di-
aspora Program which is launching a Database
of Professional Skills in the African Diaspora,
63

which will initially be used by the World Bank
Task Team Leaders to identify individuals and
frms that can successfully contribute to World
Bank-supported projects in Africa. The data-
base will also aim to assist the African Union
and other development partners, in their ef-
forts to effectively utilise the skills of the Afri-
can diaspora to address Africas development
challenges and priorities.
Diasporas organisations such Afford UK are in-
creasingly taking advantage of advancements
in ICT and testing new forms of interaction
that facilitate discussions on development
projects, welfare assistance initiatives in the
home country and business opportunities.
64

Within these virtual spaces, experts in the di-
aspora provide advice to home country policy
makers and create discussion groups, blogs and
web casts for facilitating participation in the
formulation of development policies, forging
research partnerships, creating tele-work op-
portunities, marketing products in the home
country, sharing information on investment op-
portunities, engaging in operations for natural
and man-made disaster relief, and encouraging
stronger participation of home country citizens
in the demand for governance. The diasporas
are already tapping into the endless applica-
tions of ICT for development, motivated by
philanthropic as well as market interests.
65

These motivations could be further leveraged
for enhancing the developmental impact of mi-
grant social capital in the home country.
migrant Cultural Capital: Tangible and
Intangible Factors Shaping Development
In addition to remittances, information and
knowledge, there is another important mi-
grant resource that is largely untapped: mi-
grant cultural capital, including shared norms
and values as well as artistic talents and ex-
pressions that are utilised and mobilised by
the diasporas.
Due to the weaknesses inherent to cultural
policy in many ACP countries and a feeble
institutional setting to protect intellectual
property, artistic talents and those connected
to the creative industries value-chain are
easily attracted overseas to seek recognition
and income. They become unoffcial cultural
ambassadors of their country, yet this contri-
bution has somehow gone unnoticed by policy
makers and migration scholars. Migrants pro-
mote markets for the cultural industry, in the
broadest sense: from the arts to tourism and
from clothing to gastronomy, inasmuch as they
are prime consumers of these goods and serv-
ices. This is an area of mobility which should
be further investigated, given that artists and
cultural promoters often beneft from looser
mobility schemes and that the economic prof-
itability of cultural industries increasingly
relies on their capacities to reach out extra-
territorial markets.
Creative Industries as Engines of Development
Exports by creative industries
66
are a fast-
growing global market of US$335.5 billion (in
2005), equivalent to 3.2 per cent of world
trade in merchandise goods, to which another
and widely underreported US$89 billion in
creative-industries services exports should be
added.
67
Their contribution to GDP is about 3
per cent in France and the United States and 6
per cent in the United Kingdom.
68

Exports of creative goods by developing coun-
tries accounted for US$136 billion in 2005
(mainly due to production and trade of crea-
tive goods in China, which comprises about half
of all exports from developing countries). The
ACP Groups share in world markets remains
extremely small, although it is growing fast:
exports of creative goods increased from US$20
million in 1995 to US$1.4 billion in 2005.
69
In 2005, the Africa Unions Nairobi Plan of
Action for Cultural Industries in Africa iden-
tifed a wide range of challenges and weak-
100
nesses faced by the African cultural industries.
The importance of connecting the continent
with regional and global markets is one of the
main priorities. Cultural productions abound,
although mainly by microenterprises which
lack capital and connections. Information and
communication technologies are providing im-
portant opportunities, but only large groups
can afford to scale up production. The Afri-
can Unions instructions to Members States for
boosting the industry include recommenda-
tions to support artists and their associations
in establishing networks in the region to inte-
grate diasporas and link up with large global
networks.
70

The Declaration thus recognises the role of
diasporas in promoting African cultural her-
itage and creativity, yet there is very little
knowledge about its reverse linkages with de-
velopment or about the economic and social
investments of the cultural diasporas in the
home-grown cultural industry. This is an im-
portant area to be further researched, with
coordination between the ACP Observatory
on Migration and the ACP Observatory on Cul-
ture, as well as with other ongoing research
projects
71
in this feld, including the Observa-
tory of Cultural Policies in Africa.
72

Creative Industries and Diaspora Linkages
Migrants are consumers, promoters and pro-
ducers of home country cultural goods. The
markets for goods from creative industries
including nostalgic crafts and food are pro-
moted by migrants in two ways: by stimulating
the supply side of their country, as well as by
increasing the consumer base in the destina-
tion countries beyond their own ethnic and
national groups.
A case in point is the music industry in the Carib-
bean.
73
Countries like the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have fostered
export markets in cities such as New York, Mi-
ami, Toronto, London, Paris and Amsterdam due
to the predominance of Caribbean immigrants.
The value in terms of annual export earnings
ranges from US$30 million for Trinidad and
Tobago to approximately US$50-60 million for
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.
74
Almost
every major city in North America and Europe
has a diasporic Caribbean carnival inspired by
the one in Trinidad. For instance, the Notting
Hill carnival in London attracts over two mil-
lion people over three days of activities. It is
considered to be the largest festival of popular
culture in Europe and is estimated to generate
93 million. Similarly good examples are the
Labour Day carnival in New York and Caribana
in Toronto. The diasporic Caribbean carnivals
have become a crucial component of pan-Car-
ibbean identity as well as a strategic market
for cultural exports.
75
African diasporas are equally active in pro-
moting their own music, art and traditions.
The Carlow African Film Festival in Ireland is
a good example of a diasporas engagement in
Table 4.3 Creative Goods: Exports by Economic Group, 2005
Source: Original table based on UNCTAD data, 2008.
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promoting homeland culture and artistic ex-
pressions. The festival provides an annual plat-
form to celebrate and explore the intellectual
and aesthetic diversity of African culture and
promotes social interaction and integration by
bringing together the various communities of
Africa and Ireland. It aims to celebrate and
promote excellence in African flmmaking by
showcasing and honouring the best works. It
also provides artistic links between African
and Irish communities and artists. The Carlow
African Film Festival was founded by Ade Oke,
a Nigerian, in September 2005 with support
from local businesses and authorities.
76
At the
2010 ffth edition of the Festival, a Symposium
on Effective Collaboration: Instrument of De-
velopment in the African Movie Industry was
held with key actors from the Nigerian flm in-
dustry.
Another prominent event is the London Inter-
national African Festival of the Arts featuring
some of the best of African and International
music, dance, flm and visual arts from several
countries. The Festival also aims to arouse
wider public interest in the arts and to encour-
age artistic dialogue and cultural exchange as
well as celebrate the achievements of the Af-
rican diaspora.
77
African music is another very important sub-
sector in which the diaspora can play a key
role. A prominent vehicle for African music
promotion is Afrisson, a web-based company
founded and managed by Nago Seck of Senega-
lese origin. The site is an invaluable documen-
tation centre, providing access to the musical
history of 56 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
and the Indian Ocean, about 1,138 artists and
a wide range of information about styles, in-
struments, books, and a list of African music
labels.
78
Another very important event for the promo-
tion of home-based and diaspora-based music
production is the World Music Expo (WOMEX).
This is part of the Africa-Caribbean-Pacifc Mu-
sic Festivals Network backed by the EU-ACP
Support Programme for cultural industries in
ACP countries. This demonstrates that positive
synergies can be built across sectors to pro-
mote both the industry and more migration-
friendly development policies.
By associating partners from different hori-
zons: Anglo-, Franco- and Lusophones from
West, East and Central Africa as well as the
Indian Ocean, Pacifc and Caribbean, this
project aims to create, support and consoli-
date exchanges and cooperation among these
regions and the professionals grouped in the
network.
79
The coordinating group for WOMEX
contributes to the project with its internation-
al expertise, providing professional advice, or-
ganising workshops and offering a marketplace
not only at the WOMEX event, but also online
through virtual WOMEX.
80
Migrants do not only promote, produce and
consume movies and music. In the feld of lit-
erature, an established magazine for interna-
tional contemporary writing is Wasafri. The
magazine aims to promote the work of writ-
ers from African, Caribbean, South Asian and
Black British diasporic backgrounds. Its editor,
Susheila Nasta, launched the magazine in 1984
at the University of Kent, seeking to demon-
strate the interconnections among different
cultural traditions and providing a dynamic
forum for debates about migration, diaspora,
global modernity and contemporary literature.
It also provides literary and critical coverage
of writers who often struggle, because of their
cultural or ethnic backgrounds, to obtain ad-
equate notice in the mainstream press. It is
managed by a group of associated editors with
different national backgrounds, mainly from
developing countries, that moved to Britain at
a young age to carry on their graduate stud-
ies.
81

Visual art and paintings from Africa have been
widely acknowledged thanks to the world fa-
mous exhibition Africa Remix: Contemporary
Art of a Continent. This began in 2004 under
the coordination of the Cameroon-born, Paris-
based curator, writer and critic Simon Njami. It
is the frst exhibition to provide a comprehen-
sive overview of present day artistic activities
on the African continent and in the diaspora.
All the works exhibited at Africa Remix have
been created within the last 10 years. The ex-
102
hibition features artists from countries across
the African continent, from Algeria to South Af-
rica, as well as from African artists now living
in Europe and North America. The exhibition
also aims to dispel perceptions of a continent
focused on the past, stuck in ritual and tradi-
tion, and engulfed by poverty, disease and war.
Initially launched at the Kunstpalast museum
in Dsseldorf, it has subsequently travelled to
the Hayward Gallery in London, the Pompidou
Centre in Paris, the Mori Art Museum in Tokyo,
the Moderna Museet in Stockholm and, more
recently, the Johannesburg Art Gallery in Gau-
teng, South Africa.
82
In the Pacifc, the diaspora is also very en-
gaged in promoting home culture. In 2010, the
Manukau Pacifc Arts Summit was inaugurated
in Manukau City in New Zealand to celebrate
Pacifc artistic expressions. This is the result
of engaged Pacifc Island States descendants
and members of diasporas with a professional
background in the creative industry. Indeed,
references to a continuum between migration,
urbanisation and indigenous culture are not
lacking in the festival promotional material,
as well as the need to foster the development
of Pacifc arts as a mechanism to preserve Pa-
cifc culture and maintain strong links with the
home country.
83

Another important element in the Pacifc is the
international Pacifc Arts Association, founded
in 1974. This is an international organisation
devoted to the study of art from Oceania, with
broad-based participation of intellectuals and
artists from the Pacifc Island States diasporas.
The association provides a forum for dialogue
and awareness about Pacifc art and culture. It
has antennas in Europe and the United States.
By connecting individuals and institutions
around the world, it encourages greater co-
operation among those who are involved with
the creation, study, and exhibition of Pacifc
art. For example, in 2009, the Pacifc Arts As-
sociation promoted the Fiji Times exhibition
in Honour of Fiji Day featuring fve contem-
porary artists from the Fijian diaspora, politi-
cally inspired as a commentary on the current
situation in that country.
84

Cultural Capital as an Integration
Factor in Destination countries
Migrant cultural capital is also an important
vehicle for integration and social inclusion in
the host society. It is often the case that when
this capital is not free to manifest itself and
where xenophobic attitudes are widespread,
the opposite occurs due to the strengthening
of negative perceptions of the other and the
creation of false dichotomies such as them
and us. However, when it is promoted and
supported, it can lead to signifcant integra-
tion, mutual understanding and pacifc cohab-
itation, with important spill-over effects on
the economy.
The International Network of Migration Insti-
tutions is one of many important initiatives
contributed by the diasporas to create a posi-
tive view of migration. The Network includes
museums and other cultural institutions pro-
moting public understanding of migration, fa-
cilitating transmission between generations as
well as encounters among migrants and local
populations.
These museum initiatives are aimed at ac-
knowledging the contributions made by mi-
grants to their destination societies, the di-
versity and wealth of the cultures of origin and
the right to a dual belonging. Furthermore,
they build awareness and educate regarding
the events that induced individuals to leave
their land in the frst place, thus developing
empathy among the host population. More
generally, these types of museums have been
instrumental in deconstructing stereotypes
about migration.
85
A prominent museum of the diaspora is the San
Francisco (U.S.) based Museum of the African
Diaspora which showcases the history, art and
the cultural richness that resulted from the
dispersal of Africans throughout the world. The
museum opened in 2005 and was conceived as
a cornerstone of the economic and cultural
revitalisation of downtown San Francisco. It
represents an important aspect of the city ad-
ministrations strategy to focus on the creative
industry as a means to attract talent.
86
Cultural associations of ACP migrants abound
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all over the world. They are another impor-
tant means to promote home country values,
strengths and goods. Among the thousands of
organisations that are led and managed by di-
asporas, the cultural association 100%culture
established in Sweden by a group of journal-
ists and coordinated by Ivorian-born journalist
Firmin Koto aims to make Francophone Afri-
cas culture accessible to a broader audience.
The internet-based journal and newsletters of
the association endeavour to stimulate inter-
cultural debates, informing and thus reducing
the barriers to African migrants integration in
Europe.
87
Strengthening the linkages and networks be-
tween the great number of small and large
cultural associations is an important area of
policy intervention. Furthermore, diaspora
writers and artists have suffcient distance to
be able to better identify the development
challenges in their home countries and injus-
tices faced by migrants in their countries of
origin.
88
These contributions of the diaspora
should be further explored in order to maxim-
ise the promotional and cultural potential of
engaged and organised migrants.
Diaspora Cultural Engagement Back Home
Another interesting phenomenon that involves
the mobilisation, accumulation and utilisation
of migrant cultural capital is the engagement
of diaspora groups and individuals in the crea-
tive industries back home. Diaspora cultural
engagement in the country of origin can take
various forms. Migrant associations are devel-
oping a strong interest in the promotion of lo-
cal festivals, as a way to promote transnational
identities, gain local political support and also
generate income. Festival-mania is a deeply
rooted phenomenon in many ACP countries
which tends to get a new momentum thanks
to diasporas. For example, the Cameroonian
diaspora is recently increasing its involvement
in the organisation of cultural events back
home. Several festivals are being organised
and supported by migrants abroad such as the
Ngondo Festival by the Sawa people (which
is also celebrated abroad by the diaspora in
Canada for example) and the Ngouen Festival
by the Bamoun people. These events are an
extension of the migrant intervention for the
social and spatial transformation of the place
of origin. Some argue that the migrants inter-
vention has produced a commercialisation of
once-traditional events, which are now losing
some of their originality, or that the interven-
tions have reinforced diaspora group rivalries
in gaining political support and recognition
back home.
89
There is a growing engagement of
the diaspora in the organisation of festivals in
Mali, similar to what occurred in Cameroon.
90

However, the festivals stimulate international
and domestic tourism and economic interests
around a specifc territory, with a positive im-
pact on the local economies. Cultural policies
in this area should defnitely examine the ways
in which the new encounters between the mi-
grants transnational identities and the tradi-
tional values and norms of those back home
can contribute to positive synergies and dilute
signifcant potential tensions.
In the case of the Caribbean-wide Carifesta
festival, the promoters have specifcally man-
dated that diaspora organisations open Festival
Chapters around the world to support the or-
ganisation, promotion and implementation of
the event. When held in Guyana, the diaspora
organisation Guyana Cultural Association of
New York promoted the Carifesta cultural
festival of the Caribbean Community 2008 edi-
tion in Guyana, under the theme One Carib-
bean, One Purpose, Our Culture, Our Life.
91
Since then, the association has worked closely
with Guyanas Ministry of Culture, Youth and
Sports and with members of the wider Carib-
bean community in New York and in other parts
of the United States to develop a mechanism
to support the participation of the Caribbean
diaspora in the United States in Carifesta.
92
A similar proactive engagement from the Fes-
tival promoters can be found in the organisa-
tion of the 5th Festival of Pan-African Dance.
This is a bi-annual event with a view toward
encouraging intercultural and inter-ethnic di-
alogue and to promote mutual respect through
the arts, music and dance. In 2006, eighteen
104
countries participated in the international
dance contest. A large number of Rwanda di-
aspora singers, dancers and choreographers
were invited to play a key role in the event.
93
In July 2010 the Festival was organised in Kiga-
li. Due to diasporic movements out of Rwanda
(from 1973 onwards) Traditional Dance groups
(Inthor) were formed abroad and were keep-
ing alive the core of the choreographic tradi-
tion outside of Rwanda.
Other forms of African diaspora engagement
in cultural events back home involve the par-
ticipation in large-scale artistic events, such
as the DakArt Biennial of Contemporary Af-
rican Art in Senegal, the Durban International
Film Festival in South Africa, the Pan-African
Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou
in Burkina Faso, the Gabon International Film
Festival, to mention only a few. These events
are a rite of passage for African artists liv-
ing abroad. DakArt was organised for the frst
time in 1992. Nowadays, it features 289 artists
from 34 African countries, with 16 artists rep-
resenting the African diaspora (or 6 per cent
of the total) and 13 participants from the rest
of the world.
94
In the Pacifc, the promotion of art has been
boosted by the creation of the frst Islands Mu-
seums Association in 1994 in New Caledonia.
This became a regional forum where herit-
age professionals at home and in the diaspora
could exchange views and work towards im-
proving the quality of the services that mu-
seums provide to the public. In mid-2006, the
Secretariat moved from the Fiji Museum to the
Vanuatu Cultural Centre. Its aim is to assist
Pacifc museums, cultural centres and peoples
to preserve the Pacifc Island Heritage, while
promoting community participation in herit-
age management, capacity development of
museum and cultural centres in the Pacifc Is-
lands and advocating for the development of
regional cultural resource management poli-
cies and practices. It also facilitates training,
provides a forum for the exchange of ideas
and skills involving the diasporas, and encour-
ages regional and global networks that support
Pacifc Island heritage preservation.
95
Music festivals in migrant countries of origin
are another important occasion for regional
and international musical and cultural ex-
changes and encounters. AfrifAktion is one
of the main platforms for the diffusion of
music and urban culture in Central Africa. It
is based in Gabon and collaborates with Eu-
ropean festivals such as Sfnks in Belgium,
Kosmopolite and LOriginal in France and
with the French Cultural centres in Libreville,
Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Pointe Noire, Yaound,
Malabo, Bangui, Ndjamena. The main activity
of this association is the organisation of the
Festival Gabao. Among the organisations sup-
porting AfrikAktion is the ACP Music Festival
Network. Another artistic event that reaches
out to diaspora artists is the Kriol Jazz Festival
held in Praia (Cape Verde). The Festivals main
objective is to promote Creole-inspired music
from all islands, whether in the Caribbean, In-
dian Ocean, Cape Verde, or Africa, the cradle
of Creole.
96
These festivals represent a signifcant source
of revenue and their economic benefts should
be better documented. Research on the larg-
est Caribbean festival the Trinidad Carnival
shows that in 2004 it attracted over 40,000
visitors and generated revenues of US$27.5
million. The Saint Lucia Jazz Festival attracted
10,000-13,000 visitors who spent US$17.3 mil-
lion in 2003. In Jamaica, the SumFest Reggae
Festival generated economic benefts on the
order of one billion Jamaican dollars (about
US$12.3 million).
97

Food is Also culture: Diaspora contribution
to development via nostalgic trade
Another widely unexplored area is the diaspo-
ras contribution to the demand for traditional
export products and the promotion of cultural
capital through ethnic stores and restaurants.
A recent study of twelve migrant communities
in the United States provides some interesting
indications of the magnitude of this market.
98

The consumption of home country goods (food
and crafts), which at home are non-traditional
exports (tortillas, beans, etc.), is a manifes-
tation of cultural identity, transnational links
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and community building for about 90 per cent
of the surveyed migrants. The existence of a
developed network of retailers and distribu-
tors facilitates this process, and local stores
complete the chain by offering what migrants
seek at a convenient price and in a wide range
of varieties. A migrant consumes an average
of US$1000 per year in nostalgic food and
crafts. Migrants are not the only consumers
of these goods, and their demand serves as a
catalyst for the promotion of these goods to
a wider market, thereby helping to integrate
their country to the international economy.
Clearly, together with remittances, hometown
associations and family linkages back home,
this component of cultural capital constitutes
an important building block for transnational
economic transactions and relationships chan-
nelled through migration.
As these are non-traditional exports, they rep-
resent only a small portion of total exports,
but they are the most consumed products
of their own diaspora. On the supply side,
the providers are mainly small ethnic stores
stocked by an extensive network of domestic
and international distributors. These ethnic
stores are closely connected with the commu-
nities they serve and, while introducing more
modern management and administrative prac-
tices, they remain close to their clients and
have traditional marketing approaches. Often
the owners belong to a migrant group, which
indicates the importance of this sector for
employment as well. The study also identifes
areas for improvement in the functioning of
markets, imports and distribution of nostalgic
foodstuffs. These aspects should be further
researched in the cases of the major ACP di-
asporas in the Global North.
If we project with all due caution the study
estimates on nostalgic foodstuff and craft
consumption to the ACP migrants living in the
Global North, where the demand for nostalgic
foodstuffs and goods can be higher and costs
similar to those in the United States, the com-
bined nine million ACP migrants in the Global
North could spend nine billion dollars annually
on these products.
Two Case-Studies: Analysing Migrant Capital
Flows in two Intra-ACP Mobility Corridors
This section attempts to provide two examples
of the application of the mobility corridor ap-
proach. At this stage in the development of
this tool, the analysis remains descriptive. The
analytical impact of the corridor approach can
beneft from the development of a composite
Mobility Index that includes all four migrant
capital fows.
99

A mobility-corridor should be considered a
unit of analysis that can, frst, help shed light
on the mobility dynamic between two coun-
tries where there is a critical mass of migrant
capital fows (whether remittances, social net-
works, professional and student mobility, or
cultural capital), and that can, secondly, pro-
vide the basis for comparison with other coun-
tries and regions of the ACP Group to highlight
differences and similarities in order to inform
a regional approach. It is a research method
that, considering the paucity of data, can help
provide information about mobility patterns in
less important mobility corridors that present
similar characteristics by promoting intra-re-
gional and inter-regional comparisons. It can
also be used to facilitate the transition from a
security to a human development approach
to migration by focusing on ways in which mo-
bility and migrant resources can be improved
and bottlenecks eliminated. Finally, the cor-
ridor approach also allows for monitoring of
migration-related hotspots and tipping points
that can be targeted by quick policy responses
based on comparisons with similar hotspots
and tipping points in other ACP regions.
Case 1: The Haiti-Dominican Republic
Mobility Corridor
An important mobility corridor in the ACP
Group is the one between Haiti and the Do-
minican Republic. It has been widely studied
and there is enough qualitative and quantita-
tive information that can be used. This cor-
ridor is about a century old, and is historically
linked to the importation of Haitians workers
by the Dominican sugar cane industry.
One would expect that most phases of the mi-
106
gratory project (preparation, departure, ar-
rival, integration, family reunifcation, socio-
economic inclusion, political participation,
and return) and their related policy measures
would have been suffciently tried and tested.
Instead, this corridor still presents the char-
acteristics of a recent corridor, where issues
of integration and social cohesion have not
yet been addressed, and where other meas-
ures to enhance the utilisation of migrants
resources have been limited. A closer look at
its characteristics, together with the identi-
fcation of major migration-related tipping
points and human mobility hotspots, is pre-
sented in Figure 1.
This mobility corridor involves an estimated
380,000 to 510,000 Haitians living in the Do-
minican Republic, or about 5 per cent of the
total population. This migrant groups human
capital formation in terms of education and
skills is rather low, chiefy supplying the ag-
ricultural and construction sectors. Few Hai-
tians have degrees from home or are studying
in Dominican universities.
Haitian migrants send more than half of their
remittances through family and friends, or
through offcial channels costing as much as
6 per cent to 27 per cent of the amount re-
mitted. Due to the high level of informality in
the transfers, data on remittances from the
Dominican Republic to Haiti are based on esti-
mates, and range widely from US$33 to US$350
million per year.
There is a lack of consistent data, remittance
transfers are mostly informal, and objective
constraints include a discriminatory labour
market and diffculties in moving up the skills
ladder. There is an organised Haitian-Domin-
ican civil society, but its advocacy work has
yielded only partial results; cultural exchang-
es are very limited despite the presence of
a vibrant music industry and carnival in both
countries.
As has been mentioned, this mobility corri-
Fig. 1 - The haiti-dominican republic mobility-Corridor
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dor is about a century old, yet the main chal-
lenge for both countries is still improving the
protection of migrants, whether documented
or undocumented, and whether born in Do-
minican territory to Haitian descendents or
recently arrived. Similarly, active labour mar-
ket policies targeting migrants or Dominican-
Haitian descendents are lacking, and meas-
ures to increase formal remittances transfers
are non-existent. Intercultural dialogue is
limited by negative perceptions among the
Dominican population. All of these elements
indicate that both governments have relied
upon market forces to smooth out issues re-
lated to integration, cohesion and inclusion,
or at best have implemented reactive policies
in moments of crisis. The actual contributions
to development of this mobility to both Haiti
and the Dominican Republic have yet to be ex-
plored. Historical and sociological research on
transborder fows of capital, goods and labour
and the formation of the border in the island,
have shown the establishment of sub-corridors
at the border areas with their own dynamics,
when we can clearly identify important mobil-
ity hotspots to be monitored.
100
A more detailed and systematic analysis of this
corridor expanding upon the analysis pro-
vided here could surely provide support to
policy formulation by both governments, and
assist the donor community in improving the
potential benefts of migration and mobility
on either side of the island. For example, the
World Bank, in its Dominican Republic Poverty
Assessment, has identifed among policies
to be considered for poverty alleviation the
regularisation of Haitian migrants using a mix
of temporary and longer-term work permits on
the basis of further analysis of its impact on
rural and urban labour markets and drawing
lessons from international experiences such as
the migration policy framework agreed by Cos-
ta Rica and Nicaragua.
101
Interestingly, in the
case of the Haiti-Dominican Republic mobil-
ity corridor, migration policy is proposed as a
measure for poverty reduction, together with
intervention in crucial sectors such as health
and education, which otherwise could miss the
importance of the impact of Haitian migration
on demographics and service demand.
Case 2: The Zimbabwe-South Africa
Mobility Corridor
Another example of a well established mobil-
ity corridor is the case of migration between
Zimbabwe and South Africa. The research car-
ried out by the South Africa Migration Project
(SAMP) and other specialised research centres
provides enough data to analyse this corridor
(Figure 2).
This corridor originally arose due to the de-
mand for workers by South Africas mining in-
dustry. Recently, migration between these two
countries has taken a new direction, frst be-
cause the end of the apartheid regime in South
Africa has attracted skilled workers from the
region seeking jobs in a booming economy and
secondly, because the political and economic
crisis in Zimbabwe has generated signifcant
fows of people seeking to meet their basic
needs. It is estimated that the Zimbabwean
community in South Africa numbers between
800,000 and one million people.
Historically, the mining and agriculture sec-
tors in South Africa have been dependent on
foreign labour migrating from neighbouring
countries. However, when the apartheid racial
laws were in force, migrants were mainly un-
documented and were only tolerated because
of the need to maintain a cheap supply of hu-
man resources. This situation generated a high
proportion of non-citizens with no rights, de-
spite having been in the country for genera-
tions. Even with the end of apartheid in the
mid-nineties, migrants did not obtain greater
freedoms and continued adapting to the new
reality.
The latest census in South Africa (2001), in-
dicated a total of 477,000 foreign-born resi-
dents, which was then corrected to an esti-
mated 500,000 to 850,000 migrants. According
to the 2007 Community Survey conducted by
the South African Statistics Agency, the total
number of foreign-born residents is over 1.2
million, or 2.8 per cent of the total popula-
tion. It is not clear whether this increase was
108
due to improved data collection methods, or
to the crisis in Zimbabwe. The exact number
of Zimbabweans in South Africa is not certain,
and fgures are often driven by ideological in-
terests. Despite the census results indicating
1.2 million foreign born residents, some claim
that as many as two to three million Zimba-
bweans now live in South Africa.
A closer look at the human mobility patterns
between Zimbabwe and South Africa from a
resource perspective indicates that there
have been few measures to address old and
new challenges. Until 2000, the majority of
Zimbabweans were young job seekers, with
secondary and tertiary educations, migrating
alone in order to send remittances back home.
More recently, the economic and political cri-
sis in Zimbabwe has pushed many people to
seek food and basic health care, including
larger percentages of women, children and
the elderly. This has modifed the previous
composition of migrant labour, but it did not
lead to new welfare interventions until needs
had reached a crisis point in specifc locations
(such as the border area during the mid-2008
crisis). Newly-arrived migrants are in an ex-
tremely vulnerable situation, and welfare sup-
port is mainly provided by Zimbabwes organ-
ised civil society.
Generally, Zimbabweans have a higher level
of education compared to South Africans,
and have linguistic abilities that favour their
insertion to the hospitality sector. However,
despite the need for qualifed labour in South
Africa, few efforts have been made by public
and private employers to provide Zimbabwean
migrants with opportunities.
Remittance estimates indicate that the equiv-
alent of US$289 to US$360 million is being sent
from South Africa to Zimbabwe. Transfer costs
range from 9 per cent in the case of money
transfer operators to 19 per cent through com-
mercial banks. Only 2 per cent of migrants
send remittances via offcial channels.
Cultural exchanges between the two countries
are very limited, and general perceptions in
Fig. 2 - The Zimbabwe-South Africa mobility-Corridor
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South Africa about migrants, and Zimbabwe-
ans in particular, are negative. Xenophobic
attacks against foreigners particularly Zim-
babweans point to a tense relationship, al-
though migration and migrants were not nec-
essarily the driving factors behind the attacks
in May 2008.
Preliminary Conclusion
The Zimbabwe-South Africa and Haiti-Domini-
can Republic mobility corridors are examples
that highlight the need to study contemporary
migrant resources exchanged between each of
the countries, as well as the structural factors
that affect the accumulation and mobilisation
of such resources, including the lack of wel-
fare policies and labour market policies, a lag-
ging formal remittance transfer market that
could create important multiplier effects for
the economy, and biased public perceptions of
migrants.
In the case of the Haiti-Dominican Republic
corridor, half the population sends remittances
through formal channels. Although this is quite
low given that migration from Haiti dates back
at least a century, it indicates a certain famili-
arity with money transfer operators and banks
that could be further exploited to increase the
level of bank utilisation by migrant communi-
ties, while at the same time reducing transfer
costs. In the case of Zimbabwean migrants,
very few use money transfer operators, indi-
cating that opening new branches and offces
would not be enough to improve the fow of
migrants economic capital, unless migrants
familiarity and fnancial literacy were to be
augmented.
Zimbabwean migrants to South-Africa are a
more heterogeneous group in terms of skills
and education compared to Haitians in the
Dominican Republic, yet neither country has
labour market policies favouring the employ-
ment of migrant groups or on-the-job techni-
cal and professional training. In the case of
the Dominican Republic, the lack of proactive
labour market policies has led to slower tech-
nical progress in the agriculture sector, since
entrepreneurs rely on an unlimited supply of
unskilled migrant labour. Meanwhile, in South
Africa, proactive recruitment measures for
Zimbabwean skilled migrants have not been
introduced to replenish the skills gap produced
by the brain drain of native professionals.
The potential for further developing the mobil-
ity described in these two examples is rather
obvious, if the issues emerging from the analy-
sis of mobility corridors were to be addressed
in a more systematic and coherent manner.
Recent measures that attempt to regularise
Zimbabwean migration to South Africa are a
positive indication of the South African gov-
ernments more proactive attitude.
Notes
1 - I am grateful to Susanne Melde for suggesting this
point during the peer review process.
2 - Pieke Frank N., Nicholas Van Hear, Anna Lindley
(2005)
3 - Sassen Saskia (2003)
4 - The Global Care Chain phenomenon is illustrated,
for example, in the Dominican women who go into
domestic work in Spain and the Haitian women who
come to take up care tasks in their households in the
DR. See, for example, (INSTRAW 2006).
5 - Adams, Richard H. Jr. (2006); Adams, Richard H.
Jr., Alfredo Cuecuecha, John Page (2008)
6 - Gubert Flore (2006)
7 - The description of this case is taken from: Gallina
Andrea (2008)
8 - Dodson B.. H. Simelane, D. Tevera, T. Green, A.
Chikanda and F. de Vletter (2008)
9 - Ibidem
10 - The description of the three cases of fnancial
products linked to remittances (Jijenge, Adopem and
Fonkoze) used in this chapter are taken from: Gallina
Andrea (2008)
11 - http://www.cgap.org/direct/docs/case_studies/
EBS.pdf
12 - http://www.mfnetwork.org/members/equity_
building_society.html; http://www.seepnetwork.org/
fles/2084_Equity_Mobile_Banking_Unit_Coetzee_et_
al.1.doc.
13 - OBMICA (2009)
14 - Connell John (2003)
15 - Connell John, Richard P.C. Brown (2005)
16 - Voigt-Graf Carmen (2008)
110
17 - zden alar and Maurice Schiff (2006)
18 - Clemens M. and G. Pettersson (2007) New Data
on African Health Professionals Abroad, Working Paper
No. 95, February 2007, Washington, DC. Centre for
Global Development. The developed countries (and
year of census) are: France 1999; US 2000; Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and
United Kingdom 2001. However, one should be cau-
tious in analyzing these fgures since it is impossible
to tell how many of these health care workers were
educated in the destination country.
19 - Ibidem
20 - Ibidem
21 - Shaw William (2007) p. 25.
22 - Hunzinger Laurence (2007)
23 - Thomas K.J.A. (2009)
24 - Amin M. and Aaditya Mattoo (2007)
25 - World Bank (2009b)
26 - Ibidem
27 - Ibidem
28 - Nurses in the Caribbean write a common fnal
nursing examination referred to as the Regional Nurs-
ing Examination.
29 - Little L. and J. Buchan (2007) p. 7.
30 - Hewitt H. (2004)
31 - Salmon M.E., J. Yan, H. Hewitt, and V. Guisinger
(2007)
32 - Ibidem
33 - HRSA (2002)
34 - Canadian Nurse Association (2002) p. 70.
35 - Docquier F. and H. Rapoport (2008)
36 - Gibson J. and D. McKenzie (2009)
37 - Haour-Knipe Mary and Anita Davies (2008)
38 - Voigt-Graf Carmen (2008)
39 - World Health Organization (2006)
40 - zden alar and Maurice Schiff (2006)
41 - See for example Putnam Robert D. (1993); Portes
Alejandro (1998); Bourdieu Pierre (1983); Collier Paul
(1998)
42 - Massey, DS, Arango, J, Hugo, G, Kouaouci, A, Pel-
legrino, A & Taylor, JE (1998); Guarnizo L. and M.P.
Smith (1998)
43 - Aguilera Michael B., Massey Douglas S. (2003)
44 - Orozco Manuel (2006); Newland K. (2004); Durand
Jorge, William Kandel, Emilio A. Parrado and Douglas
S. Massey (1996); COMPAS (2004)
45 - Orozco Manuel and Rebecca Rouse (2007)
46 - Ibidem
47 - Ibidem
48 - http://www.akinamamawaafrika.org/
49 - Mohanty Manoranjan (2006)
50 - Among the various initiatives there are: the Unit-
ed Nations Digital Diaspora Network for the Carib-
bean and the Digital Diaspora Network for Africa,
established by the UN ICT Task Force in 2003 and 2002.
These are mechanisms used by expatriates working in
the high-tech sector to help diaspora members jump-
start information and communication technologies
initiatives in their home region. http://www.un-gaid.
org/. The World Bank African Diaspora Initiative is an
important step towards the engagement of the highly
skilled diaspora. The various actions of the Initiative
aim to use lending instruments to fnd ways of engag-
ing the diaspora in the design and implementation of
the on-going and planned portfolio of World Bank-
assisted projects, as well as to work with diaspora
organizations and professionals, donor agencies and
African governments to share knowledge and improve
communications among and between all parties with
the objective of enhancing diaspora contributions to
development. The initiative aims to establish a da-
tabase of diaspora development expertise that can
be tapped by international and regional development
agencies. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT-
DIASPORA/Resources/African_Diaspora_Program-Ac-
tion_Points.pdf, visited on 25 August 2010. The United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) also
established the African Information Society Initiative
(AISI) in 1996 with the aim of harnessing the poten-
tial contribution of the diaspora in improving ICT and
knowledge in Africa.
51 - Interview to Margaret Kilo, Head of Fragile States
Unit, African Development Bank, at the AfDBs Annual
Meetings Side Event Mobilizing the African Diaspo-
ra for Capacity Building and Development: Focus on
Fragile States, on 25 May 2010 in Abidjan, available
at: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/
interview-the-african-diaspora-does-not-have-to-re-
locate-to-the-continent-in-order-to-contribute-to-its-
development-magaret-kilo-ofsu-head-6946/ visited
on 26 August 2010.
52 - Vezzoli Simona (2009)
53 - Mazzucato V., M. Kabki (2009)
54 - Maphosa France (2005)
55 - UNDP (2010)
56 - Mbong Magdaline Mai (2006)
111
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57 - Singh Anand and Kombi Sausi (2010)
58 - Antwi Bosiakoh Thomas (2009)
59 - Development Research Centre on Migration
(2008)
60 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-
ment during the peer review process.
61 - http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/wsis/docu-
ments/KampalaDeclaration.pdf
62 - http://cit.aed.org/forecast_sudan.htm
63 - http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTDIASPORA/0,,contentMD
K:22636820~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSit
ePK:4246098,00.html, visited on 26 August 2010. Ac-
cording to the blurb on the website This database
will capture the diverse talents, skills and experienc-
es of professionals throughout the global African di-
aspora, so that they may be utilized to further Africas
development agenda. Every year, innumerable young,
educated Africans leave home to seek their fortunes
abroad. Most of these immigrants never return home,
though their abilities and knowledge are a priceless
commodity that, if leveraged correctly, could contrib-
ute signifcantly to the development of their home
countries. In addition to this group, millions of people
of African descent, located in communities around the
world, are actively seeking ways to re-engage with
their ancestral homes in Africa.
64 - A well documented experience is Afford, the Af-
rican Foundation for Development, at: http://www.
afford-uk.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=v
iew&id=25&Itemid=43
An interesting initiative is the Chilean Disapora net-
work Chile Global, http://www.chileglobal.org/
and the recent private sector-led Emerging Diaspora
Market initiative, which was discussed in New York
as a private sector-led venture aimed at connecting
the global investment community with opportunities
that originate at the diaspora level. (See Report on
the Seminar on Emerging Diaspora Markets [EDM]:
Can they be Stimulated to Fuel Capital Flow between
Developed and Developing, 1 June 2009, New York
UN Headquarters.http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/documents/gaid/unpan035147.pdf.
65 - Gueron Joseph, Anne Marie Spevacek (2008)
66 - According to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the creative indus-
tries are cycles of creation, production and distribu-
tion of goods and services that use creativity and in-
tellectual capital as primary inputs; constitute a set
of knowledge-based activities, focused on but not
limited to arts, potentially generating revenues from
trade and intellectual property rights; comprise tan-
gible products and intangible intellectual or artistic
services with creative content, economic value and
market objectives; are at the cross-road among the
artisan, services and industrial sectors; and constitute
a new dynamic sector in world trade. UNCTAD (2008)
67 - Ibidem
68 - Ibidem
69 - Ibidem
70 - African Union (2005)
71 - The results of the ongoing TNMundi Research
Project on Diaspora as Social and Cultural Practice:
a Study of Transnational Networks across Europe and
Africa coordinated by Prof. Ulrike Meinhof at South-
ampton University should be monitored in this regard.
The project aims to gain an understanding of the in-
terconnection between cultural and social engage-
ment of groups /associations within civil society, in-
cluding those of (post-)migrant cultural practitioners
themselves, and to evaluate their impact on a variety
of cultural, social, political and ecological factors
within countries of settlement and of origin (http://
www.tnmundi.com/).
72 - The Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa is an
independent pan-African non-governmental organisa-
tion aiming to enhance the development of national
cultural policies in the region and their integration in
human development strategies through advocacy and
promotion of information exchanges, research, capac-
ity building and cooperation at the regional and inter-
national levels. http://ocpa.irmo.hr/index-en.html,
visited on 19 August 2010.
73 - Nurse Keith (2006b)
74 - Nurse Keith (2006c)
75 - A similar analysis could be made of the sports
industry. It is estimated that over six hundred Do-
minicans play professional baseball in the US, Canada,
Venezuela, Mexico and Japan, and an undetermined
number of track and feld athletes and football and
cricket players, coaches and trainers originating in
the Anglophone Caribbean work in the United States.
Nurse Keith (2006) Diaspora, Migration and Develop-
ment in the Caribbean, Focal Policy Paper, 04-6.
76 - http://www.carlowafricanflmfestival.com/in-
dex.html visited on 10 July 2010.
112
77 - http://liafa.org/default.aspx visited on 10 July
2010.
78 - www.afrisson.com/ visited on 10 July 2010.
79 - Project partners include Zone Franche (interna-
tional network), FestNapuan Association (Vanuatu),
Busara Promotions (Tanzania), Harmonia (Cape Verde,
responsible for the organization of the Kriol Jazz Fes-
tival), Umane Culture (Burkina Faso), Sakifo Produc-
tion (Reunion), Afrikaktion (Gabon), Conseil Fran-
cophone de la Chanson (international network) and
Media, Sports and Entertainment (Jamaica).
80 - http://www.womex.com/realwomex/
main.php?id_headings=122&id_realwomex=12, visited
on 18 August, 2010.
81 - http://www.wasafri.org/, visited on 10 July
2010.
82 - UNCTAD (2008)
83 - http://www.manukau.govt.nz/EN/Yourcommu-
nity/Arts/Artevents/2010ManukauPacifcArtsSummit/
Pages/Home.aspx, visited on 15 July 2010.
84 - http://pacifcarts.org, visited on 15 July 2010.
85 - http://www.migrationmuseums.org/web/index.
php?page=Network.
86 - http://www.moadsf.org/about/index.html vis-
ited on 15 July 2010.
87 - http://www.100pour100culture.com/, visited on
17 August 2010.
88 - I am grateful to Dr Bridget Wooding for this com-
ment during the peer review process.
89 - Kamdem Pierre (2008)
90 - Ouallet Anne and Diama Cissouma Togola (2008)
Festivals et patrimoine au Mali: quels enjeux pour le
dveloppement culturel? Actes du colloque interna-
tional. Le dveloppement culturel: un avenir pour les
territoires? Nmes, avril 2008 3e rendez-vous de Gog-
raphie culturelle, Ethnologie et Etudes culturelles en
Languedoc-Roussillon.
91 - The frst Carifesta, Carifesta 72, was held in
Guyana in 1972 and brought together writers, artists,
musicians, dancers, poets, and other creative peo-
ple from more than 30 Caribbean and Latin American
countries. The audiences included visitors from other
Caribbean countries, the United States, Europe, and
other parts of the world. Carifesta 72 was a celebra-
tion and a showcase of the ethnic, racial, and cultural
diversity that is the hallmark of the Caribbean. It was
inspirational and left a legacy of education and com-
munity development. This orientation and spirit have
marked the nine Carifestas that have followed since
1972Jamaica (1976), Cuba (1979), Barbados (1981),
Trinidad and Tobago (1992), Trinidad and Tobago
(1995), St. Kitts and Nevis (2000), Suriname (2003,
and Trinidad and Tobago (2006).
http://www.guyfolkfest.org/carifestax2008.htm, vis-
ited on 18 August 2010.
92 - http://www.guyfolkfest.org/carifestax2008.htm
93 - UNCTAD Newsletter No 3 / August 2006: http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctabmiscnews03_en.pdf
visited on 15 July 2010.
94 - http://www.biennaledakar.org/2010/ visited on
16 July 2010.
95 - http://www.pima-museum.com, visited on 18 Au-
gust 2010.
96 - http://www.krioljazzfestival.com/index2.php,
visited on 18 August 2010.
97 - Nurse Keith (2006a).
98 - USAID (2008)
99 - The ACP Group of States Mobility Index is under
construction. The report makes a frst attempt to de-
fne some of the main variables and indicators.
100 - Moya Pons Frank (1992) in Lozano 1992 and Dilla
Haroldo y Sobeida de Jess Cedano (2007).
101 - World Bank (2006)
This chapter is about potential solutions to the main challenges
identifed in the Report. The chapter proposes operational
recommendations regarding measures that can potentially improve the
positive impacts of mobility on human development for the ACP Group
of States Secretariat, and can also be of use to the ACP countries
governments and the regional and international organizations working on
migration
issues in ACP countries.
iNdiCATiONS FOr pOLiCiES
ANd prOJECTS
ChApTEr 5
Istockphotos
Istockphotos
Lai-momo
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ChApTEr 5
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iNdiCATiONS FOr pOLiCiES ANd prOJECTS
Implications for the ACP Group of
States Secretariat
The complexity of migration and mobility
dynamics in the ACP Group of States is enor-
mous. However, there are some stylised facts
that can help the international development
community, regional organisations and individ-
ual governments set the agenda for the next
decade of work in this area.
The indications for policies discussed in this
chapter are based on statistics, dialogue with
academics, members of think tanks and civil
society, and a thorough review of the exist-
ent literature. This section of the Report also
proposes concrete projects and programmes,
and key entry points for policies enhancing the
positive linkage between mobility and migra-
tion.
1
These are not blueprint prescriptions
that ft all countries and contexts, but rather
indications on the gaps and challenges to be
addressed as a priority at the various levels of
the policy arena.
1 - South-South mobility (intra-ACP) needs to
be further investigated in order to improve
understanding of mobility in ACP countries.
The lack of data on annual fows of migrants
between countries and the presence of signif-
cant inconsistencies in the existing datasets on
migrants stocks are important factors that lim-
it analysis. However, there is strong evidence
that South-South migration represents the bulk
of mobility for Sub-Sahara African countries,
whereas South-North mobility is much more
important in the Caribbean and the Pacifc.
Nevertheless, in all three regions there are im-
portant South-South corridors that could bene-
ft from further research, especially in the light
of recent agreements on the free movement of
people, with a view toward carrying out a cost-
beneft analysis of migrant capitals fows.
2 - The mobility corridor approach to the
analysis of the migration and development
linkages enhances the focus of the analysis
and allows for monitoring important migra-
tion hotspots and tipping points. Flows of
key migrant resources such as economic, so-
cial, human and cultural capital can be better
understood by focusing the analysis on main
mobility corridors. These corridors refect new
and old migration trends and therefore can
mirror a signifcant set of challenges, instead
of focusing on an individual countrys migra-
tion pattern towards the rest of the world. It
is thus a cost-effective research methodology
that can be adopted for both quantitative and
qualitative analysis. This approach is an exten-
sion of the remittances corridor approach to
other migrant resources. It could beneft from
the development of statistical indexes that
help achieve a multidimensional perspective
on the linkage between migration and devel-
opment that goes beyond the matter of remit-
tances. This approach can also assist in fnding
solutions to the lack of comparable data across
countries, and provide the framework for
drawing comparisons between corridors. The
This chapter is about potential solutions to the main challenges identifed
in the Report. The chapter proposes operational recommendations regard-
ing measures that can potentially improve the positive impacts of mobility
on human development for the ACP Group of States Secretariat, and can
also be of use to the ACP countries governments and the regional and in-
ternational organizations working on migration issues in ACP countries.
116
corridor approach also allows for monitoring
migration-related hotspots and tipping points.
The role of the Intra-ACP Migration Observa-
tory is going to be pivotal in coming years.
Efforts should not be spared to coordinate
with key knowledge organizations such as the
World Bank. The mobility corridor approach
can be further explored by the Observatory by
appraising and strengthening existing research
capacities at the ACP region level and by iden-
tifying ongoing projects, methodological ap-
proaches and initiatives that can be coordi-
nated and harmonised in a common ACP Group
approach to migration and mobility studies.
3 - Enhancing policy dialogue with regional
organisations and the European Union in
order to stimulate development-friendly
migration policies. Once the positive link-
age between migration and development is
acknowledged, it is necessary to introduce
migration policies in source and destination
countries that favour human mobility and
hence address the obstacles to the circulation
of migrant capital.
For example, circular migration schemes for
unskilled workers consist of migration policies
that can have a positive impact on develop-
ment. Similarly, incentives to return for skilled
migrants are another type of development-
friendly migration policy. Liberalising the cir-
culation of artists, musicians and other profes-
sionals of the culture sector can promote the
cultural industry of a country and therefore is
also development-friendly.
Another important, albeit controversial policy,
is the regularization of undocumented / ille-
gal migrants. Regularization can be a powerful
poverty alleviation tool, insofar as migration
can be an important social protection scheme
for those left behind. It must be made clear
that it is advisable to avoid using funds origi-
nally allocated to poverty reduction measures
for migration management. Instead, specifc
budget lines for migration management poli-
cies that are pro-development should be in-
stitutionalized in the government annual and
multi-annual budgets of ACP countries.
4 - Enhancing policy dialogue with regional
organisations and the European Union with a
view toward stimulating migration-friend-
ly development policies. Development poli-
cies can be introduced to improve conditions
for better utilisation of the migrants capital.
Therefore, specifc development policies can
be designed that enhance the positive impact
of migration.
For example, cutting remittance transfer costs
and improving remittance market transpar-
ency and competition are migration-friendly
development policies.
Policies promoting the introduction of infor-
Box 5.1 Strengthening the Impact of
migration in the Caribbean by protecting
Migrants Rights
The CARICOM Agreement on Social Secu-
rity (CASS) signed by the member states
in Georgetown, Guyana, on 1 March 1996
protects pension rights and provides equal
treatment in the case of select pension
rights for workers moving between CARI-
COM member states. The benefts covered
include contributory pensions for invalid-
ity, disablement, old age and survivor and
death benefts. Short-term benefts (like
maternity allowances or sickness benefts)
are not included. Instead, the broader
Convention on Social Security in the OECS
(Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States)
covers both short and long-term benefts.
Under this agreement, contributions regu-
lated by the OECS convention on social
security are always totalised, including
cases in which the worker qualifes in one
or more OECS member states. There are
also bilateral agreements on social security
signed between Caribbean states and the
UK, Canada and Quebec.
Source: ACP (2009) Background Paper for the III
Global Forum on Migration and Development,
Roundtable 2, Migrant Integration, Reintegration
and Circulation for Development, ACP/28/011/09,
Brussels, 28 October 2009 PAHD Dept.
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mation and communication technologies in
emigration areas are important measures that
can help increase the exchange of informa-
tion between migrants and those left behind.
This can help to strengthen ties with home
and share important knowledge on migration
routes, costs and conditions in host countries,
as well as information on investment opportu-
nities back home.
Development policies that promote interna-
tional cultural events and festivals are also mi-
gration-friendly since they promote the export
of cultural items that can beneft both domes-
tic and diaspora production. This sector is par-
ticularly important since it can help improve
intercultural dialogue and reduce xenophobia.
Within this group of development policies the
most important is most likely the one that ad-
dresses the human capital formation of mi-
grants. Migrants are often trapped into seg-
ments of the market that do not correspond
to their actual skills (brain waste), which in
turn reduces their capacity to enjoy the full
benefts of mobility, while their relatives and
children are penalized by lack of safety nets,
access to education and health. Therefore, so-
cial protection of migrants regardless of their
status is key to reducing losses during the mi-
gration process (reduced remittances due to
untapped skills for example, or reduced re-
turns from education which in turn translate
into lower wages and thus less remittances),
and at the same time accelerate and improve
the migrants inclusion into the host country
labour market (ameliorating social capital
formation and reducing social stigmatisation,
while increasing earnings).
Social protection policies can also improve
migrant childrens access to education and
health, and/or augment the portability or
transferability of migrant pensions. Although
measures concerning generalised education
and access to health for migrants are contro-
versial because they introduce an affrmative
action, their importance for the development
of both the country of destination and of ori-
gin is signifcant. In this regard, more research
is needed on the processes of social exclu-
sion of migrants as a group and the cost of
said exclusion. The approach to the analysis
of horizontal inequalities proposed by Frances
Stewart can yield important results as regards
advancing the understanding of inter-group in-
equalities and thus improving the targeting of
social protection policies.
In cooperation with the World Bank, DRC Sus-
sex has identifed four essential components
of social protection for international migrants.
These include: i) access to formal social pro-
tection regimes in host countries; ii) the port-
ability (or transferability) of migrants pension
benefts across international borders; iii) the
existence of safe and fair labour market condi-
tions for migrants in host countries; and iv) the
migrants access to social networks, which are
an informal but often important means of social
protection, especially among migrants moving
from one developing country to another.
2
A good example is the CARICOM Agreement on
Social Security (CASS), signed by the member
states in Georgetown, Guyana on 1 March 1996,
which protects pension rights and provides
equal treatment for workers moving between
CARICOM member states (see Box 5.1).
The benefts covered include contributory
pensions for disability, disablement, old age,
and survivor and death benefts. Short-term
benefts (such as maternity allowances or
sickness benefts) are not included. Instead,
the broader Convention on Social Security in
the OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean
States) covers both short and long-term ben-
efts. Under this agreement, contributions
regulated by the OECS convention on social
security are always totalised, including cases
in which the worker qualifes in one or more
OECS member state. There are also bilateral
agreements on social security signed between
Caribbean states and the UK, Canada and Que-
bec. However, there is no agreement between
the US and any Caribbean country, despite the
fact that the US is by far the main destination
of Caribbean migrants.
The creation of migrant welfare schemes is an-
other migration-friendly development policy.
Migrant source countries such as Bangladesh,
118
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India and
Thailand, have created migrant welfare funds
that serve as a safety net for protecting their
migrants, especially those in particularly vul-
nerable situations (domestic workers in Gulf
countries, for example, are targeted by these
measures). These funds provide a range of
services to migrants including pre-departure
orientation seminars, loans, emergency repa-
triation, life and medical insurance, and re-
integration assistance. Organizationally, there
are a variety of ways in which these funds are
managed. In Pakistan, this is a responsibility of
the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, while in
the Philippines the fund is managed by a spe-
cial government agency within the Department
of Labour and Employment. Welfare funds are
usually paid for by employers, recruitment
agencies, and/or the migrant workers. The
success of welfare funds has sparked new in-
terest by countries such as India to establish
funds that assist their workers abroad, such as
the one recently launched to assist migrants in
Gulf countries that are facing some distress.
Among the wide variety of existing welfare
funds, a closer look at the most elaborate
fund developed thus far, the Philippines Over-
seas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA),
serves to provide lessons and illustrate the
challenges faced in providing such migrant
protection services. The OWWA is fully funded
by a mandatory membership fee of US$25 per
contract for migrants going abroad as tempo-
rary workers. It can be obtained in two ways:
by enrolment upon processing of a contract at
the Philippine Overseas Employment Adminis-
tration (POEA) or by voluntary registration at a
job site overseas. Membership is valid until the
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) employment
contract expires. Ideally, the fee is paid for
by the employer or recruitment agency, but in
practice it is usually paid for by the migrant.
3

5 - Policy and institutional coherence are
areas to be further investigated since it
appears there are countervailing forces at
play. Policy incoherence in key felds such as
health, the fshing industry, agriculture and
trade must be addressed in a timely fashion.
Of particular concern is the exodus of ACP
skilled health workers moving to the Global
North. Measures to attract them back home
are rather limited and costly. Policy incoher-
ence between developed countries recruit-
ment measures (through better regulation of
private sector recruitment agencies) and de-
velopment aid assistance to support the health
sector in ACP countries should be penalised
with compensation measures for affected sec-
tors and groups.
Fishery agreements between developed coun-
tries and coastal ACP states need to be re-
viewed in light of previous negative experienc-
es that have displaced local jobs and indirectly
stimulated unauthorised migration fows. Oth-
er measures adversely affecting traditional,
labour-intensive sectors should be removed.
Negotiations and consensus-building among
various parties whose interests are not always
convergent is a key element in this process,
along with an increase in the fow of effec-
tive and relevant communication among mul-
tilateral institutions, aid agencies, foreign and
economic ministries and civil society. Mobility
should thus be included in the policy dialogue
agenda at regional, international and global
levels, and compensation mechanisms (po-
litical or economic) should be generated for
those who stand to lose, while identifying
complementarity and substitutability between
policy vectors.
Regarding specifcally ACP-EU relations, mul-
tilateral trade negotiations such as those
encompassed in the Economic Partnerships
Agreements represent an important opportu-
nity for addressing policy coherence regarding
development and worker mobility (GATS Mode
4), regardless of skill levels.
Policy and institutional coherence is also es-
sential to be built within ACP Government,
by establishing mechanisms that allow for
improved cooperation among ministries, sec-
tors and autonomous institutions involved in
migration management.
6 - Support the capacity-building process
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of ACP Governments and Regional Organi-
sations staff in addressing the multidi-
mensional aspects of the linkage between
mobility and development. The Intra-ACP
Migration Facility has an important role to
play in this area of policy. A set of ten rec-
ommendations are within reach of a substan-
tial capacity and institution-building program
such as the Intra-ACP Migration Facility, which
can target the ACP Groups governmental
staff, in order to: i) Address measures within
the framework of the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) and ACP-EU Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) negotiations related to the
fow of legal workers from ACP states, includ-
ing working conditions, employment portabil-
ity and remuneration, especially in line with
Article 13, Section 3 of the Cotonou Agree-
ment; ii) Address global economic transforma-
tions and crises in a proactive manner; labour
market policies and investment policies should
be specially targeted to deal with challenges
such as unstable world prices for raw mate-
rials, mutating multilateral agreements, and
unstable energy prices; iii) Ensure the ongoing
presence of stable personnel within and across
relevant organizations and ministries working
to integrate migration and development is-
sues into policies; iv) Assess, together with
the competent ACP authorities, the European
Commissions recommendations regarding the
development of ACP intra-regional markets in
the framework of the ongoing Economic Part-
nership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, and
introduce accompanying measures regarding
the movement of skilled and unskilled work-
ers; v) Link national and regional development
policies to migration patterns and the impact
of economic policies in developed countries
such as agricultural subsidies on the agricul-
tural sector in ACP States, which in turn have a
bearing on migration from rural to urban are-
as; vi) Manage borders and tackle the irregular
aspects of migration, particularly human traf-
fcking; vii) Design and implement preventive
measures and strategies to eradicate racial
discrimination, xenophobia, ethnocentrism
and related intolerance towards migrants; viii)
Address the burden that migration places on
the environmental and social services of ACP
states, especially with regard to the HIV/AIDS
pandemic; ix) Prepare for the new High-Level
Dialogue on International Migration in 2013,
and speed up implementation of the ACP Brus-
sels Plan of Action adopted for the purpose of
executing the Brussels Declaration; and fnally
and most importantly x) Improve the in-
tegration of mobility into Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and National Develop-
ment Plans and Strategies. This can be done in
the following practical ways: a) Insert a section
in the PRSP that provides information on the
development partners policy statements and
commitments to integrating the migration-de-
velopment nexus into development coopera-
tion and into each policy area (e.g. poverty re-
duction, business development, education); b)
Include a section of the PRSP with an analysis
of the major migration and development nexus
issues at various levels in the different sectors
and priority areas. Particular attention could
be paid to the link between poverty and the
environment (e.g. livelihood resources, envi-
ronmental degradation), as this contributes
to forced migration; c) Include the main fea-
tures of the countrys institutional, policy and
regulatory frameworks for migration into the
PRSP, thus contributing to identify weaknesses
and constraints as well as the means by which
to overcome them; d) Include segregated mi-
grant workforce data by sector, qualifcation,
gender, geographic distribution, and so on; e)
Include a section on the interventions related
to the migration and development nexus that
is to be addressed in cooperation with develop-
ment partners. The four types of migrant capi-
tal that constitute resources for development
economic, human, social and cultural can
provide a basis for identifying programmatic
actions; f) Institutionalise that these sections
of the PRSP and National Development Strate-
gies should be the specifc task of a Migration
and Mobility Focal Point. High-level support
for the focal points is needed in order to avoid
further administrative inertia in government
offces; g) Train Migration and Mobility Focal
120
Points on how to engage with diasporas and lo-
cal civil society in increasing the participatory
dimension of development policy formulation
and strengthen the civil society demand for
better migration governance.
7 - Support ongoing civil society initiatives
that enable migrant social, economic, cul-
tural and human capital accumulation and
mobilisation, as well as building capacity for
advocacy of the need to protect migrants.
There are many projects implemented by ACP
civil society which are specifcally oriented to-
wards creation and mobilisation in favour of
the development of migrant skills, knowledge,
contacts, and remittances. Projects involv-
ing an engaged diaspora have strong potential
for sustainability, compared to donor-driven
projects. However, current measures that
hinder the mobility of migrants engaged with
projects supporting their communities signif-
cantly slow down their implementation. Civil
society organisations in ACP countries often
have little or no knowledge on practices in
other countries and lack a strategic vision on
how to scale up their operations to higher lev-
els and thus infuence policy-making.
It is recommended that ACP Secretariat en-
gagement with civil society focus on build-
ing capacity and constituencies for reform.
Supply-side policy interventions can improve
by an enhanced demand-side of governance
and accountability. For example, second gen-
erations of PRSP cover consultations with civil
society, including diasporas. Supporting civil
society in making the consultations truly par-
ticipatory is an important area that can be fur-
ther explored.
Advocacy campaigns against xenophobia will
most likely yield better results if they are
strategically embedded in the social inclusion
policies of destination countries (for example
through affrmative action) as well as diaspora
dialogue and support policies in source coun-
tries.
The Way Forward: Towards a New MDG
The underlying assumption of this Report is
that mobility and migration can achieve their
full potential for development if freedom to
move 1) is considered a fundamental human
right; 2) does not affect the human develop-
ment of those that do not move; and 3) takes
place in a safe and orderly manner.
Based on this assumption, the ACP Group of
States Secretariat should strive to create a hu-
man mobility framework in which the benefts
outweigh the costs and in which fundamental
freedoms are respected.
Through ongoing policy dialogue, participation
at international and global fora, and based on
recent ACP Declarations on migration and de-
velopment, the ACP Group of States Secretar-
iat frmly holds to the position that policy and
institutional coherence can only be achieved
over the long term by creating an overarching
global consensus on mobility that views the
phenomenon frst and foremost as a livelihood
strategy.
If mobility truly contributes, as the ACP Group
believes it does, to improving peoples capa-
bilities as much as do education and health
which are key to expanding individual choices
so that lives worth living can be lived then
the inclusion of Free and Secure Human Mo-
bility for All as Millennium Development Goal
No.9 needs to be considered, as a response to
this as yet unexplored dimension of develop-
ment. No effort to build international consen-
sus on this point should be spared.
Notes
1 - There are two important documents in this area
that should be utilised by practitioners and policy
makers in the feld of migration and development: ARS
Progetti (2007) The linkage between migration and de-
velopment. Operational implications for programming
and project development, Final Report, EuropeAid,
2008, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/
infopoint/publications/europeaid/141a_en.htm and
the ARS Progetti (2007) Reference Guide for the Eu-
ropean Commission on How to Integrate Migration in
Project and Programme planning, design and imple-
mentation, ARS Progetti: Rome.
2 - Development Research Centre (2008)
3 - Ruiz Neil G. and Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias (2008)
STATiSTiCAL ANNEx
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Table 2.4 ACP Emigration Towards the Global North
122
Table 2.5 - ACP Diasporas (Total and as Percentage of Population, 2007)
Source: own estimates based on migrant stocks from Sussex DRC Database 2007.
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Table - A1 Main Socio-Economic Indicators of ACP Countries According
to UN Geoscheme Classifcation of Macro-Regions
Source: UNDP (2009) Human Development Report, 2009, UNDP: New York.
124
Table A2 - Physicians Born in African Countries Appearing in
Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries Circa 2000
Source: Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson (2006), Medical Leave: A new database of health professional emigration from
Africa, CGD Note (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development). Centre for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org. For in-
dividual countries source see sources appendix. African sending countries show country of birth as recorded in the receiving-country
census. Receiving countries show country of residence at the time of the last census (France 1999; United States 2000; Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and United Kingdom 2001). The copyright to some of the data in this table is retained
by the source agency; see appendix for details before reproducing these data elsewhere. All data used here with written permission.
*Shows the number of physicians living in each sending country circa 2000. **Gives the number of professionals abroad as a fraction
of total professionals (domestic + abroad). There are 834 physicians born in one of the other eight receiving countries who appear
in the 2001 census of South Africa. This negative number thus represents a netting out term.
125
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Source: Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson (2006), Medical Leave: A new database of health professional emigration from Af-
rica, CGD Note (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development). Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org. For indi-
vidual countries sources see sources appendix. African sending countries show country of birth as recorded in the receiving-country
census. Receiving countries show country of residence at the time of the last census (France 1999; United States 2000; Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and United Kingdom 2001). The copyright to some of the data in this table is retained
by the source agency; see appendix for details before reproducing these data elsewhere. All data used here with written permission.
*Shows the number of physicians living in each sending country circa 2000. **Gives the number of professionals abroad as a fraction
of total professionals (domestic + abroad). There are 261 professional nurses born in one of the other eight receiving countries who
appear in the 2001 census of South Africa. This negative number thus represents a netting out term.
Table A3 - Professional Nurses Born in African Countries Appearing
in Censuses of Nine Receiving Countries Circa 2000
126
Graph 3.8-3.13 - Female Migrants in ACP Countries as Share of Total, in 1960 and 2005
Source: own elaboration on UNDESA, 2009.
127
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Brain Drain, Brain Gain, Brain Waste
Brain drain: The phenomenon of large numbers of
educated and skilled persons leaving their coun-
try of origin to seek work in countries where their
skills can be used and be more highly remunerat-
ed in the labour market. Brain gain: Immigration
of talented and trained individuals from a third
country into the receiving country, or the return
of highly skilled migrants who can start projects
that beneft the country of origin. Brain waste:
This refers to skills mismatch. A typical example
is a highly skilled migrant who fnds a job in a
low-skill occupation. This process can lead to de-
skilling.
Circular migration
Circular migration: Any arrangements that make
it easier for migrants or former migrants to circu-
late, or travel back and forth between the country
of origin and the (former) country of residence.
[As defned by the EC in its COM (2005) 390 on
Migration and Development: Some concrete ori-
entations]. Temporary migration (temporary la-
bour migrants, also known as guest workers or
overseas contract workers): People who migrate
for a limited period in order to take up employ-
ment and send money home.
human development
Human Development is a development paradigm
that has to do with creating an environment in
which people can develop their full potential
and lead productive, creative lives in accordance
with their needs and interests. Development is
thus about expanding the choices people have to
lead lives that they value. Migration and mobility
are means of widening peoples range of choice,
thus allowing them to increase their capabilities
through resources accumulation.
international migrant
There is no universally accepted defnition of a
migrant. The term is usually understood as cov-
ering all cases where the decision to migrate is
taken freely by the individual concerned, for rea-
sons of personal convenience and without in-
tervention by an external compelling factor. The
term applies to persons and family members who
move to another country or region to better their
material or social conditions and improve pros-
pects for themselves or their family. A Migrant
Worker is defned by the UN Convention on the
Rights of Migrants as a person who is to be en-
gaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remu-
nerated activity in a State of which he or she is
not a national. Migrants consist of four main cat-
egories: (i) long-term immigrants (or emigrants);
(ii) short-term immigrants (or emigrants); (iii)
residents returning after (or leaving for) a pe-
riod working abroad; and (iv) nomads. Highly
skilled migrants are people with qualifcations
as managers, executives, professionals, techni-
cians or the like, who move within the internal
labour markets of transnational corporations and
international organisations, or seek employment
through international labour markets for scarce
skills. Many countries welcome such migrants and
have special skilled and business migration pro-
grams to encourage them to come.
Migrant Resources
The accumulation and mobilisation of the mi-
grants resources is the key factor for enhancing
the developmental dimensions of mobility. Mi-
grants possess at least four types of capital that
can constitute resources for development. Eco-
nomic capital: the monetary remittances of sav-
ings accumulated during the migratory process.
The infows and outfows of workers remittances
have macroeconomic implications. The infows
can have positive microeconomic implications on
consumption, savings and investment patterns.
The negative impact is associated with infation-
ary pressures, inequality, rent-seeking behaviour,
etc. Data about remittances is available for many
countries. Human capital: This refers to the
knowledge, technical and entrepreneurial skills
improved abroad that can be used upon return in
the home country. Human capitals positive im-
pact on human development can be measured in
terms of the return to country of origin by highly
skilled migrants. The negative side is associated
with the so-called brain-drain, i.e. the net loss of
public investments in education and research due
to migration. Data on return migration is often
not available. Social capital: The ties, networks,
associations, and trust developed during the mi-
gration project that increase the migrants access
128
to relevant information, facilities and resources,
and make them a possible transnational junction
between cultures, economies and societies. So-
cial capital can be measured in terms of back-
and-forth travel, accessibility to and the use of
communication channels, the number and types
of diaspora associations, and engagement in the
home communities. The negative impact of so-
cial capital is related to the creation of migrants
networks that lead to the depopulation of villag-
es and towns. Cultural capital: This refers to the
ideas, attitudes, values and artistic expressions
that are present in the migrants communities
and constitute important elements for bridging
different cultures, so that migration is perceived
not only as a way of improving economic situa-
tions but of encouraging cultural diversity. Cul-
tural capital can be measured in terms of cultural
events, festivals, and artistic productions by di-
asporas and return migrants, which also have an
economic and cultural dimension.
Migrants Civil Society and Non-State Actors
Diaspora: There is no single defnition of the
term diaspora. Nowadays diasporas are groups
of migrants residing and acting in host countries
but that maintain strong sentimental and mate-
rial ties to their countries of origin. Diaspora is
also defned as a migrant community made up
of persons with the nationality of the country of
origin and persons who have acquired the nation-
ality of the country of settlement. Informal and
community-based organizations: These organiza-
tions are not registered and rely on the mem-
bers spare time and private homes as distinct
from paid staff and rented offce space. Prima-
rily identity-based, they play an important role
and have direct and immediate impact on pov-
erty at the family and community levels. Home
town associations: Residents from the same town
or village migrating to the same locality in the
country of settlement commonly provide so-
cial support to migrants and economic support
to their places of origin. Migrants associations:
Registered non-proft associations. These are
typically founded by a group of migrants shar-
ing the same country of origin who join together
for a common purpose: to facilitate integration,
solidarity, cultural exchanges, etc. in the host
society. Migrant-led development NGOs or foun-
dations: Registered non-proft organizations or
chambers of commerce. Founded by a group of
migrants to support the diaspora in the country
of settlement and contribute to the development
of a country, with a broader geographical scope.
Confessional migrants associations: Formal or
informal, a group of people joined together by
a common faith and forms of worship. Umbrella
organizations / International solidarity organiza-
tions addressing migrant issues: Organized in na-
tional platforms, these bring together migrants
associations and networks. They are dedicated to
both integration issues in the country of settle-
ment and development activities in the country
of origin. Business networks: Acting as ethnic
chambers of commerce within the country of
settlement and/or with transnational links. They
can organize events to connect the diaspora with
businesses, and goods and services in their rel-
evant regions/countries.
migration and mobility
A process of moving, either across an internation-
al border or within a State. Migration and mobil-
ity refer to population movement, encompassing
any kind of movement of people, whatever its
length, composition and causes; it includes mi-
gration of refugees, displaced persons, uproot-
ed people, migrant workers and their families.
Internal migration or mobility refers to a move
from one area (a province, district or municipal-
ity) to another within one country. International
migration or mobility is a territorial relocation of
people between nation-states. Mobility is intro-
duced as an interchangeable concept having few-
er negative connotations than those sometimes
associated with migration. Forced migration: In
a broader sense, this includes not only refugees
and asylum seekers but also people forced to
move due to external factors, such as environ-
mental catastrophes or man-made causes. This
form of migration has characteristics similar to
displacement.
Migration and Mobility Corridors
As in other parts of the world, ACP human mo-
bility occurs within established migration cor-
ridors. The creation of migrant networks facili-
tates the fow of relevant information, reducing
risks and costs associated with travel. Migration
corridors are physical spaces inside which migrant
resources (human, social, economic and cultural
capital) move back and forth. The macro dynamic
of the migration corridor is reproduced at the mi-
129
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cro level, where people move from their home-
towns and settle in cities or towns in the country
of destination where migrant home communities
are stronger. The migration corridor is therefore
an important unit of analysis in research on the
nexus between migration and development. For
ACP countries, geographic proximity plays a very
important role, as do cultural and linguistic prox-
imity.
There are important development and social co-
hesion policy issues that should be considered
when using migration corridors as a unit of anal-
ysis. Furthermore, there will probably be more
chances to identify migrant organizations, pro-
viders of services for migrant communities, mon-
ey transfer operators, etc., when examining spe-
cifc corridors. Research on intra-ACP migration
is lacking, although quantitatively it is a more
important feld of research than North-South mi-
gration fows.
Remittances
Financial Remittances: The most commonly
used defnition of remittances is that of the IMF:
Workers remittances cover current transfers by
migrants who are employed in new economies
and considered residents there. The IMF (1996)
added that workers remittances are transfers
made by migrants who are employed by entities
in economies where the workers are considered
residents and that transfers by self-employed
migrants are not classifed as workers remit-
tances but as current transfers. Individual and
collective remittances: The bulk of remittances
are individual remittances, sent by individual
migrants. A smaller fraction is sent in the form
of collective remittances or donations by groups
of migrants through community or church as-
sociations. The latter form is often organized
through hometown associations (HTAs) consisting
of migrants from the same town or parish in the
home country, as well as other more or less or-
ganized groups, such as refugee groups, ethnic
professional groups or even virtual refugee or-
ganizations that use the internet to participate
in collective donations. In-kind remittances: In-
kind remittances are payments made on behalf
of relatives or friends in the home country (e.g.
school or medical bills), remittances in the form
of household goods (e.g. televisions, washing-
machines, etc.), and donations to origin-country
institutions. Often this sort of remittance is mis-
classifed as export revenue, tourism receipts,
and/or foreign direct investment (FDI) in the BOP
reports. Social remittances: Social remittances
are the ideas, practices, identities, and social
capital that are transmitted through the migra-
tion circuit. Social remittances are carried by
migrants and travellers or they are exchanged by
letter, video, or phone. They travel through well-
marked pathways be they formal or informal
organizational structures or during interpersonal
exchanges between individuals. Methodologies
by which to account for remittances in the bal-
ance of payments; the Technical Sub-Group (TSG)
defnition: The TSG has suggested replacing the
term workers remittances with the broader
concepts of personal transfers, personal remit-
tances and total remittances. The TSG agreed
on the following defnitions: Personal transfers:
Personal transfers would replace the current
concept of workers remittances and would
be defned as follows: Personal transfers are
all current transfers in cash or in-kind that are
made or received by resident households to or
from other non-resident households. Personal
transfers, therefore, include all current transfers
from resident to non-resident households, inde-
pendent of (a) the senders sources of income (be
they wages and salaries, social benefts or any
other type of transfers, including transfers from
a person receiving no income and running down
his/her assets); (b) the relationship between
households (be it between related or unrelated
persons); or (c) the purpose for which the trans-
fer is made (be it inheritance, alimony, lottery,
etc.). Consequently, this new component would
not be based on employment or migration status
and would resolve any inconsistencies associat-
ed with workers remittances. Personal remit-
tances: The TSG agreed to defne personal re-
mittances from the perspective of the receiving
country: Personal remittances = personal trans-
fers + net compensation of employees + capital
transfers between households. Total remittances
would thus include all transfers directly to house-
holds from other institutional sectors such as cor-
porations, government and non-proft institutions
serving households. The TSG considered this con-
cept policy-relevant. It noted that the concept
of total remittances entails irregular reporting,
since social benefts are sent by the government
and received by households.
130
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